The Indian Experiment:
Key to Asia's Future
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To
my Indian friends
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The generation that founded Asia has stepped down. In India Nehru is dead; in Indonesia Sukarno and in Burma U Nu have been deposed. Liu Chao-Chi, who was China's President till recently has become the object of a campaign of hatred. Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai are still living but the stability of the Chinese communist ranks which held out for thirty years, is shaken. Modern Asia's generation of founders has completed the liberation of their countries from foreign rule and laid the foundations for a new state. Many of the old problems, however, have remained. The fight against hunger, misery and want has not been won anywhere on the Asian mainland. With the exit of the founders the slogans which had dominated the Asian scene for a long time have lost their former meaning. Little, almost nothing, is to be heard of the fanfare which gathered the generation of founders in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955 for the first Afro-Asian conference. New ideas have matured with the new leaders. But nowhere is the Asian revolution a closed chapter. On the contrary, uncertainty has replaced the temporary stability almost everywhere. The outcome of the Indian elections of March 1971, nevertheless, gives a spark of hope. In India, at least the ruling party has regained strength after heavy factional infights. Indira Gandhi emerged as a real leader. Fourteen years have passed since that day in March, when Nehru had invited me with Gisela Bonn to the white mansion on Teen Murti Marg in the garden city of Delhi, which had once been the residence of the Commander in Chief of the
British Indian army and had then become the official residence of the Prime Minister. It was a happy day for Nehru. The second elections to be held in independent India had just concluded. Sixty-two election speeches had been uttered. Eight million people, apart from those who were listening to the radio broadcast, had sat at his feet. Again and again the plane had borne him across the gigantic country, which he had traversed so often as an orator, always surrounded by the masses and by the men and women of the Congress party, who wanted to get some light from the larger sun for their success.

We had heard Nehru talking to the masses on the vast grounds near Delhi. More than a hundred thousand people had gathered at sunset, sitting cross-legged on the ground. In the distance they saw the man sitting high on the dais, the man who had to guide the fate of four hundred million Indians then. A stool with cushions had been put just at the edge of the dais behind the low microphones. Nehru sat there comfortably and told the people of his worries. He spoke in Hindustani and so we could not follow; however, by the intonation of his voice and a few English words we grasped that he was giving them a report of his activities, warning them of dangers and appealing for a spirit of cooperation and discipline. Nehru avoided all pathos. His strong temperament seemed to be curbed. He appealed to reason and not to the emotions. It was not an elected tribune sitting there high above the crowd but rather one of those enlightened rulers known in Europe in the 18th century. If it had been necessary for Joseph II to speak to the masses in Vienna, he would have expressed himself likewise. Nehru's appeal to the Indians was not an outward show. Only in rare moments—the night India became independent and at Gandhi's death—did he resort to sentiment. We had experienced the same scene before in Bombay and in Kerala in South India. It was more impressive there, for only a few of the hundred thousands who gathered at Bombay's beach and later at a field in Trivandrum understood what he said. Nehru
mastered neither Marathi, the language spoken in Bombay, nor Kerala's Malayalam and had to use English which most of the listeners did not understand. They listened patiently all the same for three hours.

We had no inkling of this almost mystical communication with the masses of his country that day in March 1957 when he came towards us, walking slowly between the flower beds at Teen Murti, a bit stooped: an Asian aristocrat, brought up in the aloofness of the highest Brahmin caste of Kashmir; educated in Cambridge, a Grand seigneur of the socialist age, to which he had dedicated himself so passionately. At a certain turn of the conversation which covered many topics Nehru made a disdainful remark on how many of the young Asian democrats had been corrupted by the dollar. He said sharply that the Americans thought the whole world could be bought. And that they supported many things in Asia which had parvenu qualities.

In those days Nehru stood at the height of his fame. The integration of the five hundred and sixty princely states into a new India had been achieved rapidly, far beyond expectations. Ten million refugees from Pakistan had been absorbed to some extent. The First Five-Year Plan with modest targets which devoted itself mainly to improve agriculture had been concluded with success. India, which had recently been one of the colonies ruled by a few thousand English and without the right to vote, seemed to be on the way to becoming a predominant power in Asia. Asian leaders kept visiting Delhi. They admired Nehru's apparent success in dividing the Indian Union on the basis of languages and thus satisfying latent internal tension. And India's voice rang out loud in the choir of nations. In November 1948 Nehru had appeared before the General Assembly of the United Nations, which met in Paris then, and had said proudly:

May I say, as a representative from Asia, that we honour Europe for its culture and for the great advance in human
civilization which it represents. May I say that we are equally interested in the solution of European problems; but may I also say that the world is something bigger than Europe, and you will not solve your problems by thinking that the problems of the world are mainly European problems. There are vast tracts of the world which may not in the past, for a few generations, have taken much part in world affairs. But they are awake, their people are moving and they have no intention whatever of being ignored or of being passed by.

That is a simple fact I think we have to remember, because unless you have the full picture of the world before you, you will not even understand the problem, and if you isolate any single problem in the world from the rest, you do not understand the problem. Today I do venture to submit that Asia counts in world affairs. Tomorrow it will count much more than today.

The same Nehru had in his concluding speech at the Bandung Conference reproached the delegates of the African and Asian countries for complaining too much about the mistakes of their former overlords. It was more a question of building up their states anew. The people, who had fallen under colonial rule, would never have had this fate, if they had not possessed that weak quality, which had caused the loss of independence. These were unusual strains at a conference, which was devoted mainly to voicing complaints against the former colonial lords.

I asked myself that evening in Nehru's garden, how the colossal, almost magical influence which Nehru had on four hundred million people, could have been born. He said of himself that he was not a prophet like Gandhi. The fascinating movements of the face bore no resemblance to anything missionary-like; on the contrary, he had more of a sophisticated look. A word,
which was often not expressed, caused that contemplative pause, which sometimes confused the western visitors.

This man was marked by the sacrifice which he had inflicted upon himself. He did not stress it, sometimes even changed the subject with a joke, but it was part and parcel of him. He who came from a rich family had yet been willing to spend twelve years in jail and it was only thereafter that he became the Nehru whom we came to know at the zenith of his career. Decades had elapsed since the time he had been led handcuffed through the streets of a small North Indian town. The details had then almost fallen into oblivion. But they continued to be his years of learning and suffering. They had marked him and formed the image which India made of him. It was the time in which millions affectionately called him Panditji: the time during which the Hindu conception of ‘darshan’ elevated him ever higher—the belief that man gains spiritual benefits if he is in the presence of a great or holy person.

The contradictions in Nehru’s nature were partly responsible in fostering the misunderstandings in the west. Again and again it was emphasised that his nobility as a member of the most aristocratic Brahmin caste was commingled with his education in Cambridge; that, apparently reacting in a western manner, he cursed superstition in India, the holy cows and the Sadhus. They knew how powerfully the English socialism of the Fabians, the philosophies of Bernard Shaw and of the Webbs, and later the spirit of the New Statesman had left their mark on him. They were inclined in the end to consider Nehru as an agnostic intellectual whose thoughts were oriented essentially to the West, who only accidentally found his field of activity to be in the land in which he was born.

Nehru had contributed to this point of view by many vehement words. We consider this opinion, however, to be wrong after observing Nehru on many occasions in India. Of course in his personal style he was more akin to some eminent intellectuals from the west than to the ultra-conservatives in India.
But depicting him as a wanderer between east and west is misleading. He was a wanderer from the east, who could adapt the spirit of the west to achieve his objective. No more. The vision of the India of the future, which he had nurtured even as a young boy, included science and technology. He wanted an India on par with the west, but not a westernised India. Whosoever cannot see these fine contrasts cannot understand the impulses on which he acted. He considered the original and fresh ideas which pulsated Vedic India millennium ago to be withered now. He told us India had to be released from its torpor, which included also the caste system and many other things, which he felt was only historical nonsense. He was for a resuscitation with the western spirit, but only in as far as it led to a renaissance of a purified India as Gandhi had prepared it. But even here there are inconsistencies. Gandhi had a deep affection for his pupil Nehru, whom he preferred to all the others; but—with all respect for the master—Nehru was not a Gandhian. This had at certain times led almost to a break between the two. Nehru's socialist convictions were alien to Gandhi and vice-versa. Nehru did not believe that Gandhi's methods to modernise India were adequate. Only profound mutual admiration bound them closely together.

I saw Nehru a few more times, though the future was no longer as rosy as on that sunny day in spring 1957. The next time I visited India, China's threat had cast a shadow over him. He saw his ideal of unity and peaceful competition among the great nations of Asia to be an illusion. However, he did not want to admit it in its true magnitude, although that conversation in the garden revealed his first doubts on China's real intentions. This disappointment was deeply imprinted on his face at the last meeting. Not disappointment but resignation. He saw himself confronted in his last years of life with new realities in Asia, against which he could not rebel, to which he had to conform. The peculiar secret of this man was to be sought not in the political foreground, but elsewhere. Nehru, impatient,
furious, sometimes tough and inexhaustible in his ideas for whipping progress and technology into his people, despising empty phrases, ironic, unapproachable, was able to pursue his goal because he was convinced that man, born blind, had to be bound to spiritual values which elevated him above his existence. He had often expressed this idea in the last decade of his life, repeating and stressing it, after he became aware of the fact that Indian youth had begun to accept greedily materialism in one form or the other from the west. In this Nehru began to differ distinctly in his old age from the young Indian aristocrat educated in Cambridge. The conflict with China had drawn his attention to the root of India's essential characteristics in a manner which differed from his views on India's fate as he saw it earlier.

Yet it is not contradictory that in his will he declined to have the ritual which he was, however, given. He did not believe in rites but in the actual essence of India's tradition which he elucidated in his book *Discovery of India*, doubting it and yet typically moved by it.¹

I visited Teen Murti again after a decade and saw the garden which on the day of Nehru's death was overrun by hundreds of thousands of people. They had hastened on bicycles and bullock carts to pay their last homage to Nehru. Teen Murti has in the meantime become a Museum, where one is guided to the study on the first floor and the room in which he died. There you can still see the pad and pencil which he used till late that night when death hastened to him. On this tour of the house I found myself between Indian peasants, who with wife and children moved silently past Nehru's worldly legacy. Is that really all that remained?

A few days previously I had seen the immense, almost exuberant joy with which the Tamilians celebrated the glorious victory of the regional party, the DMK, over the Congress. In Calcutta I heard former Congress parliamentarians and communists, who but a short time ago had been divided in their
convictions, swear eternal fealty—against the Congress. And in Delhi I witnessed the triumph of the nationalist Hindu party, the Jana Sangh, whose members dream of a future India which with a doubled army will become the strongest power in Asia. A confusing picture of new contradictions emerged in which only one thing was common: the passionate rejection of Nehru linked with sympathy for his daughter. After four years one was confronted with a totally changed picture again. The sympathy for Mrs. Gandhi had grown up to an unbelievable triumph. She led her party into the only decisive force of the country again. It was youth, which decided itself so strongly against the traditional elements.

Truths which were latent in Nehru's last years are revealed now. A new generation has grown in India. The deeds of the freedom movement do not mean much to them. The thirty-five to forty year olds of today witnessed the end of the British rule as children or as very young men. The humiliations of that era are hardly imprinted on their minds. At the last census in 1961, 41 per cent of the Indian population were under the age of fourteen, 57 per cent below twenty-four. In the meantime the percentage of the younger people must have increased, since India's population has increased by almost a hundred million in the last decade. How could it be possible to bind these masses to the former ideals of the movement for freedom, these millions of young people who to a large extent have grown up in considerable insecurity, if not at the edge of starvation? For them Mahatma Gandhi is already remote history. They are only witnesses of the slow degeneration of the Congress party, whose history dates back to 1885. The 'law of higher expectation', which is alive in the young millions of Asia cannot be satisfied with the hint of former glories. The Red Guard in China, an outburst provoked by Mao, has its counterparts in all Asian countries, also in India, where the uncertainty about the future has increased to such an extent that even the older generation is hardly familiar with it.
We have known for a decade that in all probability the population of India will be doubled by the end of this century. We know it, but too little thought has been devoted to its consequences. Not only by us, who live far away, but in Asia itself and, above all, in India. The generation of founders had necessarily to refer to the past. This holds good for the Fabian socialism of a Nehru as well as for the guerilla romanticism of a Mao Tse-Tung, who was trying to restore artificially conditions as they prevailed during the heroic period of Chinese communism in the Loess Caves of Jenan. Nehru and Mao, as unsimilar as they may be in every other point, have one thing in common: they wanted only the progress and the modernisation of their people, but they hated and despised the technocrats and bureaucrats who were assigned the task of bringing it about. They hated the 'new class' on which they were dependent. This caused insoluble controversies for the two largest peoples of Asia. The angry young men, of whom one spoke in Europe after the second world war, have in the meantime entered Asia's stage. They have not been hardened by long struggles like their fathers. They have vulnerable souls. Impatience is marked on their faces. They do not want to wait and be consoled. Asia's second revolution has already begun. The generation of founders is undergoing a kind of twilight of the gods. They are beginning to be cursed.

The Nehru myth is paling fast and even Mao Tse-Tung will not succeed despite a mighty last effort to formulate eternal laws for his country like Confucius. In India I have defended Nehru and his work, as paradoxical as it may seem, against critical friends, who did not want to leave a shred of goodness on him. His legacy is larger than it may appear in this short time. Perhaps he has erred in some points, but nevertheless with his breath he gave life anew to India; he created it.
2  Freedom and Thereafter

Every reorganised state must first of all be able to convince its citizens that it is capable of controlling and governing the country effectively, that it has an adequate amount of social power which make up the framework of society. In the twenty years after the second world war dozens of new states have come into being in Asia and Africa. At the beginning of 1971 the United Nations had 127 members. Yet on gaining statehood India alone possessed the three prerequisites indispensable for the stability of a future polity: a relatively widespread governing group, which had worked together with the intelligentsia, developed during the British times, during the long fight for freedom; a mass movement created by Gandhi, which also covered the villages; and finally an ancient culture on which the new Indian nation was founded, a prerequisite existing otherwise only in China. Nigeria, for example, the most populous state in Africa, which won its independence ten years after India, possessed, indeed, a wide range of leading personalities, but it lacked the cultural unity which helped India immensely. There was not really any affinity between the traditionalistic Muslim emirates of the North and the modern tribes, the Ibos and the Jorubas, in the South. Even the contrasts between the North and South existing in India cannot be compared with the distrust and hate with which the Northern and Southern tribes confront each other in Nigeria. There, the murder of the only neutralising personality, Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, would suffice to bring about the downfall of the federation.

In other young states, like Egypt, Burma and also Pakistan, the military leaders alone have remained as the unifying force, after parliamentarian experiments reached a deadlock. In all recently established military dictatorships an authentic popular movement has been lacking. The officer ranks were not drawn from widespread social areas when they took the fate of these countries into their hands. Ayub’s attempt at creating a basic democracy in Pakistan was never really popular. Nasser tried again and again in the first fifteen years of his rule in Egypt to make his state party become a mass movement. He did not succeed. Even after his military government complemented by some technocrats ruled for fifteen years it was seen that the Wafd, once the civil national party in Egypt, was more firmly anchored in the hearts of the people than the military dictatorship which lost its internal solidarity with the military defeat of 1967. It is not much different in Burma, where General Ne Win after abolishing the parliament is trying in vain to get popular support from the countless tribes of his country for his military régime.

Only in China the conditions seemed to be as favourable as in India. Founded on the ancient cultural unity of the Han dynasty, a group of leaders seasoned in battle and moulded together through the decades, had attempted to win over a large number of the masses by persuasion during the initial stages of the communist rule. Driven by Mao’s impatience, however, they drew the long bow, and this led in the early sixties to internal strife within the older group of leaders. It ended in the upheaval of the cultural revolution. How far the present group of leaders can assert themselves is uncertain. Many were ousted. But even Mao did not triumph. The cultural revolution culminated after four years of fighting for power into a veiled military dictatorship, which took the place of the former party leadership.

Twenty years after independence India still faces attempts
to disrupt the unity of the state. With the disappearance of the
generation of founders the disintegrating factors have become
more conspicuous. However, in contrast to most of the recently
established states there have also been strong integrating forces.
In the United States of America signs of disintegration and
secession, which later led to the most serious national crisis and
to open civil war, appeared only eighty-five years after the
Declaration of Independence. It is possible that India will not
be spared similar crises, which will come to a head probably
much earlier. When judging these crises one should perhaps
use the standards to be found in American history as they seem
to be more applicable than comparisons with the young states
formed after the second world war.

Two powerful trends having their influence on the fathers
of the constitution confronted each other as antitheses in the
young American republic as well as in India on acquiring
statehood. The young United States, as well as young India,
had a distinguished personality revered by all parties and fac-
tions alike, embodying the myth of the nation. In America it
was George Washington, in India Mahatma Gandhi. Their
function was surprisingly similar: they forced a compromise,
which enabled America and India to have a democratic form of
government.

The two basic currents in early American democracy were
embodied in Hamilton and Jefferson. In the initial years of
India’s democracy the relationship between Nehru and Patel
corresponded to the contrast between the two leading statesmen
of the first decade of the American republic. Alexander Hamil-
ton, who had married into one of the richest families of New
York, was the great pragmatist. As chief of staff of Washington
during the war of independence he was an indispensable organ-
iser, who united the former colonies and who defiantly insisted
on their special privileges. A brilliant man, whom his contem-
poraries compared with the strong-willed Roman senators, his
role was the same as that of Vallabhbhai Patel in India.
Hamilton had in Thomas Jefferson, the man from South Virginia, a frontiersman, a rival who advocated freedom rather than authority, who did not see America's future in the big cities seething with activity, but in an autonomous and egalitarian society. One hundred and fifty years later one could say that Hamilton's spirit triumphed in the end. Jefferson's legacy, however, has not disappeared from life in the United States even today. The American individualism in a remarkably free society can be retraced to this source. Even today that society has not lost its distrust of the industrial and financial giants.

The rivalry between Hamilton and Jefferson extended over a period of twenty-five years in a series of ever new controversies. It was no different between Nehru and Patel. Jefferson and Hamilton both held senior public offices between 1781 and 1804, when Hamilton fell in a duel. The same duumvirate with Nehru and Patel heading the young Indian state was to last, however, only two and a half years—till Patel died. Gandhi had to deal with the rivalry between his two staunch colleagues from as early as 1929, when considering a suitable candidate to be the Congress President for 1930.1 He decided in favour of Nehru who was 14 years younger and acted likewise in 1946 when the President of the Congress Party was expected to be the head of the future Indian state.

However, the highly-talented, cool, practical organiser Patel was as indispensable to Gandhi as was Nehru. This strictly conservative man was for decades the actual organiser of the Congress Party. In 1929 the farmers of his native state, Gujarat, gave him the honorary title of Sardar, after he had successfully pleaded for the lowering of the excessively high taxes which the British wanted to impose on the zamindars.

Patel (born 1875) belonged, like Gandhi, to the Vaishya caste of western India. The son of a zamindar family, he was brought up according to the orthodox Hindu tradition and had never been abroad. He was practising as a lawyer when, at the age of forty, he joined Gandhi as one of his first followers after
the first world war. Bareheaded, with severe features, domineering, authoritative, he was a master of party politics and, as older Indian politicians related with certain reverence, he needed only to appear amid a group of dissident party functionaries for the heated minds to cool down. The socialist ideas of Nehru were alien to him. He wanted to build India on the foundations of traditional Hindu society—in this Morarji Desai, who also comes from Gujarat, bears great resemblance to him.

Nehru viewed the civil servants, the administrative officials trained by the British, as well as all businessmen with indomitable distrust, but it was in these circles that Patel had his followers. This can be explained by Gujarat’s sociological structure, for the textile industries had developed at an early stage and a number of Indian firms of renown were being established. Patel understood how to use their money and influence for the Indian freedom movement.

Equipped with such experiences he was able to persuade the 562 Indian princes—the Nizam of Hyderabad being the only exception—to abdicate in favour of the Indian Union, a task which required a man with an iron will and unwavering determination. It would hardly have been possible for the declared socialist Nehru, whom the princes naturally distrusted, to do this so easily and in such a short time. Patel is not usually shown in a good light in the biographies written on Nehru during his lifetime. Only about two decades after his death is he being judged with less bias. Conservative Hinduism, which Patel embodied, has after his death been obscured by the Socialist Nehru and at times forced to be on the defensive. But that does not mean that Hinduism has disappeared. On the contrary, at the end of the sixties it is clear that the basic orthodox Hindu traditions which Nehru and Patel embodied together have created the new India. Nehru’s golden years, the time in which he governed India almost alone, began after Patel’s death and extended through the fifties, till the conflict with China dimmed Nehru’s fame.
During this period of progress, the Indian Constitution was framed and a bill passed in 1950 prohibiting discrimination against the untouchables (about fifty million people, who were living at the lowest rung of society) on grounds of caste; the new bill on civil line according to the Hindu Code was passed in the face of severe opposition; the First Five-Year Plan set in motion the industrialisation and modernisation of India. This was also the period in which India possessed a mighty attraction for all Asian countries and many African countries too. The concentration on the home front corresponded to the non-alignment abroad—true to the model of its initial decades supplied by the United States to the Indians. The famous sentence from George Washington's farewell speech to the Congress could have well been the words Nehru used: "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."

India's truly radical transformation introduced by Nehru in his golden years was, however, threatened by latent forces even at the height of his creativeness, and these he never really conquered. During this time Nehru's prestige was so great that no one who aspired for success could contradict him. But those who inwardly distrusted him or did not share his views, tried by means of quiet obstruction within the Congress party to achieve what they could not gain by open opposition. Nehru's most serious opponents in these years were neither the communists nor the socialists, but the inhabitants of his own house who claimed to be his followers. They clung to him like a deadweight which was much heavier than most of the foreign observers could see at that time.3

The basis of the caste system
The caste system has not been abolished by the Constitution, as is commonly believed. The Constitution has only forbidden discrimination against the untouchables. The caste system con-
continues to exist. Even Nehru could not prevent it from influencing the policies made specially in the states. Countless internal political fights and conflicts, which have as it were no ideological differences, seem almost incomprehensible until they are clarified in the context of the caste system.

In the Sunday edition of the *Hindustan Times* dated 20th August 1967—exactly twenty years after the declaration of independence—there were 221 matrimonial advertisements which, with the exception of seven, mentioned the caste and usually the sub-caste of the girl or the young man desirous of a match. 172 advertisements emphasised that the partner should belong to the same caste. The remaining 42 matrimonials, though mentioning their own caste, did not insist on a partner from the same sub-caste; the very mention of the caste, however, dissuades certain candidates of remote castes from applying to the address given.4

The advertisers generally belong to the Indian middle-class. They mention an average monthly income of four to five hundred rupees, in some cases up to a thousand and more. The matrimonials in this edition are a common feature Sunday after Sunday in the Indian newspapers. It is a vehement contradiction of the assertion of some politicians that the caste system plays only a secondary role. If the middle-class continue to marry in their caste only, then it would not be wrong to assume that this is the case in the villages also.

India's caste system is not comparable to the social classes in western society, which were never strictly codified nor was there ever a strict ban on inter-marriages. A caste in India consists of groups of families—it could be a few dozens or hundreds of thousands—whose members intermarry and 'interdine', without defiling one another. The caste is determined by birth. In its original form the castes were strictly exclusive and graded one below the other. According to the caste system which was worked out to the last detail, all castes had a certain supremacy over the one just below it. The castes are generally associated
with certain professions, which, like the medieval guilds, were hereditary in a family. But the connection between castes and professions does not exist now in the same manner as even a century ago. An Indian’s caste can often be recognised by his name. Every Indian knows that a Menon or a Nambar belongs to the Nair caste of South India and that a Banerjee or a Mukherjee must be a Bengali Brahmin.

Nehru’s concentrated attack on the caste system was not destined to succeed. He had recognised the advantages of the old Indian social structure when he said that the castes are in themselves democratic institutions, which emphasise the duties of the individuals and the group more than the rights. His judgement of the caste system, however, was severe:

In the context of society today, the caste system and much that goes with it are wholly incompatible, reactionary, restrictive, and barriers to progress. There can be no equality in status and opportunity within its framework, nor can there be political democracy and much less economic democracy.

In another passage Nehru says:

... In the social organisation of today it has no place left. If merit is the only criterion and opportunity is thrown open to everybody then caste loses all its present-day distinguishing features and, in fact, ends. Caste has in the past not only led to the suppression of certain groups but to a separation of theoretical and scholastic learning from craftsmanship and a divorce of philosophy from actual life and its problems. It was an aristocratic approach based on traditionalism. This outlook has to change completely for it is wholly opposed to modern conditions and the democratic ideal. The functional organisation of social groups in India may continue, but even that will undergo a vast change as the nature of modern industry
creates new functions and puts an end to many old ones. The tendency today everywhere is towards a functional organisation of society, and the concept of abstract rights is giving place to that of functions. This is in harmony with the old Indian ideal. The spirit of the age is in favour of equality.

Nehru's views and outlook were rejected by all except for the few members of the Indian intelligentsia who were influenced by the west. A vast majority of the Indians still believe that by marrying within one's caste, one avoids defilement. Moreover, millions of Indians in the villages avoid partaking of food with people outside their caste. Despite this fact the caste system which had been very rigid till now has undergone considerable transformation and will continue to do so. Everyone in a large city has been compelled to make concessions, though adhering to the principles of one's caste. But, above all, many castes have undergone an internal transformation. They play a new role in India's modern democracy which had not been foreseen even twenty years ago.

It is claimed now and then that the Indian caste system is gradually giving way to a class structure. Such rash statements should not be made. The internal changes in the caste system does not mean for the present that it is being remodelled into a class hierarchy. Families belonging to the most important castes have varied incomes as a rule. The pre-requisites for a class hierarchy are determined only in material terms and the factors necessary for the consequent class conflict are at variance in India with those of almost all other peoples. Even India's communists have to make allowances for the caste system and exploit it like all other parties, in their political campaigns. The usual class conflict arguments cannot be applied so easily in a country in which the caste groups include rich and poor, who feel a stronger solidarity towards each other than towards an outsider in the same income group.
At present there is not a trace of the four original varnas, the colours of the skin, into which the legendary Brahmin law-giver Manu divided the Indian population. His book on law was probably compiled from older texts at the beginning of our era. His rigid rules have governed social life for two millenniums. The division into Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra must have once been determined by race, where the Brahmins as successors of the white-skinned Aryans stood at the head of the society. That has long been forgotten. A vague reminiscence thereof is perhaps the generally valid fair-skinned ideal of beauty, specially for women. A decade ago the matrimonial advertisements mentioned quite frankly that a ‘fair decent girl’ was wanted, an expression which can be replaced by ‘beautiful girl’. Everyone in India knows that ‘beautiful’ implies fair-skinned. Even today the parents of a very fair-skinned Indian girl do not like to permit her to marry a dark-skinned man. However, there is no deeper significance to such preference.

The ten thousand sub-castes (jati) are still a predominant factor. As a rule they determine everyday social life. Roughly estimated, the Brahmins alone have about two thousand sub-castes and even the masses of untouchables are divided into at least six hundred sub-castes, with infinite gradation, each claiming superiority over the other like the caste Hindus. The four castes which are mentioned in the handbooks on India are fictitious. K. M. Panikkar proves that even these so-called principal castes—with the exception of the Brahmins—never existed in a rigid form.8

The caste system began originally on account of racial differences; later it expanded making finer distinctions according to the professions. A determining factor in the present social structure of India is that these sub-castes are not to be found all over India, but are restricted to the linguistic groups.8 This fact is usually overlooked when making a study of the caste system. Even the Brahmins, who would perhaps be the first to represent an All-India caste, consider the sub-castes to be more
important than the general term 'Brahmin'. The advertisements mentioned above make a clear distinction. Thus for example it says: "Wanted a suitable match for a beautiful (= fair), well-educated Gaur Brahmin girl, 22." The accent lies on the sub-caste Gaur Brahmin, who are to be found only in North India and not in the South. A South Indian Brahmin would therefore not be considered, because he belongs to a completely different sub-caste.

In Rajasthan the tradespeople are usually united in the Agarwal caste. These, however, have nothing in common with the Balijas, the corresponding caste in Andhra, nor the Subarnabankis, the merchant caste in Bengal. Their manners and customs are totally different and they don't feel they have anything in common, for these boundaries coincide with the linguistic borders. The geographical area in which a sub-caste appears is often smaller than the linguistic group, but it never extends beyond it. That is for India at present of paramount importance. K. M. Panikkar has classified the regional sub-castes as the widest expression of the joint family, to which a Hindu feels allegiance:

Beyond this extended joint family the Hindu in practice recognises no society or community. This is the widest social group that the Hindu evolved and is therefore the limit of his allegiance, of his social relations, of his loyalties.¹⁰

How true this definition of Panikkar's is today can be seen in a reader's letter in autumn 1966, an impressive report on how the loyalties of the Hindus essentially differ from those of all western societies:

In our national life it is not easy to pass so lightly over Hindu traditions. The Hindu conception of an individual differs from that of the west. We are not individuals in the
Christian sense of the word, nor even the Greek and Roman. In many cases our ideas of moral responsibilities are quite different. Terms like human rights and democracy are as strange to the traditional Hindu way of thinking as the idea of romantic love between the sexes or the equality of all souls.

The Hindu caste institution is unprecedented in the whole world. Even the educated Hindu feels only a strict working relationship to the subordinate members of his staff in the office, factory or laboratory. Social contacts, which in other societies form the nucleus of human ties, hardly exist in our society. Our ideas of good and evil do not differ from the general view. But our moral obligations are only to our own group or caste; to anyone else, who does not belong to the caste, they are non-existent. A feeling that men are brothers is alien to Hindu way of thinking. That is why a Hindu can exploit the misery of men outside his group, even if they are threatened by famine. Hindu morality does not have the same categories as Christianity or Islam.¹¹

The agitation to divide India on the basis of regional languages was in fact a struggle by the castes to assert themselves in India’s new political system. This is true especially of those regions in which a caste like the Marathas, for example, comprises of millions of people. They used all their influence to bring about the bifurcation of the original Bombay State into Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Congress Party in Maharashtra fared better in the 1967 elections than any other state, because the Marathas have a group of leaders who are closely linked with the Congress Party. It is therefore, easy for them to get the entire caste on their side even for party politics.

The statement that election campaigns in the Indian states are in reality only caste struggles is far-fetched. All parties which contest in a certain electoral district try to put up men of the
important castes as candidates,\textsuperscript{12} as was seen in a by-election in Azamgarh, U.P. where all parties sought candidates from the leading Bhumihar caste. Caste rivalries could, however, have a decisive influence on the political form of a state. For instance, in Mysore there was a bitter fight between two powerful sub-castes of large zamindar families, the Lingayats and the Vakkaligars, in the Congress Party in the fifties. It ended with the Speaker for the Lingayat caste, the famous Congress politician S. Nijalingappa, becoming Chief Minister. Later he became the President of the undivided Congress Party.

A similar fight took place in Andhra at the beginning of the fifties between the Kammas and the Reddis, with the Kammas, a large zamindar group, supporting the communists and the Reddis supporting the Congress. The political downfall which overthrew the Congress in three states, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in spring and summer 1967 was also closely connected with caste rivalries. For twenty years the Brahmans and the Banias had reigned supreme in Uttar Pradesh. The revolts which broke out within the state Congress were to a large extent a revolt of the two peasant castes Jat and Ahir, whose political exponent, the Chief Minister Charan Singh put an end to Brahmin rule in Uttar Pradesh under the then Chief Minister Gupta. The same game was repeated with the same people at the beginning of 1970 when the Congress party split. The dramatic revolt led by the Rajmata of Gwalior in summer 1967 against D. P. Mishra, Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh for many years, was at the same time a revolt against the authoritative rule of the Kanyakubj Brahmans, who had joined with the merchant caste, the Marwaris, in this Central Indian state.\textsuperscript{13}

Without knowing the significances of the sub-castes who are organised in a powerful political group, it is difficult for anyone to grasp, even roughly, the jungle-like maze of India’s internal politics. The largest of these sub-castes have a well-developed social organisation, their own schools, their own teachers and in
the cities their own restaurants, where food is cooked only by people from their caste. About fifty of the largest sub-castes publish their own newspapers, intended only for the members of their caste.

In the two decades of India's democracy the castes have been confronted with a new reality; they try to wield influence now with modern means, including election votes. Through the democratic process this could lead to the sub-castes, which are not strong enough to promote the interests of their members, joining with other prominent castes in order to guarantee the possibility of having a say in politics. With the changing of society, new caste groups will be created. This means that the caste system will not necessarily collapse under the onslaught of industrialisation and the growth of big cities. It will and must decline, especially in big cities, where one is in constant contact with other castes. Decline, however, does not imply extinction. The matrimonial advertisements quoted are proof enough that even the younger generation has not lost its caste consciousness. On the contrary, it seems that the solidarity of the castes will increase as is apparent in the big cities in the apartment houses and maternity homes built for each caste, since the individual, who is as lonely in a big Indian city as in an European or American metropolis, will consider the caste as a circle that is sociologically secure.

In many states in India the lower castes voice their resentment against the Brahmins, even politically, as in Tamilnad. The principles of the caste hierarchy, however, will not be shaken. The process of secularisation is progressing very slowly. The mobile upper class, which is no longer caste-conscious, makes up only a tiny fraction of India's entire population. As the western observers come into contact to a great extent only with this small elite—as account of the language barriers—they generally view it from narrow perspectives.

Though travelling within the country has increased considerably since independence, it has not yet severed the existing caste
ties, as can be seen above all, in the suburbs of Calcutta and Bombay, in which members of a caste who have migrated to other states try to come together again. This is true to a lesser extent of the middle-class, but even their adherence to the caste works against social disintegration, subsequent to India's industrialisation in the last decades. Nehru had hardly realised it in his harsh judgement of the caste system, but modern Indian sociology has begun to refer to it frequently.

In carrying out his governmental policies Nehru had yielded to the caste system much more than can be seen in his letters, which were written in the quiet days of his terms in prison. In his later years he must have, like all other Indian politicians, had to consider the castes, even if he may have theoretically rejected them.

The Untouchables
Gandhi with his keen vision realised that the untouchables lived in the shadow of the Indian caste system, according to which there was a moral obligation only towards one's own caste, without any feelings of responsibility for the sorrows and afflictions of fellow-men from other castes. This is the only explanation for the fact that the miserable dwellings of the Harijans were allowed to exist on the outskirts of thousands of villages, without the Panchayats even thinking of looking after the outcastes, who were assigned the menial and dirty jobs—from grave-diggers to flayers and tanners working on hides. It was Gandhi, who called the untouchables 'Harijans'—Children of God. And it was Nehru who endeavoured to improve the lot of these masses of outcastes with a certain amount of success. According to the census of 1961 there were about sixty-five million untouchables. In 1968 it must have exceeded seventy million. Officially they are known as the Scheduled Castes. This expression dates back to the Government of India Act of 1935, in which the untouchables were registered in a special schedule. Fifteen million Harijans lived in U.P. alone, seven million in
Bihar and West Bengal, and six million in Madras, according to the statistics of 1961.

Article 17 of the Indian Constitution seeks to abolish untouchability. Article 25 assures every Hindu his right to enter any temple. Article 15 expressly states that anyone can enter any shop, restaurant or hotel and that wells shall be accessible to all. Article 19 grants each one the right to practise any profession.

In the light of the old Hindu customs, which threatened the lower castes and the Parias with terrible punishment if they claimed the same rights as the caste Hindus, these laws were truly revolutionary. They were complemented by a law on 1st June 1955 for the protection of the untouchables, which causes any violation of the principle of equality to be liable to severe punishment.

Over and above that, Article 330 of the Constitution states, that seats shall be reserved for the Harijans and the Backward Tribes in the Central Parliament and the state legislative assemblies for a period of twenty years. 77 seats have been reserved for the untouchables and 35 for the backward classes out of a total of 520 seats in parliament today. The Harijans have 471 seats and the backward classes have 227 seats in the state legislative assemblies out of a total of 3300. 12.5 per cent of all public official posts have to be reserved annually for the untouchables; in addition there are scholarships to study at high schools and universities for them. A Commissioner has been appointed to supervise the legislation for Scheduled Castes and Backward Tribes and to see that the special economic regulations for them are implemented. Taken as a whole this was a mighty deed of social rehabilitation, which preceded the Civil Rights Bill of the United States by almost two decades.

The annual reports of the Commissioner reveal that there are yet countless cases of discrimination, whether in admission to primary schools or access to drinking water in the villages. At the end of 1967 the press in the capital reported that only twenty
kilometres from Delhi, Harijans were forbidden to use the village well, so that the police had to step in. Millennia old customs cannot be changed overnight.

A Committee set up by the Government in April 1969 to inquire into the conditions of the Harijans, who numbered far more than seventy million, published an amazing report, giving hundreds of individual cases of discrimination against the Harijans. The Committee, however, could not find even one case where the state government had punished the hotel or restaurant for violating the law against untouchability. The worst problem is perhaps the search for accommodation. The report mentions the case of the private secretary of a minister, who could not find accommodation in the state capital Jaipur because he was casteless and was compelled to settle in the poorest section of the Harijan colony.

Indian sociological studies are usually limited to general observations. The American Harold R. Isaacs has written a useful thesis on a study made in 1963, which by means of innumerable interviews provides an insight into the material and psychological position of the former untouchables. Isaacs comes to the conclusion that the legal status of millions of untouchables in the villages may have changed, but in practical life this can hardly be noticed. "They remain where they are, caught in the great mess of backwardness, perhaps here and there becoming aware of new pressures and new possibilities, but seeing themselves nowhere in any new picture." Isaacs believes that only the young men, who go to school now, could get freed slowly from the letters of untouchability and strive to get a new position in society. The older generation appears to a great extent to be enmeshed in their old ideas, in psychological cages, as the leader of the Harijans once expressed it. This story which is often heard in India can well be typical for them. An enlightened caste Hindu invites a Harijan to his house. The Harijan, however, stands as was customary before, outside the door, says: "You may have given up your religion,
young master, but we have not given up ours," and refuses to enter the house of a caste Hindu, which he would defile in his opinion.

The number of children attending school from the ranks of the former untouchables was estimated at 6 million in 1963, four million thereof in the primary school and one and a half million in secondary and higher schools, which exempt Harijan children from paying tuition fees. 55,500 former untouchables studied then at colleges and technical institutions. The number of scholarships for the members of the scheduled castes is known, but no one knows how many of them really complete their studies; according to a rough estimate, about 3000 students annually. Isaacs ascertained that 330,000 members of the Scheduled Castes were employed in the public service in 1963, most of them naturally in rather subordinate positions. He calculated that six million, a tenth of all former untouchables were at the initial rungs of the social ladder.

The position of the Harijans in the city and in the village differs immensely. In cities they submerge and are not to be recognised easily. In the village, however, the prejudices are still so strong that the government have to construct new clean colonies, which are to replace the miserable huts inhabited by the Harijans till now, far away from the village, and have often to dig new wells for the Harijans, because they are not granted access to the village well. Apparently the official authorities had to make many compromises which can be explained only by the insurmountable prejudices of the village community.

All this disappears in the city, at a first glance anyway. But it is not easy for a former untouchable to find decent accommodation in the city as yet, even if he is one of the lucky few who have risen socially. Thousands of Harijans have apparently attempted to change their caste name which shows them to be former untouchables and have tried to somehow begin a life under a new banner. But the Harijan who distances himself
from his community encounters painful and often humiliating difficulties.

Suppose, for example, he claims to have belonged to a higher caste and a member of his family dies. If the members of his caste, who should perform the death rites, do not appear immediately, then all around realise that something is amiss. The man, however, cannot return to his former community and is thus shunned by both sides and now truly becomes an outcaste.

It is none the less difficult for a former untouchable who has already advanced socially to arrange his children’s marriage in a suitable manner. As we saw the larger part of marriages take place within the same sub-caste. A well-to-do Harijan is compelled now either to marry his daughters to the sons of former untouchables, whereby the social advance of his family suffers a momentous setback, or he has despairingly to search for a future son-in-law who does not bother about caste restrictions. These complicated problems which cannot be removed from this world only by an act of law continue to persist despite the progressive education of the Harijan children. Only a very small minority of the Indians appear to be prepared to accept them intellectually. They console themselves with the notion that good laws have been made.

A number of Harijan families, especially around Bombay, have tried in the last decade to solve this problem, by renouncing their Hindu faith and becoming Buddhists. That is why the Buddhist community in India has experienced a surprising augmentation in numbers, though in Buddha’s land of birth his religion had almost become extinct. But changing faith does not seem to be a satisfactory solution either. The mass conversions to Buddhism have shown that anyone who claims to be a Buddhist is treated as a former untouchable when he seeks accommodation or a job. Even today people make excuses to get rid of them. Moreover, the moment a Harijan changes his faith, he and his children lose the legal privileges created for them. So it has frequently occurred that sons of Harijans who
had formerly been converted to Buddhism, let themselves be registered as former untouchables in order to claim their privilege of exemption from tuition fees.

An entire sub-caste of Harijans try another way. They want to compete with the upper class in their manner of thinking to such a degree that as a respected community they may be freed of all stigma. Such a procedure, however, can take a long time and presupposes that the entire sub-caste is willing to advance. This seems to have been the case with the former untouchable caste, the Mahars, who originate from the region around Bombay, of which not less than two and a half million were converted to Buddhism in a mass ceremony—perhaps half the Mahar caste. The determining factor in all these problems is not only the attitude of society to the former untouchables, but the overcoming of complexes, which they have developed, as a result of centuries of disdain. Every psychiatrist knows how difficult it is to cure a person of an inferiority complex. But here it is a case of an inferiority complex among millions who if they want to change their lot must gain self-respect first. The progressive thinkers among the caste Hindus are keenly aware of this problem, but they are almost helpless against it; that is the reason for the frequent excuses and for the fact that they minimise the importance of the true situation.

The members of the Indian upper class, who seriously hope for a change in the position of the former untouchables, depend now especially, on the mobility of the big cities. They forget, however, that it is of paramount importance for an Indian to live in a clan with the corresponding social connections. It is not surprising that the matrimonial advertisements always boast that the person is from a well connected family. And it is just this factor, which the up and coming Harijan who at present still belongs to a minority, can acquire only in another one or two generations: the right contact with the right people.

The present privileges of the former untouchables have also an unpleasant aspect. Nehru himself foresaw it. At a con-
ference of all parliamentarians of the former untouchables in Secunderabad in February 1961 Nehru spoke with outright frankness of the new dangers. He said the special privileges accorded to the casteless people, in order to absorb them in the society, could create a new caste. The Constitution had planned a transitory period of twenty years for the casteless to be absorbed into Indian society. Even at that time protests were audible among the speakers of the untouchable classes, who wanted to extend this period considerably. Nehru turned it down emphatically. He explained that a further extension of privileges could not be considered at all.

The law, by which seats are reserved for the untouchables in parliament, will most probably be extended. After the split of the Congress Party, Mrs. Gandhi let Jigjivan Ram, the Minister for Agriculture, who has represented the untouchables for many years in the Union Government, be elected President of the 'new' Congress Party. Mrs. Gandhi could therewith hope to win the support of a large number of untouchables for her Congress Party. Jigjivan Ram had for years pleaded for the extension of the law for the untouchables.

A number of smaller tribes have made an application to be registered in the list of 'backward tribes' in order to be able to share the privileges. Just as in the Federal Republic of Germany we used to have professional refugees, there are professional Harijans today, who do not desire that the officially recorded backwardness be terminated.

An especially grotesque case is the powerful caste of the Ezhavas in Kerala, who account for almost a third of the population there. These former palm wine tappers were once at the bottom of the social pyramid and have in the meantime already worked their way up to a middle-class group. The communists have since the last decade continued to promise the Ezhavas that they will remain on the list of 'backward tribes', enabling them thereby to secure a corresponding number of official posts. The communist victories in the elections in Kerala depend
mainly on the votes from this caste, which is neither better nor worse off than most of the other inhabitants of this part of the country.

In the long run only the true economic situation of the various backward castes and tribes can provide the criterion for further aid. Their political functionaries, however, are bitterly fighting against it. That class of the untouchables who have in the meantime attained the status of the Indian middle-class are fighting most for their privileges. For the larger majority of about a hundred million outcastes—including the backward tribes—similar economic opportunities will only be available when there are education opportunities everywhere for everyone. This is still a question of one or two generations, as the schooling of the Harijans is far below the average and was at the end of the fifties only five per cent. In the meantime it has increased considerably.

Two hundred and fifty million women
In the spring of 1967 I visited Mrs. Padmaja Naidu, who was nearing the end of her term as Governor of the problematic state, West Bengal, in the venerable Governor's palace in Calcutta. We had as usual spoken about her worries and since my last visit they had become even more. Suddenly a happy smile flitted across her face and she said: "If you should be in India for a longer time, then devote some time to our women. I think, you will find many changes since your last visit." She told me of her visits to the women's colleges, in which a new generation of young Indian girls were being educated; one could hardly believe that their mothers had still lived in the strict security of the traditional purdah.

My observations in other Indian cities show that Mrs. Naidu was right. If there has been a great transformation anywhere in India in the last decade, then it has been in the sphere of women. The many women who surrounded Gandhi as voluntary helpers in the freedom movement were a vanguard of a whole
women's army who have worked with more devotion than many men to modernise and change India internally.

Gandhi provided the initiative, and again it was Nehru who with the Hindu Code Bill in 1956 changed the status of the Indian woman to a large extent—a law which broke with customs which were over two millennia old, according to which women were creatures without any rights. Nehru had said to Taya Zinkin once:

"... I consider to have been my greatest contribution to India: getting the Hindu Code Bill passed into Law. It was not easy you know. Everybody was against it. I had to be patient, bide my time, wait for the opposition to weaken and get it passed bit by bit. I believe that women are the most important element in any country. After all, it is they who bring up the men. And do you know," his face lit up with a tiny smile, "this year 200,000 girls graduated from college. I know most of them will only get married, but they will make better wives and mothers now that they are educated. I have been fighting for women to take part in politics. Even if they do not get elected, the simple fact of their having to go and fight in an election means that they are taken out of their homes. And if we put up a woman candidate, the other parties also tend to put a woman up; it is very good. I would, if I had to choose between educating boys and girls, educate only the girls. They will teach the boys." ¹⁶

Whereas the legislation for rehabilitating the Harijans can be effective only after a period of time, the Hindu Code Bill, particularly by according woman a right to property and inheritance, had a direct effect which within the decade itself, I would like to say, could be read in the faces of the young girls—expressions of a new self-consciousness. When seen as a whole it is true that the education of the girls lags far behind that of
the boys. But, with the Hindu Code the basis has been created for a new society, for which the only example in those countries with a post-war constitution in free Asia is to be found in Japan. Monogamy is legally proclaimed and a divorcee as well as a widow has rights, which Nehru had to fight for in the teeth of fierce opposition from the orthodox Hindus in parliament.

According to the former Hindu law a widow—even if she were still a child—was forbidden to marry for a second time. The English had long suppressed the gruesome custom of sati and was supported in it by Congress. But in the fifties there were still stray cases in remote villages. This only shows the depth of the incision made in tradition, when the Hindu Code Bill was introduced.

As the name Hindu Code denotes, only the status of the Hindu woman was readjusted in 1955-56. Nehru could not dare to include the other religious communities in this legislation, especially the Muslims. The result is that India’s Muslim women are yet without rights according to civil law. The Indian Civil law does indeed give the wife of a Muslim the right to claim in court that her husband support her separately, if he takes a second wife. But as the civil laws proclaimed by the Ulema still are valid for the Muslims, the husband can on his part declare the divorce (talaq), whereby the Muslim wife loses all protection. The secular Indian state is wary of interfering in the civil status of the Muslims. The discrepancy between the Hindu woman and the Muslim woman will therefore continue for some time. But in the long run the Muslim society in India will not be able to evade the bold move which had broken with traditions over two thousand years old and thus begun to loosen the deplored rigidity of Hinduism.

Light and shadows of Planning
The Indian Statistical Institute lies in a luxuriant tropical garden far beyond Calcutta. No sound of the tumult of the bustling metropolis nor of its misery penetrate till here. Only the
sound of garden shears could be heard from the broad verandah, where I sat with Professor P. C. Mahalanobis that spring evening in 1957. My host was at that time one of the most interesting men in India. He was considered to be Nehru's most intimate adviser for planning the future economy. After studying medicine, this highly-cultured Bengali Brahmin turned to anthropology and after measuring thousands of skulls fell in the clutches of statistics. He built the only Statistical Institute which existed in India then. Never in my life have I met another man as fascinated by figures as Mahalanobis.

He conversed with me in the manner of Socrates—a conversation which was to be continued again four years later. The partner in the conversation is questioned on the accuracy of a thesis and its consequent conclusion. The logic from conclusion to conclusion was indisputable. Only, after the first half hour I had an eerie feeling, as if I was sitting opposite a man who was performing the Indian rope trick in front of my eyes. Every individual inference was right—but the manner of reasoning which Mahalanobis followed unfortunately did not concur with the facts of Indian reality. It hovered with a rare ambiguousness in the air. Mahalanobis had just prepared the main draft for the Second Five-year Plan and put his critics against the wall with the same Socratic sophism, which I experienced that evening. It is a known fact now that a lot of the defects in the five-year plans could be retraced to wrong reasoning.

My visit surprised him. He was considered to be an extreme leftist among the Indian economic planning group and for that reason he rarely came in contact with western political economists. His idol and teacher was the Polish Professor Lange, who had convinced the former doctor that political economy was to be built up like human anatomy.

"The human body is borne by a framework of bones. Is that right?"

"In economy steel corresponds to the framework of bones. Is that right?"
"Without steel there cannot be an independent economy. Is that right?"

"India must therefore create a steel industry first, which covers the requirements of a vast country which will soon have a population of five hundred million. Is that right?"

"But since India is a poor country, with only a small economy, all other requirements must wait, if it wishes to build a steel industry. Is that right?"

"We cannot afford to make large investments in the basic industries and in the consumer goods industries. Is that right?"

"We have millions of underemployed people in the villages. As a result thereof we must try to promote small industry in the villages, by which these underemployed will get work. Is that right?"

The conversation continued in this manner for a long time. Mahalanobis wanted to invest all the available domestic and foreign funds in the basic industries on the one hand, and on the other hand build up new handicraft industries and cottage industries in India's 570,000 villages introducing severe measures to protect it from the rivalry of mechanised, economically more advanced factories in the consumer goods industries. Unemployment which then only totalled a few millions was to disappear within a decade according to Mahalanobis' system. His was a mixture of the most unusual Soviet planning ideas and Gandhi's tradition of the handloom. My objection that developing handicrafts and cottage industries in 100,000 villages would need a vast number of modern machines and above all, a widespread power network, which India would not have for a long time, did not figure in his calculations and remained unnoticed. Market and sales problems were likewise not considered. This Brahmanic professor had shielded himself from the realities in his country. It was appalling to imagine that he belonged to one of the few who had Nehru's ear day and night!

A decade later India's economic planning entered its greatest crisis. Unemployment, which according to Mahalanobis was to
have been removed by then had increased perhaps to twenty million and the number of underemployed was estimated at eighty million—accurate statistics on this are not available even with the Planning Commission. The Fourth Five-Year Plan which was to begin in March 1966 was postponed again and again. In September 1967, Dr. Gadgil, the severest critic of Mahalanobis and his school, headed the fully reformed Planning Commission. There was nearly a revolution in Yojana Bhavan, the seat of the Planning Commission in Delhi, which had for such a long time been considered India's ivory tower. All the members of the Planning Commission had resigned together with Asoka Mehta, Nehru's last appointed Minister for Planning. (Mehta remained in the cabinet for a while as Minister for Social Welfare, resigned in protest in autumn 1968 and later joined the 'old' Congress party).

The Planning Commission which under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister included a number of cabinet members was finally changed into an advisory body which had only five full-time heads of departments with their corresponding staff.

Only in spring 1969 could the newly formed body present the final draft of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. There had been a four-year break in the five year plans. The draft originally made by Asoka Mehta had proved to be a creation of fancy, an Indian dream book, which had lost all touch of reality. The flash of lightning which hit Yojana Bhavan was a sequel to the dark clouds of the acute economic crisis of 1967—evoked by the bad harvests in 1965 and 1966—which had led to a 20 per cent increase in prices within a year leading to a considerable decline in the purchasing power and then to a recession in all consumer goods industries. Soon thereafter even the basic industries were hit. For instance India's largest machine factory in Ranchi worked only at half capacity in spring 1967 and even the steel and rolling mills had to limit their production because of a decline in orders. These unused capacities led to a public crisis in the matter of technical competence of the
management of the factories in the public sector, which even Kosygin referred to during a state visit to India in January 1968. His suggestions, the Indian press commented, hardly differed from that of the American experts.

An overhaul of the techniques and strategies of the Planning Commission was long overdue. By summer 1967 the Commission had to redraw the plans and to see it through politically with the help of the presence of several ministers on the board. In future it will be a technocratic body with expert knowledge which will present the cabinet a number of alternatives, to be discussed then with the Chief Ministers of the states.

The epoch in which the Planning Commission represented a state within a state has passed. The painful process of adapting Indian planning to the actual conditions of the country was continually postponed. This has changed with the reorganisation of the Planning Commission. The draft for the Fourth Five-Year Plan has also been drawn up realistically.

The First Five-Year Plan (1951-1956) with a total investment of Rs. 3760 crores was an indisputable success. The main accents of the first plan were to a large extent on agriculture and major irrigation projects. Investments in the public and private sectors were almost balanced.

The Second Five-Year Plan (1961-1961) with an investment of Rs. 6830 crores, in which only 17 per cent was allotted to agriculture, was nowhere near the target. Anyway, the mechanical industries had increased five-fold and industrial production during the first two plan periods had risen annually by 7 per cent. The construction of major public sector projects, as for instance the three steel plants, in Bhilai with Russian aid, in Durgapur with British aid and in Rourkela with German aid, as well as the gigantic government undertaking, the machine factory in Ranchi which was built with Soviet and Czech aid, all came in the Second Five-Year Plan. Over a thousand crores of foreign aid flowed into the second plan. And the private sector had grown considerably during the second plan period.
almost against the will of the planning stratagem in Delhi. Although signs of a serious crisis were to be seen at the end of the second plan, the planning authorities were intoxicated by quantity.

The plan target for the Third Five Year Plan (1961-1966) was fixed at a total investment of Rs. 10,400 crores and for the Fourth Five Year Plan (1966-1971), which finally did not begin on time, Asoka Mehta wanted to set the target at the fantastic investment of Rs. 20,000 crores, i.e. almost six times the first plan.

The actual estimate for the Fourth Five Year Plan drafted by the new Planning Commission restricted itself to the relatively modest total investment of Rs. 2,430 crores, Rs. 1,100 crores thereof in the public sector. Agriculture was to participate with 16.5 per cent and the industry with 21.5 per cent. The plan set aside 17.2 per cent of the investment for improvement of roads and 11.7 per cent for slum clearance in the cities. All other items were allotted, less than 10 per cent. Mrs. Gandhi said in her speech to the Chief Ministers, who had to sanction the plan, that India must reckon with a decrease in foreign aid, that is why the entire plan was oriented towards self-sufficiency in many fields. A very sound target.

The first plans had begun with the sound principle of setting targets attainable for Indian officials and people as well but only through strenuous effort; but when drafting the third plan, the planning authorities let themselves be carried away and demanded the impossible. Prof. A.H. Hanson of the University of Leeds, who has made the most comprehensive report and criticism of the Indian five year plans, expresses resignedly that as a result of the gigantomania the planning authorities had become apathetic or outright cynical. Since the sixties the plan experts knew very well that they were chasing unattainable targets. Without the bad harvests of 1965-66 and the strong pressure to change their way of thinking, which came with the election results of 1967 through which the states auto-
matically received a bigger say in the governing of the country, one would most probably have taken an even longer time in coming to one's senses and in bringing about a total reform in Indian planning.

Another external element had its effect also. During the third plan period there were the wars with China and Pakistan, whereby the Indian government was compelled to increase its defence expenditure considerably. At the beginning of the five year plans defence was allotted a very minimum amount. Since the middle of the sixties it totals about a third of the normal budget (1969—Rs. 980 crores).

The excesses in the plan at the beginning of the sixties should not dim the fact that objectively the achievements were extraordinary. This was ascertained in the report Lester B. Pearson made to the President of the World Bank, Partners in Development, from which the following figures have mainly been taken. Between 1951 and 1966 industrial production increased by 150 per cent. The rate of growth of over 7 per cent annually achieved in the industrial sector could compare with the rate of the industrial countries in their initial stages. The stagnation of a typical colonial economy was finally lifted. India's national income has despite all crises increased at times more rapidly than that of the Chinese, which a decade ago seemed hardly to be possible. The per capita income, which in the year of independence was below Rs. 200, had (according to the prices of 1948) risen to over Rs. 350 by 1969. This is still a low figure. It, however, includes millions of small farmers, which are hardly included in the monetary system.

More than a hundred thousand new firms have been established in these fifteen years; the network of roads has been doubled and the arable area irrigated has increased fourfold. Producing now over 40,000 million kwh electric power, India has in 1969 eight times as much power as in 1951. Coal production has doubled since 1951; steel production (highest record 1966: 6.6 million tons) increased sixfold; cement production fourfold.
Moreover the chemical industry has broken new ground with the beginning of production in petrochemical complexes in Trombay and Thana. The foundations for an atomic energy industry has also been laid and India figures among the leading countries in this field. India's atomic research and its utilisation for the economy can be compared to that of Sweden.

The development of India's industry has been illustrated in the Pearson report with the following figures:

*Production of Selected Industries*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1950-1951</th>
<th>1967-1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron (million tons)</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>6.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ingots (million tons)</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>6.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway wagons (000 nos.)</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>11.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles, total (000 nos.)</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>67.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumps, power driven (000 nos.)</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>269.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric motors (000 hp.)</td>
<td>99.00</td>
<td>2029.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio receivers (000 nos.)</td>
<td>54.00</td>
<td>931.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrogenous fertilizers (000 tons of N)</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>367.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement (million tons)</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>11.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caustic soda (000 tons)</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>275.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jute textiles (000 tons)</td>
<td>837.00</td>
<td>1156.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton cloth total (million meters)</td>
<td>4215.00</td>
<td>7509.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity generated (billion kwh)</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>39.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway transport-passengers (kilometers in millions)</td>
<td>67,065.00</td>
<td>96,756.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even the number of sick beds have increased from 73,000 to 240,000 and the number of doctors has doubled. The number of children between six and eleven years who go to school has increased from 41.2 per cent in 1950 to 79 per cent today in this age group. It is now more probable that 92 per cent of India's children will attend school in 1972. The most controversial question today however is the success in the field of agricultural production which we will deal with in the tenth chapter.
On the whole, India is almost the only so-called developing country which has made systematic investments according to a rational plan. Only Pakistan has similar successes to show. In spite of many erroneous plans these efforts have borne good fruit. Only a fraction of the vast investments has disappeared through the mire of poverty and corruption. Golden beds were not bought here. India has proved that planning on a large scale is possible in a democracy also. The biggest mistakes in planning were that excess capacities were created in the heavy industries. The World Bank as well as the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin have pointed out that at times the capacities created in the public sector have not been adequately utilised. This dark aspect of Indian planning cannot be overlooked.

The background in which this occurred has been summarised by Prof. Hanson thus:

The weight of tradition, the apathy of a people sunk in deep poverty, the difficulty of squeezing extra savings out of the economy, the stagnation of India's established export markets and the uphill task of developing new ones, the inadequacy of entrepreneurial talent and the strain placed on the administration by the transition from a night watchman state to a development-oriented one. When to these we add the difficulty of operating an economy which is largely non-monetized and which consists, for the greater part, of millions of unorganized or imperfectly organized peasants and artisans, the full magnitude of the task becomes apparent.20

Foreign aid had crucially helped in the relative success of India's five year plans. According to a survey of the Indian finance ministry the sum of Rs. 7860 crores was pledged to India by the western countries (including the World Bank, the I.D.A. and the International Monetary Fund) till 31st March 1967. This includes Rs. 1650 crores to be repaid in Rupees;
the wheat supply, in particular, from the United States (Public Law 480-supplies), which alone amounted to Rs. 1130 crores. The east bloc countries have, in contrast to the disbursements from the west, offered a sum of Rs. 1800 crores to be repaid mainly in goods. Thus a sum of Rs. 9160 crores, of which a third came from the United States, was pledged to India by the east and west. The Federal Republic of Germany has pledged Rs. 750 crores, which amounts to exactly a tenth of the aid pledged by the west and not counting the World Bank it ranks second after the United States. Till 1969-70 Germany's pledged aid to India has increased to over Rs. 900 crores. In addition to this there are private investments, which are not very high, totalling Rs. 320 million in 450 joint ventures between German and Indian Industrialists. In the sphere of private investments, however, German industry takes third place—by a wide margin after Great Britain and the United States. A very representative trade delegation led by Hermann J. Abs, the chairman of the Supervisory Council of the Deutsche Bank (German Bank) visited India to investigate how German private investment to India could be increased.

The Pearson report, however, has calculated the total aid to India in a different manner and arrives at the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>India's aid receipts by plan periods</th>
<th>Millions of dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Through end of Plan I (1956)</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan II (1956-61)</td>
<td>3003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan III (1961-66)</td>
<td>6021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>1506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>1586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, one has to consider that since 1961 India has had to repay considerable sums as interest and amortization which have to be deducted from the actual aid. This interest and
amortization rose from 10 million dollars in 1956 to 411.2 million dollars in 1968. The Pearson report assumes that the foreign aid, after deducting interest, would amount to about 500 million dollars per year during the fourth plan period.

If in spite of the enormous aid and heavy taxation which makes India the highest taxed country, Indian planning cannot totally succeed in lessening the misery prevailing in the country to a large extent, then this is due mainly to the tragic race with the increase in population, which we will deal with later. Apart from this desperate basic problem India's planning crisis occurred particularly because of over-optimistic evaluation. Rectifying this is the most important task of the seventies.

Nehru himself stood in the centre of Indian planning. Consequently he made himself head of the Planning Commission and it would be unjust not to give him due credit for the success mentioned above. He was the unrelenting motive power behind India's rapid and radical modernisation. Without Nehru's energy these results would not have been achieved. This factor is frequently overlooked, for in the meantime Nehru has become the scapegoat for all India's evils.

Nehru's negative qualities have also to be taken into consideration. Many things which later were seen to be wrong in Indian planning—particularly in the hypertrophy of the system—can be retraced to Nehru directly, to his impatience and to the ambivalence of his being. During discussions on India's future constitution Nehru, under Patel's influence, declined to classify India as a Socialist Republic in the Preamble. At the famous Congress session in Avadi in January 1955 the Congress Party accepted the term 'the socialist pattern of society' as a binding maxim. Not only the right-wing group of the party, even those in the Central group and the Chief Ministers of the states particularly had no concrete idea of its meaning. Most of the Congress politicians had decided to oppose a consequent, socialization of Indian society. This was doubtlessly one of the main reasons which led to the split of the Congress Party in
1969. What Nehru himself really understood by the term 'the socialist pattern of society' he never explained. The five year plans are based on a mixed economy system which gave preference to the public sector but did not abolish the private sector.\textsuperscript{22}

It was always difficult to ascertain whether Nehru was a Liberal influenced by Marxism or a Marxist who professed liberalism. He often tried to unite principles in the economic field which excluded each other in their systematic contexts. In this Nehru does not stand alone; the same is true of a number of politicians of the British Labour Party. The consequences of such contradictions took on colossal dimensions in a statesman who was at the head of such large masses. By socialism Nehru definitely did not understand total socialism according to the Soviet pattern, because with an inherent democratic instinct he rejected any compulsory measures to be taken by the state or society—sometimes perhaps too consistently, if one thinks what labour conscription (in a country without national service) could have achieved. Although he often classified Marx as a figure of the 19th century, who could provide stimulus but in few spheres today, yet Nehru's ideas on social changes of modern capitalism were vague. This can be understood in the context of the Indian sociological conditions.

Nehru's aversion to the Indian capitalist class, in whom he saw only unscrupulous exploiters, was deep-rooted. There is an abundance of evidence to prove this; nevertheless Nehru was more attached to the thinking of his own caste than he knew, for the trader castes, the Marwaris and Banias, were despised in the Indian caste hierarchy when after the first world war they gradually started becoming entrepreneurs. There is no doubt that these castes flourished due to ruthless exploitation. They are still associated with this in the Indian consciousness. But Nehru did not realise that true entrepreneurs gradually began to develop in the fifties, even if their number were few at first. This small entrepreneur class collaborated frequently
with foreign firms, which made them maintain an attitude which differed essentially from their former exploiting methods. The fruitful collaboration between Daimler-Benz and the Tata concern in Jamshedpur is but one known example out of hundreds of others.23

During the first five year plans the new entrepreneur class has been driven to despair by an intricate maze of controls and licences. Yet it was almost a wonder that the private sector nevertheless flourished under these conditions. It was, however, no wonder that the entrepreneurs now tried to gain direct or indirect influence on the politicians and also on the officials, an attempt which brought them severe reproaches. The unmethodical system of controls and licences provoked corruption, so to say. That led then in a vicious circle back again to the fact that businessmen, especially big business gradually “replaced imperialism as the villain of the piece”.24

There have been complaints in numerous Indian articles and books that the jungle of controls is a handicap to the small entrepreneurs and favours the bigger ones. The accusation especially against the large business concern, Birlas, the most important of all Marwari concerns, has belonged for years to the constant repertoire of debates in the Indian parliament. It is quite obvious that a concern with 151 companies and property valued at three hundred crores is able to obtain licences in a manner that differs from that of a small concern.25

Nehru never succeeded in making an objective evaluation of the Indian business class. He tended to ignore the outstanding achievements of many serious entrepreneurs. Like many Indian politicians, he only saw the corrupt conditions. He did not wish to see the necessity of an increase in private capital. Instead of this he favoured that doctrinaire attitude of the Planning Commission towards Indian reality, which extended to socialising poverty. What could a socialistic pattern of society mean in a country in which scarcely a million inhabitants had taxable in-
comes in 1966. The others did not reach the lowest taxable income of three thousand rupees a year.²⁶

Nehru’s basic mistake, understandable but unusually inhibiting for the development of a rational plan, was his hopeless attempt to transfer the enthusiasm of the Indian freedom fight to making the people participate in the five year plans. In a thousand variations he repeated again and again that a rapid economic growth would only be possible with a most severe self-discipline, with participation of the entire masses, and with everyone’s selfless devotion to the planning targets and economic development. That was well and good, but time bore the burden. People tired gradually of these sermons. Economic incentives would have had a stimulating effect, which was to be seen later among the farmers of the experimental farms in Mandi. But the planning authorities recoiled from it. They dispensed with effective psychological influence and thus lost much goodwill.

A. H. Hanson in his criticism of the Indian planning methods claims that it lacked a thorough sociological foundation.²⁷ Thus the natural self-interests of India’s various classes were hardly realistically included in the plans. For example the castes who play such an important role in India’s economic life have scarcely been mentioned and when they have, then only negatively in the many thousand pages referring to the first three five year plans. In the ivory tower of Yojana Bhavan one scarcely notices how the ritually formed castes gradually changed into politically effective organisations, which began to make themselves firmly felt in the daily politics of the state capitals, far beyond personal feuds. When one reads the reasons for starting the plan one feels that the true Indian people were not taken into consideration, but rather an unknown continent. The political economic term ‘growth’ became isolated resembling a holy cow. One of the crassest results of such one-sided manner of thinking was the dangerous neglect of India’s big cities. It is agreed that Bombay, Delhi and especially Calcutta have expanded infinitely
without adequate town planning. The other side of industrialization are the slums.\textsuperscript{28}

The Planning Commission had to ascertain for themselves that in the big cities with more than a hundred thousand inhabitants the slum dwellers accounted for 20 to 60 per cent of the total population of these cities.\textsuperscript{40} If we take an average of 40 per cent in the one hundred and thirteen big cities in India, we arrive at a slum population of over fifteen million people. It is estimated that 16 per cent of the slum areas, at the most, are connected to canalization and sewage drains. Only 287 million rupees were set aside for removing slums in the Third Five-Year Plan. Removing the slums in Calcutta alone would require much more than this amount. The World Bank estimated in 1965 that about two hundred crores were necessary to clear the slums in Calcutta. This would have to begin with the transport problem (a tram in Calcutta which has 75 seats transports 200 passengers), the health system would have to be reorganized and at least, the most primitive water supply and corresponding sewage plants would have to be guaranteed. The World Bank has pointed out that it was one of the weakest points of the five year plans that the necessary money for clearing the slums in Calcutta was not set aside.\textsuperscript{30}

The social effects of industrialization and the over-rapid growth of the big cities have been given insufficient consideration in the entire planning. The term ‘growth’ should not be the only standard set by Indian economic planning if one does not want to create masses of slum dwellers whose living conditions cannot be improved any more.

Nehru’s emotional-enthusiastic attitude to economic problems and his annoyance about anything which opposed his theories had at least till the end of the Second Five-Year Plan misguided the Planning Commission to eliminate the reality of a people sunk in squalor and misery from their calculations. This game with thoughts ended in a constant ‘as if’. They behaved as if the migrants to the big cities would be able to find decent
dwellings, as if the business people would not primarily think of profit, as if the caste prejudices could be removed by an appeal, as if every state did not want to have the best piece of the cake of the total plan for themselves. When Nehru movingly referred to the new steel mills and barrages as the temples of our age, he did not relate them to the society which was slowly beginning to break with traditional ideas but which still had a strong group which did not want to break with tradition.

The basic principle of India's planning presupposes, that the present generation is ready to harvest only a fraction of the fruits of their efforts. They are prepared to forego consumption voluntarily, chiefly for the next generation and the one thereafter. Nehru knew that the dignity of man could not be considered as long as misery cries aloud to Heaven. But some time this monotonous appeal to the idealism of the population had to lead to a break. He was defeated, like many leading personalities in our era, by a collision of Utopia and reality. The heavy losses suffered by the Congress in the elections in 1967 were a harbinger of it. It was the natural reaction to promises, which can be fulfilled only in the course of time. Centuries cannot be bridged over in a decade. That was Nehru's tragedy. Without him, we said, there would not have been the powerful impetus for modernising India. He had laid a broad foundation, on which further construction is possible. But these imposing efforts of a man or of a very small circle has its other side, which became increasingly obvious.

This continued after Nehru's death. For years the nationalisation of India's banks and insurance formed the principal subject on the agenda of all Congress party sessions. At the Congress meet at Hyderabad, Finance Minister Desai had strongly opposed the nationalisation of banks. He emphasised that the state hardly had enough good experts for the two nationalised banks, leave alone for a nationalised banking system. This caused the conflict one and a half years later between Indira Gandhi and the old leaders of the Congress Party, which will be dis-
cussed later. The problem of the degree to which nationalising measures are to be taken in the Indian Republic will remain one of the most controversial subjects of India's internal politics.

It is clear that a country having the dimensions of India cannot survive without planning. And yet as inexpedient as it is for countries of normal size in Asia or Africa to have steel plants only as a matter of prestige, it is as indisputable that a country having 540 million inhabitants cannot in the long run depend on imports for its basic industries. After fifteen years of experience in planning a new evaluation is essential. India is entering an era in which social planning must have priority along with development of agriculture, if it does not want success to be jeopardised by the immense growth of the slum masses in the big cities. India's leaders have not actually realised this with the necessary clarity.

India strove for quantitative success in industry as well as education. This concurred with the infinite requirements of a post-colonial society and it would be hypocrisy if this compulsion is not judged in its true light in a country of such a size. Russia had the same problem. But in the meantime qualitative problems are peremptorily marching to the fore. The major problems are: managing public sector industries, which involves more than just administration; checking the growth of a proletariat of academicians without adequate chances of advancement in the education field; encouraging a market-oriented peasantry with production incentives in the agricultural sphere; and, clearing the slums in the large cities which oppose the training of a qualitatively efficient working group. The first generation of planners whom we became acquainted with in the extreme figure of Mr. Mahalanobis, had neither time nor understanding for qualitative problems.

It is a question of India's fate whether the new generation of planners will realise that the 'temples of our age' will be of little use if the modern temple priests are of schematic quanti-
tative fame in the ranks ranging from engineers to skilled workers, from professors to undergraduates, from academical agriculturists to the smallest peasants. India is now prepared to look at the qualitative values. Farmers, in particular, have reacted positively to the experiments in agriculture.

The manner of thinking of the first generation of planners was open to severe criticism at the end of the sixties. On the other hand the influence of indoctrinated and fanatic nationalists has increased considerably. The myth, that India could solve its difficult economic problems by dogmatic measures, has not paled. The bad experiences with the economic bureaucracy in the public sector has not changed anything there. This conflict will continue.

But India is not on the verge of a collapse, as is often believed, but of a break-through, after initial difficulties are overcome. That is why it depends crucially on the degree of private initiative to be maintained, which provided Indian economy with industrial impulses in the past two decades. The break-through period will continue for more than a decade. But in Europe in the 19th century the industrial break-through (take off, as interpreted by W. Rostow) \(^{31}\) required an even longer period of time.
The conflict with China had literally broken Nehru's heart. Frank Morley says: "‘He died on the day the Chinese crossed our frontier', a friend remarked to me on May 27, 1964, the day Nehru died." The blow which Peking dealt Nehru would have affected him less if the three tense years which preceded the actual Chinese attack in October-November 1962 had not obliterated the true depths of the conflict from his mind. While the combat was in progress in the Himalayan mountains a very shaken Nehru had confessed to Parliament of the shattering not only of his foreign policy but of his vision of the world in general: "India had lost touch with the realities of the modern world and lived in a self-created artificial atmosphere. With a deep shock we have been rudely awakened from this—all of us, the government as well as the people."

When I asked Nehru about India's relations with China in March 1957, two years before the Dalai Lama's flight which ushered in the conflict with China, he spoke of China with great respect, but also with visible remoteness "Between China and India," he said to me then, "it is not a question of power. Two very different centres are being formed in Asia. Of course acting in unison sometimes, yet basically different in their methods. We can learn something from one another, but our paths are different and cannot be the same." Not a polemic word was uttered about China. There could be no doubt that Nehru considered it inevitable, that China and India would compete
in the shaping of Asia's future, a race which, he felt, would be decided peacefully over a long period of time.

Two years had passed since the Bandung Conference, at which Nehru and Chou En-lai had appeared as rivals—a fact which rather annoyed Nehru, who felt compelled to stress India's self-awareness more than he really wanted to. A year before Bandung, on 29th April 1954, Nehru had signed an agreement with Chou En-lai, in which India recognised the Sino-Tibetan Treaty of May 1951—those seventeen points which affirmed: "The Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland—the People's Republic of China. The Central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual. The religious beliefs, customs, and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and the Lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not affect a change in the income of the monasteries."

The Dalai Lama had fled to the Indian frontier when the Chinese invaded Tibet in the autumn of 1950, but returned to Lhasa in 1951 and recognised that treaty which was to form the basis of the Sino-Indian Treaty in 1954. Thus India withdrew its protest against the occupation of Tibet which Nehru had originally made and confirmed China's sovereignty over Tibet—but under the important condition that Tibet's autonomy remain inviolable always.

The first alarm was given a year after my talk with Nehru about China. In the spring of 1958 Nehru informed Peking that he intended to return the Dalai Lama's visit in autumn. The Dalai Lama had visited Delhi in winter 1956-57 with the permission of the Chinese. Only later it was known that then itself the Dalai Lama had tried to convince Nehru that it would be better if he did not return to Tibet. He drew Nehru's attention to distinct indications that the Chinese intended to do
away with Tibet's autonomy. A number of local revolts had broken out in Tibet. But Chou-En-Lai, who had appeared in Delhi at the same time as the Dalai Lama, assured Nehru, that China would not alter anything in the conditions stipulated for Tibet, whereupon Nehru persuaded the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa, but promised to visit him in his capital and thus confirm China's promise of autonomy which had been ratified by India.

However, this was not to be. In August 1958 the Chinese communicated to the Indian Government that they did not want Nehru to visit Tibet. Nehru, however, paid a visit to the kingdom of Bhutan in September, during which he had to cross a bridle-path on Tibetan territory between Sikkim and Bhutan on horseback. At least this journey should have given Nehru an inkling of the conditions prevailing in Tibet. A member of his party told us later that the Chinese troops used the butts of their rifles to keep the Tibetan population, which had come in multitude to greet Nehru, away from the Indian delegation. The Indian guests were not supposed to have seen this, but Nehru must have realised what was happening. At the same time news of the first Chinese advances in the border areas was received in Delhi.

The following winter matters began coming to a head in Tibet. The rebellious tribes, the Khambas, increased their harassment of the Chinese occupation forces. The Chinese demanded from the Dalai Lama that he do something against the Khambas. The young God-king got involved in a severe conflict. He tried to continue the passive resistance against Chinese supremacy, but he did not let it break out openly. When finally the Chinese Military Commander and Political Commissar, Tan Kuan-san, demanded of the Dalai Lama that he leave his official residence, Potala, and enter the Chinese military command headquarters alone, without his retinue, the Dalai Lama resorted to flight on the night of the 16-17th March 1959, as he had heard that he was to be taken to Peking. The
Chinese came to know of his escape with a retinue of eighty people, (among them his youngest brother, his mother and his sister), only three days later. The Dalai Lama managed to evade the Chinese pursuers after an adventurous journey. He crossed the frontiers of the province of Assam safely on 31st March. When news of his escape became known the burning question for the world press for a week was whether he would reach Indian territory. Even the Indian Parliament had an excited discussion on his flight while he was still escaping. The newspaper-vendors in India's major cities literally had their newspapers torn from their hands. Everyone wanted to hear news of the Dalai Lama.

The Indian government provided the Tibetan God-king with a nice asylum in the hill-station, Mussoorie, which lies at the foothills of the Himalaya. Nehru visited the Dalai Lama three weeks after his arrival in India. At a press conference held after a long talk with the Dalai Lama, Nehru said in reply to a question of the diplomatic consequences of his meeting with the Dalai Lama in exile: "I met the Dalai Lama in India three years ago. He does not come to us as a vague mystical figure. He comes here as one we know. India's interest in Tibet is principally historical and sentimental and not political. I hope the present tension will not continue."

Nehru's explanation already indicates the problematical nature of the dispute. He acts out of human interest, does not evade his duty to the guest, spontaneously takes a trip to Mussoorie and yet explains at the same time that the matter is without political interest; and hopes that the tension between India and China will end as soon as possible.

His counterpart in Peking, however, did not view Nehru's actions in this light. During the Dalai Lama's flight and the weeks thereafter there were numerous anti-Chinese demonstrations in India. In Bombay an effigy of Mao Tse-tung was burnt in public. Nehru however apologised for these actions in a speech in Parliament, in which he explained why he had unhesitatingly
granted asylum to the Dalai Lama: "It is not for me to make any similar appeal to the leaders, the press and the people of China. All I can say is that I have been greatly distressed at the tone of the comments and the charges made against India by responsible people in China. They have used the language of the cold war regardless of truth and propriety. This is particularly distressing in a great nation with thousands of years of culture behind it, noted for its restrained and polite behaviour. The charges made against India are so fantastic, that I find it difficult to deal with them." (27th April 1959).

An unrestrained stream of accusations gushed forth from Peking from this day onwards. Nehru had explained on 19th April that Peking had not honoured the treaties between Tibet and China on Tibet’s autonomy nor the serious assurances it had given India. Peking in reply arrayed convincing arguments to contradict Nehru’s statements. A special issue of the Peking People’s Daily of 6th May spoke for the first time of the ‘expansionism of India’s big bourgeoisie’.

At a press conference on 14th May Nehru had stated that China would have to restore Tibet’s autonomy for the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa. “The Chinese care little for the feelings of friendly-minded nations. They have looked down on the Tibetans throughout their history, but they have also looked down on other countries, because they consider themselves to be a divine race. If China thinks that it can frighten India, it is sadly mistaken. I feel annoyed that the Chinese have begun to tell me to do this and not to do that.”

The path to conflict
Whatever occurred during the period between March and May 1959 regarding this controversial flight of the Dalai Lama only led to a further escalation. The die had been cast already for Peking. Mao Tse-tung was, as we know today, in a particularly precarious position in spring 1959. The great jump forward had failed miserably in the winter of 1958-59. There had
been violent disputes at the sixth plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in Wuhan. Mao Tse-tung did not, as we learnt eight years later, voluntarily resign his office of the President of the State, in favour of Liu Shao-chi. Liu was sworn in his new office in April 1959. All this was accompanied by conflicts more severe than anyone outside the Chinese leading circles could have ever imagined. It was the incubation period of the cultural revolution and of dissension between Mao and Liu. Nehru’s speeches fell in this tense atmosphere in Peking and evoked consequences worse than Delhi imagined. Mao, humbled by the failure of his great jump within his most intimate circle, had most probably decided to give India an enduring object-lesson and this only to show entire Asia who was the dominant power in the continent; for, a few months later the Chinese troops violated the borders for the first time. Nehru did not even think of a prolonged dispute with China. He had reacted vehemently to a challenge in the hope that this would remove a locally restricted dispute and make the Chinese see reason. He perhaps hoped, too, that autonomy would be restored in Tibet. On both sides, however, there were all the indications of a clash.

The consequent events, the intensified border conflicts, developed slowly from August 1959 to autumn 1962. A two hundred strong Chinese detachment crossed the Indian frontier in North Assam at the Himalayan control post Longju for the first time on 7th August 1959. Fourteen days later there was an exchange of fire in this lonely jungle region. At the same time it was learnt that the Chinese had occupied the eastern part of the frontier province of Ladakh—known by the name of Aksai Chin—which was governed from Kashmir. It was heard, moreover, that in 1957-58 without being noticed they had built a road through Indian territory which was to connect Tibet with Sinkiang. This was a territory which was so remote, (uninhabited and surrounded by mountainous ranges of seven thousand
metres) that small Indian patrols could only reach it once a year in summer.

On 9th September 1959 Chou En-lai sent a personal letter to Nehru in which it was asserted that the eastern region of Ladakh had no clearly demarcated boundaries; the Indian maps which claimed possession of the territory of Aksai Chin were false because China had never recognised the peace treaty concluded between the principality of Kashmir and Tibet in 1842 on the boundaries between Ladakh and Tibet. India was thus usurping 33,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory in Ladakh. The same was true for the border areas east of Bhutan. There India was claiming an area of 90,000 square kilometres which belonged to Tibet. This referred to the NEFA-area (North Eastern Frontier Agency) which is inhabited by tribes related to the Tibetans. Chou En-lai claimed in this note that this territory had been marked as belonging to Tibet in Indian maps of 1917. In actual fact Indian troops had occupied it only in 1951.

The gauntlet had been thrown; chances of an amicable compromise were remote. A new power had become evident in Asia, with which no one in Delhi had reckoned. On 12th September 1959 Nehru made the following statement in Parliament: “And I say so, I do not wish to use strong words, but it is the pride and arrogance of might that is showing in their language, in their behaviour to us and in so many things that they have done.... That is a claim (for 90,000 square kilometres of Indian territory) which it is quite impossible for India or almost any Indian ever to admit whatever the consequences.... There is no question of mediation, conciliation or arbitration about that, because that is absurd.... There is the McMahon Line. But broadly it follows the watershed. We hold by that... it involves a fundamental change in the whole geography of it, the Himalayas being handed over as a gift to them. This is an extraordinary claim.”
Thus the second act began. The dispute about the legal demarcation of the Himalayan border was to outlive Nehru.  

A paper-war followed in which Peking and Delhi tried to prove to each other in detailed notes that the demarcation of the Himalayan boundary corresponded to their legal interpretation. Thus India insisted in a note sent to Peking at the beginning of October 1959 that the boundary between Tibet and Ladakh had been determined by the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China in 1842. As proof various items of cartographical literature dating back to 1868 was mentioned, in which the demarcation line concurred with India's maps today. The Indians referred to the map attached to a convention signed by the representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet in Simla, in which the boundaries had been demarcated by the British representative, McMahon, as regards the eastern border. The Simla Convention had settled the border dispute with China's consent. The boundary ran traditionally east of Bhutan along the watershed, that means along the highest chain of peaks of the Himalayas.

The Chinese government in their reply (2nd January 1960) stated that China had never given their consent to the Simla Convention. This was, on the contrary, an imperialist act of the Anglo-Indian Government against the helpless representatives of Tibet and had always been rejected by China. This was the gist of the Chinese note which ran into several thousand words: "India must recognise the most basic fact that the entire two thousand five hundred mile boundary between the two countries has never been delimited and is therefore yet to be settled by negotiations." The McMahon Line as well as the boundaries of Ladakh were expressly stated to be illegal and it was asserted again that India had quietly usurped 122,000 square kilometres. This was substantiated by detailed historical data and maps.

I visited Nehru during this period in January 1960. The at-
mosphere had changed completely. The Prime Minister looked sad and his voice sounded surprisingly rough and aggressive whenever we got to talk about the Sino-Indian dispute. “There is no meeting ground,” he repeated. There was no meeting ground between the Chinese and Indian views: de facto the Chinese had occupied twelve thousand square kilometres of Indian territory in Eastern Ladakh. Nehru had suggested to the Chinese in autumn that the Indian troops should remain where they were, and that the Chinese should clear the area occupied by them, whereby a no-man’s land of about a hundred and fifty square kilometres would be created. The Chinese, however, rejected this suggestion. On the contrary, they had demanded of India, that the Chinese occupation of Ladakh be upheld and that at the McMahon Line both sides should withdraw their troops twenty kilometres; that is, India would have to withdraw even further from its border.

Nehru, however, did not mention the painful fact that in reality the eastern border had very few control posts. A uniform military command did not even exist in NEFA. Nehru said to me in the course of this conversation that in this year-old conflict he was less concerned about actual mileage than about its serious implications: “It is dismaying to see the mentality which lies at the back of China’s actions. I am not used to being intimidated. But it is naturally very alarming that this kind of aggressive mentality has come to Asia at all. That is what disturbs me deeply. If a major power shows such a mentality, then it can only lead to a bad end.”

During this talk with Nehru, I had the impression that he did not approve of the excitement in his own country on this subject. Apparently he would have been prepared to compromise in Eastern Ladakh (Aksa Chi). He indicated that this area was almost worthless for India and he could understand that China wanted to have a road connecting Tibet and Sinkiang, which would not have been possible elsewhere. Only Nehru demanded resolutely that Peking recognises India’s
sovereignty in this area. But Peking was not prepared to do so.

The feeling of deep disappointment which I found in Nehru was an awakening from a long-cherished illusion. India had watched the Chinese Communists seize power at the end of the forties with unreserved sympathy; Chiang Kai-shek’s regime seemed to be corrupt and compromised. The first Indian Ambassador to China during the initial stages of the Communist regime was the famous historian and statesman, K.M. Panikkar, who had witnessed the collapse of the Kuo Min-tang regime in 1948-49 in Peking. The enthusiastic reports from his embassy on the beginnings of the communist regime in China, which he later summarised in his book, had impressed Delhi considerably. Panikkar had convinced Nehru at the end of the forties that it would be possible to create a new social consciousness in Asia around the two poles, India and China. A year before India’s independence, Panikkar had summoned the first pan-Asian conference, over which Nehru presided. Even in 1960 Panikkar persisted in his opinion that there was a well-founded hope that the conflict between India and China “could be settled internally with negotiations”. Panikkar said then: “The threat of communism, which dominates the consciousness of the Europeans, does not have realistic value for Asiatic countries, which even if they should reject communism, yet are of the opinion that their independence is threatened by quite different and more acute dangers.”

The enthusiasm Panikkar had awakened in the Indian leaders for new China made them forget that in reality political and cultural ties between Asia’s two major peoples had been at a minimum throughout the centuries. Of course Buddhism had spread from India to China and had a stronger influence at times on the development of China’s culture, till it was supplanted by Confucianism. A lively intellectual and economic exchange as prevalent for a millennium between Europe’s major countries never existed between India and China. But even in
modern times the freedom movements of both the countries have rarely come into contact with each other.

India considered the Himalayas to be an insurmountable wall to the North, behind which the infinite expanse of Tibet and Sinkiang unfolded. The essence of China's culture was as remote to India as to the Europeans. Panikkar's new Asian world image, which Nehru had accepted so willingly, was an artificial structure, based on scanty information. This will clarify the tenor of an Indian note to the Chinese Government, which was published on 5th February 1960, shortly after my visit to Nehru. It concluded with the words: "The Indian people are surprised and disappointed, more so, because the Chinese Government questions India's entire historical boundaries. Recent developments have disturbed the Indian people and awakened a feeling of anxiety, on account of our lengthy boundary, which had been peaceful for centuries. The Indian Government sincerely desires a friendly agreement, but it cannot accept suggestions which affect its basic principles completely."

Khrushchev came to India for a second time during this period. This trip was essentially different from his first visit with Bulganin in December 1955. Khrushchev's visit to Delhi was a countermove to Eisenhower's appearance in the Indian capital in December 1959. The first state visit of an American president to India had gone off splendidly. Owing to the pressure of strained relations with China, the American president was received more cordially than he would otherwise have expected. In the course of this visit to India Khrushchev made several aggressive speeches against the west, in which he claimed, for example, during a visit to the Russian-aided steel plant in Bhilai, that western economy did not want India nor other developing countries to be industrialized. They wanted only to import consumer goods in order to make profit, and to keep India dependent on its agriculture and raw materials. But since only one-eighth part of India's foreign aid for the Second Five
Year Plan came from the Soviet Union, these remarks did not create a good impression in India. Khrushchev said nothing about the Sino-Indian conflict in public. Even during discussions in a small circle he made vague statements. Nehru assured the Parliament after Khrushchev's departure that India had not asked the Soviet Union to arbitrate.

Khrushchev's reserved attitude disappointed India. We now know that this visit—a year after the Sino-Indian dispute began—had played a major role in Peking's later decisions. It sufficed for the Chinese that Khrushchev paid a visit to India while Peking and Delhi were having a vehement exchange of notes. They felt that the Soviet Union was being partial and betraying the 'communist brotherhood'. Shortly after Khrushchev's second visit to India, China began its basic polemics against the Soviet Union with that famous article on Lenin's ninetieth birthday (22nd April 1960) which publicised the latent Sino-Soviet conflict.6 The question of class conflicts in the former colonies played a key role in the Chinese articles on Lenin's birthday. Khrushchev's trip to the largest non-communist country in Asia, whose leaders had been classified by Peking as being 'expansionist big bourgeoisie', had apparently hastened Mao Tse-tung's change of front against the Soviet Union.

Despite that, Mao made one last attempt to settle the Sino-Indian conflict. Chou En-lai arrived in Delhi on 19th April 1960, a few days after a Chinese note sketching the three principal points of the conflict had been received:

1. No Chinese Government had ever recognised the British claims on regions in Tibet and Sinkiang.
2. The Chinese Government had expressly stated at the Simla Convention in 1914 that it would not recognise a treaty between Tibet and British India.
3. The Chinese Government as well as Tibet protested frequently against England's violations of the traditional Sino-Indian borders. The Indian stand, that the Chinese claims
were raised for the first time in September 1959 was repudiated and it was expressly stated that during negotiations between Nehru and Chou En-Lai on Tibet in 1954 the border question was not discussed at all.

It was clear when Chou En-lai arrived in Delhi that there would hardly be any useful negotiations. Nehru welcomed the Chinese premier at the airport with a frothy speech, in which he asserted that friendship was necessary not only for these two countries but for peace in Asia and the world: "Unfortunately other events have taken place since then which have put a great strain on this bond of friendship and which have given a shock to our people. Thus our relationships have been imperilled for the present and for the future and the very basis on which they stood has been shaken..... We are thus faced with a grave problem which disturbs the minds of millions of our peoples. It is a hard task to go back and recover that feeling of good faith and friendship. Yet the future depends upon this. I earnestly trust that our efforts will be directed towards undoing much that has happened and thus recovering the climate of peace and friendship on which our relations ultimately depend."

Although Chou En-lai came with a large entourage to Delhi, only the smallest circle participated in the discussions. The experts were hardly included in the talks. The final communique six days later admitted dryly that the talks had failed. The only concrete resolution of this last meeting between Nehru and Chou En-Lai was the nomination of a Sino-Indian Government Commission, which was to join in studying all historical documents, reports and maps and in working out a report. The Commission did actually meet. For six months they discussed the boundary line in the Himalayas, but were not in a position to bring out a common report. The talks continued till January 1961 and were then broken off without any tangible results. The Indian Government presented the Parliament with a six

For two years—from Chou En-Lai's visit to Delhi in April 1960 till spring 1962—the Himalayan border was in a state of constant unrest, but without one of the two sides starting major operations. In 1961 alone 108 notes and memoranda on the border conflict were sent by the Indian authorities to Peking, which the Chinese answered with similar reproaches. Only in summer 1962, on 21st July, was there a sizeable combat near the Karakorum Pass. Here the Indians tried to move their forward posts quite a bit further to the east. Both sides began now to surround the forward posts of the other with more or less superior forces. At the controversial places there were combats between groups ranging from twenty to about five hundred men. Again Nehru tried to create a no-man's land. The suggestion was repeated in a note dated 26th July 1962, that both sides should provisionally withdraw from the controversial area of Ladakh, namely the area between the border as marked in Indian maps and the border marked in the Chinese maps of 1956. The offer could have given the Chinese Government the possibility to use the road in Aksai Chin for civil traffic. The Chinese, however, rejected this suggestion also.

Three years after the Dalai Lama's flight and the subsequent Sino-Indian dispute, the situation in the Himalayas was yet not clear to either side. Neither India nor China really controlled the border areas in the high ranges. Reaching supplies to forward posts was a problem for both sides. An Indian post with about sixty men needed about five hundred to a thousand men at the base to maintain supply. The topographical situation favoured the Chinese in Ladakh as well as in NEFA. The boundary of NEFA, in particular, runs directly in front of the sharp incline of the Himalayan mountains to the south. On the Tibetan side, however, a plateau lies just behind the highest peaks, to which the troops and supplies could be brought by means of cross-country vehicles. Even in Ladakh the Chinese
were topographically favoured. From the end of the roads to the forward posts the Indians had to walk past a jungle, rocks and glaciers, a matter of several days. The Chinese, however, could push their supply depot up to about twenty kilometres of the actual border. There was no possibility of a combined front. Two neighbouring forward posts were often separated by seven thousand metres of high mountains.

The entire border area had been completely neglected by the Indians till 1959. But even in 1960-61, when the world press gave wide coverage to the conflict, hardly anything was done in the military sphere, as we know now. Only in the spring of 1962 was the decision taken to advance as many new posts as possible right upto the border. Lieutenant-General Kaul, the later unlucky Commander in NEFA, reports that only in autumn 1961 did Nehru hold a conference during which Defence Minister Menon and the Generals Thapar and Kaul showed the Prime Minister with the help of survey maps how far the Chinese had advanced in various places during the past two years. Nehru said then, as Kaul reports, that apparently whoever succeeded in establishing even a symbolic post would establish claim to that territory. “If the Chinese could set up posts, why couldn’t we?” Nehru asked his Generals. The Indian officers explained to the Prime Minister that the logistical difficulties would be much greater; besides there were not enough trained troops for mountaineering warfare. China could overrun India’s forward posts any time, some of which in the meantime had been transferred to the valleys of the high mountain ranges with considerable effort. During the conference Nehru asserted that China did not intend to have a major war with India. He said, however, there was no reason why one could not begin to play chess with the Chinese. If they advanced in one place, we should advance in another. The participants at Nehru’s conference were of the opinion that the establishment of symbolic posts would irritate the Chinese, but no more.

Till the end of 1961, as Kaul very sceptically reports, fifty
such posts were set up in the uninhabited areas of Ladakh and NEFA. The violent clashes at the Karakorum Pass in July 1962 were the result of this forward strategy, with which India tried to maintain its rights in its own border territories. This did not involve a comprehensive strategic plan, nor did India have the intention of repelling the Chinese. Though Nehru met China's threats with strong words and unambiguous notes to Peking, yet the military counter-measures taken limited themselves to the minimum and lacked any basic idea of strategy.

General Kaul's book, The Untold Story, is his defence, because the defeat in NEFA led to his dismissal and the Indian public considered him to be chiefly responsible for the military debacle in the war with China. Yet his report could sound to a large extent credible. Kaul reports that neither Nehru nor any of his ministers had really planned a coherent defence policy; that hardly any thought had been given to the potential rival and his actual strength and that the whole defence problem in spite of the vehement exchange of notes with Peking—was not felt to be acute. In the Finance Ministry, ministerial advisers rejected most of the proposals made by the General Staff without worrying about the operative aspects. They were apparently neither examined nor understood. Finance Minister Desai did not want to hear of the strengthening of the Indian Army which would have involved foreign exchange.

The worst was that Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, continued to assure Parliament that the country's defence was well in hand, but he did little to fulfil this promise. Menon insisted that the equipment for the army be manufactured only in India; not only that, he demanded that the orders be placed only with public sector enterprises and not with private industry. As a convinced socialist, Menon wanted to cover the entire military requirements from state-owned factories. Within the public sector he had developed a large military sector under him which neither the Planning Commission nor the Finance Ministry could control. When Kaul as Chief of the
General Staff requested Nehru to bring in private industry to manufacture armament, his proposal was turned down. A proposal brought by Chester Bowles, the former American Ambassador in Delhi, who had been sent on a special mission by Kennedy, that the USA would give India military aid in view of the Chinese threat, was most vehemently rejected by Menon. If foreign military aid was to be accepted, then it was to come only from the Soviet Union.

Kaul reports that as Chief of the General Staff he addressed eight letters to Menon between November 1961 and July 1962, signed by General Thapar, Chief of the Army Staff, which mentioned the shortage of arms, equipment and clothing of the Indian army. The General Staff explained that engaging further personnel as demanded by the Government and Parliament would be senseless, if there were no additional weapons and ammunition. Indian production could by no means keep in step. Menon appears not to have presented any of these urgent proposals by the General Staff to the Cabinet. The question is, moreover, whether he discussed the demands of the military during the Cabinet meeting at all. Menon's remarkable attitude was due to the fact that he considered the conflict with China to be nothing but locally restricted misunderstandings.

Krishna Menon — the key figure

"Whether Krishna Menon is a Mcphisto, who became Nehru's evil spirit or whether he was a highly gifted interpreter of modern Asia—that did not concern my brother. He was definitely the only one among his mediocre cabinet colleagues who interested Nehru not only as a person, but stimulated him immensely and challenged him to reflect anew on the conditions in the modern world and who was intellectually his equal." Mrs. Pandit, Nehru's sister explained to me in this manner the role this ambiguous man had played in her brother's life through the years. India's policy towards Pakistan and China, the occupation of Goa, India's appearances at the
The Indian Experiment—Key to Asia’s Future

United Nations, in short, the strength and weakness of Indira’s foreign and defence policies cannot be explained without an analysis of the strange relationship which linked Nehru and Krishna Menon. Menon’s life differed completely from that of all the Congress leaders, who had spent a good many years in jail. He had never been directly influenced by Gandhi, who had moulded even western-educated Indians like Jawaharlal Nehru to become what they proved to be in the long struggle. Krishna Menon had lived abroad from the age of twenty-seven to fifty-seven, of that, twenty-eight years in London. During this period he forgot not only that he belonged to the Nair caste, Kerala’s powerful middle class, but also his mother tongue, Malayalam. Gandhi’s religiousness, which had a sub-conscious influence on agnostics like Nehru, had never affected Menon. He became a Marxist with the special English stamp when he came to London in 1924 at the age of twenty-seven. Like many other Asians and Africans Menon was one of the most zealous students of the famous Harold Laski, who as Professor in the London School of Economics had greatly influenced the first generation of young Asians and Africans seeking freedom.

Menon, living in badly heated rooms in English boarding houses and surviving on tea and toast, felt it his duty as an exile Indian to influence the British Labour Party and thereby wield the lever for India’s future freedom. He was secretary of the ‘India League’, the Congress centre for propaganda in England from 1927 to 1947. He was so closely connected with the Labour Party that he was selected twice to contest a seat in the House of Commons. However, the second time the party leaders withdrew his candidature because Menon had associated himself too closely with the small group of British Communists. After decades of absence, he had no real idea of the India which fought against the British rule. It was the India of his dreams which he as a propagandist presented to the parliamentarians of the Labour Party in London.
Menon earned his living as a literary agent and finally, after years of hardship, success with a little material profit came his way. He was the first editor of the Pelican pocketbook series, which created a revolution in England's book trade similar to that of the cheap Reclam books in Germany. His connections with the publishing houses were instrumental in his meeting with Nehru, whose first books he arranged to get published in London. Soon a personal relationship developed from this literary encounter, which strengthened when Nehru's daughter, Indira, utilised her stay in Oxford at the end of the thirties to work for the India League.

To the surprise of the Congress politicians Nehru appointed his former literary agent as India's first High Commissioner in Great Britain in recognition of his services to the India League. Menon was almost unknown in India then and most of the politicians of the Congress party who had occasionally met him in London considered him to be so closely allied to the Communists that they thought he was unsuitable for such an important assignment. These arguments did not move Nehru. He had to pay bitterly, however, for his choice of the first ambassador to Britain, when Menon soon became involved in a number of scandals. It has never been clarified whether these occurred through ineptitude or through less honest intentions. Anyway, it is a fact that Menon concluded a contract in 1948 with a completely unknown firm, Anti-Mistantes Ltd., for supplying the Indian army with two thousand jeeps, of which only 155 were supplied later—and most of which were unserviceable—before the firm became bankrupt. This deal alone cost India two million rupees. In spite of this bad experience Menon concluded an agreement with another similarly unknown firm with a capital of a hundred pounds to supply arms and ammunition valued at thirty million rupees. The Indian Government did not fare much better in this affair. Investigations on this and other scandals were dropped.

Only a few in India claim that Menon, who till his appoint-
ment as High Commissioner had led a very modest life, profited by these deals. The suspicion, however, was never eliminated that the money went to some extreme leftist political groups.

When Menon finally returned to India in 1956 he had gained considerable popularity by his speeches in the United Nations regarding the conflict with Pakistan. He became famous with his marathon speech to the Security Council which had lasted almost a whole day. The Indians did not know that Menon's arrogance in the United Nations had lost their country a great deal of sympathy, especially from the smaller countries.  

Called to the cabinet as Defence Minister, he contested for a seat in Parliament from North Bombay during the elections of 1957 and won it by a wide margin. Prior to these elections Menon had attended a meeting of the Security Council on the Hungarian problem. There, without waiting for definite instructions from Delhi, he threw India's vote in the ballot box of the East bloc. No other non-communist country had voted against the condemnation of the Soviet Union's brutal attack on Hungary. When Nehru saw that he was confronted by a highly critical Indian public, he dissociated himself from Menon, but the impression remained that India had opposed a small nation fighting for its freedom.

Menon was convinced even in the case of Hungary that imperialistic acts of suppression were only committed by the white-skinned powers against the coloured people. Even then he challenged the fact that Communist countries were able to intervene imperially. As Defence Minister, Menon had also given his commands for military operations on these principles. He considered Pakistan to be India's only enemy. He felt that the Northern border was not jeopardised, even after the Chinese resorted to clear threats. Although Menon's efforts had shown significant results in the internal organisation of India's armed forces, which had been neglected till he took charge, General Kaul sarcastically remarks that he did not pay enough attention to actual operational matters, which were important for India's
situation. This statement is very significant considering that General Kaul had originally been Menon's protegé.

Nehru's uncritical attitude towards his Defence Minister did not change even long after alert minds in India had recognised the change in the situation since the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet. Menon contested the 1962 elections in the North Bombay constituency against one of the most eloquent orators of India, the former Congress president, Kripalani, an independent. It was a bitter fight, in which Nehru intervened and said: "A vote against Menon is a vote against me."

Finally Menon conquered his extraordinary rival with a majority of 141,000 votes and thus had the greatest personal success in the election campaign of 1962. He told the American journalist Welles Hangen after his election victory: "That is a fresh mandate for socialism." General Kaul confirmed in his memoirs that this victory strengthened the Defence Minister's prestige to such an extent that Nehru was not at all prepared to listen to any criticism from the military. Five years later the same constituency, North Bombay, paid Menon's illusions back in the same coin. The regional Congress party refused to sponsor him as a candidate, so that at the end of 1966 he resigned from the Congress and contested as an independent. He lost to Barve, an illustrious member of the Planning Commission, by 12,000 votes. Barve died a few weeks after the elections necessitating a by-election for which Menon stood again. His rival, Mrs. Sapre, Barve's sister, politically unknown till then, won the second election with a majority of 15,000 votes. When Krishna Menon celebrated his seventieth birthday in May 1967, he was an outsider whose words were of little significance.

Menon's case is characteristic of many Asian politicians of the first generation after the fight for independence. I spoke to him only once. He asked me then, why did Adenauer not include Ulbricht as his Deputy in his cabinet and why was the weekly Christ und Welt of which I was the editor, not published in English. The lean and lanky man with a somewhat Lucifer-like
head and an elusive look could have hardly reacted more characteristically. His colleagues in the Defence Ministry report of an embarrassing arrogance with which he treated his subordinates, especially when they spoke English with an accent. Once he interrupted a general, who began his sentence with "I think..." with 'Soldiers are incapable of thinking'.

He let many of his cabinet colleagues feel that he considered them to be simpletons.

Nehru, who did not share the complexes of his adviser and who was well aware of his bad manners, was the only person, who, if necessary, could handle Menon as a superior. The relationship between the two men was that of equals. Perhaps that was the reason why Nehru defended Menon unusually vigorously, sometimes fiercely, whenever complaints were made about him. Walter Crocker, Australian High Commissioner in Delhi for years, remarked that in spite of Menon's indubitable talents, he was a rather incomplete personality. Perhaps this had attracted Nehru. Accustomed to severe self-discipline he could discern in Menon's brilliant pointed apercu what he did not allow himself to say.

This complex relationship explains Nehru's biggest error, the underestimation of China's intentions. He threw the warnings of the generals to the winds, because in his subconsciousness he had utmost faith in the opinion of the non-professional Menon. He parted company with Menon only in the face of visible defeat. Harold Laski's one-sided definition of imperialism was fatal for both of them. The Marxist Laski school believed that capitalism and imperialism were the two sides of one and the same medal and never appeared separated from one another. That English professor's school did not realise that imperialism is a phenomenon, which is created from a power relationship independent of the ideological basis, for they saw power only as an expression of the class structure. This narrow-minded opinion of the course of world history is the answer to the miscalculation of China by the Indian leaders.
War in the Himalayas

We return now to the report on the Sino-Indian dispute in autumn 1962. As we have seen, the Indians had decided on a forward strategy in spring 1962, i.e. they had advanced their posts in Ladakh and NEFA to the line occupied by the Chinese, that is, to the border. In September 1962, there were renewed Chinese counter-moves in NEFA and especially at the place where three countries meet—India, Tibet and Bhutan. These Chinese advances which continued throughout September alarmed the Indian government in such small measure that Nehru went to London for the Commonwealth Conference at the beginning of September and thereafter visited Nigeria, and even Defence Minister Krishna Menon led the Indian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation. The situation had become acute on their return to India at the end of September. The army suggested that the border posts should be withdrawn further back, as they could not hold out against a serious attack. Nehru and Menon decided in favour of the opposite. On 13th October, Nehru announced at a press conference that he had ordered the army to push out the Chinese from Indian territory in NEFA. It is probable that this statement precipitated China’s final decision to attack India.

The attack followed in the early hours of 20th October, during which the Chinese used four divisions, whereas the Indian side had only one division scattered over a wide region. The first fights took place at a height of over 4200 metres. The Chinese had—apart from their superior strength and equipment as well as troops experienced in mountain-warfare—the advantage that they were launching their assaults downhill. A week later they had advanced forty kilometres deep into NEFA and were at three thousand metres above sea-level. Stiff resistance from India was impossible in the wild gorges which went down to the valley. Such resistance would have been possible at the Se-La Pass, which was an almost insurmountable obstacle further south. Here the Indians had the advantage
that they were on a higher level, whereas the Chinese would have to conquer a two thousand metre steep wall. After a fortnight’s lull in the fighting the Chinese made an amazing advance by circling around Si-La Pass. They could have marched into the Brahmaputra plains. The Indian army was completely routed and an organised resistance in Assam would have hardly been possible. The Chinese, however, unexpectedly announced on 20th November 1962 that their troops would cease fire. On 22nd November at 1-00 a.m. a provisional cease-fire was to come into effect. At the same time they announced that the Chinese ‘frontier guards’ would withdraw behind the ‘lines of actual control’ which existed between China and India on 7th November 1959. This was also true of Ladakh, where the Chinese had made a less spectacular advance and had thrust India’s forward posts back. War was discontinued by the Chinese after an almost absolute victory in NEFA and after gaining considerable territory in Ladakh. Even today Asia’s military and political leaders wonder what caused China to withdraw.

The theory frequently expressed, that the Chinese were deterred by the possibility that America and England could attack and that they feared in particular that the Americans would use the atom bomb, is incredible. Neither Washington nor London threatened China directly or indirectly with such an attack. America and England consented to supply arms when Nehru applied to the two powers after the first major attack. In fact the first air-lift was built from London-Frankfurt, Turkey, Aden to Calcutta from the 2nd to 10th November, delivering the infantry with arms valued at twenty million marks. Every three hours a transport plane loaded with arms took off. On 19th November a day before China declared its cease-fire, Nehru had requested Kennedy and Macmillan for an immediate supply of heavy armament and for American transport planes as the NEFA-front was collapsing. On the same day Kennedy sent the former Governor, Averell Harriman,
with a three-man military delegation to Delhi. The Chief of the General Staff, Sir Richard Hull, came from London. A comprehensive delivery programme was drawn up with India’s new Defence Minister, Chavan. Detailed staff discussions took place between India and the western powers for the first time; this had not happened during the delivery at the beginning of November. These were all such minor matters that they could not have hindered the Chinese from continuing their campaign.

India was very disappointed in the attitude of the neutral states. Tito and Nasser, Mrs. Bandaranaike from Ceylon and Sukarno, Sekon Touré and Kwame Nkrumah—they all used non-committal phrases, strove to make doubtful negotiations or, like Nkrumah, openly favoured the Chinese.

**Moscow remained neutral**

The Soviet Union did not give India any assistance in their time of need. That was surprising, for since the beginning of the Sino-Indian dispute Moscow had adopted a neutral attitude which could be regarded as being in favour of India. After the first minor skirmishes in the Himalayas, the Soviet news agency TASS published a statement on 10th September 1959 in which it was emphasised that the Soviet Government had friendly relations with India as well as with China. Since then, Moscow has made a subtle distinction between ‘our Chinese brothers’ and ‘our Indian friends’. Only much later the Peking *People’s Daily* reported that the Chinese Government had continually protested against the neutral attitude of the Soviet leaders.

The Chinese had synchronised their military action in the Himalayas with Khrushchev’s action in Cuba. Khrushchev began his preparations of making Câba a missile base in the Caribbean Sea at the beginning of September 1962. At the same time the first Chinese attack with whole companies began in NEFA. Later Khrushchev tried to create the impression that China’s military advances in the Himalayas were an absolute surprise for him. A year later, on 18th and 23rd September 1963,
the *Pravda* published a detailed report on the Sino-Indian conflict, in which it was stated that the Chinese had not informed the other communist countries of its plans. The *Pravda* indicated clearly that Moscow considered the Chinese attack in those days of intense tension on account of Cuba to be just a stab in the back. The *Pravda* mentioned also that the border disputes in the Himalayas in August 1959 were related to Khrushchev's forthcoming trip to America to visit Eisenhower. It was a Chinese intrigue to counteract the *detente* between America and the Soviet Union.

Mao launched a counter-attack against this Soviet report on 2nd November 1963 and made public the Chinese version with documentary evidence in the Peking *People's Daily*. It was truly sensational. Since Moscow did not attempt to deny the Chinese assertions, they are perhaps true. The Peking *People's Daily* reported that twelve days prior to China's major attack in the Himalayas the Soviet Ambassador in Peking was informed that India planned a massive attack on China. At the same time the Chinese Government protested to the Soviet Ambassador that the Indian army was using Soviet transport planes (8th October 1962). It was the week in which the first rockets arrived in Cuba. Khrushchev and the Soviet leaders were in great panic. During this time the first reports were made in America which pointed to an unusual military build-up in Cuba.

On 15th October Khrushchev explained verbally to the Chinese Ambassador—according to the above report of the Peking *People's Daily*—that: "Soviet information concurs with the Chinese as regards India's plans to attack. If the Soviet Union were in the same position as China, it would definitely take similar measures. We cannot adopt a neutral attitude in the Sino-Indian border dispute. If China is attacked, then it would be treason if we were to remain neutral."

- It was known in Moscow that India did not plan a major attack in NEFA and moreover it was not in a position to do so. Khrushchev's note to the Chinese Ambassador was an open
invitation for the Chinese to begin a massive attack without Soviet interference. One day after Khrushchev's secret, important announcement to the Chinese Ambassador, Kennedy received the first photographs taken by a U-2 of the Soviet rocket installations in Cuba. And a week later China's massive attack began in the Himalayas. Moscow maintained silence at first. On 25th October the Pravda distinctly favoured China. Three days previously on 22nd October Kennedy had announced his famous ultimatum to the Soviet Union. The crisis was at its climax and no one knew then whether the third world war would break out.

The Soviet Ambassador in Delhi, Ivan Alexandrovitch Benediktov, visited Nehru and warned him expressly from accepting western arms. The exact text of Benediktov's statement is not known but from Delhi's nervous reactions it was clear that the Soviet Union was covering its Chinese allies. This must have been a terrible surprise for Nehru. He had hoped at least that the Soviet Union would be neutral after the previous violent conflicts between Peking and Moscow. Now he saw Moscow dropping him. He had to turn to the West with an appeal for aid. As far as is known, Nehru had reproached Khrushchev in these days of despair, that Moscow was contributing to marring the present Indian policy of non-alignment. Nehru's urgent appeal, however, fell on deaf ears in the Kremlin. On 5th November, Pravda repeated the suggestion that both sides should agree to an unconditional cease-fire. As the Chinese had advanced far into Indian territory, this was again considered partiality in favour of China. The Cuban crisis had not blown over entirely but since Khrushchev's message on 28th October in which he stated he was prepared to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, the danger of a war breaking out had been reduced to a minimum.

Khrushchev could therefore allow a change in his stand on the Sino-Indian conflict, as was seen from the 6th to the 9th November. On 10th November Nehru informed the Indian
Parliament that the Soviet Union had agreed to supply the twelve MIG—supersonic planes which had been ordered sometime previously. This was of no significance from the military point of view as the delivery was to be made only in the spring of 1963. But politically this statement was of paramount importance. At least the facade of the non-alignment policy was saved. Nehru's statement made with authorisation from Moscow showed that Khrushchev—after settling the Cuban crisis—could think of his policy against China's expansion. Nearly a year later TASS stated (21st September 1963): "The Chinese leaders have developed special aims and interests in Asia, which cannot be supported by the military power of the socialist camp."

This was nearly the abrogation of the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty of 1950. Khrushchev's attitude during the war in the Himalayas had shown Delhi how much Indo-Soviet relations were dependent on the world political situation. There was no doubt that Khrushchev had given the Chinese carte blanche during the most dangerous moments.

What did the Chinese want?

This brings us closer to the truth about the Chinese war in the Himalayas and its sudden discontinuance. Peking wanted to make two things clear. It was to be made indisputably evident to Asia that India was by no means on an equal footing with China. All Asians were to realise that there was only one true major power on their continent. Similarly, Peking wanted to prove that the Soviet Union was not a reliable ally for Asian powers if they entered into a conflict with China. Even the Soviet Union was to be discredited in this war in the Himalayas. China with shrewd dexterity chose a time for this action when the Soviet leaders were otherwise engaged and could not act in Asia. China wanted to take its revenge on the Soviet Union for giving more development aid to India than to China since Khrushchev's first Asian tour in December 1955 which extended to the supply of arms in 1961.
By humiliating India, Peking wanted to win the prolonged political race between India and China in influencing Asia's future development with a blow in favour of the red mandarin. This could only happen in a trial of military strength—provided Peking saw to it, that such an action did not appear to be an imperialistic act of force. Whereas Europe and America were surprised at China's discontinuance of military operations, Asia understood immediately Peking's intentions. China could never think of destroying India or compelling it to capitulate absolutely. That would not only have overtaxed China's abilities, but would not have been profitable either. Peking wanted to make Nehru irretrievably lose face and thus chastise and humiliate India and have an indelible effect on Asia. China also planned to prepare a crushing defeat for Nehru—and then to withdraw so far that India's army could not hit back at the enemy. This clever plan in Asia's power-politics was a total success.

Another purpose of the campaign was to plant an obstacle in India's plans for development. In 1962 China was at the end of the three year period of hunger which had followed the big leap forward. India had made obvious economic advance during these years. By unleashing a war Peking had found a simple means to hinder India's economic progress which the Chinese did not want and compelled the Indian government to set aside a major portion of their future investments for military needs. That has also happened and India's economic development has suffered a setback.

In order to achieve these various targets, the Chinese leaders had combined limited but unusually well calculated strategic operations with a well-planned diplomatic action and carried it out to perfection. It was meant not to demonstrate strength but to attain a political target determined previously in detail. An observer of the Asian scene will have to agree that the Chinese calculated their stakes as well as Kennedy had in Cuba. No one felt the loss of face more than Nehru. The major role which
India had played in Asia and, over and above that, in the world in the first decade after the world war was for sometime shaken; Nehru's heirs continued to bear the after-effects of the well calculated Chinese operation, even if the Indian armed forces regained their honour in the short war against Pakistan.

The relations between China and India remained tense in the following years. The negotiations of some neutral states, which met often in Colombo during 1963, failed. The Chinese rejected all compromise and did not give Ali Sabri, Egypt's Prime Minister, the emissary of the Colombo-states, who travelled between Delhi and Peking, any chance. There have been no further military operations on a massive scale in the Himalayas. In autumn 1965 and 1967 the borders of the Indian protectorate Sikkim were threatened. This was a sign that the Chinese had not given up the political aims achieved by the Himalayan war. The pressure on India's northern border has become a permanent feature. So India is compelled to increase its defence budget continually.
Nehru had always been reluctant to designate a successor. He was too confirmed a democrat not to leave the question of his successor to the natural process of selection. He did not visibly react, therefore, to the endless discussions in the last decade of his life on 'After Nehru—Who?'. The failure Churchill experienced in his designation of Eden as his successor must have convinced Nehru that he should refrain from a final decision. A few weeks before his death he even remarked to an American TV reporter: "If I nominated somebody, that is the surest way of his not becoming Prime Minister. People would be jealous of him, dislike him." However, there was little doubt that since 1961 Nehru considered Lal Bahadur Shastri, to whom he assigned the Home Ministry, to be the most suitable nominee. However, some well-informed sources in India believe that secretly Nehru considered his daughter to be the most apt successor.

Nehru himself had set the stage in his last year for a smooth transition. He had appointed not his successor but the future maker of kings. Spring and summer 1963 were overshadowed by the after-effects of the defeat in the Himalayas. Nehru's prestige had suffered a jolt and the Prime Minister no longer seemed to be in a position to intervene in the quarrels erupting in many states with his usual energy. During this period of uncertainty, he enlisted a man, who belonged to the old battle-horses of the Congress Party, but had been only of regional importance: the Chief Minister of Madras, K. A. Kamaraj. Thus a person who
differed essentially from the Congress political leaders in the Centre, stepped overnight onto the all-India scene. When Nehru decided in July 1963 to elevate to national importance a man, who hardly spoke a word of Hindi and knew little English, he knew that the future India would no longer be governed so exclusively by more or less anglicised politicians.

Kamaraj, born in 1903 to poor parents in a small town in Tamilnadu was a member of the widespread Nadar caste which as toddy tappers stood on the lowest rung of the caste ladder, only a little higher than the untouchables. This fact was to be of utmost significance in Kamaraj’s political ascent because of the continuing conflict between the Brahmans and the non-Brahmin castes in the last decades of British rule in Tamilnadu, which was exploited by the English in their usual method of *divide et impera*. Kamaraj, falling under the influence of Gandhi as a young man, became President of the Congress Party in Tamilnadu at the age of thirty-seven. That was the first spectacular breakthrough of non-Brahmins, because till then the Brahmans had controlled the Tamilian Congress organisation almost exclusively. Kamaraj always considered himself to be a man of the simple people. He completely lacked intellectual finesse. But for all that he had a marked instinct for power. In the forties, during which Kamaraj, like all leading Congress politicians, was imprisoned for a long time by the English, there arose a sharp rivalry between him and the Congress politician C. Rajagopalachari (called Rajaji), the undisputed intellectual leader of the South, a widely educated Brahmin who must have been repelled by the uncouth and rustic directness of a Kamaraj.

Rajaji was the first Indian Governor General in 1948-50: Mountbatten’s successor; he became Home Minister in Delhi later for a short time; then he resigned from the Congress Party in a huff and finally founded the Swatantra Party, a right-wing opposition group. He returned to Madras as Chief Minister in 1952. When he was succeeded by Kamaraj in 1954, the predo-
minance of the Brahmans in Tamilnadu began to diminish. Only a bitter animosity remained between the two leading men of the South, rooted deeply in their intellectual habits and origin. It was to end in 1967 with Kamaraj’s defeat in the elections. When I met Rajaji the day after in his house, he did not conceal the feeling of personal triumph at the defeat of his rival—even if it was with the help of the lower castes. Two years later Kamaraj tried to balance his crushing defeat of 1967 by contesting a by-election. He achieved an overwhelming victory with a majority of more than 120,000 votes, and entered the Lok Sabha again. In the elections of 1971, he emerged as the only successful candidate of the ‘old’ Congress in the South.

For nine years Kamaraj was a successful Chief Minister in Madras State. During his long period of rule, the land of the Tamilians developed economically far better than many other federal states. He did not belong to Nehru’s close circle during this period, but he was a highly respected ruler and seemed to be a sure guarantee that the Congress Party would retain its political upper hand in Tamilnadu for a long time. Kamaraj met Nehru in July 1968 in Hyderabad and had a long talk with him about the phenomena of dissension throughout the country, especially in many state capitals. Kamaraj suggested to Nehru that he would resign as Chief Minister and devote himself for some time only to revitalising the party, and asked the Prime Minister whether in view of the crisis in the Congress Party it was not time to reform the whole leadership of the country from its very base.

The idea that a mighty man should renounce everything one day and wander through the land with a staff in his hand in order to demonstrate his ideas to the simple people had always played a major role in India. Even Gandhi had practised it. Later the Socialist leader Jayaprakash Narayan had trod a similar path when he renounced politics and joined Vinoba Bhave’s Bhoomidan movement. Thus Kamaraj’s idea did have a certain inspiration.
When a few weeks later the leaders of the Congress Party met, Kamaraj explained in an impressive speech that it was time that all the Cabinet members and also all Chief Ministers of the states tendered their resignation in order to give the Prime Minister the opportunity of reorganising the Cabinet and the party. The Prime Minister was then to select the Cabinet ministers and chief ministers who were to give up their office so that they could devote themselves solely to work for the party. After Nehru was convinced by his friends that he would not have to resign, the Kamaraj Plan was accepted unanimously. Thus Nehru had a free hand. For the first time in Nehru's rule, the opposition submitted a no-confidence motion a few days later made by their mighty speaker Kripalani, who severely criticised the government for its failure in the campaign against China. This no-confidence move was, as was to be expected, rejected by a large majority. During the five-day debate on this motion, Nehru decided finally to act. Immediately thereafter, he announced that he had accepted the resignation of six cabinet ministers and six chief ministers (24-8-1963).

Among the ministers made to resign was naturally Kamaraj, as also Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who had ruled Kashmir with a strong hand for ten years. But more important was the fact that three ministers were to be removed from the Central Cabinet, who would be considered potential successors: Home Minister Shastri, Finance Minister Desai and Minister for Agriculture, S.K. Patil. This resulted in a uniformity in the chances of the Pretender to the Throne as seen as a matter of form.

The political meaning of this major cabinet reshuffle in Nehru's time was very obvious indeed. The left wing of the Congress Party in the Cabinet had been considerably weakened by the Chinese attack. Krishna Menon, the avowed head of the left group, had had to leave the cabinet ignominiously. His most loyal follower, the Minister for Mines and Power, K.D. Malaviya, had resigned in June 1963 after an unpleasant case of corruption. This had resulted in the right
wing, represented by Desai and Patil, having a majority which Nehru wished to remove. He was mainly concerned in removing these two ministers: politically it was covered by the fact that even Shastri, Nehru’s confidante in the Cabinet, had been made to resign. His place was taken by an orthodox Hindu, the Planning Minister, G. Nanda, a veteran member of the Cabinet and the Congress, a man to whom Nehru, however, did not attach any significance. Decisive in Kamaraj’s Plan was the dexterous manner in which Desai was made to resign, by far the most influential figure in Nehru’s cabinet. The Prime Minister wanted to exclude him thus from the war of succession. He succeeded in it. Without this move Morarji Desai would perhaps have become Nehru’s direct successor. With the resignation of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Nehru wanted to pave the way for a new solution of the embroiled situation in Kashmir, a problem in which he was to strive even in the last weeks of his life without success.

The second most important move for the succession followed a few weeks later when the so-called Syndicate met, which in the initial years after Nehru’s death was to gain vital importance. Kamaraj met a few older Congress politicians—especially Atulya Ghosh, the President of the Bengal Congress Party for many years, Sanjiva Reddy, the Congress leader from Andhra Pradesh, and Nijalingappa, the Chief Minister of Mysore, in the South Indian place of pilgrimage, Tirupathi, in September 1963. For the first time there were frank talks on Nehru’s successor and the question on who would be the future Congress President was decided. The group, which was in constant contact by telephone with Mr. S. K. Patil in Bombay, voted for Kamaraj during their talks. Perhaps they considered Shastri to be the most suitable successor to Nehru. The Syndicate, as this group of veteran Congress politicians was called by the Press, were united in one negative goal: to exclude Morarji Desai from becoming Nehru’s successor. At first they tried to
hinder Desai from contending for the Presidentialship of the Congress Party. The syndicate saw clearly that after Nehru's exit the office of the Congress President would gain in importance, after having had no significance for the last seventeen years. The unanimous vote for Kamaraj as Congress President in November 1963 saw the distribution of the future roles. Kamaraj was to take up his office at the 68th Congress session in Bhubaneshwar (the capital of Orissa). A day after the session had begun Nehru suffered a stroke, which partly paralysed his left side. Sooner than expected the question of his successor became acute. Fourteen days later Shastri was brought back into the Cabinet but not as Deputy Prime Minister, which would have confirmed him as Nehru's successor, but as Minister without Portfolio. However all the work of the sick Prime Minister was handed over to him. Kamaraj's appointment as Congress President and Shastri's as Nehru's most important Cabinet aide paved the way for a smooth transition when Nehru suffered another stroke five months later in the early hours of 27th May and closed his eyes forever that afternoon.

The difficult Desai
After Nehru's death the Congress Party have had to elect a new Prime Minister four times. Three times it was almost the same state of affairs: the candidate selected by the majority was opposed by Morarji Desai. Twice unanimity was achieved after long discussions: during Shastri's election and during Indira Gandhi's second election. Once there was an open conflict between the candidate of the majority and the candidate of the minority: at Indira Gandhi's first election. On the fourth election of a Prime Minister in March 1971, Desai was no longer an element of power.

Desai was Chief Minister of undivided Bombay State for a long time before Nehru asked him to join the Union Cabinet as Minister for Trade and Commerce. In 1958 he became Finance Minister, after the same T.T. Krishnamachari, who
was to replace him in 1963, had been involved in a scandal without being personally at fault. Nehru had admired Desai as an efficient administrator in Bombay and had offered him an important ministry several times before he actually came to Delhi. Nehru's dislike, even aversion, to Desai developed only later on, when Nehru began to feel that this strong-willed man could one day be the cause of a split in the Congress Party if he became Nehru's successor. Since the time Nehru was convinced of this he did everything in his power—together with the leaders of the Congress Party to hinder Desai's political ascent.

Born in 1896 in a Brahmin family of Gujarat, in the home land of Mahatma Gandhi, Desai had a long administrative career behind him before he became Bombay's Chief Minister. Dressed always in a spotless white starched dhoti, to which he added a waistcoat in winter, Desai portrays even outwardly something puritanical. He is not only a vegetarian, but he does not drink even tea. When he was invited to Baden-Baden some years ago, the Mayor, his host, was given exact instructions on what could be served. As a severe opposer of alcohol he had been able to introduce prohibition in Bombay, with the success that there is no other Indian city with more illicit distilleries which brew mixtures harmful to health. His campaign in the fifties against prostitution, which was prevalent in a notorious area in Bombay, was a source of amusement. It led finally to a demonstration by the women of easy virtue, whose charming advocates the Chief Minister had to receive.

Even if Nehru accepted the peculiar personal habits of his Finance Minister, Desai's fanatic espousal to introduce Hindi as the national language appeared to him to be dangerous. The Syndicate which aimed at ousting Desai comprised mainly of South Indian politicians who knew what explosives the language problem concealed. Desai showed some authoritarian traits as Finance Minister. He never shunned unpopular measures, even if they did not contribute much to the national
coffers—as for example, prohibiting the goldsmiths from processing high-graded gold, which paralysed the craft for years. As Patel’s spiritual successor the strictly orthodox Desai had always thought poorly of doctrinaire socialists. His attempt to treat the private sector in Indian economy better brought on him the anger of the confirmed socialists. This could also be a reason why Nehru wanted to hinder his further ascent. Menon and Desai have always been extreme poles apart, a fact of which both made no secret. No other Indian politician has the self-confidence with which Desai explained to his visitors without compunction that he would be the most suitable man, anyway as compared to his rivals, for the highest office in India. This was his attitude on all three occasions when there was an election for the Prime Minister after Nehru’s death. In 1969 Desai stood in the midst of a severe conflict which was later to split the Congress Party.

The preparations to elect a successor for the first time at the beginning of June 1964 were relatively simple. It was clear from the beginning that Shastri would have an overwhelming majority. The only difficulty was that Home Minister Nanda, who had been sworn in as Acting Prime Minister by Radhakrishnan on Nehru’s death, showed an inclination to stay in office, which caused Morarji Desai to stake his own claim also. Another problem was the question whether unanimity in the Congress High Command, the Working Committee, was sufficient to avoid a discussion by all the members of the Congress Party. This was finally affirmed. Kamaraj was instructed by the Working Committee to bring about unanimity. To remove Nanda’s claims was not difficult for Kamaraj. There was a bitter fight with Desai which extended over a number of days till finally he agreed to an unanimous election for Shastri. Kamaraj and the Syndicate had played such an overpowering role in the preparations for his election that it was clear from the beginning that the new Prime Minister would have to share the power with
those who raised him to the office. Only in the last few weeks before his death Shastri won greater freedom of action, due to his firm stand in the war with Pakistan.

Sooner than expected the problem of electing a Prime Minister recurred nine months later when Shastri died of a heart attack suddenly on 11th January 1966 in Tashkent immediately after the conclusion of the treaty with Pakistan. India and its Congress leaders had been prepared for Nehru’s death, and Shastri was made successor step by step, but Shastri’s death created a vacuum. The Congress President himself was the focus of many eyes at first, but he said immediately that he would not contest the election. Moreover the office of Congress President was so important in an election year that he did not want to give it into other hands. Kamaraj, of course, knew that a politician from South India, who did not understand the main language of the country, could not aspire to be Prime Minister. Candidates with equal chances were Nanda, who was again appointed acting Prime Minister, Defence Minister Chavan, who could reap the fortunate termination of the war with Pakistan, Morarji Desai, and finally Indira Gandhi who had entered Shastri’s Cabinet as Minister for Information and Broadcasting. During her father’s lifetime she was often considered a potential successor; after his death she had stepped into the background.

When two days after Shastri’s cremation the Working Committee met on 14th January to elect the new Prime Minister, it was clear that there was no unanimity. The Committee met briefly only for an hour and decided to make the entire Congress Party decide on the selection of the Prime Minister, and summoned it for 19th January. As no one suggested at the meeting of the Congress Working Committee that the Acting Prime Minister, Nanda, should continue in office till the elections in early 1967, he did not come into consideration as a candidate. At first Desai and Chavan stood opposed to each other. Kamaraj’s views on Desai had not changed since Shastri’s election. But Defence Minister Chavan had to reckon
with the dislike of some neighbouring states, especially Mysore, with whom Maharashtra always had border disputes, which increased even more after Maharashtra staked a claim to incorporate Goa. Thus Chavan as Maharashtra's former Chief Minister, did not appear to be a very promising opponent. Kamaraj then passed the word among his closest colleagues that the most suitable candidate would be Indira Gandhi. The Indian press had been won over almost by storm for this candidature on the following day. Kamaraj received the Chief Ministers who had gathered in Delhi of whom eleven (out of sixteen) were clearly in favour of Indira Gandhi. Chavan withdrew from the contest. In the following two days an unsuccessful attempt was made to ask Morarji Desai to withdraw also.

Indira Gandhi did little for her own candidature. In contrast to the other three candidates she did not show the least indication of aspiring to be Prime Minister in the first days after Shastri's death. Only after Kamaraj sent her a message, urgently requesting her to contest the elections, did Indira Gandhi tell the reporters who were harassing her that she would concur with the wishes of the Congress President. That was at a moment when only her own consent was necessary to set the seal on her victory. Kamaraj had also assured himself of the consent of the Syndicate, which had used its influence on the heads of the states whose votes were so decisive in Indira Gandhi's first election.

When in the early hours of 19th January, 524 Congress parliamentarians of both houses voted for the new Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi received 355 votes and Desai 169, almost a third of the votes. The role of the Congress President was of greater importance in Indira Gandhi's election than in Shastri's election. With a certain right the maker of kings could claim that the new Prime Minister was his political creation. This was to cause tension later, which could be noticed already during the formation of the Cabinet, when Mrs. Gandhi wanted to drop
Home Minister Nanda, who was much too orthodox for her taste and had to abstain from doing so because of objections raised by Kamaraj. She could carry her point through in this question only nine months later.

At the election of the third Prime Minister after Nehru's death the conditions had changed thoroughly. The general elections in February 1967 had brought severe reverses to the Congress Party at the Centre and in the states. Almost the entire Syndicate and Kamaraj himself were defeated in the elections. The Congress Party with a small majority saw itself forced into a defensive position lor the first time. After Chavan, who had been promoted to Home Minister, announced that he would once again withdraw in favour of Indira Gandhi, the only opponent was Morarji Desai, again. Whereas Kamaraj had considered it his task previously to exclude Morarji Desai, his attitude this time was rather neutral. There are indications that he would not have been averse to Morarji Desai winning. Publicly he did not dare to speak against Indira Gandhi, as she certainly had a larger majority of the Congress Party behind her. The Chief Ministers of the Congress Party, decimated as it were by the elections, had hardly a say in the matter, except for D. P. Mishra of Madhya Prades, who sided with Indira Gandhi. His defeat later was a severe blow for her.

In the end Morarji Desai came to realise that an open conflict would again lead to his defeat. Now it was only a question of the place he would take in Indira Gandhi's second Cabinet. Kamaraj and his colleagues from the Syndicate who had been defeated in the elections put considerable pressure on Indira Gandhi that she should make Morarji Desai the Deputy Prime Minister, an office which had been abolished on Sardar Patel's death. Desai demanded, however, also the Home Ministry, which Indira Gandhi had reserved for her faithful henchman, Chavan. After bitter negotiations they arrived at a compromise. Desai became Deputy Prime Minister and was again Finance
Minister, whereas Chavan remained Home Minister. Under these conditions Indira Gandhi was elected for a second time unanimously by the Congress party on 12th March 1967. We saw Indira Gandhi and Desai sitting stiffly next to Kamaraj on the tribune. Of course, they had little liking for each other, but once again Kamaraj had had his way, even if under less pleasant circumstances.

The question of succession which had appeared to be such a big question mark during Nehru’s lifetime had been solved four times without essentially shaking India’s democracy. The army, in particular, whose role was often a matter of speculation had not even a remote influence on the election of the Prime Minister. Neither could any foreign power influence the succession, even indirectly. The overpowering importance which the Congress President had gained in the first election was reduced in the third election. If one day India is not governed by one party at the centre but by a coalition government, then there will be radical changes. After Indira Gandhi’s triumph in March 1971, this day however, seems to be remote.
It would be difficult to find two men more dissimilar in their nature, character and stature than India's first two Prime Ministers. Whenever Nehru made an appearance at home or abroad he dominated the scene, even before uttering a word. Lal Bahadur Shastri would have been inconspicuous even during his term as Prime Minister, if it had not been for the dignity of the office which surrounded him. Of an unusually small stature, without any particularly oratorical talents, a man with a soft voice and few gestures, Lal Bahadur was a thoroughly undramatic phenomenon, who could have hardly claimed to control a multilingual subcontinent as charismatically as his predecessor. However, Lal Bahadur yet lives in the minds of his countrymen in high respect. He never evoked the furious polemics which even years after Nehru's death, appeared occasionally in the Indian press. His life ended suddenly in Tashkent, after he had held his ground against the double pressure of his greatest opponent Ayub Khan and the stubborn negotiator Kosygin for a week. The very modest Lal Bahadur attained statesmanly stature in these last months of his life, when the dispute with Pakistan, which had been smouldering for decades, became a bloody conflict.

He hailed from a poor family of teachers of the Kayastha caste, who lived near Benares. The Kayasthas were the scribes and lower court officials during the Moghul period. Even today, a vast number of members of this caste are to be found in the lower bureaucracy of the State of Uttar Pradesh. When Lal
Bahadur Shastri became Prime Minister, he was just sixty years old and not in the best of health. He overworked himself to such an extent in the first months of his rule, that the doctors had to order him to rest for a few weeks. Decades of a life devoted to the Congress and later to the Indian nation took their toll. Shastri was so poor in his youth that he could not even afford the fare for the ferry over the Ganges; he swam across the river, holding his school books with one hand over his head.
A talented pupil, he was awarded a scholarship to study at the National College in Benares, whose principal was the renowned philosopher Bhagwan Das, whom I met in Benares when he was over ninety years old; an impressive figure of Hindu syncretism and traditionalism, he had moulded young Lal Bahadur's attitude to life. Profound wisdom emanated from Bhagwan Das, despite his advanced years.

Lal Bahadur's second teacher was the colossus Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, the ruling Congress politician in the Ganges valley during the freedom struggle, later the first Chief Minister of the key-state Uttar Pradesh and finally Nehru's active Home Minister for seven years. He relieved the head of the Government of manifold problems of this populous nation with its immense variety of friction and rivalry. Pant like Shastri was hardly known abroad. He was, however, one of Asia's greatest figures during this epoch. He reminded one of the Grand Vazirs of days gone by with his walrus moustache and massive figure. As Home Minister he let the stream of visitors pass by him, while he reclined on the divan with sovereign imperturbability and gave his secretary brief orders, apparently paying no attention to the fact that some visitors in true oriental fashion kissed his feet. But decisions were made and they were precise. Shastri assisted him for many years till Nehru called him to Delhi at the beginning of the fifties to work as his confidante in the Congress High Command. Lal Bahadur was given cabinet rank immediately. Entering as Minister for Railways he rose to be Minister for Transport, then Minister for Commerce and finally,
after Pant's death, he stepped into his master's shoes in the Home Ministry.

He now was already Nehru's indispensable and never tiring colleague, who quietly and doggedly took on all the awkward and incomplete problems which the great leader threw on his table, tackled them and tried to find a solution. Since his days in Uttar Pradesh, Lal Bahadur was called 'Shastri', although this is just one of the degrees conferred on him in Benares. He was a scholar in the true traditional Indian sense. Shastri, who went abroad for the first time as Prime Minister, learnt about Western knowledge and thought only through its refraction by Indian teachers and publicists. As an American observer once remarked, he was intelligent, but not an intellectual.¹

I came to know Shastri after he had become Home Minister. Our conversation, fixed for a late hour at night, was continued after a short journey from Parliament House to his home, where I accompanied him on a nocturnal walk in his garden. His excessively small stature was forgotten the moment one looked into his searching eyes, which reflected an unexpected firmness. Peace emanated from him, although the immense excess of work did give him cause to be nervous. I came to know what the office of the Home Minister meant while we were walking up and down, when he would occasionally stop to clarify one of the many problems with which he struggled.

If there had been a Home Minister for entire Europe, with whom one could have walked in Brussels, then he would have discussed the Mafia in Sicily, the development problems of the zonal border areas, the obstinacy of the French peasants and the difficulties of retraining the miners in the Ruhr district and Belgium, in the same breath. Only this multifariousness can compare with the problems which passed Shastri's desk. He spoke of the yet inadequate measures taken in the case of the seventy million untouchables; of the resistance of individual states against balancing excesses and deficits of food; of the
language problem, which was coming to a head in the South and in Assam; of the difficulties of putting the Hindu Code Bill passed by Parliament a few years ago into practice, because of the differing position of women; and finally of the hunger strike of the bearded old Sikh leader, Master Tara Singh. There was only a little time for each of these manifold problems, but the listener had to admire the precision with which Lal Bahadur explained the pith of each matter.

When Lal Bahadur was unanimously elected Prime Minister, the Congress politicians and the state rulers thought they had elevated a person to the throne who would choose a suitable middle course for every difficult problem and finally find a conciliatory compromise, which would harm none. A fact, which Nehru knew when he began to build Lal Bahadur up as his successor, was to come to light immediately on his appointment: he was a man of character. When a year previously, the Kautilya Plan was put into operation and the resignations of many cabinet ministers and Chief Ministers were accepted, Nehru was accused of showing inexplicable consideration to corrupt grandees, particularly those who were his companions in the fight for freedom. For years there had been complaints about Pratap Singh Kairon, the Chief Minister of Punjab. They were in regard to the dubious practices of his sons, who exploited their father's position for their business. Nehru protected Kairon from all accusations, as he had many other less significant politicians, and did nothing, so that many things were suppressed. He didn't do this only out of camaraderie, but perhaps also for his convenience. Kairon guaranteed a firm hold on difficult Punjab, Shastri, however, in his second week of office, made Kairon resign although he knew that he was removing a supporting pillar of the Congress Party. That was a signal.

Taya Zinkin, correspondent of the Manchester Guardian for India, once reported on a rich member of the merchant caste, the Marwaris. He had boasted that in India everyone has his price; only one must know him. Then he added: "The only
man whose price I have not yet been able to discover is Shastri. The poor dope does not enjoy the good things of life, he has no skeleton in his cupboard, no weakness.” Shastri, however, hardly succeeded in taking the insoluble problem of corruption by the roots in his short term of office. And no one will succeed as long as the system of licences persists in India, which challenges one to pay bribes and makes a black market with all its evils unavoidable. In the Soviet Union they have not managed to solve this problem even after fifty years of planned economy. It is thought in India that corruption can be eradicated with firmness and idealism. But in reality it is only the consequences of genuine and sometimes artificially created shortages and the low salary of the officials.

Lal Bahadur showed in his short term of office that he knew the root of the evil. From some of his remarks it can be said that he was critical of the planning methods, that he would gladly have cut the hydrocephalus of the planning authorities in Delhi and wanted to emphasise the needs of agriculture in the next five-year plan. In January 1965, at the only Congress session under his leadership in Durgapur, he did not succeed in developing a new trend which would have been generally understood. Here Shastri fell back on his role of negotiator.

Two major problems came to the fore during Lal Bahadur’s short rule: the language problem and India’s relations with Pakistan. Both problems dated back to the beginning when the nation was created and dragged through the years. Only after Nehru’s death did they explode.

India’s tower of Babel
India’s multitude of languages is the most difficult problem which was put in the cradle of independent India. India’s language problem is far more complicated than that of other large Asiatic countries. Japan has one national language, and its dialects play no role politically. In China the languages of the North and the South and the dialects differ to such an extent that the
colloquial language can be understood only within its regions. But at least it has a uniform script and literary language, Mandarin. Just as the Arabic script is the same from Morocco to Iraq, similarly the Chinese script can be read by all the Chinese. A chaos of Malayan dialects has prevailed in Indonesia since independence. Only the Malayan Javans possess a somewhat developed literature. Thus Sukarno could try to invent a new uniform language for the whole of Indonesia (Bahasa Indonesia). Dialects and languages on remote islands, which did not have any literature and hardly a dictionary were subject to Sukarno’s unifying efforts. The major Indian languages, however, had their own tradition and literature for centuries. The problem had to be tackled from a different angle. The language problem could not be solved with a simple formula. In January and February 1965 Shastri saw himself confronted with riots, provoked by the language problem, in the state of Madras. The riots extended over weeks and were one of the worst in India during the sixties. They led to the resignation of two cabinet ministers in Delhi, to threats of self-immolation according to the Vietnamese example and finally to a brutal counter-offensive by the police. Two years later they were also the cause of the Congress Government’s bitter defeat in the state of Madras during the elections. The reason for these riots by the Tamilians was the fear that they would suffer considerable disadvantages as a non-Hindi speaking people; they would be degraded to second-class Indians, was the war-cry in Madras. The Tamilians were protesting against the language law, which the Indian Parliament had accepted after long drawn-out debates a year before Nehru’s death, on 27th April 1963. It came into force at the end of January 1965.

The disquieting news from Madras alarmed Shastri profoundly. Four years previously he had witnessed how a language quarrel in remote Assam between the native Assamese and the immigrated Bengalis had changed one of India’s most peaceful provinces into a true pot of trouble. He had had an
unpleasant confrontation with the complex problem of Indian languages which entangled social, racial and caste contrasts inextricably. Violence, hatred and murder broke loose when the cry goes out: The mother-tongue is in danger! In the forties and fifties about one and a half million Bengalis emigrated from their overpopulated home-state to the green Brahmaputra Valley, inhabited by the Assamese, and brought active business to the rural life of Assam. The Assamese, however, soon claimed, that they were thrust back by the agile 'foreigners' and exploited. The Assamese—mixed racially with the bordering Mongolian tribes of the Himalayas—demanded the recognition of their language as the only official language in the state. Although Assamese and Bengali languages are closely related, the Bengalis considered this to be a slight. They protested violently. This led to a frightful pogrom against the Bengalis; villages were set aflame, forty thousand Bengalis were driven out of the province. Many died or were injured. When the language quarrel enkindled anew in 1961 it was Shastri, the newly appointed Home Minister, who found a formula which brought peace to the Brahmaputra Valley and satisfied the Assamese as well as the Bengalis. But a much larger problem was raised in Madras now. Shastri saw himself unexpectedly confronted with India's most dangerous internal tension: the contrast between the North and the South.

India as a political entity is young and almost artificial. In the millennia of Indian history there was never a unitary state before 1947, which corresponded to the present boundaries. The Indian kingdom with its centre in the Ganges Valley could not annex the South for a long time. Though the Dravidians accepted the religion of the North, their culture always preserved its individuality, which is inseparably linked with the four Dravidian literary languages. As the South was successful in defending itself from a Muslim invasion, its spiritual and literary development took a different turn from that of the North. The religion of the Hindus which is more a way of liv-
ing than a cult, remained the unifying tie between the North and the South. Culturally the South has been more progressive during the last hundred years of British rule than the key areas in the Ganges Valley and in Central India—which is considered to be India by passing travellers. The South, which has a more orderly and cleaner appearance than the North has a certain feeling of superiority with its consciousness of a separate culture.

The same is true of Bengal since the Bengali language developed to be the Indian literary language in the nineteenth century and flourished in particular on account of Tagore and his Shantiniketan, for which there is no comparison in the Hindi-speaking North. The marked opposition from the Tamilians and the Bengalis against Hindi was caused by a subconscious fear that the South and the East would have to descend to a more modest cultural level.

India has two major groups of languages, which include the most important languages of the North and the South: the Aryan group of languages in the North and the Dravidian in the South. All Aryan languages are related to Sanskrit, whereas the Dravidian languages have only borrowed words from Sanskrit. The role of this Indo-Aryan dialect can be compared with Latin in Europe. Bengali, which is very well-developed. Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi as also the Rajasthani dialects and Punjabi are all related, just as the Latin language group is in West Europe. Opposed to this is the Dravidian family of languages, whose individual branches like Telugu in Andhra, Tamil in Madras, Malayalam in Kerala and Kannada in Mysore have their own literature and also their own script. They are also closely connected with each other.

The two main groups of languages by no means present the complete picture of the chaos of Indian languages. 1652 'mother-tongues' are mentioned in India's official yearbook for 1966. Ludwig Alsdorf estimates, however, that only 26 languages are spoken by 98 per cent of the total population.7

The Eighth Schedule to the Constitution recognises even less,
only fourteen languages, which are the main languages. These fourteen languages are spoken by 93 per cent of the population.

The many hundreds of original languages and dialects, especially in the Himalayas, and also among the backward tribes in Central India can be omitted, however, when the language problem is considered politically. Many are spoken only by small sections of the population. Sanskrit has been accepted in the Constitution only for historical reasons. In India there are only 2500 people who have knowledge of Sanskrit—exclusively scholars. The fathers of the Constitution did not mention one much-spoken Indian dialect in their catalogue of the major languages: Hindustani, a mixture between Urdu and Hindi, spoken and understood by millions of North Indians. It is a pleasant colloquial language, which, by the way, even Nehru spoke. It is more the lingua franca of the North than even Hindi.

It was unavoidable that even during the fight for freedom there was the wish that the future independent India should have a predominant national language. Gandhi had persuaded the Congress Party in the thirties to elevate Hindi with the Devanagri and Urdu script to the official language. Many Indian nationalists thought it undignified to use the language of the foreign ruler only as the means of communication in the multilingual continent which was seen becoming an independent national state. Later the problem appeared to be more difficult than Gandhi and after him the fathers of the Constitution of 1950 imagined. No one disputed that Hindi alone, which was spoken by 35 to 10 per cent of India’s total population and was understood by and large in the language regions of northern India, came into consideration as the future official language. The fathers of the Constitution, however, were not aware of the emotional abysses of the language problem when they determined in Article 343 that Hindi should be India’s official language and should replace English as the official language in fifteen years. Dr. Ambedkar, the leader of the Untouchables,
who was Minister for Law in Nehru's first cabinet and had formulated the draft of the Constitution, wanted to consider the multifariousness of India's people, but he wanted a strong Central Government, in which he was strongly supported by Sardar Patel.

While formulating the article on the language in the Constitution, the politicians underestimated the emotional significance of language and script of India's people. Language is the most important expression of the individual culture and form of religion of the Indian people. For instance, the Devanagari script has a deeply religious bond for many Hindus, as the Gurmukhi script has for the Sikhs or the Arabic script for the North Indian Muslims, the script of the Koran, in which he writes Urdu. This is a mixed language related to Hindi, which developed at the Moghul court and has a number of Persian word forms. The same is true of the languages and scripts of the South, the round characters of which resemble Sinhalese in Ceylon and Burmese more than the letters of North India.

The fathers of the Constitution not only gave scarcely a thought to the deep emotional anchorage of the language problem in India: they gave even less thought to the close link between the language problem and the castes. We have seen that in daily life subcastes never went beyond the language regions and will always insist on having enclosed political language regions, in which they can exert their influence. The fathers of the constitution consciously did not want to consider this basic fact of Indian life. They thought then that the castes and the religious and political feelings connected with the languages would be as easily eliminated from Indian life as the princes. It was Patel in particular, who wanted to create vital rational administrative units and strongly opposed the wish at the Constituent Assembly to reorganise India according to languages. He saw in it only the seed of future disintegration.

Shortly after Patel's death (1950) a violent movement began in all parts of India to reorganise the states according to the
language boundaries. At the beginning of this was seen most among the Telugu-speaking people, who lived in the states of Madras and Hyderabad. Because a holy man from this region, Shri Potti Sriramulu, announced that he would fast till death if the Telugu State were not formed, Nehru had to give in. The first state formed on the basis of language boundaries, Andhra, was born in 1953. Thus the ice was broken. A States Reorganisation Commission was formed, which broke up the state units created by Patel. In 1956 the Commission suggested reorganising India according to the major language boundaries, dividing the very large Hindi-speaking area into four states. In some cases there was no reorganisation on economic grounds. When Nehru, for example, announced his intention to give the city of Bombay neither to the Maharashtrians nor the Gujaratis, but to make it a Union territory like Delhi, he evoked a riot extending for weeks in Bombay which claimed hundreds of victims. Nehru had to bow to the will of Bombay’s population which did not want to be separated from the surrounding Marathi-speaking region. Bilingual Bombay was bifurcated into Maharashtra and Gujarat only in 1960. Later Nagaland with its tribal population was split from Assam and has become an individual state. The long disputed division of the Punjab, which the Sikhs fervently desired, came into force in November 1966 only.

With India’s reorganisation according to languages a major step had been taken in satisfying internal conflicts. Regionalism had prevailed with the formation of the new states. The most explosive of all language problems, however, remained unsolved: making Hindi the unifying official language. Here a new, almost insoluble contradiction between India’s integral nationalism and the lingual regionalism occurred with the formation of the new states.

At the initial stages the non-Hindi speaking regions feared that with Hindi as the national language it would step by step lead to a hegemony of the North and a discrimination of the non-Hindi speaking states. The Tamilians, above all, wished to pre-
serve English as the means of communication. They liked to use the argument that the professional prospects of the non-Hindi speaking population would be considerably reduced if Hindi were elevated to the official language. The Tamilians point to the fact that about 300,000 of the 550,000 officials of the Central Government did not know Hindi. They were scared that the non-Hindi speaking officials would be at a disadvantage in seeking careers as government officials, despite the assurances they received to the contrary. This was one of the reasons which led to the violent riots in Madras, in which thousands of students demonstrated. In the all-India services there were no less than 18 per cent Tamilians, among them a very high percentage in the senior posts, whereas the Tamil-speaking population is only eight per cent of India’s total population.

The lead the Tamilians had was doubtlessly due to their excellent command of English; if there was a Hindi hegemony, the Tamilians would necessarily feel slighted.

Nehru had always assured the non-Hindi speaking states that they would not be driven to continuous opposition on account of violent acts by the protagonists of Hindi. He declared at the annual Congress session in Gauhati in January 1958 that English would remain an ‘associated official language’, according to the wish of the non-Hindi speaking people. He said:

"These principles are (1) that decisions can only be largely by consent and cannot be imposed by a majority over a minority, (2) that every language should be given full scope and in our services, nothing should be done which puts a person from a non-Hindi area at a disadvantage. So far as English is concerned, I am all in favour of the study of English being continued and even made more widespread. But I confess that I do not understand how we can lay down for the future that English should be our all-India language. It may continue as such for some time, and even later it will no doubt play an important part."
But it seems to me rather humiliating for us to adopt a foreign language as the official all-India language. I say so even though my training and predilection would be in favour of English. In any event, I see no reason why we should hustle any decision or fix strict time-limits in a matter of this kind."a

The new Language Act in 1963, which extended the use of English till January 1975, was formulated according to these principles. English obtained the status of an additional official language which could be used for all official purposes. Only correspondence between the Union Government and Hindi speaking states was to be carried out in Hindi in future. For the other states of the Union an English translation was to be attached to the letter in Hindi. It was left to the official of the Central Government to write either in English or Hindi. It was a confusing compromise which satisfied neither the Hindi protagonists of the North nor the non-Hindi speaking states. When the new Act came into force Shastri saw himself confronted with those bloody riots in Tamilnadu, which were followed by riots organised by the Hindi protagonists in the North, who smeared innumerable English signs with tar. Shastri had no other choice but to corroborate Nehru's compromise. During his lifetime there was no revision of the Language Act.

There has been talk of a three-language formula during Indira Gandhi's term of office. The non-Hindi speaking states were to teach—along with their own language—Hindi and a simple English in the primary stage, which would at least enable the pupil to read simple English inscriptions. In Hindi-speaking regions one of the other Indian languages was to be included in the curriculum as a third language. While this project was still being discussed, a number of universities decided on their own to make the regional language the medium for the examinations. The students in Hindi-speaking states particularly began to agitate and exert violent pressure on the University
authorities to hold the examinations only in Hindi in future. Their knowledge of English learnt in school was so limited that they felt at a disadvantage when using English for the examinations. Thus the general confusion increased.

In summer 1967 the new Minister for Education, Triguna Sen, the former rector of Benares University, carried through a Cabinet resolution, in which English in all the universities was to be replaced by the regional language in five to ten years. The tactical meaning of this suggestion was only too clear: as the Hindi protagonists could not be shown preference directly, they thought they had achieved their aim indirectly—by strengthening the national languages and this would not cause any stormy scenes in the states. The Cabinet resolution hinted that during the same period of time the regional languages should replace English in administration and law. The Hindi protagonists thought perhaps that Hindi would automatically become the official language, if English were removed and the regional languages were elevated to the medium of instruction. The Cabinet resolution resembled an appeal to the sub-nationalism of the states, the easiest way out, according to later experience. This concealed appeal to regionalism seemed at first to work. The protests were limited to keen criticism from the professors who pointed to the alarming fact that India was being taken back to the time of the chaos of languages in the Babylonian tower.

What was really involved became apparent to the Indian public only after the Foreign Minister, M. C. Chagla, who had formerly been Minister for Education for three years, tendered his resignation on account of this Cabinet resolution. His letter of resignation (31st August 1967) was a remarkable document:

"There is one tenet which I have considered to be basic to my political philosophy, such as I have, and that is the maintenance of the unity of India which should override all other considerations. I regret that, in my opinion, the educational policy of Government is likely to threaten, if
not undermine that unity. . . . I also accept the position that Hindi must ultimately replace English. . . . But I equally strongly believe that the change-over from English to the regional language must be gradual and must not impair educational standards. . . . The time limit proposed to be set for the change-over in the universities of five years for undergraduate studies and ten years for all stages is hopelessly impractical and unrealistic.

"Some of the languages mentioned in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution are highly developed, others are not. Even the former have not got the necessary literature nor the teachers trained to lecture in these languages.

"It is said that a crash programme of translation will fill this gap. I disagree. It is not through translation but original work that a language is developed and original works cannot be produced overnight. . . . I dread to think what will happen to excellence if teachers are asked to lecture in a language in which they are not proficient and with the help of shoddy books hastily produced to order.

"What will happen to students whose mother-tongue is different from the regional language? In many cities you have different media of instruction to cater for a multilingual society. They will be practically shut out from universities of the state which will be teaching in the regional language. . . . Most universities recruit professors on an all-India basis and make use of the best talent available. Are these professors to be turned out?

"I must also point out the harm that an early and unprepared switch-over to regional languages will do to the study of science and technology. . . . In science, apart from the text books, the student has to keep pace with new discoveries and this he can only do if he is familiar with the large number of scientific journals which are at present published in English or other European languages. . . .

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Therefore a sudden change-over from English to the regional languages must result in a precipitous lowering of standards, more particularly in the field of science, where if we wish to industrialise our country and transform its economy, we need the work and cooperation of our best scientists and our best research scholars. . . . Regional linguistic bonds which contribute so much towards our unity, will have been snapped. Mobility of professors and students will become impossible . . .

"I have nightmarish visions of interpreters being needed in a high powered conference to interpret what one Indian is saying to another . . .

"I do not like to remain in the Government and criticise its policy. . . . In most matters, Government policy, if mistaken, can be corrected. In education it cannot be. It affects millions of our people and a whole generation may suffer."10

Cabinet members resigning on matters of principle are rare in India. The Indian press and a number of members of the intellectual elite of the country applauded the courageous Minister.

There is little to add to Chagla's moving words. English is not only the window to the world, which binds India's upper strata with the scientific, technical and literary events. The eleven million Indians who speak English fluently or somewhat fluently, have been the guarantee till now that uniform principles can be implemented in the civil administration and in the army, which would hardly be possible if translation into all regional languages were necessary.

It is true Hindi has considerably developed in recent decades. Nevertheless even confirmed Hindi protagonists must use many English words, because there is no equivalent in Hindi. It is inconceivable how one could prepare an adequate number of suitable text books in twelve regional languages in five to ten
years considering that there are not even standard dictionaries in some of these languages.\textsuperscript{11}

At the end of 1967 Indira Gandhi took on the difficult task of fulfilling the promise given by her father and Shastri to keep English as an associated official language, for an indefinite period as an amendment to the Language Law. It was a great triumph for the Government when after five days of heated debate the Lok Sabha passed the Language Law on 16th December 1967 with a majority of 205 votes to 41—a considerable majority, although many of the Congress parliamentarians abstained.

The Language Law Amendment states that English will continue to be used as the official language of the Union and in Parliament along with Hindi. Official reports of the Central Government must be written in both languages. English should be used as long as all states, whose official language is not Hindi, agree to remove English and a corresponding resolution is passed in the Lok Sabha. Such a resolution will hardly be passed this century.

Along with the law the Parliament passed a resolution recommending the principle of the three-language formula for schools. In this resolution a further suggestion was made which in the non-Hindi speaking states was considered to be a dilution of the law. Candidates for the Union Public Service Commission could be considered if they mastered only Hindi or only English. This could be an indirect advantage to India's Hindi-speaking population.

Inspite of this defect the new Language Law has averted the worst dangers of a growing provincialism. It needed courage to implement it, because Indira Gandhi had to reckon with renewed intense riots, which occurred first in the North—because of the disputed resolution—then in the South. There is the hope that the language controversy will gradually subside as for a long time no legal amendment is necessary.

Shastri could have possibly implemented a more satisfactory
solution to the language problem if he had been given time. It is part of the tragedy of his career, that he had to leave India's most important internal problem only partially resolved, as Nehru had. This was not due to Shastri's indecisiveness, but the state of affairs in summer 1965 when India unexpectedly was involved in a new difficulty, this time with its neighbour Pakistan, who believed that the time was ripe now, a year after Nehru's death, to settle old scores.

Kashmir: Panther and Tiger

Summit conferences are considered to be the universal remedy, if normal diplomacy fails. It is thought that the leading statesmen understand each other better when they sit face to face. At least two cases in modern history have shown, however, that a summit conference led to a disastrous and erroneous estimation of the other party.

One is the meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961. The two standard Kennedy biographies indicate that this meeting ended undecided, and even Khrushchev in the seclusion of his Dacha recalled with pleasure his stay in Vienna. However, many things show that Khrushchev misjudged Kennedy completely. Perhaps he would have never entered the Cuba adventure one and a half years later, if in Vienna he had not come to the conclusion that Kennedy was by far over-estimated by the World; that he would yield if he met with resolute resistance. His personal impression of the young American President had deceived the impulsive and extrovert Russian, as the German Ambassador Kroll confirms in his memoirs. The second example is less known. It is the meeting between the Pakistan President, Ayub Khan and Shastri, when the two subsequent challengers came to know each other personally at the beginning of October 1964. Shastri had then just returned from the first foreign tour of his life, from the conference of the non-aligned states in Cairo. He took the opportunity to visit
Karachi, where Ayub Khan gave a banquet in his honour. It was a short meeting, during which no discussions were to take place, as a Pakistani eye-witness reported to us later. Shastri was silent and seemed to be unsure of himself, when he sat opposite Ayub Khan. His first appearance before a large international forum was made in difficult circumstances; moreover he was suffering from the after-effects of a recent heart attack.

Ayub Khan had been, despite all differences, a true admirer of Nehru's. The non-descript Shastri appeared to Ayub Khan to be less convincing. During that lunch in Karachi he made plans to bully concessions from this successor of Nehru even if it meant resorting to force. Just like Khrushchev, Ayub Khan had also underestimated his counterpart. Six months later there was a small passage at arms between India and Pakistan in the fight in the Rann of Kutch.

The relation between the Indian and Pakistan leaders was not devoid of tragedy. In the first decade of Nehru's government, there was nobody on the Pakistani side after the assassination of the renowned Pak Premier Liaquat Ali Khan (October 1951) who was to some extent equal to Nehru. The Pak politicians of that time were not only of lesser stature, their internal political powers were hardly comparable with Nehru's. They hardly came into the picture during any discussion. A man of quite a different cut appeared on the political scene in October 1958, Ayub Khan. But now it was Nehru who distrusted this General who rose to be President by a coup d'etat, just as he had always kept his distance with his own high-ranking officers. This was all the more fatal, because Ayub Khan sought an alliance with Nehru and hoped to be able to reach a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir Problem.

Ayub Khan was tall and white-skinned like the Pathans of North Pakistan. He was born as the son of a major in the British Indian Army in 1907, about eighty kilometres north of Rawalpindi, which he later made Pakistan's capital. His family
originally came from Afghanistan. The free air of the North West frontier wafted around this upright man. As President Ayub wore nearly always only mufti, but as in many Indian and Pakistani officers of the older generation one can immediately recognise the mark of the British military academy, Sandhurst, which Ayub Khan entered in 1938. When I asked his adjutant once, to what I should pay special attention when visiting the President, he said smiling: *Polish your shoes.*

Ayub spoke to his visitors with winning directness and didn't seem to have any of that crafty double-edged intelligence which in Europe is considered to be 'typically oriental'. He has a candid look, and can break out into a hearty laugh, but one is aware of a hidden cleverness. Whosoever wishes to classify the Field-Marshal in the category of 'military whipper-snapper' will be sorely deceived, even if Sandhurst has created an unmistakable type of officers on the Indian sub-continent.

Before entering the Army Ayub had studied at the Muslim University, Aligarh, which today lies in India. Open-minded reformers, who shook off the dust of Muslim tradition, taught there at that time. Ayub's autobiography, however, shows that he was not very enthusiastic about student life in Aligarh: "I don't know how much I learnt in the way of academic studies, but I did learn how to live with people of differing origins and backgrounds and how to understand their points of view. Aligarh has always remained a place of pilgrimage for me. I found there boys from all parts of India, Iran and the African countries. But for those who stayed, there was a great feeling of equality, brotherhood and camaraderie."

Afterwards Ayub fought in Burma as an officer in the British Army. He became Commander in Chief of the Army, four years after Pakistan was established in 1951 and rose later to be the Defence Minister. He was considered to be politically a neutral officer till in 1958 he felt it his duty to end the hopeless internal chaos. He compelled the Cabinet to resign and soon after President Iskander Mirza. In his autobiography he, however,
asserts that originally he had no political ambitions and was forced to act only because of the incapability of the leaders. That is credible.

Whatever may be said about Ayub Khan's personal regime and the 'basic democracy' he introduced, a true judgement of his later activities can be made only after considering his keen clash with the Islam orthodoxy, the roots of which date back to his stay in Aligarh. As a General and even more as President he considered his true opponents to be not only the politicians who were more or less corrupt, and never dared to stand for free elections, but even the Ulema, who were powerful in West Pakistan, who wanted to rule the state from behind the scenes under the pretext of doing it in the name of Islam. The conflict between the Muslims brought up in modern style and the Ulema of the old school continued throughout Ayub Khan's political life. As President he frustrated the attempt made by the Ulema to gain supremacy in the state, although Pakistan defines itself as an Islamic state in its constitution. In his autobiography he says:

"The Constitution should provide a framework based on the experience and history of Islam and suited to the genius, temperament and traditions of the people, but within that framework, the community should be free to adopt principles derived from the Holy Quran and the Sunnah and evolve methods for the application of those principles to its own circumstances. This was the only way in which the principles of democracy could be reconciled with the principles of Islam."

At first glance Nehru's ideal of a secular state and Pakistan's Constitution based on the principles of the Koran seem to be miles apart. The interpretation which Ayub Khan gave his Constitution shows surprisingly that the ideas of the two most important men of the Indian subcontinent, at least in their prac-
tical impact, were not as contradictory, as one would have thought. Ayub’s bitter fight against the narrow-minded Islam orthodoxy has similarities with Nehru’s defensive action against the intolerant forces in Hinduism.

It was an almost ironical tragedy for India and Pakistan that both the statesmen did not recognise such similarities and that Nehru once underestimated Ayub Khan as Ayub underestimated his successor Shastri. During the first two years of his rule Ayub indicated to Delhi in various ways that he was genuinely interested in settling the conflict between the two brothers, the two related peoples. Ayub Khan wanted to have a clear-cut defence treaty between India and Pakistan—an idea which was contrary to Nehru’s idea of non-alignment. For Pakistan had taken up ties with the West by way of the CENTO-Pact and by becoming a member of SEATO, the Pacific military organisation which was never particularly important. So the opportunities which opened for India with Ayub Khan’s rise were never really used. Would Pakistan have become an ally of Communist China if Nehru had seized this opportunity? The entire relationship in the Asian sphere would perhaps have taken a different turn.

There was an almost dramatic opportunity when Nehru spent five days in Pakistan in September 1960 to sign the Indus Waters Pact and travelled through the country with Ayub. Though on his arrival in Karachi the atmosphere was frosty, at the end of the tour, which took him to the Pakistani foothills of the Himalayas, it had visibly changed.

The conclusion was a glittering garden party in the old Moghul city of Lahore, the home town of Nehru’s mother, where he had often spent his holidays during his childhood and where he was elected President of the Indian National Congress for the first time in 1929. Nehru was deeply moved when he saw the gaily illuminated Shalimar Gardens, the decorative Moghul pavilions and the fountains of his youth enlivened by a festive, joyous crowd of people, who received India’s Prime
Minister most cordially. Seeing the gracious ladies in their colourful saris he realised again that basically it was the same people who surrounded him. The speech Nehru made on this occasion had genuine warmth.

But politically nothing changed. There are no exact details published in India about the talks between Ayub and Nehru in September 1960. Ayub, however, wrote about it in detail in his autobiography. He reported: "I did not get the impression that Pandit Nehru was extraordinarily pleased to see me, but he was quite moved by some of the suggestions I made to him. He struck me as a tired man, though he still had a reserve of fight and political acumen. I missed the idealism or starry-eyed thinking which is often attributed to him. I told him I considered that relations between India and Pakistan had been dictated by drift rather than by any rational design. The reason, I thought was that neither side had drawn up any plan for neighbourliness. People on both sides thought that all social and economic ills were due to the British and once they left everything in the garden would be lovely. Events proved that they were not entirely right, though a good deal of our misfortunes were due to British occupation. Much distress and hatred was generated and people in both countries began to believe that they should have nothing further to do with each other. I felt it was not too late to formulate a plan to put our relationship on a rational and sensible basis."

Nehru and Ayub Khan discussed a non-aggression pact, which was of great interest for Nehru, as also the Kashmir Problem. It was only a comparison of the known views on these matters. All suggestions of solutions, which the two statesmen discussed, were lost in the dust of prejudices. Ayub Khan concludes his report:

I did not get the impression that Nehru was interested in any long term and lasting solution. He was perhaps not averse to the dialogue going on for the time being. But
he was not visualizing a future of understanding between the two countries. Had he been interested in such a future, I think he would have given more serious thought, for example to the proposal for joint defence which I made in May 1959. For some odd reason he thought it was an attack on India’s integrity and self-respect. There was nothing sinister in the proposal. Nor was I the first one to have made it.

If a record of Nehru’s comments were available we would probably discover a similar feeling that all efforts to discuss rationally were opposed by unbridgeable contradictions. Perhaps Nehru’s comments, like Ayub Khan’s, would have been pervaded by a deep resignation on the limits of understanding in the fraternal discussion.

Only four years later when his end was near, Nehru tried to make amends for what had been left undone during the days in Lahore. Under the influence of a long talk with the Lion of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, who had been released after a long imprisonment, Nehru was prepared to meet Ayub Khan again. Too late. Two weeks before Nehru planned to travel to Pakistan death hurried towards him on 27th May 1964.

Wheel of Asia
The Kashmir conflict is the story of missed opportunities. There would have been no show of force between India and China if India and Pakistan had been able to patch up their quarrels in good time. The Kashmir problem has therefore more than just local importance. It had a considerable effect on the whole state of affairs in Asia after the Second World War and brought about the close relations between Pakistan and China, for which there would otherwise have hardly been suitable reasons.

The former principality of Kashmir is almost predestined to play the role of a bone of contention between Asiatic powers, because of its geographical position, as it represents the most
important geopolitical potter's wheel of Inner Asia. Jammu and Kashmir borders India's key province, Punjab, in the south, Pakistan's present North-west Province in the west and Afghanistan in the north. Kashmir is separated from the Soviet Union only by a small Afghan corridor in Panir, for with its Tashikish Province the Soviet Union extends well into Inner Asia. To the east, Kashmir borders on China's problem-laden province, Sinkiang, and then on Tibet. Asia's four major powers, China, the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan meet on the borders of Kashmir. Khrushchev was fully aware of this when he stopped at Srinagar. Kashmir's capital, during his first visit to India and gave an important political speech.

The Kashmir problem, now almost insoluble, is part of the legacy of the partition of India in 1947, one of the most painful episodes of world history of our epoch. In the first eight months after the division of British India almost twenty million Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs had to leave their homes. They fled from the masses thirsting for blood. Between 600,000 and a million people were killed then. It was a true mass murder, which spared neither women nor children. Unforgettable are the scenes, as for instance the train which arrived in Lahore, crammed with massacred passengers with these words on the walls of the carriages: "A present from India". Similar trains with slain Hindus and Sikhs arrived at Indian railway stations with the inscription: "A present from Pakistan". Frightful are the memories of a group of refugees who trekked over a hundred kilometres from West Punjab, attacked constantly from all sides and the unfortunate ones taken ill with cholera, who could only drag themselves half-dead. Even Gandhi's assassination in January 1948 by a Hindu fanatic was a result of general terror. Gandhi had pleaded for the Muslims surviving in Delhi and by fasting had succeeded in persuading the Hindu refugees to vacate the one hundred and eighteen mosques they had occupied. The events in Kashmir, which were to lead to
continual strife between India and Pakistan, occurred in the atmosphere of general violence.

The Kashmir Valley, the 'Jewel of the East' since time immemorial, has one of the most captivating landscapes in Asia. Houseboats and decorated shikaras, which remind one of the Venetian gondolas, float on the Dal Lake. The gleaming white front of the seven and eight thousand metre high mountains of the Himalayas tower behind the green foothills. Between the sunny terraces of rice fields one often finds large groups of mighty shade-giving Shenar trees, whose broad fan-shaped leaves have become the emblem of the Kashmir Valley. The Moghul Emperors came to this mountain paradise from the dusty plains of North India when the summer came. Since the time Akbar conquered Kashmir in 1587, his successors have built pleasure gardens with dainty pavilions, terraces, fountains and cascades in this 'happy valley' which even today is filled with tourists from the whole of India. Shalimar Bagh, the Garden of Love, Nishat Bagh, the Garden of Desire, Nasim Bagh, the Garden of the Morning Breeze, with their crystal waters and luxuriant flower beds were laid out by Muslim landscape gardeners, who were not inferior to the western Muslim artists to whom we are indebted for the gardens in Marrakesh and Alhambra.

Islam has remained the ruling religion in the valley since the Moghul period. Two million inhabitants, about 94 per cent, are Muslims in the Valley itself; the Province of Jammu and Kashmir has a population of four million, of which 70 per cent are Muslims and 30 per cent Hindus and Sikhs. In that part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan, which is now called Azad Kashmir, there are a further one and a half million Muslims. India never had the European cuius regio eius religios. In the principality of Hyderabad the Nizam ruled over millions of Hindus, whereas in Jammu and Kashmir the Hindu dynasty, the Dogra, ruled this land having a majority of Muslims ever since the time the British sold Kashmir to a Rajput dynasty originally from Jammu, for a considerable sum in the Amritsar Agree-
ment (1846). These Dogra princes hardly bothered to learn the traditions of their Muslim subjects. They favoured the Hindu minority, the Kashmir Brahmins, who usually have the title of 'Pandit' and are considered to be the most sublime and aristocratic Brahmin caste in entire India. Even Nehru, whose family hailed from Kashmir and were Kauls by caste, was always called 'Pandit'.

In the thirties a national movement—similar to the Congress movement in India—began to fight for freedom from English rule as well as from the despotism of the last Dogra ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh. The movement, made up mostly of Kashmiri Muslims, was headed by a high school teacher, Sheikh Abdullah and called itself the National Conference. When India attained independence in August 1947 Sheikh Abdullah, as head of the National Conference, was still in prison under orders of the Maharaja. It was Mahatma Gandhi who persuaded the Maharaja to release Sheikh Abdullah in September 1947.

The Indian Independence Act declared that the Indian Princes could opt for either Pakistan or India. Hari Singh tried to delay the decision for Jammu and Kashmir. Apparently he wanted Pakistan and India to recognise his state as an independent principality. However, in the middle of October 1947 he was put under pressure, when suddenly thousands of well-armed Pathans from the Northwest Province of Pakistan invaded the Kashmir Valley, murdering and ravaging, and defeated the Maharaja's small army. In dire need Hari Singh turned to the Government in Delhi for immediate succour, whereby he attached the formal declaration of accession to India to his plea for help. It was accepted on 27th October 1947 by the Indian Government, after Sheikh Abdullah, who had hurried to Delhi, agreed in the name of the National Conference to the accession.14 Abdullah had thus also taken on full responsibility for annexing Kashmir to India. The first Indian troops were flown to Kashmir on the same day. It was just in
time. The hordes of Pathans stood a few kilometres from the capital, Srinagar.

Indian troops repelled the Pathans to the borders of the Kashmir Valley, but they did not succeed in occupying all of Kashmir, because from the Spring of 1948 regular Pakistani troops took part in the hostilities. During the winter months, they had already occupied the Eastern part of Kashmir, the Gilgit area. India turned to the Security Council on 31st December 1947 to protest against Pakistan's aggression. Only a year later on 31st December 1948 did the arbitrators sent by the UNO manage to bring about a cease-fire. From this day there exists the cease-fire line, the demarcation line in the east and south of Kashmir Valley, which is the de facto border between India and Pakistan.

The violent debates in the Security Council on Kashmir, which continued over two decades, are not based only on these facts. When accepting the declaration of accession of the Maharaja of Kashmir, Lord Mountbatten as Governor-General of India had made the condition that "when law and order has been restored in Kashmir and the invaders driven out a plebiscite should decide on the final accession". Nehru had confirmed this in a telegram dated 4th November 1947 to the Pak Prime Minister. During a radio talk on 2nd November he declared: "As soon as law and order are restored in Kashmir we are prepared to have a plebiscite under the international supervision of the United Nations." The Security Council had demanded in two resolutions of 13th August 1948 and 15th January 1949 that a plebiscite be held in Jammu and Kashmir for which the prerequisites were that the troops of both sides should withdraw.

Endless debates have evolved around this. We can skip the details here. The Security Council sent three observers—famous experts of international law—the Australian Sir Owen Dixon, the American Frank P. Graham and the Swede, Gunnar Jarring. They were to create the conditions for a plebiscite. All their efforts were fruitless because India maintained that first Pakistan
must concede its aggression and then vacate the area its troops occupied in the Eastern part of Kashmir. India demanded guarantees for an uninfluenced plebiscite which Pakistan was not prepared to give to the desired extent.

When Pakistan concluded a military aid pact with the United States of America in 1954, Nehru was no longer prepared to honour his promise of a plebiscite. The basic position had changed completely after Pakistan had refused to withdraw its troops from Kashmir, Nehru said at a Press conference in April 1955, and after Pakistan had in the meantime joined one of the two military blocs. From now on Delhi would irreversibly treat Kashmir as an integral part of India. When the Kashmir question came up again before the Security Council in May and June 1962, Defence Minister Krishna Menon, India's representative, declared: "The accession of Jammu and Kashmir is complete. The people of Kashmir have endorsed their solidarity with India in three general elections."

A last attempt to solve the Kashmir problem peaceably between India and Pakistan was made in late autumn 1962 and in spring 1963 after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war. India found herself in a tight corner. While negotiating military aid to India in November 1962 the American roving Ambassador, Averell Harriman, and the British Commonwealth Minister, Duncan Sandys, tried to bring about an agreement between India and Pakistan. Both had discussions with Ayub Khan and finally succeeded in making Ayub Khan and Nehru sign a joint communiqué on 30th November, stating that both governments would soon discuss Kashmir and other problems. The Americans and English wanted to block thereby a closer understanding between Pakistan and China.

There were six round table discussions between the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, and the Indian Minister for Railways, Swaran Singh, later Foreign Minister, between December 1962 and May 1963, which, however, were broken off without any success. During these negotiations India demand-
ed that the cease-fire line in Kashmir should be the official border whereby it was prepared to make three adjustments in favour of Pakistan. Bhutto, however, insisted that India must vacate the whole of Kashmir and parts of Jammu. The negotiations were encumbered from the beginning by the fact that the Pakistani side were having negotiations simultaneously with China, which later led to the boundary pact with China in which Pakistan relinquished an area of 2600 square miles, which formerly belonged to Kashmir. This final attempt at negotiation was overshadowed by the general state of affairs in Asia and never really had serious chances of success.

Abdullah — a tragic case
Strained state of affairs had developed in Kashmir itself. Sheikh Abdullah had become Chief Minister after Kashmir's official accession to India, the Maharaja abdicated in favour of his son Karan Singh, on whom the Indian Government conferred the title of Sardar-i-Riyasat, something between Governor and head of state. Politically Kashmir was treated like any other Indian state, but it had certain privileges which are also mentioned in the Indian Constitution of 1950. As Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah initially spoke of the 'eternal bonds' between Kashmir and India. When Kashmir's first Constituent Assembly met in November 1951, he pleaded for Kashmir's final accession to India. In the following year however, the Lion of Kashmir, as Sheikh Abdullah is known in his country, began delaying the proclamation of the new Constitution and the ratification of the treaty. Rumours spread, that Sheikh Abdullah was attempting to form an autonomous or independent Kashmir State. Whether any of these facts are correct was never clarified. Sheikh Abdullah was arrested for treason by his deputy, Bakshi Gulam Mohammed in concord with Delhi in August 1953, and remained a prisoner till April 1964. The treason trial was postponed again and again and dragged through the years and was finally dropped at Nehru's request. Just before that Nehru had
ended Bakshi’s ten year rule of Kashmir as part of the Kamaraj Plan.

Bakshi, who had founded a very personal autocracy in the Kashmir Valley, was later accused of corruption, jailed for some time, but never legally sentenced. I visited him a few months before his fall from power in Srinagar and saw him sitting under a mighty Shinar tree on a day of celebration of the Mohammedans, listening to a number of applicants and taking decisions on many petitions. Bakshi was one of those Muslim autocrats whom I have come to know, from King Mohammed V in Morocco and Gamal Abdel Nasser to rulers on the slopes of the Himalayas. None of India’s administrators I know resembled him in bearing. The atmosphere moulded in Inner Asia by the Koran surrounded Bakshi.

When Sheikh Abdullah returned to Srinagar amidst unending jubilation of his followers the enigmatic cover which Bakshi had drawn over Kashmir for a decade was torn. It was clear that at least in the Valley a major part of the Moslem population wished to accede to Pakistan, or form their own state, in spite of all the privileges granted them by India. In Jammu, however, there was a pro-India feeling. The influential Abdullah had not been broken by the long years of imprisonment. When Gisela Bonn interviewed him shortly after his release in Srinagar, he gave evasive answers to concrete questions. He avoided frank statements, but it was clear that during his long imprisonment he had not come to believe that Kashmir should accede to Pakistan. He dreamt perhaps of an independent Kashmir under his guidance.

Abdullah went to Delhi again at the end of April. Nehru invited him to be his guest. Indira Gandhi vacated her apartment for the Sheikh. The two men who had once been firm friends confronted each other after eleven years, deeply moved. Abdullah was magnanimous enough not to bear Nehru a grudge for having played an ambiguous role in the events of August
1958, which had led to the Sheikh's arrest—a fact which played heavy on Nehru's conscience.

After long discussions Abdullah left India to visit Ayub Khan in Rawalpindi in order to arrange a meeting between the two men who he hoped would solve the Kashmir conflict peacefully. There he was told of Nehru's death. A day later he was seen crying bitter tears at the funeral pyre in Delhi among Nehru's family members. Later on that did not hinder him in the course of a trip abroad from talking to Chou En-lai, whom he met in Algeria. Again Delhi suspected treason. On his return to India he was arrested once more by Nehru's successor and was interned in a Southern hill-resort and brought later to a villa in Delhi. He was released in January 1968 and received by Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai. In public speeches he again pleaded that the Indo-Pak conflict be settled. He seemed now to want some form of condominium of the two countries on Kashmir. However, he avoided again to make concrete suggestions.

A strange life, a mixture of heroism, ambiguity and quixotism. Some former enthusiastic followers of the Sheikh were disappointed and tuned their loyalty to provincial leaders who had less scruples than this wanderer between two worlds.

**The Indian Muslims**

The world at large has never been more critical of Nehru, except perhaps on his conquest of the small Portuguese colony of Goa, than on his Kashmir politics. Some claim that Nehru's critical comments on other people's problems are hypocritical considering that he first evaded and then finally broke his promise to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. His objection to Pakistan's aggression was never taken really seriously. India's arguments to the Security Council bypassed the true core of the Kashmir problem for years.

Kashmir has become a kind of symbol for the national ideology of the two newly-formed states after partition. Pakistan staked its claim for Kashmir on geographical grounds, as all
natural approaches to Kashmir went through Pakistan, before the road over the Banihal Pass was constructed. Another decisive factor in favour of Pakistan is that the inhabitants of the Kashmir Valley follow the Muslim faith. Pakistan would have hardly made a serious claim to Jammu, which had a major Hindu population, when annexing Kashmir. Pakistan was founded as a state for Muslims; Islam is the official religion in Pakistan. On this alone Pakistan bases its claim for 'freeing brothers of the faith'.

India adheres to the claim on Kashmir with the same stubbornness, but for just the opposite reason. After the partition India had a Muslim minority of originally forty-five million which in the meantime has increased to about seventy million and has thus become the third largest Muslim state in the world after Indonesia and Pakistan. The number of Indian Muslims corresponds to three-fourths of the population of all the Arabic states. India was founded as a secular state, whose constitution does not and cannot provide for an official religion. India's politicians emphasised that by relinquishing a part of India for purely religious reasons they would open the wounds of 1947, which had not yet been healed; then they would incite the distrust of the Hindu majority towards the Muslim minority anew and lead to endless violence, of which there had been more than enough in the first twenty years of the existence of the Indian State. Krishna Menon had mentioned this only in passing in his marathon speeches before the Security Council, though it was a vital argument for the Government in Delhi. Menon emphasised only Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir. It was Chagla, India's Minister for Education and later Foreign Minister, himself, a Muslim, who presented the truly relevant arguments to the Security Council in February 1964:

"I would like to inform the Assembly that the Indian Muslims are not a minority in the true sense of the word."
These seventy million are children of our country, racially they are Indians, they can hold any office and many of them occupy very senior positions in the country. Our culture is a syntheses of cultures having most varied sources, whereby the Muslims have made a major contribution. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Sikhs and Parsis have the right to profess any religion. We would have to reject the theory that religion is made a criterion for taking on either nationality. That would mean a break-up of our nation.”

This is perhaps a complicated argument for the outside world; but for Indians it is quite natural, because the terrible experiences of 1947, the blood bath involving Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs which continued for weeks, is not just a memory. It continues to live in the subconscious. I have met many Muslims in India who have told me point-blank that if Delhi should consider giving up Kashmir, then their efforts to make the Muslims a community on an equal footing in India would have been in vain. From then the Muslims would truly be second class citizens, because the majority of Hindus would doubt the loyalty of their Muslim fellow-citizens forever. It is not a question of three million Muslims in Kashmir, but of the peace and welfare of seventy million Muslims in India. They were not to be sacrificed to some fanatics in the Kashmir Valley.

The tension between Hindus and Muslims in India had gradually eased when the conflict with Pakistan began in 1965. Muslim officers stood in the front ranks on the Indian side. However, it cannot be denied that in the North, above all, many Hindus still looked at them with condescension, yes even with disgust, because they eat beef. There was the danger that the Muslims in North India would be persecuted again, when at the end of 1966 the movement to ban cow slaughter was artificially boosted. Latent feelings, which play such a major role in
India’s complicated caste system, cannot be overcome overnight. I’ll never forget the disgust, the aversion with which an Indian lady, the wife of a senior official in Srinagar, spoke about the customs and behaviour of the Muslims, as if she was looking with abhorrence into an abyss.

The leaders of the Congress Party have striven to see that as many Muslims as possible have held important posts and thus tried to bridge this gulf of uncontrollable feelings since the nation was founded. These efforts were crowned when Professor Zakir Hussain was elected as third President of India by a large majority in May 1967, with whom an eminent scholar became India’s head again. Zakir Hussain had studied in Berlin and still spoke fluent German. Together with Nehru’s close friend, Maulana Azad, he represented the Muslims in the Congress High Command for decades. He was closely connected with the Aligarh Muslim University. Zakir Hussain was snatched by death from the Indian people on 3rd May 1969.

The Congress leaders, however, could not prevent some discrimination of the Muslim population in the lower rungs of the bureaucratic hierarchy. This was also due to the fact that a considerable number of intelligent Muslims emigrated to Pakistan, so that the Muslims who stayed behind were part of an unfavourable social structure. In the initial years the Muslims were removed from some administrative branches, like the Police Force, for example, because they had been the favourites of the British. This changed gradually in the last decade. There is almost an equality of chances for the Muslim population and at least the upper strata of Hindu society is getting rid of prejudices. The prejudices will remain with the masses, as was seen again in the bloody riots in the Kashmir Valley in August 1967, which were caused by a trivial incident. A Hindu girl married a young Muslim and was converted to Islam at her wish. The family of the girl declared that she had been kidnapped, although she stated unequivocally that she wanted to marry him.
A further argument, seldom uttered publicly in India, came to light in the sixties and has become of major importance after the Sino-Indian war: the strategic position India holds in Inner Asia when in control of Kashmir. A major Chinese attack was directed at the Ladakh strip in the highest Himalaya ranges. India's entire defence posts in the North and North-east would have been threatened if the Kashmir Valley had been relinquished in the fifties. This fact was of minor importance to Nehru and his advisers. Today India's army would violently oppose a change in the map of the North, which would move the defence posts, accessible only with difficulty, to India's disfavour.

That could be one of the reasons why highly dubious methods, unlike those in other Indian provinces, are used during Kashmir's elections and thus guarantee the regional Congress a majority there. The nomination papers of one hundred and eighteen opposition candidates were rejected for trivial reasons before the elections in the Kashmir Valley in February 1967. The Congress Party held twenty-two seats in the Kashmir Valley for which there were no rivals at all. The argument used by Menon in the Security Council that as it is Kashmir has a sort of plebiscite by its participation in the general elections seems even less convincing. The most upright democrats in Delhi have permitted these election practices for raison d'État. The Indian press however, did not mince words and spoke frankly on the counterfeit of the elections in Kashmir.20

One thing, however, cannot be overlooked when judging the behaviour of the Congress in Kashmir: the character of the Kashmiris. These people living on the Indian border on the fringe to Inner Asia are not warriors like the Pathans in Northwest Pakistan; they are craftsmen and tradespeople who have since time immemorial lived by their excellent craftsmanship and trade which once extended over the pass roads far into Inner Asia. Although easily excitable, the Kashmiris have in the course of their long history—unlike many other Indian border
inhabitants—never accomplished any particularly spectacular valiant heroic deeds.

This was their attitude also when in Kashmir's decisive hour, in August 1965, Pakistan tried to incite a general Kashmiri revolt by sending infiltrators to Kashmir Valley. Nothing like that happened. Even the sincere believers in accession to Pakistan did not move even a finger in Kashmir, when the hour struck. Four weeks after the end of the Indo-Pak war, Sheikh Abdullah's closest colleagues—Maulana Masudi and G. M. Kara—and Abdullah's keenest opponent, the High Priest, Faruk, were arrested for making inflammatory speeches, but there was not a single trial for active participation in Pakistan's militant actions. It is therefore no wonder that the Congress Party in Kashmir and Delhi as well were convinced that no special consideration should be made for the opposition in Kashmir. Whether it is wise to leave this waiting policy on Kashmir to strong-arm politics is another question. S. Mulgaonkar, the Chief Editor of Hindusthan Times wrote:

But the possibility that political positions have changed after the events beginning August 5 must not be ruled out. For that will lead to sterile negativism. At any rate, the least that ought to be done is to start a serious dialogue and take soundings instead of falling into the error of dubbing every Kashmiri who does not accept the present state of affairs as an enemy of India. A positive policy in Kashmir is needed.21

The war in Kashmir
The major dispute between India and Pakistan in autumn 1965 was preceded by a strange occurrence in spring which boded evil. Fights suddenly broke out over a border area which is of no value to both countries. The area of dispute was the so-called Rann of Kutch, a large salt desert, to the north of the former principality of Kutch, which acceded to India in 1947.
The salt desert (Rann) extends over vast areas. It belongs to the present state of Gujarat. This salt desert has one peculiarity. At the beginning of the monsoons the water from the Arabian Sea flows onto the land here driven by the west wind every May and floods the entire low-lying area for about six months till late autumn, so that only some higher levels project like islands from the water. This peculiarity makes it impossible to cultivate the Rann or inhabit it.

A final demarcation line was never made in this worthless strip of land, which has caused occasional clashes between Indian and Pakistan patrols. These erupted into a major action in April 1965. Both countries brought their troops to the vicinity of the territory under dispute. A large number were killed and wounded. The British Prime Minister Wilson intervened immediately and in the first week of May succeeded in arranging a mutual cease-fire. England suggested that a judicial commission be appointed. Final discussions were held between Ayub Khan and Shastri eight weeks later during the Commonwealth Conference in London. During the official state banquet in Buckingham Palace, the Minister for Commonwealth Affairs requested the Queen for permission to withdraw with the two leaders to the Queen's study, where the agreement on the arbitration committee was signed. (The Committee with the Swede Lagergren as Chairman announced its decision in February 1968. The disputed territory covering 9085 square kilometres remained to a large extent with India. Only 777 square kilometres were given to Pakistan).

Back home, Shastri as well as Ayub Khan praised the cease-fire agreement as an honorable solution. Only two months later it was seen that in the meantime Ayub Khan had made all preparations for a far more serious conflict. Since the beginning of June, Pakistan's Army High Command had trained a guerilla corps for infiltration into Kashmir, whose headquarters was in the hill-station Murree, not far from Rawalpindi.

The report made by the Chief of the Observer Group of the
United Nations, the Australian Lieutenant-General Robert Nimmo, and published by U Thant on 4th September 1965, showed that Pakistan had slipped about seven to eight thousand soldiers and officers over the mountains and ravines of the demarcation line into the Kashmir Valley since the 5th of August. The seven hundred kilometre long demarcation line runs to a large extent over precipices and deep gorges, in which only vultures live. The conditions for infiltration were just ideal. It needed only strict discipline and organisation and a few local collaborators in the Kashmir Valley to carry out this military plan, which was later revealed in Srinagar. The anniversary of Sheikh Abdullah’s first arrest in 1953 fell on 9th August. His followers had planned a large demonstration on this day for weeks. With the help of the infiltrators from Pakistan, this occasion was to be the signal for a general uprising of the masses in Kashmir. From 5th August the transmitter on the Pakistan side “Free Kashmir Radio” called the Kashmiris to revolt. Although the Pakistani infiltrators were already operating in the Kashmir Valley for the past four days, the Government in Srinagar was clever enough not to ban the demonstration, which took place without ending in riots. But as mentioned before there was no revolt by the masses. Even the High Priest of Srinagar, who belonged to the Opposition, the twenty-year old Faruk, had not led the demonstration, which according to Pakistani plans was to begin from the large mosque and stream onto the streets of Srinagar.

Although Pakistan adamantly denied any charges of infiltration, there was vigorous guerilla warfare in the Kashmir Valley in which according to Indian statistics 374 Pakistanis and 118 Indians fell up to 23rd August. The Indian Government permitted its troops to cross over the demarcation line at eighteen points, eleven days after the infiltration began, and to occupy mountain heights lying on the Pakistani side, which provided a far better view of the Pak-occupied territory of Kashmir.
India claimed that, only from these posts was it possible to hinder further Pakistani infiltrations.

Pakistan's counter-offensive began on 1st September. Over an area of ten kilometres a Pak division crossed over the cease-fire line in the extreme south in the general direction of the city of Jammu. Two days later the Security Council met and demanded an immediate cease-fire. At the same time the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, landed in Karachi and had long discussions with Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Bhutto. Thus India was threatened with a two-front war.

The Pakistani campaign planned at cutting off the only road leading from India to Kashmir at its starting point, Jammu. It planned to encircle the Indian division stationed near Jammu and to advance from Lahore to Amritsar, in order to take possession of the major highway from Punjab to Delhi, which would lead to a collapse in India's defence beyond the Kashmir Valley. This military manoeuvre of Pakistan's did not succeed, for the Indian army managed on 6th September to meet the advancing tank divisions and their infantry support by moving south of Sialkot and at the same time in the general direction of Lahore. South of Sialkot the Indian army succeeded in occupying an area of 450 square kilometres after the tank battle of Phillora and in the Lahore sector they gained possession of the entire area up to the canal, running nearly parallel to the border, directly in front of the city. This territorial gain was not important, but it is significant for the outcome of the passage-at-arms that on the day of the cease-fire India had occupied 1850 square kilometres of Pak territory as against 525 which Pakistan had occupied of Indian soil.

First at Sialkot and then at Phillora, the largest tank battles since the Second World War were fought. Pakistan had brought six to seven tank regiments with the latest Patton-model tanks into action. Unlike the Israel-Egyptian war of June 1967, both the Air Forces played a minor role. An aerial support of battles on earth, which two years later was to decide Israel's lightning
victory, was hardly to be found. Contrary to the sensational reports published by the world press, cities were hardly attacked. The loss of tanks and men was equally high on both sides. Pakistan sacrificed perhaps half of its six hundred first-class tanks. Indian losses were estimated at two hundred tanks out of a total of seven to eight hundred. The number of dead were recorded at 2000 on the Indian side, Pakistan's losses are supposed to have been higher.

On the day of the cease-fire, which was concluded on 23rd September, after several interventions by the Security Council, India had by no means won a sweeping military victory, but there was no doubt that the Indian army was superior in its operational strategy as well as tactically on the battlefield. This was a surprise to the military observers of the entire world, for the English papers had written in the first few days of September that one Pakistani soldier was worth three Indian. Ayub Khan must have also believed this and reckoned with a major military success. Pakistan prepared to cease fighting after Ayub Khan realised with disappointment that he could no longer make a decisive break-through with the means at his disposal and furthermore there was the danger that India would penetrate yet deeper into Pak territory.

It was of political and military importance that in the course of this war, there was no fighting on India's borders with East Pakistan. As Pakistan had only a few troops in its Eastern region, the Indians would have been far superior to them. During the war Shastri declared repeatedly that India was not at war with East Pakistan. This was certainly done to suggest a meaningful distinction between East and West Pakistan.

China restricted itself to propagandistic support of Pakistan. Late at night on 16th September, the Indian Legation Secretary received a three-day ultimatum. The Chinese claimed that the Indians had set up military units on the Tibetan side of the border of Sikkim, which India denied. A massive movement of
Chinese troops was observed all along the Himalayan border. The Chinese, however, went no farther than furious propaganda attacks and were obviously disappointed that Pakistan was prepared to cease fire so soon.

As short as this war was, it indicated a new state of affairs in world politics in Asia in its course and the after-effects. It was more significant than the lesson to Pakistan, that it is not possible to solve the long smouldering Kashmir problem with the use of force. The United States and the Soviet Union used similar means to restore peace. For the first time the two super powers clearly had a common interest in an Asian conflict; the fear, that China could gain by intervening in the fighting, determined the attitude of Washington as well as Moscow.

The Indo-Pak war marked the end of the Commonwealth for England. The outbreak of open fighting between two members of the Commonwealth was a hard blow to the community-idea fostered by Britain. Prime Minister Wilson could be blamed for England’s failure to play its traditional role as arbitrator. Despite the fact that Pakistan began infiltration into Kashmir, Wilson was clearly on Pakistan’s side after the Indian counter-offensive on Lahore on 6th September and warned India of the consequences of aggression. As the United States did not consider itself to be in a position to act as arbitrator the Pax Sovietica came in place of the Pax Britannica for the first time in Asia at the end of the Indo-Pak conflict with the negotiations for peace in Tashkent.

The Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin had suggested during the Indo-Pak war that he would negotiate and invited Ayub Khan and Shastri to Tashkent for negotiations for peace. Both countries hesitated, however, in accepting the invitation. Pakistan hoped for success in the debate in the Security Council, which continued after the cease-fire. But after the Pak Foreign Minister Bhutto spoke of the ‘Indian dogs’ at the Security Council, Pakistan lost its chances to raise the Kashmir problem again on an international basis. Bhutto had ruined his chances and lost
much sympathy. Thereupon, Pakistan decided to accept the Soviet offer of negotiation.

India followed only hesitantly. A positive understanding with Moscow had always been one of the bedrocks of India's foreign policy. India was dependent on the Soviet Union to veto the Kashmir problem, in case the Security Council agreed to Pakistan's suggestions.

A new phase of Soviet policy towards Asia began with Krushchev's downfall. The Indian visitor to Moscow was received a shade less cordially and was often told that from the Soviet angle Shastri was not such a reliable partner as Nehru. At the same time Moscow made advances to Pakistan. Ayub Khan was invited to Moscow in 1965, which he had never visited till then. During the Indo-Pak fighting this new tendency was clearly seen. The Soviet Press adopted a neutral stand between the two fighting forces. This indicated the interest of the Soviet Union to win Pakistan away from the one-sided relation to China, even if it were to a certain extent at India's expense. This was to be seen in the fact that during Shastri's visit to Moscow in May 1965—one month after Ayub Khan's visit to the Kremlin—the final communiqué did not even mention Kashmir. The previous communiqués were always in favour of India. These subtle changes of the Soviet Foreign policy had been noted in Delhi, even if outwardly no notice was taken of it. The Indo-Soviet attitude had as such not changed basically, but one had to admit that the Soviet Union used every opportunity as a consequence of its clash with China to draw closer to any Asiatic nation, which looked like developing one-sided ties with China. This development caused anxious conjectures in Delhi before Shastri's trip to Tashkent.

The meeting in Tashkent
Shastri and President Ayub Khan accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and a large advisory staff arrived in Tashkent on 4th January 1966, where they were received by
Kosygin and Gromyko. The two heads of the delegation were accommodated in villas on the outskirts of the town, which had been selected as a neutral place for negotiations. The negotiations in Tashkent took the shape of discussions mainly, which Kosygin had either with Ayub Khan or Shastri individually. Ayub and Shastri spoke with each other privately only for two hours in the neutral villa. This alone shows the great difficulties which confronted both the sides and the Soviet arbiter in reaching a positive agreement.

Ayub Khan demanded an initial discussion on Kashmir. He seemed to regard this to be the actual subject under discussion. All other questions were of minor interest to him. The Indian delegation, however, were adamant from the beginning that the Indian part of Kashmir was not to be negotiated, the Kashmir Valley being an integral part of the Indian Union. India's suggestions centred on the plan for a non-aggression pact between India and Pakistan, which Nehru had suggested years ago. Shastri and his advisors wanted to make the withdrawal of armed personnel of both sides to the positions held by them on 5th August 1965 to follow Pakistan's signing such a pact. Such withdrawal had been demanded by the Security Council in various resolutions.

The land won in the Lahore area and some other areas was of little significance. The Indian Army wanted rather to keep the strategically favourable posts in the passes in the north-west of the Kashmir Valley, the control of which had been the aim of the Indian army for years. In question in particular was the Haji Pir Pass, around the region of Tithval and above all the pocket between Uri and Poonch. The connecting road between these two places, which till now ran through Pak-occupied areas, has always been considered a vital link. The Indian view was therefore that the territory now occupied by them, which was of such importance for the defence of Kashmir Valley, could be relinquished only if Pakistan agreed to desist from further aggression by signing a solemn non-aggression pact.
On arrival in Tashkent, Ayub Khan did not want to hear anything about a non-aggression pact, if India were not prepared to treat the Kashmir problem as a whole. Pakistan had a whole arsenal of arguments which had been presented to the Security Council for eighteen years.

In view of these diametrically opposed points of view it was no wonder that negotiations came to a standstill whenever they were started anew. As usual in difficult international conferences the matter itself was not touched, only the problems of proceeding further were discussed, which became an almost insurmountable wall. On the sixth day it seemed as if the conference had failed. This would have been a great setback for the Soviet Union. Kosygin then began to work with hard-line methods from the afternoon of 9th January, by threatening both sides. From that afternoon till the next morning at 10 o'clock Kosygin spoke with Ayub Khan and Shastri individually four times each and finally succeeded.

To the surprise of the pessimistic observers in Tashkent the Indian and Pakistani delegations signed a joint communiqué in Kosygin's presence on the afternoon of 10th January in a surprisingly relaxed and cosy atmosphere. Both sides had to make concessions, or at least withdraw main claims. Pakistan for instance had to be satisfied with the Kashmir problem being mentioned in the communiqué only as a matter for discussion, in which each party stated its views. Ayub Khan thus had to drop his principal condition for an agreement with India. The conference resolved not to have an arbitrary commission to solve the Kashmir problem. India on its part had to agree to withdraw its troops to the positions held at the beginning of the dispute—despite the objections of the Indian Army—without having concluded a formal non-aggression pact. It was only confirmed in the communiqué that disputes would have to be solved in a peaceful manner as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. These conditions had existed in the
summer of 1965 and had yet not been able to prevent an attack. Actually the only fruits of the negotiations in Tashkent was the withdrawal of the troops which was to be concluded by 25th February 1966. All other demands of both parties were not considered.

The reaction in Pakistan was accordingly negative. Students rioted at various universities, so that three days after signing the agreement curfew was clamped down in West Pakistan. Even in India there were several disappointed voices. The opposition declared that the army had won the war, but the politicians have lost the peace. There would have been even more severe criticism in India if Lal Bahadur’s sudden death a few hours after signing the agreement did not inhibit world opinion.

All the delegates to the conference and the journalists who hurried to Tashkent were invited to a reception on 10th January, where Ayub Khan as well as Shastri seemed to be happy. They bid each other farewell in Hindustani. Shastri retired at 11 o’clock. Shortly after 1 o’clock, he woke up with a severe bout of coughing. The end was so quick that no medicine could have helped. Within the hour Kosygin stood at Shastri’s deathbed surrounded by the bewildered Indian delegation. The world press published the symbolic picture with Kosygin and Ayub Khan carrying the coffin to the aeroplane which was to fly the Prime Minister to Delhi.

Shastri’s death lent a tragic note not only to the dramatic events in Tashkent. Only in the last months of his life had the Prime Minister succeeded in taking the reins of the government firmly into his hand. With his resolute attitude after the beginning of hostilities with Pakistan, Lal Bahadur strengthened his prestige in the entire country, above all with the Chief Ministers, to such an extent that he could have had a free hand in passing even unpopular measures. Nobody could have agreed to the Pakistani compromise, except one who could claim to have created the political conditions for the success of India’s arms. The widespread feeling of setback which prevailed in India after
the severe defeat in the passage at arms against China had nearly been overcome by the war with Pakistan. Furthermore, I have never experienced such euphoric national feeling in India as in the days after the cease-fire in the conflict with Pakistan. Even otherwise rather reserved Indian friends were thrilled by the unexpected success the army had won. Shastri's name thus went down in the annals of the Indian pantheon.

For Ayub Khan, however, the conference in Tashkent was the beginning of his political downfall. The result of it was that Foreign Minister Bhutto distanced himself from him, declaring that the President had let the Russians as well as the Indians override him. This was a severe blow to Ayub Khan's prestige. It became evident only two and a half years later. At the beginning of October 1968 Ayub, yet uncontested, broadcast to his people on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of his assumption of charge of the government. A few days later students rioted in Lahore, and this spread like a forest fire to all the big towns of Pakistan. Finally East Pakistan was almost on the verge of a revolt in winter 1968-69. Ayub had to give up his principles of 'basic democracy' but even that could not hinder his downfall, which was sealed in March 1969 when the heads of the Army refused to proclaim a state of emergency.

The then Army Chief, General Yahya Khan, took over as President and decreed half a year later that there would be general elections for a national assembly in December 1970. This election led to the final split between West and East Pakistan. The Awami League of Seikh Mujibur Rahman emerged as the only political force in the East. The Peoples Party of Ali Zulfiqar Bhutto won in the West. The split between the two wings of Pakistan could not be bridged any longer. There was not much chance left for a constitution which could be acceptable to both wings.
Indira Gandhi

On New Year's Day 1931, Nehru wrote to his thirteen-year-old daughter Indira from prison: "It is very interesting to think of the past story of the world and of the great men and women and of the great deeds that it contains. To read history is good, but even more interesting and fascinating is to help in making history. And you know that history is being made in our country today. The past of India is a long, long one, lost in the mists of antiquity; and yet today we have little leisure to think of the past. It is the future that fills our minds, the future that we are fashioning, and the present that absorbs all our time and energy."

In conclusion he said: "Later in the morning came the news that Mummy had been arrested and taken to jail. It was a pleasant New Year's gift for me. It had long been expected and I have no doubt that Mummy is thoroughly happy and contented. You must be rather lonely. Once a fortnight you may see Mummy and once a fortnight you may see me, and you will carry our messages to each other. But I shall sit down with pen and paper and I shall think of you. And then you will silently come near me and we shall talk of many things. And we shall dream of the past, and find our way to make the future greater than the past. Goodbye, little one, and may you grow up into a brave soldier in India's service!"

The Central Prison in Naini lay opposite the city of Allahabad, on the other side of the Jamuna river. It would have been a stone's throw to the opposite bank where the family house of
the Nehrus stood encircled by large verandahs in a garden of old trees. Grandfather Motilal had built it in Moghul style with a coquette tower on the roof, an imitation of the Red Fort in Delhi. The young Indira lived in the spacious rooms of this Anand Bhavan, surrounded by amas, gardeners and servants, sometimes almost alone, when father, mother and grandfather sat behind prison bars. The aristocratic zamindari house, which the Kashmiri Brahmin Nehrus inhabited in Allahabad had, by this time for long been the centre of the Congress Party, an active headquarters. One of the young Congress members, who used to look after lonely Indira, was Lal Bahadur Shastri.

The question has been asked whether Nehru had systematically brought up his daughter to be his successor. Shastri himself believed during the weeks before Nehru’s death that Nehru wanted to see Indira as his successor, when she was elected Congress president in 1959 at the age of forty-two. It seemed almost natural then that she should occupy the same chair that her father and her grandfather had occupied before her. The private life of Nehru’s daughter, could never be separated from the work for the Congress party and for India’s freedom.

It was but a matter of course that Indira accompanied her father, Nehru, when he moved to Delhi, into the stately house at Teen Murti, not far from the Rashtrapati Bhavan. She was the mistress of Teen Murti for seventeen years and had to manage the house, in which state visitors from all parts of the world were as common as the crowd of people large and small from every nook and corner of India, who besieged the house every day from the early hours of the morning. She accompanied her father on his frequent trips to the world capitals. All the great statesmen of our epoch had crossed her path, whether it was Chou-en-Lai, Mao-tse-Tung or Eisenhower, Kennedy, de Gaulle or Adenauer, Churchill, Khrushchev, Kiji, Macmillan or Erlander. It was inevitable that she was much more aware of her father’s innermost thoughts and the most confidential matters than Krishna Menon, Shastri or Pandit Pant. The question,
often asked in India—I have heard it even from members of Nehru's family—was whether Indira was a political personality in her own strength and in her own right or whether she was only her father's hostess. This question was decided only in the fourth year of her rule, when Mrs. Gandhi, to the surprise of many observers, showed herself to be a politician who in the face of a crisis can combine craftiness, consideration, demagogic talents and a considerable amount of ruthlessness. This was seen only in the months when the Congress Party finally split. When she regained a two-third-majority of Congress (N) after the March 1971 elections, she was really the undisputed master of her huge country. This victory gave to her a new status, only comparable to her father.

Shastri embodied the Indian middle class. Indira can make as many socialistic speeches as she likes, but she always appears to be an aristocrat. Many foreign visitors have testified that it is as difficult to carry on a conversation with Indira as with her father. She can be reserved, even frosty. But I have hardly felt this in my various meetings with this remarkable woman. The determining impression which one always has when sitting opposite Indira Gandhi is: This is a woman who is spurred by the thought that she has already lost too much time. Indira Gandhi had once despairingly said to Gisela Bonn in the mid-fifties: "You cannot imagine how it really is. A tiny weeny wheel, which has to set a gigantic basin full of tough dough into motion." That is the predominant impression one gets on meeting her. She had inherited her father's impatience and the view that India's problems could lead to a catastrophe, if one waited too long. She differed from him in the fact that she was far less accustomed to hesitate. Nehru had deliberated on many problems without finding a solution. Perhaps the contrary is true of Indira. She is sometimes inclined to take decisions which have not matured fully. But she has shown that she can wait. In Shashtri's Cabinet she did not insist to take over the Ministry of External Affairs, as many had expected her to do, but was
satisfied with a low-ranking cabinet post. When she became Prime Minister after Shastri's death it was by no effort of hers. She let herself be selected to the post almost gracefully. This did not change when she had to accept the Congress Party's severe defeat in the elections. There was no equally matched rival at first. Her rival Desai said after her second election: "We have garlanded her with flowers; actually, we have put a crown of thorns on her head."

Whoever grew up in the house of the Nehrus could never escape the spell of political thoughts and decisions, which stirred the followers of the Mahatma: "What present can I send you from Naini Prison?" Nehru wrote to her on her thirteenth birthday. "My presents cannot be very material or solid. They can only be of the air and of the mind and spirit, such as a good fairy might have bestowed on you—things that even the high walls of prison cannot stop." It was at this time that her father wrote to her those now well-known letters on the course of world history, which greatly influenced the development of her image of the world.

Indira's mother, Kamala, died at an early age. Indira was eighteen years old when her mother died in 1936. Her father had played the major role in her life, even after her marriage to Feroze Gandhi in 1942. Feroze Gandhi, a Parsi from Bombay whose parents lived in Allahabad, knew Indira as his childhood companion. He met her in England after her mother's death and urged her to be his wife. The entire Nehru family, even her father, was against this marriage, for even the enlightened agnostic was conscious in his sub-conscious of the fact that the bridegroom was a Parsi—that is, he belonged to a religious community into which a Brahmin could not marry. (Feroze was not related to Mahatma Gandhi). Indira acted against the wishes of her father, married Feroze and bore him two sons. But she was not happy in her marriage. Feroze, politically a pupil of Krishna Menon's, became a member of Parlia-
ment. He died in 1960, after the couple had lived separated for over a decade. The conjecture that Indira’s devotion to her father’s work stood in the way of a happy marriage is perhaps not wrong. After her father’s appointment as Prime Minister she had indeed no other choice but to live in her father’s house and also to take on the role of First Lady. This could be combined with the role of a mother, but hardly that of a devoted wife. Indira’s sons studied in England. Her eldest son has married an Italian.

In 1955 Indira Gandhi was elected a member of the Congress Working Committee, the High Command of a somewhat amorphous structure, in which her vote strengthened that group which tended to veer somewhat to the left of the central group. Her political image was moulded in the years in which she headed the Congress Party (1959-1960). It was by chance that during this period law and order collapsed totally in the Southern state Kerala, in which the communists had formed a state government for the first time. It was Indira Gandhi, who—while her father was still hesitating—persuaded President Prasad to intervene in Kerala, to dismiss a government incapable of action and to declare President’s rule in this state according to the regulations of the Indian Constitution. Later she succeeded in bringing about a coalition between the Congress Party and the Muslim League, which defeated the Communists in the next elections. This was the last success which the Congress had in Kerala. Seven years later as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had to deal again with the mighty chief of the left communists in Kerala, Namboodiripad, whom she had stripped of office and again Namboodiripad fell while she governed at the centre but this time without her having had a hand in the matter.

Together with her father and the then Home Minister, Shastri, she had examined the qualifications of all candidates of the Congress Party before the elections in 1962. She was given the key-role in a seven-man committee which had to contend with rebel Congress members in the various provinces after the
elections. That made her very familiar with the position of the party in all provinces. After the attack by the Chinese she became Chairman of the National Citizens' Council, which controlled the coordination of all civil emergency measures. It was her first public office, but it was still outside the Cabinet. In the beginning of 1965 we find her again to be one of the few Congress politicians who, during the language riots in Madras, dared to explain the policies of the government to the angry masses. Again—already as Prime Minister—she was the only Congress leader who, despite opposition which took on a wild form, could hold mammoth meetings all over the country. She was hit by a stone, which an unruly student threw at her at one such meeting in Orissa. She was not disturbed. India knows that Indira is a courageous woman.

A more difficult question to answer is how far her powers of judgment are equal to facing complex problems of the national economy. Life has been for her just one unique school of experience, granted as it is to only a few people. Her training, however, shows some gaps. She has to overcome them by vision and female instinct. To be fair to her, how many of the leaders of the bigger states of today, are really experts on economy? Indira's dependence on expert advice in these matters is inevitable and it is surely not because she is a woman. Most heads of governments have rather dim ideas about the economic decisions they have to take. In this respect Indira is no exception.

A new generation has appeared with Indira Gandhi on the Indian scene. Krishna Menon and the former Home Minister, Nanda, from the left wing of the Congress Party and Desai and Patil from the right wing, were old men and had little to offer to India's younger generation. The new generation, whose leaders could just about be counted among those imprisoned during the British rule—Indira for thirteen months—have been moulded more by the post-war era and the epoch of freedom than by the struggle against the British. To bring this generation, which has not been particularly articulate as yet into poli-
tical positions, to mould them, to make a new India, an *Avant garde*, these were the tasks facing Indira Gandhi, when she answered the appeal of the Congress President Kamaraj. Indira had this advantage over all politicians of the older generation. Indira Gandhi gathered around her a circle of younger and pragmatic men, among whom were Finance Minister Chavan, as well as Subramaniam, Minister for Agriculture, later on for Planning. P. N. Haksar, the Union Secretary to the Prime Minister, who is in charge of the coordination of the various authorities and ministries, had a great influence on her.

A few days before her second election as Prime Minister, I found Indira Gandhi in the same room and at the same writing table where Nehru spoke to me about his main worries after the Chinese attack. She sat there with a frown, absorbed in her files, before she realised that I had stepped into her room. One could almost physically feel the miseries of five hundred million people being concentrated here, a large portion of whom hardly had the bare minimum for existence and were seriously threatened by hunger after two bad harvests. Indira, who had to win an arduous fight against Desai—it was about his re-entry into the cabinet—presented an almost fragile appearance, and one had to ask oneself whether these delicate shoulders could bear the burdens of an Atlas. She was fifty years old and the rigour of fights and disillusionments had made her reserved. She appeared to be lonely.

When I saw her four days later—an hour after she had been unanimously elected in Parliament—she was as if another person. In high spirits, evading importunate questions put by American journalists about her meeting with Svetlana Stalin with irony, she had rediscovered that sovereignty and distance which earned her the reputation of being the only man in Delhi. The white-haired lock in her black hair seemed no longer a herald of old age but a bold challenge. And the rose, which Nehru never forgot on his achkan, glowed on her peach-coloured sari. The probation period was over. The period of true competency had
begun, a period which Indira Gandhi had to enter under very
difficult circumstances, more difficult than those Shastri or even
her father had to face.

Three major problems cropped up during Indira's first year
of power: the demand of the Sikhs for their own state, the
devaluation of the rupee and finally an aimless revolt of the
youth. which shook India in the summer and the winter of
1966.

A state for the Sikhs
A short two months after taking the oath of office, Indira
Gandhi decided to make a move of great magnitude in internal
politics, a move which her father had stubbornly opposed dur-
ing his entire period as Prime Minister. Despite warnings from
many people, she effected the division of the state of Punjab
into a state with a Sikh majority (Punjabi Suba) and a newly
formed state Haryana. She wanted thereby to remove the
irremedial problem which had burdened internal politics
since independence. The state of Punjab was divided
on 1st November 1966. The Punjabi Suba received 41 per
cent of the area of former Punjab with a population of 11.5
million. Haryana received 35.8 per cent of the area with a
population of 7.5 million. Himachal Pradesh received 22 per
cent of the area and 7.1 per cent of the population. This Union
territory enlarged considerably will be the eighteenth Indian
state. The Union territory of Chandigarh comprises of 113
square kilometres and has a population of 1.2 million. Later on
it will be the Capital of Punjabi Suba. Haryana has to build its
own capital.

It was a very difficult operation which Indira Gandhi took
on as her first act of office. The religious community of the
Sikhs had not been considered while reorganising India on a
linguistic basis in 1956, because though Punjabi is recognised
as a language by itself, it is in reality only a kind of Hindi, a
dialect, which any Hindi-speaking person will understand with-
out much difficulty. The Punjabi language has its own script, however, Gurmukhi: This somewhat antique script is hardly used in normal everyday life. The Arab script which is used in Urdu is generally used for Punjabi. Apart from the Sikhs, there are also a number of Hindus in Punjab who speak Punjabi. They violently opposed the division of the former state of Punjab.

The demand by the Sikhs for their own state was not only motivated on a narrow linguistic basis by the Sikh Party, the Akali Dal. In reality the Sikhs wanted to enforce a somewhat religiously compact community, a contradiction of the secular principles of the Indian State. The language problem had to be used to conceal the true reasons. That was the reason why Nehru stuck to his decision not to divide the Punjab despite constant threats by the Sikhs. Indira Gandhi's decision to take a path different to that of her father's was not only because of the chaotic conditions in the Punjab. Indira wanted to thus honour the Sikh soldiers and officers, who formed about 20 per cent of the Indian army, for their valour in the recent Indo-Pakistan war. The long unsolved problem of a Sikh state was not to cause a split in the army.

Whoever has seen the crowds in the Golden Temple of the Sikhs in their sacred city of Amritsar, could not help receiving the impression that they have come to a part of India which has a unique and special character. The long-bearded, tall Indians, who always wear a colourful, artistically bound turban, are considered in Europe to be the typical inhabitants of India. The turban, the beard and an iron bangle are some of the signs which unmistakably differentiate this religious community from all other Indians. The somewhat martial women whom we meet in Amritsar wear wide trousers, and at a glance one can see that the Sikh women, as opposed to their Hindu and Muslim counterparts, have had equal rights for centuries. 3

The Golden Temple, whose gilded copper glitters under India's sun, lies on an island, amidst an artificial lake, connect-
ed to the shores by a marble causeway. No statue nor idol decorates the interior. But it glitters with precious stones and costly metals. The stream of believers winds through the doors opened on all four sides, which symbolises that the temple is open to all Indian castes. In the main hall musicians play without a break on drums and string instruments, to which hymns are sung. In the other rooms men, women and children gather for common prayers, which plays a major role in Sikh worship. In the upper rooms of the temples the priests take turns at continually reading the Granth Sahib, the sacred book of the Sikhs; it contains the teachings of the Guru, the great masters and founders of the Sikh religion, India’s youngest religion.

Guru Nanak (1469-1539), a great social reformer, had tried to find a synthesis between Hinduism and Islam in his teachings after the Moghul rule began. He accepted some important features of Hinduism like Karma and reincarnation, but rejected the caste system and the seclusion of the women, the parda, and founded a religion based on practical rules. His successors, the nine gurus of the Sikhs, developed and improved the teachings of the master and compiled it in the Granth Sahib. Today there are nearly eight million Sikhs, of whom about 6.5 million live in the Punjab; the rest have emigrated, mostly to Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and the Union capital of Delhi, where foreigners know them particularly as taxi chauffeurs.

The Sikhs have preserved a close concord in the diaspora. The hard struggles which they had with the Moghul rulers till they finally succeeded in founding a Sikh state with Lahore as the capital (1761) awakened a particularly intense community feeling. The Sikhs in the vicinity of Lahore had paid heavily with their lives in the massacres in 1947. In other parts of India they are considered to be a little naive; the Hindus have many jokes about the Sikhs. No other Indian community had done more for modernising the country; there is quite a number of Sikhs among technicians and engineers, architects and doctors. The girls brought up freer than other Indian girls have begun
the pioneer movement in women's sports, a tradition which has continued till today!

Master Tara Singh, the recognised leader of the Sikh community, was considered to be a bitter enemy of the British in the last two decades of British rule. The Sikhs had not forgotten the two bloody wars with the British in the middle of the nineteenth century, which in 1849 led to their defeat and to the occupation of the Punjab, thus completing the conquest of British India. Master Tara Singh is one of the founders of the Sikh Party, the Akali Dal, which was established in 1919 after the gruesome massacre in Amritsar, when General Dyer, to revenge the murder of four Europeans, let fifteen hundred Sikhs be shot to the last man, during a meeting which was claimed to be illegal.

After India's independence, Master Tara Singh had hoped for a separate state for the Sikhs, after the Punjab had been divided between India and Pakistan. There were continual riots after the government in Delhi refused to accede to this wish, which the police quelled rather brutally. In summer 1961 the almost eighty-year-old white-bearded Tara Singh decided to go on a fast to death, which he bore for forty-eight days in the courtyard of the Golden Temple, but which he broke later. When it became known that he had not seriously fasted, his reputation was ruined. He had to do public penance and it was drastic; to wash used crockery in the courtyard of the Golden Temple. He died in November 1967 without having succeeded in regaining his former influence.

His political successor was another white-bearded man. Fateh Singh continued the fight for the autonomy of the Sikhs with the same keenness. The demands for autonomy were unmistakably infused with separatist paroles, which only intensified Nehru's reluctance to make any concessions to the Sikhs. Several commissions were set up, which were of no avail. In the autumn of 1965, Shastri found himself again confronted by Fateh Singh's threat to fast to death. This plan was thwarted by the
outbreak of war with Pakistan. But after Indira Gandhi's assumption of office, Fateh Singh repeated his threat, with the variation that he would burn himself publicly at the end of his fasting during a major festival of the Sikhs, when thousands of Sikhs came to Amritsar. Before this could happen, Mrs. Gandhi cut the Gordian knot and agreed to divide the Punjab.

The practical difficulties were many. Haryana, the state to be newly formed, surrounded to the north and south by the Union Territory of Delhi, did not have a suitable city in which the state government could be installed. Delhi decided to declare Chandigarh, the most modern city in Asia, built by Le Corbusier, as the capital, in which both the Punjabi Suba and Haryana would have their separate Ministries. The solution led to renewed protests by the Sikhs and especially by Fateh Singh, who insisted that the Government of Haryana should be removed from Chandigarh. But the division of the Punjab pacified the Sikhs and silenced the tendency to separatism. There arose, however, increased expenditure. The ministries of both the new states had together four times as much personnel as the former Punjab government. Even Haryana became an area of discontent. The Congress Party won the elections in 1967 in the youngest state but split thereafter, so that an anti-Congress government came into power in Haryana, which however, did not last long.

A particularly difficult problem was the question of the capital, as neither Punjab nor Haryana were satisfied with sharing the present capital of Chandigarh. After nearly three years of indecision the Union government decided that Chandigarh should remain the common capital of both states for a further five years. Then Chandigarh could be the capital of the Punjab, while in the meantime Haryana would build its own capital, for which the Union Government sanctioned a sum of two hundred million rupees. Haryana received an additional hundred and twenty villages by this arrangement.
Indira and the Syndicate
The first government of Indira Gandhi operated with less finesse when they devalued the rupee by 36.5 per cent on 6th June 1966. In view of India's growing export difficulties this measure, strongly advised by the World Bank, became unavoidable. The government, however, made the unforgivable mistake of delaying orders which should have accompanied the devaluation, and of putting them into force only in September 1966. This occurred most probably because the government were not fully united in the devaluation decision. The Minister for Commerce, Manubhai Shah, was one of the keenest opponents of this move. "The devaluation was not followed by the lifting or easing of the controls which hold Indian industry in a virtual administrative strait-jacket," the Indian journalist Krishna Bhatia said.\(^4\) Actually export decreased after devaluation—a unique case; the prices rose and, instead of a stimulus, Indian economy experienced a recession initially.

Even politically the devaluation released a crisis. The Congress President Kamaraj, who had always advocated that the rupee retain its parity, had not been informed of the government's decision beforehand. This was to be the starting point for a lasting resentment between the Congress President and Indira Gandhi. The close confidence which existed originally between Kamaraj and Mrs. Gandhi changed to a cool expedient alliance after the devaluation. Indira Gandhi made no preparations in late autumn 1967 to see that Kamaraj retained the office of Congress President for a further two years. Instead S. Nijalingappa (68), Chief Minister of Mysore till then, was elected Congress President. It could not be foreseen then that a year later Nijalingappa was to become one of her bitterest enemies.

The cool relations between Indira Gandhi and Kamaraj had thrown its shadows long before. Even before the parliamentary elections she used the first opportunity to dismiss one of Kamaraj's confidantes from the Cabinet, the Home Minister Nanda. Demonstrations organised by the Jan Sangh, were held
throughout autumn 1966 to ban the slaughter of cows, which as is known the Hindus consider to be sacred. A committee to protect the cow had negotiated with Home Minister Nanda and demanded a federal law to ban cow slaughter. Nanda, who was an honorary protector of the Sadhus, the holy men, expressed his personal sympathies for the work of the committee, but he had to insist that he could not issue a law banning cow slaughter in the individual states. A number of states hesitated in passing such a law in consideration of their Muslim population, who needed beef for their nourishment. There were violent riots during the mammoth demonstration (which Nanda had not banned despite dangerous omens), against cow slaughter on 6th November 1966 in Delhi. A crowd of over a hundred thousand people, led by naked Sadhus, converged on Parliament House. For the first time in independent India, the police had to use their guns to protect Parliament. Dozens were killed and hundreds injured. Even the house of the Congress President, Kamaraj was stormed and damaged.

After this Nanda could not have kept his position as Home Minister. Although the Syndicate opposed it and warned Indira Gandhi publicly against making changes in the ministry just before the elections, she did not waver. Nanda was dismissed and the Defence Minister Chavan received the important Home Ministry, the centre of power. The Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, a Sikh, became Defence Minister; the Education Minister, Chagla, took over as Foreign Minister. Even after the elections of 1967 these ministries remained in the same hands till Chagla resigned on the language issue. His place was taken temporarily by Dinesh Singh. Nanda returned, in spite of these former conflicts, as Minister for Railways in the cabinet of Indira Gandhi after the Congress Party split. He lost his Cabinet post only after the elections of March 1971.

India's restless students
The most persistent problem by far with which Indira Gandhi
had to contend in her first year of office, was the uninterrupted chain of student revolts which spread over the country like a forest fire. About a hundred and fifty demonstrations were recorded in about eighty cities in the months of September and October 1966, which usually led to clashes with the police. Dozens were injured in some riots, several were killed. Millions of rupees worth of property was damaged in many university cities. The rioters adopted strange methods. Trains were stormed or stopped from leaving the station. In Madhya Pradesh, thousands of students made the helpless conductors carry them free of charge. The riots extended far beyond the actual university campus. Arson, especially at railway stations, was frequent; buses were burnt, cars damaged and passengers and passers-by on the road molested. These outbreaks were sparked by trivial events; small disputes with the police caused mammoth demonstrations. The reason was mostly to be found in the administration of the university itself. The opposition parties made use of the revolts, but seldom did they instigate them—though in a number of cases the youth organisations of the Congress Party as well as other parties were involved in clashes with the police. The outcome of these riots was that many universities and a number of colleges were closed. This meant the loss of a whole year for thousands of students, even if they did not participate in the revolts, because the final examinations could not be held.

One of the reasons for these aimless demonstrations which threatened to bring chaos to the country is the much too rapid growth of universities. There were sixty-two universities in India in 1966, of which not less than twenty-three had been established between 1960 and 1965. The number of Indian universities increased threefold in the twenty years since independence. When the English left, there were twenty-one universities, four of which had been founded in the previous century: the universities of Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay in 1857 and Allahabad in 1887. A further eighteen universities were added
in the first twelve years after independence. In the following years the new universities sprung up like mushrooms. The number of students, which was a little over eight hundred thousand in 1959 in the then forty universities, increased in 1966 to over 1.2 million. Seven universities have more than fifty thousand students, led by Calcutta with a hundred and twenty thousand students. Other universities with heavy enrolments are Agra, Bombay, Madras, Punjab, Gorakhpur (U.P.) and Trivandrum, the capital of Kerala, whose population of three hundred thousand, includes over fifty thousand students. The number of university professors which was about twenty-five thousand in 1951 increased to seventy-five thousand in 1963. It was unavoidable that with this rapid growth of students as well as professors the niveau would sink considerably and that the social facilities for the students could not keep step.

Only a fraction of India's student population belongs to the educated classes which have traditionally been limited in number. The majority of India's students come now from simple families; they have therefore no experience of dealing with books and knowledge. In addition to that, education is based on mechanical book knowledge. The examinations are carried out on a marks system, which offers the best chances to a parrot rather than to a brilliant student. It was said in some universities during the riots that it was no wonder that the students revolted, because with the existing shift system, the students learnt only for two and a half hours in overfilled class-rooms. About other universities, however, it was said that lectures were held from nine in the morning till five in the evening without a break, a mechanical reading and learning from text books, so that because of lack of extra-curricular activities like sports, the pent-up energies were let loose at the slightest provocation. Especially in the newly-founded universities the rectors were administrative officials without any pedagogical experience, who immediately called the police even for trivial disturbances. One rector of the University of Delhi, however,
who had prohibited the police from stepping in at a fray, restored law and order on the strength of his own authority and enhanced the students' respect for him. This remained a unique example.

The events in India this stormy autumn exposed the process of alienation known so well to us Europeans, but which has gripped Asia only recently. Max Weber has spoken of the span between rational thought and the idea of the divinely harmonised, ethically wisely, oriented cosmos. Such ideas have already attenuated in Europe. The shock delves deeper in Asia provoked by disenchantment with the world. The major part of Asiatic societies is still captivated by the traditional circle of thought. The transition to rational thought was to be completed in a single generation. The universities became the prominent scene of action.

Older Indians still live empirically pondering spiritual phenomena. The modern world civilisation, however, with its American and above all Marxist variations has in the meantime penetrated deeply into India. Literature and films are as affected by it as the masses of students, who come from traditionalistic parental homes. The impact of a Gandhi is hardly conceivable today in the manner in which it swept through India fifty years back. Vinoba Bhave, the only living great spiritual phenomenon who directly followed in Gandhi's footsteps, is highly respected. But his actual influence is minimal. Measurable time which had never existed in the country has now come to India. Whoever followed a great teacher, a guru, did not count years by the calendar, but in the gradually increasing fount of knowledge. Not the clock, but the irregular annual rings of trees were symbols of this culture. Knowledge of existence was the decisive factor for the Indian sages. It was not to be gained by thought but by self-realisation. One can still observe the influence that this orientation of life has on the masses, in South Indian temples above all. There is no common worship but
everybody strives in his own way to present himself and his relation with God in prayers using sometimes strange rhythms.

The contention that all this is past does not conform to reality. Hindu culture has shown a great power of resistance. English thought, which had once been accepted only by the small upper class of society, continued to be a basic subject of all studies for twenty years after independence. But the young Indians whose recent revolt shook all university cities follow the severest critics of the earlier unhesitating implementation of Anglicization. They live no longer in the private spiritual world of castes of their ancestors. They present a fluctuating transitional stage. The former Oxford ideal of Indian academicians does not exist any more or only for that small number who lived abroad. The students want consciously to be Asians and not 'brown Europeans'. But even the old world is closing its doors to them after they are touched by a breath of rational thought. Touched, but not seized. Thus a wide chasm has formed which creates restlessness and discontent, which bursts out in strange acts of violence.

The student revolts show the danger that the political superstructure which has remained intact in spite of many defects will be thoroughly undermined if the epidemic of revolts cannot be curbed by measures which penetrate deep into the root of the problem. The lack of authority of the professors will not end as long as higher qualifications are not demanded of the teaching staff. The same is true of the increase in students. A selection must begin in the higher schools, for in India too, discipline has relaxed even more and the teacher has often not dared to give bad marks. Some of the students having obtained the certificates more or less by blackmail, come to the universities with inadequate preliminary education, where again with vocal strength they try to lower the level of the examinations. From colonial times the students know the role that Gandhi's mass demonstrations have played.
They don’t realise, however, that former methods cannot simply be transferred to the present day.

Some universities, like the Banaras Hindu University (1916) and the Muslim Universities in Hyderabad (1918) as well as in Aligarh (1921), were established with the new pride in Indian culture, which stimulated the middle class at the turn of the century. Gandhi’s profound effect could hardly have been possible without these cultural centres of thinking. These first private establishments consciously opposed the four old universities with their exclusively British traditions. In the sixties, however, quality was replaced by quantity. The result can be felt more keenly every year: there is an inadequately educated academic proletariat. Especially, an excess of students of literature is bemoaned each year but nothing has been done to stem the tide.

The rapid growth of the number of universities corresponded to the general inclination that better education could justify higher expectations. It is therefore all the more disappointing for individual students and for all students as a whole, when they realise that higher education helps relatively only a few to attain the professional goal they aimed at. At the beginning of the sixties I saw Mrs. Naidu, Governor of Bengal and Chancellor of the University of Calcutta, break into tears in her room after distributing certificates to some ten thousand students and she said to me: “I knew this morning that of these ten thousand boys and girls only half of them can take up a job which corresponds to their education. The others will be affixing stamps somewhere or the other.”

It is pleasing to see that the number of technical students has increased considerably. They have better chances for a job. In 1951 there were only 2700 technical degrees and 2600 technical diplomas. In 1965 there were 10,100 and 17,500. As gratifying was the increase of colleges for agriculture and forestry, which increased from 20 (1951) to nearly 50. In 1951 there were only 53 Teacher’s Training institutions. In 1966 they had already increased to more than 700. Likewise the number of technical
vocational schools has increased threefold, from 470 (1951) to over 1300 (1966). A changeover of the university medium of instruction to the regional languages in technical subjects would seriously endanger the educational standard, as most Indian languages have only a small number of scientific books and almost no scientific or technical magazines.\(^6\)

The growth of the universities should be seen in relation to the average educational niveau of the entire country. According to the census of 1961 the number of literate people in India was only 24 per cent, the number of literate men 34.5 per cent. This average is, however, misleading. A differentiation between city people and village people must be made. The four hundred millions in the villages provide only a minimum percentage of future candidates for academic careers. The average figures do not give rational ratios. If only the cities are considered then there is a more accurate picture. 57.4 per cent of the male population in the city were literate and 35.4 per cent of the female population (against an average of 13 per cent of the village population) in 1966. In the mid-sixties India's city population could have been about a hundred million of which according to the above calculation about 15 million men and women were literate. If you add to it 1.2 million college students then there is a far higher ratio of students and literates among the town population than in any European country. In Germany for example there were 270,000 students at all universities out of a total of 60 million literates in 1967. This calculation shows that the number of students in India is many times more than can be absorbed in professions suitable for academicians.

Even in the technical fields, the Indian Institute of Applied Man Power Research foresees, that in 1974 about 100,000 graduate engineers will not find work. The Institute has calculated that the yearly growth in the technical organisations with intensive capital should be 16 to 18 per cent if all graduates of the technical institutions are to be employed. The institute cal-
culates that in the mid-seventies annually 16,000 engineers will not find work. At the beginning of 1969 there were 56,700 engineers who were either unemployed or employed in other capacities. The economic recession of the previous years was of course a transitory factor. But the position remains critical. The danger that an academic proletariat will be formed cannot be overlooked. The transition from purely quantitative to qualitative thought and action in the field of education has become an imperative necessity.
Defeat, Split and Revival of the Congress Party

The student disturbances a few months before the fourth general elections in February 1967 were an omen. The elections which resulted in a severe defeat for the Congress Party reflected the state of uncertainty, from which the older generation had retreated somewhat helplessly by using less effective slogans. From among the approximately 240 million people entitled to vote, 23 million were voting for the first time. It was, however, not only the younger generation which voted against the Congress Party. The protest by the students had, nevertheless, worked as a stimulant and had set the pace. The continual bickering among the old leaders of the Congress, which was evident in the states for years, the critical food situation, the apparent and veiled unemployment, and the increasing corruption—all were reason enough to cause an atmosphere of protest, which was expressed in various ways in different parts of India. No single party which opposed the Congress could claim an overwhelming victory in the elections, great as the surprises may have been regionally.

It was an impressive day in February, when the Congress politicians anxiously awaited the results which were to ascertain whether the Congress Party had at least retained its majority in the Lok Sabha. A final counting of the votes showed that the Congress had got 283 seats from a total of 520 in the Lok Sabha—a mere twenty-two more than necessary for an absolute majority. It had lost seventy-eight seats since the parliamentary elections in 1962, a loss which was underlined by the
fact that the total number of members in the parliament had increased by a further twenty-six. The Congress Party had had a monopoly in India's political life for more than sixty years. It had always had a two-thirds majority in the first three union parliaments of independent India. From now on, only twenty-five Congress parliamentarians had to break away to topple the government—a temptation, to be sure, for ambitious politicians. And it was this breaking away which put the Congress Party in the minority in all those states where the opposition could form governments in the spring and summer of 1967.

The defeat of the Congress Party was far more shattering in the states than in the Lok Sabha. While putting up the list of candidates the leaders of the local Congress factions had tried to exclude minorities in a number of states, depending sometimes also on caste. This procedure began in Kerala, where two Congress parties opposed each other in the by-elections. There were also two Congress factions opposing each other in West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and finally even in the newly formed state of Haryana. In all these states the old Congress could have got a majority, if its factions had united beforehand. In Orissa, for instance, the Jana Congress, which had broken away from the Congress, got almost as many seats (26) as the Congress Party itself (30). United, the Congress Party would have been the strongest party in Orissa; but because of the split, they had to take second place to the Swatantra Party.

In nine of the seventeen states—counting also the political defeat in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, which came only after the elections—results showed that the Congress Party did not get a majority. With the help of some independents, the Congress was able afterwards to get a bare majority in Rajasthan.

The ruling party lost the historically central states in the Ganges valley for the first time. From Punjab to Orissa there was a string of opposing states. And there was the extreme south, where the Congress Party completely forfeited their ruling posi-
tion. These elections brought about the loss of the central states on the Gangetic plain, the key states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar containing some 135 million people, and the crushing defeat of the Congress Party in the Union territory of Delhi, where they lost six out of seven seats to the Jana Sangh. Of the then 510 million Indians, there were only 185 million in states with Congress governments in summer 1967; 325 million now lived in states ruled by the opposition. A landslide had not been foreseen to this extent.

The Congress Party had reached the status of a small opposition party in four states, their most catastrophic defeat being in Kerala, where they won only nine of the 133 seats in the Legislative Assembly. In Orissa they won thirty of 140, in Madras 49 of the 234. In West Bengal the Congress Party had lost seventy-two seats in the by-elections in 1969. Madras alone was the only state where the opposition, the DMK, could form a Government. In all other states with the opposition in majority, coalition governments had to be formed, which, except for the firm alliance between the Swatantra Party and the Jana Congress Party in Orissa, led to unstable conditions.

The division of seats among the parties in the Central Parliament in 1967 shows that in spite of the severe defeat the Congress Party had, all other parties were only relatively weak groups. None of the opposition parties, with which we will deal in detail, could even attain 10 per cent of the total strength of the House.

The elections in March 1971 were a landslide again—this time for the New Congress of Indira Gandhi—as is to be seen in the last column of the following table. We shall deal with this important event at the end of this chapter.

The Swatantra Party with 42 members was the second strongest single group in the parliament in 1967. In the previous parliament this position was secured by the Communists, who had 29 seats. Taking both the communist groups together, they were of an equal strength with Swatantra in 1967. Jana Sangh as an
The Indian Experiment—Key to Asia’s Future

Division of Seats in the Union Parliament

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<tr>
<td>Congress Party (N)</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>350</td>
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<td>Old Congress</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<td>SSP</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPJ</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>(23)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Sangh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMK (Tamil)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small parties and independents</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>489</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>520</td>
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individual party took third place with 35 seats. The socialists had, taking both groups together, increased their number three-fold since the previous parliament. The strength of the Tamil Party, the DMK, was remarkable, for it had increased three and a half times since the last parliament.

The defeat of the Congress party in the 1967 elections was the result of the law of majority vote, which exists in India. A calculation of the percentage of votes won by the individual parties shows surprising results. On the whole the Congress party got only 3.7 per cent. votes less than in the previous elections for the Union Parliament. Even the elections for the legislative assemblies show them at a better percentage than the catastrophic defeat leads one to think. The decline here was only 4.3 per cent.

This picture of the percentage division of the votes reflects the problem inherent in the majority vote system. Till now the smaller parties had always contended that the law of majority vote favoured the Congress party. With an average of only 44.5 per cent of the votes it could hold more than three fourths of
Defeat, Split and Revival of the Congress Party

LOK SABHA

Percentage of total votes for various parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1957</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1967</th>
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<td>44.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>(9.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<td>SSP</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(5.0)</td>
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<td>Other parties and independents</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
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LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Percentage of total votes for various parties

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<th>1962</th>
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<td>45.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>40.1</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPM</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(4.6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>(5.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other parties and independents</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
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the seats in the first three parliaments. In 1967 the law of majority vote worked for the first time adversely against the Congress party. Even in Kerala, where the Congress party experienced its greatest setback, in 1967 it had still 36.1 per cent of the votes. In Madras it had 41.5 per cent of the votes—more than the DMK which had only 40.8 per cent. Even in West Bengal the Congress party got 40 per cent of the votes.

Decisive for the defeat was the fact that in many Indian states the rivals of the Congress party had entered into electoral alli-
ances, by which they could guarantee the majority in individual electoral constituencies. The Congress party, however, which had put up candidates in all constituencies for the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assemblies—a feat, which no other party was in a position to do—realized that it had neglected to concentrate on critical centres. The Congress party was represented by so many contending groups that the voters were disgusted by this picture of disunity. The regional Congress organisations apparently believed that the Indian people had become so accustomed to the fights within the ruling party that it did not need to worry about a change of mood. Even if the law of majority vote is unfair, a force majeur acted in the elections of 1967. A proportional vote could not have brought the widespread discontent among the Indian people so clearly to the fore.

This is true above all for the two large states on the Gauges, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. In both states the Congress party remained by far the strongest group in the Legislative Assembly with 32.1 per cent and 33.1 per cent respectively (1962: 36.3 per cent and 41.3 per cent respectively). The people had for long been disgusted by the useless squabbles, with which the Congress party had sunk deeper and deeper into the mire of petty caste rivalries and the patronage of office connected therewith. When C. B. Gupta formed a new government in Uttar Pradesh, where the Congress had lost fifty seats, but was by far the strongest party in the Legislative Assembly, it was seen that almost half of the cabinet were of his own caste. So the leader of the opposing Congress wing, Charan Singh, revolted. With seventeen of his personal followers he voted against the government—after being a member of the Congress for forty-five years—and was sworn in three days later as the new Chief Minister. He could not offer a proper alternative. His government collapsed and Uttar Pradesh also came under the President's Rule in February 1968. Other troublesome consequences of short-lived cabinets were to follow.

The fact that the members of the Syndicate, with the excep-
tion of Sanjiva Reddy, whom Mrs. Gandhi transferred later from the cabinet to the post of Speaker of the Lok Sabha (Reddy was later a candidate for the presidency), were not re-elected, corresponded to the mood of the voters. In his home town of Madras, Congress President Kamaraj was defeated by an unknown young student. He thus shared the fate of Atulya Ghosh, the leading Congress politician of West Bengal, and S. K. Patil, the party boss of Bombay of long standing. No less than five of the fifteen cabinet ministers—and five chief ministers of the Congress party—were defeated. The people, it seemed, wanted to compel a change of generation by their votes. The Indian commentator Krishan Bhatia, analysed the election thus: “The people did not want to vote for one party or the other but against the Congress. The Indian people voted in a mood of fury. It would be presumptuous if the Swatantra party, the Jana Sangh or any other opposition group would believe that their programme and ideology had won the hearts of the people. If they came to power in some regions or had unexpectedly many votes, it was not so much because they had won the confidence of the voters, but because thousands were deeply annoyed with the Congress. This was an election of denial, which brought no clear and positive picture of the future.”

The Congress party remained in 1967 the only political group which could depute members to all legislative assemblies in India. It had been most successful in Maharashtra, where they could send thirty-seven of the forty-five parliamentarians to the Lok Sabha. Here the solid unity of the widespread Maratha caste and the reputation of the Home Minister Chavan played their part.

It was seen again that all opposition party groups had regional roots and had initially few chances to spread uniformly all over India. The communists of both factions could not send a single member to the Lok Sabha from nine states. In six legislative assemblies they were represented by only two members or none at all. In the whole of Northern India, the communists
were of no importance. Likewise the Swatantra party did not send a single parliamentarian to the Lok Sabha from nine states. In six legislative assemblies they were hardly represented or not at all.

The right wing party, Jana Sangh, is a regional party of the North. They could not depute a parliamentarian to the Lok Sabha from eleven states, in four legislative assemblies they were not represented at all, and in six others with four or less members. Even the socialists shared this fate. They could send no representatives from nine states and in six legislative assemblies they appeared with only four or fewer members. Even the socialists were concentrated in the Gangetic plain.

As great as the weakness of the unwieldy Congress party has been, an analysis of the elections results of 1967 showed, however, that a further downfall of the Congress would accelerate the danger of balkanising India. As all other Indian parties including the communists have only regional importance, it is easy to see the difficulties which the Congress party faced in its attempt to make individual personalities known and successful on an all-India basis.

Intolerant regional groups, over and above the official parties, have appeared in many states. In South India and in Bengal, they turn against the 'intruders from the North', whereby they mean the members of the trader caste, the Marwaris from Rajasthan and the money-lenders and merchants of the bania caste of Gujarat. The members of both these castes do not have only the money business in their hands. In Bengal, in particular, the Marwaris own the jute and textile industries, they control the produce and money market, the banking system and the real estate business. So the communists had an easy task inciting the excitable Bengalis against the Marwari caste, as was the case after the Bengal coalition cabinet was established in the spring of 1967.

On the other hand, the fascist-inspired Shiv Sena movement is directed particularly against the industrial and agricultural
labourers who have come to Bombay from South India, who have to contend with the lower middle class and labourer class of Maharashtrians as their constant rivals. Thousands have emigrated from over-populated Kerala to the slums of Bombay in the past decades, where they usually live in segregated quarters and where the Shiva Sena followers have threatened them with arson and murder. The Shiv Sena movement was founded in Bombay by Bal Thakary in the summer of 1966 and within a short time grew in size with its slogan 'Maharashtra for the Maharashtrians'. It quotes the statistics obtained during an industrial enquiry in Bombay, which showed that of the 366,000 industrial workers 265,000 come from other states. Nevertheless, Shiv Sena failed to get a single candidate elected to the Lok Sabha in March 1971.

Union and States
The political regionalism based on local caste lines took on a newly dangerous aspect after the defeat of the Congress party at the elections in 1967. The relationship between the Union and the states has been under severe strain ever since the formation of the nation. Even when the Congress party under Nehru and Shastri ruled throughout India, from the centre as well as from the states, the Union Government was always reproached for neglecting one state or the other. The rivalry between the states was subdued by the fact that—with the temporary exception of Kerala—all Chief Ministers belonged to the same party. The Working Committee of the Congress Party could send a mediator to the states to settle differences, as Shastri had done so often with success. The regional differences were brought up at the regular meetings of the Chief Ministers in New Delhi, and one could always appeal to party discipline, so that there was no conflict regarding the Constitution.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the principal architect of the Indian Constitution, comments on his work in the following words: "The Constitution of the Indian Union and of the States is a
single frame from which neither can get out and within which they must work.”8 Article 257 of the Constitution states that the executive in every state is subordinate to the Union. “The executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.” The states possess certain autonomous rights, which every government in Delhi has to honour. By and large the Union is responsible for Defence, Foreign Affairs, the railways, the national highways, civil aviation, means of communication, shipping, food and financial policies. The autonomy of the states relates to agriculture, irrigation, education, health, promotion of small industries and state highways. The relationship between the Union and the states is complicated by the fact that the Lok Sabha is entitled to pass general laws for a number of items which are on the list of the responsibilities of the states. Moreover, the Union has the power to coordinate institutions of higher education. Science and research are almost exclusively under the Union and in those cases where the Union finances projects of the state it has the right to co-determine and regulate. The Indian Constitution provides the Union with greater possibilities to intervene than does the constitution of the German Federal Republic. Above all the Union can declare President’s Rule according to Article 365, if a state government is not able to function properly or if the legislative assembly cannot form a government. In this case the executive and legislative powers are transferred to the Governor, the representative of the President, till the next elections.

In the seventh schedule of the Constitution the taxes are divided between the Union and the states. The privileges of the Union are seen clearly in Article 282 of the Constitution, which defines under which circumstances the Union can give loans or even direct payments to the states. States can also float loans, but as long as they are indebted to the Union they
have to obtain the sanction of the Union for further loans, according to Article 293.

The relationship between the Union and the states has been characterised by a constant competition by the states to share the central funds. The planning authorities have, of course, tried to guarantee all states a fair share after an extremely careful and detailed study. It was unavoidable, however, that they should want to invest further in areas where an already somewhat developed economy promised the greatest success for new investments. They could hardly circumvent the danger that the backward areas in India already had had fewer chances to be on par with the more developed regions. This may explain the fact that states like Kerala and parts of Bihar remain less developed because of the limited Union funds. The Planning Commission, made up of pure experts, have apparently given little thought to the political consequences of planning. The Constitution has developed in favour of the Union.

The fact that since 1967 all opposition factions have had to bear solid responsibilities in the states has been offset by the tendency of the states to use the centre as the scapegoat more than before for all failures and difficulties. The states behave as if the centre has a magic bag, which needs only to be emptied. There could be bitter disputes as regards the Constitution in this situation.

Mrs. Gandhi as well as Home Minister Chavan told me directly after the elections in 1967 that the Congress Party has to adjust itself to the fact that it would never be able to recover the monopoly it formerly enjoyed, even though both hoped that one or the other state would return to the Congress. The basic state of affairs had changed. The relationship between the Union and the States, behind which hides the problem of preserving India’s unity, became the major problem of India’s internal politics. None could have foreseen that Congress under the leadership of Indira Gandhi would win back a two-third majority four years later.
The Indian Experiment—Key to Asia’s Future

The Split of the Congress Party
Till summer 1969 it was doubtful whether Indira Gandhi could ever break the bonds which came from being elected Prime Minister at the suggestion of the Syndicate and a large number of chief ministers. After her second election she had had to take Morarji Desai as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister into her cabinet. Desai had worked loyally with Mrs. Gandhi, but there was no doubt that as politicians they represented very varying views. We have seen already how the relationship between Mrs. Gandhi and the former Congress President Kamaraj became strained.

At the same time the members of the Syndicate—above all, the Congress President Nijalingappa and Desai—came closer. Whereas the Syndicate had been founded, initially, particularly to keep Desai from coming into power, now there was a quiet change of fronts. A man like Nijalingappa was no less conservative in his basic ideas than Desai. This could be clearly seen at the Congress session in Faridabad (April 1969), when Mrs. Gandhi gave up her reluctant role and intervened no less than five times with long speeches, which showed a decided tendency to the left. She was often in open opposition to the Congress President Nijalingappa.

The basis of the discussion in Faridabad was a memorandum from Indira’s friend, Subramaniam, which stated, that parliament would not be able to function after 1972, if the Congress Party did not draw up by then a clearly socialistic programme. In Faridabad itself the antagonism between the right and left wings of the Congress party had become irreconcilable. In the following months it was often rumoured that in the meantime the Syndicate, allied with Desai, intended to remove Indira Gandhi from power in autumn 1969. One of the leading men of the opposition against Mrs. Gandhi within the Congress party told me of this in spring 1969. The assumption that there was a conspiracy against Mrs. Gandhi after the Congress session in Faridabad was not a mere rumour. This may explain why
Indira Gandhi hit back with unexpected results and with an energy which her rivals did not suspect she had, at a time when their plans had not fully matured.

The fight between Mrs. Gandhi and the conservative forces within the Congress party came as a total surprise on 10th July 1969 with a memorandum in which Indira Gandhi demanded the immediate nationalisation of banks at the AICC session at Bangalore. The memorandum was apparently worked out in some haste, as Mrs. Gandhi conceded in the final sentence: "These are just some stray thoughts rather hurriedly dictated." The nationalisation of banks included many other measures—for example, implementing a land reform, appointing a commission to enquire into monopolies, and other measures for a socialist pattern of economy in India. The memorandum was accepted by the AICC after heated debate. Even Finance Minister Desai, who had always voted against the nationalisation of banks, did not oppose it any longer.

The actual decision which was to lead to the division of the Congress Party followed immediately after. The six-man parliamentary commission of the AICC had to decide on the successor to the late President Zakir Husain, who had died in May. Without much discussion the four major party bosses, S. K. Patil, Kamaraj, Desai and Chavan, proposed the name of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Sanjiva Reddy. Indira Gandhi and the Minister for Industries, Ahmed, were in a minority with their two votes, when they voted for Jagjivan Ram. That was a clear defeat for Mrs. Gandhi, who had stated clearly that she could hardly work with Reddy as President. Furiously she accused her older colleagues of manipulation and conspiracy.

Mrs. Gandhi then acted with unusual decisiveness and speed. She publicly supported the candidature of Vice-President Giri. Furthermore, she dismissed Morarji Desai as Finance Minister after a few days without having had any discussion with him. There was no apparent formal reason for this abrupt dismissal, for Morarji Desai had agreed to the nationalisation of the banks.
When Congress President Nijalingappa opposed Desai's dismissal, an unavoidable and violent clash was renewed between him and Indira Gandhi. Without wavering Mrs. Gandhi implemented the draft of a law to nationalise the fourteen largest private banks on the day of Desai's final dismissal from the cabinet. It should be mentioned here that Chavan, who during the selection of the candidate for the presidency had been siding with Mrs. Gandhi's rivals, quickly changed fronts, when he saw that the Syndicate had already lost this round of the dispute.

With the nationalisation of banks Mrs. Gandhi won a major lead over the Syndicate, but she was not all sure of her position. When the presidential elections approached on 16th August, Nijalingappa demanded of Mrs. Gandhi that she publicly support Reddy as the elected party candidate, so that the majority of the Congress party within the election body could vote unanimously. Mrs. Gandhi informed everyone then that her candidate was Giri, who was canvassing as an independent, although he was supported by the communists.

Because of this attitude of Mrs. Gandhi, Giri became the victor at the presidential elections, in which 4,137 members of both houses of parliament and the members of seventeen state assemblies participated. He got 420,077 votes, whereas Reddy got 405,427. Only about forty members had turned the scale for Giri among the 4,000 voters. It was seen, that only 38 per cent of the Congress members of the Union Parliament and only 21 per cent from the state assemblies followed Indira Gandhi and voted for Giri.

The Congress managed once more to avoid the final break. On 25th August 1969 the Congress Working Committee published a conciliatory statement, which hushed up the existing antagonism. But none could doubt that the dispute would continue.

The old guard within the Congress party could learn from numerous comments from Indira Gandhi's followers that they
would have to reckon with a serious attempt to dispossess the Syndicate finally and to remove them from the Party executive. So Nijalingappa decided to take a counter-offensive. The followers of Indira Gandhi and the Syndicate were balanced in the Working Committee. The Syndicate tried initially to get a clear majority. Since Subramaniam had lost his chairmanship of the regional Congress party of Tamilnadu in the meantime, Nijalingappa declared that he was automatically removed from the Working Committee. The Syndicate would thus have the majority in the Congress high command.

In the second half of October the heat of dissension increased to boiling point. Both sides accused the other of betraying the principles of the Congress party. In reality ideological differences played hardly any role. The open fight for power was enkindled anew. We can pass over the various phases which finally led to a total split. On 12th November 1969 the Working Committee decided—only eleven of the members were present—to dismiss Mrs. Gandhi from the Congress Party for gross indiscipline. At the same time the parliamentary wing was asked to elect a new leader, which meant that Mrs. Gandhi would be deposed as Prime Minister.

When three days later the parliamentary factions met, it was seen that the minority had removed the majority. Of 432 members of both houses, 330 voted for Indira Gandhi. The minority formed an opposition party the next day, 16th November, which took the name Organisation Congress. Of the 282 Congress members of the Lok Sabha, 65 joined the new opposition party. Desai was chosen to be the leader of the 'old' Congress party. The leader of the faction in parliament was Ram Subhag Singh, former Minister for Railways, who had just been dismissed from the cabinet. Between the two Congress parties there was a dispute now as to which was the 'legal' group, as well as to the ownership of the party property and rights, and who had claims to the famous election symbol, the bullocks. At the 1971 elections this symbol could not be used by either faction.
At the first parliamentary voting after the split of the Congress party the opposition was defeated by 306 to 140 votes. Only 204 Congress members, however, voted for Mrs. Gandhi. Her majority was backed by the two communist parties, the DMK and most of the independent members. The members of the Swatantra Party, the Jana Sangh, the SSP and eight members of the PSP voted against Mrs. Gandhi along with the opposition Congress. Thus Mrs. Gandhi became the leader of a minority cabinet.

In December 1969 both Congress organisations held a review of its followers. The ‘old’ Congress held its party session in Ahmedabad, which was surprisingly well attended. Of the 4650 delegates of the last Congress session in Faridabad 2470 came to Ahmedabad. Almost half a million people participated at the final meeting.

As many people attended the party session of the ‘new’ Congress in Bombay. Here about 2,400 official delegates were listed. However, one could assume that a large number of delegates had, for safety’s sake, attended both sessions.

The political leader of the untouchables, Minister for Agriculture Jagjivan Ram, was elected Congress President in Bombay, although there had just been a house debate on the tax defrauds of the New Congress President. While in Ahmedabad the accent had been on a keen declaration of war against Indira Gandhi, in Bombay it was above all the dispute within the ‘new’ Congress. The left wing had pleaded for an extensive application of socialistic measures, which were rejected by the moderates at first. Only one representative of the Young Turks was elected to the Working Committee of the ‘new’ Congress.

The final split of the Congress party was doubtlessly the most important event in India since Nehru’s death. With it the whole internal political climate changed decisively. No one can deny that it was Indira Gandhi herself who brought about this split. In October 1969 it was yet possible to bridge this gulf, but she rejected it. She had apparently decided that further com-
promise would mean an irksome postponement of the break which was unavoidable.

Mrs. Gandhi had mastered the tactics to carry out the split operation. But she knew quite well this could be beneficial only if she could regain a stable majority in Parliament. As leader of a minority Government she could only carry on. No major decisions were possible. The inner circle around Mrs. Gandhi pondered therefore after summer 1970 to bring things to a head and to have early elections. For months Delhi was rife with rumours about a snap election in spring 1971.

The final decision came in the last days of 1970. Parliament was dissolved. Elections were to be held between 1st and 10th of March 1971. In three states only—Tamilnadu, Orissa and West Bengal—the Legislative Assemblies were to be elected together with elections for the Union Parliament.

The election campaign was short but vehement. In all parts of India more than a hundred people lost their lives during the campaign, most of them in West Bengal. Nevertheless, the election itself was conducted in an orderly way as it has been the case in all former elections.

On the right, Jana Sangh, the old Congress, the Swatantra Party and SSP formed a coalition against Indira Gandhi. In the former Parliament these four parties held all together 150 seats. They could not find a common platform. Their only common slogan was 'Remove Indira—stop her!'. They painted the gloomy prospects of a dictatorial regime.

This negative attitude of the main opposition parties was not impressive from the start. They could not compete with Mrs. Gandhi's whirlwind campaign. She was able to fight in the whole of India. Her slogan 'Remove poverty!' was exactly what the masses hoped for. They gave her a new vote of confidence, much stronger than even Mrs. Gandhi's friends had dared to hope.

When all the votes were counted, Indira had won 130 seats
more than Congress (N) had in the former Parliament. She had won 350 seats and regained the two-third majority, which the united Congress party enjoyed during her father's time. This was an overwhelming victory indeed. Not only was the 'old' Congress routed; Swatantra, Jana Sangh and the two Socialist parties virtually disappeared. The four opposition parties maintained hardly fifty seats together. Delhi, the Union Capital, came back to the fold of the Congress. So did Uttar Pradesh and even Mysore. All the key states were again firmly in the hands of the ruling party. The 'old' Congress had been practically reduced to a faction of Gujarat—Desai's home state.

It was Mrs. Gandhi's own victory. Within her party nobody could match or even challenge her. She came out as a political force even stronger than Nehru himself. This has of course doubled the burden she has to carry. "She has aroused expectations far beyond the consciously moderate promises in her party's manifesto. In a very real sense this manifesto has been overtaken by events," wrote The Indian Express in one of its election commentaries. This is only too true. Many dangers of growing disintegration we have touched on in this book seem to have passed. Again a strong government seems possible for India. The obstacles against efficient government—as identified by Mrs. Gandhi during the campaign—have been swept away for her by the people. She is confronted no longer with petty party haggling; she has to stand the real test. Hard years may follow the pleasure of victory. Nobody seems to understand better this ultimate challenge than herself.

The battle-cry of her adversaries—the threat of a woman-dictatorship—was never a real issue. It was just a bogus party slogan one can forget about. But the really dangerous problems remain. How to solve the unemployment question? How to deal with the unruly situation in West Bengal? How to give the landless poor of the countryside a chance to survive? Nationalization—necessary as it may be in a few cases—will not give the
answer. A very bold experiment has to be started afresh. The very ordeal of Indira began the same day the last victorious vote had been counted. Vote had been counted. A few weeks later the picture changed again. The influx of millions of refugees from East Bengal overshadowed all the other problems of India.
The Jana Sangh Party
I have seldom seen such an overwhelming enthusiasm in Asia as at a party convention of the Jana Sangh. Thousands celebrated there the almost total victory which the party won in 1967 in the capital Delhi. Dr. M. L. Sondhi, a man of about forty, stood on the tribune high above the masses—a man whom I had come to know a few years ago as lecturer at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and an expert on Czechoslovakia. I noticed him because of his lively wit. But how he had changed! An academician had inadvertently become a flaming hero-figure from the epic Mahabharata, and had come down to our earth again. Where was Sondhi, with whom I formerly had a detailed discussion on developments in East Europe? His listeners hung fascinated on his words. They were mostly low-ranking employees from the ministries in Delhi. Only after he was rejected elsewhere had he come to the Jana Sangh, an extremely rightist party, which because of its orthodox Hindu tendency had hardly attracted any members of the intelligentsia. A few years ago a man like Dr. Sondhi would have found it compromising to become a member of the Jana Sangh. But now in spring 1967 he was the hero of the day in Delhi. When I met him again at a small party he spoke contemptuously of Indira Gandhi and the Congress politicians as the ‘great ones of the past’. Four years later Sondhi himself became ‘of the past’. He failed to get re-elected in Delhi in 1971.

The advance of the right-wing parties of India has not been
an isolated phenomenon in Asia. While I attended that Jana Sangh meeting and witnessed the emotional Hindu nationalism, my thoughts flew to Japan where I had observed the rise of the Soka Gakkai sect in the last decade, whose political party Komeito had with a leap got twenty-five members into parliament at the elections in January 1967. (Komeito became Japan's third strongest party with 47 seats at the December elections in 1969). In Indonesia the students of the KAMI-organisation were a decisive factor in bringing about Sukarno's downfall after the unsuccessful communist putsch in October 1965. The national movements in Asia could differ in their aims, but they seemed to have one thing in common: the conscious return to certain traditional values.

The Indonesian KAMI students expressed this in the rejection of imported communism. The return of the Soka Gakkai sect to tradition is rooted yet deeper and is founded in the dogma of the Buddhist monk Nichiren (1222-1282). The Soka Gakkai became Japan's largest mass movement in the postwar period, and with ten million followers comprised a tenth of the Japanese population. Although it uses the cleverest methods of modern mass leadership in influencing the masses, it is embedded in the firm teaching which has been handed down by the seven century old Nichiren sect through its priests, rituals and formulas. With the Soka Gakkai an original Japanese manner of thought and action appeared, which seemed to have been thrust out and extinguished by the western-influenced conservatives and the Marxists after the Meiji-reform which is about a century old. That is why the established Japanese right wing and left wing parties are puzzled by this steadily growing mass movement. It cannot be understood without its religious origins even if the young leaders of the Soka Gakkai manipulate the teachings of Nichiren for their political purposes.

When one sees the mass festivals and parades of the valiant sect in the vast oval of the Olympia Stadium of Tokyo or in
Taisekiji, the headquarters of the Soka Gakkai, at the foot of the snow-covered Fuji, then one can understand the discipline and the art of organisation of this new expression of Japanese culture, religion and politics. Even if the eternal repetition of the lotus formula of the monk Nichiren by thousands of men, women and children appears to be strange, we can comprehend by and large the essence of the Buddhistic renaissance.

But in India it was quite different. The rebirth and reform of Hinduism has brought about an untidy jungle-like growth. The overwhelming presence of Mahatma Gandhi has hidden the origins of Hindu nationalism for the West. They date back to the second half of the nineteenth century and are closely connected with the rise of the middle class. The initial stages of the Hindu reform movement did not create politicians but philosophers like the Bengali Ram Mohan Roy, who founded a 'Divine Community'—the 'Brahmo Samaj' around 1830. The call of this movement 'Back to the Scriptures', was the first genuine Indian answer to the British rule. Almost half a century later he was followed by a holy man from the Punjab, Swami Dayananda, who like the European reformers of the dying middle ages laid the axe forcefully to the bushes of Hindu teachings and appealed for self-discipline and a spirit of sacrifice.

After a long hibernation of the Hindu society these were the new ideas, which soon took on a militant character. The Arya Samaj founded by Dayananda was the beginning of a movement, whose aim was to convert the Indian Muslims back to Hinduism. Here the thought, which belongs today to the official ideology of the Jana Sangh party, appeared for the first time: the Indian Muslims are in reality only converts, who adapted themselves to the pressure of Moghul rule.

The real founder of Indian nationalism was the great freedom fighter, Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920), who appears in the annals of India's struggle for freedom as 'Lokamanya'. Next to Gandhi, he was the most revered leader of the Indian people. He hailed from a family of Chitpavan Brahmins.
of the highest caste. From his field of activity, Poona, he recalled incessantly the glorious history of the Maratha kings. At the same time he interpreted the Gita anew and explained that the basic thought of the philosophy of the Hindu scriptures was action. The Indian nation could only awake to a new dynamism, if it gave up the wrong interpretation of the Gita through which it had sunk to fatalistic inaction. For the first time India's freedom struggle found a link to the renaissance of traditional Hinduism. He rejected the liberal ideas of many of his fellow fighters vehemently. He pleaded even at that time for a ban on cow slaughter, defended child marriage, and glorified the old rites and traditions of Hinduism. Arrested frequently by the British, his imprisonment in 1908 sparked off the first general strike of the textile workers—an event which is mentioned in Lenin's writings also. Tilak only just about witnessed Gandhi's arrival in India before he died. The idea of tolerance of all religions on the sub-continent, which was to become Gandhi's vital principle, occurred to him only very late.¹

Two movements followed shortly after Tilak's death in the twenties. These were in sharp contrast to the enlightened basic tendencies of the Congress party and its belief in British democracy: The Hindu Mahasabha party and the movement made famous in India as the RSS, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, which was founded in 1925 by Dr. K. B. Hedgewar and has been led by M. S. Golwalkar since 1940—both men of traditionalist-mythical Hindu convictions, both inspired by the thought that Muslims and Christians should be allowed to play only a subordinate role in India. These two Hindu movements are the direct fore-runners of the Jana Sangh.

Nathuram Godse, Mahatma Gandhi's assassin, came later from the ranks of the Hindu Mahasabha and the general indignation at the murder soon drove this Hindu party out of the scene. The RSS, however, has preserved its importance till today. Appearing on the outside as a purely cultural organisation,
the RSS had in its initial stages founded a militant youth organisation. In the fifties it had over five thousand local groups. Its membership was estimated then at 600,000, the number of its followers at about two million Hindus. The RSS has many characteristics of a secret organisation, whose official cultural activities do not say much of the true aims. The RSS organisation has the strictest discipline and its orders have to be obeyed by its members. It has been said that the executive of the RSS is identical with the leading group of the Jana Sangh. As the RSS is considered in India to be a fascist organisation, the Jana Sangh politicians vigorously deny this. The second party President, M. Manlichandra Sharma, however, resigned from office in 1954 in protest, as he stated, against the complete control of the party by the RSS. It is certain in any case that the strict party discipline, which the Jana Sangh has in contrast to all Indian parties, leads back to the influence of the RSS militants. The Party President has a particularly strong position in the Jana Sangh as laid down by the constitution of the party. He appoints the entire party executive, whereas in the Congress a third of the Working Committee is elected by the enlarged party executive, the AICC, in which all provincial organisations are represented. The President of the Jana Sangh is a kind of leader whose influence is somewhat mitigated by the equally strong position of the General Secretary. This office was for a long time with the RSS leader, D. Upadhyaya, whereas the President has changed often. In January 1968 he replaced Prof. Balraj Madhok, who had been the President of the Jana Sangh since 1963, and who had also come from the RSS. A few weeks later Upadhyaya was murdered by unknown persons and was cremated in Delhi by thousands of his followers. His successor was A. B. Vajpayee. Since the split in the Congress, the new party leader has indicated now and then that he would be prepared to form a coalition government with the right-wing of the Congress party.

The Jana Sangh is concentrated today in the Hindi-speaking Ganges valley and in Central India. It was founded by the bril-
liant Bengali politician, S. P. Mookerjee (1901-1953) as the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Indian people's party) in October 1951. Mookerjee had already a brilliant career behind him. He had become rector of the University of Calcutta at the age of 33. During the war he was President of the Hindu Mahasabha. Nehru took him as Minister for Industries into his first cabinet, which had five politicians who were not members of the Congress party. Mookerjee resigned soon. Shortly thereafter he died under mysterious circumstances in Kashmir. In Bengal, the state of the founder of the party, the Jana Sangh could not find any roots.

Its ideological and organisational tradition distinguishes the Jana Sangh sharply from all other political groups in India. It is the only party whose origin is not in the Congress, the only party also which was not influenced by Gandhi’s teachings of tolerance. It is, on the contrary, dedicated to Hindu nationalism, which recognises the Indian Muslims as converts of the Hindu faith. “Whatever India’s religion may be, India has only one culture, which has its roots in the Vedas. Any talk of a complex culture is wrong, unrealistic and dangerous. Indian culture is one entity”, said the former party President, Prof. Balraj Madhok, when he gave reasons why even Muslims and Christians should become members of the Jana Sangh. The party under the leadership of its founder, S. P. Mookerjee, was at least theoretically open to believers of all faiths. During the elections in 1967 it managed to convert some one thousand Muslims in Old Delhi to its way of thinking. This, however, does not alter the fact that the Jana Sangh deviates considerably from the goal of a secular state, which the Congress had emblazoned on its flag. Whoever considers Indian Muslims or Indian Christians only in their capacity as those fallen from the true Hindu faith will have difficulty in repudiating the reproach of communalism, which the Jana Sangh has to fight incessantly. For communalism—which means preference for a caste, a religious community or a region at the expense of the
...others—is a mortal sin and against the spirit of new India' for Nehru and his followers.

The militantly Hindu roots of the Jana Sangh, however, has been its greatest reserve of strength and influence. Hinduism anchored in tradition and religion has been superimposed upon by the small anglicised upper class society, which under Nehru had the control of the Congress Party. If even in Nehru's last years the Congress Party could produce far more traditionalistic figures like Shastri, Nanda, Desai and Kamaraj, who came even more to the fore with Nehru's death, then a party, which is consciously allied to the Hindu tradition, was bound to bring forth even more tradition-bound leaders.

The sociological composition of the Jana Sangh shows certain similarities with the Soka Gakkai sect in Japan. The growth of the Soka Gakkai to a powerful mass movement runs parallel to the exodus of millions of the rural population of Japan to the big cities. The three largest cities of Japan—Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya—have registered an increase in their population by almost ten million in the twenty years between 1947 and 1966. Torn out of their usual rural surroundings, they must have felt lost in the maze of Japan's large cities. The political parties could not have altered the solitude of the immigrants, even if they had realised the problem. The Soka Gakkai penetrated into this vacuum. Suddenly there was someone who looked after the lost ones, after those who had come too late and after the lonely ones; who promised them salvation and happiness on this earth; who invited them, played music, celebrated familiar festivals and caused a feeling of belonging, which in Japan's sceptical postwar period was to be found nowhere else—not even with the socialists, whose dogmatic teachings work more on the intelligentsia than on the simple people. It is neither the peasantry nor the organised labour class which makes up the Soka Gakkai sect. It depends on the lower middle classes, who live in the indefinitely spread out suburbs of Japan's big cities.

With similar conditions in North India the Jana Sangh has
The Opposition

attracted the same social classes. It began with the millions of refugees who settled down as a lost group on the outskirts of big cities. The Jana Sangh's overpowering victory in the elections in Delhi was due above all to the refugees from West Punjab, who had found refuge there by the thousands. Moreover, there are the traditionally orientated sub-castes of the North Indian Brahmins, small business people, in short the lower middle class, which has resented the anglicised upper society always. In Japan, India, Europe and the United States, it is the same group which tends to follow the nationalistic parties. The membership of the Jana Sangh, estimated in 1962 at 600,000 is supposed to have increased to 1.3 millions in 1967.5

After the elections of 1967 the Jana Sangh became the strongest opposition party with a short lead over the communists of both factions, if we count the votes and not the members. They had 13.5 million voters. Their growth from election to election has been by leaps and bounds until the party's unexpected defeat in 1971.

Of the thirty-five Jana Sangh members of parliament elected in 1967, twenty-nine came from Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi and three from Rajasthan. As long as one of the most important items in the Jana Sangh programme is to implement Hindi as the national language in India, it will be difficult to ignore the effectiveness of this nationalistic party in the Hindi-speaking areas. Inspite of the recent addition of some intellectuals, it will not be easy for it to overcome obscurantism, which expresses itself so drastically in the propaganda against cow slaughter. In the economic sphere the Jana Sangh has no definite programme, but it is clear that the party as a middle class organisation is against organised labour, as also against the great capitalists. "We want competition. We do not want the state to have a monopoly, it should appear as a competition in trade," former Party President Madhok has said.6

I met this short, wiry professor of history in Delhi shortly after his election victory in spring 1967. Born in 1918 in West
Punjab he is a typical descendant of the Indian warrior caste, the Kshatriyas. His nationalism reminds one of the German right wing parties in the twenties, before the rise of national socialism. Pakistan is and will continue to be India’s foremost enemy. He wants the Indian Army to be increased from 800,000 men to two million, without thinking of the economic consequences. He demands the atom bomb for India, which he can plausibly justify with China’s atomic progress. But even here he does not consider the economic outcome of such an investment. “Economic development can wait. But the defence of the country cannot wait,” he said abruptly. “We do not want to continue to be the ‘gold sparrow’, as we were when the Muslims overran India in the eighth, tenth and eleventh century.” Kashmir he considers definitely an integral part of India. Madhok would like to see India as a unitary state; it is all the same to him if instead of the existing seventeen states there would be thirty states, which would then be provinces fully dependent on the centre. “The languages will remain; the castes will remain and even the religions. None can destroy them; to want to fight them would lead to negative results. India has only to see that the positive unifying forces are strengthened.” At the Jana Sangh convention in Patna at the beginning of 1970 the radical wing of the party asserted itself again. The convention passed a resolution which clearly declared their mistrust of the Muslim minority. They demanded the “elimination of all elements, who have their loyalty to powers outside India”. This was directed not only against the communists, but also against the Muslims, whose sympathies are suspected to be with Pakistan.

Madhok is against non-alignment in foreign policy: “The only basis of a realistic and independent foreign policy can be in consolidating old friendships and seeking new ones; but above all to weaken our enemy.” Madhok attacked the government’s policy towards Israel even before the Middle East crisis of 1967. Later he was one of the keenest critics of Foreign
Minister Chagla. He told me that the Jews are one of the most influential forces in the world. From the Indian point of view, there is no reason why one should not have closer relations with Israel.

The first true election victory of the Jana Sangh, which brought them almost a tenth of all votes, came only after Nehru’s death. Nehru considered the Jana Sangh and their forerunners as the most dangerous enemy in internal politics. He saw a dubious reactionary element in the religious roots of this party, which could only mean a backward step for India. The foundations on which the Jana Sangh was founded have not changed since Nehru’s death, but their methods have.

Still keenly opposed to the Congress, the Jana Sangh has less in common with the capitalistic right wing Swatantra, which has stronger roots in South India than with the socialist parties, which like the Jana Sangh have their most important field of influence in the Hindi-speaking Gangetic valley, especially in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. As much as the Jana Sangh and the socialists may differ in their economic attitudes, yet in the linguistic problem, which means implementing Hindi as the national language, they are closer to each other than all other parties. Madhok classifies the Praja Socialists, the moderate wing of the split party, expressly as possible colleagues, and recognises them as a related nationalist group. This did not exclude the fact that he tried to form a link with the orthodox-minded people in the right wing faction of the Congress Party. Before the 1971 elections Jana Sangh formed an alliance with the Old Congress and with Swatantra. This led to a terrible failure. In the Parliament of 1971 Jana Sangh could retain only twenty-two seats. It lost one-third of its former strength (eleven seats). Half of the remaining seats came from Madhya Pradesh, and these were won almost wholly due to the popularity of the Rajmata of Gwalior. The severest defeat was in Delhi where Jana Sangh lost all its six seats. Also Uttar Pradesh was no longer a stronghold. There it won four seats only as against
73 seats won by the Congress (N.) In 1971 Jana Sangh has been reduced to a small regional party without real national appeal. In twenty-two states it could not get a single candidate elected.

The Swatantra Party
The liberal right wing party, the Swatantra is, like India's socialist parties, an offspring of the Congress party. The socialists had split from the mother party in 1948. The more the Congress party developed into a socialist party under Nehru's leadership, the more difficult it became for the parties working under a socialist flag to attain their own profile. This was not the case with the right wing party. The split followed only in 1959. The party was founded as a result of a direct reaction to the resolutions passed by the Congress party at their convention in Nagpur in January 1959. Here the old demands for land reform were renewed and it was resolved to change over Indian agriculture to cooperative associations. Even a decade later these demands have not been implemented because the radical resolutions at the Congress sessions later met with passive resistance from the states. The resolution at Nagpur anyway made N. G. Ranga, one of the most well-known rural leaders of India—he was General Secretary of the Congress Party for a long time—join the former socialist Minoo Masani and a few other politicians of the right wing of the Congress party. They wanted to create a liberal-conservative party, which was to be supported chiefly by the middle class. Decisive for the founding of the party was the sonorous voice of C. Rajagopalachari (born 1879), one of the grand old men of India's struggle for freedom. He was eighty years old when the party was formed. We have already met him as a rival of the Congress President Kamaraj in his home town Madras. I visited Rajaji in Madras shortly after the formation of the Swatantra Party and then again after the crushing defeat of the Congress in February 1967. He had reached the age of eighty-eight, but was yet one of the most impressive per-
sonalities one could meet in India. Delicate and fragile, a fascinating power emanated from this age-old nan. A bit fatigued by the excitement of the elections, Rajaji led me to his bedroom and sitting on a comfortable chair showed me with a mocking gesture the many medicine bottles all around. Then he was completely absorbed in our discussion.

Contrary to the habit of old men, who speak mainly of the past, his thoughts wandered during this conversation with an unusual intensity to India’s future and to mankind in general. He vehemently opposed the idea of the Congress party that a welfare state could exist only by extensive controls by the State. “The Swatantra Party believes that social justice can be attained with tactics other than the techniques of the so-called socialism with all its accompanying phenomena of injustice, expropriation and denial of existing obligations. I believe, that one should do one’s utmost to preserve that which is good in our culture and to overcome material philosophy. It cannot be for the good of the nation, if the State retains the monopoly in all fields, which is then practically a party monopoly.”

Rajaji recalled the times when he stood at Gandhi’s side and when he published Gandhi’s journal Young India while Gandhi was in prison. He himself had been imprisoned five times. He had arranged the famous historic talk between Gandhi and the Muslim leader Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, in 1944, which he attended as the only witness. He distanced himself later from Nehru and the Congress Party and even in our talk at the beginning of 1967 the voice of the old man indicated his resentment when he spoke of Nehru’s dictatorial tendencies, whereas for Indira he found only soft, almost loving words. The basic note in all that he said was an unbounded belief in the free development of society, which Rajaji believed was threatened by an impractical bureaucratic rule, which seemed all-pervasive. The second danger he sees is the continual enmity towards Pakistan, which he, as a South Indian, views in a different light from those of the North.
It was almost symbolic that I should meet a large number of members of parliament belonging to the Tamilian Party, the DMK, who had just been elected and who sat at his feet as if he were their Guru. This appeared all the more remarkable, because Rajaji, like most of the leaders of the Swatantra Party, is a Brahmin of the highest caste, whereas the DMK had fought and vanquished the Brahmans. But Rajaji had outgrown all bonds of party and caste in his old age. Just as Gandhi never took on the leadership of the Congress party personally, likewise he left the leadership of the Swatantra Party to Prof. Ranga and Masani, who was the General Secretary of the organisation.

Minoo Masani (born 1905) is a Parsi from Bombay. He belonged at first to the left wing of the Congress party as a confirmed socialist, but later he turned more to the right. During the war he became the Mayor of Bombay. Then for a time he was Ambassador to Brazil, then again a member of parliament and finally joined the industrial house of Tatas. His book on the history of communism in India, which appeared in 1959, has become a classical work. His speeches are always spirited, witty, and often full of biting irony. Together with Ranga he drew up the party programme of the Swatantra Party, in the centre of which are these views on rural property:

The Swatantra Party is prepared to help agriculture in every way, but is opposed to all measures which make private possessions a mere title on paper, and to the idea of collective property, which takes away all incentive from the peasant, and will necessarily reduce the yield and lead to a collective economy with a corresponding bureaucracy.8

The party does not reject planning completely, but refers in its recent comments to the basic programme of the German social democrats drawn up in Godesberg, which refutes Nehru's claim that this party is only the political extension of the
industrialists who joined the Association, Free Enterprise. Just like the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra sees the State only as a partner in a general system of competition and does not approve of any monopolies which would necessarily lead to a small group of officials gaining privileges. A German observer would, however, find parallels rather to the Free Democratic Party than to the Social Democrats. The same manner in which varied and non-conforming forces have come together in the German FDP has also happened in the Swatantra, and it is difficult to combine them under one name. Sociologically, the Swatantra Party is characterized by the more liberal among India's large landowners who are rich and few in number.

From the beginning, princely families have played an important part in the Swatantra, like the Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur, who won no less than 192,000 votes of the 246,000 votes of her constituency. After the elections in 1967 she tried to start a revolt, which was to shake the Indian rococo city of Jaipur to its very foundations. Along with this beautiful princess who is highly revered in the villages of Rajasthan is the Rajmata of Gwalior. In July 1967 she succeeded in making thirty-six Congress members of the legislative assembly defect to a United Front of the Jana Sangh and Swatantra. The members represented to a greater extent the constituency of Adivasis and had themselves grown up in these castes. In 1969 this cabinet collapsed and had to give way to a government ruled by the Congress. It was not much different in Orissa, where the Swatantra party combined with a small princely party, the Ganatantra Parishad, which was firmly anchored in the tribal population and had contributed considerably to the election victory of 1967.

Almost a hundred former princes managed to become members of parliament or of legislative assemblies in the elections of 1967, mostly as candidates on behalf of the Swatantra. This led to the demand at the AICC session in June 1967 that Articles 291 and 362 of the Indian Constitution, which entitled
the former princes to a number of privileges and a regular and unalterable sum of money which was tax free, be removed. This Article in the Constitution was the price which India's first Home Minister, Sardar Patel, had to pay for his success in getting the 562 princes to forego their sovereign rights. In 1967 the payments made to the Indian princes amounted to forty-eight million rupees. The negotiations with the princes have continued for a long time. The attitude of the government hardened towards the princes after the split of the Congress party. Essentially, however, it is criticised even outside the princely circles, that the Indian government wants to back out on promises stipulated in the Constitution.

In the first year after independence itself about half the Indian princes renounced the privileges conceded to them and agreed to a compensation. Their 'state' comprised of one or two villages. But even among the two hundred and eighty-four princes who insisted on their privileges, there are some dozens who can only claim one to two thousand rupees per year as compensation. On the other hand, the nephew of the late Nizam of Hyderabad gets 2.4 million rupees annually. Considerable sums go also to the three princely houses of Rajasthan—Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner—and to the Maharaja of Baroda, who is entitled to 1.4 million rupees. The great Maharajas and Nawabs still retain their palaces and retinue, but the Maharaja of Baroda does not want to be greeted with a twenty-one gun salute when he arrives in Delhi, although he is entitled to it. A number of them work in the foreign service, whereas others, as in England, take in hunting guests, who pay, or try to enter the social life of an upper class which in reality is no longer influential. There is, however, a minority, which is involved in the problems of the country.

The issue of the princely privileges came to a head in 1970. Parliament voted in September with a two-thirds majority the abolition of the privileges but the Upper House failed by one vote to abolish articles 291 and 362 of the Constitution. President
Giri tried to solve the problem by a simple ordinance. The Supreme Court denied him this right and declared the President's ordinance as unconstitutional. This was one of the reasons which led to the dissolution of Parliament and to new elections.

Conspicuous as these former princes are in the ranks of the Swatantra party, they play a role only where they have patriarchal followers as in Orissa, or in the land of the Rajputs or in areas where the Adivasi tribes are constantly in conflict with the bureaucracy and defend their traditional way of life. This princely party will not be adequate as a party of the masses. Here the Swatantra would need a wider rural class of voters and, above all, the confidence of the new middle classes in the city. This base has been formed in the course of a decade, though not to the extent the party had hoped before the elections of 1967. The party leadership believed then that they could reckon with about a hundred seats in Parliament. They only managed to have forty-two members in 1967—twenty more than in the elections of 1962, when the Swatantra party contested the elections for the first time. According to the number of votes, the Swatantra party stood with 8.5 per cent and 12.4 million voters in the fourth place after the Congress, the Jana Sangh and the two communist parties. As the Swatantra had 7.9 per cent of the votes in the elections in 1962, their success in the elections was less spectacular than the number of parliamentary seats seem to show. In the legislative assemblies the number of votes gained by the Swatantra party decreased from 7.4 per cent (1962) to 6.6 per cent (1967).

The major victories of the Swatantra party in 1967 were limited to the three states of Gujarat, Orissa and Rajasthan, and to some extent to Mysore. The only Swatantra politician to become a Chief Minister was R. N. Singh Deo in the state of Orissa. In Gujarat the Swatantra has sixty-four members in the legislative assembly consisting of 168 members, but it could not remove the Congress Party from the saddle, as also in Rajasthan. The Swatantra is far from being an all-India party. The
organisational structure of the party is relatively weak because of the heterogeneous nature of its followers. The hopes of the party leadership to get a lot of money from big industries have been fulfilled only in part, for the large industrial concerns and commercial firms were wary of denying the Congress party their support before the elections.

Even though the chances of the Swatantra becoming a ruling party were small, they could have played an important part as partners in a coalition. In contrast to the Jana Sangh, the leaders of the Swatantra are, even if one does not consider Rajaji, almost exclusively members of the older generation. We cannot say, however, whether the party will be in a position to bring up an energetic younger leadership. A liberal alternative to the ruling socialist doctrine cannot be made popular very easily among India's youth. There is a widespread belief that with stronger socialist measures, poverty will decrease. In contrast to the Hindi fanatics of the Jana Sangh, most of the politicians of the Swatantra party have advocated retaining English as the official language. The elections of March 1971 have destroyed all hopes of the Swatantra. The party could retain eight members only in the new Parliament out of 35 it had before. Party chiefs Masani and Ranga failed to get re-elected. The decline of Swatantra seems to be final.

The DMK
When I visited C. N. Annadurai in Madras at his home in 1960 I had been prepared for surprises. I had been told that the leader of the Tamilian party, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian progress front) could hardly be outstripped in his extreme attitude towards North India. And 'Anna'—as he was generally called in Tamilnadu—said indeed hard things about the government in Delhi and he left no doubt that his party had made it its aim not only to make the state of Madras break away, but also, if possible, the entire south. At that time he wanted to establish an independent Indian state, Dravidasthan,
since India's south had its own history and its own traditions. He resented the fact that India's three steel plants had been erected in the north and that Tamilnadu, as he said, had been systematically neglected.

How serious he was then, it is difficult to say now. The roundish man with a well cared-for moustache mixed seriousness, jokes and irony and introduced himself as the writer of film scripts. He seemed to be quite happy when we changed the conversation from politics to literary themes. The films on which he worked at that time were dedicated to the ideology of Dravidasthan.

He had just been working on a historical drama, in which the inhabitants of the South successfully repulse the conquerors from the North. It struck me as a typically Indian blood-and-soil piece, in the way he narrated it to me—but the author seemed quite unaware of this effect.

When I met Annadurai in Madras again after seven years the scene had changed considerably. His DMK-party had just won an overwhelming victory in the elections and Annadurai had already been designated as Chief Minister of Madras. He and his immediate staff—they were all connected with the theatre, film or literature—had managed, to their own surprise, to reverse the ratio of the Congress party and the DMK in the legislative assembly. The members of the Congress party had decreased from 139 to 49, whereas the DMK had increased from 54 to 138. The DMK thus won a complete majority in the legislative assembly and did not have to form a coalition with any other party. Even in the Lok Sabha the number of DMK parliamentarians increased from 7 to 25. Of the fifteen million voters in Madras State, five and a half million had voted for DMK.

Annadurai's language had changed in the seven years as much as his triumphant appearance at his press conference. He had finally given up his idea of a Dravidasthan. The other southern states had rejected the proposal. And even for Madras Annadurai had renounced separatism in the meantime. He had been
imprisoned for some time in 1962 for his separatist convictions. After the Chinese attack on Indian territory there came a decisive change. The DMK promised then to give up the agitation for Dravidasthan. They saw themselves overpowered by the wave of Indian nationalism and turned their struggle to parry the supremacy of the Hindi language, which in 1965 led to weeks of rioting in Madras, instigated by the new ordinance on the national language.

'Anna' died of a heart attack in February 1969 at the age of sixty. He left behind a big void, because none of his party associates possessed the popularity and statesmanship of this born leader of the people. Hailing from a wealthy Mudaliar caste, 'Anna' had his education in Madras and turned to politics at an early age. Characteristic of him and the intellectuals in his party is a campaign against religious prejudices, which they have fought for years. This is closely connected with the fact that the DMK which came to power in 1967, tried in its initial stages, while India was still under British rule, to unite all castes and factions, and fight against the hegemony of the Brahmins in Tamilnadu. The privileges given to the Brahmins had been removed to a large extent under Kamaraj's rule, for he himself belonged to a lower caste. But only after the DMK came into power did they make a final break-through, which could be felt even physically. Much has changed since the new ministers moved into Fort St. George, the old Government House in Madras. The crowds of lower castes, waiting to see the ministers, made themselves temporarily at home on the large verandas of the Government House, built in the old colonial style, which had once lodged the administrative offices of the East India Company. Whoever is called to the minister has to step over various bundles and naked babies belonging to the waiting peasants. This building, which was once the solemn reserve of the state ministry, where one was guided by peons with high turbans, had become a house for the masses.

The Tamil party always had two sides. It was a party of
regional nationalism protesting against the supremacy of the North. This was to be seen especially in the city of Madras with its two million population. But together with this the Tamil party also constitutes a rural movement which has some resemblance to the former East European peasant parties, which advocated social justice for the neighbouring rural population in the twenties and thirties. The Tamil Party is therefore, like all peasant parties, basically rather conservative. The communists have only a minor influence in Madras, 'Anna' himself and his intimate friends have been rationalistic and agnostic in contrast to the traditional Brahmins who guard the temples. This indicates a certain contradiction to the customs of their rural following, who are yet bound deeply to old traditions. 'Anna', an eloquent orator, knew how to manage such inconsistencies. His 'city' speeches and his 'village' speeches had totally different accents, it is said in Madras.

The new Ministers who did not have any administrative experience had to adapt themselves to the demands of their office. They decided to forego half their salaries, which was not a mean sum, used their private transport and did not move into official residences allotted to ministers. These propagandistic measures have, however, shown the other side of the coin, that a minister, who earns only five hundred rupees as salary finds it hard to resist certain temptations in the long run. An idealism can sometimes be seen in India which soon falls victim to the new problems it creates. The DMK Party is trying to create the impression that it is returning to the principles of simple living which Gandhi had preached. It corresponds therewith to the basic trend, which could be seen throughout India at the end of the sixties. Ascetic ideals were in vogue again. Madras is not one of the Indian states which is hard to govern. Symbolic gestures of regional nationalism are highly esteemed. So Annadurai changed the official name of the state from Madras to Tamilnadu. On the whole, however, he maintained a conservative attitude and avoided clashes with the centre as
far as possible. Even Annadurai's successors in Madras adhered to this attitude. After the split in the Congress party, Mrs. Gandhi had the votes of the twenty-four members of the DMK in the Lok Sabha on her side. The party supported her minority government. It did quite well in the elections of March 1971 and retained twenty-three members to the Lok Sabha while it broadened its majority in the Tamilnadu Legislative Assembly.

Red India
When one comes from the withered red-brown earth of the Deccan plateau to the Malabar coast, the former principality of Travancore-Cochin and present day Kerala, it is as if one is in paradise. Groves of palm trees rise on the fringes of the luxuriant rice fields. Thick bushes with Arabian camellias, blossoming trees in white, violet and pink, adorn the streets. Gigantic banana trees tower over the clean palm-thatched huts between which groups of naked children play. At each corner one is confronted by white Christian churches or idols of Mary under high altars, erected by the ancient Syrian Church or by the Roman Catholic Church, which came fourteen hundred years later to the country with the advent of the Portuguese.

A long procession of maidens in white, church flags, sacristans and priests approach us on a wide avenue of palms. Shortly thereafter we meet a strange procession with about twenty men, some almost naked, having deep-red markings. They make strange movements with their body and dance to the din of drums, cymbals and pipes, which precede them. They throw their hands upwards, kneel and jump. They are from one of the lowest castes, who worship the devil.

We have hardly driven further for ten minutes past the verdant rice fields, when another procession approaches, but this time led by young boys with red banners; about two hundred men and women march behind them in a neat file. I had seen the same scene ten years ago. Even then Kerala swarmed with red
flags, adorned with a hammer and an ear of corn. In some villages trees were completely covered by red flags as they had been ten years ago. The propaganda pictures of the Congress party were hardly to be seen in the superabundance of communist symbols. We are in India's centre of communism.

Kerala's problems are open to the traveller like a picture-book. The lovely tarred road from the twin city of Cochin-Ernakulam to Trivandrum, the capital of the southernmost state, has one village following the other without a break. There is hardly a gap in the chain of houses for two hundred kilometres. This south sea paradise is one of the most densely populated areas on the earth. There are about four hundred and fifty people to a square kilometre, whereas the Indian average is one hundred and fifty. When travelling in the morning one meets hundreds of school-children, girls and boys, with books in their left hands, from learners of the ABC to eighteen-year-olds. Compulsory schooling was introduced here decades ago. More than half the total population can read and write, almost all children without exception receive education. The Maharaja of Travancore-Cochin had with the help of private Christian schools transformed his South sea paradise into an oasis of education since the turn of the century.

The many Christian churches, the schoolgirls in long green skirts, the half-naked men who lounge somewhere indolently and read the newspaper (a rare sight up north, for only a few can read there), and the red flags—all seem as confusing as the contrast between the cheerfulness of these southern people and the communist propaganda slogans, which can be seen on endless village roads in the soft round Malayalam script.

Other things are immediately evident. The sweepers, who are incessantly busy cleaning the tiled floors in every Indian hotel, are suppressed figures everywhere. But here the sweeper cowers if one accidentally meets him on the steps, whereby he transforms the quite embarrassed guest into a Sahib. These are remnants of a time, in which neither the breath nor the shadow of
a casteless person was allowed to fall on a gentleman from a higher caste.

Though one is received hospitably everywhere in Kerala, it is rare to receive an invitation to meals from a Brahmin or a member of the Nair caste, which forms the middle-class here. Despite the communist supremacy, caste traditions have not been preserved elsewhere as strongly as here in Kerala. Even the Christians, who with five million people are a quarter of the population of this red state, which is more than twenty million, are considered to be a caste. They vote almost exclusively for the Congress party, which split into two groups some years ago, whereas the communists depend on the caste of the Ezhavas, who were formerly toddy tappers and in the caste system are only a little above the Untouchables. When a member of the Ezhava caste became head of the regional Congress Party, the Congress succeeded for a time in getting a number of votes from this class of voters. Caste loyalty and political conviction are linked inextricably here in South India. Even the communists in Kerala cannot escape it.

E. M. S. Namboodiripad, head of the South Indian communists for a long time, does not come from one of the lower castes, but from one of the highest Brahmin castes in India, the Namboodiris. They are considered in India's caste system as an exclusive elite, which till recently kept their distance from the rest of society. It has been said of the Namboodiris that they were accustomed for centuries to play chess without using a chessboard. To sit face to face and to make the moves by memory was part of the mental training for this caste. Namboodiripad, who has become the oldest member of the Indian communist party (CPI) in rank, belongs to that select group of Indian politicians, who are referred to only by their initials. The initials EMS are known throughout India.

Even now after EMS has passed the age of sixty (born 1909) he appears to be youthful, a dynamic man who speaks English fluently. If one looks at his roundish, yet gentle appearance
from close, one would hardly think him to be one of Asia's great demagogues. When he appears as an orator before the masses, he has a certain similarity with the Chinese Chief Minister of Singapore, Li Kuan-yew. His effect is tuned to extreme dialecticism. In personal conversation Namboodiripad does not even today deny his origins in the Congress party. He speaks of Nehru as a father, who got into bad company in his older years. At the age of twenty-five Namboodiripad became a co-founder of that left wing of the Congress Party which called itself then the Congress Socialist Party. He was Secretary of the Pradesh Committee of Congress in Kerala. Only during the war did he turn to the Communists and in the period thereafter participated in the remarkable changes of front which the Indian communists were forced to make on orders from abroad. In 1957 Namboodiripad became the first head of the first communist state government in India, after his party won a weak majority in the elections in Kerala. He stayed in office twenty-seven months, till 31st July 1959, when the Central Government intervened on the strength of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution and introduced President's Rule with the argument that the communist government in Kerala could no longer maintain law and order.10

The communists had organised systematic strikes in the tea estates in Kerala and murders committed during these riots were not investigated. An education bill, which was to nationalise the numerous private schools of the state, evoked an open conflict. The private schools would then have been compelled to employ communist teachers. There were demonstrations against the government, in which thousands of people took part, among them many women. The Christians, Muslims and Nairs had opposed the communist government then. Lawlessness prevailed, so that the intervention of the central government became inevitable. Kerala had President's Rule again from 1965 upto the elections in 1967. The legislative assembly

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could not form a government, so that the executive power was again transferred back to the Governor.

Exactly a decade after his first success in the elections Nambodiripad became Chief Minister again, at the head of a coalition government this time. The government consisted of the conservative Muslim League, who had got 6.7 per cent of the votes and had been returned to the legislative assembly with fourteen seats. In a book which appeared shortly before the elections, EMS showed his indignation at the fact that the Congress party had united several times with the Muslim League to form a coalition.\textsuperscript{31} So even the CPM can be accused of ‘communalism’. It used the same tactics used by other parties.

During his second term Nambodiripad seemed at first to give more consideration to the fact that the communists no longer had a majority in Kerala according to the number of votes. Though in Bengal the communists began to bring about general chaos under similar circumstances, Nambodiripad took a cautious road in the first year of his rule and tried to toe the line with the Central Government and especially with Indira Gandhi. The basic economic problems of this southern state are so unusually great that it is easier by far to be in the opposition than to bear the burden of ruling. Kerala needs in spite of its several harvests an additional 1.2 million tons of rice per year, which is caused partly by the fact that the planting of rice has become unprofitable. The cultivation of industrial plants (coconut, rubber, pepper, tea) increased by twenty per cent in Kerala between 1961 to 1966, the cultivation of coffee by forty per cent, whereas the area for growing rice was extended only by 2.7 per cent. Every government in Kerala, therefore, whether communist or not, has to get a considerable supply of food from the Centre. In summer 1967 Nambodiripad wanted to get gratuitous supplies of rice, which of course brought him into conflict with New Delhi.

Kerala’s basic problem is lack of industries which corresponds to the high standard of education of the people and especially
to the increasing number of students from the universities. As Kerala has only had small-scale industries till now, which deal with refining agricultural products, unemployment is great and the intellectual proletariat increases more alarmingly than in any other part in India. Emigration was the only solution till now. In Bombay alone there are half a million people from Kerala, who in recent years have met with growing resistance from the native working classes of Maharashtra and have been partly responsible for the fact that the semi-fascist Shiv Sena movement wish to drive the South Indians from Bombay completely.

Nambodiripad who had taken on the reins of government for the second time did not know any other solution than to request G. D. Birla, the famous industrialist of the Marwari caste, to make considerable investment in Kerala. A project of 360 million rupees was negotiated. Apart from this individual case, the communist government of Kerala tried to attract capital to Kerala by offering cheap electricity and other incentives, in order to promote industrialisation. In spite of such offers, capital has not really been forthcoming. The former Congress governments had attempted the same, but had never made any visible progress, because of their internal quarrels and corruption. The relative success of the communists in Kerala is thus only a reflection of a Congress faction which had committed suicide years ago. Even the communists in Kerala cannot solve the pressing basic problems by socialistic measures, because there is little that can be socialised.

When in 1964 the CPI split into a Moscow-wing and a Peking-wing, Nambodiripad, who had taken a middle course for years in the Indian Politbüro joined the Moscow Wing. Six months after his return to power in Kerala he was classified by Peking as being the "lackey of the zamindars and capitalists" and saw the danger of his own party being split by those who tended to veer yet more to the left. This group led by the
Minister for Agriculture, Mrs. A. R. Gouri, accused the Chief Minister of betraying communist principles.

Indian communism has also its own peculiarities. In his last book, Namboodiripad ridiculed those Indian politicians who superstitiously had astrologers around them. In 1957 as well as a decade later, however, the state government of Kerala which was led by the communists took the oath of office on a day which the astrologers had forecast previously to be free from evil influences. Theoretical knowledge and normal habits often vary considerably from one another.

During 1969 Namboodiripad made the old mistakes again. Conditions in Kerala took a turn for the worse, after the government under the leadership of the left communists encouraged the land labourers to grab land by force from the zamindars. Law and order were on the decline. The position of the Chief Minister became unsustainable, so that he was compelled to resign on 23rd October 1969. He himself had brought about this crisis, which had again ended in his downfall. He had accused some ministers of his own coalition of corruption. When later similar accusations were made against left communist ministers, he refused to investigate, and even refused to give information on substantiated accusations. Thus Namboodiripad failed for the third time as Chief Minister. A new coalition cabinet led by the right communists took the place of the ruling United Front. Achutha Menon became Chief Minister.

The history of the CPI has since its inception at the beginning of the twenties been one of perpetual crises which continued to be intensified. Till the Second World War the Indian communists hardly had their own individual political programme. After severe reverses in the twenties, the Komintern in Moscow decided to entrust the control and part of the leadership in Indian communism to their British comrades. The actual management was in London. After Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 Harry Pollitt, the General Secretary of the
British communist party, demanded from his comrades in India that they give up all anti-British activity and work loyally with India’s rulers, as the Soviet Union was fighting as England’s ally. This caused indescribable confusion among the communist leaders in India; they were now compelled, so to say, to appear at the side of the ‘British imperialists’ and to condemn their former ‘bourgeois nationalist defections’, whereas at the same time the Congress party was getting prepared for its final struggle against British supremacy.

Yet more detrimental for the prestige of the communists was their intercession for ‘total autonomy’ for the Indian people. Even during the war Maharashtrian communist leader, B.T. Ranadive had supported the right of the Muslims to form their own State. The Soviet expert on India, A.M. Dyakow said later: “It is only the Communist Party of India which has put forward the slogan of a consistently democratic solution of the national question, i.e. the right of all nationalities of India to self-determination, including the right to secession and the formation of independent states.”

The desire to bring about a balkanisation of India played an important role within the CPI even after twenty years. Wherever it was possible the communists made use of regionalism and tried to exploit the linguistic problem for their own ends. The communists know very well, that they have only a small chance of being able to rule India in the foreseeable future. That is why they try to concentrate on those states in which resistance against the Centre, which can lead to separatism, can be provoked.

Shortly after the formation of independent India, communism suffered a crushing setback as a result of supporting separatism. Depending on the influential Kamma Caste, the communists incited a revolt among the peasants of Andhra in autumn 1948, which resistance against the Centre, which can lead to separatist characteristics. The revolt of the Andhra communists failed, after about four thousand men had laid down their lives in
bitter fights. The result was that the Indian communists were compromised again, and their membership is supposed to have fallen from about 100,000 members to 20,000. In memory of that rebellion however Andhra remained for a long time one of the three main centres of Indian communism.

Split of the communists
Just as the CPI gradually recovered from the severe reverses of 1948/49 in a decade of incessant internal faction fights, it entered a new crisis caused by the aggressive action of the Chinese, at first in Tibet and later on the Sino-Indian border. This was caused by the intense dilemma, whether Indian communists should openly profess their faith in China or whether they should show themselves to be loyal sons of India. The second alternative became the principle which guided S.A. Dange (born 1899). Though he could not make communism successful in his home town Bombay, as his colleagues in the other industrial metropolis Calcutta were able to, yet he played an important role as the organiser of the left-oriented All-India Trade Union Congress and for a time also as the leader of the communist party in the Lok Sabha.

When relations between Peking and Moscow began to come to a head from 1960 onwards, Dange turned decisively to the Soviet side. He was responsible for the fact that a member of the Soviet Politburo, Michail Suslłow personally attended the communist convention in Vijayawada in April 1961. He tried to tip the scales in the bitter fight between the Moscow-wing and Peking-wing of the CPI in favour of Moscow’s friends. But Suslłow did not succeed in bringing the Bengali group under the leadership of Ranadive and Jyoti Basu (born 1909) on the side of the Soviets. When in autumn 1962 the Chinese started an open invasion of India, the central government adopted stern measures and arrested some thousand communists who were known to be friends of Peking.

Dange, who after the Chinese attack had openly joined
Nehru's side, and his friends were not arrested. For a spell he was at the head of the communist group, but it was clear that a break was inevitable as soon as the left communists would be released from jail. This happened in the autumn and winter of 1963. A few months later, in April 1964, the party split.

S. A. Dange had gone to Moscow to prepare for a party convention. His rivals used this opportunity to strike a blow which was to hit his personal reputation deeply. An article in a weekly in Bombay claimed that Dange had been an agent of the colonial government during the British rule and had worked in a news agency for the British and thus betrayed Indian comrades. A letter of Dange's had been found in the National Archives in Delhi, which he had written in 1922 to an English official from a prison under the British. In it Dange had shown his willingness to collaborate with the British news service in India, in case he were released. Dange of course contradicted it, but he refused to make any further comments on this dark episode when the members of the national council of the CPI met. Thirty-two members of the 101-strong national council demanded that the accusations against Dange should be given priority and be dealt with first on the agenda. The majority rejected the motion and removed the thirty-two rebelling 'Peking-members' from further activity in the national council. Along with Namboodiripad there were the three most important communists of West Bengal, J. Basu, H. K. Konar and G. Das Gupta, who till recently had been interned.

It is estimated, that at the time of the split there had been a hundred and forty thousand or a hundred and eighty thousand registered with the party, a greater number of which joined the Peking-wing. The quarrelling communist brothers had fought bitterly. The result was that the Moscow wing returned to parliament with twenty-three seats and the Peking wing with nineteen members. The total share of votes for the communists had however decreased during the elections in 1967 from 9.9 (1962) to 9.3 per cent. In the elections for the legislative assembly
both wings got 8.9 per cent of the votes. Thirteen million Indians had voted for the communists.

The CPI has never played an important role in North India: From the Hindi-speaking states they could hardly send any parliamentarians to the Lok Sabha. Even largely industrialised Maharashtra, which sent forty-five delegates to Delhi, had only two right-wing communists in 1967 and none in 1971.

Indian communism is still concentrating on the two states, Kerala and West Bengal, and to some extent on Andhra, where the communists however suffered a severe setback in 1967. From fifty-one parliamentarians in the legislative assembly its number declined to nineteen, which was almost equally divided between both wings.

In West Bengal, J. Basu had used the advance of the communists to power to further intensify the social tension in Calcutta. Shortly after the new coalition government came into power in March 1967, in which the communists had a leading role, labour riots flared up in India's second most important industrial area, Calcutta, which were favoured openly by the communist ministers. The West Bengal police were forbidden to take any action against the so-called 'gheraos'. This was a new form of revolt by the workers, in which dozens, even hundreds of workers laid siege to the office of the head of a firm for a long time, till he conceded their demands or conditions. During such gheraos the employer was often denied food and drink for days. In May 1967 no less than 237 gheraos were recorded, in which the employer was often assaulted physically. Even hospitals and the Municipal Council of Calcutta were threatened by gheraos. Even here the police were forbidden by the communist ministers to take action.

On the whole there are supposed to have been over a thousand gheraos in Bengal till the first coalition government controlled by the communists collapsed in November 1967. It is estimated that twenty million working hours were lost. At the end of the communist rule in Calcutta, 170 factories were closed,
for their proprietors saw no possibility of continuing to work under these conditions. A member of the High Court in Calcutta declared the gheraos to be illegal, shortly before the Central Government finally intervened. But in the meantime chaos was so widespread in West Bengal that dozens of firms were seriously considering a transfer of their headquarters to other parts of the country. Of course one must consider that in many small and medium organisations in Calcutta, the social conditions were very bad and that the Marwari caste, which was hated by the Bengalis, was inclined to socially exploit the workers without any consideration. The head of the coalition government in West Bengal, Ajoy Mukherjee, who defected from the Congress only in 1966, had to concede after a few months that his communist colleagues in the cabinet were not trying to rectify the social grievances in Bengal by constructive measures. In contrast to Kerala, the communists here were inclined only to create general chaos, in the hope that they could compel new elections in Bengal, in which the communists promised themselves considerable success.

The first coalition government in Bengal ended finally like a satyr play. The Food Minister P. C. Ghosh, who belonged to the breakaway Bangla Congress, resigned at the beginning of November 1967 with sixteen other members of his faction from the government, causing it to be a minority in the legislative assembly. The governor demanded thereupon that the government would have to move a vote of confidence in the legislative assembly, which the government refused to do. On instructions from the Central Government, the Governor dismissed the coalition government on 21st November and named P. C. Ghosh as the new Chief Minister. But as the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, who was influenced by the communists, refused to let the assembly vote on whether the new government really had a majority, there was a constitutional crisis.

The Congress Party decided in January 1968 to collaborate in the weak cabinet of the seventy-year-old P. C. Ghosh, but the
majority ratio continued to fluctuate, because the younger members of the Congress party were not prepared to have the regional party controlled authoritatively by the older members led by Atulya Ghosh, a member of the Syndicate. After an attempt by the governor to bring about a vote of confidence in the legislative assembly failed miserably amid tumultuous scenes, the Central Government had to decide finally on 20th February to dissolve the legislative assembly, to dismiss the government and to declare President’s rule.

The Central Government in Delhi had observed the increasing chaos in Bengal keenly for many months, but it did not want to incur the odium that it had acted purely for party considerations. But when it intervened, the communists had given ample proof that it had not acted according to the letter of the constitution, hence an intervention by the Central Government became inevitable.

This referred in particular to the rural revolts in the northern part of Bengal, which had been instigated by the left communists in 1967. The left communists had kindled a local agrarian revolution among the primitive Santhal tribes in the foothill of the Himalayas at a strategically important place—at a thin bottle-neck—which connects Assam with the rest of India. This revolt in the village Naxalbari led to the attempt of the left communists to form an illegal parallel government in an area in which 25,000 people lived. It was finally quelled by the police without any loss of blood.

Peking enthusiastically welcomed this revolt as the beginning of a general revolution of the Indian peasants: “When the majority of the Indian peasantry has been awakened, then some hundred million Indian peasants will be the un conquerable force of the Indian revolution. The Indian proletariat must unite with them in order to conquer the mighty enemy in merciless national war. Our great leader, Chairman Mao Tse-tung teaches us: The seizing of power by armed force, settling open problems by war is the central aim and the highest form of
revolution. Armed revolt is therefore also the only correct way for the Indian revolution. Such nonsense like Gandhi's teachings or parliamentarism are only opium, which the ruling classes of India use, in order to lull the people," wrote the Peking Review on the revolt of Naxalbari.¹⁰

After this rebellion was quelled by the intervention of the Bengal Police—the communist Deputy Chief Minister Basu had to agree to it against his will—Peking cursed even the left communists of Bengal. The participation of the communists in the state governments had made the problem of their loyalty to India more acute, almost insoluble.

Just as in Kerala, extreme groups were formed among the left communists in Bengal after the collapse of the Naxalbari revolt, who condemned the 'willingness to compromise' of the communist ministers and wanted to make the method of perpetual peasant revolts, as desired by Peking, their maxim for the future communist manner of action. They called themselves the Naxalites. The chaos of the Chinese cultural revolution hit back more and more violently on Indian communism. The Central Committee of the Left Communists which consists of thirty-five members met in Madurai in August 1967. Threatened by their own extremists, they saw themselves compelled to dissociate themselves somewhat from Peking. The Central Committee still classified the Soviet Union as before as a 'stronghold of modern revisionism', but it rejected the Chinese claim that the Soviet Union was an ally of American imperialism. It protested above all about the intervention of the Chinese Party in matters concerning Indian communism. These were methods which did not conform to the Marxist teaching.

The Bengali communists were able to extend their success of 1967 considerably in the by-elections of February 1969. The Congress Party, which in 1967—with 127 seats of the 280 in the legislative assembly—could claim to be the largest single party in the West Bengal state assembly, returned only 55 parliamentarians and suffered a devastating defeat. The United Front
obtained 210 seats in these by-elections. The left communists, who had got 43 seats in 1967, were strengthened now to 80 members and were thus the strongest group by far within the United Front. The Bangla Congress retained its position with 33 seats.

So again a cabinet of the United Front was formed with the leader of the Bangla Congress, Ajoy Mukherjee as Chief Minister. As in 1967 J. Basu, leader of the left communists became Deputy Chief Minister and Home Minister. With the formation of this coalition government which was controlled even more explicitly by the communists, the state of Bengal soon became a centre of revolts, in which public law and order gradually gave way to complete chaos. The left communists and other radical groups started a terror regime in Calcutta, where there were murderous incidents almost daily. Basu as Home Minister hindered the police from investigating misdeeds of the left communists. Systematically all officials who were inclined to maintain law and order were removed from the police. At the same time Basu organised an illegal army of his CPM-followers, which in spring 1970 was estimated to be 110,000 strong.

The chaos did not limit itself to Calcutta alone, but extended also to the entire state of West Bengal. The left communists had organised gangs throughout West Bengal in the summer and autumn of 1969. They took land from the farmers by force or simply harvested their fields. This included even the smaller landowner, who dared to oppose the left communists.

The attitude of the Chief Minister Ajoy Mukherjee was very unusual in view of these chaotic conditions. In November 1969 he called his own government ‘uncivilised’ and stated to the press: “The government of the United Front in West Bengal can no longer protect the life and property of the citizen. In the entire civilised world there is at present no precedent to the conditions prevailing here. Murder, bloodshed, robbery, despotic coercive measures towards employers and
officials and an occupation of the land by force—that occurs every day in West Bengal. I cannot deny, the population on the flat land in particular are in panic, the conditions for life and property have become so insecure."

In spite of these declarations Mukherjee remained for months at the head of a government, which in fact did not govern any more. The Chief Minister and his Deputy, Basu, accused each other in letters which the press was allowed to publish. After months of agony this government, which in reality no longer existed, finally broke up in March 1970.

The Central Government had observed the indescribable circumstances in West Bengal without making an attempt to intervene at the proper time and to see that the economically most important State with a large industrial area could live in peace again. Apparently this was due to tactical considerations, especially after the split of the Congress party.

President's rule failed during 1970/71 to better the situation in Calcutta and West-Bengal. On the contrary, the number of murders and criminal acts grew from day to day. The governor was too weak a person to come to grips with a much deteriorated climate of open civil war. When Indira Gandhi personally assumed the portfolio of the Home Ministry at the end of June 1970, it was generally assumed she would take stronger measures in West Bengal. But no real change was to be seen until the general elections in March 1971.

Mrs. Gandhi campaigned vigorously in West Bengal and succeeded to a large extent. The number of Congress (N) members in the Bengal Assembly rose from 55 to 105. On the other hand, CPM came even stronger out of the polls. They have risen from 80 to 111 members. President's Rule was again inevitable.

Indian communism has remained by and large a regional force and has not been able, therefore, to have strong roots in industrial centres other than the gigantic city of Calcutta. In Madras and Bombay the CPI is an insignificant faction and in Delhi, the city with over two million population, it is not re-
presented in the City council by even a single member. Throughout the world no other communist party has been as shaken with incessant internal quarrels and breaking up into groups as the communist party in India. Its strength is due to the fact that it has exploited most effectively all local grievances which arose from mismanagement by the Congress party in Bengal and Kerala. Even the two factions of the party, which are in existence since 1964, continue to have violent internal fights. After the elections of March 1971, the CPI came back with nineteen, the CPM with twenty-three members. The overall picture had not changed. The communists won no new votes except in West Bengal and Kerala. Eighteen of the twenty-three CPM legislators are from West Bengal alone.
The internal and external difficulties with which India has had to fight increasingly raises the crucial question whether India's democracy will survive in the form in which it was created during Nehru's epoch. Even now sixty to seventy per cent of the population is employed in agriculture; only a tenth of the population lives on industry. Industry contributes one-fifth of the national product—whereas more than twice the figure—45 per cent—is met by agriculture. * India's dependence on foreign aid continues. Tremendous progress has been made in industrialisation, but the growth rate of the national product is only a little higher than the yearly growth of population. Moreover regionalism is apparently spreading and seems to threaten the unity of the country, which has a very old history but is yet a very young state. The disillusionment of the Indian masses continues to increase and the oppressive feeling of stagnation is spreading and is becoming the fertile soil for extremist ideas and parties.

There are facts and events, rarely mentioned, because they are taken for granted, which show the other side of this rather gloomy picture, which the Indian and the international press have been reflecting for years. In the wide Afro-Asian world with its population of over two billion, India is the only large nation with a functioning democratic system, apart from Japan. During Nehru's lifetime it was sometimes observed that in spite

* The rest of the national product comes from trade, transport and liberal professions.
of all formal democratic institutions India was more like a benevolent dictatorship, as only the will of one man was decisive. This observation was never really true, in view of the many-sided Indian public life. Nehru's death has removed this assumption completely. India's democracy resembled a one-party system in its initial two decades because of the overwhelming strength of the ruling party. In the meantime it has taken the opposite direction like the one party regime in the rest of Africa and Asia. The opposition parties have not only gathered strength since the elections in 1967, they have also taken over the responsibility in many states. In 1971 this process has been reversed by Indira Gandhi's victory.

152 million people participated in the elections of 1967: this was the largest operation of a true democratic election which has ever occurred in history. The elections extended over a week in various parts of the country and were almost without any disturbances, though India had been shaken by continual riots in the months before the elections. Moreover, with the exception of the special case of Kashmir, where one can hardly speak of free elections, there were no real cases of fraud or illegal influencing of voters. The results of the elections prove this: all opposition parties grew in numbers.

Participation in the elections for the Lok Sabha has been increasing constantly. In the first elections of 1952 it was 45.7 per cent of those entitled to vote, in 1967 it was 61 per cent which almost equals the percentage of those participating in the presidential elections in the United States. Political participation of the broad masses is thus on the increase.¹

The majority of the Indian body of voters still consists of illiterate people, for whom the symbols of the individual parties have to be drawn on the ballots, as for instance the two bullocks of the Congress Party. This has not been as much an obstacle to a free choice of candidates as one is inclined to think in western countries. The answer of a servant of some friends in Madras, whom I asked whether he had also voted for the Tamil Party,
the DMK, was more impressive than the discussions of intellectuals during the elections: "Certainly I have voted for them—for the first time—and if they do not govern well, then I will vote for the Congress again the next time." The man was most probably illiterate and spoke the usual servant's English. His answer, however, showed a surprising insight into the rules of the game for democracy.

The Indian Parliament has after twenty years a firm and central place within the nation. Occasionally there is considerable tumult, which is sharply criticised in the press. On the whole, however, it is a well-functioning people's representation, in which the opposition can talk without hindrance; after the usual discussions hundreds of laws are passed. Nehru himself hardly ever missed a meeting of the parliament. His successor Shastri was severely criticised for leaving Delhi on tour during a parliament session. Whenever vital problems in Indian life, as for example the linguistic problem, or the special powers for the government after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war, are discussed, the participation of the Indian population is apparent far beyond the capital. The radio news in English and the regional languages is heard in the remotest villages, with the increasing propagation of transistors. All India Radio is an instrument of the government. It could not be denied that AIR was objective. Only, in the bitter fights within the Congress party in autumn 1969 Mrs. Gandhi did not fear to use the radio for her party politics. This was strongly criticised by the opposition. In spite of that, All India Radio is an important factor of integration which daily continues to act invisibly against the process of disintegration. A record of these apparently centrifugal tendencies, which are often mentioned in this book, would give a false picture, if one overlooked the new factors of integration, which existed not in the person of Nehru alone.

Apart from a parliamentary system which functions by and large, India stands out in the entire Afro-Asiatic world by means of three institutions, which, in this combination anyway, does
not exist in any other country on the Asian continent: an independent judiciary, which does not enslave itself to the government; a bureaucracy with strong traditions and an intimate corps spirit in its upper ranks; and finally a free Press, whose comments are as independent and critical as in the Federal Republic of Germany, England or America, and whose news reflect the events throughout the world without any kind of censorship.

Judiciary as a cornerstone
The traditions of independent judges are—more important than the forms and methods of parliamentary democracy—the lasting legacy which the English left behind in India. In Ghana, for instance, which had the same British legacy, Nkrumah removed the independent judiciary a few years after independence. In India, however, it is quite different. In this country, which is constantly threatened by corruption because of its poverty, there have hardly been any cases of the judges being influenced in the past twenty years. The Supreme Court has continued to develop its independent position towards the government year by year. Characteristic of this was the fundamental decision of the Supreme Court in 1967 that parliament did not have the right to repeal or amend the basic rights guaranteed by the constitution. The Supreme Court asserted that Article 368 of the Constitution made amendments to the Constitution possible, but it could not be used to infringe the fundamental rights. In this judgement of the Supreme Court, Article 13 of the Constitution, which forbids a modification of the basic rights, was placed above Article 368. This particularly striking example could be supplemented by a whole catalogue in which the High Courts have opposed decisions of the government or parliament with authority.

* This very Article 13 is in danger when this book goes to the press. In case it is abolished the whole system of an independent judiciary would be menaced.
An example on a less higher level, which became a cause célèbre and had strengthened the independence of the judiciary particularly, was the so-called Mundhra Scandal in 1958, which led to the resignation of the then Finance Minister, Krishnamachari. The state controlled life insurance company had bought shares worth fifteen million rupees from dubious companies, which belonged to a speculator from the Marwari caste, Haridas Mundhra. The Finance Minister had sanctioned this transaction with the argument that the Stock Exchange in Calcutta would be thus supported. There was a legal investigation, which the Chief Justice of Bombay, M. C. Chagla (later Foreign Minister) conducted. Mundhra was convicted as a speculator and forger of shares. The Secretary of the Finance Ministry was severely reprimanded by the Court and the Finance Minister, who had had no dishonourable motive, but had lacked a sense of supervision, had to resign. Nehru, who feared that through this affair the reputation of his government would be tarnished, had asked for a legal enquiry. The Mundhra affair, which had been reported in detail by the press, had set a standard which was to guarantee the judiciary a place in Indian public affairs.² The courageous judgement of a member of the High Court of Bengal against the communist gherao, mentioned before, is yet another example of judicial independence in recent times. Likewise the Supreme Court was not afraid to declare the nationalisation of the major banks by the government in autumn 1969 illegal as a matter of form, so that the government was compelled to introduce a new law which corresponded to the demands of the Supreme Court.

However, there is a modification to be made. The Preventive Detention Act, which was normal during the British rule, has been taken over by the Indian government as the Defence of India Act. This enabled the parliament to declare a state of emergency in October 1962 at the beginning of the Chinese attack in the Himalayas, which was annulled only after more than five years. This law makes an arrest for political reasons
possible, without making it necessary to have a judicial enquiry. That is why some thousands of communists were taken into preventive custody in 1962. But were released by the end of 1963. This law was applied rather indiscriminately in Kashmir. The Preventive Detention Act was abolished on the Union level on 1st January 1970 because the law was not renewed. Mrs. Gandhi could not dare, as head of a minority government, fight for an extension of the law in parliament, because some opposition parties on whose support she depended had voted against the extension of the law. A number of states then passed their own laws in the following months. This created legal insecurity because internment was possible in one state as before whereas in another it was no longer possible. West Bengal, for instance, could not pass such a law because of the pressure of the communists.

The abolishing of the state of emergency in January 1968 was preceded by a strong law against separatism, which enabled the state governments to intern separatist agitators. This law is directed particularly towards the leaders of separatist movements in the tribes in North East India, especially among the Nagas and Mizos. The Nagaland had become an independent state under Nehru, but continued to be a centre of constant trouble. Nehru, and after him Shastri and Indira Gandhi, have negotiated with the semi-legal leaders of the underground movement of the Nagas, without arriving at a satisfactory solution.

The tribe of the Mizos live in a remote mountainous region on the borders with East Pakistan and Burma. They began to become restless in the spring of 1966, because this tribe felt that they had been neglected economically and culturally. When the state of emergency was lifted in January 1968 some six hundred Mizo agitators were kept in custody on the basis of the law against separatism. Neither the state government in Assam nor the union government believed that they could contend with separatism in the tribes without a strong legal weapon. The British press in particular has favoured the separatists among.
the Nagas and Mizos, for years. It would however be absurd to form small states according to the West African model. The tribes have been allowed considerable autonomy, but in order to maintain this the Indian government must be allowed a legal weapon. It is, however, quite another question, whether the Indian administrative authorities have done justice to the aspirations of the mountain tribes.

India’s mandarins
The Indian Civil Service, world famous by its three initials ICS, is a more disputed legacy of the British than the independent judiciary. “Not the English themselves,” remarked Gandhi once, “but our English-speaking officials have made India a slave.” The resentment against the ICS can still be felt twenty years after independence. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, a critical intelligent Bengali, author has attacked the upper strata of bureaucracy in his much read book of essays on the peoples of India,8 which, he opines, “combines the Hindu pride of caste with the English pride of class”. As Chaudhuri said: ‘An unpleasant mixture of doubled arrogance.’ Even Nehru was originally full of distrust of the senior ICS men, till he later changed his mind as Prime Minister—when he noticed that the high ranks of the ICS, in the initial years of independence in particular, were really what many considered them to be: a steel frame-work, which was strong and elastic and able to bear the monstrous burden of administering such a large country.

The Indian Civil Service was founded in 1853 at a time when even in England there were only the beginnings of an orderly central administration. It dates back to the last important Governor-General of the East India Company, Lord Dalhousie (1848-55), who had realised that the administrative methods adopted till then were inadequate. He bequeathed the later viceroyys a well planned administrative reform. The casual recruitment of young gentlemen was to end. The very best talent was to be recruited for the Indian Civil Service.
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The deciding innovation was the introduction of difficult examinations for the ICS candidates. Thereby the selection of future administrative officers was not limited only to the sons of aristocracy. The examination was originally to be passed at the age of twenty-two, and later even at the age of nineteen, and was the key to a twenty-five year sojourn in India. As the examinations were held in London, Indian candidates were, so to say, discouraged from the beginning. Even in 1905 there were only 94 Indians among the 1307 members of the higher ranks of the ICS. Only in 1917 Lord Montagu, as Secretary of State for India, opened the ranks of the ICS to Indian candidates. Thus began the period of the so-called dyarchy, in which the Indian upper class began to participate increasingly in the administration of the provinces, whereby they naturally attempted to assimilate the English traditions as far as possible. In 1939 there were 625 Indians occupying ICS posts; approximately 45 per cent of the total strength of the ICS corps then.

Even today it seems to be a wonder that the English ruled the vast Indian Empire with an administrative staff, which consisted of less than two thousand senior officials. It was an exclusive elite, which was to be found only in one other place in the British Empire, in the Sudan Civil Service. Whoever belonged to the ICS knew that he would spend the best years of his life in India and that promotion to the highest administrative posts depended on his merits in the first decade of service.

This corps spirit has been transferred automatically to the Indian members of the ICS, who were recruited in ever growing numbers in the thirty years between 1917 and 1947. After independence they were able to guarantee the maintenance of an orderly and systematic administration. By about 1975 the last of the four hundred members of the ICS, who during the British rule had begun their career as Assistant Collectors will have left the service.

This position of Assistant Collector, with which the young ICS members began, was the highest post, which an official of
the provincial service (Tahsildar) could attain. A brilliant official of the Provincial Service would end his career there where the young civil servant earned his first spurs. It was a cleverly thought out administrative system, which forged a link between the lower and higher grades of administration, yet reserved the highest administrative career for members of those special classes, who had undergone the standardised preparation for the strictly exclusive Indian Civil Service.

If one knows some of the Chief Secretaries in the state capitals or has contact with the principal secretaries in the ministries in Delhi, then one will be convinced of the equality of this administrative elite. It was originally so small that everyone knew everyone else and this led to the development of that corps spirit, which grew to resemble a caste feeling. It is understandable that Indians of a high intellectual standard outside the ICS, view it with disfavour, not because of the nature of its work but because of its exclusiveness. Even the heads of the Indian diplomatic service which was built up after 1947 are usually from the ICS. Certain characteristics in the Indian diplomats, which cause surprise abroad, can be explained by this ICS mentality which likes to appear as 'super-Oxford'.

The gross difference between the senior administrative officials and the many branches of the lower bureaucracy, which has been called an army of hundred thousand snails, is very conspicuous. Whoever is caught in its web is rather to be pitied. Above this army of oriental scribes towers the Indian Administrative Service, as the ICS was renamed, and continues the traditions born in England. India has preserved a kind of Mandarin-class in the past hundred years. It has created one of the best administrative structures in the world. Professor Hugh Tinker, who was a member of the ICS, says: "In most new countries, the government can decide on policy and issue instructions to their officials and to the public: but there the matter rests. 'Between the decision and the action lies the shadow'—of inactivity, irresolution and incompetence. But in India and Pakis-
tan, the machinery of government actually works. This machinery may not be adapted to the ideal functioning of democracy and the welfare state, but it does provide a mechanism to execute the public will."

The question, whether the IAS will have the privileges of its predecessor, the ICS, has been much discussed in India. The examinations for the state services have been held for some years in the regional languages. The English language is yet decisive and indispensable as the linking limb of India's administration. The danger that the high standard of the IAS would begin to fall with the more forceful appearance of regionalism would be true, only if the requirements for the examinations in the states are lowered.

The number of IAS officers in 1964 was only two thousand four hundred.\(^5\) The examination for the IAS candidates is as academic as it was during the British rule. Almost all the candidates hail from the urban middle class. Many are sons of the most senior administrative officers and judges. The character of the elite selected consciously on merit has been preserved, though till now only a small number of Muslims have had the preliminary education for passing the examinations. An increase in the IAS enrolment is inevitable. The administrative tasks of India are far greater than what they were two decades ago. If the principle of merit, which has been adhered to so strictly, were to be relaxed, then the door to nepotism would be opened even to the highest administrative elite. That this hereditary ailment in all oriental societies has not been able to penetrate the exclusive corps of the highest administrative officials is a peculiarity, which has a certain parallel in Pakistan because of the common origin. What has often been said of France of the Fourth Republic is true also of India: The Ministers came and went, but the administrative elite remained. This was the secret, why France was not shaken more deeply during the political storms of the twentieth century. The younger members,
who have grown up in the Indian administration, accuse the older members of the IAS of becoming apathetic and lacking in imagination. Such accusations are perhaps not unjustified. But it is most essential that this steel frame-work of the administrative officials, which guarantees India's integration, is maintained.

India's journalists
The Indian press is no less important for the continuance of India's democracy than the judiciary and the administration. Even Indian journalism has its roots in England. Newspapers like the Times of India (established in 1838 in Bombay) or The Statesman in Calcutta and The Hindu in Madras, which have been published for over ninety years, have a tradition which only very few daily newspapers can boast of in Europe. Even in India sensational journalism, as for example the weekly Blitz, which appears from Bombay (circulation 200,000) has found an opening. The large number of serious dailies in English have retained their original character, and they follow an editorial policy which is comparable with Le Monde, the Frankfurter Allgemeine or The Guardian.

News and comments are clearly divided. The major newspapers like the Times of India, Hindustan Times, Indian Express, Amrit Bazar Patrika, The Statesman and The Hindu have certain shades of difference, but are on the whole oriented towards sharp, constructive criticism. They have contributed largely in the two decades after the war in creating an all-India consciousness. With the exception of certain military news the Indian press is not subject to censorship. There is free thinking and socially all doors are open to the famous Indian commentators in the capital as also in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. Their pens are feared and are incorrupt. They have contributed more than many parliamentarians have, who lack international standards of comparison, in making India understand herself.
Indian journalism has become one of the most important opposing powers of provincialism. The foreign news service of the leading Indian newspapers is excellent, where lack of foreign exchange does not put limits. In reports from Europe, the British point of view is predominant. The Indian reader gets still only a small fraction of the news on events in Germany, France, Scandinavia and Italy because there are not enough correspondents in these countries. The newspapers are all the more indispensable as windows to the world, as with the exception of a small studio in Delhi, there is no television in India.

Comments here on the Indian press refer particularly to the English language daily newspapers, which predominate in quality and circulation. In 1966 the Indian daily newspapers had a total circulation of 5.8 million, of which 1.5 million was from 54 English newspapers. This is followed by 142 newspapers in Hindi with a circulation of 764,000. The Hindi newspapers have only half the circulation of newspapers in the English language. Usually they appear from small publishing houses and are of only local importance. In contrast to this are the newspapers in Tamil (29 with a circulation of 628,000), Bengali (9 with a circulation of 303,000), Malayalam (39 with a circulation of 613,000) and Marathi (41 with a circulation of 536,000) which deal with more important issues. It is remarkable to see the relatively large circulation of newspapers (in Malayalam), in the small state of Kerala, a phenomenon which is connected with the large number of literates in this state.

The English newspapers are far superior to the so-called vernacular press in niveau. V.K. Narasimhan, co-editor of The Hindu, asserts in a study of the Indian press that the regional vernacular press offers very little of international news and that even national news is given less space than regional news. It is claimed that in the long run the circulation of the English language newspapers will recede in favour of the regional vernacular press. But it has not been proved true as yet.
Military dictatorship as an alternative?
No one would dare to answer the burning question, whether the growing political consciousness in the Indian people, a functioning parliamentary system, in which the masses can participate by means of the polls, the independent judiciary, an administrative machinery with strong traditions and a critical, free press would suffice, to balance the centrifugal tendencies and the consequences of continual poverty and under-nourishment. It is definite that on the basis of the national movement begun by Mahatma Gandhi, a national self-consciousness and self-understanding has developed in these two decades.

Will India one day tread the path to a military dictatorship as so many states in Asia and Africa? There is much to suggest the contrary. The elite of the Indian military have abstained till now from exercising political influence or even participating politically. There are deeper reasons which make it more difficult for a military junta in India to come to power than in other countries in the third world. Some Indian critics claim, however, that the representative democracy which had been decided on for the constitution was a foreign article and was not based on purely Indian traditions. That could be true initially. Ayub Khan’s attempt to set up a ‘basic democracy’ based on indirect elections, had at one time given rise to similar romantic ideas in India. After two decades it was seen that a democratic system of government, which depended on a balanced collaboration between the Union Parliament, the Union Government and the Chief Ministers of the States, was the best method to balance regional interests.

A military putsch in the centre would almost certainly lead to the breaking away of the South and perhaps even Bengal. It would be an adventure, which would make the desired success of strengthening India’s unity doubtful from the beginning. It is difficult to imagine that a revolutionary organisation would come to power in an equal measure in all seventeen states.
Considering the vast expanse of India the chances of a rebellious military junta are small indeed.

As seen in the perspective of the seventies a dictatorship in India as an alternative to parliamentary democracy would mean impending destruction of the political unity, even if the revolutionists acted only in the centre and guaranteed the continuance of the present-day order in the states. The Times correspondent N. Maxwell (28th February 1968) considered this to be a possible development. He believed that India belonged to the "seismic zones of a military outbreak". He added, however, that a military regime would hardly be in a position to find a better solution to India's major problems. As long as the appearance of the ruin of democratic order is limited to a few state capitals, the probability of military intervention remains at a minimum. The future depends on the stability of the Centre alone.

Inhibitions for coalitions

The Congress party lost its political monopoly as the sole ruling party in 1967. This was a very new experience for the Congress politicians. It was difficult for them to change their usual practices and manner of thinking to meet the new situation. The word coalition was not to be found in the dictionary of the Congress organisation till spring 1967. That is why they did not even try to form a coalition with one of the smaller parties in the States like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, where the Congress had lost its majority and yet was the strongest party by far in the Legislative Assembly. They retired immediately into the corner as the opposition. The development which began in 1967 did not continue. Congress is again the main power of the country. The united opposition parties were able in 1967 to form governments in the States. These in some cases extended from extreme rightists to extreme leftists. This was possible because no decisions are made in the States which would affect the development of the nation, but it led to much internal
friction. It would, however, be difficult to imagine a Union Government in which the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra would have to be allied with all the other parties including the left communists, in order to gain a majority. Such a heterogeneous government would fail because of its own contradictions.

The parliamentarians in the States, who no longer agreed with the regional Congress leadership formed small Congress factions. As the motives were usually selfish and the incitement to form such small groups came from people who hoped to become ministers in this manner, these incidents were of a compromising nature. That is why the Congress government in Madhya Pradesh collapsed in 1967 summer because Chief Minister Mishra did not consider all the aspirants for ministerial offices. Seen in the context of the Union parliament such practices could lead to the suicide of Indian democracy. The Congress is faced with this problem.

No less than thirteen changes in government took place in the Indian states in the year between the February elections in 1967 and the declaration of President's Rule in West Bengal at the end of February 1968—including the Union territories. A very fluid situation has been created in most of India, because dozens of parliamentarians change their parties as if they were changing their clothes.

After the break up of the Congress Party in autumn 1969, Indira Gandhi's government was officially a minority government for some time. In reality, however, it was a veiled coalition, because it was dependent on the votes of some smaller leftist parties. This trend has been reversed by the elections of 1971.

Behind the political restlessness there is a yet profounder problem, which affects India as well as many other countries, which have been caught in the stream of modern world civilisation in the recent decades: the law of higher expectations. We have referred to this again and again in this book. When the English left India twenty-five years ago, the town and the
village were two worlds which hardly touched each other. The only thing common was the desire for freedom which Mahatma Gandhi’s teachings had instilled in them. It was only gradually that ‘freedom’ meant also the enhancement of the material position of the masses. In the initial years the progress was almost stupendous, if one looks at the production figures. Only, the individual could hardly notice it. What he wanted was not much: a cycle, a transistor, better nourishment—no ‘luxury’ at all, but normal things and often such things, like a bicycle, which are dying out in western countries. Should we always remain outcasts, millions were asking? Neither the Indian government nor the Chinese could give an answer. The law of higher expectations was opposed in both countries, which have the largest population in the world, by the law of large numbers, which many have overrated—till the miscalculations of Professor Wilhelm Fuchs, who naively considers over-large population figures to be an absolute factor of power.10

The future of Indian democracy will not be determined by the average figures of the statisticians, but by reality. Because of the growth in population, the income of individuals has increased only marginally. The problems of the Asiatic forms of government are related to the vital ratio between population and food. The major crisis, which broke out in China in 1966 after years of apparent stability, leads back to the same roots, on which the unrest in India is based. Both countries had their optimal period in the fifties, varied as their forms of government may have been. In the meantime there has been disillusionment in both countries. The future of Indian democracy will depend on the time required to overcome a stage, in which economic progress hardly affects the standard of living of the individual families. This race has been in progress within all the developing countries. It will be yet accelerated.
Twenty-three babies were born every minute in India at the beginning of the seventies: about thirty thousand daily, twelve million each year. India’s population passed the five hundred million mark in 1966 and stood around five hundred and forty million at the beginning of 1970. If the population increases at the speed it did in the past decade, then India will have a population of about a billion in the year 2000. These figures are a nightmare not only for the Indians, but for all rational and feeling people on the earth.

India has had a general census regularly every ten years for the past ninety years. Ludwig Alsdorf reckons that India’s population remained somewhat stationary until the eighteenth century at a hundred or a hundred and forty million. Epidemics and natural catastrophes restrained the natural increase for almost two thousand years. Only in this century the population curve began its steep rise. The Indian population doubled in the forty-five years from 1921 to 1966. This unhindered progress is mainly due to the decrease in the death rate which used to be very high. The birth rate has not increased very much and is by no means the highest in the world. Ceylon, the Chinese in Singapore and some Latin American countries lie far above India in this regard.

The increase of India’s population was subject to major fluctuations since the beginning of the century. The last epidemic to grip the whole of India was the influenza epidemic of 1918, which took a toll of more than eighteen million lives.
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This caused a stagnation in the population figures in the decade 1911-21. Even the famine in Bengal in 1913 is supposed to have claimed three and a half million victims. The eradication of epidemics and famines on a large scale is clearly to be seen in the population figures of the last decades.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population in millions</th>
<th>Increase in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>235.9</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>235.5</td>
<td>— 0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>249.0</td>
<td>+ 13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>248.1</td>
<td>— 0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>275.5</td>
<td>— 27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>312.8</td>
<td>— 37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>356.9</td>
<td>+ 44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>438.0</td>
<td>— 81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>515.0 (estimated)</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>540.0 (estimated)</td>
<td>102.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the decade 1951-61 the absolute rate of growth of the Indian population was twice as high as that of the previous decade. In the meantime the population has increased by more than a hundred million in nine years. The population increased by one hundred and eight million from 1961 to the next census in 1971.

The rate of growth is by no means uniform in the various regions of India, as the survey on the next page will show. These population figures are based on the census of 1961 continuing till February 1967.3

Four regions are most overpopulated: Kerala in the South and West Bengal—both centres of communism in India—and the two states on the Ganges, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which were greatly affected by the drought in 1965-66. Even the state of Tamilnadu belongs to the very thickly populated regions, but it is seen here that the rate of growth is almost the lowest.
in India. The Tamilians appear to be the only people in India who have applied effective methods of birth control.

The death rate has steadily decreased from 27 per thousand to 16 per thousand per year from 1951 to 1967. The birth rate has, however, remained the same at 10 to 41 per thousand. The absolute increase in births was about 2.5 per cent on an average at the end of the sixties. The census of 1961 showed that 41 per cent of the population were under fourteen years of age and a further 13.1 per cent between fifteen and forty-four. Almost 50 per cent of the male population were at a procreative age in 1961, and about 11 per cent of the female population were able to bear children. The sexually active population was estimated at about two hundred million in 1961. In the meantime it must

\textit{Development of India's population in the states (excluding Union Territories)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Estimated Population 1967 (in millions)</th>
<th>Density of Population per square mile</th>
<th>Percentage of annual rate of growth in Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>1127</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysore</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>24.0*</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Punjab and Haryana
have increased. It is estimated that the Indian woman gives birth to six children on an average. This explains why the rough calculation of the development of the Indian population in the past twenty years has always been far behind the actual increase of population. When I wrote my book *Die Menschenlawine* (The Avalanche of Men) in 1956 it was estimated that there would be an annual increase of five million. In 1961 the increase was estimated at eight million. In the meantime it has grown to over twelve million annually.

What has been done and what can be done? An all-India organization for Family Planning has been in existence since 1957. About 270 million rupees were spent on family planning during the Third Five-Year Plan. There were 1311 family planning centres in towns and 6785 in the rural areas. In addition almost ten thousand centres to distribute contraceptives were set up which, however, did not have a full-time staff. 172 clinicmobiles were also in operation. Sterilisation can be performed in these and in 230 hospitals and dispensaries. Colonel Raina, the Director of the Central Family Planning Institute which has been erected on the outskirts of Delhi, informed me that two million sterilisations had been performed up to the beginning of 1967. According to his estimate, 1.43 million women had got the so-called Loop (Intra-Uterine Devices or IUD) during the same period and a further four million use other contraceptives. According to the statistics of the Family Planning Institute, eight million people applied the various contraceptives available. This is a low figure when seen in the context of two hundred million people capable of procreation and child-bearing, and an ostensible effect cannot be expected immediately.

Too much was perhaps expected from the Loop. In the city of Delhi it was ascertained that eighteen per cent of the women removed the instrument after six months and that after eighteen months hardly any women wore it. This brings us to the question whether a study commission of the United Nations, which concluded in 1966, that nine million births could be hindered per
year till 1975, was not a bit too optimistic. The commission reckoned that only four million would be hindered by the loop.

In her second cabinet, Mrs. Gandhi appointed an advocate for the most radical measures in policies regarding population, S. Chandrasekhar, as Minister for Family Planning. I visited him years ago, when he was Director of the Institute for Problems on Population in Madras. At that time the radicalism with which he demanded the compulsory sterilisation of men with three children frightened me. Today I have to agree with him. Without really drastic measures this pressing problem cannot be solved. It is understandable that a democratic country does not want to interfere in the private life of its citizens. By 1967 all but three Chief Ministers were converted to Chandrasekhar's point of view. It is, however, an open question whether parliament will pass such a drastic law.

Chandrasekhar does not believe in voluntary methods after the failure of India's family planning till then. For instance, it was demanded that the marriage age for girls, which is legally sixteen years now, should be raised to twenty or even twenty-one. Such a measure would only be on paper. It is known that in the Indian villages marriages are arranged for nine-year olds, which are consummated a few years later. Even today the average marriage age for girls in Uttar Pradesh is estimated at thirteen and a half years; in enlightened Kerala, on the contrary, at nineteen. Legal measures alone will not help to grapple with the customs of the village. It is true that compulsory sterilisation will meet with resistance in all rural families where the first three children are daughters. The rural population wishes for sons, not only on religious grounds but on economic ones also. The sterilisation method demands furthermore a medical staff in order to guarantee a proper and hygenic operation. These radical methods promise more success than vague hopes that millions of people, who are still deeply anchored in traditional ideas, will comprehend the problem.
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It is for this reason that the anti-baby pills could not promise much success initially. The pill is out of the question in India for financial reasons, even if it can be manufactured more cheaply than it is today. Since the Loop appears to be a doubtful aid, there is no other way out other than sterilisation, supplemented by abortion. As is known, Japan solved its population problem in a surprisingly short time by unofficially allowing abortion. But this was at the cost of the health of the female population, and that is why the Indian government did not adopt this method till now.

It will take a long time to overcome prejudices. That is of course no excuse for the fact that the central authorities for family planning have talked a lot but achieved very little. The commission sent by the UNO in 1965 considered that at least 90,000 trained assistants were the minimum needed for family planning. In 1966 only ten thousand were available.

The growth of India’s population confronts us with almost inexplicable contradictions. Modern technology, which is based on the needs and experiences of western civilisation, cannot function without the principle of rationalisation, that means above all on the principle of work-saving machines. But India would require the opposite, that is, to employ as many people as possible. The larger the industrial unit, the smaller the ratio of human labour needed in operating the factory in question. The large steel mills, for example, provide work and food to only a relatively small percentage of the neighbouring population. The contradiction of the planning methods till now and even of foreign aid lies in the fact that with very few exceptions foreign aid has been given to the public and private sectors in order to put the Indian industry in a position to introduce the technology of the highly-developed countries. As a result a technology has been developed which is applied in countries where there is considerable capital, but a shortage of labour. No attempt has been made to adapt it to the Indian conditions—much labour, little capital. Neither the foreign advisers nor
the Indian engineers, who were trained by western or Russian instructors, were imaginative enough to adapt foreign technology to the actual situation in India. The result was a considerable investment in factories with a lot of capital, whose capacity could be used only to a limited extent because foreign exchange is needed for spare parts and other requirements. But there is a shortage of foreign exchange. The Managing Director of the steel plant at Rourkela told me that the orders of public undertakings for spare parts resembled a lottery. One never knew, which one order among the many hundreds in Delhi would be placed.

A change in this situation can be achieved only if a new kind of technology adapted to the Indian conditions in agriculture as well as industry is developed. There are meagre prospects of this happening. This contradiction, which is a result of the development of population, has to be considered when judging Indian planning on the whole.

The deficit in food
There is a clear answer to the alarming question whether India will be able to nourish its growing population in the next decades: it is possible. But a great effort has to be made. When in the middle of the sixties the Second and Third Five-Year Plans were critically examined, it was ascertained that much too little had been invested in agriculture. The reason was a certain over-optimism, which had spread a decade ago. Food production had risen after the bad harvest in 1951. In 1955 India was almost self-sufficient and had to import only 600,000 tons of grains. But after that the deficit began to increase. In 1960 it was 5.1 million tons; in 1965 7.2 million tons; in 1966 almost 11 million tons; in 1967 it was estimated at about 10 million tons. Thereafter it declined.

1965 and 1966 were years of very bad harvests. The people had to fight against the worst drought which India has experienced in this century. The import figures for these two years are not
normal. It has been seen that excessive imports disturb the structure of India’s economy. Professor Otto Schiller feels that an import of six to seven million tons is just about bearable for the development of India’s agriculture.

89 million tons of grain were harvested for the first time in the productive years 1964-65. It was reduced to 72.3 million tons in 1965-66 and rose in 1966-67 only to 76 million tons. In 1967-68 the monsoon was good, so that 95 million tons could be harvested. In 1968-69 the harvest increased to 105 million tons. This level was maintained even in 1969-70. In 1967 for the first time the record harvest was not a result of plentiful rain alone. New kinds of grains and rice had been planted on 2.5 million hectares, which made it possible not only to get an increased yield, but also to have two to three harvests by decreasing the maturing period to only 120 days. Eight million hectares were cultivated with the new seed in 1968. Production increased by 30 per cent on this area. Moreover double harvests will be made on a further three million hectares with the help of improved irrigation.

At the end of the fifties the Ford Foundation calculated that about 110 million tons of grains and rice would have to be produced by 1967-68 to provide sufficient food for India’s population. Even in the good year of 1967, grain production was below the minimum requirement, so that five million tons had to be imported for 1968. For the first time one was less dependent on the blessings of the monsoon. The hope is now more justified that the plan target made for 1972 of 120 million tons can be achieved by combined measures. This seemed improbable a few years ago. There was an ostensible breakthrough in the agricultural field in 1967. But of course India’s population has increased to over 550 million by 1971, and will increase to about 620 to 630 million by 1977. India would have to produce about 140 million tons of grain, when 500 grammes are consumed per head per day. That would mean an increase in harvest by almost half within a decade. This is by no means an
utopian target, if one succeeds along with the improved methods of cultivation in extending the area cultivated with productive seeds by eight million hectares per year. This depends, as we will see, above all, on the production of fertilisers.

**India's large reserves**

Where do we get the courage to be optimistic that one day India can nourish its growing population? The large reserves, which India had at the end of the sixties, are not lying in land not utilised till now. The Indian Ministry of Agriculture estimates that about 142 million hectares can be made arable from a total area of 327 million hectares; others estimate an arable area of 160 million hectares. 136 million hectares were utilised in 1964, of which 117.5 million hectares were cultivated with grains and rice. So the reserve of land is meagre. But the possibilities of increasing the yields per hectare on suitable soil are immense, almost immeasurable. Only sixteen quintals of rice were harvested per hectare in India in 1965; in Japan, on the contrary, it was fifty and in the United States forty-eight quintals. The Indian farmer harvested only nine quintals of wheat per hectare, the Japanese twenty-seven and the German farmer thirty-six quintals in 1967. It is the same for maize: the Indian farmer harvested ten quintals, the Japanese twenty-five and the German forty quintals.

If one could succeed in raising India's yield to even Japan's level, then there would be an increase in the harvest by about two and a half or even three. So, as regards basic food, India's population, even if it were doubled by 2000, could be adequately nourished. It remains a question of India's fate whether this will happen. There is however an encouraging indication. The total harvest of grain and rice was only 52 million tons at the beginning of the five year plans in 1951. It rose to an average of over 80 million tons in the sixties, although agricultural planning was by far the weakest point in India's planning. The record har-
vests since 1967 show that the production capacity has almost doubled in sixteen years, so long as the monsoon was good. The problem is now to reduce systematically the dependence on the monsoon.

If the major stress of planning and investment is put on agriculture in the coming decade, then it should be possible to achieve a far greater increase. This presupposes, however, that future governments of India reconcile themselves to the fact that the industrial rate of growth will stagnate for a time. This could be taken into the bargain considering that in the middle of the sixties the industrial production capacities were not fully utilised.

With mere figures we cannot solve this problem which is one of the greatest challenges for mankind today. Approximately four hundred million people lived in the villages in India in 1968. No government nor any scientific institute has a precise idea of the conditions of living, which vary tremendously. There are only estimated figures of the unemployed and under-employed in the villages. It fluctuates between ten and fifty millions. There is no doubt that the Indian village is over-populated in every part of the country and that only a very small portion of the rural economy is in a position to produce for the market. A research team of the South Asian Institute in Heidelberg, led by Kurt H. Junghans, had calculated, for example, that in 1967 in the district of the steel city Rourkela, only 14 per cent of the farmers produced enough for their own requirements for one economic year. All the other rural families depended on a side-business and could not be considered in the category of those producing for the market.6

I always visited villages in one part of India or the other during my ten visits to India. The more I saw of them, the more confusing the picture became. On the opposite side of the gruesome, devastated famine areas in Bihar are the flourishing landscapes of Punjab or Gujarat. I saw the over-populated areas in
Kerala and close to that some agricultural districts in Madras, which could not have been better in Europe. There are villages where the inhabitants think in terms of market economy, as for example the tobacco cultivators in Gujarat or the wheat-growers in Punjab. But in eastern Uttar Pradesh, on the contrary, in Bihar and even in parts of Andhra the division into castes is so hierarchic and orthodox, that it is impossible for the middle-class farmer to think in terms of market economy. The lowest castes here lived in strict seclusion from the rest of the village community, even twenty years after independence, and had hardly any chances to rise economically. This is described in a series of good monographs on Indian villages. Lily Abegg—a Swiss author—says of such regions:

It is not easy, to understand the mode of thought of the Indian farmers. The people in the West assume that every man, hence even the Indian farmer, wants to earn more. But this is not necessarily the case. To earn more than one needs is for most Indian farmers a sin. They live for today, are happy if they have money for festivities and jewellery for their wives and do not think of the morrow; for the future lies in God's hands. That is why they do not save, and there is no formation of capital. Even today only eight per cent of the rural population and fifteen per cent of the city population have put money aside. This is not because the people are too poor to save. The surplus earnings are generally only for daily needs and not to procure modern equipment or fertilisers, to get better and closer wells for the fields.

This observation is not wrong, but it cannot be generalised. From thousands of villages we can report the contrary. The caste barriers have relaxed, there are modern-minded farmers who are really interested in getting fertilisers. The study carried out by Junghans in the Rourkela area has shown clearly
that the farmers there reacted positively to economic incentives. In 1963 the vegetables for Rourkela had to be brought by the dealers from distant Patna, but in 1967 almost seventy per cent of the requirements in vegetables was covered by the region around Rourkela. The farmers began to think in terms of market economy and there were the first beginnings of formation of capital. This contradicts the legend of the hopelessly immobile Indian peasants. It depends on the conditions which are created for him. It had taken almost ten years around Rourkela until the farmers began to produce for the market. One has to be patient.

The surprising success which the German agricultural expert von Hülst could show with sixty thousand farmers in the experimental district of Mandi, is definitely not only because the farmers on the foothills of the Himalayas are more open-minded than other farmers. They were encouraged by the example. Harvests here lie far above the average. In Bihar, on the contrary, an excellent Japanese experimental farm did not have the least effect, apparently because the competent regional authorities did not offer enough support.

The experimental farms of the old style are being abandoned. A large model district was created in Mandi in 1962, where a so-called package-programme was carried out in a larger region: interdependent measures of making fertilisers, seeds and insecticides available, introducing new breeds of cattle, planting fruit, setting up a distribution organisation and educating the farmers. The Mandi-project has been extended after its excellent results to a neighbouring district and a third Indo-German regional project of agricultural development was begun in the Nilgiri Hills in West Madras in 1967. The region comprises of about a thousand square miles with 45,000 hectares of cultivated land. Seven other regions were developed in 1967 with American aid according to the package-programme principle. The Indian government is trying to start regions in
Orissa and Punjab on its own. The response by the farmers in all these regions has been very encouraging.

The Indian government had tried at the beginning of the fifties to create an organisation covering the whole country, which was to help modernising the villages, the National Extension Service. Community Development was emphasised in the first decade of India's independence. Later there were disappointments. There was a shortage of adequately educated agronomists. Gross shortcomings in planning often destroyed the work of willing agricultural assistants.

It is clear that there would be economic as well as psychological reverses when a demonstration of the advantages of fertilisers was not followed up by making sufficient seed or fertilisers available. The same is true of irrigation. It is estimated that four thousand kilometres of canals have to be built by the government for 400,000 hectares of irrigated land and sixteen thousand of side canals dug by the villages. It has often been seen that the main irrigation canals have been laid, but not the secondary canals which lead the water to the villages. It was not possible to get the village inhabitants to do this work. "In India," says Lily Abegg, "they always act democratically, without compulsion. But the apparently democratic methods are over-exaggerated. Isn't the word 'democratic' used sometimes as an excuse for a certain indolence, a weak control and too much consideration to interest groups?"10

One of the most difficult problems is the question of transport. It is said that the Indian village lies ninety-five kilometres away on an average from the nearest railway station. The Community Development Organisation, which has been criticised in other spheres so severely, at least managed to build 160,000 kilometres of new provincial roads and improved as large a number of roads during the first two five-year plans. Nevertheless the distance of the market from thousands of villages is still a great hindrance for rational cultivation.

Rural debt is also one of the unsolved problems. The Zamin-
dar who formerly controlled a number of villages as a tax-collector, has been eliminated. But the village money-lenders belonging to the bania caste who give credit for harvesting the crop and demand exorbitant interest for it, usually still exist. The agricultural credit cooperatives, which are supposed to replace the money-lender and bring a new self-consciousness in the villages, have not managed to make themselves felt as yet. In 1964 they had only twenty-one million members. A large number of the cooperatives exist on paper only. Some give credit for all kinds of non-agricultural purposes, for example for marriages, which are so important in India. More than a fourth of the amount was outstanding before the drought in 1965-66. In 1965 the banias had given 47 per cent of the total rural credits; the cooperatives, however, only ten per cent. The Indian banks founded an Agricultural Finance Corporation in autumn 1967 which was to raise a capital of a billion rupees. The nationalisation of large Indian banks in 1969 was justified with the argument that a nationalised banking system had greater possibilities to extend essentially agrarian credit. The first successes have been achieved in 1970. It will be seen whether the rural credit system finally gets a sound basis. According to the latest statistics available to us, Indian agriculture was encumbered with eleven billion rupees in 1961. 46 per cent of the debt came from domestic expenditure and only 22 per cent from capital investments in individual rural economy.\textsuperscript{11}

These are shocking figures. The village money-lender does not contribute to the productivity of rural economy. He is only called for when a purchase is unavoidable or if one has to buy food in the period between the harvests. In a comparative study on land reforms in Asia, it has been ascertained that the responsible officials in the villages in India are indifferent to the interests of the farmers and that they hardly try to awaken the self-interest of the farmers.\textsuperscript{12} This has all contributed to the stagnation of India's agriculture, against which one is fighting successfully in the 'regions', as in Mandi. The improvements in
the villages have however succeeded in increasing the production of basic food-stuffs by fifty million tons in the first twenty years after independence. In 1951 the Indian population had 13.9 ounces of grains and pulses per head per day; in 1965 it was 16.8 ounces, of which 1.5 ounces had to be imported.13

But the statistical average figures are deceptive. The Indian states are divided into deficit and surplus states. No Central Government has yet managed to bring about a balance. India had been divided into large food zones for a time in the sixties. There were such frictions from this that the last of these zones in the North East had to be discontinued in 1967. Since then the rationing of the federal reserves have been decided from state to state. The trade in grains is free only within the individual states; shipment of grains between the states can be made only by one Central Governmental organisation (Food Corporation of India). The Central Government had only the American import to balance the deficits in the individual states in the sixties.

Due to the drought in 1965 rationing was introduced in all the major cities, as well as in some industrial areas like the neighbourhood of Ranchi, Rourkela, Jamshedpur and Durgapur. The state governments avoided extending the rationing too far, because then each person would be entitled to his share. If sometimes the government is not able to meet this claim, then they have considerable political difficulties, as in Kerala, where the food situation became much worse in summer 1967 under the communist government. Three years previously the Central Government had made the solemn promise that it would supply 70-75,000 tons of rice to Kerala per month, in order to guarantee a ration of 160 grammes per head per day. The government could only provide 45,000 tons per month in summer 1967. The result was that the price of rice in Kerala shot up to three and a half rupees for 1.25 kilogrammes, whereas in neighbouring Madras it was possible for the DMK government to maintain the price level at one rupee. The average income of a
worker's family in Kerala was estimated at five rupees daily. Their requirements of rice per day is about two and a half kilos. If they have to pay seven to eight rupees it is but natural that they run into debt.¹⁴

This example—one among many—shows the true situation better than the statistics. But even this shows a frightful poverty. In 1969 the average income per year per head was 350 rupees, that is about a rupee per day. The living costs have increased in India from 100 to 180 from 1958 to the beginning of 1967. The most important factor for this rise in prices was the shortage of food, which—and this is a vicious circle—reduces even more the ability to work. Meanwhile the situation has improved considerably.

The pressing tasks
What can be done? As we saw, it is essential that the yield per hectare is increased. A long-term prerequisite for it is that the standard of education be raised in the villages. Seventy million children went to school in 1967. Yet the number of literates in the villages is half that of those in the cities. Even the most modest rural rationalisation requires a certain standard of education. The secret of Japan's progress, which cannot be repeated too many times, was the introduction of compulsory education in 1870, which was carried out completely a generation later. The Japanese agricultural reform would never have had such a surprising success if the standard of education in the village had not been relatively high. Thousands of schools cover the countryside in India.¹⁵ But it will hardly be possible to cover the village youth completely till the end of the seventies.

Apart from the expansion of rural education, irrigation and adequate artificial manuring are the two most important prerequisites to double and then treble the yield per hectare. The Egyptian irrigation system makes two harvests per year possible on a greater part of their agricultural area. In Taiwan four harvests are possible in the irrigated areas. In India only
fifteen per cent of the cultivated area brought in a double harvest in 1965, because only twenty-three per cent of the arable land was irrigated artificially. The irrigated area increased from twenty-three million hectares in 1951 to thirty-six million hectares in 1966, which is a quarter of the total artificially irrigated area on the whole earth. Yet not even half the irrigable area has been utilised, which is estimated at seventy-six million hectares—of which forty-five million could be irrigated through canalisation and a further thirty million hectares by utilising ground water. The Fourth Five-Year Plan has aimed at irrigating sixty-five million hectares. A rapid increase of doubled harvests depends on this to a large extent.

The most gloomy chapter in India's planning is the lagging behind of the production of fertilisers. Hard words can be heard on this subject among the agricultural authorities in Delhi. The total requirements of nitrogenous fertilisers were estimated at at least two million tons in 1967. The production in India amounted to only 380,000 in 1966. Only 600,000 tons, after taking imports into account, were available. Nine new factories began production of nitrogenous fertilisers by the beginning of 1968 so that the yearly capacity increased to 681,000 tons. In 1968 four more factories began production. In 1971 there should be 2.1 million tons available. The requirement till then, however, is estimated at 3.2 million tons. Even the figures in the plans are far behind actual requirements. The production capacity in phosphates amounted to 237,000 tons in 1967, whereas the demand amounted to a million tons. This target is to be achieved in home production by 1971. But Indian agricultural experts doubt whether it will be possible. After years of constant famines the international India Consortium have good reason to make further aid to India dependent on an increase of nitrogenous fertilisers to three million tons within five years. An achievable target, if one concentrates on it.

The high loss in harvests through bad storage, and because of pests and rats, is also a gloomy story. The shortage of silos
protected from rats and rotting elements leads to waste, hence India has had to import grain from the middle of the sixties. Nobody knows exactly how much is lost. The government estimates the loss at 14.5 per cent annually. The Indian agricultural expert K. Ray thinks the total loss is essentially higher and feels that it is more than the average import.\textsuperscript{18} I have been suggesting for years that the German government utilize its development aid to fight insects and rats in India. A success—which is not simple to achieve—could exceed the value of the import of American grains.

The measures briefly sketched here to increase agricultural yields in India's agriculture are of utmost importance. The Americans were no longer in a position in 1967 to ship as much grain as in the previous year (about eleven million tons). Public Law 480, which enabled the American government to make these large exports of grains since the term of Eisenhower expired in 1966. It enabled the receiving country to pay for the grain supplies in their own currency. P.L. 480 has been replaced since 1967 by Food for Freedom, which determines that the American supplies of grain has to be paid for in dollars instead of in local currency. There is a ten year period of option to repay, but the period of large American gifts has ended. The grain reserves of the USA was forty million in 1961; five years later it had shrunk to thirteen million tons. The days when the American government could fall back on almost unlimited reserves, have passed.

India and other countries which import grains have to reckon with considerable fluctuations which have occurred in the world trade of grains. Eastern Europe had exported about five million tons annually before the second world war, whereas these countries including the Soviet Union have to import considerable quantities. Asia required thirty million tons in the middle of the sixties, whereas thirty years ago it had a small surplus of two million tons. Africa had exported about a mil-
lion tons thirty years ago, but now it imports two million tons. In the same period the grain export of the Latin American countries has decreased from nine to (net) three million tons. West Europe has a rather constant import of grains of about twenty-five million tons (including maize).

The countries which export grains on a large scale are only the USA, Canada, Australia and in good years France. The world trade of rice has declined considerably in the last decade. Burma as well as South Vietnam export lesser quantities. The total world trade in rice was only six and a half million tons in 1965. The United States has decided, therefore, to increase its own production of rice by ten per cent in order to be able to export more. This could be a small relief for the countries in Asia which import rice. But the world trade in grains and rice will be reduced in relation to the increasing demand. If in years of bad harvest the Soviet Union should become an additional buyer on a large scale, then the world market will contract considerably. It is therefore a question of life and death for India to be able to cover its demand by home production.

In a poor country like India the consumption of grains is most important because of its high content of calories. The food of the Indian people is very one-sided and has to be supplemented. It is therefore doubtful whether the food aid, which was resolved by the formation of an international Grains Fund in August 1967 in Geneva, should deal mainly only with supplies of grain. This contradicts the knowledge gained in dietetics. There is a shortage of proteins. The Indian population consumes only seventy per cent of the calories of the highly developed countries and only 57 per cent of proteins. An adult needs 0.5 grammes of proteins daily per kilogramme of body weight; children, expectant mothers and those feeding their babies need considerably more. Only 8.7 grammes of high-value animal protein are consumed on an average in India daily, whereas it is 50 to 60 grammes in the highly developed countries. The Indian production of meat, fish and eggs amounts to only
ten per cent, only fifteen per cent of vegetables and only fifty per cent of milk of the quantity necessary for a balanced diet.

The holy skeletons
We now come to the serious much discussed problem of the 'holy skeletons'—the famous Indian cow—which became an embarrassing election symbol in the winter of 1966-67 when the movement against cow slaughter led to violent demonstrations. According to the census of 1961 India had 225 million heads of cattle, of that 15 million buffaloes. Of the remaining 180 million about half were oxen. Seventy million were used for breeding. Twenty million oxen were completely useless. Of the ninety million cows only ten per cent gave enough milk to be sent to the dams. It is estimated that twenty million cows were in such a bad state that they did not give any milk at all.

At least seventy million heads of cattle are superfluous and should disappear as quickly as possible. Klaus Natorp and others have made us bear in mind that the Indian cow is the bouquet factory of the poor man especially in North India where there are so few forests for cow dung is used to cook on the open fire.

Such considerations however could hardly invalidate the claim that the number of cattle has to be reduced by a third, so that they do not threaten man's nourishment. The suggestion that the Indian cows should be made barren by a mass application of the loop is good, but cannot be carried out because there are too few veterinary surgeons. This leaves the burning question, whether the Indian government will succeed in the foreseeable future to decimate the present number of cattle and to develop a rational dairy system. This is very necessary, as the milk production has remained nearly the same since 1951, though the population has increased considerably.

Natorp points to the fact that the worship of the cow in India does not date back to the Vedas. At the time when they were written between 1500 and 500 B.C. eating beef was not a sacr
Food for six hundred millions

lege in many parts of India. The cow is worshipped not in India alone. I saw the ritual dances of the Dinkas in Southern Sudan, in which they stretch their arms out to imitate the horns of the cow. But the Dinkas slaughter cattle on festive days. The Aryans who had been nomads and cattle-breeders, had apparently brought the cattle cult when they invaded Northern India. Only much later did a religious aversion to the consumption of beef develop. There is still an aversion to horse-meat in the North European cultural sphere. Millennia ago the horse was a sacred totem animal in the Germanic cultural sphere. Such archaic prejudices exist thus not in India alone. Only, here they are exaggerated grotesquely. The emaciated skeletons which eat up any straw they can get in the city or the village roused Nehru more than any one else. He pleaded for rational cattle-breeding: but unfortunately only with a minimum of success. Large dairies are to be found only near some major cities, especially Bombay. It is therefore of paramount importance that milk production be increased in the villages, where the majority is consuming vegetarian food.

The race and the spectators

The race between population growth and food for nourishment in India can be won, provided that the usual lip-service which has existed for the past two decades gives way to systematic agricultural policies. A good beginning has been made since Shastri’s period of government. The results in the agricultural sphere can never be as spectacular as those in the industrial field. That is why the agricultural experts in the Planning Commission were always only second in rank, as the Ford Foundation stated in 1959.22 It should have been clear a long time ago that India’s future role in the world depended to a large extent on whether it was able to attain self-sufficiency and to meet its agricultural demands.

If the power of India’s voice has been reduced in Asia and in the chorus of the peoples of the world, it is mainly because
the necessary steps to remove hunger and undernourishment have not been taken. For understandable reasons the Indian government avoids dramatising this problem. But the problem is dramatic. Indians with a feeling of responsibility were not inclined to ascribe the famine in Bihar in 1966-67 only to climatic conditions. S. Mulgaokar, then editor of the Hindustan Times, had severely criticised the apathy, which prevailed in Patna and in far distant Delhi on the state of affairs in Bihar. The unhappy rural population of Bihar, whose fields were exposed to erosion after two years of drought, had in addition to fight the corruption of the subordinate officials who held back the ration cards and did not raise a finger when in the villages, where untouchables resided, ten per cent of a small credit of a hundred rupees was given to the clerk in the public accounts department.

Critical observations should not hinder us, the people from the West, who hardly have an inkling of the misery of everyday life in India, from asking again, whether we have done our part in building this new common world, in which an interdependence has been created at the end of the twentieth century among all nations, which has affected us deeply, as is the case in Vietnam. We had to learn our lesson as regards development aid. Many things have gone wrong, especially in Africa. On the other hand the degree of efficiency of German aid in India was especially high. Yet when one often hears that all these efforts were in vain, it is more from a growing indifference than from despondency. Are we released from our duty to make an effort to adhere to an increase in our efforts to help nations whose own powers and resources are not adequate because of the magnitude of their problems?

Whosoever lives in the secure conditions of the West, even if it is on the lowest rung of the ladder of prosperity, will hardly be able to comprehend what caused Marx to get his Messianic dreams, when he saw in 1850 children who had to work fourteen hours. When one travels with open eyes
through India, one can understand what moved the social revolutionaries and reformers a hundred years ago in Europe. A person outside India has to ask himself whether this misery shall not affect him also, even though it is separated from him by some thousands of miles of fields.

The polarisation between the rich countries of the North and those in the South which are continually getting poorer become obvious. This is a dangerous explosive for future generations. This challenge was understood by many people in the West more than a decade ago. But now there has been a slackening, as if the problem can be solved by just speaking about it. The aid of all rich nations to the poorer ones is becoming relatively smaller. The terms of trade have continually become worse for the developing countries. Their share in world trade continues to decrease, whereas their debts increase. They were estimated at forty billion dollars in 1967. The developing countries have to provide a sum for interest, which consumes forty per cent of the annual development aid.

Internal difficulties have cropped up everywhere. One closes one's eyes to the burdens of today, because the consequences do not fall upon us like thunder and lightning, but come creeping quietly, making it all the more eerie. Sentimental deliberations are of no use here. We need prudent predictions of what really will happen to India. The mistakes which India has made is accompanied by considerable achievements, of which we in the West hardly know and speak of. Who has ever mentioned that the national income in India has almost doubled through diligence within fifteen years? The picture of a bottomless vessel does not correspond to the facts: not even in the agricultural field, as we have seen.

If India should get the feeling that the West now wants to leave her to her fate, then it will cause bitterness which the next generation will find difficult to overcome. The survival of Indian democracy cannot be controlled externally. As Barbara Ward said a decade ago, the western powers still stick to the
deceptive idea that the world economy gets regulated by itself, whereas in reality the poor people are at a disadvantage year after year because of the growing price difference between raw materials and investment goods. The setting up of a responsible social order on a world scale is not a mere Utopia. "The generally known facts," wrote Georg Picht in a remarkable book,\textsuperscript{25} "are expelled from the consciousness. The flight from reality is a reality of today, the discovery of reality is our hope."
In the first decade of this century, the British planned New Delhi as the capital of an Empire, in which power and splendour would be manifest to all. In front of the President’s residence, high above the city, are the two powerful wings of the Secretariat, red and white sandstone buildings in Moghul style. The ministries of the British Indian Government were housed there in the thirties following the transfer of the capital from uneasy Calcutta to the former imperial city. When India became independent, it had a central capital, which could easily vie with the two great Asian centres of power, Peking and Tokyo. On the Republic Day, the colourful procession of thousands of people from all corners of India moves down the avenue of triumph, which is bordered by meadows, to India Gate. Even twenty years after independence a rather thin King George V still stood on his pedestal—a strange ancestor. Only on the twentieth anniversary of India’s declaration of becoming a republic was this statue removed.

The garden city of New Delhi with its friendly avenues covered with hundreds of bungalows for the ministers, senior officials and members of parliament is far from the bustle of Old Delhi, in the midst of which one of the largest and most beautiful mosques of the Orient is to be found. Similar to Washington, New Delhi is a city of civil servants. The same peaceful silence is to be found around the Secretariat as that in the monumental governmental sector of the American capital, which seems to
lie a bit apart from this world, when a stream of clerks does not flow to the bus-stops after office hours.

Those who visited the New Delhi Secretariat in the mid-fifties got a clear impression of the transformation which has taken place in Asia. A new empire had been created, which has an important say in the policy of the great powers. Delhi with its motto of non-alignment had become the focal centre of the Third World in the shadow of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. We have already mentioned certain parallels to the America of the 19th century. Non-alignment appeared to have some similarity to the Monroe Doctrine and the policy of isolationism which the United States practised for a whole century, together with the proud and even imperious claim that no power outside the American continent should gain influence there. During this long period the United States was deeply indebted to old Europe, whose capital had financed the development of the North American continent. This situation changed only after 1917 because of the war debts of the European allies.

The Monroe Doctrine was a declaration of war against the imperialism of the former big powers, whose capital was welcome in the New World, but whose political ambitions were to be denied there. Applied to Asia, Nehru's motto of non-alignment had the same intentions. Aid without strings was the other side of the coin: the capital of the former colonial powers was needed in the period of de-colonisation, but, jealously guarding the newly-gained independence, the new nations tried to ward off any political strings attached to it.

At the beginning of the seventies the same formulas are being repeated which were made when new Asia was being established. Non-alignment continues to be the main principle of India's foreign policy, but its meaning and content have changed. The emergence of China as one of the major factors in the future development of the world has shifted the accent. A zone of fear has developed in Asia around China. China's
neighbours are deeply affected by this. Even the positions of the two super-powers were greatly influenced by China's definite entry into world politics. The cold war between the two super-powers has not really ended as yet. In Vietnam it has led indirectly to a hopeless and cruel war against one another since the middle of the sixties. But the Russian-American confrontation, which has continued for two decades, changed in the Kennedy-Johnson period partially into a concealed solidarity: both the powers had the same overwhelming interest in containing China. Their interests were restricted to the negative objective of preventing China from becoming the sole determining power in Asia. In the first years of President Nixon's regime, the emphasis of American politics changed again. An opening towards China took place which led to the somewhat sensational invitation of Nixon to Peking.

Nixon made it clear that the United States did not intend to take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This must have been alarming for Moscow, for since 1969 summer the Soviet Union has intensified its threat to contain, even to attack China. Until Nixon assumed office the Soviet Union had reason to believe that if the Sino-Soviet conflict should involve military action, the USA would maintain a neutrality which augured well for Moscow; but now the Soviet Union could no longer count on it. That is why Moscow looked with disfavour on some signs with which Washington made it clear to the Chinese that Nixon's government was very interested in a gradual relaxing of the tension existing between China and America for over twenty years. The first response from China came in April 1971, when Chou En-lai received an American table tennis team and spoke of "turning a new page in the history of both countries". In Washington many restrictions of commerce and travel have been relaxed considerably. Nevertheless, the main difficulty remains: the question of Taiwan. The American policy has leaned towards the so-called 'Two-China Policy', which has been sternly rejected by China. Therefore the question of a seat
for mainland China on the Security Council of the United Nations is still pending and cannot easily be solved.

We have already seen how the pan-Asian dreams of the early years of independence gradually faded. A deep illusionment emerged. Only a few of the proud slogans of the fifties are to be heard now when one sits in the rooms of the Secretariat facing the planners and policy-makers of Indian politics. The attempt ten years after Bandung to convene a similar conference of the Third World in Algiers failed due to the differences of opinion between Moscow and Peking, after the Soviet Union had with some hesitation claimed its right to participate. Prior to this an attempt had been made at the conference of the non-aligned powers in Belgrade in Ocober 1961 to find a substitute for the Bandung idea with the exclusion of China. Nehru participated there rather unwillingly and sceptically. A second repetition of this project promoted mostly by Tito was a mere swan song. The prime ministers of the neutral states who had gathered in Cairo restricted themselves to exercises of style. The Bandung Conference was finally resumed in Lusaka (Zambia) in September 1970. Mrs. Indira Gandhi took part in this conference but it was President Kaunda of Zambia who ran the show. The Lusaka Conference turned out mainly to be an African affair.

The heralds of pan-Asian solidarity, such as K. M. Panikkar and Sukarno, had grossly underestimated the force by which they themselves had been borne in their own countries: nationalism. This commodity imported from Europe to Asia smothered the efforts at Asian solidarity. As late as the turn of the century, nationalism in its modern form was—with the exception of Japan—almost unknown in Asia. The family, the village, the clan, the tribe, the caste, religious creed, the sects and the vernacular groups claimed the loyalty of the people. The authority of the state, if it existed at all, was far removed from these groups and clans. In its name taxes were collected
and privileges granted. The concept of national unity which reigns in Asia too today, is a very recent one.

The island Empire of Japan was the first country to accept the ideas of nationalism which wandered from Europe to the East and merged them irrevocably with its old traditions after the Meiji Reform which began in 1868. Japan’s emergence as a modern power was the starting signal for the whole of East Asia to develop a nationalist mentality. Tremendous forces were thus mobilised but at the same time Asia too had to tolerate the concurrent evil factors, which are unavoidably connected with the spread of nationalism. The fight for border territories and minorities has now become part of everyday life in Asia, as it was in Europe for a long time. The proclamation of the great principles of the Pancha Shila, the five principles of non-intervention, at the conference at Bandung\(^2\) has had no essential influence on everyday politics in Asia. India itself, a standard bearer of the Pancha Shila, lives in constant tension with its neighbours, Pakistan and China. The same applies to Cambodia, which mistrusts its neighbours Thailand and South Vietnam. At the beginning of 1970, Prince Sihanouk said frankly that Cambodia might suffer the fate of Czechoslovakia, if the American troops withdrew completely from South Vietnam. Later on he had to go to China himself as an emigrant. Even Soviet Russia no longer recognised his regime in exile.

Ceylon is burdened with the problem of its Tamil population, which is difficult to solve. The unfortunate relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan leads to constant recurring border tension. Burma has expelled its Indian minority and feels it is threatened by China. The confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia has relaxed somewhat after Sukarno’s exit. The federation between Malaysia and Singapore dissolved as a result of unconquerable distrust. Inimical feelings towards the Chinese minority, whose business efficiency provokes disfavour, are flaring up in entire South-east Asia. Only Japan and Korea have made any attempt, which was unpopular in
both countries, to bury their old quarrels; a strenuous venture, which made the capital Seoul tremble with nationalist demonstrations. India had to find its place and assert itself in this everyday life in Asia where widespread tension prevailed.

A country's foreign policy is marked by its relations with its direct neighbours. This does not hold true for the super-powers though. Their special and elevated status is due to the fact that they have nothing to fear from their neighbours. In spite of its size and population, India does not belong to this category. Ever since the new nation was formed, India's foreign policies have been dominated by the latent tension with Pakistan, and since 1959 with China also.

The confrontation with Pakistan which has continued for the past twenty years explains some individual characteristics in India's foreign policy which are otherwise difficult to understand. The fact that India hesitated to state its opinion on the revolution in Hungary in 1956 or on self-determination for the people of Germany, is due to the fact that they feared repercussions in Kashmir, where India has refused to grant a plebiscite. Even the surprisingly vehement intercession of the Indian government for the Arab point of view after the six day war in Israel in June 1967 was caused almost exclusively by its rivalry with Pakistan. Delhi wanted to show the Arabs who their true friends were in Asia, because Arab states like Jordan and Saudi Arabia had sided with Pakistan in the Security Council during and after the short Indo-Pak conflict in 1967. But the then Foreign Minister Chagla over-exaggerated the matter. One should always reckon with allergic reactions in India when Pakistan is involved in an international issue. This was again demonstrated in the late summer of 1969 when an Islamic conference met in Rabat to discuss the destruction of the Al Aksa mosque in Jerusalem. The Indian delegation, which was not invited at first and then later summoned, was finally prevented in a degrading manner from participating at the conference.
due to the manoeuvres of Pakistan and some Arab states. It was seen again that it did not pay India to woo the Arab states. Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh met with a severe reverse at Rabat, which was the beginning of the decline of his political influence.

The Indo-Pak relations have been greatly strained after the tragic events which followed the first free elections in Pakistan in December 1970. The Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had emerged as the only force in East Pakistan to reckon with. It gained 167 out of 169 seats in the National Assembly. The prospect of a leader of Pakistan with friendly intentions towards India was emerging. Sheikh Mujibur was not especially interested in the Kashmir question and had generally pleaded for a better understanding with India. Nevertheless, he was never a stooge of the Indians as he was accused of being later on. He just wanted a practical relationship between the two countries of the sub-continent.

It is not necessary to repeat here all the well-known facts which led to the nearly total destruction of East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur stuck to the Six Point Programme of the Awami League and President Yahya seemed to be prepared to concede this at a certain stage. The meeting of the National Assembly had to be postponed twice because Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose People’s Party had won a majority of seats in West Pakistan, refused to come to Dacca with his 80 deputies. Mujibur announced a campaign of civil disobedience at the beginning of March. Civil life in East Pakistan was thus nearly totally disrupted when President Yahya came to Dacca in the middle of March to have talks with Mujibur. These negotiations failed and on the night of March 25/26, the Pakistan Army began a terrible onslaught against the civilian population of East Pakistan. For weeks and even months wholesale murder and killing went on. The exact number of persons killed will never be known but neutral witnesses considered it as high as several hundred thousands.
The Indian Experiment—Key to Asia’s Future

The Pakistan Army had devastated from the start the Hindu dwellings in towns and villages. The Hindu population was stricken by panic and fled by the millions over the Indian border to West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. By the beginning of autumn 1971, more than eight million refugees had escaped into India. The Government of West Bengal and the Union Government in Delhi had to deal with an unbearable burden of human misery. No single government in the world would have been in a position to deal with such an influx of people in such a short time. In spite of all the medical assistance the Indians tried to give, cholera was spreading in certain camps as the monsoons began.

All these nearly unbelievable events strained the relationship between India and Pakistan to the utmost, nearly to the breaking point. The Indian Government sternly demanded that Pakistan should take back the refugees and pleaded with the international community to put pressure on Pakistan to give assurance of normal conditions in East Bengal so that all the refugees could return. There was much doubt that this could ever be achieved. The military government in East Pakistan was indulging in anti-Indian-propaganda and tried to unload the responsibility for the situation in East Pakistan on Indian shoulders. Foreign correspondents saw many posters "Crush India" in Dacca and other towns of East Bengal. The hatred between West Pakistan and India was worse than ever.

China—the unfriendly neighbour
The tense relations with China were created in a manner quite different from those with Pakistan. Abysmal feelings of fraternal hate do not come into consideration as regards China. We have shown in the third chapter how India’s reactions resembled more that of a cheated and disappointed lover when the Chinese raised claims to Indian territory. We have shown the one-sided reporting by the Indian Ambassador to China, Pankaj. Delhi realised only gradually that the Chinese did not
reciprocate this love towards independent India, although the Chinese hardly concealed their true feelings. This can be seen in the greetings telegram which Mao Tse-t'ung sent on 19th November 1949 in reply to the congratulations of the then General Secretary of the CPI, B. T. Ranadive, on the victory of the Chinese Communists:

The Indian people are one of the great Asian people, with a long history and a vast population; in many respects, her fate and her path to the future resemble those of China. I firmly believe that India, relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in the socialist and people's democratic family; that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind.”

(italics by the author).

The text of this very interesting telegram was published in Bombay, but the Indian government hardly paid any heed to it. India had been independent for over two years when this telegraphic correspondence took place. Mao said that India would not remain under the yoke of imperialism, if it relied on the brave Indian communists. He left no doubt that he considered independence to be only a shabby concealment of imperialism. Liu Chao-chi had indeed spoken of a 'deceptive independence' in 1950 and Mao had called Nehru a 'weak-hearted bourgeois' in the same year. Four years later Nehru was a state guest in Peking (autumn 1954) and returned with those divided feelings which we have already described. Today we know that Mao Tse-tung did not change his opinion of Nehru nor of Indian independence then. The Chinese communists were interested in getting India to recognise their occupation of
Tibet. The Indians did not realise then that this changed nothing in the far-reaching revolutionary aims of the Chinese.

Five years later India had to resign itself to the fact that even in Asia the usual laws of power politics hold true and that even in Asia there was imperialism. India was confronted by the psychological phenomenon that the secluded mentality of the ‘Celestial Empire’ continued to prevail in communist China. China had named itself Tien-Hsia—‘everything under the sky’—till 1911. Mao’s proclamation that the Chinese revolution did not begin a new chapter in the history of Asia only, but rather a new era in the history of mankind, corresponded to the old introverted notions of the Chinese. China’s relations with the outside world have been of a totally different nature for millennia than that of all other peoples to foreign countries. Beyond the borders of their empire, there were only vassals or enemies.

In the first thirty years of the 19th century the Manchu Emperors though they were already degenerated, still felt that they were the focal point of the world. The idea of a partnership of nations enjoying equal status was completely alien to the Chinese way of thinking. Till the éclat of the opium war (1840) even the ambassadors of the then European great powers were treated as emissaries of tributary states. The Chinese considered the entire outside world to consist of ‘barbarians’, who had no share in the harmonious order of the only true culture. Till the second half of the 19th century there were no Chinese diplomats and the official name of the department for external affairs at court was ‘department to control the barbarians’.

These basic ideas of the Chinese handed down through the ages combined with Mao’s revolutionary impulse of recreating mankind; they did not give way to a new conception of people enjoying equal status. A surprised Delhi had to take note of the fact that the Chinese notes at the beginning of the border dispute were scarcely different from the letters which the Chinese
viceroy Lin Tse-hsü wrote to Queen Victoria in 1839, warning her to stop the trade in opium. The Mandarin wrote to the remote ruler of the seas: "Think of what I have said. Do not hesitate to obey. Show a humble feeling for duty and a clear conception of the divine principles I have placed before you." Similar phrases written in modern terms are to be found in the letters which Chou En-lai wrote to Nehru after the flight of the Dalai Lama. Lin Tse-hsü had only a medieval operetta army, but Chou En-lai was supported by a considerably large military force.

After Mao had achieved his targets as regards India in the Himalayan war of 1962, China became for India an uncanny neighbour, about whose future designs only speculative opinions could be given. When the Chinese exploded their first atom bomb in 1964, India realised that the whole of North India was living under this threat. In June 1967 there was the added threat of the hydrogen bomb. The Americans estimated that the Chinese would have a certain number of far-ranging rockets by 1970.

India's dilemma is great. Even if India could develop its own atom bomb, it would still be at a disadvantage in comparison with China. The overpopulated Ganges valley with its numerous large cities is easy to threaten with medium range rockets from the Tibetan bases. China's central areas, however, are so far from any Indian bases, that India would be compelled to equip itself with intercontinental rockets, which would be hard to pay for, if it wanted to be on the same level with China.

For this reason the Indian government hesitated to give its decision on nuclear disarmament. Theoretically India is in the position to produce atom bombs at short notice at the plant near Bombay. The immense investments for the carrier weapons would however completely upset the five year plans which, as it is, are already undergoing a crisis.

China's increasing nuclear armament made India view the
project of an international nuclear disarmament sceptically from the beginning and also led to the fact that India did not sign the non-proliferation pact. In view of the Chinese nuclear threat, Delhi would not like to commit itself and would like to preserve its freedom of decision for the distant future. The objections which India brought forth in Geneva against the non-proliferation treaty were due to the latent Chinese threat. India stresses the point that the treaty seems to only give the nuclear powers the right to continue nuclear research unhindered and that this treaty is in no way connected with the principle of general nuclear disarmament formed by the United Nations.

China’s modern nuclear armament is only an additional threat for India. The atom bomb is a political weapon, whose potential can only be seen from the context of foreign policies of a country. We saw that Peking made no secret of the fact that the aim of China’s policies to India was a revolutionary uplift of the rural proletariat, which should then lead to the overthrow of the existing order in India. This was stated clearly during the peasant’s revolt in Naxalbari in the northern border area in Bengal, which proclaimed openly Mao’s revolution theory in summer 1967. Peking then supported the so-called Naxalites openly in the following years, who formed another communist party group of extremists mostly in Bengal but also in other Indian states.

The Chinese aims have their roots in the Chinese idea of the world. Mao had said in 1936 to the American, Edgar Snow: “It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories.” On another occasion he said that China is the palm and Nepal, Bhutan, Annam, Mongolia and Malaya the five fingers. In 1939 Mao explained in the essay ‘The Chinese revolution and the Communist Party’ that the imperialist powers had wrested a large number of tributary states from China by force. He expressly stated Korea, Taiwan, the Riukiu-Islands, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Hongkong, Annam and Macao. These facts were mentioned again in 1963 when the Chinese
raised their territorial claims against Soviet imperialism. One can see that Mao’s basic conception had not changed, that only countries which formerly were vassals to Peking in the era of expansion, should border the large Chinese Empire. After the end of the cultural revolution (1966-69) China relaxed its foreign relations with various countries. The tension with some neighbours in Asia was diminished to some extent. Even then the bad relations with India did not improve. One could observe that India remained an exceptional case within the context of China’s foreign policy. The unfriendly slogans China had used against India since 1959 were still the same in 1971.

There is for India the latent danger that its entire Northern border will be in constant unrest. In the Nagaland, numerous tribes live who would connive at attempts at infiltration. The Indian protectorate Sikkim and the kingdom of Bhutan, which is independent of India in its foreign policies, are special danger points. While Peking broke with Ne Win, also, the operation area for subversion east of the NFFA area is extending to the restless tribal regions of Burma. The Chinese have their agents in the Chan states in the eastern border area of Burma, and have kept contact with the Burmese communists, ‘the white flags’. A training camp in the Chinese province of Yunan has trained the Burmese agents for years. These strivings should not be mistaken for a desire to annex. Mao does not want to expand Chinese territory, but to get vassals in the whole Himalayan area, which would decisively reduce India’s potential in the unforeseeable future.

Pakistan is to be mentioned here, China’s only neighbour, with which Peking has maintained friendly contact even during the Cultural Revolution period. A useful alliance without illusions has been formed between China and Pakistan, which resembles Turkey’s good relations with the Soviet Union in the epoch of Kamal Atta Turk in the twenties. This was based on the fact that the Soviet powers desisted from infiltrating communists into Turkey as China has also desisted in Pakistan.
The Pakistani demand that Kashmir should be detached from India has been wholly supported by China since 1960. One could suppose that for Peking an independent Kashmir would be the most pleasant solution. Such a small state would fit in well with the conception of vassal states on the border of Sinkiang and Tibet. The general attitude of China’s foreign policy changed again to a certain extent after the period of the Cultural Revolution came to an end in 1969. China resumed now better diplomatic relations with many countries round the world. The Chinese were especially eager to assure most of their Asian neighbours that there could be no real threat from Peking concerning their national independence. Nevertheless, India remained as much an exception within the framework of this new policy, instituted by Chou En-lai, as Japan. Anti-Indian and Anti-Japanese propaganda continued to be routine in Peking. On several occasions Indira Gandhi hinted to the Government of China that India was prepared to resume and improve the relationship between the two largest countries of Asia. There has been no response at all from the Chinese side. On the contrary, the terrorist acts of the Naxalites in West Bengal got from time to time applause and ideological support from China.

India’s foreign policy has thus had to deal with a very different situation if one looks back at the ’fifties. Non-alignment is still the guiding line of Indian foreign policy, but the inner sense of this much-used and also sometimes misused conception has changed considerably. India has to keep a look-out for powers who could form a counterweight to the Sino-Pak alliance. India’s attitude towards the two super-powers has been dominated by these considerations since the beginning of the sixties.

The Soviet Union as a partner
Even during Stalin’s time Nehru and many Congress politicians considered the Soviet Union to be an example worth imitating by an under-developed country. The Soviet Union had worked
its way with its own energy and resources and with much effort to become a modern industrial power. The methods with which Stalin achieved this were, however, held suspect by the Indians. Their admiration for the Soviet Union ended when personal freedom was curbed by coercive measures. Later, after China's sudden rise, the Soviet Union—as seen from the South Asian angle—became an intermediary power between the extreme communism of Mao and the present capitalism of the United States. During Khrushchev's term of office the abolition of a number of coercive measures and repression of the political influence of the secret police followed this attitude towards the state of affairs in the world. The rise of the 'new class' of the technical intelligentsia and the advance of the bureaucratic career politicians was pleasant and encouraging to South Asia. India never shared the defensive attitude which prevailed in Europe and America during the period of the cold war. After the end of the Second World War Europe felt itself threatened by the Soviet expansion towards the west. There was no reason for similar reactions in India and the rest of South Asia. It has often been naively demanded in Europe and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany that countries like India should assess the Soviet Union on the same standards as Western Europe. Such wishes showed an ignorance of the South Asian point of view.

The admiration of many Indians for the Soviet Union was one-sided at first. Stalin and the Soviet leaders of the forties judged Gandhi, Nehru and the Congress Party in the same light as China does today. The following entry was to be found in the Soviet Encyclopaedia in Stalin's time under the word Gandhi: "A reactionary from the Bania caste, who betrayed the Indian people and claimed demagogically to be supporting Indian independence, but he only exploited religious superstition." After Gandhi was assassinated the Soviet Union was almost the only country in the world which did not condole with India. Professor Radhakrishnan who went to Moscow as ambas-
sador in 1949 was able to warm up the icy atmosphere. Only after Stalin's death was Khrushchev able to direct Russia towards the new state of affairs in the world. 

It is one of the remarkable aspects of Stalin's policies that the Soviet Union during his long rule did not have an articulate policy regarding Asia. The significant start, which People's Commissar Karachan made for a Soviet policy regarding Asia at the beginning of the twenties, came to nothing later. It is known also that Stalin never supported the Chinese communists effectively. A visible change was felt only at the end of 1955, when Khrushchev and Bulganin arrived in India on a visit after negotiations of Soviet aid had already been in progress for some time. It can be assumed that the conference in Bandung initiated it. The Soviet Union, a major power in Asia, did not want to leave Asia for only the Chinese to impose their influence. There was no better starting point for this than India, where at the time of Khrushchev's first visit the aversion towards the United States, had been strengthened by the fact that the USA had entered into a military alliance with Pakistan. During Khrushchev's first trip to India, it was decided that India would receive economic aid on a larger scale and that Soviet technicians would help to build the Bhilai Steel Plant.

We have first hand knowledge today that Mao had observed the advance of the Soviet Union into Asia suspiciously from the beginning; moreover, that it had hurt him deeply. An increased Soviet commitment to India, he thought, was aid to a potential rival, which was inconsistent with communist solidarity. Peking noted crossly that at the end of the fifties the new edition of the large Soviet Encyclopedia had a friendly appreciation of Gandhi. This annoyance, however, came into the open, much later. It is stated in the communique of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, dated 14th June 1963, in which the complaints against the Soviet Communist Party comprised twenty-five items:
The big bourgeoisie of a number of countries, which have obtained their independence recently, is, together with intensifying social contrasts within the country and within the international class-conflict, favouring the side of imperialism and professes an unpopular anti-communist and anti-revolutionary policy. This demands of the proletarian parties that they decisively fight against this reactionary policy.10

The Soviet Union soon took first place in India's foreign policy after Khrushchev succeeded in implementing a new policy towards Asia. We have already pointed to the importance of the Soviet veto regarding the Kashmir problem in the Security Council. It became a vital factor of India's foreign policy. In the meantime, however, this has been fluctuating ever since the Soviet Union stopped considering Pakistan to be a vassal state of the Americans. Moscow divided its friendship more and more equally between India and Pakistan.

From 1967 the Soviet Union began to supply arms to India along with continually intensified economic aid and gradually supplanted Great Britain from its traditional position in equipping the Indian army, navy and air force. The Indian Foreign Ministers now began to make more frequent visits to Moscow. The Indian diplomats began to systematically support the Soviet stand; above all in the controversy about its participation in the second Afro-Asian conference in Algiers in 1965. When the Chinese tried to hinder the Soviet Union from participating by all means possible, it was the Indian diplomats, who with strong arguments pleaded with the host country to invite the Soviet Union. The episode ended with the second Bandung conference being adjourned sine die and was China's first grievous defeat in the Afro-Asian world. The close contact between Delhi and Moscow during this period of hectic diplomatic activity, however, did not work out in Delhi's favour shortly thereafter during the negotiations in Tashkent,
as had happened earlier also when Khrushchev paid no attention to India during the Cuban crisis.

Soviet propaganda has increased in India year by year. The Information Department of the Soviet Embassy in Delhi provides the Indian press with sixteen press releases. The propaganda magazine Soviet Land is published with a circulation of over half a million in all the principal Indian languages. Hundreds of Soviet and communist books have been published in various Indian languages. The total expenditure of the Soviet Union for its propaganda in India was estimated to be 80 million rupees in 1965—almost twice the expenditure of the American Information Service.\(^{11}\) This keen activity has borne good fruit for the Soviet Union. Although Soviet development aid ranks only fourth after the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain, a Gallup poll in February 1966 showed that 79 per cent of the Indians asked could give information on Soviet aid, whereas only 41 per cent could for Great Britain and only 30 per cent for the Federal Republic.\(^{12}\) A new poll in 1969 showed that the popularity of the Federal Republic of Germany had improved considerably. It was next to that of the USA, even before that of the Soviet Union. Till then the Soviet Union ranked second in an enquiry on countries well disposed towards India, after USA, leaving the other countries far behind.

The undeniable successes of the Soviet Union in India made people in America and Europe think that the Russian diplomats and technicians had acted with more dexterity than their Western colleagues. Actually the Russians had also to learn the hard way, and they were not always tactful. Such was the case, for instance, when the Soviet Ambassador Benediktov, slipped up over Svetlana Stalina’s flight and was considered by the Indians in Delhi to be rather clumsy. His harsh tone made him very unpopular in the Foreign Office. The secret, why Russian mistakes are forgiven more easily than those of the Americans, is mainly because the gulf between Russians and Indians, in everyday matters, is much less. Almost every American makes
claims which are quite normal in America, but which in a poor
country often appear to be unbearable extravagances, though
even the most benevolent American hardly realises it. The
Russians are clumsier, but less demanding. So it is easy to for-
give them for being different, even if Russian experts are more
impatient with their Indian partners than the Western experts.

After Khrushchev’s downfall, Indo-Soviet relations were sub-
ject to subtle changes, as we have already observed. It was part
of Khrushchev’s nature that he impulsively committed himself
to the new friendship with Delhi, even though he did not feel shy
to criticise Indian conditions occasionally. Kosygin kept a cool
distance and step by step reduced the one-sided preference for
India over Pakistan. This change in accent was not noted all
that distinctly by the large masses, for the Indian press reported
on it only with extreme caution. But the Indian politicians
realised that the Soviet Union had begun to adopt a more neu-
tral attitude to the Kashmir issue. The Indian press spoke about
it more frankly than before after Kosygin’s visit to Delhi in
January 1968. Kashmir was not mentioned at all in the com-
muniqué issued on the occasion of this visit.

Ayub Khan visited Moscow for the third time in September
1967, when he was received by Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny
with great cordiality and was given a long-term sanction of al-
most a hundred million dollars development aid for the next
five years. The balance, which Kosygin held between India
and Pakistan, puts him in the position that he can put pres-
sure on Delhi without using harsh words over issues which appear
important for the Soviet Union. Merely a move in favour of
Pakistan suffices.

In April 1968 Kosygin paid a visit to Pakistan as the first
ruling Soviet Premier to visit that country. At first India was
still under the impression that there were no far-reaching con-
sequences as a result of the visit. But when it was known in
July that the Soviet Union had committed itself basically to
deliver arms to Pakistan, a storm broke out in Delhi, as a re-
sult of which there were serious complaints against the Soviet Union for the first time in the Indian parliament.

Unluckily, as coincidence would have it, the Indian President Zakir Husain was on a state visit to Moscow, when the news of Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan was made known. Mrs. Gandhi made a statement on 22nd July 1968, on the day parliament was reconvened, that she had protested against the Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan. She said that she had written a serious letter to Premier Kosygin. The main statement was:

"As for Pakistan's protestations of peaceful intentions, we have pointed out to the Soviet Union that in spite of the assurances given to us by the U.S. Pakistan was not inhibited in using American arms against India in the Kutch conflict, and subsequently in August 1965. The U.S. could not prevent it from so doing. In these circumstances, we cannot but view with concern this further increase of armed strength to Pakistan. The unavoidable consequence would be to accentuate tension in the sub-continent and to add to our responsibilities in regard to the defence and security of our country."

Since this date Indo-Soviet relations have undeniably entered another stage. After the Congress Party split there were debates in parliament, when the 'old' Congress reproached the government of Mrs. Gandhi for having submitted to Soviet influence and for having taken the supply of arms to Pakistan, despite that protest, too lightly. The government repudiated these reproaches. Some change was again to be observed after the events in East Pakistan in March 1971. The Soviet Union happened to be the only big power which admonished Yahiya Khan to be more cautious in his dealings with the Bengalis. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not make any direct move until the situation on the subcontinent deteriorated considerably in the summer of 1971 and the danger of war between India and
Pakistan was imminent again. In the first week of August, foreign minister Gromyko came to Delhi and a treaty of friendship was signed between India and the Soviet Union. This treaty was not a formal military alliance and its article IV mentions the traditional policy of India's non-alignment. Nevertheless, most Indian commentators considered the treaty as the end of a long period of India's foreign policy. The treaty was welcomed as a protection against any war-like move by Pakistan.

At every Indian state visit to Moscow the Soviet side has brought up the German issue. However the Indian Prime Ministers were not prepared to recognise diplomatically the regime of GDR as desired by the Soviet Union. The formula used by them was that India did not wish to obstruct a later reunification by a formal recognition of the division of Germany. Delhi adhered to this firmly. Nehru, Shastri and Indira Gandhi signed communiqués in Moscow with almost the same text, where it was explained that the fact that two German states existed could not be ignored; any attempt to change the existing boundaries would have dangerous consequences, and there was an imperative need to find a peaceful solution of the German problem by negotiations among all parties interested. This attitude adopted by Nehru in September 1961—shortly after the Berlin Wall was erected—did not change in the following years. It has to be taken into account that the Soviet Union will always make the attempt when the opportunity arises to induce India to formally recognise the regime of the GDR. The visit of the Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger to Delhi in November 1967, which went off very cordially, retarded such efforts. Foreign Minister Walter Scheel made his first visit on behalf of the government formed under Federal Chancellor Brandt in February 1970. He explained firmly that the Hallstein doctrine was no longer a basic principle of the government of the Federal Republic, but requested the Indian government not to undertake anything that would further encumber the difficult relations between the two German
The Indian Experiment—Key to Asia’s Future

states. The Indian government indicated that it would for the time being adhere to its policy of not recognising the GDR. Nevertheless, a consulate general was established by India in East Berlin in 1970. The GDR representative in Delhi has been spending a considerable amount of money for propaganda purposes for years and has tried to support its own lobby amongst members of parliament. The general public of India is mostly not very well informed that the Berlin Wall and the zone of death on the border line between the Federal Republic and the GDR is still very much a bleeding frontier, where every month young people who try to escape to the other part of Germany are shot at by GDR guards. Continued talks between East Berlin and Bonn have not changed the abnormal situation in Germany until now.

Indo-Soviet relations have become more sober since Kosygin’s term of office, but it remains a corner-stone of India’s foreign policy. The interests of both countries towards China are almost identical. The Soviet inclination to intensify economic commitments is less under Kosygin. The steel plant in Bokaro, which is at present the last major Soviet investment, requires an essentially larger expenditure on both sides than planned previously. Though Khrushchev wished to catch up with America’s immense aid gradually, his successor did not have this ambition at all. Kosygin, who thought practically, was more interested in utilising the production capacity existing in 1968 than in creating new ones. So he offered to purchase rails and railway wagons manufactured in India at the excellent factory in Madras. This is what India needs more than development aid: export of industrial products. Indo-Soviet trade increased threefold from 530 million rupees in 1953 to 1.5 billion rupees in 1967. The figures of development aid do not provide a complete picture of Soviet activity in India.

On the other hand India continued since 1966 to have violent debates on Soviet radio propaganda in Indian languages, seriously ruffling Indira Gandhi’s government. On this second line
of Soviet policy towards India was the reception the three leaders of the Moscow-oriented communist party had from Kosygin in the Soviet Embassy in Delhi. Kosygin had kept the fifth day of his visit to India free from all appointments. Only later the baffled Indian diplomats came to know that the Soviet Premier had devoted himself on this day to the comrades of the Communist Party of India. Khrushchev had avoided any contact with the comrades of the Communist Party of India during his visits to India in 1955 and 1960. Eight years later Kosygin paid less consideration to his hosts.

The great interest which the Soviet Union has had for India for almost a decade and a half has not decreased. For some years a new ambivalence of the Soviet policy towards India was to be observed when Moscow tried to better its relations with Pakistan. The treaty of friendship with India (8 August 1971) has changed the picture again. From the Soviet point of view, this treaty was also a countermove to the announcement of President Nixon’s visit to Peking.

The presence of the USA
India’s relations with the United States seem to be a reflection of the Indo-Soviet relations. It was overshadowed for a long time by the predominant figure of John Forster Dulles. He distrusted Nehru’s non-alignment policy as much as Nehru considered him to be an unbearable dogmatist. Even today one can hear the anecdotes of Dulles’ quick visit to Delhi, when the puritan American violated almost all the rules which have to be observed when appearing in the Orient. Indelatigably Dulles tried to manoeuvre India into an alliance system controlled by America. The US ambassador Chester Bowles did counter-balance him, but he could not neutralise the unpleasant atmosphere which Dulles had created.14

The atmosphere changed only with Eisenhower’s visit to Delhi in December 1959. He was greeted with ovations as a reaction to the Chinese threats. Kennedy entered office with the
firm decision that he would treat India as the key area in Asia and provide it with any possible support. Even Nehru considered Kennedy to be a new and trustworthy type of American. Kennedy sent an independent man as ambassador, the Harvard professor, J. K. Galbraith, who knew Nehru well. The visit the Prime Minister paid to Kennedy in November 1961 was disappointing, as the biographers of the President unanimously state.

Nehru arrived in Washington tired and weary and was passive to the suggestions made by Kennedy. It was the period when Nehru no longer responded to new personalities and as Arthur Schlesinger writes, followed the events only from a distance. Kennedy had communicated a proposal to Nehru via his Vice-President Johnson, which was to stimulate India, while respecting non-alignment, to a more active policy towards Asia. Nehru did not respond. Perhaps the Pakistan question was involved also. Schlesinger quotes from a letter which Galbraith wrote at this time:

"Parliament assembled a week or two ago, and during the recess two things happened: We had committed 500 million dollars in aid to India and the twelve F-101 planes to Pakistan. The ratio of questions, words, comment and emotion has been no less than ten to one in favour of the planes. Such is the current yield of the Dulles policy."

After the Chinese attack Kennedy offered India military aid also, particularly to equip the mountain divisions and to improve the radar network on the Northern boundaries. He sanctioned 200 million dollars. About 85 million dollars had been used, when after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan conflict President Johnson put an arms embargo on the whole subcontinent, which continued for two years. Pakistan is supposed to have received about 750 million dollars worth of arms from the USA from 1954 to 1965. Economic aid to India was con-
siderably increased during Kennedy’s term of office and was continued under Johnson. In the years 1960-1965 India received the vast amount of 650 million dollars annually on an average as purely economic aid from the USA. In addition there were the grain supplies, which at its climax in 1966 was almost a third of the total wheat harvest in America. The largest auxiliary fleet, which had ever travelled the seas, brought the grain from the coasts of the USA to India. At times a million tons of American wheat was discharged in Indian ports in a month.

The United States put a moral pressure on all countries participating in aid to India through the Aid-to-India Club. They made their sanction dependent on the participation of the others. Aid to India was by far the most prominent item of the national aid programme of the Federal Republic, England and Japan during 1960 and 1970, as of the USA also. America’s aid to India was almost twice that of the economic aid to Pakistan, which ranked second in America’s total aid-giving.

President Johnson did not change anything in the policies towards India which had been developed by Kennedy. Aid to India was hardly affected by the cut in foreign aid passed by the American Congress. Johnson sent Chester Bowles to India as ambassador for the second time—an American advocate who had close ties with India. However, India’s relationship with Washington developed on the same lines as was the case with Moscow. Like Kosygin, Johnson also was cooler towards India and more reserved than his predecessor. Indira Gandhi’s first visit abroad in March 1966 was to Washington and she struck up cordial relations with him. The President left no room for doubt that India would have to considerably intensify its efforts in the agricultural field, if it wanted to have more aid in large quantities from America. Later there were differences of opinion because of Vietnam and the nuclear disarmament treaty, which was being promoted impatiently in Washington. Friendly ties were established anew under President Nixon.
Foreign Minister Rogers visited Delhi shortly after the new government was sworn in. President Nixon followed him in summer 1969 on a short visit to the Indian capital. This cordiality was strained again by bitter disappointment in summer 1971, because the U.S.A. continued delivery of arms to Pakistan after the outbreak of civil war in East Bengal.

India’s reactions to the massive aid of the United States were ambivalent. Apart from the significance of the aid for the development of India’s industry there would have been a catastrophic famine in 1965-67 if America had not given wheat. India fully appreciated this. But despite that, the feeling of dependence aroused defiant feelings. It hurt the national pride. The greater the actual dependence on the United States the more the headlines proclaimed that India would need no more aid in the near future.

A decade ago America resented the psychic sensitivity of a country which received vast aid from America. Then they considered development aid—really naively—to be a kind of automat, which is fed with dollars and which emits a flow of gratitude. Only Midwest senators may still be thinking this way. The major part of the American public, however, has understood in the meantime that development aid is a far more complicated psychological process and they accept occasional disappointing reactions with lassitude.

The gap between totally different cultural spheres can never be bridged. For instance President Johnson believed he was making Indira Gandhi a particularly magnificent present, when he suggested to her during her visit to Washington that a National Science Foundation should be founded with 300 million dollars of the rupee funds resulting from the supply of wheat. This Foundation was to establish study centres and particularly elite universities for the natural sciences under Indian management and with the participation of American scientists. It can be assumed that Johnson and his advisors did not suggest this for selfish reasons. They just wanted to use the
large rupee credit, which was not being made use of, for a good purpose. However, the echo in the Indian parliament was overwhelmingly negative, because many members feared the Americans would control the cultural development of India. Indira Gandhi was in an embarrassing situation, because she had first to persuade her own parliament to accept such a generous present.

Oriental traditions in certain matters do not differ greatly from western ones. The Hindu mentality cannot believe that the American President could offer such a major foundation without ulterior political motives. The Western man considers such reactions to be ingratitude—it is only natural—but he does not realise that till recently the average Hindu had no loyalty beyond his caste, as we have shown in chapter two. As a result of this he distrusts humanitarian considerations, even if they are meant honestly. There are thus often misunderstandings. The United States are so overpoweringly mighty, that any action they take meets with initial reservations in Asia.

An institution like the Peace Corps can therefore never be overestimated, for it contributes to bring together two cultural spheres which in essence are different and to awaken an understanding for the basic traditional principles of the partner. It can only be a slow process. Perfection cannot be expected.

Even in India the Americans have taken the place of the British. But this is not the case in the purely business field. In 1967 there were more English businessmen in India than at the time of independence. Private American investment is relatively small. But this makes no difference to the fact that the prestige of the United States ranks first in India among all the peoples of the western world, whether for good or bad things. There are only emotional bonds with England, which are also becoming alien to the younger generation.

The presence of the American force in East Asia has become one of the basic problems of the recent development of the
world. America's military commitment in Vietnam has expelled the anti-colonial tradition of the United States from all minds. They played a major role during and shortly after the Second World War when Roosevelt harassed his unwilling partner Churchill by dexterous moves to bring about the dissolution of the old Empire. Two decades later the Asians considered the United States to be the only true heirs of the former colonial powers. Much has contributed to making the governments in South Vietnam, which succeeded that of President Diem, only puppet governments of the Americans. From Japan to Pakistan the internal developments in South Vietnam have intensified the resentment against America. President Nixon's attempt to end the Vietnam war and to withdraw the American troops was welcomed with sympathy. Yet the American presence in Asia is considered to be the only actual counterbalance to the growing Chinese power, since the Chinese are now in possession of hydrogen bombs.

A kind of political schizophrenia has resulted in India and Japan as also in the smaller Asiatic states from this contradiction. There is hardly any Asian who will support the actions of the Americans in Vietnam. The resistance of a small nation to superior arms arouses admiration. The bomb war was condemned unanimously. But if one asks politicians and diplomats in responsible positions in India and Japan whether they desire the unconditional withdrawal of the Americans, then the answer is: not at all. I have heard this answer often enough in Delhi and in Tokyo in the spring and autumn of 1967 and even later on. This changed only after it was clear that the United States had to withdraw totally from Vietnam.

This was formulated precisely by Li Kuan-yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, whom I met in Tokyo in March 1967. He was for a peace by negotiation in Vietnam, but added:

"Any solution has to offer the guarantee that what has happened in South Vietnam will not be repeated anywhere
else. This depends on an effective treaty, which removes the fear of the nations on the Asiatic periphery of being broken up or subjugated. Should a similar conflict flare up after the conclusion of peace, the Asiatic countries which are threatened, would prefer to have the Americans in Asia. They would have to forego their feelings and their \textit{amour propre}. There is some truth in what Senators Kennedy and Fulbright say. If they had to bear the responsibility of a solution for the Vietnam problem, then they would adopt a similar position to that of the present American government."\footnote{17}

No active Indian nor Japanese politician has ever expressed himself as clearly as this fearless Chinese socialist from Singapore. Li Kuan-yew only spoke out what responsible officials think in Delhi and Tokyo, even if they do not wish to concede the fact. How could one think differently, if one does not feel oneself in the position to take over responsibilities, in South-east Asia which go beyond the protection of one's own boundaries?

The relativity and limits of India's foreign policy in the large panorama of East Asia are caused by the difficult economic situation and the dependence on foreign aid, which will continue for some time. It has its consequences, even if a superpower is not foolish enough to attach hard political strings to its economic aid. It is not surprising therefore, that the Secretariat in Delhi sees its role more soberly than in the fifties during Nehru's period of glory. The Chinese threat and the uncertain relations with Pakistan encumber India so acutely that one does not want to commit oneself in South-east Asia.

Nehru's thoughts turned to major universal political contexts, but he neglected relations with the smaller Asian states neighbouring India. Relations with Nepal were very tense when King Mahendra deposed Prime Minister Koirala, an old friend of the Indian Congress politicians, and imprisoned him. Under
Shastri India’s foreign policy devoted itself to improve neighbourly relations with the smaller states in South-east Asia. Cordial ties were resumed with Nepal. Shastri concluded a pact with Ceylon, which tried to regulate the difficult issue of the Tamilians, which has hindered smooth relations between India and Ceylon since 1947. The Indian minority comprises of one-tenth of the population of the island. A differentiation has to be made between those Tamilians who have lived on the neighbouring islands for centuries and the million stateless persons, who emigrated in this century as workers in the plantations and tea estates. The pact concluded between Shastri and Mrs. Bandaranaike planned the resettling of half a million Tamilians in India within fifteen years. It was confirmed by Mrs. Gandhi on a visit to Colombo in September 1967. Nehru’s successors have introduced a more concrete and positive policy towards Afghanistan, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The alienation towards Indonesia, which was brought about by the influence of the Chinese, was removed after Sukarno’s fall.

Delhi is well aware of the fact that India must act cautiously in building up regional relations in Asia. As compared to the neighbouring nations India is overpoweringly vast, it has a potential that is almost incomparable, despite all its weaknesses. What was commented above on Indo-American relations is also true of India’s relations with its neighbours. Activity which is too hectic can arouse distrust easily. The question of Indian minorities in South-east Asia was never as acute as that of the Chinese, but it is yet a burden. India has promoted regional economic cooperation in recent years. The successes are not yet spectacular. India will certainly support organisations of regional economic cooperation in future. Mrs. Gandhi said during her visit to Ceylon in September 1967 that mere coexistence of the Asian neighbouring states was not enough; but she expressly rejected the taking over of military obligations.

In the whole of South-east Asia it is a public secret that all efforts to promote regional partnership—even if they are in-
tensified—will never be in a position to replace the American presence. If an American President should really concede to the demands of the neo-isolationists in Washington and withdraw from the Pacific, there would be a vacuum in Asia. That is the dilemma of America’s East Asia policies and also the dilemma of the East Asians. One has to see if this thesis will be altered when an American President visits Peking.

Theoretically this vacuum could only be filled by a truly close cooperation between India and Japan, the two vital forces beyond the Chinese sphere of influence, so that the smaller nations can feel safe. These two Asian super-powers, however, had little in common till recently. They knew each other too little. For Tokyo is as far from Delhi as Europe on the normal flight route. Japan began to take a certain economic interest in India in the second decade of the post-war period and to participate modestly in the economic aid for India (Average 1960-65: 28 million dollars). Political partnership is therefore something of recent date. India and Japan concluded a treaty in 1966 to have regular political consultations, which are to take place alternately in Delhi and Tokyo. When Morarji Desai visited Tokyo in August 1967 the Japanese showed themselves to be interested listeners, but avoided any further political obligation, even as regards the nuclear disarmament treaty, which was of equal interest for both countries. Even when Indira Gandhi visited Japan in the summer of 1969 there were no spectacular results, although Japan’s economic interest in India has been intensified.

Whereas India feels directly threatened by its Chinese neighbours, Japan is less in danger, even though the Chinese atom bomb evoked unpleasant feelings. In consideration of its important trade interests with the Chinese, the Japanese will in the long run have little inclination to enter into political commitments which would impair the unstable relations with China. Tokyo and Peking do not have diplomatic relations, but the Liao-Takasaki Treaty which became effective at the beginning of 1963, and almost takes the place of a formal trade pact.
is considered in Japan to be a possible target of Chinese blackmail if Peking wishes to work against Japanese actions regarding its foreign policy. It is true that India can support Japan in overcoming some of the resentment which arose in the years of the Second World War in those countries which were occupied. But it is still a long way to an Indo-Japanese cooperation that can fill the vacuum which would arise if the American force in East Asia is reduced.

The debate in the American Senate on the validity of the domino-theory which began between Senator Fulbright and Foreign Minister Dean Rusk from 1965 onwards, found its most eager listener in Moscow. Till then the Soviets had limited their presence in East Asia to economic aid to India and to supplying North Vietnam with arms. But the interest of the Soviet Union to fill a vacuum, if it should come about, is beginning to increase. Japan, which for a long time was considered to be a 'hopeless case' by the Soviets, is being given increasing attention and is being enticed to Siberia with large orders, which the Japanese have considered to be too risky politically till now.

One could observe in 1967, how quickly the Soviet Union took the chance to become a super-power present in the Mediterranean. A similar action could take place in East Asia, considering that no Dardanelles blocks the way from Vladivostock to the South China Sea. The Soviet Union, the largest land-force on the earth, has shown itself surprisingly to be a naval power in the Mediterranean—the first time since a Russian fleet operated in a grand style since the naval battle of Tsuschima (1905). There is nothing to indicate that Russia could expand its navy in East Asia also, for since 1915 there has been no major Japanese fleet in this area.

The Indian Ocean has become the first point of attraction for the United States as well as for the Soviet Union. Both super-powers undertake manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean more frequently. Even Chinese submarines have been seen there towards the end of the sixties.
The Soviet Union has stipulated to Pakistan that it expand the port of Gwadar, which lies near the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union appears to have a naval base directly on the Persian border in mind. Of no less importance is the fact that the Russians set up a major shipping agency in Singapore. For the time being the Soviet fleet, which was estimated to have fourteen warships and a large fleet of submarines, is based in Aden, the former base of the English fleet, where, however, there is no dry dock. No doubt the Soviet Union has tried to acquire bases on the Indian coast. The Indian government denies energetically that it has acceded to such Soviet proposals. The architects of Indian foreign policy have said more than once that any talk of a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean is erroneous. They stress the point that there is no power vacuum at all. One cannot but doubt, whether these repeated statements match up to reality. Even after Prime Minister Heath reversed to some extent Wilson’s decision of withdrawal from East of Suez, the British presence on the fringes of the Indian Ocean is quite insignificant. But, on the other hand, the activity of Soviet naval operations within the Indian Ocean is an undeniable fact and will be more so in case the Suez Canal is reopened. The Soviets have already acquired strong naval bases at the mouth of the Red Sea in Berbera (Somalia) and some other places. The border states of the Indian Ocean in Asia and Africa are not in a position to enforce a neutral zone within this crucial area where the big powers have no influence at all. In case the United States of America should totally withdraw from East Asia, a new balance of power would arise in favour of the Soviet Union and later on perhaps also in favour of China. The question of America’s presence in East Asia extends far beyond just the domino-theory. It is a basic issue of the present state of affairs among the super powers. This is very well known in Japan and in countries like Taiwan and Singapore and even—behind closed doors—in India.
Historic dimensions
Let us glance at the seventies and eighties which lie ahead of us and realise that the fatal question for India's foreign policy as well as those of the other Asiatic nations is what China will be like in the next two decades. Will the traditional policy of seclusion change? This tradition seemed to be mitigated when Chou En-lai undertook his extensive good-will-tour through Asia and Africa. Even though these trips only served to make the Chinese form of communism popular in the Third World, they were yet attempts at contact with the outside world. Nothing came of them. There was a reverse after the cultural revolution. A hate of foreigners was enkindled, which reminded one of the time of the Boxer War, together with an almost total seclusion of China again, which strangely is combined with the conviction that China is the most modern model for the rest of the world--its southern half at least. The policies of the large and small Asian powers will be determined inevitably by this Chinese phenomenon in the next decades. For a short time after the Boxer revolt, at least in the upper Chinese strata, especially the newly created intelligentsia, nobody wished to remember the xenophobia. One can hardly deny that a new epoch has begun, when China will again make contacts with the outside world after the convulsions of the cultural revolution. Even if Mao could be having semi-victories over his counterparts, it is probable that the Chinese pragmatists will gradually dominate the scene after his death. The traditional Chinese perspectives will, however, change only after a long period of time; for the youth, in the form of the Red Guards, have again been deprived of a realistic understanding of the outside world. These experiences will not fade away so quickly for India and the remaining neighbours of the Chinese.

It can nevertheless be foreseen that initially the overpoweringly strong position of the two super-powers will decrease or become more relative in the next decades. In a few decades one will have to deal with over a billion Chinese and a billion
Indians. Over-large population figures, as we have already said, are more a burden than an absolute advantage of force. It means however also that the state of affairs in Asia can be manipulated less than today. Japan, which made rapid progress because of stricter discipline, has provided an example to the vast continental peoples of what future generations in Asia have to contend with. It is hard to say whether India will succeed in taming and organising the larger masses as effectively as the disciplined island people have done.

In the twenty years after independence India has not become the battlefield of the super-powers, as many thought formerly. It forms an intermediary zone between the centres of crisis in the Middle East and Indo-China, which has been shaken only by the regional conflicts and not those of the world. Soviet and American influence have taken the place of the former British influence, though on the Indian sub-continent they don't seek disputes as long as Indian unity is preserved. This would change rapidly if India were to be so shaken by internal events that it became disunited and gave rise to a number of powerless states of secondary importance on Indian soil. A balkanized India would soon become the booty of its neighbours; Chinese influence would extend far into the Gangetic Plain. It is in the common interest of all other powers that such a development never occur.

This danger can only be forestalled, if India's democracy creates the prerequisites to maintain an all-India elite and their successors who are not bound by the regional culture of the states alone. We saw what importance is given to the language problem in this connection. The intelligentsia of India who had communicated through the medium of English can crumble between the attacks of a militant Hinduism and the communists—who till now have been strong only on a regional level—if it is not farsighted enough to maintain the mobility of the elite within the entire country. But this is not possible without a certain control of regionalism, as also all other diffuse
forces which are known in India as communalism: Bengal, India's most inflammable province, is on the threshold of being enkindled. The communists will always work to weaken the central authorities and the militant Hinduism of the Hindi-speaking area will hardly be able to harness the South, which is so different, to its wagon.

The new elite will differ from the anglicized elite during Nehru's era; it will be more Indian and in its personal way of life will not seek a synthesis with the West. But the major influences, which start from technical development, will hinder this new elite from making India shut itself off from the outside world like an introvert. Thus a new element has entered into Indian thought: the historical dimension, in a country, whose religious leaders and philosophers have only thought in aeons in immeasurable universal eras.

The historic dimension of thought is already a part of the self-identification of modern India; without it India's unity can not be maintained internally nor defended externally.

It enables a concrete discussion with foreign civilisations streaming in from the West as well as from communism. It will detach the thought prevailing till now of being one with the universe, which evoked India's distance from all historic happenings still more. The constant confrontation with the social grievances in one's own country and with forces which threaten India's unity from outside, makes this change in thought necessary. Many Indians ranking high intellectually would like to withdraw from this process and flee to a political world of formulas without substance, a tendency which is shown with almost religious fervour. But these are only running fights. They can last for a long time; that is why we speak of 'Asia's dangerous years', the epoch of transition.

The modern civilisation flowing to India has already worked as a stimulant for a new evaluation of its culture, far beyond the first generation of ingenious romanticists like Tagore. The German Indologist Hermann Goetz has observed that it needs
only a light shift of accent, to adapt technical and organisational possibilities into tradition. "Another part of tradition has been transferred to the national, the remainder is reinterpreted and distorted to serve the present requirements. The deep mental roots however remain intact and could lead to new, highly modern conceptions."  

The historic dimension of the new era, which India cannot avoid, will not lead to an Americanisation nor to communism, but as in Japan, to a new self-understanding. Strange as it may seem, the defeat of India's army by the Chinese divisions has essentially contributed to this. It accelerated the process of rethinking. The loss of face which India suffered was a stimulant also. Since this time the elite feel that the tasks, internal and external, are more concrete than ten years ago. The dispute with the militant Bengali communism can get a similar importance. Only real danger leads to a clarification of the situation.

The standards with which one has to reckon in view of the increase in population in Asia, appear to us present-day people to be fantastic. India will always belong to the major peoples who set these standards. Whether India will succeed in continuing to do this with the aid of democracy is one of the major questions of future world history.
Notes

ASIA'S SECOND GENERATION

1 Jawaharlal Nehru: *The Discovery of India*, London 1956 (4th edition); especially pages 36 ff, 44 ff.

FREEDOM AND THEREAFTER

2 Above all in Brecher, but also in Frank Morace: *Nehru*, New York 1956.
4 The marriage advertisements are usually submitted by the parents, though not mentioned in the text. Here are some examples of such advertisements from *The Hindustan Times* dated 1st October 1967 (the subcaste is printed in italics):
   Young bachelor, *Brahmin Ayer Bharadwaja Gothram*, aged 28, highly qualified mechanical engineer with lucrative occupation in West Germany coming to India early in October for selection of suitable, accomplished, pretty, educated bride below 24, prepared to be with him abroad. Father of boy in senior post.
   Educated *Saxena Dusere virgin* for Govt. Lecturer, M.Sc., age 26, drawing 390/- monthly.
   *Kanyakubja Brahmin* bachelor 32, earning Rs. 800, foreign firm Bombay, seeks matrimonial alliance with educated, accomplished, pretty girl of decent family.


This thesis has been elaborated on in detail by Selig S. Harrison: *India, the Most Dangerous Decades*, N. Y. 1960 (Madras 1965). Though Harrison occasionally makes overstatements, this book is a basic investigation of caste and language in India in its political effects. Further: Hugh Tinker: *India and Pakistan*, N. Y. second revised edition 1967; appeared also in London.


Quoted from *Indo Asia*, (Quarterly on India’s Politics, Culture and Economy), edited by Giselher Wirsing, Stuttgart, Volume 9, No. 1, 1967.


*Indo Asia*, Volume 3, 1961, p. 121. The largest number of Untouchables are to be found according to a census in 1961, in U.P. having 15.4 million, West Bengal 7 million, Bihar 6.5 million, Madras 6 million and Madhya Pradesh 4.2 million. The largest number of adivasis are in Madhya Pradesh (6.6 million) and Orissa (4.2 million).


The number of Indian school children increased from 23.5 million in 1950 to over 70 million in 1967.

A. H. Hanson: *op. cit.*, p. 533.

The sum of the development aid given to India differs in the various sources of information available. There is often no difference...
between the aid sanctioned by the helping country and the actual aid. The author could not get any reliable information on the extent to which the 91.6 billion rupees capital aid mentioned in the text has really been paid. The amount of aid given to India divided into countries as on 31st March 1967 is given below (Source: Finance Ministry of India):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Million rupees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>34,402.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including 11,295.6 worth of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grain supplies on PL 480)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>7,498.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>6,489.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,934.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,530.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,148.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,027.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>538.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>412.9</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>250.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>91,675.8</td>
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\textsuperscript{22} There were 60.5 million workers in the private sector and 9.2 millions in the public sector in 1965, (according to the Statistical Pocket Book 1966).

\textsuperscript{23} British private investments amounted to 4.8 billion rupees in 1962, (according to the Statistical Pocket Book 1966); American investments one billion and German investments 120 million. Accord-
ing to *The Hindustan Times*, (11-10-1967) approx. 615 British firms, 45 American firms and 370 German firms participated in 'joint ventures' in India from 1960-66.


26 There were only 949,000 taxable persons in India in 1966, who earned more than 3000 rupees net. The net income of 720,000 people was below 10,000 rupees. Only 110,000 persons paid taxes for an income over 15,000 rupees.


THE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON

1 Frank Moraes: *Nehru, Sunlight and Shadow*, Bombay 1964.

2 All Nehru's speeches and the quotations of China's notes in this chapter are quoted from *Indo Asia*, ibid. The original texts are to be found in the seven White Books and documents on the border issue of the Indian government, as well as in the relevant volumes of the *Peking Review*.


"Nehru said then: As regards China, it is not excluded, that the
population of this country could in 25 years increase to one billion people. What would happen then, no one knows. He believes however, that for the next fifteen years China would be absorbed in overcoming its internal problems. The Chinese are a hardworking, talented and disciplined people, who represent a potential force. But for the next fifteen to twenty years they would have enough to do in their own country. When Chou En-lai visited India two years previously, he had often told him, Nehru, that India, compared with China, was far more developed and had a better industry. He had added, that the Chinese would do their utmost to catch up with them." (Italics by G. W."

6 The article from Hung Chi (Red Flag) has been printed in Fritz Schatten: Der Konflikt Peking-Moskau, (The Conflict Peking-Moscow), Munich 1963, (Document collection).


8 Kaul: ibid., p. 340.


12 Hangen: ibid., p. 98.

13 Kaul: ibid., p. 213.


KAMARAJ—MAKER OF KINGS

1 Michael Brecher: Succession in India, London 1966, p. 27.


3 Brecher: ibid., p. 51-62.

4 Narasimhan: ibid., p. 115ff.

LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI


4 Carl Weiss: *Sukarnos tausend Inseln* (Sukarno’s thousand islands), Hamburg 1963.
5 Hangen: *ibid.*, p. 119.
7 Ludwig Alsdorf: *Vorderindien* (India), Braunschweig 1955, p. 67, and H. Beechhold: *op. cit.*, p. 79.
8 Brecher: *ibid.*, p. 159.
9 Quoted from Brecher: *ibid.*, p. 153.
17 *Christ und Welt*, 8-5-1964.
22 A precise description of the course of the campaign as seen from the Indian point of view: B. G. Verghese in six articles in *The Times of India*, 12th to 20th October 1965.


#### INDIRA GANDHI


2 Hangen: *ibid.*, p. 159ff.


6 Even in Hindi there were only 825 books on Chemistry, 676 on Physics, 470 on Engineering and 525 on technology in 1967, *The Hindustan Times*, 3-9-1967. Scientific literature in the other Indian languages is even more sparse.

7 INFA—Study on All India Literacy in *Press and Advertisers Year Book*, New Delhi 1966, p. XIII.

#### THE DEFEAT AND SPLIT OF THE CONGRESS PARTY


#### THE OPPOSITION


2 Motilal A. Jhangiani: *Jana Sanjh and Swatantra*, Bombay


4 Amaury de Riencourt: The Soul of India, London 1961, p. 395; “Jan Sangh’s potential ... is considerable, insofar as it might become a political expression of Hinduism’s enduring ethos. This atavistic Hinduism is still alive today and is likely to benefit directly from any major political upheaval that would pulverize the present westernized structure of a united India.”

5 Weekend Review, New Delhi, 28-1-1967.

6 Madhok, ibid., p. 32.

7 Ibid., p. 36.

8 Jhangiani, ibid., p. 117.

9 In Kerala 55.1 percent of the population could write in 1961. In the meantime the number has increased to 60 per cent.

10 Article 356 of the Indian Constitution reads: “If the President on receipt of a report from the governor of a state or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of a state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this constitution, the President may by proclamation assume to himself all or any of the functions of the government of the state and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the governor or anybody or authority in the state other than the legislatures of the state.”


13 Namboodiripad: ibidem, p. 312 and also Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, dated 15-6-1967: “When the Communists first came to power in Kerala in 1957, they asked the astrologers to determine the most auspicious day to start the term of office. In 1967 the same: again a morning was chosen for the swearing in, which according to the astrologers was free from evil influences.”


15 Quoted from Masani, ibid., p. 143.

16 Harrison, ibid., p. 143 gives a precise report on the communist revolt in Andhra as seen from the caste angle.

17 G.D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller: Communism in

301
The Indian Experiment—Key to Asia’s Future

India, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959, p. 559. The book gives short life-sketches of the communist leaders of India.

19 Peking Review, 14-7-1967.

WILL INDIA’S DEMOCRACY SURVIVE?

2 Detailed reports on the Mundhra affair in Bhargava, ibid., p. 71ff and Brecher: Nehru, p. 460ff.
4 Riencourt, ibid., p. 220, 256; Hugh Tinker, ibid., p. 162ff, also for the following quotation.
5 A. H. Hanson, ibid., p. 261, 268, 298. The author points out in particular the insufficient number of senior administrative officials in the states.
6 Circulation according to Press Year Book 1966.
8 The Indian Express took a surprising upswing, when in 1967 it reached a total circulation of 360,000 copies which appeared simultaneously in Bombay, Delhi and two southern states. It has overtaken The Times of India (in Bombay and Delhi: 200,000 copies) by far. The Statesman (Calcutta and Delhi) printed 152,000 copies in 1966; The Hindu (Madras) 141,000; The Hindustan Times (Delhi) and The Amrita Bazar Patrika (English in Calcutta) 114,000 each. Patriot (Delhi) which champions Krishna Menon, lags far behind with 30,000 copies.
9 Hangen, ibid., p. 130ff.
10 Wilhelm Fucks: Formeln der Macht, (Formulas of Power), Stuttgart 1965, and my own detailed criticism in Indo Asia, Volume 8/1966, p. 306-318. Wolfram Eberhard: Chinas Geschichte (China’s history), Bern 1948, points to the fact that the real reason for the downfall on the Manchu Dynasty was the immense growth of population though production conditions remained the same (p. 308).

FOOD FOR SIX HUNDRED MILLIONS

1 Alsdorf, ibid., p. 51.
Notes

5 Ford Foundation: Report on India's Food Crisis, April 1959.
10 Abegg, ibid.
12 Wolf Ladeinsky in Foreign Affairs, New York, April 1964.
14 The Hindustan Times, 8-8-1967.
15 In 1964 there were 376,619 primary schools in India, in the meantime over four hundred thousand.
16 The figures contradict themselves. In Science Reporter 1967, No. 1, page 25 a mention of 36 million hectares of irrigated land is made, on page 57 of 42 million hectares.
19 Ibid.
21 Frankfurter Allgemeine, 22-4-1967.
22 Ford Foundation, ibid.
23 Mulguokar, ibid.

ASIA'S FUTURE

2 The term Pancha Shila was used even before the conference in
Bandung in communiqués between Nehru and Chou En-lai. Even Sukarno used the term.


7 Seven (India, Indonesia, Burma, Mongolia, Ceylon Nepal Cambodia) of the twelve Asiatic countries which have diplomatic relations with China, had clashes with Peking in 1967. The crisis in China's diplomacy could be seen from the fact that on 1st October 1966 the national day was celebrated in forty of the forty-six embassies in the presence of the Ambassador; on 1st October 1967 only one Ambassador made an appearance, the Ambassador in Cairo. All the others had been called back to Peking months ago and had not been replaced.


9 Stuart R. Schram, ibid., p. 257.

10 Fritz Schatten. ibid., p. 113; also Robert S. Elegant : China's Next Phase, in Foreign Affairs, October 1967.

11 Peter Sager : Moskaus Hand in Indien, (Moscow's Hand in India), Bern 1966.


17 Li Kuan-yew expressed his views in similar words publicly at the Foreign Press Club Tokyo, on 21-3-1967, on which the Japanese Press reported.
18 On the so-called Domino-Theory—rejecting it—Thilo Bode: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 10 February 1968. But agreeing with it: *The Hindustan Times*, 6th March 1968 in a report from Singapore on the rapid spreading of subversive revolutionary forces in South East Asia: “Peking transmits instigating directives in all the languages of South East Asia and plays host to the leaders of the ‘freedom fronts’ of Malaya, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia. The Russians are by no means sad about it.”

In a letter to *Le Monde* (7th March 1968) Prince Sihanouk emphatically rejects the statement made by a correspondent of *Le Monde*, that the unrest in the province of Battambang was mainly for social reasons. He proves that the unrest has been piloted by Peking and that the “Red Khmer” weapons were received from outside. “It is absolutely clear, that Asiatic communism no longer allows us to be neutral…. We have to protect ourselves from toppling attempts, as we do not intend to die for Hanoi, Peking or even for Washington.”


Even Lin Piao’s North-South theory is essentially a projection of introverted Chinese standards to completely different conditions in remote continents. In Africa for example there is neither “North” nor “city” in Lin Piao’s sense. Detailed report in Heinrich Bechthöld: *Die Allianz mit der Armut (Chinas Revolutionsstrategie gegen Russland und Amerika)*. (The Alliance with poverty—China’s revolution strategy against Russia and America), Frieburg 1967, p. 120ff.

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