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AKṢARA

A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER

IN THE

HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Inaugural—Dissertation

zur

ERLANGUNG DER DOCTORWÜRDE

der

HOHEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN FAKULTÄT

der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

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Kiel,
MOTTO:

Pañcaviniṣṭam yad etat te proktam Brāhmaṇasattamaṃ
tathā tan na tathā c eti tad bhavān vakṣum arhali ||

"Thus Twentyfifth [of the Upaniṣadas] (i.e. akṣara) which has been described by you, O best of Brahmins, pray tell me whether it is so or whether it is not so."

MBh. XII. 318. 58.
ERRATA.

Page. Line.  
5, 2: read maitra for maitra.  
11, 6: read vādānti "vādānti.  
11, 27: insert a comma after ( anūta ).  
24, 28: read karman or yoga instead of karma or yogan.  
25, 32 " Sāṃkhya for Sāṃkhya.  
42, 40: " avyakta " āvyakta.  
43, 1: " budhyamāna " budhydmāna.  
44, 21: " a-vidyā " a-vidyā.  
44, 23: insert a comma after Viṣṇu.  
55, 14: read "itself" for "itself".  
55, 14: read "there" "there".  
55, 36: " that " "what".  
56, 16: delete semicolon.  
59, 34 read "L. Mahābhārata" "Mahābhārata".  
62, 2: read viddhi yogūn "viddhi yogan.  
63, 24: " invulnerable " "invulnerable".  
63, 26: " believed " "believed".  
66, 24: " buddhaka " buddhak.  
68, 23. " eli " eli.  
71, 7 " not " "note".  
71, 42: " tattvasaṃyūṭalāḥ " tattvasaṃyūṭalāḥ.  
76, 10: delete "and" after indentity.  
78, 19: read "from" for "for".
Page, Line.
78, 39: read "(reference)" for "(refence)".
80, 8: "differentiated" "differentiusted".
80, 11: "twentyfive" "Twentyfive".
80, 20: "Twentyfifth" "Twentififth".
80, 11: tūmbabhāvana tūmabhāvana.
94, 19: delete "the" before "more".
96, 17: "this".
97, 7: read "throughout" for "throught".
99, 27: "esa" esa.
100, 15: substitute "The views of both" for "Both".
114, 23: read "offered" for "done".
123, 27: "beings" "begins".
138, 5: delete 'the' before "Knowledge" and "not-Knowledge."
138, 36: "the" before "Bh. Gi."
141, 6: insert "second" before "Imperishable."
143, 27: read "(8)" for "(6)"
144, 15: adhibhūta adhibhūta.
145, 5: "would" "will".
146, 6: "penetrated" "penetrated".
152, 5: "their authors had" "they have."
152, 7: "to have found" "that we have."
154, 27: "need" "would".
166, 29: Upalabdhi Upalabalu.
170, 31: "moon, sun" "Moon, Sun."
175, 7: aksare aksara.
177, 4: "studied at" "visited"
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INTRODUCTION.

Translations of the Bhagavadgītā abound, and their number is constantly increasing, but not so the help for interpreting that famous text, such as Colonel Jacob’s “Concordance to the Principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā.” It is curious, indeed, that even now, more than a century after the first translations and A. W. von Schlegel’s critical edition of the Bhagavadgītā, the one work which ought to precede any translation, viz., the book on the term inology of the Gītā, has yet to be written. There exists so far but a single contribution to it, viz., Franklin Edgerton’s Paper “The meaning of Sāmkhya and Yoga,” which appeared in 1924 in Vol. XLV of the American Journal of Philology.

Accepting Prof. Schrader’s suggestion I, therefore, proposed to supply this want and began by examining what seemed to us the most puzzling of the metaphysical terms of the Gītā, viz., aksara; and the inquiry on it grew to such an extent that it has become the sole subject of this Thesis.

The following table will give an idea of the present condition of our problem. There are altogether fourteen passages in the Gītā in which the word aksara occurs. Three of these (viz., VIII. 13, X. 25, and X. 33) may be dismissed at once, because in them the meaning “letter” or “syllable” is incontestable. In the remaining eleven places (Bh. Gī. III. 15 b; VIII. 3a, 11a, 21a, XI. 18a, 37d, XII 1c, 3a; XV. 16b and d, 18b), where it may be supposed to mean a metaphysical principle or an adjective qualifying the same, it is understood as follows by the two best known Indian commentators and four European translators:—

III. 15b  The Supreme Soul (m.).  The individual soul.  The Imperishable (cause of prakṛti).

VIII. 3a  Brahman (n.).  The One of the form of the aggregate of individual souls (kṣetra-jīnasamaśṭirūpa).

11a  ”  The Immutable possessing the attributes “not-gross” etc.

21a  (Not explained.)  A liberated soul.  ” in VIII. 19 (adj. to avyakta bhāva, i.e. puruṣa in VIII. 22).

XI. 18a  Brahman (n.).  The Immutable.  Imperishable (adj.).

37d  (Not explained.)  The principle (called) the individual soul (jīvātmatvamakatvā).

XII. 1c  Brahman, the Supreme Atman.  The nature of the inner self (= the impersonal Brahman).

3a  The One presiding over the power of Illusion.  ”  Imperishable (adj.).

XV. 16b,d  The Lord’s power of Illusion.  The liberated person.  The Imperishable (the individual soul).

18b  The seed of the world-tree (i.e. the power of Illusion).  The liberated soul.  ”

The Imperishable (cause of Veda—Word). The Imperishable (cause of "Word-Brahman"). The Imperishable (cause of prakṛti).

III. 15b

The Imperishable (Vāsudeva). The Imperishable (Vāsudeva).

VIII. 3a

The Imperishable (also the Syllable Om). The Imperishable (the Abode).

The Imperishable (the Praṇava).

11a

"Ākṣara (imperishable)" (identical with āvyakta bhāva in VIII 19; adj. to āpuruṣa in VIII 22).

The Imperishable (identical with āpuruṣa in VIII 22).

21a

XI. 18a

The Imperishable. The Imperishable. The Imperishable

"" "" ""

37d

"" (the Absolute). (Vāsudeva).

XII. 1c

"" The Imperishable. (Do.)

3a

Imperishable (adj. to āpuruṣa). (the World–Soul). (the soul, individual and universal).

XV. 16b, d

The Imperishable. The Imperishable. The Imperishable.

18b
It will be seen from the above that, while the Indians feel at liberty to understand, in each case, the word in the sense in which it fits best into their own philosophical Systems, the Europeans show a certain tendency towards giving the word so far as possible one consistent meaning. But it is clear that none of them, Indian or European, has endeavoured to study the word in the light of previous and later texts, not even Deussen who, having translated sixty Upaniṣads and most of the philosophical texts of the Maññabhātāra, was best equipped for that study. The reason for this neglect is, of course, the supposed irreparable vagueness of the terminology of the Gītā.

The terminology of the Gītā is, however, not so vague as it is generally believed to be. There are certain words which are known to the Gītā as saṃjñās "technical terms," while there are others which are yet in the making. To the former class belong words like kāmam (VIII. 3), avyakta (VIII. 18), adhyātma (XI. 1), kṣetra, kṣetrajña (XIII. 2), guṇātīta (XIV. 25), āsvala (XV. 1), dvandva (XV. 5), pūruṣottama (XV. 18), sad (XVII. 26-27), a-sad (XVII. 28), sannyāsa, tvāga (XVIII. 2, 41; VI. 2), śluta-prajña (II. 55; 86), adhikvāra, adhyājña (VII. 29-30, VIII. 1-4) and many others. There are some terms which the Gītā uses in two or more technical meanings, e. g., yoga (V. 4; VI. 23; II. 48), sāmkhyā (V. 4, XVIII. 13-14), etc. Moreover, pravadunti "they declare," prāhuḥ "they say," ucayate "it is called," abhūdhita "it is named," saṃjñātam "called," smṛtam "known (in tradition)", udāhṛtam "illustrated (by people)", prathilalاه "well-known", prakta "said to be"—all such expressions which often occur in the Gītā indicate the existence of a fixed terminology to which the author had recourse. But there are also a number of words which are used in two or more meanings without there being an indication of their having had at that time any technical sense. Such terms are prakrti, guṇa, māyā, mahat brahma, svabhāva,
nirvāṇa, buddhi, param. aṣṭāna, adhiṣṭhāna, mad-bhāva, mat-sūdharmayam, aṁśa, mātra, karaṇa, sāmya, siddha, etc. It is to be noted that while expressions such as sanjñatam, proktam, prāhulh, etc. frequently accompany the words of the former class, they are not to be found in the passages where the words of the latter group occur. This shows that the Gītā had certain fixed terms at its disposal.

Was akṣara a technical term in the days of the Gītā? In III. 15, akṣara is introduced as if it were a technical term. In VIII. 3, akṣara is given as the explanation of Brahman; this shows that its meaning was considered to be less ambiguous and better fixed than that of the term Brahman. In VIII. 11, akṣara is that one "which the Veda-knowers declare". In VIII. 21, akṣara is the designation of the higher awyaktā otherwise "called" paramā gali. The Lord is said to be akṣara which is "the highest to be known" (XI. 18) and "akṣara, sad, asad, and whatever is beyond these" (XI. 37). In XII. 1, the contrast between the meditators on akṣara and on Kṛṣṇa (i.e. puṇya) is introduced as if the distinction between the two were quite well-known; the question is not whether both are objects of meditation, but it is, which of the two is better. The description of akṣara (in XII. 3) is given not because it is unknown, but because thereby the author wants to point out the difficulties that surround the akṣara-mediator (XII. 5). In XV. 16, kṣara and akṣara are contrasted (almost in the same way as in Śve. Up. I. 8) and kūṭastha is said to be the "designation" of akṣara (kūṭastho ṣkṣara ucyate). So, it is quite clear that the author of the Gītā uses the term akṣara in the unambiguous sense of a technical expression. He has inherited it from very old traditions, viz., from the traditions of the Oldest Prose and the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads.

In addition to the internal evidence that the Gītā itself supplies to us, we have ample material to recover the meaning or meanings of the metaphysical terms of this work. First of all, we have the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, to which the Gītā itself refers (XIII. 4). These are the
The Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. The terms prakṛti, māyā etc., which are not known to the Gitā as technical terms, occur not at all or rarely in these Upaniṣads, while the terms like sāṁkhyā, yoga etc., which the Gitā knows as used in more than one technical sense are known to these Upaniṣads but not as technical. For the term aksaīa, these Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads supply a good deal of information, as can be seen by referring to passages like Sve. Up. I. 8,10, Sve. Up. V. 1, and Mu. Up. II. 1. 2. The relation of aksaīa and puruṣa in the Gitā is based upon the same in these Upaniṣads. The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad in particular has rendered an important service in this respect.

The Mahābhārata philosophical texts, especially the chapters of the Mokṣadharma Section of Book XII, show the stage immediately following that of the Gitā teaching, just as the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads record the preceding one. The terms like sāṁkhyā and yoga, which have in the Gitā two or more technical meanings, have here only one, and the terms like prakṛti etc., for the exact sense of which in each verse of its occurrence in the Gitā we have to depend mainly on the context, are in the Mahābhārata fixed technical terms. The aksaīa doctrine of the Gitā has undergone a great development and in place of the one System of the Gitā, we have in the Mahābhārata at least four Schools, each of which has its own conception of aksaīa. This latter deserves to be fully examined in order to make out the sense of the term aksaīa in its later historical relations. In the course of my investigation it was found that the aksaīa-puruṣa doctrine as embodied in these (four) Mahābhārata Schools which are the descendants of the Gitā doctrine had been misunderstood, in consequence of the Gitā doctrine itself having been previously misunderstood. So the laborious task devolved on me of reconstructing as best I could the several systems of those Schools, and thus the Chapter on “Aksaīa in the Mahābhārata” in this Thesis has
come to be the largest one (though it is only the summary of a much bigger work to be published on a later occasion, if that should be desired). The Mahābhārata philosophical portions have proved to be specially useful, as they have preserved for us the history of the aksara-doctrine of the Gitā in its development prior to Saṅkara, the earliest commentator on the Gitā whose commentary is available to us.

The Brahmasūtras, though not a regular commentary on the Gitā, were intended to explain not only the Upaniṣads but also the Gitā in sūtras. So far as it agrees or seemed to agree with them. They, thus, have a right to be examined for the present inquiry. It is well-known that "api ca smayate" and similar expressions in the Sūtras refer always to the Gitā. Though the verses of the Gitā are referred to in the Sūtras only as a witness for the view of the Sūtrakāra about the Upaniṣads, and though unlike the latter, they rarely form the viṣayavākyā of an entire adhukaraṇa, the Sūtras' attempt to fix the meaning of the Upaniṣads which had greatly influenced the Gitā doctrine is really useful to us for our present purpose. The Sūtrakāra had to consider, among many others, the same terms with which we are confronted in the Gitā; avyakta (I.4.1-7, in Ka.Up.I.3.11), aksara (I.2.21-23, in Mu.Up.I.1.5-6; and I.3.10-11, in Br.Up.III.8.7-8), dhṛty (I.3.16, in Bh.Gi.XIII.6), prakṛti (I.4.23), yonı (I.4.27, in Bh.Gi. VII.6, XIV.3-4), samādhī (II.3.39, in Bh.Gi.II.44.53), para (II.3.41, III.2.11 etc., in Bh.Gi.II.59, III.19), avyakta (III.2.23), puruṣa (I.2.26)—these and many other terms have been either discussed or are used during discussion by the Sūtrakāra. Among the many useful remarks that the Sūtrakāra makes regarding the terminology concerning aksara and puruṣa, I may here point out Br. Śr.III.3.52 where he says that "Aksara and puruṣa have the same designations in common, but the application of terms in each case to either of them is to be determined by the frequency of their occurrence" (Appendix IV). But what is more important is the aksara-doctrine of the Sūtras in its relation to the puruṣa-doctrine. As one would expect from an author who lived some centuries after the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, the Gitā and the Mahābhārata, (and
the Buddhistic philosophy, we have in the Sūtras an independent view based upon these texts, revealing an age of criticism, that yet remembered the Gitā doctrine and was thus much earlier than that of Śaṅkara. When I discovered that the Sūtrakāra's akṣara-or-puruṣa doctrine was directly based upon the still unforgotten traditions of the akṣara-and-puruṣa doctrine of the Gitā (though the Sūtrakāra understands them in his own way), the difference between the Sūtrakāra's own teaching and that of his commentators appeared so great that I had to undertake an independent interpretation of the Sūtras concerned, leaving aside the question of criticizing the other interpretations. Thus, the Sūtras have given an unexpected help in settling the sense of the term akṣara in the Gitā.

In this way it will be seen that for fixing the terminology of the Gitā we have an amount of useful materials coming to our aid.

I must here note that the Gitā uses a number of expressions in place of akṣara, such as prakṛti, parā prakṛti, mahad brahmaṇa, kṣetra, yon, avyakta, brahmaṇa, ātman. A systematic account of these had to be postponed owing to the bulk that this dissertation reached already during the investigation of the term "akṣara", though almost all of these and also some of the terms for the lower Nature had to be indirectly dealt with in course of the study, not only in the light of the evidence of the Gitā but also in that of the other literature connected with the subject.

Regarding the results of my investigation I feel tempted to say with Kālidāsa: "Balavad api śikṣitā-nām ātmany apralyayānt cetalī" (Śakuntala I. 2). I confess, I really have such a feeling as regards some of the details of the interpretations I have given to the various texts. I think however, that my dissertation will show that till now we have either missed or not properly realised the significance of one very important Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy. The history of the akṣara-puruṣa conception covers a very long period of metaphysical thought definitely beginning with the
age of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣids. The view of these was confirmed and amplified by the Gitā. This led to the origin and development of the four great philosophical Schools of the Mahābhārata, including the Mahābhārata Sāṁkhya School. These, in their turn, were responsible for the establishment of the Vedanta as a system in opposition to other Systems, the earliest account of which can be said to have come down to us in the Brahmasūtras, which, henceforth, became the philosophical Text Book of all the various Branches of the Veda. If my interpretations of these texts, taken in their entirety, are not wrong, that will prove not only the importance of the aksara-puruṣa doctrine in Indian Metaphysics, but it will also explain the as yet unsolved question of the origin of the Classical Sāṁkhya, which should be ultimately traced to the Gitā theory of two Natures. Moreover, it has been here discovered that the idea of a transcendent God, as we have it in the Classical Yoga School, originated in the rejection of the Upaniṣadic identity of Jīva and Paramātman. Regarding the texts here dealt with, it is hoped, that the new interpretation given to many verses of the Gitā and the reconstruction of the Schools of the later Mahābhārata made in this work will show that this “Great Epic of India” is a much more consistent and much more useful account of the philosophical movements of those days than it has been hitherto believed to be. Lastly, it is left to the reader how far the pioneer effort made here to present an independent explanation of parts of the Brahma-sūtras is successful in its aim of discovering the original meaning of that aphoristic work.

In conclusion, it remains to be stated that I have as a rule used the Bombay edition of the Mahābhārata; wherever the Kumbhakoṇam edition was used, it has been so stated. Similarly in case of numbering the Sūtras I have followed Śaṅkara’s pāṭha; otherwise, I have made a note. A list of translations and interpretations of the various texts used by me is given overleaf. I am indebted to most of these for supplying me with a stimulating pūrva-pākaṇa on a fairly good number of passages.
Works and Articles consulted: their Abbreviations.


R. Garbe: Introduction to the Bhagavadgītā, Bombay, 1918. (IBG).


The Bhagavadgītā (Bh. Gi.).

The Brahmaśūtras (Br. Sū.).

The Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads (EMU).

The Later Mahābhārata i.e. the Mahābhārata excluding the Bhagavadgītā (L. MBh.).

The Mahābhārata (MBh.).

The Oldest Prose Upaniṣads (OPU).
CHAPTER I.

AKŚARA IN THE UPANIŚADS.

The conception of the impersonal Absolute goes back to the Rgveda: “That which is one the wise

The Impersonal speak of in various ways” (ekāṁ sad

and the Personal vibhā baludhā vadanti RV. I. 164.47) and

in the Vedas. “That one (n.) breathed by its own

power in absence of air” (ānud avālaṁ

svadhayā tad ekam—RV. X. 129. 2.). The idea of the personal

is also to be traced to the same source: “Puruṣa alone is all

this” (puruṣa ev edam sarvam—RV. X. 90. 2).

Again, the Oldest Prōse Upāniṣads know both these con-

ceptions “Across what then, pray, is the

In the Oldest Ether woven, warp and woof? (Br. Up.

Prose Upāniṣads. III. 8. 7); He said: ‘That, O Gārgī, the

Brahman-philosophers call the Immutable (akṣara). It is not course, not fine, not short, not long,

....(Br. Up. III. 8. 8). Verily, O Gārgī, at the command of

that Immutable, the sun and the moon stand separately sus-
tained (Br. Up. III. 8. 9)....Verily, O Gārgī, that Immutable

is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker,

the ununderstood understander. Other than it there is naught

that sees; other than it there is naught that hears; other than

it there is naught that thinks; other than it there is naught that

understands’ ” (Br. Up. III. 3. 11). The personal ātman also

is described in the same terms in Br. Up. III. 7. 23. About

puruṣa we read: “So much is his greatness, yet puruṣa

is greater than this, all beings are one-fourth of him;

three-fourths of him, the Immortal (ātmā) is in heaven”

(Chā. Up. III. 12. 6, RV. X. 90. 3). The puruṣa in the eye and

in the sun are mentioned in Chā. Up. I. 7. 5 and I. 6. 6. The

“Golden puruṣa” is found in Br. Up IV. 3. 11. Br. Up. also

states “I am Brahman” (I. 4. 10.) and “He who is yonder,

yonder puruṣa—I myself am he” (V. 15. 1).
Neither the Ṛgveda nor these oldest Upaniṣads feel it necessary to consider whether the final reality is personal or impersonal. The Br. Up. even ascribes personal attributes like that of ‘commanding’ (प्रवेशासा) to the impersonal ḛṣara. Both the ideas of ḛṣara and puruṣa are mentioned here independently of each other. ḛṣara is neither identified with puruṣa, nor is it lower than puruṣa. Each by itself is the highest object of human life. The direct effect of ḛṣara is the first element called Ether; and between ḛṣara and the Ether, there is no other principle.

But when we come to the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, we find as if their authors were engaged in the problem: “Are ḛṣara and puruṣa two or one? In what relation do they stand?”

The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad in one place preserves an earliest effort aimed as if at solving this problem.

Earliest Solution: It thinks it best to identify the two and of their Relation. thus to speak of अक्षरपुरुष “the Immutable [or] the Puruṣa” (Mu. Up. I.2. 13; Appendix I). The author of this passage was confronted only with the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads; he did not know the “Spiritual Dualism” contained in the “Pluralistic Dualism” of the Mahābhārata Upaniṣadas, of which we shall have to speak hereafter. He tried to answer the problem of his age: “Is the final reality personal or impersonal?” He acquiesced in simply putting the two conceptions side by side. He may have been encouraged in doing so by those who held that “This shining, immortal puruṣa who is in this earth ..........is just this ātman, this Immortal (amṛta), this Brahman, this All” (Br. Up. II. 5. 1).

But this identification did not satisfy the philosophers of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, who seem to have gone on reasoning “How could the personal and the impersonal be identified? Were they not both of them mentioned separately in the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads? If they should be kept separate, what could be their relation? Can the impersonal be
the master of the personal? No. The personal must be higher than the impersonal." This seems to have been the view prevalent during the age of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. All of them agree in placing puruṣa above aksara (Mu. Up. II. 1–2, III. 2. 8; Appendix I; Pr. Up. V. 5. 7; App. I; Śve. Up. I. 7–12, V. I; App. I). The Kaṭha Upan. says "Puruṣa is higher than avyakta" (Ka. Up. III. 11), and in Tait. Up. II. 5, we read: "Brahman is the synonym of aksara.\footnote{Aksara, a synonym of aksara.}" Such a tendency is already found in Br. Up. where ātman (who is identical with aksara in Br. Up. III. 8. 8–11) and puruṣa called "Aupaniṣada Puruṣa" are separately described in the same terms (Br. Up. III. 9. 26) and yet puruṣa is said to be the last resort (parāyaṇa) of ātman the All (Br. Up. III. 9. 10–17), and where amṛta (a synonym of aksara as in Śve. Up. I. 10) is distinguished from puruṣa because it is his devatā (Br. Up. III. 9. 10).

But though the impersonal is thus definitely said to be lower than the personal, both of them

Both eternal: both are the goals (gati, the summum bonum) goals: both vidyās. for those who desire to be free from the world (Mu. Up. III. 2. 8, I 1. 5, III 1. 1; App. I). The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (II and III) aims at teaching that both aksara and puruṣa are objects to be independently pursued by men, though those who meditate on puruṣa go beyond "the bright one" i.e. aksara (Mu. Up. III. 2. 1, App. I). The Pr. Up. says that "jīvaghnaha brahma-loka" i.e. aksara is the lower brahman and puruṣa is the higher brahman (Pr. Up. V. 2, 5–7 App. I). Aksara and puruṣa are said to be the goals respectively in Śve. Up. IV. 18, I 11. Again, the teaching of aksara as well as that of puruṣa is vidyā "the Lore" (Mu. Up. I. 1. 5, I. 2. 13, II. 1. 10, III. 2. 10). Moreover, both aksara and puruṣa are eternal and unborn (Mu. Up I 1. 6, II. 1. 2, Śve. Up. I. 9). To this conception of the impersonal, and the personal is to be traced ultimately the earliest germ of the Mahābhārata and the Classical Sāṁkhya as we shall see later on.\footnote{\textit{Aksara, a synonym of aksara.}}
But, if _aksara_ and _purusa_ are both of them "goals," both of them "Lores," and both of them eternal, why should the former be lower than the latter? The reason was more a cosmogonical one than either theological or ontological. Brahman or _aksara_ or _avyakta_ which is lower than the _purusa_ (Mu. Up. II. 1. 2; Śve. Up. I. 1. 8; Ka. Up. III. 11) is a living principle (_jivaghana_—Pr. Up. V. 5, App. I; _prajñāna-ghana_-Br. Up. IV. 5. 13; _jiva_ _āhman_ Chā. Up. VI. 3. 2, VI. 11. 1.); and both _aksara_ and _purusa_ are jointly to produce the world (Mu. Up. II. 1. 5 c–d).

How can these animate and conscious principles produce the animate, the unconscious? Here the Earher Metrical Upaniṣads contemplate on the nature of the relation between _aksara_ and _purusa_. The Śve. Up. has gone further in solving this problem than either Muṇḍaka or Praśna Upaniṣad. The Mu. Up. said that _aksara_ is the matrix, _yom_, in respect to _purusa_ (Mu. Up. III. 1. 3b), and that "the male pours seed into the female" (Mu. Up. II. 1. 5). The Śve. Up. confirms this idea of the relation (Śve. Up. I. 2; VI. 16a, V. 6), but explains it further: _aksara_ is a power of the Lord (Śve. Up. III. 3), an unborn female (I. 9); _aksara_ is the _māyā_ or _prakṛti_ and _purusa_ is the _māyin_ the possessor of _māyā_ (IV. 10); and in this respect, not in so far as it is a "goal", _aksara_ is "the ruled" and _purusa_ is "the ruler" (while the Jīva is a "not-ruler", Śve. Up. I. 8).

_Āksara_, the Power (śakti).

_Āksara_, _a dharma_ of _purusa_.

This seems to be the sense of the _higher-ness_ (paratva) of the _purusa_, and it is quite consistent with the statement that both _aksara_ and _purusa_ are eternal, that the knowledge of both is Brahmāvidyā, and that both are goals. The _paratva_ has to do with creation, not with absolution. There is a "Spiritual Dualistic Monism"; together with the _Jīva_, _aksara_ and _purusa_ form a Triad, but not three principles (Śve. Up. I. 9, 12).
With the above relation, åksara and puṇya set out to create the world. At this stage, a new conception enters the field of Indian the Earlier Metrical Philosophy. The authors of the EMU Upaniṣads. thought that the unconscious world (jada jagat) could only be produced out of an unconscious principle. They could not think that “the Ether” (ākāśa) was directly the effect of åksara, as Yājñavalkya had really believed (Br. Up. III. 8. 11; see P. 12 above). They said, the unconscious Nature is an effect born of åksara when this falls into pregnancy through puṇya (p. 14 above). This Nature is called brahaman in Mu. Up. I. 1. 8–9. The Sve. Up. says that pradhāna is the Mutable (I. 10). The Ka Up. meant the same when it placed mahān ālāmā between buddhi and āvyakta (III. 10–11, VI. 7). The Ka. Up. is the first to enumerate the principles making the world, in the form of an evolutonal series such as becomes common in later philosophy. This Nature from which the world is directly produced is inanimate, while åksara is the animate Nature. As we shall see later on, this distinction between the two Natures continues to be maintained in the Upaniṣada School during the period of the Gitā and the Mahābhārata.

There are many synonyms of åksara, which rise up during this period of the EMU. The most terms for the important of these for the history of Higher Nature. Indian Philosophy are āvyakta (Sve. Up. I. 8; Ka. Up. III. 11) and vidyā (Sve Up. V. 1, App. I); “prakṛti” may also be noted here (Sve.Up.IV. 10).

The unconscious Nature was called the brahaman which is born (Mu. Up. I. 1. 8–9), avidyā (Sve. Terms for the Up. V. 1), kṣara (Sve. Up. I. 8, 10), Lower Nature. and pradhāna (Sve.Up. I. 10). Pradhāna was so called because it was thought to be the first of the produced things. It had not become a technical term even in the days of the Mahābhārata and the Brahmasūtras where we find the word used by different schools in different meanings as it suited them. (See Ch. IV.)
The conception of the paths to reach akṣara or puruṣa has also advanced during this period. Paths leading to akṣara and puruṣa. This is clear when we contrast the simple mention of “jiñāna” and “devayāna” in the Oldest Prose Upāniṣads with the statements on the same topic in Mu. Up. III and Śye. Up. VI. 13. This shall be considered along with the teaching of the Gītā on the same subject.

If we compare the idea of akṣara in the EMU with that in the OPU, we find that, unlike the Progress during Br. Up. (III. 8.9) which makes akṣara, the EMU Period. the impersonal principle, “a ruler” or “a commander” sustaining by its command the world, the Śye. Up. definitely separates the functions of akṣara and puruṣa, and makes only the latter the ruler and sustainer. Śve. Up. I. 8 says that the Lord, akṣara and the Jīva are the ruler, the ruled and not-ruler respectively. Śve. Up. I. 9 a–b and IV. 5 state that all these three are “unborn”. Śve. Up. I. 12 explains the same three as “the inciter”, preitr, “the object of enjoyment”, bhogya, and “the enjoyer”, bhokty. The lower Nature is kṣara or pradhāna (Śve. Up. I. 10) or vyakta (Śve. Up. I. 8); it is called vyakta because the Śve. Up. which mentions akṣara as the only avyakta, does not yet know the theory of two avyaktas of the Gītā (Bh. Gî. VII. 19–21, App. I and II); but this lower Nature is not “unborn” and is not to be included in the Triad. The term “brahma” seems to have been used here for the Triad specially to distinguish it as a whole from akṣara.

Idea of Trinity or tīra either of which could be called in the Śve. Up. Brahman (n.). Though the word “brahmani” may mean a Brahman–song elsewhere, such a sense cannot be reasonably attributed to the term here. “Brahman” (Śve. Up. I. 9,12) is equivalent to “paramam brahma” in Śve. Up. I. 7. The three are tṛaya or three (Śve. Up. I. 7,9), but they form a three-fold reality called “tiṉdham brahma” (Śve. Up. I. 12). We shall see later on how the authors of the Mahābhārata (XII. 217) used this passage of the Śve. Up. to express their own idea of a Tetrad.
CHAPTER II.

AKSARA IN THE BHAGAVADGITA.

The Gita accepts the distinction between aksara and purusa, taught originally in the Earlier Metrical Upanishads. Aksara is not to be identified with purusa (Bh. Gi. VIII. 3-4, 10-11, 21-22; XII. 1-4; XV. 16-18; App. II.); purusa is beyond (para) aksara (VIII. 21-22; XV. 18; App. II); as an object of meditation and two "goals" as in as a "goal" aksara is not dependent on EMU. purusa (VIII. 11; XII. 1). The aksara-meditators may even be said to reach the purusa (Bh. Gi. XII. 4), or else those who have reached aksara or Brahman, make a further progress and reach the purusa (Bh. Gi. XVIII. 53-55; App. II). In this last point the Gita seems to develop the earlier aksara-doctrine. The Gita prefers the meditation on purusa to that on aksara, because the former is easier than the latter (Bh. Gi XII. 5). Purusa is the "presiding deity", adludaivala (VIII. 4, 22; App. II), and presides over aksara which is his "abode" dhaman (Bh. Gi. VIII. 21, 3, 11). This idea of dhaman appears originally in the Mu. Up. (III. 2. 1-4; App. I) and the Gita develops it. The word "padā" is used for "dhāman" in Bh. Gi. XV. 4 (as probably in Ka. Up. III. 11.)

One older word for aksara, used in the Gita is Brahman. It should be here pointed out that the Brahman, a Synonym of aksara. purusa with Brahman, because the latter stands for aksara which is different from and lower than purusa. Kṛṣṇa is identified with purusa, and
not with Brahman. Even Garbe finds that in reply to Arjuna's question: "What is that Brahman?" (Bh. Gi. VIII. 1), Kṛṣṇa does not say "I am that Brahman", but says that Brahman is aksara (Bh. Gi. VIII. 3; App. II). It would have been better if Garbe had accepted as genuine this position of the Gītā Brahman as regards the relations of Brahman VIII. or aksara and purusa, as he actually found it in the Gītā itself. In Bh. Gi. XIV. 26–27, purusa or Kṛṣṇa who is identified with purusa is stated to be the foundation, pratiṣṭhā, of Brahman or aksara. If we accept this statement of the Gītā that Kṛṣṇa or purusa is different from aksara or Brahman, we can clearly understand the teaching of the Gītā. Bh. Gi. VI. 27–29 explains the method of dhyāna as applied to Brahman (the word "ātman" was also used in those days for aksara or Brahman, as in Mu. Up. II. 2. 3–5, see App. I), and the same is said also of Kṛṣṇa i.e. purusa in VI. 30–32. Bh. Gi. VI. 27–32 is no interpolation, because it does not say that "Kṛṣṇa is Brahman "; it distinguishes the two and only teaches the same method as to the attainment of both. In Bh. Gi. VIII. 1–4 Brahman is explained as aksara, and purusa or Kṛṣṇa as the adhudaivata; the adhyayāña (VIII. 4c–d) is not "an answer by Kṛṣṇa regarding himself "; it refers to the Yaṣña-philosophy of the Gītā according to which every act of a man is a yaṣña and every man is the purusa. That the purusa mentioned in VIII. 4b is "the answer by Kṛṣṇa regarding himself" can be easily seen by a glance at VIII. 5–14 which verses speak of Kṛṣṇa as if he were identified with purusa. Kṛṣṇa's being pratiṣṭhā "the foundation " of Brahman (XIV. 26–27) means that purusa is the adhudaivata of aksara. (VIII. 3–4): Kṛṣṇa is identified with purusa, not with "the God ", or "a demi-god ", or "the Impersonal". In XVIII. 50–53, 54–55, Kṛṣṇa is not identified with Brahman; but it is said that after reaching Brahman one can by further development reach purusa who is higher than aksara.
Vāsudevaḥ sarvam (Bh. Gī. VIII. 19, XI. 40) is not different from puruṣa ev edam sarvam (RV. X. 90. 2). Similarly, the other verses of the seventh Adhyāya of the Gitā will be explained without any difficulty, if we accept the Gitā's own words that puruṣa is higher than aksara, and if we remember that this puruṣa is the Apaniṣada puruṣa, and that according to the Gitā both of them are "goals" to be reached by the same methods. In Bh. Gī. X. 12; XI. 18, 17; VII. 19; XI. 40 it is not that the re-editor has not "shrunked from asserting out and out the identity of Kṛṣṇa with Brahman" (Garbe, IBG, p. 7) as he had done in Bh. Gī. VIII. 1-4; but Kṛṣṇa is here said to be both Brahman or aksara and puruṣa (X. 12; XI. 18; XI. 37-38); similarly he is also Vāyu, Yama, etc. etc. (XI. 39). When in the famous Rg-verse the one Being is identified with Agni, Varuṇa, Indra, etc., or when in Nārada's prayer in MBh. XII. 338, Nārāyaṇa is said to be Puruṣa (8), Pradhāna (12), Sacrifice (67), Pāñcarātrika (67), Sāmkhya, Yoga (78) etc., we should suppose that each of these passages was composed at different periods part by part as the different identifications arose, if we accept Prof. Garbe's explanation of Bh. Gī. X 12 etc. A comparison of Bh. Gī. V. 14–17 with V. 18–26 will show that they teach the attainment of puruṣa and Brahman respectively through the same means viz., the path of Yoga; in V. 19 Brahman is said to be free from faults and impartial, while the same is said of prabhu, the Lord, in V. 14, as distinguished from the Yogas following the path of puruṣa, who dedicate their intellect and mind, and devote themselves to puruṣa or prabhu (17), the Yogas following the path of aksara are here taught to turn their mind inward and find pleasure and peace and light within themselves (24 a–b, 21 lb.). One can dedicate all his actions to Brahman (IV. 24, V. 10) or to puruṣa (IX. 16). Bh. Gī. IV. 35 and VI. 30 say that one can see all beings in Kṛṣṇa or puruṣa and vice versa; the same is said of
"aksara or ātman in VI. 28–29 where the word ātman is used for Brahman. In fact, there are two "goals": aksara or Brahman and puruṣa or Kṛṣṇa; and there are many paths to attain either of the two. If the Gītā offers any teaching regarding these two, it is that the two are never to be identified. Both can be reached by the same means, as said in XII. 1 and therefore the Gītā is against their identification. All the so-called Vedantic interpolations assumed by Prof. Garbe can be understood as genuine parts of the Gītā if we accept the Gītā's View untenable.

Prof. Garbe's own view regarding the relation of aksara and puruṣa. Kṛṣṇa is puruṣa, not aksara. This can be easily seen if we contrast the Gītā with the Pāñcarātra texts of the Mahābhārata (see Ch. III) or with the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

Though, as a goal aksara is independent of puruṣa, in the process of creation this is not the case. The Gītā's doctrine of aksara as one of the two goals is the same as that of the EMU. What the Gītā particularly seems to contribute to the philosophy of those days is its teaching about aksara as a partner of the puruṣa in the act of creation, and this was done by distinguishing aksara from the unconscious Nature or brahman of Mu. Up. I. 1. 9. Let us therefore briefly notice the Gītā's contrast of the higher Nature with the lower one. Aksara is here also a conscious living Nature (VII. 5; cetanā in XIII. 6) as in Pr. Up. V. 5 (see p. 13) and the upholding (dhṛty) of the world is here also one of its functions (Bh. Gī. XIII. 6; VII. 5; Br. Up. III. 8. 9; Br. Sū. I. 3. 10, 16). For this reason it would not be accepted as the direct cause of the world. So aksara is in the Gītā the cause of brahman "the lower Nature", as in the "Munḍaka Upanisad (Bh. Gī. III. 15; Mu. Up. 1. 1. 9); and this lower Nature becomes (through activity or karmā) the
cause of the creation (III. 15; App. II). This relation of aksara and this brahman is the same as that in Mu. Up. I. 1. 9 i.e. the latter is "born" of the former. Aksara may be called para prakṛti, and the brahman aparā prakṛti (VII. 4–5); in contrast with the latter which is called brahman (III. 15) aksara may be called mahād brahman (XIV. 3). The higher Nature may be called the sanātana avyakta or aksara (VIII. 20–21); the lower Nature is avyakta technically so called (VIII. 18; XIII. 5; App. II).

Synonyms of aksara.

Gitā’s Theory of two avyaktas or two prakṛtis.

The union of the higher Nature and the puruṣa leads to the birth of "all beings" (VII. 6, XIV. 3; XIII. 26) Aksara is called also kṣetra (XIII. 6, 26) or simply prakṛti (XIII. 19) and is eternal (anādi or sanātana, as in VIII. 20) like puruṣa (XIII 19). The Gitā associates the three guṇas only with the lower Nature (III. 27, etc.), and "karma" activity is the latter’s special attribute (III. 15). Māyā in here the lower Nature (Cf. III. 27 with VII. 14–15). But though the Gitā thus makes a minute distinction between the lower Nature, the higher Nature and the puruṣa, it should be noticed that these three are not enumerated in the Gitā as three principles; the lower Nature is twice said to be the effect of aksara (III. 15, IX. 7–10), but the higher Nature is eternal like puruṣa as we saw above, and the relation of these last two may not have been considered by the Gitā to be really more than that of dharmadhammabhāva.

The Higher Nature, eternal.

The Lower Nature, a Material Principle.

Difference between the Gitā and the L. MBh.

This is clear from the statement that even the aksara-worshippers, in a sense, reach the puruṣa.

Unlike the Śve. Up. (I. 8) and Ka. Up. (III. 11) the Gitā knows two avyaktas (VIII. 18–20, XIII. 5), and while the Śve. Up. understood kṣara to mean pradhāna and explained kṣara as vyakta; the Gitā says that kṣara consists of "all beings" (Bh. Gi. VIII. 18–19;
VIII. 4; III. 14–15; XV. 16) and that “all manifestations” vyaktis arise from the lower Unmanifest which is lower than the higher or “eternal” anyaṅkta called aksara (VIII. 18–21). Equally important with the mention of these two anyaṅktas is that of two prakṛtis in the Gitā, while the Śve. Up. (IV. 10) knew only one principle called prakṛti which is the higher one of the Gitā. These two anyaṅktas and two prakṛtis were the chief points round which, as we shall see in the next Chapter, the Mahābhārata philosophers centred their discussions.

Of greater historical worth than its contribution to the metaphysics of the day, was the Gitā’s ethical and religious teaching. This was its doctrine about the three great paths of absoluition: the sāṁkhya, the yoga, and the upāsanā or the bhakti paths. The Gitā says that aksara or puruṣa can be reached by any one of the many paths.

The Three Great Paths of the Gitā. (Bh. Gi. IV. 11, 25–30; IX. 15). Bh. Gi. XIII. 24–25 gives the names of these as dhyānayoga, sāṁkhya-yoga, karmayoga, and the path of pure upāsanā i.e. upāsanā not accompanied by knowledge. The first three are also mentioned under the names of dhyāna, jñāna and karmaphalalayāga in Bh. Gi. XII. 12. The three paths of bhakti, jñāna and kārman are also to be found in Bh. Gi. IX. 13–14, 15 and 16 respectively. The path of devotion is preached throughout the Gitā (XIII. 25; IV. 10; VII. 16; IX. 13–14, 32–33; XII. 1–2; XVIII. 55). The path of complete self-surrender and divine grace may have been meant in XVIII. 62, 64–66 and XI. 47–48, though the Gitā does not seem to distinguish it from the path of devotion, in the way it distinguishes between sāṁkhya and yoga or jñāna and kārman. Each of these is not exclusive of the rest, but one particular idea is prominent in each. Dhyāna may have been helpful to all those who aspired after liberation.

Here we are concerned chiefly with sāṁkhya and yoga. These terms occur only once in Śve. Up. viz., VI. 13, where the context shows that they are names of paths to reach the goal; there is no word to indicate that they stand there for philosophical schools of those names; on the contrary it seems that in the Śve. Up. they are less sharply contrasted with each
other than in the Gītā. That the Gītā knows these terms only as paths can be proved from the fact that Arjuna is asked to follow either of the two paths sāṁkhyā and yoga (II. 39; III. 3; V. 1–5; VI. 1–2, XIII. 24; XVIII. 1, 49–55, 56). If sāṁkhyā and yoga had been two schools of those names at that time, the author of the Gītā who belonged to neither of these but to the Apaniśada School, would not have asked Arjuna to follow either of these. Sāṁkhyā is a synonym for sannyāsa (V. 1–5; VI. 2; XVIII.1; XVIII. 50–55) or jñāna (III.3; IX. 15; XII. 12, XVIII. 50–55); and yoga means the path of action, the more complete name being karmayoga (III. 3; V. 1–2, 4–5; XIII 24d; XIII. le; XVIII. 56). If these terms had any other signification at that time, who could have profited by these explanations assigned to them in the Gītā?

I should here draw attention to the necessity of rendering "sāṁkhyā" in the Gītā by "renunciation" rather than by "knowledge". The origin of the sāṁkhyā path is to be traced to the belief in jñāna or vidyā as a means for absolution; and this word "jñāna" was originally used to imply renunciation of actions though the latter may have meant only sacrificial actions. "Avidyā" meant sacrificial rites (K. Up. II. 4–5; Cf. Mu. Up. I. 2. 8), and vidyā the Apaniśadic knowledge in contrast to these; when the term parā vidyā was used for the latter, apana vidyā was used for the former, as in Mu. Up. I. 1. 4. where vidyā is contrasted with the Vedic rites. But the contrast between these two careers for life (āśīthā) is brought out most clearly in Mu. Up. 1. 2. Avidyā (in Mu. Up. 1. 2. 9a) is explained as karmam in "Yat karmiṇah....." (Mu. Up. I. 2. 9c); and so the life of begging, bhaikṣacaryā (Mu. Up. I. 2. 11.), stands for vidyā. This passage of Mu. Up. is a record of the later form of a conflict between the followers of the Vedic path of actions and those of "renuncia-
tion of those actions" called jñāna, such as we read of in Chā. Up. V. 10 which uses the term "pāthas" for the two paths (Chā. Up. V. 10. 8.), characterises them as "light" and "smoke" (Chā. Up. V. 10. 1 and 3) and calls them "devayāna" and "pitryāṇa" (Chā. Up. V. 10. 2, 4). The same two paths are described in Ka. Up. 1. 3. The words "in the forest" (aranye-Chā. Up. V. 1. 1) and "the life of begging" (bhaktacayā-Mu. Up. I. 2. 11) are indicative of "renunciation" sannyāsa, a word not known to these earlier Upaniṣads and therefore not to be expected therein. This latter term came into vogue for the first time in the days of the Gītā, which uses both the terms jñāna and sannyāsa as synonyms (Bh. Gī. III. 4, V. 1–2). In the Gītā, karman inclusive of jñāna or karmayoga or yoga, as it is often called, is not unaccompanied by knowledge, as it was the case with the path of "karman" in the earlier Upaniṣads. Bh. Gī. II. 53 says that the sthulaprajñā described in II. 54–72 is a follower of the yoga and a glance at his picture will show that he lacks no knowledge. Bh. Gī. III. 3–4 will show that sāmkhya is primarily concerned with sannyāsa, and yoga with action, while neither is particularly a path of knowledge. Whenever Arjuna is asked to perform the actions of his life, he is advised to do so after having attained knowledge (IV. 15). The illustration of Janaka as follower of the path of karman proves the same (III. 20). Karman or yoga by itself attains the same fruit as sāmkhya or sannyāsa (V. 4–5). Instead of jñāna, sannyāsa is opposed to karma or yogan in V. 1–2 and other places. It is well known that the predecessor of Śaṅkara, had explained jñānakarmasamuccaya to be yoga, jñāna plus the teaching of the Gītā. If the Gītā karman opposed pure action (i.e. action without knowledge) to knowledge or renunciation and said that either of the two leads to the same goal, one fails to understand how it could teach such a doctrine. When the Gītā sometimes uses the term jñāna in place of the clearer term sannyāsa, it does so because it retains the older usage of the term while it admits or probably employs for the first time
the new expression. All these points show, that in the Gitā, sāmkhya is an equivalent of sannyāsa, Śāmkhya, jñāna i.e. jñānasamuccita-sannyāsa, just as plus sannyāsa. yoga is one of karmān i.e. jñānasamuccita-karman. Lastly, if we look to the L.MBh. we find that the Śāmkhya is specially associated with asceticism, and, as I shall show later on, the L.MBh. Yoga has its own metaphysical theories (Ch. III), which could not have developed if yoga in the Gitā had meant actions without knowledge. For these reasons, I believe, it would be more accurate to explain the term sāmkhya in the Gitā as renunciation than as knowledge (Bh. Gi. III. 4; V. 1–2). In the Gitā “knowledge” does not imply renunciation (Prof. Edgerton, AJP. XLV, 1924), but it is renunciation itself. In the Gitā sāmkhya differs from the yoga only so far as this renunciation of actions is concerned. There is hardly any other point of difference between the two paths, so far as the Gitā is concerned. The association of sāmkhya with renunciation is not incidental but inherent (Edgerton, AJP p. 32). To say otherwise is to deprive the Gitā of its special contribution to the Indian religion and ethics.

The above discussion as regards the meanings of sāmkhya and yoga shows that when the Gitā says: “Sāmkhya and yoga are one” (V. 5c–d), it means that both are independent paths to either of the two “goals” of the Gitā, aksara and puruṣa. A confusion has arisen regarding the meaning of this and similar statements in the Gitā, because such statements are also made with regard to the Śāmkhya and Yoga Schools of the L. MBh. and the Classical ones. It seems that at each of these three periods in Indian Philosophy, the saying about the unity or identity of the two had quite different meanings and therefore we must interpret it always with reference to the context.

Identity of Goals, not of Paths. The Gitā explains it in the words: “The same place (i.e. aksara or puruṣa) as is reached by the sāmkhya-followers is also reached by the yoga-followers” (V. 5 a–b), and “One who has
properly resorted to either of the two, gains the fruit of both” (V. 4 c–d). They are not two steps on the same path as Śaṅkara believes, nor does it mean that “the same system is both Śāmkhya and Yoga, the system being double but the teaching being identical,” as Prof. Hopkins holds. As we have seen, the path of sannyāsa accompanied by knowledge was already known before the Gitā was written, though under the names of bhāikṣaṇya etc., and the path of actions not accompanied by knowledge was also well known (Mu. Up. I. 2. 9–11). The Gitā was the first to put forth systematically a third path viz., the path of actions accompanied by knowledge and in doing so said that the first and the last are the only paths, the middle one being considered fit to be condemned (Bh. Gī. II. 41–45 and Mu. Up. I. 2. 1–9); and that out of the remaining two the latter was preferable (II. 40; III. 4; V. 2; VI. 1–2).

But the Gitā as we have it before us betrays more than the knowledge of sāṃkhyā as a mere path. Though the expression “guna–sāṃkhyāṇa” cannot in itself suggest any reference to sāṃkhyā as a school, because “the discrimination of the three constituents” seems to have originated in the Apanḍiṣṭa School (of the Gitā) and to have been adopted later on by all the philosophical schools that followed it; yet “sāṃkhye kṛtānte” (Bl. Gī. XVIII. 13) is the one undoubted reference in the Gitā to a philosophical school of the name of sāṃkhyā which could not be directly described as a darsana or śāstra but only as the “sāṃkhyā in which the teaching is settled” (kṛtānte-siddhānta). This expression, though not implying a complete system of philosophy, as is shown by its contents, goes against Prof. Edgerton’s view that nowhere in the Gitā, the sāṃkhyā has to do with the discussion of philosophical truth (AJP. Vol. XLV, 1924). The followers of the path of sāṃkhyā believed that “all action” belonged to prakṛti, the
lower Nature, as did also the followers of *yoga* and *bhakti*. But a few of the former who seem to have differed on the point, held that the individual soul is one of the five agents (XVIII. 15). While the Gitā as a whole objected to attributing any agency, *karta*va, to the individual soul, these *śāṅkhyā*-separatists, as we may aptly call them, objected to attributing the whole agency to the individual soul. Both the followers of *śāṅkhyā* and the *śāṅkhyā*-separatists must have accepted *aṅgara* and *puruṣa* as the "goals"—the then prevailing conceptions of *sumnum bonum*. The belief that the individual soul is an agent must have been originally the reason why the Śāṅkhya-followers insisted upon *sannyāsa*. Bh. Gi. XVIII. 12–16 only shows that some of the followers of the *śāṅkhyā*-path of the Gitā had begun to take interest in philosophical discussions, especially in that on the origin of *karta*va, the most burning question of the time when the Gitā was written. These *śāṅkhyā*-separatists seem to have survived in the form of the later Mahābhārata Śāṅkhayas, who also held that the Atman has two technical meanings of "yoga", in the Gitā.

Survival of that View in L. MBh. Ch. III. But the *śāṅkhyā*-followers of the Gitā seem to have merged into the Aupanṣada School of the Mahābhārata, the question of *sannyāsa* having probably come to rest by the doctrine of the four *aśramas* or stages of life of which the Gitā knows little. Thus, as regards the Gitā, not only is the *śāṅkhyā* to be understood as *brahmavidyā* (Dahlmann, Nirvāṇa, P. 165), but even *yoga* and *bhakti* or *upāsanā* are also *brahmavidyā* or rather we should say, all the three are paths to *brahmavidyā*, because in the Gitā as in the EMU, the *brahmavidyā* deals with *aṅgara* and *puruṣa*, and *śāṅkhyā, yoga*, and *bhakti* are means to it.

Regarding *yoga*, the reader may be reminded that the Gitā knows two technical meanings of the term, viz., "karmayoga" and "dhyāna-yoga", both of which had no special metaphysical doctrines of their own (except that the "goal" was *aṅgara* or *puruṣa*). In the days of
the later Mahābhārata, they reach the status of philosophical Schools, as also do the sāmkhya-followers.

The Gītā's path of bhakti, upāsanā, gracc or complete self-surrender (Bh. Gī. XI. 47–48; XVIII. 65–66; IX. 26; X. 9) arose from an earlier movement (Śve. Up. VI. 18, 23; Mu. Up. III. 2. 3–4). In the Gītā, bhakti leads to aksara or to āpuruṣa (see "bhaktā" in Bh. Gī. XII. 1) because upāsanā is not yet completely separated from bhakti. But this upāsanā or bhakti is according to the Gītā "one-minded" (VIII. 22, IX. 22; XI. 54; IX. 30), and that of the personal āpuruṣa is preferable because it is easier than that of the impersonal aksara (XII. 5).

The point to be noticed most of all is that the Apaniṣadas of the Gītā admit the alternative of aksara and āpuruṣa, so that the Gītā has only one Apaniṣada School, and not two. Moreover the sāmkhya-yoga- and bhakti-paths of the Gītā do not discuss what are the final principles, what is their number, and how they are mutually related. These and other problems are attempted for the first time in the later Mahābhārata. Thus, the Gītā has only one philosophical school with three paths.

Lastly, if it be asked, whether there was a re-edition of the "original" Gītā, I would venture to suggest that at first the Gītā taught the sāmkhya and yoga paths to reach aksara or āpuruṣa, and afterwards the path of bhakti was added to these. We have already seen that the path of pure karmā and that of pure jñāna which must have arisen from the Vedas-—Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads respectively, were supplanted by the Gītā's teaching about yoga i.e. jñānakurmasamuccaya. This latter may have been in course supplemented by the path of bhakti, which also admitted the possibility of a compromise between pure action or karmā and pure knowledge or sannyāsa (see Bh. Gī. V. 29; IX. 24, 27; cf. also the performance of sacrifices in the L.MBh.
Pāñcarātra School). And this was incorporated into the Gītā as a third alternative career (nṛṣṭhā) in addition to the two it had already, viz., śāṅkhyā and yoga. During all these stages the philosophical theory inherited no doctrinal change from the time of the EMU continued unaltered, and the śāṅkhyā and yoga continued to be mere paths, and not schools. Thus, when the bhaktiyoga was recognised as a path, it was a path to akṣara or ṣṛuṣa (Bh. Gi. XII. 1). Puruṣottama was substituted for ṣṛuṣa, but then akṣara and kṣara came to be described as ṣṛuṣas (Bh. Gi. XV. 16-18: App. II). This shows that the re-edition must have taken place long before the formation of the Mahābhārata Pāñcarātra School which identified akṣara and ṣṛuṣa (see Ch. III).
CHAPTER III.

AKṢARA IN THE LATER MAHĀBHĀRATA.

When one speaks of the later Mahābhārata philosophy, he must distinguish not only between four different Schools but also between the Chapters describing them. MBh. XII. 182–253, 302–317, 308, and 334–352 respectively deal with the MBh. Aupaniṣada, Sāmkhya, Yoga and Pāncarātra Schools. The words Sāmkhya and Yoga are almost entirely wanting in 182–253 and if they occur they invariably show that the author is referring to those Schools by way of explaining his own (i.e. Aupaniṣada) School. Thus, 234. 28-30 is found to be a cursory reference to the Sāmkhya and Yoga Schools, if we look to what precedes and follows these verses. Similarly, 210. 9–10 and 14 refer to the Pāncarātra School by such words as “vidulī” and “vadanti”; the doctrine contained in these verses is that which we find in the Nārāyanīya Section (MBh. XII. 334–352). On the contrary 302–307 and 309–317 give the principles which are common to both Sāmkhya and Yoga, and also those which are peculiar to Sāmkhya only, and even Prof. Hopkins says that 308 records the teaching of the Yoga School only. Prof. Edgerton’s contention that the principles described in 308 belong to both the Sāmkhya and Yoga (Schools) is based upon the grave misunderstanding that the terms “sāmkhya” and “yoga”, even in the later Mahābhārata, denote only two paths of these names and in no way two Schools of philosophy. Prof. Deussen and Prof. Hopkins have not admitted this four-fold division of the Chapters of MBh. XII; they have not distinguished the Aupaniṣada School (182–253) from the Sāmkhya and Yoga.
Schools (301–317); and this mistake has led them to a great confusion as regards the teaching of these Schools, as is evident from Prof. Hopkins' constant complaint that the author or authors of the Mahābhārata have tried to Vedanticise the Sāṃkhya doctrine, and also from the wrong interpretations of the MBh. philosophical texts given by Prof. Deussen in his Translation, which shall be pointed out in the following pages.

Even Dr. Frauwallner who deals with Dr. Frauwallner some of the Chapters (182–253) as "non-Sāmkhyist texts" seems to understand these as containing a pre-Classical Sāmkhya doctrine, but not an Aupanisada one (JAOS. Vol. 45, p. 201, p. 203, p. 204), though, as he himself points out in most of the cases, the verses (in Ch. 194, 219, 201–206) are closely connected with the Upanisads. Prof. Jacob's belief that the basis of the Epic Sāmkhya was the Classical Sāmkhya is founded upon what he understands to be contradictory statements in the Mahābhārata, viz., that "the Sāmkhya teaches only twentyfive principles" (MBh. XII. 307.47; 308.14; 318.35), and, again, that, "Brahman is the Twentysixth" (e.g. MBh. XII. 308). (See Prof. Jacob, Ueber das ursprüngliche Yogasystem, p. 4.) He thinks that the series of twentyfive principles was the original one and then Brahman was added as the Twentysixth. His chief reason is that Brahman stands as the Twentysixth. But if we look to the Earliest Metrical Upanisads and the Gitā, we learn that the series of twenty-six principles was already known though the principles were then not counted and consequently the numerical designations Twenty-fourth, Twentysifth, and Twentysixth not given to the highest three principles. Thus, five (subtle) elements, five (gross elements or) "objects" (viṣayas or anītas), ten organs of sense and action, the Mind, the Self-conscibousness, the Intellect, the lower Nature, the higher Nature, and puruṣa make up a series of twenty-six principles; and such a series, at least that including
the last six of these is already mentioned in Ka. Up.III. 10–11, Bh. Gi. VII.4–6; and the two Natures and *purusa* are also to be found in the numerous passages from the Gitā and the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads quoted in Ch. I. This shows that the series of evolution was known long before the number and numerical designations of the principles came into vogue. Neither the Ka. Up. nor the Gitā knows anything about these latter. In this sense the series of the twenty-six principles was the original one and that of the twenty-five was arrived at by rejecting one (viz., the higher Nature) of the twenty-six, as we shall see. The *Mahābhārata Sāṃkhya* was the *first philosophers to count the principles and at the same time to reject the higher Nature; but, then, at the same time the *Mahābhārata Apaniṣadas* accepted the fashion of the day by counting their own principles including the higher Nature. It is always said in the Mahābhārata, as Prof. Jacobi himself notes, that the Sāṃkhya have twenty-five and only twenty-five principles; and I must add that when a twenty-sixth principle is mentioned, it is never said to belong to the Sāṃkhya School (see below). Thus, Prof. Jacobi’s contention that the series of twenty-five was the original one is only partly right; it is right in so far as the counting is concerned, but not from the standpoint of the series itself. Therefore, I believe, my proposal to divide the Chapters of MBh. XII in the manner I have done above, will prove acceptable.

I have already said above that immediately after the Sāṃkhya started the mode of counting and numbering the metaphysical principles, the Apaniṣadas adopted the fashion. It should be mentioned further that this was the case also with the Yogas and the Pāñcarātras of the days of the MBh. All the four Schools gave numerical designations to their more important principles. The Sāṃkhya had only twenty-five principles (MBh. XIII. 307. 47; 308. 1; 318. 35); they held that
the Nature, which for them is only one, is the Twentyfourth and that the Lord or Viṣṇu who is identical with the Jīva is the Twentysixth (302. 38, 39; 305. 37–39; 306. 36; 306. 39, 40, 42, 43–44; 307. 2, 8, 9, 40). The Yogas called the Nature the Twentyfourth, the Jīva the Twentysixth, and Brahman or the Lord the Twentysixth. This difference between the L. MBh. Saṃkhya and Yoga Schools has been till now overlooked. The Yoga Chapter in the MBh. (XII. 308) is emphatic in asserting that the Saṃkhya have only twentyfive principles (XII. 308. 14, 25; see also 307. 47) and the same chapter is equally emphatic in stating that from the Yoga-standpoint the Jīva is the Twentysixth and Brahman the Twentysixth (308. 6, 7). MBh. XII. 398. 17 clearly says that “The budhyāmanā (i.e. the Twentysixth) is ‘devoid of intellect (buddhi)’ (as compared) with the prabuddha the Twentysixth; this is said to be the difference (nānātva) of the Yoga School from the teaching of the Saṃkhya Sruti”. This very idea is given in verses 6–7 of the same Chapter where we read that “The Twentysixth knows the Unmanifest (i.e. the Nature) but even he does not know the Twentysixth who eternally knows the Twentysixth and the Twentyfourth (i.e. the Nature)”. In my opinion this should leave no doubt that the Brahman which is described as the Twentysixth in this Chapter (308) is neither a Saṃkhya, nor an Apanaṇaṇa Twentysixth, but only a Yoga Twentysixth. The non-admission of this evidently clear statement of the L. MBh. is one of the causes that have led my predecessors in the field to various curious theories such as those pointed out above. As we shall see later on, there was another Yoga School in the days of L. MBh., which regarded puruṣa as the Twentysixth. Another fact which we have to admit is that the Apanaṇaṇa of the L. MBh. had also Apanaṇaṇa, a a Twentysixth principle; and this was School of 26 naturally the puruṣa; they did not distinguish the Jīva from this puruṣa, and consequently they held the higher Nature to be the Twentysixth but called it the unfallen
Twentyfifth (*acyuta pañcavimśaka*—318. 57ff.) in order to distinguish it from the Twentyfifth of other Schools, specially the Sāmkhya. According to these Apaniṣadas, the lower Nature was the Twentyfourth. This nomenclature of the L. MBh. Apaniṣadas has been preserved for us in MBh. 318. 55–82. The Chapter (318) as a whole states the Apaniṣada doctrine and clearly says that the Twentyfifth (i.e. the higher Nature) of the Apaniṣadas was rejected by the Sāmkhya and the Yogas. Prof. Hopkins’ explanation of “*acyuta pañcavimśa*” as denoting an attempt of the Apaniṣadas to foist their own view that “the Jiva is destructible in Paramātman” on the Sāmkhyas who rejected it, is quite unacceptable (Prof. Hopkins, GEI p. 137).

Mistakes of Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen. This is so because no Indian School of philosophy has ever said that the Jiva is destroyed in Paramātman and also because the context (*sāṃvata avyakta*—318. 56) clearly shows that the “*acyuta pañcavimśa*” is the higher Nature of the Apaniṣadas. The same has got to be said with regard to Prof. Deussen’s translation of the verses in question (VPTM pp. 665 ff.). His interpretation of verses 318. 56 etc. seems to suggest that he himself had a doubt as regards what he was writing. Lastly I have to note that even the Pāñcarātras did not withhold themselves from following the usual

Pāñcarātra, a custom of the philosophical Schools of School of 25 Principles. They named their highest principle (i.e. *purusa* identified with the higher Nature, as we shall see later on) the Twentyfifth (MBh. XII. 339. 24), and therefore their Twentyfourth would be the Nature which they regarded as “born” of the Twentyfifth (see Ch. III.). If we do not lose sight of this fact of the nomenclature of those days, the number of the so-called inconsistent statements in the L. MBh. will be reduced a great deal.
1. The Aupaniṣada School.

It is noteworthy that MBh. XII. 182–253 which gives the chief Aupaniṣada doctrine exhibits a complete unity of teaching if we examine it in the light of the EMU and the Gitā. This becomes evident if we try to understand the “para–ladders” so called by Prof. Hopkins. These are found in L. MBh. XII. 204. 10–11; 204. 19–20: 210. 14, 23, 26–28; 210. 35–39; 213. 12; 247. 3–4, 7. Most of these give a complete list of all the steps in the ladder. The main difficulty that has till now been experienced by the various interpreters of these passages seems to center in the term “jñāna” (204. 10c–d, 11 a, 19c–d, 213. 12c.). Prof. Hopkins seems to confound this technical term of the Mahābhārata age with the word “jñāna” in the sense of knowledge leading to absolution (GEI. p. 136 and p. 131). Dr. Frauwallner ventures the conjecture that jñānam in these passages comes from or is an abbreviation of jñānātmā (see the footnote to p. 193, Band XXXII. “Wiener Zeitschrift fuer die Kunde des Morgenlandes”). Prof. Deussen translates jñānam as consciousness (VPTM p. 225) and does not explain why the intellect is here the effect of that consciousness (jñānam, as he understands it), in contradiction to the usual description according to which the latter is the effect of the former. As a matter of fact, all these conjectures are not necessary, if we do not lose sight of the text of the L. MBh. itself which describes the L. MBh. Sāmkhya and says that “The Sāmkhyas called the jñāna (of the Aupaniṣadas) avyakta (MBh. XII. 306. 40 and 307. 9) and prakṛti” (MBh. XII. 318. 40). These verses leave no doubt that the jñānam in 204. 10c–d, etc., is the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, which the Sāmkhyas adopted as their own Nature (avyakta or prakṛti). This meaning of the technical term jñānam together with the fact that the theory of two Natures given in these ladders (e.g. in 247. 3–4, 7) was already mentioned in the EMU and the Gitā, is a sufficient help for reconstructing the evolutional series con-
tained in them, the last three numbers of which are the same as those in the earlier Aupaniṣada Schools viz., the lower Nature, the higher Nature and the puruṣa. The  para—ladder passages are too numerous to be abandoned as “a loose exploiting of the Sāṃkhya in terms of Brahmaism” (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 131).

These Aupaniṣadas, like those of the Gitā, accepted the aksara—and—puṇya doctrine of the EMU.

The aksara—and— Both aksara and puṇya are “goals” for puṇya Doctrine as them. In XII. 211.15 aksara is called in EMU and Bh.Gi. salīva, and puṇya kṣetrajña. 210. 23 mentions “pāram brahma” and “dhātā prabhūḥ”. In 213.2 Viṣṇu and avyakta or aksara, His residence, are mentioned. 217.6—12 is an adaptation of Ka. Up. III. 11. According to 237.31—33 salīva or aksara and kṣetrajña are two Atmans. The higher Nature and the Lord are found stated in 240. 16—23,28; 240. 31—32, 34; 241. 22, 36;243. 3,15, 18,19,20; 247. 3—4; 248.20—24; 249.1—2, 10—11; 285. 36—37; 301. 21—23. Puruṣa is said to be higher than aksara in these passages and also in 210. 23, 36, 8. We have already seen that the lower Nature called jñāna as in EMU and etc., is also mentioned in these texts. In Bh. Gi. all these respects the EMU, the Gitā and L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas can be said to have the same teaching.

But what is of particular interest to us, is the emphasis that this Aupaniṣada School of the L. MBh. lays on the non-identity of aksara and puṇya on the one hand and on that of aksara and the lower Nature on the other. The latter point is more vigorously put forth than the former. This was done in two ways, viz., the two Natures by showing that aksara is a conscious emphasised principle while the lower Nature is not so, and by explaining that it is eternal as distinguished from the non—eternal lower Nature.

The following statements emphasise the living nature of aksara:—
(1) "The Subtle (sūkṣma, i.e. the higher Nature) is able to see the lower Nature, buddhi, etc."

Aksara the Higher (MBh. XII. 204. 20).

Living Nature.

(2) "Saṅtva (i.e. aksara) and kṣetrajña are both of them Atmans" (MBh. XII. 237. 31–33). Prof. Deussen does not explain why saṅtva which he understands as prakṛti is called Atman (VPTM. p. 353). The same statement is found also in MBh. XII. 285. 36; 248, 20–24; 249. 1–2, 10–11.

(3) "Puruṣa has himself become aksara and kṣara" (MBh. XII. 240. 31–32).

(4) MBh. XII. 213. 12–13, 242. 18–20 and 252. 10c–d say that aksara is the Life-principle (Cf. jīva-bhūtā in Bh. Gī. VII. 5). It acts and animates the All (XII. 242. 20b); its designation is jīva, and in company of Aksara designated Time and Action it revolves the world (XII. 213. 13); it is jīva and yet it is called kṣetra (XII. 249. 11 ff); it is the seed of all individual souls (XII. 213. 13).

(5) The fact that aksara is "living" and is called "kṣetra" (XII. 249. 10. 11f; 252. 11 ff., 307. 14; 318. 111) agrees well with Bh. Gī. XIII. 6 which states that kṣetra includes cetanā "consciousness" and dhrīti "the sustenance of the world." (Cf. also jivabhūtā and dhārayate in Mistakes of Prof. Bh. Gī. VII. 5.) All these passages Deussen and Prof. mentioning kṣetra, which stands for aksara Hopkins. as possessed of "life" jīva were not considered by Prof. Hopkins; and Prof. Deussen who translated the term "jīva" in this connection as "the seed of the embodied" and "the individual soul" (VPTM. p. 256, 368, 398) did not notice the inconsistency involved in calling that "individual soul" saṅtva or kṣetra, and in saying that the "individual soul" is "the seed of the embodied".

(6) The lower Nature is "not-seeing", a-pāṣya, the higher Nature is "seeing", pāṣya, and puruṣa is "always seeing" sadā-pāṣya (XII. 318. 72, 73, 82).
NOTE.—As the terms āpaśya and a-apaśya forming the compound āpaśyapaśya occur in 318.82 and also elsewhere in the MBh., I propose to read “Paśyam tathāiva c āpaśyam paśyaty anyāḥ sadāṣnagha”—in XII. 318.72a–b. The meaning of the proposed reading given by me here will also testify to the correctness of my suggestion. For the same reasons I read “paśyam” in place of “paśyan” in 73 a of the same Chapter.

(7) To point out the consciousness of akṣara, it was called “the awakening Twentyninth”

Other Synonyms budhyamāna pāñcavimśaka (MBh. of akṣara in L.MBh. Kumb. ed. 323.70) in contrast to the abudhyamāna “lower Nature”; and also

(8) “the awakening Unmanifest” budhyamāna anyakta (MBh. XII. 305.34) as distinct from the “apratibuddha anyakta” the lower Nature.

(9) For the same purpose of distinguishing akṣam from the lower Nature, the former was called sāsvata anyakta “the eternal Unmanifest” (Cf. Bh. Gī. VIII. 20: sanātana anyakta), implying that the lower Nature (or the Nature of the Sāmkhyas) was not eternal in so far as it did not eternally remain in the same condition (MBh. XII. 318.56);

(10) “acyuta pāñcavimśaka”, “the unfallen Twentyninth”, as distinguished from the Twentyfourth which was “fallen” (XII. 318.57);

(11) “the first deity” adya daivata (XII. 318.83, not “the origin of gods,” as Prof. Deussen says); and

(12) “the primeval Twentyninth” adya pāñcavimśa (XII. 318.82).

(13) The same aim was desired to be served by giving numerical designations to these three

The Numerical Designations. Though the higher Nature was eternal and differed from the lower because the latter was not eternal and as such logically they could not have been counted
as two, yet they were said to be two. Akṣara and pūruṣa were also numerically two, firstly because "He (i.e. a meditator) who sees the Twentysixth does not see "the seeing" (pāṣyam—see notes above), the Twentyfifth i.e. akṣara" (XII. 318.73a–b), and secondly because "The Twentysifth (i.e. akṣara) can think that 'There is none higher than I,'" (XII. 318.73 c–d). Kṣetra which is a term for the living conscious Nature as we have already seen is said to be the Twentyfifth (MBh. XII. 307.14c–d, 15).

Note.—According to the reading in 72a–b proposed above, the verse means, "The other (i.e. the Supreme Being) sees eternally pāṣya (i.e. akṣara) as well as a-pāṣya (i.e. the Twentyfourth). The Twentysixth sees (both) the Twentyfifth and the Twentyfourth". Thus the latter half of the verse expresses in numerical terms what the former half does in the terms of the attribute of consciousness or "seeing". Verse 73a–b says that the meditators of akṣara (pāṣya) and those of pūruṣa (the Twentysixth of 72c referred to by "enam" in 73b) realise only the object of their meditation and not both the objects of meditation. 73 c–d asserts the self-consciousness of akṣara or the Twentyfifth and the fact that as a goal it is independent of pūruṣa. The interpretations of Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen, which are not discussed here, are based upon an incorrect reading and hence fail to present any consistent meaning.

The above-mentioned sharp distinction between prakṛti (above which "stands" akṣara—XII. 314. 10–11), akṣara and pūruṣa was necessitated by the opposition of the Sāmkhya and Yoga Schools with which the Aupaniṣadas found themselves confronted, as can be seen from the passages which mention that distinction given above. The latter

Progress in the thus made each of these three principles Aupaniṣada School an individual entity; they accepted during L. MBh. vyaktihṛdaya between akṣara and pūruṣa, though pūruṣa was above akṣara and in that sense the latter was yet subordinate to the former. The EMU and the Gītā had also distinguished
between these three but the mutual difference between them had never before been considered sufficient to justify their being enumerated as the three principles, as we have seen in Chapters I and II. The EMU and the Gitā had maintained dualistic monism of akṣara and puruṣa.

The Doctrine of “Pluralistic Dualism”. The MBh. Aupaniṣadas admitted a dualism of these, while, on the other hand, their doctrine was a non–pluralism in so far as the lower Nature which was counted as an entity was not eternal like the other two, but was born of the higher Nature. Thus it is not possible to describe this system as a pluralism. It is very difficult to find out an accurate expression from Western Philosophy which would convey the exact sense of the metaphysical position of these Aupaniṣadas. Under the circumstances it would not be wrong to speak of it as “Pluralistic Dualism” of the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas.

It should be specially noted that, just as in Sve. Up., so with the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas the delhi, though counted separately, is not actually considered a different principle from the puruṣa (but somehow as an aspect of the latter). It is only the L. MBh. Yogas, as we shall see, who achieved the separation. The “tetrad” of the Aupaniṣadas is merely the “trīd” or Sve. Up. with vyakta added to it (Cf. Retrospect, foot–note) and with a less theistic conception of the highest principle which is here not so much the “ruler” as in Sve. Up.

On account of the above–mentioned position of the chief L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas, it is but natural that we find, in the same text a second Aupaniṣada School which seceded from the former. These separatists were called “saints” sādhuvaḥ School in L. MBh. (MBh. XII. 318. 56, 78). They held that the two (eternal and non–eternal) forms of the Unmanifest, avyakta, should be looked upon as one and the same end of the evolutionary series, or that the
eternal Unmanifest should be looked upon as the one end in so far as it stands above the (lower)

Numerical Unity of the Lower and the Higher Natures. \( \text{prakṛti} \), which is non-eternal and an effect of the former (MBh. XII. 318. 56; see also the v. l. in the Kumb. ed.). Regarding the relation of \( \text{aṅkara} \) and \( \text{puruṣa} \) these “saints” said that “One should look upon them as only one on account of their (mutual) position” (MBh. XII. 318. 79), or that “One should look upon them as one and the same because the Twenty-sixth resides in the Twenty-fifth” (according to the v. l. in the Kumb. ed.). Thus the second Aupaniṣadāda School also believes that \( \text{aṅkara} \) is the residence “stūna” of the \( \text{puruṣa} \), and thus accepts “stūnābheda” but it rejects “vyaktibheda” in \( \text{aṅkara} \) and \( \text{puruṣa} \) and also in \( \text{aṅkara} \) and \( \text{prakṛti} \). Prof. Hopkins is not right in identifying these “saints” with either the Sāṅkhya or the Yoga who only quoted the “saints” in support of their own views. (His interpretations of verses 56, 78 are also misguided.)

The position of these Aupaniṣadas thus supported in a way the Sāṅkhya and Yoga Schools in their doctrines, and gave rise to such an Aupaniṣadāda School as the author of the Brahmaśūtras belonged to. In Brahmaśūtras III. 2.11-21 and 32-38 both of these L. MBh. Aupaniṣadāda Schools are criticised by the Śītrakāra (see Ch. IV; App. IV).

2. The Sāṅkhya School.

The doctrine of the Sāṅkhya of the later Mahābhārata Age has been preserved to us in MBh. Sāṅkhya Chapters in L. MBh. XII. 300-307 and 309-317. We can briefly summarise it under three headings. (a) What the Sāṅkhya are here said to have rejected, (b) What they are said to have accepted, and (c) How they differ from the Classical Sāṅkhya.
(a) What these Sāṃkhyas are said to have rejected:—

(1) The Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas rejected "budhyamāna avyakta", (MBh. XII. 305. 32–35). This passage mentions two avyaktas and two budhyamānas and ironically says that if the enlightened Sāṃkhyas and Yogas understood the budhyamāna avyakta, they will equate [their doctrine to the Aupaniṣadā one] (305. 34), and mentions three principles budhyamāna "avyakta, budhyamāna avyakta, and the Higher Nature. budhyamāna (305. 32–35). The middle of these, which the enlightened did not know (i.e. did not accept as a principle) is āksara or the higher conscious Nature of the Aupaniṣadās, who invented this designation to distinguish the latter from avyakta the lower unconscious Nature and from budhyamāna, the Lord, both of which were accepted by their fellow-philosophers. Prof. Hopkins finds the plurality of souls in this passage! (See GEI. p. 124–125.) He and Prof. Deussen show utter ignorance of the L. MBh. terminology according to which all these terms are technical (see MBh. XII. 306–308; and also Ch. III.)

Note.—Prof. Hopkins, in finding in the passage in question (MBh. XII. 305. 32–35) a reference to the doctrine of plurality of souls, ignores that aprabuddha "the non-awakened" is in the MBh. a name for the Nature (305. 32, see Deussen, VPTM. p. 623), His interpretation of aprabuddha as "the conditioned soul" is based upon an ignorance of the L. MBh. terminology. In contrast to this aprabuddha, the soul was called budhyamāna (305. 31; 307–308). Again, Prof. Hopkins is not quite just to the text because he drops verse 34 and connects 33 with 35. As a matter of fact verse 34 is the most important of the whole group; it mentions budhyamāna avyakta and says that "If the enlightened (Sāṃkhyas and Yogas) know the budhyamāna avakta, then they will equate their doctrine [to that of Aupaniṣadās]." This budhyamāna avyakta was rejected by the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas, as will be seen from the fact that the passage ironically asserts the ignorance of the "enlightened". This "budhyamāna avyakta" is different from the āvyakta which is aprabuddha
(verse 32) and from the "buddhayānā" which is not avyakta (verse 31), i.e. in brief we have here three principles, avyakta (the lower Nature of the Aupanīṣadas and) the Nature of the Śaṅkhyas, buddhayānā avyakta or akṣara which the "enlightened" Śaṅkhyas and Yogas did not know, and buddhayānā, the Supreme Soul not distinguished from the individual one; all these three are meant by the plural number of the compound "buddhayānā-prabuddhānām" (gen. plu., verse 35c). Prof. Deussen takes the verse (34) to mean: "When the enlightened know Prakṛti (i.e. the lower Nature), they will teach Brahma". Is not this interpretation a strange one? Even Prof. Deussen shows complete ignorance of the L. MBh. terminology when he translates buddhayānā as the awakened ones and aprabuddhas as the unawakened ones, in verse 35 (VPTM. 623), this was the way he adopted to explain the plural number of the compound just noticed.

(2) The Śaṅkhyas and the Yogas also rejected what the Aupanīṣadas called acuyta pañcavimśaka Śaṅkhyas' Rejection of "acyuta 318. 56–57, 79; see p. 34 above where pañcavimśa". Prof. Hopkins' interpretation has been criticised). The Twenty-fourth of the Aupanīṣadas, the Śaṅkhyas and the Yogas was a "fallen" (acyuta) Twenty-fourth.

(3) The Śaṅkhyas and the Yogas refused to admit śāsvata avyakta which corresponds to Sāṅkhyas' Rejection of "śāsvata and which was a designation given by the L. MBh. Aupanīṣadas (see p. 38 above).

Note.—It should be noted that Prof. Deussen takes acuyta and śāsvata as independent designations of pañcavimśaka and avyakta and explains the pañcavimśaka (thus separated from acuyta) as the individual Soul, as if the topic of the discussion (in XII. 318) were the latter. Nowhere in the Indian Philosophy is śāsvata an independent designation, and never in the L. MBh. is acuyta used in that sense. Both Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen have lost sight of the great problem that busied the philosophers of the Mahābhārata, who followed the Age of the Gitā.
All the passages referred to above show that the Sāṃkhya and the Yogas rejected the aksara of the Aupanisadas in so far as it was a higher Nature different from their conception of the Nature.

(b). What the Sāmkhyas are said to have accepted:—

(1) The terminology of the L. MBh. Sāmkhya betray their descent and at the same time dissent from those who had the traditions of the EMU and the Gitā. If we study the Sāmkhya terms in MBh. XII 302–317 and 309–317, we find that the Twentysfourth or the Nature of these Sāmkhyas bears the names which belonged originally to the lower Nature and to aksara (in its capacity as the higher Nature) of the Aupanisadas and that their Twentyfifth has such designations as had mainly belonged to the Aupaniṣada puruṣa and aksara (in its capacity as a “goal”). The former shows that the Sāmkhyas have identified the two Natures, and the latter that they have identified the two “goals” of the Aupanisadas. To the former class of terms are to be traced such words as a-vidyā, kṣetra, avyakta, jīna and to the latter vidyā, urguṣa, iṣvāra, Viṣṇu avyakta (306. 34, 38). These occur too often in the Sāmkhya and Yoga Chapters (XII. 302–317) to be specially pointed out here. A detailed list of them is given in the L. MBh. itself (XII. 318 37–47). As an illustration of my standpoint I would draw the attention of the readers to two of the terms just mentioned, viz., a-vidyā and vidyā which the Sāmkhyas used for their Nature and puruṣa respectively (XII. 307.2–3). Prof. Hopkins has expressed great surprise at this usage of the terms in question (GEI. p. 136). The presence of these terms cannot be explained by referring them to the Knowledge and Ignorance taught in Śāṅkara’s theory of Illusion; because, as Prof. Hopkins correctly points out, the Māyāvāda is not known to the Mahābhārata; and though Prof. Deussen adds no explanatory notes to his translation of these terms, I believe he would not have
differed from Prof. Hopkins on this point. The fact seems to be that these Sāṃkhyaśas had got to explain the terms which the Aūpaniśadas used. In the terminology of the latter a-vidyā and vidyā stood for the lower Nature and the higher Nature respectively. They were used in that sense in Śve. Up. V. 1 (see App. I). The Sāṃkhyaśas having used “a-vidyā” for their own Nature, had no other course but that of applying “vī līyā” to their puruṣa the Twentyfifth. In doing so they tried to give a new sense to these terms (307. 3-8). This was an effort similar to their effort to explain the Twentyfifth as both kṣara and akṣara (see below).

(2) The Sāṃkhyaśas accepted “kṣara” and “akṣara” of the Aūpaniśadas, but explained these terms in their own way. They said that the same Nature is akṣara when it withdraws the manifestations within itself, and it is

The terms kṣara and akṣara when it puts forth these manifestations (307. 10-17); in other words, akṣara is Nature as one, kṣara is Nature as many (305. 36-39). This explanation of kṣara and akṣara was necessitated by the fact that the Sāṃkhyaśas identified the two Natures of the Aūpaniśadas, who held that kṣara or pradhāna was the lower Nature and akṣara was the higher Nature (Cf. Śve. Up. 1. 7-11; App. 1). In extending the kṣara-akṣara standpoint to the puruṣa (MBh. XII. 307. 18-19), the Sāṃkhyaśas sought a justification for their position regarding the Nature.

NOTE.—Regarding MBh. XII. 305. 36 it should be noticed here that ekatva and nānātva in “ekatvam akṣaram prāhu nānātvam kṣaram ucyate” (36c–d) are explained as what the soul sees and what it does not see when it proceeds on the right path having placed its belief in (the doctrine of) the twentyfive (37); and the same topic is continued in the following chapter where ekatva and bahutva are both said to belong to the Prakṛti only (306. 33) and it is said that ekatva comes into existence during the dissolution and bahutva when the
Nature creates the creation (306.33). Prof. Hopkins who says that a real plurality of souls is mentioned in these passages (GEI. p. 12-I) and Prof. Edgeion who would like to find here an empirical plurality (AJP) have no justification for their incorrect conjecture except that the words ekatva and nānatva or balutva occur here (though they do not refer at all to the plurality of souls). How can the "many" souls be called ksara "perishable"? These interpreters have not considered the context at all. Prof. Deussen translates the term, but suggests no explanation (VPTM. p. 623, p. 627).

(3) The Śāmkhyas accepted jñāna "the lower Nature" of the Aupaniṣadas and also the avyakta
The term jñāna. of the latter; but they called these Prakṛti,
and this was for them the one and only Prakṛti (XII. 318.40, 39).

(4) The Śāmkhyas accepted kṣetra, the conscious Nature or the Twentyfifth of the Aupaniṣadas (see p. 37 above); but identified it with their own Nature. MBh. 307.14c-d, 15 says, that "They (i.e. the Aupaniṣadas) call
The term kṣetra. (the aksara mentioned in verse 13a-b)
kṣetra because it is adhiśthana, the residence (of the purusa); this is that Twentyfifth (of the Aupaniṣadas). But when it withdraws the net of constituents within its unmanifest self, then along with those constituents the Twentyfifth dissolves". Prof. Deussen does not note that the kṣetra is here said to be the Twentyfifth and that the dissolution of the Twentyfifth within itself is taught here (VPTM. p. 630).

(5) The Śāmkhyas taught that Prakṛti is both "moving" and "unmoving", "changing" and "unchanging"; it is also "imperishable", "unborn" etc. They herewith intended to show that there is no necessity of accepting two prakṛtis. They combined the two prakṛtis of the Aupaniṣadas into one and naturally rejected the view that the (lower) Nature is "born" as a distinct entity—the view of the EMU and the Gitā (MBh. XII. 318. 37-47).
(6) Sāmkhyas took the term *prakṛti* from the Aupaniṣadas but made it a teacnical term in their School. "The Sāmkhyas hold the view of Evolution The Sāmkhyas first (lit. the Sāmkhyas evolve) and speak to emphasise (but not to originate) the Theory of the Evolving Matter, Prakṛti." This idea is expressed in a very terse sentence: "Sāmkhyāḥ prakūvate prakṛtum ca pracākṣate (MBh. XII. 306.42). Although the Aupaniṣadas of the Gītā knew the Evolution and used the term *prakṛti*, the first philosophers in India to be called "Evolutionists" are these L. MBh. Sāmkhyas. They are prakṛtivādinaḥ (306. 27). These Sāmkhyas henceforth restricted in the above sense the application of the term "*prakṛti" (318. 39–40).

(7) The Sāmkhyas accepted the *purusa* of the Aupaniṣadas (318. 39, 42) and said that *purusa* alone is conscious (and not akṣara also). Their acceptance of the term *jñāna* for their Nature was only a technical matter; it did not mean that the Nature was a conscious principle.

(8) They accepted the *iśvara* of the Aupaniṣadas but called him "nirguṇa", a name of akṣara in the MBh. Aupaniṣada School.

(9) If any positive proof is needed for the conclusion that the L. MBh. Sāmkhyas were not atheists, it will be found in MBh. XII 318. 79e–f, where it is said that the Sāmkhyas and the Yogas accepted the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas. It would be unscientific to start with a presupposition that the Sāmkhya School Character of the L. MBh. was atheistic, and then MBh. Sāmkhyas to argue that MBh. XII. 318 is an interpolation or is influenced by Classical Sāmkhyas. It should also be remembered that though the L. MBh. Sāmkhyas admitted the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas they called it the Twentifth, because they rejected the Aupaniṣada Twentifth. This is the sense of MBh. XII. 318. 79e–f, which has been noticed above. Prof. Hopkins' and Prof.
Jacobi’s views about this verse have been mentioned and refuted in the beginning of this Chapter. So these Sāṃkhyaists, though not in the Western sense: they believed (as the Aupanishadas did) in one Supreme Being which somehow appears as an individual soul striving for liberation (i.e. self-realisation).

In MBh XII. 302. 138, it is clearly said that the Twenty-fifth of the Sāṃkhya was Viṣṇu. But as said just above, the Sāṃkhyaists did not distinguish it from the Jīva, and this accounts for the objection in MBh. XII. 300. 3 “How can ‘one without the Lord’ (anīśvara) be freed?” This refers to one who does not believe in God as distinct from the Jīva. “anīśvara” in MBh. This sense of XII. 300. 3 is clear from the fact that this objection (in MBh. XII. 300.) comes from the Yoga School; while the statement that the Sāṃkhyaists accept the Twenty-sixth (of the Aupanishadas) is from the Aupanishada School. In order to understand this one has to go a little deeper into the study of the L. MBh. Schools. In 308 where the Yoga doctrine is mentioned, it is explained that the L. MBh. Yogas for the first time separated Jīva and Īśvara, unlike the Sāṃkhyaists who identified the two (see MBh. XII. 308 below). This will be fully dealt with in the next Section about the Yoga School. But it should be only stated here that MBh. XII. 300. 2-7 where the disputed words “anīśvara” and “mokṣa” occur, is explained nowhere except in MBh. XII. 308. 10-35, particularly 25-26 which undoubtedly refers to 300. 2-7, as the topic in both the passages shows. A comparison of these two passages will prove that anīśvara only means “one without a Lord separate from himself.” The Jīva who is the not-Lord (Śve. Up. I. 8) as compared with Paramātman who is the Lord, has never had the term anīśvara applied to it as a designation; there is no passage where anīśvara is used as a synonym

Prof. Edgerton’s for Jīva the individual soul; and there is View untenable. no text in the EMU, the Gitā or the L. MBh. where Jīva is said to be anīśvara in the sense “because there is no Īśvara above him” (Prof.
Edgerton, AJP. 1924), though the L. MBh. Sāmkhyas regarded the Jiva as ultimately one with the Supreme Soul. Even when the Gitā uses the term īśvara with reference to the Jiva it does so only in an etymological sense, viz., with regard to the Jiva’s “ownership” of his subtle body (Bh. Gl. XV. 7–8). And as Prof. Schrader points out to me there are other words used with reference to the Jiva in the same sense as “īśvara”; thus the Sāmkhyas used the term “svāmin”, according to Garbe (Sāmkhya-Philosophie, p. 305, 287, etc.), for the soul in its connection with the Upādhyāyas, i.e., as a Jiva; and in a similar use the term is also met with in MBh. XII. 311. 20; “Indryāṇām tu sarveśāṃ īśvaram mana ucyate”, as compared with Bh. Gl. X. 22: “Indryāṇām manasaḥ c āśmiḥ,” also see Ahirbudhnya–Sāṃhitā XII. 22 where svāmin is given as a Sāmkhya term for manas (see Prof. Schrader in Z. D. M. G. for 191+). Moreover, MBh. XII. 300. 3 and Gitā XV. 7–8 describe the “bound” soul, and it would be to no purpose if the authors were using anīśvara or ēśvara in the sense that the Jiva is identical with the Lord; on the contrary, such a statement would only lead to confusion. MBh. XII. 306. 41 refers to ēśvara as a term for the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, and therefore an equivalent of kṣetra and satvā, and says that the Sāmkhyas regarded it to be anīśvara. Thus, this passage refers to neither theism nor atheism in Sāmkhya. For these reasons, I cannot accept the interpretation of anīśvara in MBh. XII. 300 as “having no-lord, supreme”, given by Prof. Edgerton, though, of course, I do not deny that anīśvara elsewhere can mean anuttara “supreme” (Prof. Edgerton AJP, pp. 8–12).

Thus, the terminology of the L. MBh. Sāmkhyas clearly shows that they accepted the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, but identified with it the aksara or the higher Nature of the latter and thus admitted only one Nature. It also indicates that these Sāmkhyas approved of the puruṣa or ēśvara of the Aupaniṣadas but to him they attributed all such characteristics and designations of the Aupaniṣada aksara, as could not be consistently assigned to their own Nature.
(c) How the later Mahābhārata Sāmkhyas differ from the Classical Sāmkhyas:

The mere difference between these two Schools bearing the same name cannot in itself show that one is later than the other, though Prof. Hopkins would say the reverse. It should be examined carefully which of the two Schools has a more primitive form. If one of them is more primitive than the other and if the texts concerned have not the appearance of a dishonest report, then the possibility of the system described in them being the older form of the two cannot well be denied.

There may be many other points of difference between the L. MBh. Sāmkhya and the Classical School of that name than those given below, and these may be found out by a more detailed enquiry into the Mahābhārata, than it was possible for the present writer to undertake; he simply collects here those points which seemed to him to be very striking during his enquiry for ākṣara into the chapters concerned.

(1) This Sāmkhya does not know the terms of the Classical Sāmkhya, like vyākṛti, prakṛti-vikṛti, etc. It mentions "eight prakṛtis"; and the term "prakṛti-vikṛti. Prakṛti is then called para prakṛti (MBh. XII. 310. 10) a term which though used by the Aupanṣadas for their ākṣara (Bh. Gī. VII. 5) these Sāmkhyas could apply only to their Nature.

(2) The Mind, not the ahaṁkāra as in the Classical Sāmkhya, is here the cause of the five elements (XII. 306. 27–28).

(3) Instead of the more advanced view of regarding Prakṛti described as Male, not as Female.
nor—non—male”. “The male” is the Prakṛti and “the neither-male—nor—non—male” is the Puruṣa (of these Sāṃkhyas) (MBh. XII. 305. 25–29).

(4) Thus Sāṃkhya uses the terms abuddha for its prakṛti and budhyamāna for its puruṣa who is Jīva and becomes buddha, the Lord, in the state of absolution (MBh. XII. 305.31). These form a part of the L. MBh. terminology; it would be wrong to explain them as having only the etymological sense, to the exclusion of the technical one as will be shown later on.

(5) The Twentyfifth of these Sāṃkhyas is “the Lord,” Isvara of the Apaniṣadas, and not only the Jīva as in the Classical Sāṃkhya and Isvara. Theism. Identity of Jīva of and Isvara. Theism. Sāṃkhya is theistic, like the L. MBh. Apaniṣadas.

(6) Not only is the conception of the grounds on which the existence of Puruṣa the Twentyfifth is supported in this Sāṃkhya, quite primitive when compared with the one given in Sāṃkhya Kārikā 17; but it is also noteworthy that L. MBh. Sāṃkhya has four instead of the five grounds of the Classical Sāṃkhya (MBh. XII. 315.9c–d, 10).

(7) One of the grounds for the existence of the Twentyfifth is that the Twentyfifth is “an agent” Puruṣa, an Agent. kartri (MBh. XII 315.7–9a–b). L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas did not say that he is bhokti, because they did not yet distinguish kartriya from bhoktiya as did the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (17). Thus these Sāṃkhyas seem to be the descendants of the “sāṃkhya-separatists” of Bh. Gī. XVIII. 13–16 (see Ch. II. p. 27).

(8) The Classical Sāṃkhya idea of emphasising the non-identity of the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti is not found in the Mahābhārata, though all the Mahābhārata Schools taught that the Twentyfourth should be given up (“heya”). This is so because the Mahābhārata does
not know anything about the identity of these two, which the Classical Sāṃkhya treats of as the a-viveka “want of discrimination”, though the former knows that the Prakṛti is of the nature of attachment (sāsaṅgā) and the Puruṣa is by nature devoid of attachment (uḥsāṅga) as is said in MBh. XII. 315. 13–16.

(9) The most important fact to be noticed in this connection is that the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya did not know the doctrine of the plurality of individual souls. I have examined and interpreted all the passages that Prof. Hopkins, Prof. Edgerton and Prof. Deussen have put forth in support of their views in this respect (see Appendix III, where even XII. 350.2 is discussed). They either refer to the doctrine of two Natures of the L. MBh. Apaniṣadas, which the Sāṃkhyas criticised or they discuss the unity and diversity of the Twentyfourth and do not at all refer to a real (as Prof. Hopkins thinks) or an empirical (as Prof. Edgerton holds) plurality of individual souls. Even the L. MBh. Yogas who separated the Jīva and Paramātman did not know of this plurality (MBh. XII. 308).

These points of difference between the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and the Classical Sāṃkhya seem to me to bear witness to the historical priority of the former.

Dr. Frauwallner’s View amplified. Dr. Frauwallner (Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 45, and Wiener Zeitschrift fuer die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Band XXXII) has shown the same on the ground of other similar points. But I must say that some of the passages used by him belong definitely to the L. MBh. Apaniṣada School (see p. 31 above), while some others quoted by him would lose their strength if the author or authors of the Mahābhārata really attempted “a loose exploiting of Classical Sāṃkhya in terms of Brahmaism” (Prof. Hopkins, the Great Epic of India, p. 131). I have examined all such passages that have been pointed out by Prof Hopkins, and I must confess
that to me they appear to be only an honest attempt on the part of the Mahābhārata authors to preserve for us the then existing philosophical doctrines. The difference on most of the vital points like karīṭva of the Jiva and the plurality of individual souls, and the child-like ingenuousness with which these views are placed before us in addition to the evidence of the terminology and to that of the fact that these Sāṁkhyays rejected the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣdas, should be regarded as a sufficient proof of the great antiquity of the L. MBh. Sāṁkhya School.

The special contribution of the Mahābhārata Sāṁkhyays to the history of the Indian Philosophy lies in the fact that they are the first to separate Matter and Spirit as the Unconscious and the Conscious. The contrast between the (lower) Unmanifest and puruṣa is put forth in the Sāṁkhya chapters of the Mahābhārata as emphatically as the distinction between akṣara (the higher or living Nature) and puruṣa was in the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Gitā (MBh. XII. 318. 37–44). The one was saguṇa, the other was nirguṇa; the one was ajña, the other was jña; the one was averted, the other was vedya; the one jñāna, the other jñeya; the one aavyā, the other avdyā (MBh. XII. 307. 2); the one a tattva, the other nistattva; the one sāsaṅga, the other niḥsaṅga; the one abuddha, the other budhyamāna. Such is the distinction between Matter and Spirit that one finds in the Mahābhārata Sāṁkhya for the first time in the history of the Indian Philosophy, and at a period much prior indeed to that of the Classical Sāṁkhya School. The Aupaniṣdas of the EMU and the Gitā and even those of the L. MBh. had not realised this most striking phenomenon in the every-day world, because they had believed in the higher Nature intervening between the pure Matter (i.e. the lower Nature) and puruṣa. The L. MBh. Aupaniṣdas could accept the inherited view
that Matter is an effect of Spirit and for this reason they accepted also the spiritual \textit{akṣara} which connected the two viz., the lower Nature and the \textit{puruṣa}. The great contrast itself between Spirit and Matter may have been the ground on which the Sāmkhyas based their view and parted company with their fellow-thinkers. That this disentanglement of Spirit and Matter from the causal relation which the Upaniṣadas always believed in, was achieved through the rejection of \textit{akṣara} "the higher Nature" is a fact which the Mahābhārata most emphatically teaches. This point cannot be insisted upon strongly enough. The \textit{sāsvata avyakta} or \textit{acyuta pāñcaviśīṣṭa} was flatly refused by the Sāmkhyas. Most of the philosophers of the days of Mahābhārata were engaged in the discussion of this problem. The Mahābhārata credits Āsuri and Pañcasikha and also Kapila with having expressed their views on this problem. From the context in which their names occur in the Mahābhārata, they seem to have been the pioneers in rejecting the distinction between the two Natures of the Upaniṣadas (MBh. XII. 318. 59 ff). The origin of the Mahābhārata Sāmkhya and Yoga Schools should be traced to what they are expressly said in the Mahābhārata to have refused to accept (see pp. 42–43 above). Compare the "motto" at the beginning of this Thesis. To the followers of the EMU and the Gitā who accepted a Dualistic Monism of two Spirits, and to the Upaniṣadas of the Mahābhārata who believed in a Pluralistic Dualism of three principles (apart from the Jīva), one material and two spiritual, this purely dualistic attitude of the Sāmkhya could not have come as a great surprise, because these latter did any how accept the Twentysixth of the Upaniṣadas, the \textit{puruṣa} of the EMU, one of the two "goals". It is for this reason that the L. MBh. Apaniṣadas sympathised with the Sāmkhyas and often praised them (MBh. XII. 318. 57, 79).

Finally, we have already seen that some followers of the \textit{sāmkhya}-path of the Gitā had begun taking interest
in doctrinal questions (see pp. 26–27 above). These sāṃkhya-separatists believed the Atman to be an agent (Bh. G. XVIII. 13–16), while the sāṃkhya-followers as a whole believed in two Natures the higher of which was not at all “active” while the lower possessed “all the activities”, as did the followers of yoga and bhakti paths. From the fact that the Sāṃkhya philosophers of the L. MBh. hold Atman to be an agent, I have already suggested that it were the sāṃkhya-separatists of the Gita who are responsible for the Sāṃkhya School of the L. MBh. (p. 27). The latter’s rejection of the higher Nature seems to have been due to their belief in the Atman’s kartriṣva. When the Atman was itself an agent, there was no necessity of believing in two Natures, neither of which would be in this case an agent. Though a verbal statement expressive of this argument is wanting in the (later) Mahābhārata which starts with the very idea that the Sāṃkhya is an independent School, the period intervening between the Gita and the L MBh. must have seen the sāṃkhya-separatists reasoning as above. These latter, like other followers of the sāṃkhya-uṣṭhā were ascetics; the follower of the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya School were also ascetics as already emphasised by Prof. Hopkms. For these reasons the sāṃkhya-uṣṭhā of the Gita is the ultimate origin of the Sāṃkhya School of the L. MBh.

But even then the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya did not entirely cease to be a path or uṣṭhā like the sāṃkhya-path of the Gita, because both of these accept the puruṣa (and the latter, the akṣara also) as their “goal”. The same is true also of the L. MBh. Yogas, who like the Rudrīte Yogas, accepted the puruṣa, or like the Hīranyagarbha Yogas, the akṣara of the Aupanītadas as the “goal”, as we shall see in the next Section. From this standpoint one can say what the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools do share the Nature of being “paths” for the same goal as the L. MBh. Aupanītadas. The statements in the L. MBh. that “the Sāṃkhya and the Yogas see the puruṣa or
the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas” (XII. 318, 79) or that all these Schools are equally good for the attainment of liberation from this world, are expressive of what was then a real fact.

3. The Yoga School.

It is more necessary to point out that the Yoga in the L. MBh. forms a metaphysical system of its own than it was to do the same with regard to the Sāṃkhya. The problem is exceedingly important because, while Yoga an independent School of Thought in L. MBh. Prof. Edgerton, so far as I know, is the only one to hold that in the (later) Mahābhārata, “Sāṃkhya” does not stand for a School but only for a path of salvation, the view that in Mahābhārata at least the Twentysixth is a principle either foisted upon the Sāṃkhya or said any how to belong to them, and therefore in that sense the Sāṃkhya and the Yogas of the L. MBh. have the same metaphysical principles; is held by almost all scholars who have worked in this field and is generally believed in all over India also. My study has led me to think that the metaphysical principles in both these Schools were identical neither in their number nor in their nature; on the contrary, there is evidence to believe that unlike the Classical Schools of these names, the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools agreed mostly as regards the non-philosophical matters.

There are striking statements in the L. MBh. itself on this point. Just as the Sāṃkhya is a Śāstra, so is Yoga a Darśana (XII. 307.44, 48d). Again, “Both the Systems have the same career of life” (ekacaryāṇa tiśāv ubhau—XII. 316 2c). “Purity, accompanied by penance and compassion for all beings are equally taught in both. The observance of vows also is the same in both; but the doctrinal teaching is not the same in the two Schools”, (darśanam na samam tayoḥ—XII. 300. 8–9). Moreover, “The Yogas and Sāṃkhyaśas who have made the definition
of the metaphysical principles according to their own individual Scriptures see that this (visible world) is the action of the Unmanifest and the Manifest" (MBh. XII. 310. 100c–d, 101 a–b). Whenever the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga are mentioned together in the Gītā, it was intended to show that they were concerned with "renunciation" and "action" respectively, but in the L. MBh. this is not the case at all; it aims at pointing out some philosophical differences and sometimes resemblances also between the two Schools (MBh. XII. 307. 47–48; 308. 1). In the Gītā an aspirant is advised to accept either of the two paths, sāṃkhya or yoga; the Mahābhārata, on the contrary, complains that the Sāṃkhya and Yogas do not accept some philosophical principles of the Aupaniṣadas (MBh. XII. 318. 56–57, 79; 305. 32–35), and therefore no Aupaniṣada would be asked to follow either Sāṃkhya or Yoga.

These statement go againsts the view that "This system is both Yoga and Sāṃkhya, the systems being double but the teaching being identical" (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. pp. 133-134) and also against the other view that "Nowhere is there any suggestion that the Sāṃkhya—or Yoga either—means any particular system of metaphysical truth" (Prof. Edgerton, AJP. p. 5 and p. 7). They had their own doctrines and these were recorded in writings not available to us now (XII. 307. 46a–b).

But while I emphasise the importance of the hitherto neglected statements regarding the Meaning of doctrinal differences between the Sāṃ-
khya and the Yogas, I should not ignore "Yoga are one" in L. MBh. another type of sentences which say that "Whatever is the Scripture of the Sāṃkhya is also the teaching of the Yogas" (MBh. XII. 307. 44) or that "The two Schools are one" (MBh. XII. 305. 19; 316. 4; 305. 31; 310. 8, 26; 318. 71, 100–101). These passages are not in conflict with those noted in the above paragraph. For their meaning we have to depend upon the context, as we have done in the case of similar
statements in the Gitā (see. pp. 25–26). They generally refer to the theory of the Nature which was common to both the Sāmkhya and the Yogas (XII. 307. 44; 310. 8, 26, 71, 100–101; and also 311, 312, 313). It was this part of the doctrine which the Sāmkhya were the first to make their own and which the Yogas accepted exactly as the Sāmkhya taught (XII. 308. Id.). Otherwise, such statements refer to the same-ness of the 'goal' in the two systems (XII. 300. 8–9). They never intend to say that the conception of the individual soul was the same in the two Schools; rather, as we shall see later on, this and as a corollary to it, the nature of absolution were the very points on which they differed. It is where the interpreters of the L. MBh, have extended the application of the statements concerning the unity or identity of the Sāmkhya and the Yoga to such doctrinal matters as are not meant by the context, that they have actually gone beyond the text of the Mahābhārata.

In this connection it would not be wrong once again to refer to the statements in the L. MBh. which always say that the Sāmkhyas have only twenty-five

The Twentysixth principles (XII 302, 38, 306. 43–44; 305. never said to be a 38. 307. 2, 47; 308. 14). The other Principle of the statements which mention the Twenty-sixth always refer either to the two Sāmkhya School. Yoga Schools or to the Aupanśada School of the later Mahābhārata. There is no verse in the L. MBh. where it is said that the Sāmkhya had a Twentysixth principle. "The Sāmkhya see the Twentysixth" (XII. 318 79) means that they believe in the Twentysixth of the Aupanśadas, which they call the Twentyfifth in their own System. Even XII. 308. 14–17 which refers to the Twentysixth of the Yoga is wonderfully accurate when it says that the Sāmkhyas mention "twenty-five principles" (XII. 308 14). The Sāmkhyas believed that the budhyamāna becomes the buddha, but they never said that the Twentyfifth becomes the Twentysixth, because in their School the budhyamāna is always numerically identical with buddha.
Thus we have seen that, so far as the statements about the number and nature of the principles in the two Schools of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga are concerned, they do admit of doctrinal difference between them, though they also refer to the identity of some points of the teaching. Let us now see how far these statements are corroborated by the actual teaching itself.

The Yogas had rejected the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, just as the Sāṃkhyas had done. Whenever the Sāṃkhyas are described as not having accepted the budhiyamāna avyakta, sāsvata avyakta or acyuta pañcarūpiniṣa, the Yogas are always mentioned as their companions (see p. 42–43).

The second point of similarity between these two Schools is that they have the same view about Prakṛti or the Nature, and this follows as a natural consequence of their joint rejection of the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas just noticed above. The statement, “The same is the doctrinal teaching of both these Schools” (MBh. XII. 307. 44), is immediately followed by other statements: “I have narrated to you the highest principle of the Sāṃkhya” (307. 47), and “The teaching of the Yoga is said to consist of budhiyamāna and buddha” (307. 48). These sentences restrict the sense of 307. 44 and show that only the doctrine of the Nature, which has been given in the verses that precede 307. 44, is the same in the two Schools; thus we are not allowed to say that “The Systems are two but the teaching is the same,” as Prof. Hopkins holds, or that the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga have no part in the discussion of philosophical teaching but are only two paths even in the Mahābhārata, as Prof. Edgerton believes. My interpretation of 307. 44 is proved by 308. 1, where we read:

“[The followers of the Yoga] making the Atman multiple (i.e. twofold, as we shall see below), relate the same (twenty-four) principles (ātmānaḥ bahudhāḥ kṛtvā tāny eva pravacāṣate).”
This is followed by: "The budhyamāna transforming this ( etad i.e. the avyakta ) in this way ( i.e., in the way taught by the Sāṃkhya in the preceding chapter ) does not know ( ceases to be a knower )" ( etad evaṃ vikurvāno budhyamāno na budhyate — 308. 2a-b ) These two verses ( 308. 1–2 ) are to be taken with 307. 46 and 48, and 308. 1a–b which clearly say that the author describes the Yoga School in 308 with which we are concerned here. "Tāny eva pravicaksate" and " etad evaṃ vikurvāṇah " show that only the doctrine of the Nature is common to the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, while "ātmānam bahudhā kṛtvā " establishes beyond any possibility of doubt my thesis that the Yogas differed from the Sāṃkhyas in so far as they ( i.e. the Yogas ) believed in the Jīva to be different from the Brahman or purusa ( as we shall see below ). Without giving here other passages ( enumerated above ) or explaining further the meanings of the above verses, I refer my reader to the following note which will convince him that Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen Interpretation also have failed to understand even the fundamentals of this Yoga School. It is sufficient to say here that the Yogas accepted the twentyfour principles, but unlike the Sāṃkhyaśas, said that the Jīva is the modifying agent of the Twentyfourth as distinct from the Supreme Soul.

NOTE.—As the whole of Chapter 308 is misunderstood by my predecessors, I must here say something to justify my interpretations. (1) "Ātmānam bahudhā kṛtvā " is explained by Prof. Hopkins as: "The Lord-Spirit divides himself into many" ( GÉI, p. 134, 136 ). This is quite wrong; kṛtvā can refer only to the subject of pravicaksate, which must be in the plural number: it were the Yogas who "made the Atman multiple ( i.e. two-fold )". It is indeed surprising to find that even Prof. Deussen has committed the same mistake ( VPTMN, p. 633 ). (2) It should also be pointed out that none of these scholars seems to have understood "tāny eva" in "tāny eva pravicaksate: " the expression undoubtedly refers to the "twenty-four principles," and explains 307. 44. (3) Prof. Hopkins explains vikurvāna ( 308. 2 ) as vikṛti and budhyamāna as Brahman! I see no reason for not explaining vikurvāṇah as nom. sing. of the present participle of vi + kṛ. According to
the Yoga School *budhyamāna* was the individual soul (see below) and is quite different from the Supreme Soul whom they called *buddha*, and therefore Prof. Hopkins' interpretation is due to a grave misunderstanding regarding the fundamental doctrines of this Yoga School. Prof. Deussen shares the same blunder (VPTM. p. 633).

The third point of similarity to be noticed here is the conception of the *sumnum bonum* in the two Schools, which they had in common of *sumnum bonum*. with the Aupaniṣadas and in a certain sense with the Pāñcarātras. To explain the situation of those days, *aṅkṣara* and *puruṣa* were both of them regarded as the goals of life. This idea was inherited from the EMU and the Gitā. As a result, all philosophers who accepted either of these two singly (like the Sāmkhyas and the Yogas) and also those who identified the two into one (like the Pāñcarātras, see Sec. 4 below) could be, in that sense, said to have recognised the same *sumnum bonum*. While describing the numerical designations in all the four Schools of the days of the later Mahābhārata (pp. 32–34), and also the doctrines which the Sāmkhyas accepted from the Aupaniṣadas (pp. 44–47), while showing that the idea of God was the same in the Sāmkhya as in the Aupaniṣada School and therefore the former was not atheistic (pp. 47–48), and lastly while pointing out that the L. MBh. Sāmkhya is in a way like the *sāmkhya*-path of the Gitā (p. 52), I had occasions to refer to the fact that the *puruṣa* (not to be distinguished from *aṅkṣara* in its capacity as the "goal" and not yet to be identified with it) was the "goal" of the Sāmkhyas. Now, I shall show that the "goal" of the Yogas was also not different from that of the Aupaniṣadas.

But before we can properly understand the "goal" in the L.MBh. Yoga, it is here necessary to point out that the L.MBh. mentions Schools in L.MBh. two Yoga Schools. One was taught originally by Hiraṇyagarbha (XII. 308. 45), while the head of the other was Rudra (316. 5; 318. 52). "O you, controller of your enemies, know the
Yogas with Rudra at their head to be other Yogas” (rudrapradhānān aparāṇ viddhu yogan aindama-316. 5a-b), and, “They move about in all the ten quarters with the self-same body till the dissolution of the world” (316. 6). “Aparāṇ yogāṇi” (316.5) refers to the distinction between these Rudrite Yogas and the Yogas described in the Chapter and the verses that precede 316.5. The origin of these two Schools of Yoga is undoubtedly to be trace to the Bh.

The Germ of which knows the term yōga to have both present in the two technical meanings (Bh. Gī. II. 48, 50 and VI. 23; see Introduction, p. 4). While the Gītā did not enumerate the Yoga Schools as two because they were then in their infancy, the definite statement in the later Mahābhārata noticed above is indicative of the progress of thought during the period intervening between the composition of the two works. It also shows that the L.MBh., as we have

Their Priority to it, is prior to the Classical period of the Classical Yoga. Indian Philosophy which knows only one Yoga School viz., the dhyānayōga which the Gītā explains as duḥkhasanyogavāyoga (Bh. Gī. VI. 23) and the L.MBh. as rudrapradhānayōga. The Gītā uses the terms yōga and karmayoga for the other Yoga; the later Mahābhārata seems to refer to a later development of this Yoga when it mentions the Hīranyagarbha Yoga School (308. 45). In interpreting the Gītā and the L.MBh. we must not lose sight of these two meanings of the word (in the former) and two Schools having the same name (in the latter). When these texts themselves explain the term yōga to have two independent technical meanings recognised as such in the days of their composition, it is not reasonable to identify “karmayoga” with “dhyānayoga” (through the word yogakṛtya “practices or exercises of Yoga” used for Prof. Edgerton’s “dhyānayōga” in the L.MBh.), and to and prof. Hopkins’ say that “there was only ‘one method’ Views untenable. called Yoga but the word had two interpretations”, as Prof. Edgerton has done (AJP, pp. 40–46). Again Prof. Hopkins, and others who argue that the Mahābhārata (the Gītā included) is an
effort to render the Classical Śaṁkhya theistic on the analogy of the Classical Yoga, seem to have been led to such a conclusion, partly at least, on account of having overlooked the distinction between the two Yoga Schools of L. MBh. and therefore the notice I have here taken of this fact will not be deemed unnecessary.

Now, we shall not be surprised to find that these two Yoga Schools have two different conceptions of the final goal, both of which were recognised as equally good, at that time. Hiranyagarbha (308.45) is mentioned as the teacher of the Yogas described in 308, and verses 31–51 of that Chapter described aksara to be their goal or highest principle which (aṁśara) they called the Twentysixth (308 7–8) These Yogas rejected aṁśara as the higher Nature but accepted it as the goal; and as the Gītā had already made this twofold distinction in the conception of aṁśara it is quite natural that the same discrimination is made by these Yogas. Unlike these Hiranyagarbha Yogas, the Rudrīte Yogas contemplated on ṁpurusa. “Having thus enumerated (their principles up to Prakṛti, as stated in the preceding verse), they meditate on the absolute eternal, infinite, pure, the woundless (avṛti), constant ṁpurusa, the invulnerale, ageless, deathless, eternal, unchanging Lord and the unchanging Brahman (316.16, 17, 25)”. Thus, the two Yoga Schools respectively believed in aṁśara and ṁpurusa as the goal.

Besides the two passages (308.31–52, 7–8 and 316.16–17, 25) we have to consider one more passage on this subject, viz., 318.79e–f. It says that “The Śaṁkhya and the Yogas accept the Twentysixth”. I have already explained how it describes the Śaṁkhya doctrine of those days (see p. 47 above). As regards its application to the two Yoga Systems I do not think we have any difficulty in understanding it. Chapter 318 mainly deals with the Aupaniṣada doctrine (see p. 34 above), and therefore the verse in question means “The Yogas see the Twentysixth of the Aupa-
niṣadas”, and this applies easily to the Rudrīte Yogas whose Twentysixth was the puruṣa. But the verse can also mean “The Yogas see their own Twentysixth”, and this would be correct with reference to both the Schools of the Yoga, because according to both the Twentysifth was the individual soul, and so the Twentysixth was aksa (as the goal) with the Hiranyagarbha Yogas and puruṣa with the Rudra Yogas. Thus, according to the verse (318.79 e–f) the Twentysixth of the Apaniṣadas, viz., the puruṣa, was accepted by the Śaṅkhya (but as the Twentysifth in their System) and also by the Rudra Yogas (with whom the puruṣa was the Twentysixth). As Rudra is mentioned in the list of the teachers in that Chapter (318.52) and as Hiranyagarbha is wanting in the same, I am inclined to believe that the author had in his mind the Rudrite Yogas (in 79e–f), though the verse applies also to the Hiranyagarbha Yogas if we construe the text in a way not uncommon to the Sanskrit literature. (The views of Professors Hopkins and Jacobi on “the Twentysixth” in 318. 79. and elsewhere in MBh. have been already discussed on p. 30 ff. above).

There is one more point in which the Yogas seem to have resembled the Śaṅkhya. It is said that

The Conception of the Career of Life.

“The practice or observance (i.e. the career of life) followed by the Śaṅkhya and the Yogas is the same” (tāḥ ubhāṃ ekacarvan—MBh. XII. 316. 2c, quoted above on p.50). In the L.MBh. though the Śaṅkhya are said to be Yatis (ascetics), the Yogas are not said to be karmayogins which they are actually and most emphatically declared to be in the Gītā. Moreover, instead of contrasting Śaṅkhya and Yoga on the basis of renunciation and action, the L. MBh. mentions three niṣīḥs without Reference to Schools.

The L. MBh. Conception of Three niṣīḥs, without Reference to Schools.

In contrast, the Śaṅkhya and Yoga are clearly distinguished in the Gītā. The Yoga is said to be kṣīyā (most probably referring to the Pāncarātras who were particularly favored by one or other of these latter. They are called loka niṣīḥa (traceable in the Śaṅkhya Schools, kṣīyā kūnūm (most probably referring to the Pāncarātras who were
Yatis devoting themselves to big sacrifices offered to Nārāyaṇa), and jñānakārmasamuccaya followed by Janaka. These are described in MBh. XII. 320. 39–40 and 345. 92. It is most striking that, though Janaka himself refers to the Schools under the names of "sāṁkhyaṇāna", "yoga", and "mahāpālavidhi" (i.e. the Path of Devotion, cf. rāṣṭridya and rajaguhya in Bh. Gī. IX. 2) in 320. 25 and again to the three niṣṭhās, mentioned above, in 320. 39–40, still he does not connect them with each other; on the contrary, he says that Pañcaśikha taught the jñānakārmasamuccaya niṣṭhā, though he was himself a Sāṁkhya philosopher. Thus, in the days of the L.Mbh. the careers of life were independent of the metaphysical doctrine. This, again, is in consistency with the progress of thought during the period intervening between the Gītā and the L.Mbh., during which the sāṁkhya and the yoga paths became Schools of these names.

Before we begin to examine the points of difference between the L.Mbh. Yogas and Sāṁkhya, it is necessary to make a few remarks regarding the terminology of the Yogas. The Yogas seem to have specially favoured the designations a-pralibuddha or a-prabuddha, budhyamāna, and buddha (rather than the Twentyfourth, the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth—which they also used in

Terminology of pursuance of the fashion of the day. It L. MBh. Yoga is probable that these expressions referring to the presence or absence of "consciousness" in the philosophical principles were originated by the Yogas and accepted by the Sāṁkhya and the Apanaṇḍadas with such additions and alterations as would suit their own Systems. This fact should be carefully noted because as yet these terms have not been definitely recognised as technical terms by those who have interpreted the Mahābhārata. There is ample evidence that these (terms) are used in the L.Mbh. in a conventional and not in the etymological sense, though the latter must have been the basis of the former. In 307. 47 the author brings to a close his description of the Sāṁkhya doctrine (sāṁkhya-
tu param tattvam vathavad anvavritam—307.47c-d) and then thus begins the Yoga teaching: “Buddha and buddhyamana, because he (the latter, i.e. the soul) is not in reality the pratibuddha, buddhyamana and buddha, they declared to be the Yoga doctrine” (307.48). (The Kumbhakoṇam ed. reads “buddham apratibuddhaham ca buddhyamanaḥ ca tatvataliḥ” in place of 307.48a-b of Bombay ed., which is intended to show that three principles of these three names are taught by the Yogas.) Now, hear the following guṇavidhi (classification of the principles?) [concerning] buddha and abuddha. [The Yogas] (see above 307.48) making the Atman multiple (bahudhā, i.e. twofold; see below) assert the same (tāṇy eva, i.e., the twenty-four principles of the Sāṃkhya, described in 307) (308.1). The budhyamana modifying this [Unmanifest or abuddha mentioned in verse 1] in this way does not know (i.e. ceases to be a knower of the Twentysixth?). He upholds the constituents, he creates and withdraws them. He does so continuously for the sake of mere sport (308.2,3a-b). And they call the budhyamana [sc] because he knows the Unmanifest (308.3c-d). But the Unmanifest being itself possessed of the constituents never (na kaci) knows [the budhyamana who is] the Constituentless, [therefore] they call it (n.) apratibuddhak (308.4). But when this Twentysixth (n., sc. tattvam) knows the Unmanifest, the budhyamana certainly becomes attached to the world; so says the Śrutī (of the Yogas). For this reason [the Yogas] call the unfallen Unmanifest (acyuta ayyakta) “aprati-buddha” (308.5). And they call the Twentysixth “budhyamana” because he knows the Unmanifest, but even he does not know the Great Atman (mahātman) (308.6). The Twentysixth (n.), the buddha, which is pure, incomprehensible, eternal, knows eternally (sataṭam.......budhyate, the Twentysixth and the Twentyfourth (308.7). Here, the Unmanifest (i.e. the Twentysixth), the absolute Brahman, which is by its very nature permeating the visible and the invisible, is, O friend of great lustre, the [sole] Knower in this world. The Twentyfourth does not see the Absolute (kevala) and the Twentyfifth” (308.9a-b).
From this quotation it would appear that verse 307.48 associates budhyamāna and buddha and (according to the Kumbhakonam ed.) apratibuddha (also mentioned in 308.4) specially with the Yoga School. Secondly it is clear from the verbal forms vadāniḥ (308.3d, 6b) and āhūth (4d) that these are sanjñās “technical names”. If we look to what follows, we also find that apratibuddha, budhyamāna and buddha are the names of the principles (308.21c–d, 22a–b). It is also clear from the above that these Yogas called them respectively the Twentyfourth, the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth. It is further evident that the three are defined here in such a way that the possibility of their being reduced to two at any stage of development is precluded. Apratibuddha is “never a knower” (4a, c), i.e. one which can never become budhyamāna or buddha. Buddha is “eternally a knower” (7c–d), so the budhyamāna can never become the buddha. The three must eternally remain three; and we shall see later on that this position is maintained throughout by the author of this Chapter. They are also numbered as the three. The remarks concerning these terms made already (on pp. 42–43 and p. 51) and the following note will convince the reader that Professors Hopkins, Deussen and Edgerton have committed grave blunders in not interpreting these terms as technical.

**Note.**—The fact that the interpreters of the L. MBh. School have not until now recognised these three as three principles of these names becomes clear if we look to their interpretations. Prof. Edgerton translates 307.48 as follows: “The (soul) becoming-enlightened and that-is-enlightened is declared to be (also) the substance of Yoga teaching” (so that there is, as stated, no difference in the Sāmkhya and Yoga views of truth)”. Besides other objections to be raised against this translation later on, I would here point out that Prof. Edgerton has failed to understand that budhyamāna and buddha are two principles of these names and not two conditions of the same soul. This is evident from the fact that he has done away with the repeated “ca” in 308.44c–d. While 307.48 clearly says that the budhyamāna is budhyamāna “because in reality it is not pratibuddha (or, to use the usual form, buddha) and while 308.3–7 distinguishes budhyamāna as a knower (of the Nature) and buddha as an eternal knower (of the other
two), Prof. Hopkins sees the identity of the individual spirit and the Lord-Spirit in verse 307.48. In doing so, he neglects the context. If the *budhyamāna* became the *buddha* (or, in other words, if the Twentifth became identical with the Twentysixth), how could the Twentysixth be said to be "eternally knowing the Twentifth and the Twenti-fourth"? This shows that *budhyamāna* and *buddha* are here two principles and not conditions. (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 134). I have already mentioned Prof. Hopkins' and Prof. Deussen's explanations of 308.1 above. Prof. Hopkins explains *apratībuddha* in 308.4, not as a name for the Unmanifest, but as that of the individual soul (GEI. p. 135). Prof Deussen interprets "caud (n.) evam vikurvānah" (308.2) as "As he changes himself in this way......," and "budhyamāna" (in 308.5c) as "knowing" (i.e. as an adj.) though in 307.48 he interprets the same word as "the Awakening" (i.e. as a noun): this proves that even Prof. Deussen did not decide for himself whether these are technical terms or adjectives (VPTM. 633). 308.6a–b means according to Deussen: "Through him, the Prakṛti has not yet been [fully] known (*apratībuddha*—Prof. Deussen does not understand that according to the context *apratībuddha eli* stands for "*apratībuddha*—not *apratībibuddha* dahā—+iti" i.e. for *aprabuddham iti*), so they say with reference to the Unmanifest, Imperturbable". No more examples will be necessary for proving that the terminology of the L MBh. Yogas (and, in a sense, that of other L MBh. Schools who also used the same terms with modifications) has been till now not correctly understood. Henceforth I shall restrict myself to giving a consistent interpretation of 308 as I believe it to be, and request the reader to compare it with those of Professors Deussen and Hopkins wherever these be available. (*Abuddha* in 308.1 is a short form of *apratībuddha* in 4 and 5 and also in 21, used metrical cause).

Now, we shall be able to understand how the L MBh. Yogas differed from the L MBh. Sāmkhyas. The most prominent point of difference was the distinction of the Jiva from the Paramātman, which these Yogas made for the first time in the history of Indian Philosophy, just as the Sāmkhyas separated the Nature from the Puruṣa for the first time by the rejection of the higher Nature.
As we have seen (in 308. 1) the Yogas made the Atman "multiple" bahudhā. The meaning of bahudhā must depend upon the context between Jiva and which, as we can learn from the verses that follow 308. 1, shows that unlike the Śaṃskhyas, the Yogas have two Atmans, the budhyamāna and the buddha, the Twentysixth and the Twenty-fifth. It will have been also noticed that the budhyamāna is here the creator and destroyer (308. 2-3) while the buddha is permeating the visible and the invisible world without taking any part in the creation. The buddha is (at first) not known even to the budhyamāna (308. 6c-d) and has apparently nothing to do with creation and destruction on account of its seeing the other two eternally. Thus, bahudhā is used for dvīdhā partly because of metrical reasons and partly because, as in those days when only one Atman was known to the Śaṃskhyas there was no possibility of its being confounded if the Yoga doctrine was contrasted with their view. Thus, there is no support to the interpretation of bahudhā as implying plurality of souls. (Moreover, as already said, it is not the "Lord of the World who makes himself many", as was interpreted by Prof. Hopkins, see p. 60 above.) The following verses (308. 9c-d, 17) bring out this fundamental difference between the two Schools quite distinctly:

"When the budhyamāna thinks of himself that he is of a different nature [from the Twentysixth], then he is 'Unmanifest-eyed' avyaktalakśana because he is possessed of Prakṛti (9c-d, 10a-b). But when he knows the supreme knowledge pure and unimpure, he attains to 'the state of the buddha' (buddhatva) like the Twentysixth (10c-d, 11a-b).

Then, he gives up the Unmanifest which Evidence for the is of the nature of creation and dissolution (11c-d). Then, he who is devoid of the attributes knows the Nature (prakṛti) as possessed of attributes and as devoid of consciousness. Then, he comes to possess the attributes [buddhatva etc.] of the Absolute (i.e. the Twentysixth—
308. 8), because of his having seen the Unmanifest (i.e. Brahman, as said in 308. 8) (12). Having come into contact with the Absolute, the liberated soul will reach the Atman” (13a–b). “This non-principle, ageless and deathless, they (i.e. the Sāṃkhya) call ‘principle’

The Sāṃkhya (tattvam) (13c–d). But it is not [to be criticised by the deal with] as a principle (tattvavat na) Yogas, ‘because it resorts to the principles’ (tattvasamprayañāi). Learned people (i.e., the Sāṃkhya) speak of twenty-five ‘principles’ (tattvas) (14). But he is not ‘possessed of principles’ (tattvavan); rather this intelligent one is a ‘non-principle’ (nislattva). He leaves far behind (i.e. is entirely different from) the (Sāṃkhyo) principle of which buddhatva is predicated (by the Sāṃkhya). The highly conscious one (prajña), the ageless and deathless, the Twenty-sixth, when being conceived of [by the Twenty-fifth or the Jiva] with the notion of ‘I’ (i.e. I am the prajña) becomes identical [with the meditator] undoubtedly only through force (kevalena balen eva) [but not in reality]⁰ (16). By [the side of] the Twenty-sixth i.e. the prabuddha, even the budhyamāna (i.e. the Twenty-fifth) is ignorant.” This is said to be the distinction” [of the Yoga School] from the teaching of the Sāṃkhyo Scripture (17).

Notes.—1. These two verses (9c–d and 10a–b should be construed together (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 135, differs). “Of a different nature” stands for anyah, because, as said in verse 26ft, the liberation of the soul from the world lies in the Twenty-fifth becoming like the Twenty-sixth. Prof. Hopkins’ translation: ‘thinks that I am the other’, is based upon a complete misunderstanding of the Yoga doctrine in this Chapter. ‘Anyakta-locana’ is confirmed by Kumbb. ed.; the reading proposed by Prof. Hopkins, viz., ‘vyakta-locana’ is not necessary; so also his proposed reading aprakrtmān in place of prakrtmān. ‘Anyaka-locana’ means “one who sees through the influence of the Unmanifest, the Nature” and also “one whose eyes are not anointed with collyrium (and therefore cannot see clearly)”. 2. Yathā sādhvamsiḥ gives the standard of comparison for buddhatva, the sādhana dharma which would then belong to both the budhyamāna and the buddha. Prof. Edgerton’s interpretation, “the budhyamāna,
as the Twentysixth (ṣaḍvimsatāḥ yathā) will attain to buddhatva", is, besides being in itself meaningless, in disharmony with the context, which shows that the budhyamāna never becomes the buddha (see also Prof. Deussen VPTM. p. 634). 3. 'Kevaladharmā and 'kevalena samāgamyā' in verse 13 shows that "śaḍvimsatāḥ yathā" is the upamāna here, and that the Twentyfifth does not become the Twentysixth in the state of absolotion. Prof. Deussen’s translation of "kevaladharmā bhavah" as "and becomes the Absolute" is inaccurate; so, also his translation of kevalena samāgamyā as "having become one with the Absolute".

4. Aitmūnam āpnyayāt is an expression for the state of liberation; it cannot mean "reaches his real self" if such an expression implies any theory of Illusion (Prof. Deussen, VPTM. p. 634). "Āluḥ" in 13 shows that a School other than that in 308 is probably referred to here and verse 14 shows that this other School is the Sāmkhya School (see 307. 40, 47; 305, 43 etc. where the Sāmkhya is said to have only twenty-five principles). Etad nistattvam in 13c–d refers to kevala in 13a. Ajāraṇaram in 13d—the Yogas would never allow that the Supreme Being becomes subject to old age and death, unlike the Sāmkhyas who held that the Supreme Being itself is bound and again liberated. This postion of the Yogas is quite consistent with their view that the budhyamāna (and not the buddha) is the creator and destroyer and that the Twentysixth knows the Twentyfifth and the Twentyfourth eternally (308. 2, 7). The buddha serves for the buṭhyamāna as an ideal as it were (308. 11). The budhyamāna becomes kevaladharmā, not kevala itself (12–13); he can come into contact with the kevala and hope to be thereby liberated only if the latter is eternally a b o v e bondage and liberation (13).

5. In my opinion we have here a protest of the Yogas against the custom of the Sāmkhyas who called the Supreme Being (the Twentysixth of the Yogas) “a tattva” on the ground that it resorts to the tattvas. According to the Yogas, the Supreme One never resorts to the tattvas as we have seen in 308. 6–8, and therefore it can never be called a tattva even in the secondary sense. In other words, the Yogas do not admit that the budhyamāna becomes the buddha in liberation; the buddha never resorts to the principles at all during its eternal existence. The position of the Sāmkhyas, “tattvasamāṣrayanāḥ tattvam”, is often met with in the L. MBh. e.g. in 302. 38:

"Pañcavimsatilamu Viṣṇur nistattvas tattvasamāṣrayanāḥ

\[\text{tattvasamāṣrayanāḥ etat tattvam āhu maniṣṭṛah}\]"
See also 306. 41; 307. 47; 306. 43; 302. 38. 6. "But he is not possessed of principles" amounts to "he never resorts to the principles". 7-8. Here the followers of the Yoga emphatically assert their view that the Supreme Being is in no sense a tattva, he is a nistattva. 9. i.e., He is not a principle with the characteristic buddhatva, but is no principle at all, though he should be called the Twentysixth, as these Yogas do. The followers of the Yoga object to the term tattva being applied to the Supreme Being and, for this reason, are bound to reject the Supreme Being of the Sāmkhyas whom they called "buddha" and also "tattva". Again, "buddhatvalaksanam tattvam", "a principle (and again) called buddha", is to be found only in the Sāmkhya School, not in the Yoga; the latter would accept buddhatvalaksanam nistattvam. This seems to be the sense of verse 15. As regards the position of the Sāmkhyas, 306. 44 when considered along with 307. 37 would mean that the Twentysifth who, when influenced by prakṛti, is called budhyamāna, becomes kevala (306. 44d) and buddha ("now I am buddha" 307. 37c) when he knows himself (306. 44c). The Yogas refused to accept the identity of the two. 10. The repetition of ajarānāra (in 13, 16) shows that it forms an important argument of the Yogas; the Jiva is subject to death and old age, the Supreme Being is according to Yoga eternally free from these; there is no possibility of there being complete identity between the two even after the former's absolution. Aham iti gṛhyāṇaṁ refers to the method of meditation, in which the object of meditation is thought of as identical with the self of the meditator. "Kevalena baleva eva" is a simple expression and means "only by force" i.e., "never in reality", the reason is, as explained above, that the saṁvivāsa is not like the pañcarāma; there can be no real identity between the two; the identity achieved during the meditation is an unreal conjectural one, as it is based upon mere force and on no reasonable grounds. Prof. Hopkins has failed to notice the emphasis underlying the expression "kevalena baleva eva" and then he comes to the conclusion quite contrary to the one given above (see GEI. p. 135) Prof. Edgerton interprets it as, "by the mere abstract power" and adds, by way of explanation, "the power of this knowledge"; I do not think "baleva" should be here interpreted as "the power of knowledge"; the context shows that all identity of the individual soul with the Supreme One is denied here (Prof. Edgerton, AJP, Vol. X.I.V, 1924). Prof. Edgerton, seems to have followed Prof. Deussen (VPTM p. 635). All the three interpreters believe that in the present verse the
identity is taught by the Yogas. But the next verse solves the problem. 11. This seems to mean: The Twentyfifth never becomes identical with the Twenty-sixth because though the former is budhyamāna, the latter is prabuddha. This was already said in verse 6: “Even he (i.e., the budhyamāna) does not know the Great Atman”. “Prabuddha” shows that the buddha eternally knows the budhyamāna who knows the former only during liberation. 12. “Nānātva” in verse 17 refers to the difference between the Yogas and the Sāmkhya Schools. In 13 and 14 the Sāmkhya doctrine has been introduced as the view of an opponent; and the word “tu” in 13c shows the same. Again, the remarks, “it is not like tatvā” (14b) and “That intelligent one is nistatvā, and has no tatvā” (15a-b) indicate that here the Sāmkhya view has been rejected; because elsewhere in the Sāmkhya text (302-307) it is always said that though the Twentyfifth (of the Sāmkhyas, of course) is a non-principle, it is yet a principle because it resorts to principles. Moreover we are given here the facts that the buddha or the Twenty-sixth of the Yogas is “no principle characterised as buddha”, that the identity of the Jiva and the Supreme Soul is a forced one; and that the budhyamāna, as compared with the buddha is ignorant. All these arguments show that the difference between the Yoga and the Sāmkhya Schools is meant here by the word “nānātva”. In 308 1.c-d we are told that “the Yogas having made the Atman multiple (i.e. twofold, as already shown above) describe the same (n. plu.) (principles)”; and it is exactly in agreement with this statement that these verses (308. 9c-d—17) explain the difference between the two Schools on the problem of the Yoga view of Atman. The Yogas actually taught two Atmans, the Twenty-fifth and the Twenty-sixth. Verse 14 has clearly said that the Sāmkhyas accept only twentyfive tatvās including the Twenty-fifth as tatvā because it resorts to the tatvās, there is no indication here that the Sāmkhyas accepted the Twenty-sixth. Prof. Deussen translates verse 17 as follows: “But when he has become awakened through the awake Twentysixth, he [still] continues being ignorant (so ist er weiter erkenntnislos, 17a-b which, however, has nothing like “weiter”), because this [opposition of the subject and the object in the act of knowing] is explained to be still a plurality according to the view of the Sāmkhyas and the Scripture (17c-d)”. And Prof. Hopkins (10c. cit. p. 135) explains the same in the following manner, “That separateness of spirits (nānātva, M.) which is part of the exposition of Sāmkhya is really (explained by) the conditioned spirit (budhyamāna? M.) when not fully (? M.
enlightened (abuddhīmāṇa, M) by the (fully) ( ? M.) enlightened Twentysixth." Prof. Edgerton takes "citām nānātvam ity uklam" (17c) to mean "This (consciousness) implies plurality" (Prof. Edgerton, AJP. Vol. XLV, 1924). It will be seen that all these interpreters have not realised the importance of the terms buddhyamāna and buddha as names of metaphysical principles. It is difficult to understand what meaning Prof. Deussen makes out of 17a–b. Though the term nānātva can mean "plurality", it can also mean "difference", as in the present case. Moreover, I do not think that in 308 we have anywhere "the opposition of the subject and the object". As regards Prof. Hopkins' translation, I have shown that the L. MBh. Śāmkhya knows nothing of the plurality of individual souls implied in his words "separateness of spirits". (There is a separateness of spirits here, viz., that of the Twentysifth and the Twentysixth; but this is far from Prof. Hopkins' meaning.) Moreover, his translation is too free to be of any value in understanding the text. There are other minor differences between my interpretation and those of others, these have not been noticed here. It will be seen that the second point of difference between the two Schools of L. MBh, to be presently noticed, will also prove the correctness of the interpretation proposed by me above.

The above translation of 308. 9c–d—17 and the notes added to it, which fully refute the incorrect interpretations of Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen, prove that the L. MBh. Yoga differed from the L. MBh. Śāmkhya as regards the Atman. The Yoga believed in two Atmans, the Twentysifth and the Twentysixth, while the Śāmkhyas believed in only one viz., the Twentifth. The Twentifth of the Yoga is the creator and destroyer, and their Twentysixth has nothing to do with the world. The Yogas objected to calling the latter a tattva and rejected the Śāmkhya view on that point.

As a natural consequence of the separation of the Jīva from the Supreme Being, which this Yoga School taught for

* Bracketed additions marked M. (Modi) are my own.
the first time in the history of the Indian Philosophy, they were led to reject the then existing view about the nature of liberation or release from worldly existence. But as this Yoga School found itself confronted specially by the Sāṃkhyaśa, the explanation of their teaching on this point, like that on the question of the separateness of the Jīva from the Lord, has assumed the form of a criticism of the Sāṃkhya view on the same topic. This has been already suggested in the verses translated above. The "bondage" was said to consist in the budhyamāna becoming attached to the world (308. 5). It was said that the budhyamāna does not know the Great Atman (during his bondage) (308. 6), and that when he thinks himself to be other [than the Twentysixth] he comes into possession of Prakṛti (308. 9c-d, 10a-b), and that when he "knows (i.e. acquires) the pure knowledge" he attains the buddha-state like (that of) the Twentysixth. The fact that he does not himself become the Twentysixth was made clear by stating that in absolutism he becomes (not kevala but) kevaladharmā (308. 12c). This last one is the point emphatically stated in verses 18-30 to be now examined.

"The identity (ekatva) of this Twentyfifth united with the Conscious One (cetanena sametasya), takes place, when he (i.e. the Twentyfifth) does not cognize [any longer] by means of the intellect [and not when he merges himself into the Supreme] strange, the Twentysixth, as Prof. Hopkins implies] (18). When the budhyamāna attains equality (samatāṃ yāḥ) with the prabuddha, he ‘whose nature was attachment’ (saṃgadharmaḥ) becomes unattached (19). Having reached the unattached, the Twentysixth, the unborn and omnipresent, the omnipresent same.

Evidence for the [Jīva] abandons the Unmanifest, the Twentyfourth, when he knows it to be worthless, through the knowledge of the Twentysixth (20-21a-b)⁴. Here the apratibuddha, the budhyamāna and the buddha have been to-day described to you in their proper way according
to the teaching in the [Yoga] Sruti (21c–d, 22a–b). The similarity and the dissimilarity (ekatva and nānātva) [of the budhyamāna and the buddha] should be seen from the teaching in the [Yoga] Scripture as follows (etāvad) (22c–d): The dissimilarity (anyatva) between these two [the budhyamāna and the buddha] is like that between the fruit of the tree of Ficus Glomerata and the worm [residing in it]; the distinction (anyatva) between the two can be perceived also as that between the fish and the water7 (23). Only thus (evam eva) should be understood the non-identity and identity and of these two. This [knowledge of the identity and the non-identity] together with the knowledge of the Unmanifest criticised by the (i.e. the Nature, the apratibuddhaka, the Yogas. Twentyfourth) is called [in the Yoga School] the liberation (24). They [i.e. the Sāmkhyas] say that this one here, viz., the Twentyfifth who lives in the [various] bodies [by turn] is to be made free from the sphere (or power) of the Unmanifest (25). It is the decision [of the Yogas] that he [i.e. "the Twentyfifth in the body"] might be released only in this way and not otherwise12. Having associated13 with the Highest he comes to possess the attributes of the Highest (26). Having come into association ("samelya," occurring four times in 27–30) with the pure (śuddha), the Awakened (buddha), the [ever—] liberated (mukta) the one whose nature is [eternal] separation [from prakṛti], who possesses absolution, whose nature is pure, who is absolute and independent, the Twentyfifth comes to possess as his attributes purity, awakening (buddha), liberation, separation (Kumbh. ed.), purity...........and becomes independent" (308. 27–30)15.

Notes.—1. Compare this with "kevalena samāgamya" in 13 above. 2. i.e., ceases to be "Unmanifest-eyed" (10b). "Yada buddhyā na budhyate" cannot here mean "has no longer any consciousness (of self)" (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 135). 3. The liberation consists in the samātmaka (5d) becoming niḥsaṃgamā (19d). 4. Verses 21c–d and 22a–b have been
already explained. They mention three independent principles and thus indirectly show that the preceding verses (18-21a-b) are not intended to mean that the *budhyamāna* becomes identical with the *buddha* even in liberation. 5. *Nānātva* and *ekatva* 22c-d cannot be other than those mentioned in 24b (see below). *Nānātva* is explained as *anyatva* in 23. 6. That the similarity and dissimilarity intended in 22c-d is that between the two viz., the *budhyamāna* and the *buddha*, is proved not only by my interpretation of 13-17a-b and by the fact that there can be no question of *apraḥbudhā* being compared with any of these two, but also from *elayoh* in 23b, d and 25b. 7. The Yoga Twenty-sixth (*buddha*) is here compared with the fruit itself and the Jīva (the *budhyamāna*, the Yoga Twenty-fifth) with the worm within it. The Ficus Glomorata is never known to be without a worm or worms within it. The idea underlying these similes as given here seems to be that just as the fruit and the water are greater than the worm and the fish, so the *buddha* is greater than the *budhyamāna* and therefore the two are “never identical”. The repetition of *anyatva* shows that here the non-identity of the two is emphasised as in 13-17 also. 8. “Only thus”, *evam eva*, implies a protest against the Sāmkhya’s. It means that the *buddha* is like the *budhyamāna*, but is also greater than the latter. Both are knowing principles, but the *buddha’s* knowing is eternal, the *budhyamāna* knows the *buddha* only when he is liberated. 9. It should be noted that verse 24 gives the Yoga view of liberation. This view maintains the non-identity (though likeness also) of the Twenty-fifth and the Twenty-sixth even during absorbed. 10. After having stated their own view (24), it is just proper for the Yogas to mention the Sāmkhya standpoint, which they wanted to refute. *Prāhuḥ* (25c) shows that the hostile view is mentioned here and the statements about the *pañcavimsalaka* leave no doubt that the Sāmkhya is meant here. 11. This expression, though used by the Sāmkhyas, applies well to the Twenty-fifth of the Yogas also and therefore they welcome it. 12. The emphatic expressions: *evam... nānyathā* (23), *iti viniścayāḥ* (26) and *evam eva* (21) are not meaningless, only if we suppose that the Sāmkhya view is criticised here from the Yoga standpoint. So, the Yogas do not accept the Sāmkhya view that the *budhyamāna* becomes *buddha* in liberation or that the Twenty-fifth is both the individual and the universal soul. 13. Note the Yogas’ emphatic use of “sametya” (26). Cf. *sametya* in 18 and *āsādyā* in 20. 14. I follow the v.l. in the Kumbh. ed. which runs as follows: “*pāreṇa paradharmā*
ca bhavya esa sametya vai". The reading in he Bombay ed., 
parascā paradhanā ca bhavya esa sametya vai", is inconsistent 
with the word "sametya" in it and seems to have been intro-
duced by some one who believed the Yoga to teach the identity 
of Jīva and Paramātman. 15. After reading all the verses 
(18–30) it would appear clear that Prof. Deussen and Prof. 
Hopkins are not right in understanding nānātva (in 22,24) to 
refer to the doctrine of the plurality of individual souls (VPTM. 
p. 635, GEI. p. 135). It is evident that nānātva here (as 
invariably in all other places where Prof. Hopkins takes it 
to mean plurality of souls—see App. III) is explained by the 
text itself as anyatva (308,23) and both nānātva and eka 
va of 22 refer to only two (and not to many) in 308,24. We 
have here (22–24) not "the two theories of separateness [of 
many souls] and unity [of two, the Jīva and the Lord], but only 
one theory of the identity and non–identity (bheda bhedā in a 
sense) of the Jīva and Iśvara.

The above interpretation of 308,18–30 and the notes on 
the same will have shown that the Yogas differed for the 
Śaṁkhya on the point of the nature of liberation. Verses 
13–17 show that the Twentysifth and the Twentysixth of the 
Yogas (or, in other words the individual soul and the Supreme 
Being) are different in their very nature, thus they mean 
indirectly that the two are not identical during bondage 
(sansāra); and verses 18–30 aim at 
emphasizing their non–identity even after 
the liberation of the Jīva. According to 
the Yogas, the Jīva never realises himself 
as the Supreme Being which is never 
involved into bondage. So also their 
identity conceived of during meditation is a forced one (16). 
The liberated soul (the Twentysifth in liberation) and the 
Supreme Being (the Twentysixth) are quantitatively 
two though, as regards their attributes they may be said 
to be quantitatively one.

That the Śaṁkhya is criticised here is proved not only 
by the Yogas' persistence on the method of 
salvation described here (24, 26) and by the reference 
to the Śaṁkhya method of the same (25) which (reference)
finds its parallel in 14, but also by another passage viz., XII. 300. 3–4 which unequivocally says that the Sāmkhyas and the Yogas differed in their method and idea of absolution. Further evidence. The Yogas had said: “Antisvarah katham mucyat.” How could the soul be released if he had no God (apart from himself) ? The answer of the Sāmkhyas, which did not admit of God as distinct from the Jīva, is given in 300. 4–5. It was the mokṣadārśana (300. 5) on which the two Schools differed. “Pratyakṣahetavo Yogāḥ Sāmkhyāḥ sāstravimścayāḥ” (300. 7) should therefore refer to the fact that the Yogas for the first time went against the Scriptures in separating the Jīva from Isvara. They argued from direct cognition (pratyakṣa). To them, the idea that God has become bound or that the bound soul becomes God would have appeared most inconsistent. Yet both the Schools had a good number of followers (300. 8).

To sum up: The L. MBh. Yogas had made the Atman “multiple” bahudhā i. e. twofold. the Jīva and the Isvara, while they accepted the same twenty-four principles as the Sāmkhyas (308. 1).

The above explanation of 308. 1–30 contains no indication that the Yogas knew the theory of the plurality of souls.

No Plurality of Souls in the Yoga Schools. The expression bahudhā (308. 1) means dvudhā according to the context, as explained above. Nānātva in 308. 17 or in 308. 22 and 24 has no reference to that theory, as is evident from my translation and notes. I have also shown that even the L. MBh. Sāmkhya did not believe that the souls were many (except in 350. 2 for which see App. III). For all these reasons, both Prof. Deussen (VPTM, p. 635) and Prof. Hopkins (GEI, p. 135) must be said to have failed in their efforts to explain nānātva (in 308. 17, 22 and 24) as plurality of souls. The latter’s interpretation, according to which nānātva (22, 24) refers to the plurality or separateness of individual spirits and ekatva mentioned in the same breath.
refers to the unity of the Twentyfifth and the Twenty-sixth looks absurd, even independently of the context which restricts both nānātva and ekatva to "the two" in 308. 24 (and not to “the many” of Prof. Hopkins).

It will have been noticed that throughout this Chapter (308) the Twenty-sixth is distinguished from the Twenty-fifth (or, that the Jiva aspect of the Twenty-fifth of the Sāmkhya has been fundamentally differentiated from the Iśvara and Mukta aspect of the same so as to make them numerically two). Again, the Sāmkhyas are twice said to have only Twenty-five principles (308. 14, 25), these statements are exceedingly important because they occur in the midst of other statements mentioning the Twenty-sixth (308. 7 11, 16, 17, 20, 21). So, the Twenty-sixth mentioned here is that of the Yoga School, not that of the Sāmkhya. Moreover, I have already shown that the Twenty-sixth in XII. 318. 7e-f is that of the Aupanāṣadas and does not belong to the Sāmkhya as their Twentysixth, though the Twentysixth of the Aupanāṣadas is not different from that of the Twenty-fifth of the Sāmkhya. Finally, the Twenty-fifth never becomes the Twenty-sixth in the any passage in the entire LMBh. Schools. Mahābhārata stating that the Twenty-fifth becomes the Twentysixth in the state of liberation. This was, indeed, impossible (a) in the Aupanāṣada School because their Twentififth and Twenty-sixth were respectively ākṣara and pūrṇa; (b) in the Yoga Schools because they denied that the Twenty-sixth, ākṣara (with the Hiraṇyagarbha Yogas) or pūrṇa (with the Rudra Yogas) and the Twenty-fifth were numerically one; and lastly (c–d) in the Sāmkhya and the Pāñcarātra Schools because they believed only in twenty-five principles. The effort of Prof. Hopkins to find the Twenty-sixth (of the Sāmkhya School!) in 307 which nowhere mentions the name “Twenty-sixth” but on the contrary says that the Sāmkhyas have no principle higher than the Twenty-fifth (307. 47) is not a well guided one. The “friend” (bandhu) mentioned in 307. 27, who is neither
explicitly nor implicitly said to be the Twentysixth, should be construed like the two "friends" in Śve. Up. IV. 6, which knows nothing about the separation of the Jīva and Īśvara (see Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 133).

Just as the origin of the Classical Sāṃkhya is to be traced to the rejection of the higher Nature, so we find, according to the above interpretation of the LMBh., that the origin of the Classical Yoga lies in the rejection of the traditional identity of the Jīva and Īśvara inherited from the days of the Earliest Prose Upaniṣads. The idea of God in the Yoga System was not arrived at by superimposing it on an atheistic Sāṃkhya System with twenty-five principles, but by distinguishing the Jīva from God on practical grounds, viz. (1) on the argument that the actual experience (pratyakṣa) shows that they should be always numerically two, though not qualitatively, and therefore the Scripture (śāstra) may be set aside on this point (300. 4–5); (2) on the belief that God is eternally beyond old age and death, while the Jīva undergoes bondage (sāṁsāra) (308. 16c.); (3) by making the Jīva (who is separate from God from the beginning) the creator and destroyer of the world (308. 2), and finally (4) by keeping him distinct from God both during bondage and liberation:—in short by the rejection of the identity of Jīva and God (i.e. aksara or puruṣa, as the case may be) taught in the Oldest Prose and Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and in the Gītā and inherited by the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya. Not only is this origin of the Yoga conception of a transcendent and supercosmic God supported by the text (308), but also there is nothing unreasonable in the process of its being obtained by the rejection of jīvēśvarayor abheda instead of its being attributed, rather superficially, to a nītīśvara Sāṃkhya. It is probable that originally the word nītīśvara may have meant what the word aniśvara means in the L.MBH. ("one not having any God separate from the Jīva—
Thus the Chapter (XII. 308) clearly shows that the idea of a supercosmic God who serves, as it were, only as an ideal for the Jiva, had been reached long before the theory of the plurality of souls was known.

The importance of Chapter 308 of MBh. XII is as great as that of the passages which show that the Sāmkhyas and the Yogas rejected the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas. This Chapter (308) clearly proves that the Yogas was one definite philosophical School in the days of the L. MBh.; that it differed from the Sāmkhya on the nature of the Jiva and Īśvara; that the Yogas had a Twentysixth principle but the Sāmkhyas had only twentyfive; and lastly that the origin of the idea of God in the Classical Yoga is to be traced not to a superficial ascription of God to an atheistic Sāmkhya System, but to the rejection of the Upaniṣadic oneness of God and the soul. If the importance of this Chapter (308) and the passages which refer to the rejection of the higher Nature had been realised, the four Schools of the later Mahābhārata would have been clearly distinguished from each other.

I have already suggested that the new terminology of upraha-buddha, budhyamāna and buddha, which probably originated in the L. MBh Yoga School (307. 48), was also adopted by the other Schools. It would be therefore interesting here to note the different conceptions of the principle called bu ḫyamāna in the three different Schools with which we are here concerned. The Aupaniṣadas called

* The one soul of this L. MBh. Yoga was omnipresent (308. 20), and thus must be the reason that when, in the later history of Sāmkhya and Yoga Schools, the doctrine of the plurality of souls arose, the many souls were also taught to be omnipresent.
their higher Nature *budhyamāna avyakta* "the knowing Unmanifest" because their *akṣara* is a living conscious principle (MBh. XII. 305. 31–35, see pp. 38, 42 above). The in all the Schools. Sāṃkhyaśas gave the name of *budhyamāna* to the bound soul which became *buddha* in the liberated state (MBh. XII. 306. 44, 307. 37). This was their highest principle, the Twenty-fifth (MBh. XII. 306. 43; 304. 9; 302. 32; 307. 47, 308. 14). The Yogas said that the *budhyamāna* obtains the state of the *buddha* (*buddhatva*) i.e. becomes like the *buddha*, but the two are eternally two, as we have seen above. (This was perhaps the origin of the term *buddha* which later on in the days of Buddhism became the property of the Buddhistic School with a definite sense.)

Origin of the term "*buddha*" older than Buddhism.

Thus, the Yoga is a System of what may be appropriately termed a *Double Dualism*, viz., one dualism of Matter and Spirit, as that of the Sāṃkhya; and another of two Spirits, i.e., the Jiva and the impersonal Brahman or the personal *puruṣa*. The special contribution of this L. MBh. School of Yoga lies, as already stated, in the fact that it consciously separated the individual from the Supreme Soul for the first time in the history of the Indian Philosophy. This Spiritual Dualism should be distinguished from the Spiritual Dualistic Monism of the EMU and the Gītā which consisted of the higher Nature and the *puruṣa* both of which are called Atmans. The L. MBh. Aupaniṣads had a Pluralistic Dualism because they enumerated *akṣara*, *puruṣa* and the lower Nature as three principles, but the last was not considered to be eternal while these

The Doctrine of “Double Dualism of Spirit and Matter.” The Yogas who regard the Jiva as an independent principle like the Twenty-fourth and the Twenty-sixth have really three eternal principles which, however, as explained above, stand to each other in the relation of a Double Dualism. The Oldest Prose Upaniṣads knew nothing about any dualism
or Dualistic Momism. They had said: “Brahman is one only, without a second”. That was not yet the age of synthesis and antithesis but that of mere thesis. The Age of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, the Gītā, and the later Mahābhārata, although it started with the intention of providing a synthesis for the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads (Remember-Mu. Up. 1. 2 does nothing except placing akṣara and puruṣa side by side) is really an age of antithesis, when we compare it with that of the Brahmaśūstras. But this latter had its forerunner in the L. MBh. Pāñcarātra School, which we shall examine in the next Section.

4. The Pāñcarātra School.

The text of the L. MBh. Pāñcarātras is the Nārāyanāṇiśya Section (MBh. XII. 334–351). Whenever their views are quoted elsewhere in the Mahābhārata, the text refers to these as belonging to another chapter in the L. MBh. School i.e. the School of the Pāñcarātra. An example of the latter is found in MBh. XII. 210. 10–11 and 14 (see p. 30 above). The accuracy with which the views of the Pāñcarātra School are mentioned in the L. MBh. is a sufficient guide to distinguish its doctrines from those of other Schools.

The most striking phenomenon that we find in the Pāñcarātra School is its complete identification of akṣara and puruṣa. “This (Nārāyaṇa) is the one auspicious form of that which is the akṣara and puruṣa. Immutatle (akṣara), the Unmanifest (avyakta), the Lord, the cause of the world, the Unchanging (kītāliha), the Agent (kārīr), devoid of “the pairs” (dvandvas), whom they knew as the non-Agent (akārīr).........” (XII. 342. 125–126). In another passage Nārāyaṇa is “the unborn ancient puruṣa”, “the Lord”, and also the source of the world, the abode of the Immortal, “the Subte” (sukṣma)...... (XII. 346. 21–22). There are many other passages of the same type, which identify the impersonal with the personal (XII. 334. 29–31a–b, 339.
The terms for akṣara in the EMU and the Gitā are thus included here in
Revival of the those of the puruṣa; as a result Nārāyaṇa
Oldest Description could be described as he who is not to
of akṣara be seen with the eye, not to be touched
* with the sense of touch etc., i.e. exactly
in the fashion of the description of akṣara in Br. Up. IV. 5. 15.
Especially noteworthy is the term ūdyā which the Śve. Up.
(V. 1) used for akṣara, and the L. MBh.
The term ūdyā. Śāṅkhya for puruṣa or the Twentyfifth
(307. 1–2; see pp. 44–45 above) and
which these Pāñcarātras could only use for an innate power
of the puruṣa, always in his “company” though he is “alone”
(MBh. XII. 339. 68, 72; 342. 95; 344. 12 c–d; 347, 19). If
the historical development in the meaning of ūdyā and avidyā
is lost sight of, a great confusion is inevitable (Prof. Hopkius,
GEI, p. 104 and p. 136). Its position in the L. MBh. Pāñcarātra School shows that the latter identified akṣara and puruṣa.
Even the later development of the Pāñcarātra Sect also
confirms this view (see Prof. Schrader, Introduction to
the Pāñcarātra, pp. 62–64 and p. 78).
Nārāyaṇa, named This combination of akṣara and puruṣa
the Twentyfifth. under the name of Nārāyaṇa was called
by the Pāñcarātras “the Twentyfifth”
(XII. 339. 43).

NOTE.—The three passages mentioning ūdyā as conceived
of in the three Schools may be quoted here for facilitating
their comparison:—

(1) Dve aksare brahmaṇapare tv anante ūdyāvidye nilute
     yatra gūḍhe |
     ksaram tv avidyā hy anātany tu ūdyā ūdyāvidye
     iṣate yas tu sosnyaḥ ||
     (Śve. Up. V. 1)

(2) Avidyāṁ āhur ayyakṣaṁ sargaṇḍalayadhaṁ vai |
     sargaṇḍalayanimuktāṁ ūdyāṁ vai pāñcaṁśakāḥ ||
(MBh. 307. 2). Cf. also MBh. 307. 11a–b where we read about the same two: *Udbhāv ev ākṣaraṁ uklūv ubhāv etāv anākṣarau.*

(3) *Ekākī vidyayā sārdham vihariṣya jagat pūnaḥ |
tato bhūyo jagat sarvam kariṣyāmīha vidyayā || (339. 72)

Or

*vidyāsahāyo yatrāste bhagavān havyakavyabhuk *

(344. 12c–d).

If we remember that in its original conception this *vidyā* is a living, conscious principle (see p. 15 above), we can also understand the great religious movement of the Sākta Sect and also Sakti- or Devī-worship prevalent even now in some form or other all over India. It could not have originated from a personification of the dead, inanimate, unconscious Nature or *prakṛti* of the Classical or L. MBh. Sāṃkhya. The first root of it is in the “śakti” of Sve. Up. I. 3 and the *jivabhūtā para prakṛti* of the Gitā (VII. 5).

Another point in the doctrinal teaching of this School is that the Nature or *prakṛti* which should be regarded as the Twentyfourth of this School is said to be “born of Nārāyaṇa”. This is undoubtedly the natural result of the Pāñcarātras’ conception of Nārāyaṇa who is *puruṣa* identified completely with *ākṣara* (as the goal) and yet having as his “sahāya” *vidyā*, as said above. This Nature which is thus the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadās (born of *ākṣara* the higher Nature—Bh. Gī. III. 15, Mu. Up. I. 1. 9) is often described in the Nārāyaṇiya Section: ‘From Him (i.e. *puruṣa* in 334. 30) is born the Unmanifest possessed of three guṇas” (334. 31); “The Unmanifest dissolves into the actionless *puruṣa*” (339. 29–31); “He whom the Sāṃkhya and the Yogas call Paramātmman........From Him is born the Unmanifest which the wise know as *pradhāna* (340. 28c–d, 29c–d; see also 347. 16a–c).
Like Nature, the jīva or individual soul is also described as emerging from and returning unto the puruṣa. A reference to App. III. which discusses among others the two chapters of the Nārāyanīya Section on the plurality of souls would show that, the puruṣa of the Pāñcarātras is called the yonī (i.e. "source", or "matrix") of the souls, and this agrees with other passages, such as 334. 42 and 335. 2 where an individual soul is said to have "come forth" (prāśṛta) from the Atman (ātman-prabhava). But though in one passage (343. 14) Nārāyaṇa is called the "creator of the self" (saṅvabhūtānāśabhāvāna), we may justly doubt that this means an abandoning of the general Indian belief that transmigration, i.e. the individual soul, has no beginning. For, in another passage (350.23) even the God Brahman is said to have created and go on creating "many souls". And there can be but little doubt that here, as throughout in the later Pāñcarātra, the liberated are thought of as persons different from, though united with and similar to Nārāyaṇa. Such seemingly advaitic phrases like mām praviṣya (339. 43) or parunātmā bhaiviṣyati (349. 48) should not mislead us (Cf. Schrader, Introduction to the Pāñcarātra, p. 91 ffl.). For, the inhabitants of Śvetadvipa are all of them "awakened", i.e., liberated (prabuddhāḥ ca te sarve), and God is "pleased in their company" (tāḥ sārdhamuṇıyamale) (343. 53-64). Indeed, Śvetadvipa is nothing else than the place of the liberated (and, according to Prof. Schrader, identical mutatis mutandis with the umbrella-shaped "rock of the liberated" of the Jains). And though a further progress from Śvetadvipa to the "Thousand-rayed God is indicated (339.129-130; cf. 339. 19-20), which presumably takes place when pralaya comes (cf. the kramamukti in Śaṅkara's Vedānta), we may safely assume that, as in the later Pāñcarātra, the difference between the liberated and the non-liberated continues even during the cosmic Night, and that, when the latter ends, it is the non-liberated who are "created", i.e., sent out again into the world. There would, indeed, be no sense in teaching liberation at all, if in pralaya
both the liberated and the non- liberated would get rid of individual existence.

Thus, what the history of Indian Philosophy owes to these Pāncarātras is the identification of ṛṣa and ṁruṣa into one goal. This identification is not to be found in the whole by the Pāncarātra of the Gitā, except in Bh. Gi. XIII. School. 12-17. What Gurbe has said about the conception of the Supreme Being in the Gitā applies to this passage only out of the entire Gitā and to the entire Nārāyaniya Section of this Mahābhārata. In the Pāncarātra Doctrine we have no dualism of any kind whatsoever; because ṛṣa and ṁruṣa are not to be distinguished; and ṛākṛiti is “born” of Nārāyanā.

No Dualism. Though both the Pāncarātra and the Sāmkhya are Systems recognising only twenty-five principles, Comparison of the former has only one eternal principle the Pāncarātra with (the individual souls, though eternal, not other Schools. being counted as different from the Universal Spirit, but admitted as existing within that Spirit itself), while the Sāmkhyas teach two eternal entities viz., Spirit and Matter. The Yoga Schools and the Auṇḍanṣada System differ from the Pāncarātra in so far as each of them accepts twenty-six principles while the latter has only twenty-five. The Pāncarātra however is nearer to the Auṇḍanṣada than to the Yogi because the Pāncarātra like the Auṇḍanṣada does not distinguish the Jiva as an independent and numerically one principle, and believes that the Nature is not eternal. Moreover, in so far as the Pāncarātra identifies the ṛṣa with the ṁruṣa, it may be looked upon as more Auṇḍadic than the Yogas who gave up the ṛṣa as the higher Nature and also as the goal (as did the Rudra Yogas) or gave up the ṁruṣa (as was the case with the Hiranyagarbha Yogas).

* I am indebted to Professor Schrader for this information about the conception of the Jiva in the Pāncarātra.
One result of this Pāñcarātra doctrine of the identity of aksara and puruṣa is that the Supreme Reality is now conceived to be possessed of contradictory attributes. It is both saguna and nirguna, kartri and akartri, etc.; that is to say: it is saguna, kartri, etc. like puruṣa, and nirguna, akartri, etc., like aksara. We may say that the Supreme Being is both satyakāma, satyasamkalpa (Chā. Up. VIII. 1. 5) and anau, ahrasva, adirgha (Br. Up. III. 8. 8). As the Gitā puts it, it is possessed of feet etc. (like the viśvarūpa puruṣa in Bh. Gi. XI) and it is also devoid of all senses (Bh. Gi. XII. 13–14).

It is important to notice this nature of the aksara-puruṣa doctrine here, because the explanation of this conception has become one of the chief problems in the later Indian Philosophy. Saṅkara, who said that the positive attributes of Brahman are unreal and the negative ones are real, went against the historically correct view which regarded both of them as real, (and by "positive attributes" Saṅkara, understands all attributes i. e., both those given in the Śrutis which refer to puruṣa and those that are denied of aksara). Rāmaciśa who held that Brahman has all auspicious (kalyūna) and no objectionable (heya) attributes, or, in other words, that Brahman is full of compassion etc., and devoid of cruelty, etc., did not understand the original sense of passages like Bh. Gi. XIII. 13–16. Vallabha who explained the texts in question as implying that Brahman is possessed of all divine (alaukika) and devoid of all worldly (laukika) attributes seems to have come to that conclusion after examining exactly what is actually denied and asserted of the Supreme Being in the positive and negative texts of the Scriptures.

Is the Pāñcarātra a development of the Gita doctrine like the later. Mahābhārata Sāṁkhya and Yoga, or is it
the protest riased by those who possessed the traditions of
the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads? To me it
appears that predominantly neither of
Pāṇcarātra School: these was the case. The Paṇcarātra
Reconciliation or Revival of Vedic Religion under the Bhakti-teaching of
the Gitā.

Origin of the this is clear from the importance of rites and ceremonies
Reconciliation or of which the Gitā had asked man to perform his worldly duties,
Revival of Vedic i.e., as a dedication to the Supreme Being. The Gitā taught
Religion under the that acts can be dedicated to the impersonal as well to the
personal (Bh. Gi. IV. 24 and IX. 16), and under the influence
of this allegorical Yajña philosophy of the Gitā the Pāṇcarātras
revived the old Vedic cult. The traces of such a revival of or
probably reconciliation with the Vedic religion are found in
the Gitā itself (see p. 28 above). Also the same devotional
spirit (bhakti) of the Gitā, which pervades throughout the
Nārāyaṇiya Section) led them to the mystic identification of
aksara and purusa. Their “one-mindedness” (ananyatā of
Bh. Gi. VIII. 14, 22; IX. 30, 13, 22; XI. 54; XII. 6) was more
intensive than that of the Gitā because in the latter it was
either for aksara or for purusa (Bh. Gi. XII. 1), while the
former could not think that there was the possibility of an
option being given to a devotee as regards the choice of the
object of his meditation or devotion, and therefore identified
the two then known objects of reverence.

A similar rejection of the idea of “two goals” resulting in
a similar admission of only one goal was achieved by the
Sāmkhyas and the Yogas on a quite rationalistic basis, as is
clear from their rejection of the higher Nature. There is no
wonder, therefore, that the text of the L. MBh. represents all
these three and also the Aupaniṣada School as having been on
friendly terms with one another. In a sense all of them felt to
be on an equal level (MBh. XII. 348. 82–83; 249. 1 etc.).
That they had all of them the same goal is a fact repeatedly mentioned in the Nārāyaṇiya Section (XII 349. 68c–d—70, 73). As we have seen, the goal in all of them was to the same Goal, aksara, or puruṣa, or both (see p. 55 above); and coming undoubtedly after the much revered Gitā which consistently taught either of these to be the goal, none of these four Schools was likely to quarrel with the others for the doctrine concerning the Supreme Being. In the light of the teaching of the Gitā they all felt that each of them and therefore all of them were in a way—and only in a way because they had their own doctrinal differences also—different paths to the same sumum bonum. Though in the days of the Ācāryas and in our own days this form of tolerance and sympathy may seem incomprehensible, it was not so in the Mahābhārata Age because the catholic spirit and teaching of the Gitā were not yet forgotten.

Under the influence of the Gitā, though much later than the Mahābhārata, a further philosophical movement also took place, which explained and in so doing modified the Pāñcarātra doctrine of the identity of aksara and puruṣa. The result of this movement was recorded in the Brahmasūtras. The Pāñcarātras never discussed with their fellow-philosophers their doctrinal differences which we have noticed above. The Nārāyaṇiya Section unlike the other Sections of MBh. XII, avoids all arguments and reasonings. There is a kind of mysticism about the union of aksara and puruṣa. (The “Anruddha-theology” is not any reasoned-out doctrine against any other School.) It is the author of the Brahmasūtras who gives reasons for the equality of aksara and puruṣa, and in doing so he acts like the “saints” mentioned in MBh. XII. 318. 56, 78 (see p. 40 above). This further development of the doctrine which came into existence with the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads we shall examine in the next Chapter.
CHAPTER IV.

AKṢARA IN THE BRAHMASŪTRAS.

The aphoristic language of the Brahmāsūtras is a real obstacle to the right interpretation of the Sūtras and does not assure as much success as one may expect in the case of the Mahābhārata. Yet, if once the key of their proper explanation is found out, this very obstacle becomes a help because though aphoristic the Sūtras are arranged into certain groups of aphorisms which are connected with each other in a logical train of ideas. The writer of this Thesis believes to have discovered this key and though he may not have—and he does feel that he has not—been able to understand correctly every one and every word of the aphorisms he has attempted to interpret, he thinks, the general sense of the Sūtras cannot, originally, have been very different from what he has suggested it to be. And thus it is that he has ventured to include their discussion in this work.

First of all it should be noticed that even Saṅkara had not always the original readings or divisions (adhiṣṭhānaś) of the Sūtras before him, and in most of such cases all the later Bhāṣyakārās too will be found to have shared the same fate. This will be seen from the suggestions made in Appendix IV, regarding Sūtras III. 3. 26, 38–39, 42, 43, 45–46, 50–51. One more example of this loss of the old tradition may be given here. Br. Sū. II. 3. 18 is “jnoṣta eva” which means “the Atman is possessed of consciousness (lit. is conscious), on account of the same reason (i. e. “because of the Śrutas”, as said in Br. Sū. II. 3. 17 )”. Now, it is quite probable that the next two aphorisms formed only one and
meant, "And because out of [the three possible movements that he makes during his worldly life, viz.,] departure from the body, going to the other world, and coming back, the last two are to be made by himself alone" (Br. Sū. II. 3. 19–20). It is a well-known fact that at the time of the departure from the gross body, the God of death or his messengers are supposed to come and take away the Jiva from the body, according to the Scriptures. This leaves no room for the use of the soul's consciousness then. But in the other two cases, the soul exercises its power of knowing and itself directs its way to and from the other world. Thus, the Śūtrakāra supports his argument for jñāna-viś “knoweress” of the Jiva. But the fact that Śaṅkara and his successors divide the originally one Śūtra into two and explain them as embodying a pūrvapaksa on the topic of the size of the individual soul shows how far the meaning of the Śūtras had been already forgotten even at the time of the Bhāṣyakāras remembered by Śaṅkara. This is confirmed by some interpretations preserved by Śaṅkara of these predecessors of his. See particularly Br. Sū. I. 4. 1–3 (explained later on in this Chapter). So we see that a new interpretation need not be wrong because it differs widely from that of the commentators.

If we study the Śūtras, the most conspicuous point that immediately attracts our attention is a discrimination which the Śūtrakāra makes and which amounts to a dualism which he is not ready to call a dualism of metaphysical principles, but which he would have us understand as samjñābheda “a Non-identity of Names” (Br. Sū. III. 3. 8) in contrast to "arthābheda" “Identity of Goal” (Br. Sū. III. 3. 5). For the sake of convenience we may call this a dual method of meditation on the Highest One (para). This Duality of Names is the sole teaching of Br. Sū. III. 3. 1–55 (App. IV). An enumeration of some of the points on the strength of which this duality is put forth by the author of the Śūtras will bring home to the reader the first and foremost problem that the Śūtrakāra has discussed in his work :—
(1) First of all, as said above, the goal in all the Vedanta texts is one and the same, but a distinction in its names is admissible, and on this distinction the Sūtrakāra will base his teaching of two types of the method of meditation, the means to reach the goal (Br. Sū. III. 3. 8, 10, 16, 33). These two names are pradhāna (III. 3. 11) and aksara (III. 3. 33). (For the terminology of the Sūtrakāra see (9) below.) By pradhāna is meant puṇya. In Br. Sū. III. 2. 23 the Sūtrakāra says that the Highest One (puruṣa—Br. Sū. III. 2. 11) is the Unmanifest (avyakta) and in the same connection he says that “Because it has both the designations (i.e. puṇya and aksara), the case is like that of the words ‘ahu’ (the name of a serpent without any reference to its posture) and ‘kuṇḍala’ (the name of a serpent with special reference to its posture of coil).

(2) Another discrimination between the two is that pradhāna has a form, aksara is formless; and because the latter is the more important than the former (Br. Sū. III. 3. 44), the Supreme Being itself is formless (Br. Sū. III. 2. 14). The fact that pradhāna or puṇya has a form is used as an argument for deciding the topic of Mu. Up. II. 1 in Br. Sū. I. 2. 23.

(3) A third point of discrimination is that in the case of the meditation on puṇya “the collection of thoughts” (upasamāhāra) is obligatory, while in that on aksara it is voluntary and is to be observed only in the case of those attributes of aksara which are mentioned in the text of the particular School (“Branch”) to which the meditator belongs (Br. Sū. III. 3. 11, 33, 39, 40, 41).

(4) The Sūtrakāra differentiates between the functions (kāmya) of pradhāna and aksara. They are respectively “maintenance” or “sustenance of the world” sambhūti and “heaven-pervasion” dyuVyāpti (Br. Sū. III. 3. 18, 23).
(5) The author of the Sūtras distinguishes between three kinds of thoughts or attributes: (a) those of the puruṣa (b) those of the akṣara and (c) some of both of these which are interchangeable, i.e., which primarily belong to puruṣa but which are mentioned their Thoughts. by the Śrutis with referance to akṣara also. The Śūtrakāra illustrates the last by quoting Tai. Up. II.1 (satyaṁ jñānam anantāṁ brahma) where, he says, satya and those that follow it, though really the attributes of puruṣa, are however mentioned as those belonging to akṣara. The utility of all these attributes is mentioned above in (3). (See Br. Sū. III. 3. 37-43; App. IV.) Even in Br. Sū. I, where the author has given his explanations of the Śruti-texts, he has kept in mind this “Scriptural Interchange”. It appears that in Br. Sū. I. 1-2 the Śūtrakāra has dealt with those texts which according to him refer to puruṣa and in Br. Sū. I. 3-4 those which primarily deal with akṣara but ascribe to it such attributes as properly belong to puruṣa. This original scheme of the Sūtras is suggested by the word “āyalarū” in Br. Sū. III. 3. 39, which undoubtedly refers to dyuḥbhavāyatanam in Br. Sū. I. 3.1 (see App. IV).

(6) The dual method of meditation ord, as the Śūtrakāra himself puts it, the option of akṣara and puruṣa for the purpose of meditation is vigorously upheld by him. Liberation is achieved in either way. If this option of choice is not admitted, then the Scriptures would be violated (Br. Sū. III. 3. 28-30). Both akṣara- and puruṣa-meditations are Vidyāś “Lores leading to Salvation”, as in the Mundaka Upaniṣad which is referred to by the Śūtrakāra on this point (Br. Sū. III. 3. 47). The attainment of puruṣa which results in the eternal enjoyment of all objects of desire by the liberated in the company of puruṣa is not to be understood as the attainment of a world (loka, like the world of the moon etc.), though there is a common feature between the two (Br. Sū. III. 3. 51; App. IV).
(7) The sūtrakāra finds it necessary to give his opinion regarding the question: which of the two, aksara and puruṣa, is more important? He says that the former is "the stronger" (baliyāḥ) because it is mentioned in more texts than puruṣa is. But at the same time the option of choice from either of the two, given to the meditator, is strongly maintained by him, as already said above (Br. Sū. III. 3. 44–45).

(8) I may here draw attention to Br. Sū. III. 2. 35 (sthānaviśeṣāt prakāśādvat) which answers a pūrvaṇaṣa argument basing "Place" in the distinction of aksara and puruṣa (with their individual attributes) as two principles on the fact that aksara is connected on the one hand with mahat and on the other with puruṣa (as in Ka. Up. III. 11). The Śūtra (III. 2. 35) replies this by saying that this "connection" (of the two) refers to the "distinction of place" in the Supreme Being. The light is called the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars in connection with its presence in various places; the same is the case with the Supreme Being which is also like the Light as said in Br. Sū. III. 2. 26 (Br. Sū. III 2. 32, 35; App. IV).

(9) The distinction that we have seen above is also visible in the Śūtrakāra's terminology. In this connection I wish to point out particularly three terms para, pradhāna and aksara, which are used by him respectively in the sense of the Supreme Being (irrespective of the personal or the impersonal aspect), the personal, and the impersonal. In using "para" for the Highest The term "para". One, the Śūtrakāra's intention seems to be to avoid a term which would suggest solely aksara or solely puruṣa. Thus word occurs in Br. Sū. II. 3. 41 ("The Jiva derives his power of action from para 'the Highest One' ", II. 3. 46 ("The Jiva's being 'a part', amśa, [of the Supreme One] is like the case of the Light etc. 'The Highest One' para is not such "), III. 2. 11 ("The twofold
statements [ containing the coincidentia oppositorum ] cannot be-
long to ' the Highest One ', \( \text{\textit{para}} \), even from the standpoint of
place........."), III. 2. 5 ("[ The real nature of the Jiva ] is con-
cealed on account of the desire of the ' Highest One ' ( \( \text{\textit{para}} \)
[ that it should be so ]........"), and IV. 3. 12 ("[aimini says that
the liberated soul goes to the ' Highest One ' \( \text{\textit{para}}......".
). All these passages show that through the Sūtras " \( \text{\textit{para}} \) " is used
consistently for the " Highest One ", as said above. It is so
used in Br. Śū III. 3. 54 (Appendix IV). The term \textit{pradhāna}
occurs in Br. Śū III. 3. 11 and (as I have suggested in Appen-
dix IV) in III. 3. 43. In both these places
the term is used as a metaphysical
where the term is used as a metaphysical
principle, the context shows that it is
contrasted ( in III. 3. 11, III. 3. 33 ) or
compared (III. 3 43) with \textit{aksara} ( see App. IV for the inter-
pretation of the Sūtras ). This fact shows that the word
\textit{pradhāna} is consistently used for \textit{puruṣa}. In using this term
in this sense, the Sūtrakāra seems to have adopted the termi-

ology of his own days, as he does in the case of many terms
like \textit{sūkṣma} and others (Br. Śū. I. 4. 3; see below). "\textit{Pradhāna}"
was used in the days of the Mahābhārata exactly for the perso-

al aspect of the Supreme Being as understood by the
Sūtrakāra. "He, who is always thus ready and whose mind is
pleased, reaches, without delay, that \textit{Brahman} by
seeing which one comes to know \( \text{\textit{prad-}
\textit{hānā}} \). He is not to be seen with the eye, nor even with all the
senses. The Great Atman is seen only by the lamp of the mind.
\textit{He has the ends of his hands and feet on all sides, the eyes and faces in all directions; he possesses
ears in all places in the world, and [thus] he stands pervading all}" (MBh. XIV 19. 47–49 also see. 18.32). There can be no
doubt as to the meaning of the term \textit{pradhiṇā} in this passage.
It is so used probably also in MBh. XII. 340. 39. The
Sūtrakāra does not avoid using the older term for the personal
aspect of the Supreme Being, I mean, the word \textit{puruṣa} (Br.
Śū. III 3.24; I. 2. 26, see below). This, by the way, is an
instructive example for the totally different meanings which
the same word as a technical term may have in different
Schools (\( \text{\textit{pradhāna =prakṛti} esp. as anvaṃta, in the Classical Sām-} \)
khya; =the lower Nature in Śve. Up. I. 10). As regards “aksara”, Sūtra III. 3. 33 clearly shows that the
The term ‘aksara’. Sūtrakāra restricts its usage only to the impersonal aspect. So, there can be no
doubt that even the terminology of the aphorisms reveals the
differentiation between aksara and puruṣa.

(10) The last noteworthy point in the Sūtras in this
respect is that in the first Adhyāya of the work certain Śrutis
are explained as not referring not only to (the Śāmkhya)
Prakṛti and the Jīva but also to aksara.

“Aksara” as a
Śaṅkara and other commentators could
pūrvapakṣa in Br. Sū. I.
not understand that aksara could have
been the pūrvapakṣa in the interpretation
of certain Vedanta texts. In some cases,
if we cast a glance at the original viṣayavākyā it would
at once appear that the pūrvapakṣa views stated by the
commentators had never had the least possibility of having
represented any hostile School. Such pūrvapakṣas look ridi-
culous; and the wonder is that they have not yet been question-
ed by any scholar and that they had

Dr. Thibaut and
Prof. Deussen. Thibaut and Prof. Deussen who were, so
far as I know, the only persons to
make a thorough study of the Brahmāsūtras and comment-
aries on them.

Thus, Br. Sū. I. 2. 24 discusses the topic of the vaisvānara
Section of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Chā. Up. V. Iff.) The
Section begins with the words: “Ko nu ātmā kim brahma”
(Chā. Up. V. II. 1) and the text is meant to teach the meditation
on the vaisvānara Atman. Śaṅkara’s pūrvapakṣas are expre-
ssed in “Kim vaisvānaraśabdena (1)

Vaisvānara in
jāthurognir upadhyayata uka (2) bhūtāgnir
Chā. Up.V., puruṣa, altha (3) tadabhūmiṁnu devatā alhava
not aksara.
(4) śārta āhosvuit (5) paramesvarāh” (Śa
appear that out of these the second and the third are the
pūrvapakṣas discussed in Br. Sū. I. 2. 27, but not in I. 2. 24.
The fourth seems to have been refuted in 26, not in 24–25.
There was not the least possibility of the “abdominal fire” having been one of the antagonistic views. The only pūrva-pakṣa refuted in 24–25 seems to have been one about aksara being the topic of Chā. Up. V. Iff. This is clear from the fact that the Sūtrakāra refers to a text which mentions “vaśvānara even as puruṣa” (Br. Sū. I. 2. 26). Śaṅkara has hit upon the exact Śruti referred to in this Sūtra; but he did not understand why a text mentioning puruṣa was specially referred to by the Sūtrakāra. The Jiva is called puruṣa, but, as the Sūtra (26) shows, the Jiva is to be refuted; so the Śruti with the word puruṣa is used to refute aksara. (“Tatḥādīṣṭhyupadesāt” and “asambhavāt” refute the Jiva view.) In the Gitā (Bh. Gi. XV. 14) vaśvānara is identified with Kṛṣṇa who stands for puruṣa and not for aksara, so the Sūtrakāra is also right in referring to the Bhagavadgītā.

Let us take another example. Br. Sū. I. 2. 18–20 discusses the topic of the famous antaryāmibrahmaṇa (Br. Up. III. 7. 3ff). Śaṅkara presents the various possible views in the words: “Sa (i.e. antaryāmi) (1) kum adludavādyabhi-mūnidevalaṁ kasci (2) kumvā prāplāyāmādyaisvaryaḥ kasci yogi (3) kumvā parunātina (4) kumvāryaṁtaram kumcit,.............” (Sā Bhā. Br. Sū. I. 2. 18.). The last supposition shows that Br. Up. III, puruṣa, even Śaṅkara felt doubtful if (1) and (2) not aksara. could have been the pūrva-pakṣas though he himself proposed them as such. A glance at the Śruti which repeats “esa ta ātmāntaryāmy amṛtah” with every sentence will show that the possibility of Śaṅkara’s pūrva-pakṣas stands precluded even by the original Vedanta text. As is clear from the Sūtras and Śaṅkara’s commentary on them, it is Śaṅkara who himself raises these objections and himself gives their refutations. As the “śārira” is refuted in 20, he could not be the pūrva-pakṣa in 18 and 19. Moreover, the Nature [of the Sāmkhyas] is refuted in 19 and not in 18; and “ca” in na ca smārtam........ “ (19) shows that one view has been already refuted in 18. So, aksara only (which is not the Nature of the Sāmkhyas and not the śārira also) is the pūrva-pakṣa in 18. This is also suggested by the
word "smārta" (19). The Sūtrakāra has in his mind śravita
avyakta and smārta avyakta: the Gitā mentions these two
avyaktaś and the word smārta may as well suggest the lower
Nature of the Gitā which is called a Smṛti. The Sūtrakāra
does not believe in this lower Nature. So, "ca" and "smārtam"
(in 19) distinctly show that the "śravita avyakta" i.e. aksara is
refuted in 18. The attribute (dhāraṇā) referred to in 18 seems
to be the one implied in "yamayati" i.e., the act of controlling;
according to the Sūtrakāra the governing over the creation
(praśāsana—Br. Sū. I. 3. 10–11; sambhiru—Br. Sū. III. 3. 23) is
a function of puruṣa, not of aksara.

Br. Sū. III. 3. 18–24 discusses whether Tai. Up. II. 8
mentions aksara or puruṣa (see App. IV).

The above examples will be, I believe, sufficient to prove
that even in Br. Sū. I the Sūtrakāra distinguishes between
aksara and puruṣa. It is quite probable that even the Aupa-
ṇiṣadasas differed as to whether the topic of certain Śrutiś was
aksara or puruṣa, because in those days both of these were
accepted as the objects of meditation.

The foregoing points will show that the discrimination
between aksara and puruṣa, which the Sūtrakāra exhibits throughout his work is so explicit and is so unambiguously expressed that one cannot fail to observe it after the first three Chapters of this Dissertation have been written or read. This differentiation is always present in the mind of the author of the aphorisms
and serves him as the guiding principle

Thorough Distinction between aksara and puruṣa
in the Sūtras.

whether he discusses (1) the names
(2) its form or formlessness, (3) collection of its attributes,
(4) its functions, (5) the "thoughts" about it (or attributes belonging to it),
(6) the option of choice regarding the object of meditation,
(7) the comparative importance of the two "names", (8) the
doctrines of other Aupaniṣada Schools, (9) the question of the
terminology or (10) the textual interpretation. This differentia-
tion of akṣara and puruṣa appears to me to be the most arresting point in the Sūtras and therefore it has been mentioned first and that too with some details.

We have seen above that the distinction between akṣara and puruṣa is known to the Sūtrakāra. Before trying to ascertain the exact nature of this differentiation, I wish to point out what seems to me to be an indication to the Sūtrakāra’s knowledge of the distinction between the two Natures of the EMU and the Gitā, though the Sūtrakāra himself does not accept it. This problem is discussed in Br. Sū. I. 4. 23–28. Having described avyakta or akṣara (in I. 4. 1–23), the Sūtrakāra says that “It is also prakṛti [the word used for the lower Nature by the Aupanisadas of his time, and for the Nature by the Sāmkhyas] because the Proposition and the Illustrations [given in Chā. Up. VI. I. 3, VI. I. 4–6] are not to be obstructed [in their sense]” (23). “Ca” (also) in the Sūtra shows that the author identifies akṣara understood in the previous Sūtras with prakṛti, so that according to him there is only one Nature viz., the higher Nature or, to speak more accurately, the Supreme Being, which may be called akṣara or puruṣa, is also the Nature of the creation. The Sruti referred to by him does not mention the lower Nature of the EMU and the Gitā, but describes the creation as directly taking place from “that by (hearing) which the unheard becomes heard……..” (Chā. Up. VI. I. 3). “And [akṣara is also prakṛti] because ‘thought’ (abhudhyā) is predicated [of the Essential Cause of the Universe in the Scriptures]” (24). Here the author refers to a text like “soSkāmayaśa bahu syām ……” (Tai. Up. II. 6. 1), which shows that the Nature of the world is a thinking one and therefore goes against prakṛti or the lower Nature which is devoid of consciousness according to the EMU and the Gitā. “And [akṣara is also prakṛti] because both [the evolution and the dissolution of the world] are, in the Scriptures, stated as directly taking place [from
and into it ]" (25). "Directly" (sākṣāt) is a clear proof that the Sūtrakāra rejects the lower Nature. For that purpose he refers to texts like "Sarvāṇi ha vu ināmi bhūtāny ākāśād eva samutpadyante | ākāśam praty astaṁ yānti "—Chā. Up. I. 9. 1. The fact that "ubhaya" in the Sūtra (25) refers to the evolution and the dissolution of the world and that "sākṣāt" refers to "eva" in the Śruti, goes against Śaṅkara who holds that this Adhikaraṇa is intended to describe ākṣara as the "nimitta" and at the same time the "upādāna" cause of the world. "[Ākṣara is also prakṛti ] because [the world is] a modification, paniṇāma, of ātmakṛti i.e. of Brahman or ākṣara itself creating itself as the creation" (26). The uṣayasavāya is "Tad ātmānaṁ svayam akṛurta"—Tāl. Up. II. 7. This Śruti says that the creation or what the creator has made is itself the self of the creator (ākṣara). This is in agreement with Br. Sū. II. 1. 14 and 20. The modification (paniṇāma) cannot be the Ātman of ākṣara if it were to take place from the lower Nature. "And [ākṣara is also prakṛti ] because it is said to be the source, yoni, of the world in the metrical compositions," (27). In this Adhikaraṇa this is the only Sūtra where the author refers to the EMU and the Gitā, and in doing so he has hit upon a very important statement in these works which always describe ākṣara as the yoni wherein the puruṣa lays the seed and from which "all beings" are born. Such passages are Kau. Br. Up. I. 6; Śve. Up. I. 2, VI. 16, V. 6; Mu. Up. I. 3; Bh. Gi. XIV. 3–4, VII. 6. In these, ākāśa (meaning Ātman), ātmāna, Brahman, mahād brahman, or jivabhūtā parā prakṛti is "the source" yoni. So, the lower Nature cannot be the yoni described in these words. And because ākṣara is the yoni, it is also prakṛti (the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadas or the Nature of the Śāṅkhyas). In Br. Sū. II. 1. 23, the author says that in the Śruti "anena jīvena ātmānānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇa- vāyu " (Chā. Up. VI. 3. 2), "jiva ātmān" refers to the living self of Brahman because the cause of the world is not devoid of consciousness and cannot be explained to be like inanimate objects e.g. a stone etc. All these Sūtras prove
that the Śūtrakāra knows the theory of the two Natures and rejects the lower Nature in so far as he identifies it with the higher one, which is for him the Supreme Being.*

The Śūtrakāra’s rejection of the lower Nature was not a novel feature in the history of Indian philosophy. The “saints” (sādhavāh) in MBh. XII. 318. 56 are said to have held that “One should look upon the two forms of the eternal Unmanifest as one and the same end [of the series of evolution].”

The doctrine of these saints on this particular point seems to have been the same as that of the Śūtrakāra. Moreover, in identifying the lower Nature with the higher one, the author has gone exactly in the opposite direction of what the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyaśas are found to have done (see above pp. 42–44). Both of them are the results of a movement of the same character, but their conclusions are quite different from each other. The Śūtrakāra says that the created world is a living, conscious modification (pārṇāma) of the Atman; the Sāṃkhyaśas said that the world is devoid of consciousness.

In this connection we may examine the exact meaning of aksara as the Nature, as taught in the Śūtras. Avyakta in the evolutional series of Ka. Up. III. 10–11 is discussed in Br. Sū. I. 4. 1ff. The Śūtrakāra says that it is not “the principle established by inference by the Sāṃkhya” (ānumānaka) as the Nature: Br. Sū. I. 4. 1–7. because “its comprehension (grahiti, interpretation) is presented in the allegory of the body [and the chariot]” and that “the Śrutī shows it.” The “allegory” says that the end of the journey is the Highest Abode of Viṣṇu (Ka. Up. III. 9); so according to the Śūtrakāra “avyakta” is “Viṣṇoh paramaṁ pād-

* Though the Śūtrakāra’s doctrine of the identity of the lower Nature with the higher one is not entirely different from Sāṅkara’s doctrine of “abhinnanimittopādana” according to which he explains Br. Sū. I. 4 23–28, the standpoint from which each of these two discusses the problem, reveals a contrast rather than a resemblance between the two views.
"Darśayati ca" in the Sūtra refers to Ka. Up. III. 15 which describes what is said to be "beyond mahat" and avyakta is also "beyond mahat" in Ka. Up. III. 11a which is the viśayavākya. In the second Sūtra (I. 4 2.), the same avyakta is said to be the sūkṣma because it can be properly so called. In the days of the Śūtrakāra "sūkṣma" was a synonym for aksara ("The sūkṣma see all these, the lower Nature "jiṇāna", the Intellect, etc. etc.—MBh. XII. 204. 20). So, he uses a current word to explain the Śrauta term. * Among his other arguments, he says that in the same passage "mahat" is stated to be lower than avyakta and higher than buddhi; and as according to the Śāṃkhyas buddhi is the direct effect of their avyakta, this mahat (in Ka. Up. III. 11) cannot be a Śāṃkhya principle; so also avyakta (Br. Sū. I. 4. 7).

Now, the fact to be noticed here is the Śūtrakāra's view of avyakta or aksara as the Nature, and this is given in the Adhikaraṇa discussed above. He says, avyakta is lower than puruṣa because the former is dependent on the latter, just as the objects of sense (urliḥḥa in Ka. Up. III. 10.) are said to be lower than the mind because they are dependent on the latter for being perceived. The Śūtrakāra seems to reject a pūrvaṇ̄kṣa view which regarded avyakta in the capacity of the higher "Puruṣa is higher Nature (in Ka. Up. III. 10–11) to be lower than puruṣa from "the standpoint of the place" (siḥāna—Br. Sū. III. 2. 11) of the two.§ Thus, according to the Śūtrakāra, avyakta as the subtle principle (sūkṣma) i.e. as the

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* Saṅkara's explanation of sūkṣma and avyakta as the subtle body as distinguished from the gross one is a proof that he had not an uninterrupted tradition. He depends upon his predecessor who, taking avyakta to refer to the gross body also, was in no better position than Saṅkara himself.

§Those who believed that avyakta is spatially lower than puruṣa, also believed that the mūrgūṇa texts refer to avyakta and saṅgūṇa to puruṣa. The Śūtrakāra rejects their view (Br. Sū. III. 2. 11–21; see App. IV. 2.).
Nature depends upon purusa. In other words, in the Highest Being, the personal aspect governs the impersonal one as far as the act of creation is concerned (Br. Sū. I. 4. 3). This would be the Śūtrakāra's explanation of avyakta or akṣara in such texts as Ka. Up. III. 10–11.

As regards the evolution from akṣara, we have seen already (pp. 101–102 above) that the Śūtrakāra does not distinguish the lower Nature from the akṣara. This means that he does not accept the lower Nature. In the same way he rejects the creation of buddhi and manas (Br. Sū. II. 3. 15) and begins the evolution from akṣara with the direct creation of the Ether (vyāt—Br. Sū. II. 3. 1) from it. He says that the world is identical with its cause (i.e. Atman) and gives as a proof of it the example of the vital breath (Br. Sū. II. 1. 14, 20). In dropping the three links, the lower Nature, the Intellect, and the Mind (—the problem of atmankara does not arise for him, as also for the authors of the Mahābhārata in many places—), the Śūtrakāra has directly set aside the teaching of the EMU, the Gitā and the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas.

Before we summarise the Śūtrakāra's view about the nature of the Highest Being (para), it would be both interesting and instructive to note the doctrines of some Aupaniṣada (Vedanta?) Schools, which the Śūtrakāra has refuted. The adversaries of the Śūtrakāra were those who held that the Vedanta texts mention more "goals" than one (i.e. two) (Br. Sū. III. 3. 1–4) and Schools criticised that the (two) goals are not identical (Br. by the Śūtrakāra. Sū III. 3. 5–9). The former he confronted with such texts as Bh. Gi. VIII. 11 and Ka. Up. II. 15 which the Śūtrakāra could interpret as teaching unity of the goal of the Vedantas (III. 3. 4). With the latter he argued that non-identity of the goals was inconsistent with the omnipresence of each of them taught in the Śruti (III. 3. 9). He held that there was only one goal but it had two names, pradhāna and akṣara. The former of these
two hostile Schools seems to have regarded purusā and aksara as two independent goals; the latter who said that the two were not identical may have thereby meant that aksara is the Abode and purusā lives in it and therefore they are in that sense one, but they are not identical. The exact views of these opponents are not given in Br. Sū. III. 3. 1–9, yet they could be inferred to have held some such doctrines as we have described above. There are, however, two other groups of aphorisms, which come to our aid here. The first group is Br. Sū. III. 2. 11–21 (App. IV. 2. a). It records a hostile view which admitted a difference of place in the Highest Being, and went further by saying that the negative texts belong to one "place" and the positive ones to another.

The "sthāna- bheda" (?) View. seems to mean that aksara and purusā are two places in the Supreme One and the negative and the positive texts respectively describe these two places (sthāna—Br. Sū. III. 2. 11). The other School is implied in "api" in Br. Sū. III. 2. 11 and is refuted in Br. Sū. III. 2. 32–37 (App. IV. 2 b). It believed that there was a goal beyond (other than) the Unmanifest or aksara (Br. Sū III. 2. 23 and 32), because the Unmanifest was described as connected with the Supreme One (or purusā) beyond it and because the śruti asserted the difference (bheda) between the two (Br. Sū. III. 2. 32). According to this School aksara and purusā are numerically two.

Although neither the commentators nor the modern interpretors like Dr. Thibaut and Prof. Deussen have even exhibited any curiosity as to who these opponents of the Sūtrakāra could have been, it is not difficult to identify them with some predecessors of the author of the Śrutā. The view which believes in a difference of place (sthāna) in the Supreme Being which is numerically one seems to be that of the L. MBh. "saints" (tatsthānāc c ānupāśyanti eka ev eti sādhavaḥ—MBh. XII. 318. 78; see Ch. III p. 41 above),
who held that *aṅghara* is the "place" of the Best One and therefore in that sense the two are one. The other doctrine according to which *aṅghara* and *puruṣa* are different from each other (and therefore two in number) was the view of the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas who enumerated *aṅghara* as the Twentyfifth and *puruṣa* as the Twenty-sixth (MBh. XII. 318. 47–8°). According to the Sūtrakāra both these Schools are dualistic. The latter asserted the

The Sūtrakāra's difference between *aṅghara* and *puruṣa* Criticism of these and was therefore undoubtedly dualistic. Views. The unity of goal propounded by the former was superficial, because though they stated that the Supreme Being was one, yet not only did they say that in that one Being *aṅghara* was spatially lower than *puruṣa*, but they also said that the negative sentences described only the lower place (*aṅghara*) and the positive only the upper one (*puruṣa*) in the Supreme Being; so that all the attributes of the Highest Being did not belong to it wherever it was present (Br. Sū. III. 2. 11—note the word "*saṅvatra*") in this Sūtra; App. IV. 2. a). The Sūtrakāra regarded such a distinction between the twofold attributes as an admission of duality, and therefore he opposed it, as will be clear from his view of the nature of the Supreme Being.

The most striking feature in the Sūtrakāra's view of the Highest Being (*para*), is the systematic and rational interpretation which he gives for the first time in the history of Indian Philosophy, to the twofold contradictory statements regarding the attributes of the Supreme One, the *coincidentia oppositorum*.

The historical position of the problem before the Sūtrakāra may be summed up in the following words: the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads which had thought of the impersonal (*aṅghara*) and the personal (*puruṣa*) independently of each other, had regarded each of them as the Highest Being in itself. Therefore, the attributes of *aṅghara* contained not only
the negative ones, but also some positive ones, such as the act of ruling (praśāsana—Br. Up. III. 8. 9). Similarly there was the custom of describing the personal principle negatively as was done in the case of the impersonal. The personal is described negatively in Br. Up. III. 9. 26 and III. 7. 23 (cf. the impersonal in Br. Up. III. 8. 11), Br. Up. IV. 4. 25 and Chā. Up. VIII. 7. 1 (cf. Pra. Up. V. 7); and the Gītā remembers this fact in II. 24. But a second stage was reached when the impersonal was placed below the personal (as the latter’s Nature). Then the ākṣara was no longer associated with such attributes as properly belong to the puruṣa. This is the case in Ka. Up. III. 15; Mu. Up. I. 1. 6; Pra. Up. V. 7; and Bh. Gī. XII. 3. In the third stage which is evident in the later Mahābhārata (and in Br. Sū. III. 2. 32–37), the distinction between ākṣara and puruṣa and between the attributes of the two became very sharp, and, as we have seen, they have developed into numerically two metaphysical principles. In the fourth case, we find that the distinction between the attributes of these two is allowed to remain as it was, but the two were to be regarded as numerically one (MBh. XII. 318. 78; Br. Sū. III. 2. 11–21). On the fifth occasion, the tendency already visible in Śve. Up. III. 19–20, Ka. Up. II. 10, Īśa. Up. 5, Ka. Up. II. 20 and Bh. Gī. XII. 13–14 assumes a definite shape and the Pāñcarātra conception of one mystic principle springs up by the fusion of ākṣara and puruṣa. This (principle) had both the negative and the positive attributes without any reference to the lower or the higher “place” in it. But at this stage no explanation for this mystic combination of the two hitherto distinct principles with distinct qualities is offered, nor is it realised that this conception is inconsistent with those already in vogue (see p. 91 above).

The author of the Sūtras who comes after all these stages definitely rejects the earlier views (2–4) except the first one, which he emphasises as an argument for his own view, and the last one which he adopts and systematises. According to him ākṣara is not spatially lower than puruṣa; and again they are not two, but one. Whatever attributes, negative or positive, the one is said to have, also belong to the
other, because the Śrutī itself makes such an interchange; their distinction is useful only for meditation (see p. 94 above). The Highest Being in its entirety is called aksara or puruṣa and the negative and the positive statements are applicable to every part of it, to every place in it (sarvatra). The Śrutī says that aksara is the goal. It also says that puruṣa is the goal. Each of the the two are also individually said to be omnipresent. It is irrational to hold that there are two goals and that each of Rational Explanation of the Problem. makes use of this argument twice (Br. Sū. III. 2. 38; III. 3. 9) Wherever aksara is mentioned, it is said that there is none else than it; wherever ātmā or puruṣa is mentioned, it is also said that there exists none else but him (Br. Sū. III. 2. 37). The Sūtras refer to Br. Up. IV. 5. 13, "It is—as is a mass of salt, without inside, without outside, entirely a mass of taste (krtṣṇa rasaghana eva), even so, verily, is this Atman, without inside, without outside, entirely a mass of knowledge (kṛṣṇah prajñāṇaghaṇa eva)", and especially to Bh. Gī. XIII. 12–16. "This has everywhere its hands and feet, everywhere its eyes, heads, and mouths, everywhere it is possessed of ears in the world, and remains having enveloped every [existing] thing" (Bh. Gī. XIII. 13). "Sarvataḥ" in the Gītā corresponds to “sarvatra” in Br. Su. III. 2–11. and therefore the Śutrakāra refers to it. According to the Śutrakāra, when any text says that the Supreme Being (aṣara or puruṣa) is devoid of hand and feet, it denies them of it in its entirety. This will be the sense of Sve. Up. III. 19 and Mu. Up. I. 1. 6. This is how he solves the problem of the coincidentia oppositorum. The same is perhaps meant also in Br. Sū. II. 1. 30 and 37 (sarvopelā ca taddaśanāt and sarvadharmopapattēśca respectively). The Supreme Being as a whole (“sarvatra”) is possessed of all, and therefore contradictory, attributes. The great teachers of Vedanta, that followed the Śutrakāra busied themselves with interpreting this verdict of the author of the aphorisms (see p. 89 above).
The standpoint which the Sūtrakāra has taken up is guided by a historical insight into the development of the *ākṣara-puruṣa* doctrine in those days. The Chāndogya and Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣads never taught that the *ākṣara* was spatially lower than the *puruṣa*, nor did they think that the personal aspect was in conflict with the impersonal. The Earlier Meticcal Upaniṣads did not mean that *ākṣara* was a principle with so much share of individuality as to

The Sūtrakāra, be counted as a second principle by the Restorer of the side of the *puruṣa*. What they Advatism in the implied by putting the *ākṣara* below Aupaniṣada School, the *puruṣa* in the discussion of the evolution of the world (as in Ka. Up. III. 10-11) was perhaps that in the entire Brahman the personal aspect governs the impersonal during the act of creating the world, and we find that the Sūtrakāra does accept this meaning of the *paralva* of the *puruṣa* (Br. Sū. I. 4. 3; see p. 104 above). When the EMU and the Gitā said that the meditator on *puruṣa* when liberated "went beyond *ākṣara* (Mu. Up. III. 2.1; Pra. Up. V. 5, 7; Bh. Gi. VIII. 21-22, XV. 16-18, XVIII. 53-55), they did not mean that the meditators on *ākṣara* reached the Twentififth and those on *puruṣa* the Twentysixth (see Bh. Gi. XII. 4). The Sūtrakāra feels himself bound to understand those statements as referring to different places in the entire Brahman which is like an omnipresent mass of light wherein one may differentiate between its parts as occupying different places, though each part has the same attributes. In brief, let not the historian of the Indian Philosophy forget that the Aupaniṣada or rather the Vedanta School owes its "monistic monolheism" (how else shall we name the union of the personal and the impersonal with the control of the former over the latter as regards the latter's creative activity!) and therewith all the later monistic or monotheistic phases of the various Vedanta Schools, to the author of the Brahmaśūtras. Henceforth the dualism and the pluralism to which the EMU, the Gitā and, more than either of these, the later Mahābhārata Aupaniṣadas had fallen a victim, is driven out of the Vedanta School once for all.
Most of the other notable features of the "aksara or purusa" doctrine of the Sūtrakāra have been noticed in the beginning of this Chapter; but one point in which the author has checked and corrected the turn of thought, into which the Pāñcarātras had already let themselves enter, requires to be mentioned here, so that the Sūtrakāra may not be mistaken for being more of the Pāñcarātras than he really is. The latter (as we find them in the L. MBh.) did not at all distinguish between aksara and purusa and could think that the personal is at the same time the impersonal (see p. 84 above). But, for the Sūtrakāra these two are two for the practical purpose of meditation. They are two distinct names of the one object of meditation and indicate two distinct methods of meditation, though leading to one and the same goal. This difference between the Pāñcarātras and the Sūtrakāra, and the way in which the latter succeeded in purging the Aupanuṣṣada speculation of its dualistic character, and thereby establishing an option of choice as regards the object of meditation, lead us to consider what we may call the compromising nature of the aphorisms.

Although the Gītā never aimed at reconciling the various Schools of Indian Philosophy, the Brahmaṣūtras bear clear marks of the great sacrifices

Compromising that the various Sākhās of the Śrutī have Character of the made in the cause of maintaining the Sūtras.

original monism or monotheism of their ancestors. First of all, each of the Vedic Schools agreed to honour the Revealed Texts of all others (Br. Sū. III 3. 44, 49). Secondly, if any one of the four requirements, codanā, ākhyā, etc. was the same in these texts, the same Brahman was to be understood as the topic in all of them (Br. Sū. III 3. 1, 6). But this did not mean that every School was henceforth to study all the texts, the rule of svādhyāya was taught in all the Sākhās and was not to be disturbed in the least by this union of the Schools. Thirdly,
since all the texts did not mention both aksara and puruṣa, henceforth aksara or puruṣa was the goal. We have already noticed the nature of this new teaching. The followers of the Chāndogya and the Brhadāraṇyaka could join the union only on this condition; while those whose texts taught both as the goals (i.e., the EMU and the Gitā) were in practice pursuing only one of the two because they were both of them not meant for one and the same man. Moreover, great appeal for unity was effected by such other arguments as the fact that every Revealed Text whether teaching the personal or the impersonal principle had taught it as omnipresent and there can be no two omnipresent principles. The followers of the EMU and the Gitā found that the idea of aksara as the Nature of the puruṣa was inconsistent with their conception of it as an eternal goal; so, aksara was allowed to remain as Prakṛti (Br. Śū. I. 4. 23) but not as a prakṛti belonging to puruṣa. The fact that the Chāndogya and the Brhadāraṇyaka Schools had already at various times taught the personal and the impersonal principles without reference to their mutual relations led them to accept the new standpoint. Henceforth those who believed in aksara were to note that puruṣa was also a name of the same principle; and those who meditated on puruṣa were to accept that the puruṣa could also be designated aksara (Br. Śū. III. 3. 8). “Aksara” was only “a different thought” (prthag dhī—Br. Śū. III 3 42; prajñāntara—Br. Śū. III 3 50; upadesantara—Br. Śū. III 3. 37). Aksara is “more powerful” (baliyas) than puruṣa because a majority of the combining parties believed in it; but, then, puruṣa is also sanctioned by the Sruti (Br. Śū. III. 3. 44–45) and both are equally good as the Vidyā (Br. Śū. III 3. 47). The followers of the oldest Schools were not to think that the attainment of puruṣa was that of a world (loka—Br. Śū. III. 3. 51). The fourth important condition to which all had to agree was that about “upasāṃhāra” or “the Rule of Collection of Thoughts” (Br.Śū. III. 3. 5). This was the most important and practical feature of this Syncretism. Till now, each School had meditated on God as He was described in its own individual text. But now a list of the thoughts on God was to be
prepared from the Revealed Texts of all the Schools. Each School was to accept what was common to all and to give to others what was peculiar to itself and consistent with the new doctrine of "aksara or purusa." This syncretic "Rule of Collection," was obligatory for the meditation on the personal aspect, but not for that on the impersonal, because in this latter case the meditator was to deny all attributes of aksara and the existing lists were found to contain a sufficiently exhaustive enumeration of these (Br. Sū. III. 3. 33). But if they found some attributes of purusa in the list of those of aksara, they were not to reject them out of respect for the Śruti which (re-spect) was the background of their union (III. 3. 40), and if they wished to collect the attributes of aksara from the various texts, there was no objection (III. 3. 39). Even in the case of the meditation on purusa, it was not possible that a meditator could meditate on Him as possessed of all the attributes in all the Revealed Texts; therefore the number of such attributes to be used in practical contemplation was not to be fixed (III. 3. 31). The younger Schools were to make a greater sacrifice and we find that they did it without any opposition. They were asked to give up such attributes of purusa as would show that purusa was different from aksara (Br. Sū. III. 3. 12).

The Younger Upaniṣadic Schools. The Śūtrakāra says that puyaśrastva, brahmaupacchatva etc. are not to be accepted as attributes of purusa, even though they are mentioned as such in the Śruti; and the wonder is that he finds none to oppose him. There is no pūrvaṇaṣa on this significant step he takes. The followers of the EMU and the Gitā also agreed to give up the lower Nature, the Intellect and the Mind as the created principles in the evolitional series (1. 4. 23–28; II. 3. 15). This was done perhaps because all of them vigorously opposed the purely rational Śāṅkhyas or perhaps because it was necessary to appease the Vaiśasanyins and the Bāhurcś who were yet highly honoured by the philosophical thinkers. (Even the L. MBh. contains some descriptions of creation beginning with the Ether as in the Chā and Br. Upaniṣads.)
Thus, we find that all the Upaniṣadic Schools agreed in giving up minor though important differences for the purpose of forming a union of all the followers of the Revealed texts. A new book was to be prepared. The general points of agreement were to be recorded in a document for the future guidance of all the Sākhās who were to keep on studying their own svādhyāya but in the light of this agreement. The most important requirement was a list of the thoughts on the highest Being and a systematic account of the exact nature of the "śūdhaṇa" and "phala" agreeable to all the combining Schools. The task seems to have been handed over to Bādarāyana and to some other renowned teachers who represented all these Schools. They composed a book and therein noted their views on the points where they differed (Br. Śū. I. 4. 21–23; IV. 3. 7–16; IV. 4. 5–7, IV. 4. 10–12; III. 2. 41–42). Henceforth this new work (on the teaching of Brahman as distinguished from Karman) became the chief text for this united School of the Vedic Sākhās, to be known now as the Vedic School.

The great sacrifices, described above, which the uniting parties have done, sets one to think whether the purpose that made them sink their differences was only a theoretical one or whether this syncretism had a practical goal. Would anybody have advised the followers of the EMU and the Gitā, under normal circumstances, to give up the subordination of aksara to puruṣa by abandoning some of the attributes of each of these about the meaning of which they had not the least doubt? And would such an advice have been accepted by them if it had been actually given? Do the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads* and the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads show any signs of this union? Is not the theory of the two Natures a formidable hinderance in the way of such a proposal? It is not at all difficult to imagine the motive force of this union. We have
seen how the Gitā distinguished between the two Natures and how the L. MBh. Aupanışadas differed from the L. MBh. Sāmkhyas and Yugas, though all of them (as they are found in the later Mahābhārata) agreed, in a way, as regards the nature of the final goal. But the seed of their disunion and enmity is also present in the Mahābhārata. The Sāmkhyas and the Yogas refused to accept aksara either as the higher Nature or as a goal by the side of the puruṣa (i.e. optionally to be accepted in place of puruṣa.) When later on these two Schools became more and more rationalistic and introduced philosophical changes of grave significance, which caused them to be ranked with atheists, the orthodox Aupanışadas of all Sākhās found it necessary to offer a combined opposition to these now entirely hostile Schools. Perhaps some more adversaries had freshly entered the field. It was under these circumstances that the descendants of the L. MBh. Aupanışadas who never before found it necessary to form themselves into a combined School, who speculated in a variety of ways on all points except the aksara-puruṣa doctrine, and who understood by the word Vedanta any text or passage of the Upanīṣads, formed themselves into a School of their own distinguished from the hostile Schools, Sāmkhya, Yoga and others. No wonder that from the beginning of the very first chapter, the Brahmāstras criticise the Sāmkhya and lose no opportunity of doing the same whenever possible.

But this achievement itself would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, and the considerations, by which we find it to have been guided, would have been entirely different from what they really are, if the teaching of the Bhagavadgitā had been already forgotten at the time of the composition of the work which is intended to record it. It is impossible to think that the third point described above (p. 94) regarding the admission of the option of choice of one out of aksara and puruṣa would have suggested itself or would have been accepted by the parties involved if they had not before them the correct
interpretation of the EMU, the Gitā and the L. MBh. Aupani-
śāda doctrines, the last of which are criticised and rejected by
the Śūtrakāra. On the contrary, the fact, as I have found it,
is that the remembrance of the aksara-
and-puruṣa doctrine of the Gitā (Bh Gī. XII. 1-5) had exce-
ceedingly facilitated the task of the author of the Śūtras who
only transformed it into an aksara-or-puruṣa doctrine. The boldness which the Śūtrakāra shows in reject-
ing those attributes of puruṣa which conveyed its distinction
from aksara (see p. 113 above) is unparalleled in the works of
any of the Ācāryas whose only recourse was an hair-splitting
method of interpretation" whenever they had to meet a passage
contrary to what they taught. The Śūtrakāra could do what
he has done, because he was sure of the support of those for
whom he did it. (In this respect the Śūtrakāra is more reliable
than the Ācāryas in the matter of the interpretation of the
texts with which we are concerned.) In brief, the interpreta-
tion of the Śūtras offered in this Thesis will, it is hoped, show
that the unique success which they achieved in their aim of
combining all Aupaniśadās against the purely rational Schools
and giving the Vedanta texts a System called Vedanta
Darśana, was greatly due to the teaching of the Bhagavadgitā.†
Therefore, the inclusion of the Brahmasūtras in the present
Dissertation as an evidence for the meaning of the term aksara
will not be considered out of place.

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* Śaṅkara actually said that piyāśrastva, brahma-puccha-vā, etc. refer to the "ānandalī āṁśā" who is the ānandamaya

† Does not Bh. Gī. XIII. 4 which may be a later interpolation
in the Gitā, refer to the diversity (bahudhā) of the aksara-
puruṣa doctrine in the EMU, in the Gitā and, in the
Brahmasūtras? This Thesis has also produced ample
evidence to show that kṣetra (Bh. Gī. XIII) was a term for
aksara and therefore kṣetraśa a term for puruṣa.
RETROSPECT.

In the Rgveda, the oldest literary monument of Aryan culture, we read already in those few hymns which herald the dawn of philosophy, that it is in reality but one being (ekam sat) named differently which is addressed in the hymns to the various deities (I. 164. 46); and that, before the world was created, "without air that one breathed by its own power; for there was not beyond it anything whatever" (X. 129. 2).

Later, the Oldest Prose Upanishads taught as their highest metaphysical principle either aksara only, i.e., the (impersonal) Immutable or only purusa the "Person"; it, or he, respectively, was declared to be "one only without a second" (ekam eva adityam-Châ. Up. VI. 2. 1).

After that, we find in Chapter I of Muñḍaka Upanishad a first attempt at reconciling the impersonal and the personal (yen aksaram purusam veda satyam I. 2. 13); but the prevailing view in the Age of these Earlier Metrical Upanishads is the one expressed in Mu. Up. II and III, placing purusa above aksara (Mu. Up. II. 1. 2; Pra. Up. V. 5, 7; Ka. Up. III. 11). In the Svetásvatara Upanishad this is summarized as follows: Brahma (not Brahman) is the one threefold being (tiruvatham brahmanam), viz., a triad (not three!) consisting of the individual soul, the Immutable, and the Person, called here (I. 12), respectively, the Enjoyer, the Enjoyable, and the Inciter (or Lord in I. 8); the Immutable (i.e., the "Highest Immutable"; Sve. Up. IV. 8) being again twofold (V. 1) in so far as it has the unconscious Matter (the Manifest, Mutable, pradhiṇa, avidyā) as its periodical manifestation and is yet persisting as the Unmanifest; Immortal, Immutable, Light, Self, Knowledge
(avyakta, amṛta, akṣara, haras, ātman, vidyā) (I. 8, 10; V. 1). The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, then, taught a triad foreshadowing a future tetrad.*

The Bhagavadgītā taught the very same doctrine, only with some new names, speaking of two Unmanifest ones or Natures (VIII. 20, VII. 5), viz., a higher one (akṣara, mahād brahman) and a lower one (kṣara, brahman) (XV. 16; XIV. 3; VIII. 3–4; III. 15; V 10) of which the latter periodically emerges from the former (IX.7; III. 15); and we may suppose that its teaching the lower Unmanifest to produce the manifest universe (VIII. 18–19) is also in agreement with Śve. Up., as is undoubtedly its regarding the personal (puruṣa) as higher than the impersonal (akṣara) and yet not a distinct entity from it: they are not two, though they are not one either; i.e., they are so to speak, an internal difference only (sva-ga-ta bheda) of one and the same being.

This doctrine we find again practically unchanged with the Mahābhārata Apaniṣadas: they called the lower Nature (1), akṣara (2), and puruṣa (3), the Twenty-fourth, the Twentifth and the Twentysixth respectively and said(MBh. XII. 217. 1): “He who does not know the tetrad does not know the Supreme Brahman” (na sa vedā paraḥ brahma yo na veda ca lōṣṭhayam; XII. 217. 1), where the four are: (1) vyakta; (2) avyakta or amṛta pāda XII. 217. 2), (3) puruṣa (XII. 217. 6), and (4) dehi, the embodied soul (XII. 217. 12). But we see also another and, evidently, later School of the Mahābhārata Apaniṣadas preparing already the ground for future developments by finding it necessary to explain—which was not really different, apart from its being expressly stated, from the view of both Śve. Up. and Bh. Gīt—that the two Natures are one and akṣara and puruṣa are one in that in either case the one is the “place” of the other (tattvatvāt, XII. 318. 56. 78).

* This becomes quite clear, if we restore, as Prof. Schrauder suggests, the strange reading supratiṣṭhākṣaram ca in Śv. Up. I. 7 to supratiṣṭhāṃ kṣaram ca.
The Sāṃkhya and the Yogas of the Mahābhārata then actually did away with the theory of the two Natures, but in a different manner.

(1) The Sāṃkhya abolished the ākṣara or the higher Nature by simply distributing its attributes among the lower, i.e., their only Nature, and the Twentysixth of the Apaniṣadas whom they accepted as their Twentyfifth. [This was the origin of the dualism of Spirit and Matter which we find as an accomplished fact in the Classical Sāṃkhya.]

(2) The Rudrite Yogas, while accepting the Sāṃkhya Twentyfourth (and rejecting the higher Nature), could not admit the Sāṃkhya purusa who was both Jīva and Īsvara, for they (i.e., these Yogas) wanted a highest principle which was absolutely beyond bondage and liberation, i.e., had not even the semblance of being somehow (temporarily), viz., by creation etc., contaminated by the Prakṛti. Thus, they believed in two principles instead of the one purusa of the Sāṃkhya, viz., the Twentysixth, who was for them only a kind of world-soul, and the Twentyfifth, the Parmātman, who was placed above the Twentyfifth and the Twentyfourth (Prakṛti) and who was the absolutely transcendent, yet personal, highest being. [Thus, and not on the basis of an atheistic Sāṃkhya, has evolved the idea of a personal highest God in the Yoga System.] This School, then, may be looked upon as having evolved from the (likewise Rudrite) Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. For, its two Atmans are the two “friends” in Sve. Up. IV. 6–7. But in Śve. Up. the boundary between the two is still constantly obliterated; it has still a conscious prakṛti and its “Lord” is still, though not bhoktṛ, yet kariḥ as regards creation etc., (V. 3; VI. 3–4).

(3) The Hīranyagarbha Yogas were at one with the Rudrite Yogas as regards their Twentyfourth and Twentyfifth, but went beyond them by positing an impersonal Twentysixth which they called ākṣara. This ākṣara, then, was like that of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads deprived of both its personality (cf. Br. Up. III. 8. 9) and materiality, the former being reserved for their Twentyfifth,
and the latter for their Twentyfourth. This is the acme of metaphysical abstraction reached in the Mahābhārata.

In all of these three Schools the Twentyfifth engaged (either really or apparently) in creation, etc., and transmigration etc., had so far been only one, who either had (as in the case of the Yogas) or had not (as with the Sāmkhyas) a higher principle above him, and the empirical plurality of individuals must have been for them but a phenomenon of Nature, if they cared at all to explain it. We can understand this attitude if we realise that it was a Herculean task for Indian thinkers to free themselves from the grip of the ancient Upaniṣada tradition with its one and only Ātman. It is a great pity, therefore, that the Mahābhārata has not preserved for us one or two documents showing the rise of the theory of plurality of souls. We are merely confronted, in one of the latest chapters of the Sāntiparvan (350. 1 fl.) with the fact that both the Sāmkhyas and the Yogas had meanwhile taken to it, i.e., to the doctrine of one real highest soul and many empirical individual ones. [For the Sāmkhyas now only one more step remained to be taken, viz., that of abolishing the puruṣa, just as formerly they had abolished the higher Nature, and establishing a real plurality of souls, but that is not heard of yet in the Mahābhārata; it came later, when Buddhism spread and atheism became fashionable.]

Some time after the origin of these three Schools, came the Mahābhārata Pāñcarātras who rather developed the religion (dharma) of the Bhagavadgītā, their most venerable authority: they emphasised the oneness of aksara and puruṣa and did not allow either Matter or soul to be a distinct entity from it, but looked upon the former as periodically created and withdrawn and upon the latter also as emerging from and returning into their “source” the Puruṣa. In spite of this they did not renounce the vyagata-bheda standpoint of the Gītā, but spoke of an innate power of the Puruṣa which they called his Vidyā (and which was later identified with Viṣṇu’s wife Lakṣmi) and also of the souls as somehow
being parts of God and continuing as such even during the period of cosmic rest. This, then, is the strictest monism taught in the Mahābhārata.

And, finally, Bādrāyaṇa, the author (or reviser?) of the Brāhmaṇa-sūtras, substituted the Mahābhārata Pāṇcarātra view of the oneness of akṣara and puruṣa by his teaching that the same Supreme Being called para “the Highest” is to be meditated upon as akṣara or puruṣa.

But, while in Bādrāyaṇa’s Sūtras (and also in the systems of the Vaiṣṇavite Ācāryas) the abandoned ancient position (of puruṣa being higher than akṣara) is still to some extent recognizable, even the traces of the latter will be found to have disappeared when we turn to the works of his most renowned successor, Śaṅkarācārya.

Thus it has happened that the history of akṣara has become what it has been called by us: a forgotten chapter. It undoubtedly covers a very long period when again and over again those very questions were asked which are echoed in the motto of this Thesis. The history of Indian Philosophy must, indeed, have essentially been for many centuries the history of akṣara.
APPENDIX I.

INTERPRETATION OF THE UPAŅIṢADS.

Scholars may want a more detailed demonstration of the right claimed by the author of this Thesis to use the Upaniṣads in the way he has done. He, therefore, submits to them the following translation of, and notes on, those passages of the Upaniṣads which testify most unambiguously to the correctness of his view of aksara and at the same time can be shown to be in full agreement, in this respect, with his second source on aksara, the Bhagavadgītā.

A.—Mundaka Upaniṣad.


(1) The following is the truth: Just as from a well-kindled fire sparks rise in thousands all alike, so, O gentle one, are the various things born of the Immutable and return into the same.

(2) That divine, formless puruṣa is both outside and inside, unborn, without breath, without a mind, shining, higher than the highest Immutable (aṣṭarāt paratvaḥ parah).

NOTES:—

1. These verses make it quite clear that the Mundaka Upaniṣad distinguishes between aksaru and puruṣa and places the latter above the former, as does the Gitā (e. g. in XV. 16–18).

2. It should, however, be noticed that this passage of the Upaniṣad (II. 1. 1) describes all things as originating from the Immutable. We know that in the Gitā also, the higher Nature is said to be either the origin of all beings (e. g. Bh. Gī. VII. 6, XIV. 4), or the origin of the lower Nature which is the direct origin of all begins (Bh. Gī. VIII 20–21, III. 14–15).

Just as the flowing rivers disappear into the ocean, having abandoned name and form, so the knower totally freed from name and form reaches the divine purusa higher than the Highest (parat param purusam).

Notes:--

1. Purusa in this verse can be no other than purusa above the highest Immutable in Mu. Up. II. 1. 2.


(7) Just as the spider creates and takes [back], just as herbs rise up on the earth, just as the hairs on the head and the hairs on the body (appear) from the living man, so does everything here rise from ‘the Immutable’ (akṣara).

(8) The [lower] brahman develops on account of tapas, from that is the food born; from food, breath, mind, truth (satya), words, and, in the rites, ‘the Immortal’ (amṛtam).

(9) From that [atman] who is omniscient, who knows all, whose tapas consists of knowledge, is born this [lower] brahman, name, form, and food.

Notes:--

1. The use of the masculine forms in I. 1. 9 should not lead us to suppose that the last verse is a later interpolation, because akṣara ātmā (Pr. Up. IV. 9) or akṣaraḥ puruṣah (Mu. Up. I. 2. 13), or rather simply ātmā (see ātmā in Mu. Up. II. 2. 5, and notes on Śve. Up. I. 7-12) could have been understood by the author of the Upaniṣad as the subject possessed of omniscience and other attributes mentioned in this Śruti. The occurrence of these masculine expressions in the sense of the impersonal Immutable shows nothing else than that though the idea in the mind of these writers was an impersonal one, they believed themselves to be entitled to make use of words that were of the masculine gender. Even in the oldest Upaniṣads like the Br. Up ātmā is the word used for what is described only negatively, e.g. Br. Up. III. 9. 26. In the present instance, brahman is said to be the effect of the Immutable according to the interpretation we have proposed,
and this conclusion is justified by Bh. Gī. III. 15 (brahmā ākṣara-rasamudbhavan). So brahman in Mu. Up. I. 1. 9 means the lower Nature. Moreover the expression ‘yah sarvā jñāh san avad’ (in I. 1. 9) is the same as in II. 2. 7 where undoubtedly it refers to ākṣara (see notes on ātmān under Śve. Up. 1. 7–12). The author of the Brahmsūtras clearly says that ātmān, Brahman, etc. are words used both for ākṣara and puruṣa (Br. Sū. III. 3. 52; see App. IV).

2. As already said, brahman in I. 1. 9 is the lower Nature, because it is the effect of the Immutable. This follows also from the fact that it is said to be ‘growing’ ‘gathering’ or ‘developing’ (cīyate) through śaṭpas (I. 1. 8).

3. That ākṣara in this passage is of the same nature as that of the Bhagavadgītā is proved by the similarity of the attributes mentioned in Mu. Up. I. 1. 6 and those in Gītā XII. 2–3.

4. That the Immutable is said to be the goal in Mu. Up. II. 2. 3, while elsewhere in the same Upaniṣad, e.g. in III. 2. 8 puruṣa is said to be the goal, is no obstacle to our interpretation, because in the days of the Munḍaka Upaniṣad both ākṣara and puruṣa were regarded as goals, as we find in the case of the Bhagavadgītā.


To him who had properly approached [him], whose mind was tranquil and who possessed control (of the senses), that knower (of Brahman) proclaimed in truth that Lore of Brahman so that he could know the real ‘Immutable–puruṣa’ (ākṣara puruṣa).

Note:—

‘Ākṣara puruṣa’, mentioned here, seems to be a crude attempt to explain the relation of ākṣara and puruṣa. The oldest Upaniṣads use both these terms separately, e.g. ākṣara in Br. Up. III. 8. 8–11, and puruṣa in Cha. Up. III. 12. 6, and Br. Up. III. 9. 26. Each word denotes the highest reality known to the Upaniṣad. Both these words are placed together in the present passage: this seems to have been done consciously in order to reconcile the impersonal and the personal conceptions about the highest truth referred to above. The authors of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads found that in the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads, sometimes, ākṣara was taught, and at other
times *puruṣa* was taught, as is the case in the passages just mentioned. They were not confronted with an Aupanṣada School teaching *aṅkara* and *puruṣa* as two philosophical principles, as was actually the case with the author of the Brahmaṣūtras who had before him the Mahābhārata Aupanṣada School. So, the EMU try to reconcile the conception of the impersonal with that of the personal in Br. Up. and Chā. Up., but were not concerned with that spiritual dualism which was itself the result of the EMU and the Gitā. Thus, the first section of the Śruti Upaniṣad seems to be earlier than the other two sections, because this effort to reconcile *aṅkara* and *puruṣa* (in Mu. Up. I) is less successful than the same in II and III where the impersonal *aṅkara* (e.g. in II. 1. 2, III. 1. 3 and III. 2. 1, 8) is clearly placed below the personal *puruṣa*. The expression ‘*aṅkara puruṣa*’ betrays the author’s intention to convey the idea of the impersonal Immutable only, because he uses the simple term *aṅkara* in Mu. Up. I. 1. and refers to *tapas* and *śvadīḥ* in I. 2. 11 which is evidently based upon Chā. Up. V. 10. 1-2. Both these Upaniṣadic passages describe the paths of gods and Pitṛs. Chā. Up. V. 10. 1-2 mentions the impersonal Brahman as the goal of *devayāna*, so it is quite probable that the Mu. Up. passage which draws upon that older text has the same goal in view. The words like *brahma-loka* (Mu. Up. I. 2. 6) and *āṁśa puruṣa* in Mu. Up. I. 2. 11 also point to the same. The expression *aṅkara puruṣa* is like the expression *aṅkara ātman* in Pr. Up. IV. 9, which though masculine refers to the impersonal reality described in Pr. Up. IV. 10. The Immutable is designated as *aṅkara puruṣa* also in Bh. Gi. XV. 16: “I here are these two *puruṣas* in the world, viz., the Mutable and the Immutable”; but the Gitā does so, because it calls the *puruṣa* (of Mu. Up.) “*puruṣottama*” (Bh. Gi. XV. 18).

**Conclusion:**

1. The Immutable in the Mu. Up. is the Impersonal One (I. 1. 6) as in Bh. Gi. XII. 3-4.

2. It is below *puruṣa*, e.g. in II. 1. 2, III. 1. 2, III. 2. 8, as in Bh. Gi. XV. 16-18.

3. It is an independent goal just like the *puruṣa* (I. 1. 5), as in Bh. Gi. XII. 1, VIII. 10.

4. It can be called *aṅkara* (I. 1. 5, 7; II. 1. 2; II. 2. 2), *ātman* (possibly in I. 1. 9, II. 2. 5), *aṅkara puruṣa* (I. 2. 13),
amrita puruṣa (I. 2. 11), Brahman (III. 1. 3), yoni (with reference to puruṣa) (III. 1. 3), yoni of all beings (I. 1. 6), śukra (III. 2. 1), biahmadhāma (III. 2. 2, 4).

5. From it, brahman or the lower Nature is "born" (I. 1. 8–9).

6. Specially noteworthy is the fact that in Mu. Up. 1. 2, we have an earlier effort to reconcile the impersonal and personal principles of Br. Up. and Chā. Up. than the one in Mu. Up. II. 1. 1–2.

B.—Praśna Upaniṣad.

Sections IV and V of the Praśna Upaniṣad mention the Immutable (akṣara) and puruṣa respectively, and, as we shall see presently, distinguish between the two, placing puruṣa above akṣara.


(9) For he, who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, fancies, knows, and acts, he is the person of the nature of knowledge (viṣṇuṇātmā puruṣah), [and ] he has his stand in the highest Immutable Self (pāre ṣkṣare ātmam).

(10) He, indeed, who knows the Immutable (akṣara) which is without shadow, without a body, without blood, and radiant, O gentle one, he, who knows this Immutable, reaches none else than the highest Immutable. He becomes omniscient and all—embracing. For that the following verse [ is the authority ].

(11) He who knows that Immutable in which the knowledge—self (viṣṇuṇātmā), along with all the gods (i. e. senses), and all the vital airs and elements find rest—such a one having become omniscient, O gentle one, has certainly entered everything.

Notes:—

1. The person of the nature of knowledge (viṣṇuṇātmā puruṣah) is the Jiva (individual soul) in whom all senses and all objects of sense rest during the dreamless sleep (Pr. Up. IV. 6–7).
2. The expression \textit{para akṣara ātman} (in verse IV. 9) for the highest Immutable, which is more complex than the usual word \textit{akṣara} (e.g. in Mu. Up. I. 1. 3) may be compared with the similar expression \textit{akṣara purusa}, 'the Immutable \textit{purusa}', for the same, used in Mu. Up. I. 2. 13. see pp. 125-126).

3. The description of the Immutable in verse 10 makes it quite clear that \textit{para akṣara ātman} in the previous verse is to be identified with the \textit{akṣara} of the Bhagavadgītā (see e. g. XII. 2-5).

4. Verse 11 makes the sense of \textit{vizñānātmā puruṣah} in verse 9 quite clear. He is accompanied by the senses, the vital airs and the elements. He can be none else but the Jīva.


(2) Indeed, O Satyakāma, that which is the Syllable 'Om' is the Higher and the Lower Brahman (\textit{param c āparaṁ ca brahma}). Therefore the knower obtains either of the two (\textit{ekataram}) by this same resort (viz., the Syllable Om).

\begin{tabular}{ccc}
\textbf{x} & \textbf{x} & \textbf{x} \\
\end{tabular}

(5) But he who meditates on the Supreme \textit{puruṣa} (\textit{parama puruṣa}) by means of this very Syllable, viz., 'Om', consisting of three parts, joins the Light, viz., the Sun. He being free from sin, just as the serpent is freed from slough, is carried by the Sāma–hymns to the world of Brahman (i. e. to the Immutable). From this [world] replete with Life (or from this solid Mass of Life–Jivaghana), he sees \textit{puruṣa}, higher than the Highest, residing in the City (\textit{parat param purisayam puruṣam}). Regarding this, the following two verses are [the authority].

\begin{tabular}{ccc}
\textbf{x} & \textbf{x} & \textbf{x} \\
\end{tabular}

(7) He obtains this [human] world by means of the Rg–verses, the world of the atmosphere through the Yajus–verses, and through Sāmans he obtains that [Immutable] which the Wise proclaim. He, who knows what is quiet, without old age, immortal, without fear, and the Highest (\textit{para}) obtains Him even by the same resort viz., the Syllable 'Om' [meditated upon as an entire Syllable].
Notes:

1. The conception of the Higher and Lower Brahman of this Upanişad is very important. Sentences 3 and 4 of this section describe how the meditator on one and two parts (ekamātra and dvimātra) of the Syllable ‘Om’, obtains the human world and the world of the moon. (Apparently these worlds are not to be counted as Brahman.) The world of the moon is the world from which the soul returns, according to V. 4. The sentence (V. 5), therefore, describes the world from which there is no return. This world is said to be the Brahman-world (brahmāloka). And the man who meditates on all the three parts of the Syllable (i.e. who meditates on the Syllable ‘Om’ as consisting of three parts, but not as a single Syllable, see note 9 below), goes to it after having joined [the rays of] the Light viz., the Sun. The description (vinirmuktaṁ etc. in V. 5) shows that this man is the liberated soul. Therefore, this must be the Lower Brahman (aparam brahma) mentioned in verse V. 2. This is “one of the two (goals)” stated in this Sruti (V. 2). The phrase parāt param (V. 5) is an epithet of the puruṣa “who is higher than this Mass of Life which is the Highest (etosinaḥ jivaghanāt parāt param).” This interpretation is supported by the description of the puruṣa in the Muṇḍaka Upanişad. There we read: the Brahman-knower being freed from ‘name and form’ reaches the divine puruṣa higher than the Highest (Mu. Up. III. 2. 8).

2. Brahmāloka in this passage is ‘the Immutable ākṣara’, because (a) as pointed out in the note to the previous verse, according to this Upanişad there is no return from this Brahman-world, return being possible only if the meditator goes to the world of the moon as said in sentence 3 of this section; (b) it is said here that the liberated soul “sees” the puruṣa from this Brahman-world; no text tells us that one can “see” the puruṣa from the world of Brahmā otherwise called Prajāpati; (c) even some of the Upanişads distinguish between the Brahman-world, i.e. the Immutable, and the world of Prajāpati, e.g. Kau. Up. I. 3, in which brahmāloka can only mean the Immutable; as the question of return and non-return is here (in Pra. Up. V) discussed according as the soul reaches the Moon or the Sun, we can associate this passage with Kau. Up. I. 3 where the same topic is met with; and (d) lastly this Brahman-world is said to be jivaghana, a solid Mass of Life; the soul that is “bound” including even Brahmā could not have been so-called. The idea of ‘jivasamaśṭi’ as the inter-
pretation of jivaghana is not acceptable because that idea is not known to the EMU and because "jivaghana" is not difficult to be explained, if we look to the literature of the Age of the EMU. This term "jivaghana" means the same as is called prajñānaghana "Mass of Consciousness" in Br. Up. IV. 5. 13 and in Māndukya Up. 5, and "jivabhūtā.prakṛti" the Life-element in Bh. Gī. VII. 5, and "jiva ātman" in Chā. Up. VI. 3. 2. (see Ch. IV. p. 102). In Chā. Up. VIII. 3. 2. (brahmaloka means aksara the "Immutable"; so also in Chā. Up. VIII. 4. 1–3, VIII. 5. 3–4 and in Br. Up. IV. 3. 32.

3. It should also be emphasised that the liberated soul is here said to see purusa from the world of the Immutable, so that it is not meant here that the soul reaches the purusa by meditation on Him through the syllable 'Om' conceived of as consisting of three parts.

4. The world described as 'what the Wise (kavayah—cf. Ka. Up. III 14) proclaim,' is the Brahman-world of V. 5 or "the Lower Brahman" of V. 2, because both of these are said to be reached through the Sāman-hymns. And this description of the Brahman-world also justifies my interpretation of the term brahmaloka in V. 5. So, the expression "the Lower Brahman" has got quite a different meaning from what Saṅkara would explain it to be.

5. Now, there should be no doubt regarding the explanation of "Him" (V. 7c), because this word stands for purusa who is mentioned in V. 5. Verse 7 is a quotation intended to explain sentence 5 (see note 8 below).

6. As it is said that even by the syllable 'Om' the Brahman-knower reaches purusa; it follows that 'Om' in this case is not conceived of as a syllable consisting of three parts, but as a self-complete single mystic symbol. This idea seems to be similar to that in the Bh. Gī. VIII. 13. 'Even' (eva in V.7c–d) is significant in this connection.

7. 'The quiet one' and the other epithets refer undoubt-edly to aksara. It is not unusual to describe the Immutable in these terms (see sāntātman in Ka. Up. III. 13). Moreover, param 'the Highest' mentioned here is to be distinguished from parit param 'the higher than the Highest', the attribute of purusa in one of the sentences here (V. 5).
8. 'Him' (in V. 7c) must refer to puṇḍra as distinguished from the impersonal akṣara conveyed here by the neuter pronouns 'yat' and 'tat'. This puṇḍra is the one whom the liberated soul "sees" from the Brahman-world (V. 5).

9. The exact literal sense of this last verse must be noted. It states that one who knows akṣara attains to puṇḍra by means of the syllable "Om". This idea follows also from two verses in Bh. Gi. viz., VIII. 12, where it is said that 'he, who, repeating the Brahman consisting of the one syllable viz., 'Om' and remembering me, departs leaving off his body reaches the highest goal', and XII. 4 which says: 'Those who meditate on akṣara being attached to the good of all creatures, reach none but me'. This also agrees with Tai. Up. II. 1, which says 'The knower of Brahman obtains what is beyond [it]’ (see also Bh. Gi. XVII. 53–55 and XII. 4–5).

CONCLUSION:—

1. So, according to Praśna Upaniṣad IV and V, the Immutable (akṣara) is impersonal and can be described negatively (Pr. Up. IV. 10, V. 7d), as is also the case in Bh. Gi. XII. 3–4.

2. It is also called (a) para akṣara ātman 'the Highest Immutable Atman' (Pr. Up. IV. 9–11, the term ātman being used here without a reference to the self), (b) 'apara brahman' the Lower Brahman, in contrast with the puṇḍra who is called 'para brahman' the Higher Brahman (Pr. Up. V. 2), (c) 'brahma-loka' the Brahman-world, (d) 'jivaghana' a solid Mass of Life (Pr. Up. V. 5), meaning the same as jivabhūta para prakṛti in Bh. Gi. VII. 5, and (e) 'that which the Wise proclaim' (yat tat kavyo vedayante—Pr. Up. V. 7).

3. The puṇḍra is higher than it (parāt paraṁ puṇḍrayam puṇḍram iksate—V. 5).

C.—Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

From the standpoint of terminology, this Upaniṣad is later than the two already examined. Two passages in it are specially important for our inquiry and will, therefore, be discussed here in extenso, viz., I. 7–9 and V. 1.
1. Śve. Up. I. 7–12.

(7) This is the Supreme Brahman (paramām brahma) celebrated in song. The three therein are well established and imperishable (akṣara). The Brahman-knower having known the distinction between these are merged into Brahman, being devoted to it and freed from [all] forms of existence.

(8) The Lord (īśa) maintains (bhārate) this all, the combined Mutable (kṣara) and Immutable (akṣara), the Manifest and the Unmanifest (vyaktāvyaktam). And the Atman, the not-Lord (aniśa), is "bound" because of his being the enjoyer (bhoktā), and is released from all bonds after having known the divine One.

(9) The knower (jīna) and the not-knower (ajña), the Lord and the not-Lord, are both "unborn". The one "female unborn" is associated with the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment. And the infinite Atman is "of the form of the all" (viśvarūpa) and, indeed, no Agent. It is [the attainment of] Brahma, when one attains these three.

(10) The Mutable (kṣara) is the First Evolver (pradhāna); and the Immortal, the Immutable (amṛtākṣaram) is the Light (haras). Over the Mutable and the [Immutable] ātman, the One God rules. Through meditation on him, through applying oneself to him and [thus] becoming completely of his nature (tattvabhāvāt, bhūyāḥ) at the end [there results] the cessation of all deceit (viśvamāyā).

(11) For him who has known God [there follows] the relinquishment of all fetters, the cessation of birth and death because of the troubles being removed. Through meditation on him, [he gains] the third [of the triad] on the loss of the body [and thus] all-Lordliness (viśvaśvarya). He is then absolute (kevala) and has achieved all desires.

(12) This [triad] should be known as contained eternally in the Atman, since nothing higher remains to be known for him who has known the Enjoyer (bhoktā), the Enjoyable (bhogya) and the Prompter (preṇīty); this is the entire Threefold Brahma which has been proclaimed.
NOTES:-

1. The technical use of 'aṅkṣara' in the sense of the Immutable should be distinguished from the ordinary sense of the word, viz., imperishable.

2. Verse 8 gives the explanation of the 'three' mentioned in the previous verse. They are (1) the Mutable and the Immutable combined together (samyukta) and thus forming one of the three, (2) the Lord (iṣṭa) and (3) the not-Lord (aniṣṭa) i.e. the Jīva.

3. If Śve. Up. I. 7b be interpreted to mean "The three are well established and are imperishable therein", then the three should be necessarily understood as (1) the Mutable, (2) the Immutable and (3) the not-Lord, the Supreme Brahma being the Lord (iṣṭa) himself. In that case, verse 7 would regard also the Immutable (iṅkṣara) as an imperishable (aṅkṣara) principle, along with the Immutable and the Jīva. An explanation of this is found in Śve. Up. V. I (see note 2 on Śve. Up. V. I).

4. It should be noted here that the Mutable is called the Manifest and the Immutable the Unmanifest (avyakta). These terms are also used in the Gitā e.g. in VIII. 18-21 (see App. II). This use of the term avyakta for aṅkṣara is a later one. The older Upaniṣads, e.g. the Mūndaka and the Praṣna, do not use it. They use the word 'aṅkṣara' which is met with in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, e.g. in III. 8.8 (see note 13 below). The explanation of the Immutable as the Unmanifest in contrast with that of iṅkṣara as the Manifest shows that aṅkṣara cannot be here interpreted as the Jīva. This, also, follows from the fact that the not-Lord is one of the imperishable three, along with the Immutable also (see notes 2-3 above).

5. The distinction between the Immutable and the Lord is here definitely stated as that between the ruled and the ruler or the sustained and the sustainer (bhūrata in verse 8).

6. The first half of verse 8 finds an exact parallel in Bh. Git. XV.16-18. The Upaniṣadic words bhūrata and iṣṭa should be compared with bibharti and iṅwara in the Gitā. The author of the Brahmasūtras makes 'sustenance' sambhṛti a distinct attribute of puruṣa (Br. Śū. III. 3. 23; App. IV).

7. As distinct from 'the ruled' i.e. the Immutable and the Mutable, and 'the ruler' the Lord, the Jīva is called 'the
not-ruler’. It should be noticed that he is here not counted as one of the ruled. The statement that the not-ruler Atman is “bound” through his characteristic as an enjoyer may be compared with B. Gl. XIII. 20–22 (see also Sve. U. IV. 5–7).

8. The one “unborn female” is the higher Nature or the Immutable because only the Immutable can be said to be united, on the one hand, with ‘the enjoyer’ the Jiva and, on the other, with ‘the objects of enjoyment’ which would constitute the Mutable, and because the Mutable is here ‘the First Evolver’ pradhāna and ‘the Immutable’ (aksara) is said to be ‘the Immortal’ amṛta which ultimately means the same as ajā ‘unborn’ (see verse 10).

9. Thus, the three in verse 9 are the three unborn, viz., the Jiva, the higher Nature and the infinite Atman or the Lord. Verse 8 includes the Mutable along with the Immutable, but the tripled is essentially the same in both the verses.

10. Verse 9 describing the infinite Atman or the Lord as ‘of the form of the all’ (vivasvāna) means that the Mutable and the Immutable which constitute ‘the all’, are contained in the Lord (see verse 8).

11. The word amṛta in verse I. 10 a is the one which is used as a synonym of aksara, the Immutable. It is so used in the oldest Upaniṣads as well as in those which can be historically assigned to the same period as the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, e. g. “This is the Immutable, this is the Immortal, the Fearless (Chā. Up. I. 4. 4); “It alone is the Bright (sukram), it is Brahman, it alone is designated the Immortal” (Katha Up. V. 8, VI. 1); see also Muṇḍaka Up. II. 2. 11 and Katha Up. VI. 17 (see note 1 on Śve. Up. V. 1).

12. The word haras (as Prof. Schrader points out to me) has been identified with Greek theros “heat [of the summer]” and traced back, together with ghṛṇa, gharma, etc., to the root ghṛ. Besides in the Rgveda it also occurs in Yajurveda (Taitt. Saṃh. and Brāhm.) to which the Śve. Up. is said to belong. It is used especially for “energy” as of the eye or of a horse (cf. harasvin “fiery”, “energetic”), and thus may be looked upon as a synonym of tejas and a precursor of the later term sakti. For tegas in the sense of a higher prakṛti compare e. g. Chā. Up. VI. 2. 3, 8. 4–6, 15. 2; Pra. Up. IV. 6.
13. The explanation of the Mutable as pradhāna 'the First Evolver' is very important. Pradhāna is here said to be kṣara (the Mutable) because in the days of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads (e.g. Mu. Up. I. 1. 9) and even later in Bh. Gī. (III. 15) and MBh. (see Ch 1. Section 1) the Aupanisada School thought the Nature (i.e. their lower Nature) to be an effect of the higher Nature viz., aksara. The Mutable is not the Intellect and the other elements produced from the Intellect, but prakṛti 'the lower Nature' itself including all its effects (and capable of becoming manifest and therefore) called the Manifest (vyakta) in contrast with the Unmanifest (avyakta), the designation of the Immutable (Śve I. 8). The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad seems to be the earliest to use the term"avyakta". It is absent in the Chā., Br., Mu., Pr. Upaniṣads. It occurs only once in Śve. Up. while thrice in Kaṭha Up., though both of these are of equal length. As we shall see later on, the history of avyakta is the history of some centuries of Indian philosophy. Here it should be noted that, the Śve. Up. which explains both pradhāna and vyakta as kṣara, has got a more primitive conception of avyakta than the Gītā which speaks of all manifestations (avyaklayaḥ) as born of avyakta (which stands there for pradhāna) and of the latter as 'lower than' another avyakta (which is 'aksara avyakta' of the Śve. Up.) (Bh. Gī. VIII. 18–21). The Śve. Up. understands vyakta to be pradhāna. Thus, the Śve. Up. uses these terms (vyakta and avyakta) in a very primitive way, and the Kaṭha Up. avoids vyakta but shows a special fondness for avyakta while the Gītā goes still further and puts forth the doctrine of vyaktaś and two ayaktas, the lower and the higher, the first of which is pra.śāna (Śve. Up.) or mahāt (Kaṭha Up.) "the lower Nature" and the second of which is the aksara of Śve. Up. and the avyakta of Śve. and Kaṭha Upaniṣads.

14. The term ātman in verse 10b evidently stands here for the Immutable mentioned along with the Mutable in 10a and 8a–b. In both these verses the Lord is the ruler over the Mutable and the Immutable, as is said also in this verse. As remarked already, the Jīva is here conceived as the not-ruler but not as one who is ruled over. The Śve. Up. uses the term ātman in the sense of the Immutable. Thus, in I. 3d ātman in kālātmyaktiṇi stands for the term "yoni" in 2 b, the term kāla being the first in the list of the causes mentioned in 2 a–b just as puruṣa, to be here identified with deva in 3b, is the
last. Ātman (in 3d) cannot be the Jiya, because he (i.e. the Jiva) is positively denied to be a cause in 2 c–d. In Śve. Up. VI. 16, puruṣa is actually said to be ātmayoni, having ātman (the Immutable) as the womb (at his disposal for fructification). ‘Ātmayoni’ is to be compared with brahmayoni in Śve Up.V 6. He who ‘presides’ (adhiiṣṭhati—I. 3) is the same as he who ‘rules’ (I. 10). It is highly probable that the word ātman in Śve. Up. I. 6 c–d means the Immutable. “The Jiva having known ātman (the Immutable) and the Prompter as distinct [from each other and also from him-self] and then having become gratified with that [knowledge or with that Immutable, compare jīvamāṇa and jīva in Śve. Up. IV. 5 and 7] attains to immortality” (Śve. Up. I. 6). Thus, this verse gives us the same idea of the ‘Triad’ as is given also in the verses that follow it.

The Śve. Up. is not the only one which uses the term ātman for the Immutable. Mūndaka Upanishad II. 1 gives us the description of puruṣa, who is above the Immutable (II. 1. 2). In contrast with Mu. Up. II. 1. Mu. Up. II. 2 aims at teaching the Lore of the Immutable (II. 2. 2–3). The term Brahman in II. 2. 4b and the term ātman in II. 2. 5c are used for the Immutable, aksara, of II. 2. 2–3. ‘That ātman in which the sky, the earth, the atmosphere, the mind are woven crosswise and lengthwise, along with all the vital airs’ is the Immutable (aksara) according to Br. Up. III. 8. 7–8, 11. The words ānita (7) and Brahman (9, 11) make it quite clear that ātman (in 5, 6, 7) is used for aksara.

So also Mu. Up. III. 1 is intended to explain the Lore of the Immutable and uses the term ātman (e.g. in verses 5, 10) for the Immutable, while III. 2 is intended to teach the doctrine of the puruṣa. The first verse of III. 2 is very important. ‘He [the knower of ātman—III. 1. 10] knows this Highest Abode in the form of Brahman (paramān brahmādāhāma). Those wise men who without a desire [for the fruit] worship puruṣa (described in III. 3) go beyond this bright one (siṃkram catā) (III. 2. 1). Here the terms brahmādāhāma and siṃkram make it clear that ātman in III. 1 is used for Brahman, which is the womb for puruṣa (III. 1. 3). The term siṃkram ‘the bright one’ is so used in Katha Up. V. 8, VI. 1, VI. 17, also in Śve. Up. IV. 2. ‘This’ (catā) in ‘this bright one’ (siṃkram catā) in verse 1 refers to brahmādāhāma which is an explanation of ātman in III. 1. 10. But the term ātman in
III. 2. 3–4 is used for purusa mentioned in III. 2. 1. In III. 2. 3–4 it is said that purusa or ātman can be obtained by no other means than ‘selection’ (varṇa), and the latter half of verse 4 says that “But this self of that knower who tries to obtain him by these means (Vedic study etc. mentioned in III. 3) enters the Brahman—abode (brahmādāhāma) [but not purusa]”. That III. 2 is intended to teach purusa-vidyā is proved by the mention of purusa higher than the Highest in III. 2. 8.

So, in the history of the term ātman we have to admit a period when it meant in some texts the Immutable and in others the purusa especially, at the time when these two were actually distinguished from each other as in the Mu., Pr., and Sve Upaniṣads. This is quite natural because even when the term ātman was used with reference to the “self”, as in the Chā. and Br. Upaniṣads, it was thought of as possessing those attributes and functions which are later on divided between akṣara and purusa.

In Chā. Up. IV. 15. 1. purusa, ātman, amṛta and Brahman are all identified, and ātman is not different from the impersonal Immortal. So also in Br. Up. IV. 4. 25 where purusa is absent.

In the Kaṭha Up. which seems to be later than the Śvetāśvatara in as much as the latter does not know the evolutionary series which the former mentions twice, an effort is made to distinguish the various meanings of ātman by qualifying the term by such words as jñāna, mahān, śantā (II. 13) and maulwada, jīva (IV. 5). So also akṣara ātman in Pr. Up. IV. 9.

Thus ātman in Śve. Up. I. 10b means the Immutable (akṣara.)

15. The word māyā “deceit” in verse 10 is explained in verse 11 as the fetters. It does not seem to mean the Illusion of the existence of the world, but it means the cause of the bondage and the bondage itself. In absolution the ‘all’ (viśva) does not cease to exist but the liberated gets the lordship over the all (I. 10–11).

16. The three mentioned in verse 12 are the same as those in verse 9. In 12 the names of these three are given from the standpoint of ‘enjoyment’. So, the Enjoyable is the Immutable from which the Mutable or the First Evolver and the whole creation proceed.

There are, with Brahman above them (brahmapare) two infinite Imperishables, wherein Knowledge (vidyā) and not-Knowledge (avidyā) are placed concealed. Not-Knowledge is the Mutable (kṣara), Knowledge is the Immortal. He who rules over the Knowledge and the not-Knowledge is other than these two.

NOTES:

1. In this verse the Supreme Brahman is said to be above ‘two Imperishables’. One of these is the hiding place of ‘Knowledge’, vidyā, which is identified with ‘the Immortal’. As said in note 11 on Sve. Up. I. 7–12 the Immortal means the Immutable. This conclusion will follow also from the fact that ‘the not-Knowledge’, the opposite of Knowledge, is identified with the Mutable (kṣara). These terms (vidyā and avidyā) with these meanings have played a great part in the Mahābhārata philosophical Schools.

2. The identification of ‘Knowledge’ with amṛta i.e. the Immutable, seems to be the identification of the means and the aim. In Kena Up. 12 we are told that ‘one attains the Immortal through Knowledge’. So also in Isa Up. 11. In the Pāncārātra system, vidyā ‘Knowledge’ is a synonym for the higher Nature (i.e. the Immutable). See Prof. Schrader’s Introduction to the Pāncārātra and the Alurbugdhanya Sāmhitā, P. 62).

3. The idea of ‘two Imperishables’ (aṅgkaras) one of which is (the place of) the Immutable and the other (that of) the Mutable is like that of two Unmanifests (avyaktas) in Bh. Gi. VIII. 20 According to the Gītā, all beings (called the Mutable in Bh. Gi. VIII. 4, XV. 16) rise from the lower Unmanifest, just as the Immutable in the form of “not-Knowledge” is to be traced to the Imperishable according to this verse of the Sve. Up.

The higher Unmanifest of the Gītā (VIII. 20–21) is, according to the terminology of the Gītā, aṅkara “the Immutable” properly so called. Thus, the two Imperishables are also the same as the two prakṛitis in the Bh. Gi. VII. 4–6.

*See Additional Note.
The Mutable in the form of pradhāna is the second Imperishable (I. 10). The kind of vagueness in the sense of kṣara 'the Mutable' (used for pradhāna or the second Imperishable in I. 8, 10 and for "not-Knowledge" the effect of that Imperishable in V. 1.) is due to the fact that the Sve. Up. is the first Up. to use the term kṣara in contrast to aksara. The Ruler of Knowledge and not-Knowledge or the two Imperishables is the same as the Ruler mentioned in Sve. Up. I. 8, and 10 and also in Bh. Gī. XV. 18.

CONCLUSION:—

This Upaniṣad is important from various standpoints, especially from that of the idea of Trinity. But here we are concerned only with its terminology the fixation of which will be facilitated by the following considerations:—

1. The Immutable is according to this Upaniṣad lower than Brahma (V. 1).

2. The highness or superiority of purusa to the Immutable is here interpreted as the Immutable's being ruled by purusa the Ruler (I. 8, 10; V. 1).

3. It is impersonal (I. 10.), but again it is described as a female (I. 9, IV. 5—a female unborn). This idea seems to have arisen out of the conception of aksara as the "matrix" (yoni) for purusa (e.g. in Mu. Up. I. 3, Sve Up. V. 6). In this connection it may be noted that the Sve. Up. is the first Upaniṣad to use the terms prakṛti, māyā (IV. 10), and ṣakti (I. 3.) for the Immutable. When purusa was placed above the Immutable, the idea suggested itself naturally that the Immutable was the power of, or the "matrix" for, purusa, and this idea further developed into a number of words of the feminine gender invented for the Immutable (e.g. vidyā, māyā, prakṛti). The term māyin (Sve. Up. IV. 9–10) also shows that māyā was supposed to be a power belonging to purusa. The term ajā "the female unborn" was suggested by the term ajā "unborn" for purusa and the Jīva and by the fact that the Immutable called either aksara or Brahma or ātman was considered to be the female generative organ (yoni) for purusa (VI. 16, I. 2, V. 6). This term ajā was also responsible for the invention of the term prakṛti.
4. This Immutable is unborn, just as in the Gitā (VIII. 20, XIII. 10).

5. The Immutable and the Mutable are joined together, i.e. as the cause and the effect; so pradhāna is the effect of the Immutable.

The terminology of Śve. Up. may, then, be summarised as follows:—

1. The Reality is threefold or a Triad and it is called paramam brahma (I. 7), brahman, (I. 9) or trividhaṁ brahmanam (I. 12).

2. Puruṣa is called puruṣa (I. 2), ṭhā (I. 8, 9, 10; V. 1), deva (I. 8, 11), jña (I. 9), ātman (I. 9), pravirā (I. 12, 16), Brahman (V. 1).

3. The Immutable is called aksara (I. 1, 10; V. 1), Brahman (I. 7, V. 6), avyakta (I. 8), ajñā (I. 9), ātman (I. 3, 6, 10; VI. 16), bhogya (I. 12), haras (I. 10), amṛta (I. 10; V. 1), (the abode of) vidyā (V. 1), (and also māyā and prakṛti in IV. 10).

4. The lower Nature is meant by the Imperishable (V. 1), (the abode of) avidyā (V. 1), kṣara (I. 8, 10), vyakta 'the Manifest' (I. 8).

5. The effects also of the lower Nature are called kṣara (V. 1) or avidyā (V. 1).

6. The individual soul is designated as amśa (I. 8, 9), bhokṭr (I. 8, 9, 12), ajña (I–9).

Let us, finally, see how the Trinity of the Śve. Up. is found in the Gitā:—

We should here compare the various forms of the Lord in Bh. Gī. VII. 29–30 and VIII. 1–4 with the members of the triad in Śve Up. I. 6–12. In the Gitā we are told that one should know the Lord with his Adhibhūta, Adhidaiva, Adhiyajña and Adhyātma forms, while in Śve. Up. we read: "It is [the attainment of] Brahma, when one attains the three" (I. 9). Puruṣa or the Adhidaiva of Bh. Gī. VIII. 4 is called
Śūra in Sve. Up. I. 2, ḍa and deva in Śve. Up. I. 8. The Immutable is called akṣara in both the texts (Bh. Gī. VIII. 3, and Śve. Up. I. 8, 10). The second Imperishable or pradhāna (Śve. Up. I. 10) which is the same as kṣara and vyakta is to be identified with svabhāva or Adhyātma in Bh. Gī. VIII. 3. Kṣara ‘the effect of the Imperishable’ (Śve. Up. V. 1) is the Adhībhūta (Bh. Gī. VIII 4a). The bhūkṛ (Śve. Up. I. 9) is the Adhyājña in Bh. Gī. VIII. 4. Besides these identifications, the Bh. Gī. speaks of the Immutable, the Jīva and Śūra as ‘eternal’, sanātana, in IV. 31, VIII. 20, in II. 24, XV. 7 and in XI. 18, VII. 10 respectively. The higher Nature or the Immutable and Śūra are called ‘beginningless’ anādi in XIII. 19 and X 3; and the attribute aja, ‘unborn’, is applied to the Jīva in Bh. Gī. II. 21 and to the Lord in IV. 6, VII. 25, X. 3, 12. Thus, the Bhāgavadgītā is also inclined to regard the three members of the Trinity of the Śve. Up. as eternal (see App. II).
APPENDIX II.

INTERPRETATION OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ.

It is intended here to explain from my standpoint the aksara-passages of the Gitā. The meanings assigned by various ancient and modern authorities to the term aksara in the verses concerned have been stated in a tabular form in the Introduction.


Sacrifice is born of Activity (karma). Know Activity to be born of brahman [the lower Nature] and brahman as born of the Immutable (aksara); therefore [this aksara which may be called] the omnipresent [and] eternal Brahman is to be found in Sacrifice (i.e., it is the final source to which Sacrifice can be traced).

Notes:—

1. The term ‘Brahman’ when used for the Immutable (aksara) is qualified by the two epithets ‘omnipresent’ and ‘eternal’ in order to distinguish it from brahman which is born of the Immutable and is not therefore eternal.

2. The lower Nature is here said to be “born” of the Immutable. This passage of the Gitā is very important on account of this clear and doubtless statement regarding the lower Nature. See notes, below, on Gitā XIII. 19. ‘Brahman’, the lower Nature, is said to be ‘born’ also in Mu. Up.: I. 1. 9. “Brahman” seems to have been used for the lower Nature in contrast with the higher Nature which is called māhad brahman in Bh. Gi. XIV. 3–4.

2. Bh. Gi. VII. 29–30, VIII. 1–5, 8.

(VII. 29) Those who, having resorted to me, endeavour for freedom from old age and death, know that Brahman, the whole spiritual form (adhyātma) and the whole Activity (karma).
(30) Those who know me with my material and divine forms (adhubhūta and adhudaiva), and with my form as the sacrificial agent (adhiyajña), will also, with their mind disciplined through Yoga, know me at the time of [their] departure [from this world].

Arjuna said:—

(VIII. 1–2) What is that Brahma? What is the spiritual form? What, Oh Puruṣottama, is Activity? What is said to be the material form? How is the divine form [to be understood]? And who in this body here is the sacrificial agent, O slayer of Madhu? And how are you known [even] at the time of departure [from this world] by those who are self-disciplined?

The Lord said:—

(3) The Immutable (aksara) is the Supreme Brahma (prama brahman); the [lower] Nature (svabhava) is the spiritual form (adhyātmā). The act of creating (visarga) causing the birth and existence of beings is [technically] named Activity (karman).

(4) The material form (adhubhūta) is the mutable existence (kṣara bhūva), and the divine form (adhudaiva) is puruṣa. O best of the embodied beings, I myself am the sacrificial agent (adhyājña) in this body.

(5) And he who, while leaving the physical frame at the time of death, departs remembering me alone, attains to my state; there is no doubt as to this.

x x x

(6) He reaches the divine supreme puruṣa, meditating [on him] with a concentrated mind disciplined by the path of constant application (abhyaṣa-yoga).

Notes:—

1. This passage must be considered in connection with III. 14 c–d, 15. "The whole Activity" (VII. 29) shows that the topic of karman is here further discussed. Brahma,
karmavan, yajña (in adhivajña) and akṣara are dealt with in both the places. VIII. 5 also reminds one of II. 72.

2. Brahman in VII. 29 and VIII. 1 is the omnipresent and eternal Brahman mentioned in III. 15.

3. As the term adhyātma seems to have been used in the Gitā always in the sense of 'spiritual' (vade Bh. Gl. XI. 1), we can distinguish between adhibhūta and adhyātma by translating them as 'material' and 'spiritual' forms. Adhidāvā may therefore be fitly translated as the 'divine form', so that it may be distinguished from adhyātma. As verse VII. 30 states that adhibhūta, adhidaiva and adhyātma are the forms belonging to Kṛṣṇa, we should not hesitate in taking adhyātma (VII. 29) also as one of his forms. These three forms may also be called Kṛṣṇa's supernatural (adhidaiva), super-sensual (adhyātma), and sensual (adhibhūta) forms, thus implying the 'higher-ness', paratva, of each, which, as we shall see later on, is distinctly mentioned in the Gitā.

4. They may be regarded as the purely transcendent, the transcendent-and-immanent and the purely immanent forms. Puruṣa is only transcendent; therefore he is called 'divine', adhidāvā or īśwara (VIII. 8, 10), or 'the highest', para (VIII. 10) or parama (VIII. 8). For the same reason he is also called puṇḍarīka (VIII. 1), because he is beyond the Mutable and higher than the Immutable' (XV. 18). The purely immanent or material form of Kṛṣṇa is 'the mutable existence' (VIII. 4). When the Gitā explains the immanence of the Lord e. g. in VII. 7–12, X. 20–42, XI, XV. 12–15, it is always with reference to this form of the Lord. Whatever is neither purely immanent nor purely transcendent, may be classified as constituting the transcendent-and-immanent or adhyātma form. Now, let us see what existences (bhāvāḥ) constitute 'adhyātma in its entirety', kṛṣṇam adhyātmam (VII. 29). The Gitā clearly states that svabhāva 'the lower Nature', is adhyātma (VIII. 3). The Gitā also says that karmavan is born of svabhāva (e. g. in V. 14); and in III. 14 karmavan is said to be born of brahman. So svabhāva being identical with brahman, the immediate cause of karmavan, is born of the Immutable (III. 15b).

The fact that the Gitā understands the lower Nature (svabhāva, brahman, prakṛti, etc) to be adhyātma and explains the adhibhūta form as 'all beings' is noteworthy. The Gitā distinguishes between the two Natures, but does not make the
lower Nature *adhibhūta*. The Mahābhārata always understands *adyātma* with reference only to *aṅkara* and *puruṣa*, while the author of the Brahmaśūtras identifies both the Natures (Br. Śū. I. 4. 23–28, see Chap. IV. p. 101) and according to him the Nature will be *adyātma*.

'The Immutable' by its very nature stands above 'the Mutable' or *adhibhūta*. 'The Immutable' is quite distinct from, and lower than, *puruṣa* who is the highest; so *aṅkara* seems to be one of the constituents of the 'entire *adyātma* mentioned in VII. 29. The Activity or *karman* (VIII. 3) as the effect of *brahman*, *svabhāva* or the lower *prakṛti* (III. 15, V. 14, III. 27) is also a constituent of the same, because 'the material form' consists only of "the beings".

So, on the data of III. 14–15 and VII. 29–30 and VIII. 1–8 we arrive at the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>parama</em></th>
<th><em>divya</em></th>
<th><em>puruṣa</em> (VIII. 8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>= the supreme divine <em>puruṣa</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= <em>adhidīva</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= the supernatural or the transcendent form.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aṅkara* "the Immutable" + *brahman* (III. 15a) or *svabhāva* (VIII. 3, V. 14) or the lower *prakṛti* (e. g. III. 27), + *karman* the "Activity" (III. 14, VIII 3 c–d, III. 27)

= *adyātma*

= the supersensual or the transcendent–and–immanent form.

*kṣara* = the Mutable (VIII. 4), = "all beings", *bhūlāni*, mentioned in III. 14 and VIII. 4

= the sensual or purely immanent form.

We find that this sequence of gradation arrived at from these two passages, is confirmed by XV. 16–18, which may therefore be next taken up for consideration.

19

(16) There are these two \textit{puru\ṣas} in the world: ‘the Mutable’ (\textit{kṣara}) and ‘the Immutable’ (\textit{akṣara}). ‘The Mutable’ consists of all beings; the Unchanging is called ‘the Immutable’.

(17) The Highest \textit{puruṣa}, however, is (yet) another; he is called ‘the Highest Spirit’ (\textit{paramātman}), the imperishable Lord who sustains the three worlds, having penetrated them.

(18) As I am beyond the Mutable and as I am higher even than the Immutable; hence am I well-known in the world and in the Veda as ‘the Highest \textit{puruṣa}’ (\textit{puruṣottama}).

\textbf{Notes:—}

1. We have seen in the passages already examined that \textit{puruṣa}, the Immutable and the Mutable are the three forms of Kṛṣṇa. The same is the idea of this passage. In VIII. 1 Kṛṣṇa was addressed by Arjuna as \textit{puruṣottama}; here he calls himself “\textit{puruṣottama} well-known in the world and in the Veda”. The reason why the \textit{puruṣa} of the other passages in the Gītā (e. g. VIII 4, 8, 10,22; XI. 38; X. 12) is called here \textit{puruṣottama} seems to be that his own other two forms have been here described as \textit{puruṣas} which term is here used in a secondary sense (“principle”), the purpose being that of pointing out the inferiority of \textit{kṣara} and \textit{akṣara} to \textit{puruṣa} mentioned also in VIII 3–4. \textit{Puruṣottama} is a special term of the MBh. Pāñcarātras.

2. ‘The Mutable’ is lower than ‘the Immutable’; this is the force of \textit{api ‘even’ in} \textit{akṣarād api c oltamah—XV. 18}. It consists of all beings (XV. 16 c–d); so it is the same Mutable as is explained in VIII. 4a.

3. ‘The Immutable’ is naturally not different from the same mentioned in VIII. 1. It is above ‘the Mutable’ and is said to be in the world (XV. 16) because \textit{puruṣa} or \textit{puruṣottama} is higher even than ‘the Immutable’. ‘The Immutable’ is described to be the Unchanging, \textit{kuṭastha}, both here and in XII 3, where undoubtedly \textit{akṣara} means the impersonal form of the Lord.

4. \textit{Akṣara} cannot mean the individual soul (as the term is often understood) in the Gītā because in the Gītā the Jīva is never said to be lower than the Lord but is always regarded
as identical with him (being his own 'part'). Again, there is no passage in the Gitā, where the Jiva is given the designation 'akṣara'. Moreover, 'the Immutable' is according to the Gitā an object of meditation (XII. 3-4) and the goal of ascetics (VII.11); while the Jiva is never such an object nor such a goal. The term akṣara, is here used in contrast with the term kṣara, as in VIII 3-4, and therefore must have the same meaning here as in that verse (see notes 6-7 on Śve. Up. I. 7-12).


Arjun said:—

(1) Which of those devotees who thus worship you with constant devotion and those, on the other hand, who [worship] 'the Immutable' (akṣara), 'the Unmanifest' (avyakta), are the better learned in the [science of the various] paths?

The Lord said:—

(2) Those who having fixed their mind on me, being always devoted [to me], and possessed of the highest belief [in me], worship me, are considered by me to be the best possessed of the [right] path.

(3-4) Those, however, who worship 'the Immutable' (akṣara) the ineffable, the unmanifest, the omnipresent, the unthinkable, the unchanging, the unmoving, and the firm, having controlled the group of the organs (of sense and action), having the same feeling towards everything, and rejoicing in the welfare of all beings, obtain none but me.

Notes:—

1. The Gitā here, mentions the 'Immutable' and puruṣa as the goals reached by the released; so there are two kinds of worship or meditation and two independent paths. 'Yoga' in XIII. 1 means a path for salvation.

2. The worshippers of the Immutable are here contrasted with those of puruṣa. This contrast was already a burning question in the days of the Mûndaka, Praśna, and Śvetâsvatara Upaniṣads (Vide App. I). Though the Immutable is not here
stated to be lower than *puruṣa*, it is 'lower' according to XV. 16–18 (and VIII. 21–22, as we shall just see). The worshippers of *puruṣa* are said to be better possessed of the right path than those of the Immutable because these latter choose a path more troublesome than that of the former (XII. 5).

3. The worshippers of ‘the Immutable’ are not generally said in the Gitā to reach *puruṣa*. As a rule they “enter the Immutable” (VIII. 11). So also in VI.1. 21; II. 72; V. 6, 24; VI. 28. Similarly the worshippers of *puruṣa* usually attain *puruṣa* (VIII. 10; VIII. 22; VI. 31; VII. 18, 19; VIII. 5, 16). In XVIII. 53–55, we are told that one who is devoid of the idea of ‘mine’ *mama* ‘becomes Brahman’ and then, having secured devotion to Krṣṇa, enters Krṣṇa. So, on the strength of these passages (XII. 4, VIII. 11, XV. 53–55), we may, without assigning a secondary or metaphorical sense, to any word or sentence in these verses, conclude that generally the meditators on ‘the Immutable’ reach ‘the Immutable’ and that some of them reach also Krṣṇa after having obtained devotion to him.

4. The verse under consideration (XII. 4) is important from the standpoint of the relation of the Immutable to *puruṣa*. As (some at least of) the aksara—meditators are said to reach *puruṣa* just like the *puruṣa*—worshippers; the Immutable is not to be understood as a second independent entity by the side of *puruṣa*, though undoubtedly according to the Gitā the Immutable is to be distinguished from *puruṣa* and is in a way lower than *puruṣa*, as said above in note 2. The next passage which we have to examine throws further light on the present question.

5. Bh. Gi. VIII. 18–22.

(18) All manifestations arise at the advent of the Day of Brahmā from the [lower] Unmanifest (*avyakta*); they are absorbed at the advent of the Night into that same called [technically] the Unmanifest.

(19)—This same group of beings having repeatedly become [manifest] is dissolved [into its original source] at the advent of the Night, without a will of their own: O son of Prthvī, it arises [also similarly] at the advent of the Day—

(20) However, beyond that Unmanifest [technically so called], there is another ‘eternal Unmanifest Existence’ (*sanatana* *avyakta* *bhāva*) which does not perish when all beings perish.
(21) This [latter] Unmanifest Existence is [technically] called the Immutable (aṅkṣara); [the sages] call it the Highest Goal. That [Existence] [from which the liberated, after having reached it, do not return, is my Supreme Abode (parama dhāma)]

(22) Higher (than the Immutable) is that puruṣa obtainable through undivided devotion, in the interior of whom [all] beings rest and by whom all this [visible world] is permeated.

Notes:—

1. Verse 19 is a parenthetical one. The lower Unmanifest in 18 is the source of all beings mentioned in verse 10. Verse 20 mentions two Unmanifest Existences. One of them is withdrawn when all beings perish. The other, the higher one, is eternal. This is called 'the Immutable' (aṅkṣara) in verse 21. It is the highest goal [of the worshippers of the Immutable].

2. I have followed the reading according to Śaṅkara's commentary. If we had to read vyaktā in place of a-vyaktā in 20 b, we lose the force of the contrast intended in the verse. Moreover, there is no difficulty in understanding the doctrine of the tēva Unmanifest Existences, as we have seen above. The lower Unmanifest is again mentioned in Bh.Gī. XIII. 5 where avyaktā is the source of buddhā and therefore is the same as the lower prakṛti (Bh. Gī. VII. 4). This doctrine of two avyaktas became most important in the days of the LMBh., as will be seen from Ch. III.

3. That the word dhāma in verse 21 d means 'abode' can be shown on the strength of the passages in the Gītā in which the same or a similar word like pāda or sīhāna or a verb showing motion from one place to another (with reference to the movement of the released) is used. In this verse also the expressions, 'having reached' and 'do not return,' point to the correctness of the interpretation. So, aṅkṣara is the 'abode' wherein Kṛṣṇa (or puruṣa) dwells, and perhaps we are to understand the puruṣa "being higher" than the Immutable in this sense also.

4. Verse 22 should be studied along with IX. 4. In the former that puruṣa in the interior of whom the beings rest and by whom "all this" is penetrated is mentioned, in the latter the same is said of Kṛṣṇa. So puruṣa of verse 22 is the puruṣottama of XV. 18, and parah in the first quarter of verse 22 distinctly
means that puruṣa is higher (para) than the Immutable. Puruṣa is never identified with akṣara in the Gitā. In Bh. Gi. VIII. 3–4 both of them are clearly distinguished from each other.

6. Bh. Gi. XI. 18, 37 c–d.

(18) You are the Immutable (akaśra) the highest worth knowing, you are the highest resting place of all this [world]. You are the imperishable eternal protector of Dharma. I believe you to be the eternal puruṣa.

(37 c–d) O Infinite One, Lord of the gods, abode of the world, you are ‘the Immutable’ (akaśra), the Being (i. e. the Manifest), the not-Being (i. e. the Unmanifest), and whatever is beyond that.

**NOTES:**

1. First, it should be noted that these are the words of Arjuna who out of his homage to Kṛṣṇa identifies him by turn with all the various gods and yet places him above all of them. Secondly, in verse 18, Kṛṣṇa is identified with the Immutable and also with puruṣa. The same is also the sense of verse 37, where Kṛṣṇa is said to be the Immutable and what is beyond it. This last expression ‘what is beyond the Immutable’, refers to puruṣa. So, according to these verses also puruṣa is above akṣara.

**CONCLUSION:**

On the strength of the above passages in which akṣara is mentioned expressly the conception of the Immutable in the Gitā may be summarised as follows:

(1) The Immutable in the Gitā is described (e. g. in XII. 3) in the same negative terms in which the Upaniṣads describe akṣara (e. g. Br. Up. III. 8. 8; Mu. Up. I. 1. 6) or avyakta (e. g. Kaṭha Up. III. 15). The Gitā says that it describes the same akṣara as is described by the knowers of the Veda (VIII. 11).

2. It is distinct from puruṣa or puruṣottama (VIII. 3–4, 10–11, 21–22; XII 1–4; XV. 16–18).

3. It is lower than puruṣa or puruṣottama (VIII: 21–22, XV. 18).
4. It is other than the lower Nature called svabhāva (VIII. 3), or the lower avyakta (VIII. 18-20), or brahman “the immediate cause of Activity” (III. 15).

5. It is above this lower Nature (VIII. 20-21), or in other words the lower Nature is “born” of the Immutable (III. 15).

6. It is above the Mutable (XV. 18.) or all beings (VIII. 18-19; VIII. 4; III. 14-15).

7. In relation to puruṣa, the Immutable may be described as ‘the supreme abode’ of the puruṣa (dhīma paramāṇa-mama—VIII. 21-22; and pada—VIII. 11).

8. It is the ultimate source of all ‘Activity’ (karman) (III. 14-15) and all beings (III. 14-15, VIII. 18-19).

9. It is like puruṣa an independent object of meditation and a goal (XII. 1-4, VIII. 21). Particularly it is the goal of ascetics (VIII. 11).


11. It may be called parama aksara (VIII. 3), paramā gati (VIII. 21), parima dhīma (VIII. 21), avyakta (VIII. 2C-21, XII 1, 3), kūṭastha (XII 3, XV. 17).

12. Though both the Immutable and the puruṣa are independently objects and goals of meditation, the author of the Gitā thinks the latter to be the better of the two because it can be understood and reached with less trouble (XII. 5).

13. The Immutable is one of the three eternal (sanātana) principles in the Gitā (VIII. 20) and it does not perish even when all beings including the lower Unmanifest perish. So, aksara is unborn, unlike the lower avyakta, its effect (VIII. 18, III. 13). It is also kūṭastha ‘unchanging’.
APPENDIX III.

NO PLURALITY OF SOULS IN THE MAHĀBHĀRATA.

Most of the passages in the Mahābhārata which Prof. Hopkins, Prof. Deussen and Prof. Edgerton have explained as referring to the doctrine of the plurality of souls have been already discussed in Chapter III of the Thesis and it has been shown that they have not the least knowledge of this doctrine (see Ch. III. Sec. 2). Only two passages where Prof. Hopkins believes that we have the mention of the plurality of souls remain to be considered here, viz., MBh. XII. 315. 10e–f, 11ff, and MBh. XII. 350. 1–3, 7.

1. MBh. XII. 315. 10e–f, 11ff.

These verses can be easily translated as follows:—

(10e–f) The Unmanifest is eternal; the Manifest, non– eternal. This we have learnt.

(11) Men, who have compassion for all beings and who have resorted to kevala jiñāna (‘the knowledge of the Absolute’), say that the Unmanifest is one and also many.

(12) Different [from the Unmanifest] is the Puruṣa; but the Unmanifest called the Unchangeable * is [in reality] not unchangeable. Just as stalks [issue] in the rush, so is this [Unmanifest] born [as the Manifest].

* Cf. Čūlikā Upaniṣad: “aṣṭarūpām ajām dhruvām” and Bh. Gī. “kūṭasthiṣkṣara ucyate” (Bh. Gī. XV. 16). This verse of the MBh. (XII. 315. 12. a–b) also proves, my point that the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyaśas have identified the two Natures of the Aupaniṣadas. (I am thankful to Prof. Schrader for the above interpretation of MBh. XII. 315. 12 and for drawing my attention to the passages from Čū. Up. and Bh. Gī.).
It should be noted that these verses use the terms *vyakta* and *avyakta* for the two metaphysical principles of the Sāṃkhya of those names. This is apparent from the context. Prof. Hopkins’ translation of 10 a–b must appear queer to any reader: “Puruṣa is eternal and non-eternal, manifest and unmanifest”. (GEI. p. 123). Such an interpretation requires no refutation. Then, in the case of verse II, Prof. Hopkins removes *puruṣāḥ* from its grammatical connection as subject of *āhūḥ* in “avāktakalvam uty āhur nānātvam puruṣās tathā” (11 a–b). He wants to show that this sentence teaches the doctrine of the plurality of souls and therefore makes an independent sentence of “nānātvam puruṣās tathā” (GEI. p. 123). In fact *ekatva* and *nānātva* in II refer to the eternal Unmanifest and to the non-eternal Manifest in 10 e–f. In this sense they have been used very often in L. MBh, e. g. in XII. 305. 36 (see pp. 45, 74, 76). *Avyakta* means the Sāṃkhya Nature, and therefore Prof. Edgerton is also wrong when he explains *avyakta-ekatva* as ‘the esoteric unity of souls’ and ‘nānātva’ as ‘the empirical plurality’ and quotes examples where ‘avyakta’ is used of Brahman or the Lord, but does not trouble himself about what it could have meant throughout these Sāṃkhya chapters of the L. MBh. (AJP. Vol XLV, 1924, p. 26) Prof. Deussen is quite right here when he explains *puruṣāḥ* in II b as human beings and as the subject to āhūḥ in IIA (VPTM p. 653).

2. MBh. XII. 350. 1–3, 7.

The second and last passage which remains to be examined in this connection is found in chapter 350 of MBh. XII, which teaches indeed a plurality of souls, but without reference to the Classical Sāṃkhya and in a different sense. The first fact to be borne in mind in interpreting the verses in question is that they are, like the whole of the Nārāyaṇiya, much later than the chapters describing the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga Schools of the Mahābhārata (XII. 302–317), and that the two chapters (350–351) dealing with the problem, never before raised, of *puruṣa-bahutva* form the very last section of

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*This is evident from its general character, but also e. g. from the statement (343, II fill.) that “the nectar of the story about Nārāyaṇa” has been won by churning the ocean of the “Bhārata of one hundred thousand (verses)”.*
the Nārāyaṇiya. Secondly, the verses state that the philosophers of the Śāmkhya and Yoga Schools believed in many souls “in the world” (b.ḥavaḥ puruṣā loke—MBh. XII. 350. 2). Thus the passage mentions an empirical plurality of souls, and not a real one which came to be believed in perhaps only when the Śāmkhya became atheistic. Moreover, in verse 350. 7, the interpolator of these chapters (350–351) himself admits that “Vyāsa” did not teach plurality of souls, but only “unity of puruṣa” (puruṣa ikatva). This is a frank admission that in the Mahābhārata we have always “unity of soul”, since “Vyāsa” can refer only to the “author” of the Mahābhārata. And lastly, as regards the explanation of the problem given here, it is not the desire of the interpolator to misrepresent the Classical Śāmkhya view, as Prof. Hopkins charges him with having done, but the interpolator admitting that the Śāmkhyas teach an empirical plurality of souls, tries to explain it from his own standpoint (350 7) which is that of a Pāncarātra, as Prof. Schrader rightly points out to me. The doctrine of one Puruṣa as the “Source” (yoni) of many souls (bahunām puruṣānām yath aikā yonih—XII. 350. 3) represents the position of the Pāncarātras who admitted a real internal difference (svagatabhedā) in one sole Being.

Thus, even this last passage goes directly against Prof. Hopkins’ conclusions, and on the contrary, admits positively that in the Mahābhārata “Vyāsa” has taught “unity of puruṣa” (350. 7).

I would not repeat here the other passages discussed already in the text (see Ch. III. pp. 42, 45, 74, 78) where I have shown that Professors Hopkins, Deussen and Edgerton were wrong in referring them to plurality of souls. Thus, in the Mahābhārata we have no plurality of souls and the only passage where an empirical plurality of souls is mentioned without expressly excluding a real world-soul and a Supreme Lord is also a witness for the “unity of puruṣa” in the Mahābhārata.

“loke” means “in the world”, as opposed to ‘Vede” “in the Scripture;” compare “loke Vede ca prathitaḥ Puruṣottamah” (Bh. Gī. XV. 18), and also “lokavat” in Br. Sū. II. 1. 13, 33, etc, and “loke” in Br. Sū. II. 1. 25, where also “loke” is contrasted with what is stated “in the Śruti”.
APPENDIX IV.

INTERPRETATION OF THE BRAHMASŪTRAS.

This appendix has been prompted by two considerations: firstly, I felt it to be my duty to the reader of Chapter IV to justify in a more extensive way the unusual method applied there in the interpretation of the Sūtras; and, secondly, I wish to invite criticism of my method with a view to encouraging if encouraged to do so, an independent interpretation of the whole of the Brahmasūtras. The contrast between my interpretation and those of the Ācāryas is the necessary result of my conviction that these, including even Saṅkara, were not in possession of an unbroken tradition. How the latter got lost, I am at present unable to explain; but the fact of its having been broken long before Saṅkara will, I believe, become evident from the consistency of my interpretation in the following pages as against the farfetchedness and often palpable impossibility of those of the Ācāryas.


SECTION* 1.

Oneness of Goal.

(1) [Brahman] is such that the [very same] idea thereof is [to be had] from all the Vedanta texts, because of the absence of any difference in the scriptural injunction, etc.

(2) If it be argued: "No. [All the Vedanta texts do not teach the same Brahman] because of the difference [in scriptural injunction, etc.]", we reply: "No. [If the Vedanta texts are similar] even in one [out of the scriptural injunction, name, etc.] [we would say that all of them teach the same Brahman].

The division of the Sections (adhukaraṇas) followed here is my own."
(3) [Although the same Brahman is taught in all the Vedanta texts, one learns only one of these and not all] because [the rule of studying] the text of one's own Vedic Branch is indeed such, and one is religiously qualified for [the study of] the customary text (only). And that rule is like that of [taking] the water [from one particular well, although one can take it from any other watering place as well].

(4) And [there is a text which] also shows it.

NOTES:

1. The reading "savyavacca" in place of sahlavacca will give the following interpretation. "And that rule is like that of the sava-sacrifices [where complete option is given]."

2. e.g. Bh. Gî. VIII. 11, as Sańkara rightly says. Note that the problem in this Section is whether all the Vedanta texts teach one and the same Brahman, or two, or many.

SECTION 2.

Collection of Thoughts*

(5) A Collection [of all the attributes of the object of meditation, mentioned in all the Vedanta texts] [should be made], because of the non-difference (i.e. identity) of the goal, as [is done] in the case of [the rites] which are subordinate to vidhu (the Vedic precept), and [the collection should be made only] in so far as the context is similar [in the Vedantas concerned].

(6) If it be said: "The difference [of goals] does exist because [of the authority] of the Word," we reply: "No, because of non-distinction [in the Word]."

(7) "Nor [can the view of the difference of goals be maintained] on the strength of a difference of 'the context' (prakaraṇa) as in the case of parovarīvastva" etc.

(8) If it be said: "[There is a difference of goals] because of 'the designations' (sāmījña) [like akṣara and puṇuṣa]," we reply: "It has been already explained, and that is even admitted here (by us)."

* This, as in Br. Sū. III.3.33
(9) And [the difference of goals] is inconsistent² because of the omnipresence (of both the so-called goals).

Notes:—

1. i. e., the Sūtrakāra allows the “collection” of the attributes of puruṣa only from the puruṣa-texts and not from the aksara-texts also, when one meditates on puruṣa.

2. Note that the opponent seems to have in his mind the two goals: aksara and puruṣa.

3. Saṅkara reads ‘samañjasam,’ but I follow the reading accepted by most of the other Ācāryas.

Section 3.

Two Names of the Goal.

(10) Because there is no difference in all (other points), these two (designations) are (to be understood) otherwise¹.

Note:—

The Sūtrakāra agrees to a difference of two samjñās, not to that of goals, the goal being in all Upaniṣads (and the Gitā) the same because all other points, codanā etc. are the same everywhere.

Section 4.

Attributes of puruṣa.

(11) The attributes, beginning with “bliss” (ānanda) belong to pradhāna² [ and should be collected for the meditation on the same, as said in Sūtra 5 above ].

(12) The attributes, such as ‘having priya for the head’ (priyāsṛastva) do not come up for consideration because [these attributes show ] an accumulation and a diminution which are [possible only] in case of there being a difference [in the “goals” to be achieved ]².

(13) But the other [attributes] [should be collected] because of the sameness of the object [ of meditation ].

(14) [The attributes such as ‘having priya for the head’ are not to be collected ] because of their non-utility in meditation.
(15) And because of the word ātman [used as predicate of ānanda in the Śrutī].

Notes:—

1. This is probably a reference to Br. Sū. I. 1. 12, because no Śrutī gives a list beginning with bliss, as is required by the Sūtra, not even Tai. Up. II 1 which is referred to in Br. Sū I. 1. 12 and indirectly in the present Sūtra.

2. ‘Pradhāna’ is a word used for ātman even according to Saṅkara (Ś. Bhā. Br. Sū. III. 3. 33). In the days of the Sūtrakāra pradhāna was used for the personal ātman e.g. in MBh XIV. 19. 47–48, XIV. 18. 32 (see Chapter IV).

3. Note that the Sūtrakāra rejects such attributes of ātman (in Tai. Up. II. 5) as do not agree with his standpoint that ākṣara and ātman are only two names for the same goal (Br. Sū. III. 3, 8). He would reject also brahma-pucchātva of ātman in “brahma pucchātva pratiṣṭhā” (Tai. Up. II. 5).

4. “Ānanda ātmā” (Tai. Up. II. 5) may have meant: “Ananda is the Atman of the ātman [just as jiva is the Atman of ākṣara or Brahman, Chā. Up. VI. 3. 3]”; but the Sūtrakāra understands it to mean “Ananda is the Atman” i.e. “Ananda is the Paramātman or pradhāna”.

Section 5.

Method of ātman-meditation.

(16) Pradhāna should be grasped [in the meditation] as [identical with] the Self (ātman) [of the meditator], as is the case in [the meditation of] the other [i.e. ākṣara], because of what follows.

(17) If it be said; “[Pradhāna should be so comprehended] because of the ‘invariable concomitance’ (ānvaya)” we reply: “[Still it may be because of the ‘affirmation’ avadhāraṇa]”.

Notes:—

1. Ānvaya is ‘the invariable co-existence’ (opp. of vyāliṅkā); here, that of the Jiva and ātman in the human heart (?)

SECTION 6.

The Functions of akṣara and puruṣa.

(18) [ The topic ( prakaraṇa ) in Tai. Up. II. 8 ] is not the same as that which has preceded, because of the description of the function [ of akṣara in this passage ].

(19–20) "(The functions of 'delighting' and 'awing') are the same; and this is so because of the non-difference (of the topic in these sections of the Vedanta ). Even in other places it is so because of the connection (between the two functions) ¹".

(21) Not, indeed, because of the difference [ between the two functions of 'delighting' and 'awing' ].

(22) And [ the Sruti ] shows it.

(23) Moreover on this ground [ we distinguish between ] 'maintenance' (or sustenance) ( sambhūti )¹ and 'heaven-pervasion' dyumyāpti ² [ as the functions of puruṣa and akṣara respectively ].

(24) And [ the topic in Tai. Up. II. 8. is not the same as in the preceding sections i.e. Tai. Up. II. 1–7 ] because the other attributes are not herein mentioned as they are in the sections of puruṣa-lord⁶.

(25) "[ 'No, aksara is not mentioned in Tai. Up. II. 8', or 'No, the topic of Tai. Up. II. 8 is not different from that in the preceding sections' ] because the objects, viz., penetration and others [ mentioned here ] are different [ from those usually mentioned with respect to akṣara, e.g. those in Mu. Up. II. 2. 3–4 ]⁸ ".

(26) [ No ], but in case of any one of these objects missing ( hām ) one should take it over ( upāyanam )¹ [ from any other text where it is not missing ], because of the subordination [ of such objects ] to the [ express ] Word, as is done in the case [ of the non-mention of one or more ] of kuśa grass, a piece of cloth ( āchhandas – a seat? ), a hymn and a by-song; this has been already explained.
27. (One must take in the objects not mentioned in his text from other texts where they are mentioned,) because there remains nothing to be accomplished hereafter (by the liberated), for so say the followers of a certain Branch.

NOTES:

1. As 'va' in Sutra 21 shows, these two Sutras (19-20) are purvapaksha Sutras.

2. According to the Sutrakara, "delighting," anandana (in Tai. Up. II. 7) and "awing" (in bhisâ asmât vatah pawate Tai. Up. II. 8) are respectively the functions of purusa and aksara.


5. This shows that pradhana is, according to the Sutrakara, purusa, and that the Sutrakara makes a distinction between purusa-vidya and aksara-vidya.

6. Note that the Acarya is do not know the Sruti to which this Sutra must refer.

7. Instead of upyanasabdasesatvat I propose to read upyanam sabdasesatvat. I believe this was the original reading as is suggested by the context, by the presence of the word 'hanau', and by the fact that the Acaryas could not give any satisfactory meaning to the Sutra as they found it.

SECTION 7.

Option of the Name for Meditation.

(28) [One may meditate on either of the two, purusa and aksara] in accordance with his own wish, because both of them are not in disagreement [with the Scriptures].

(29) The goal (gati) is fulfilled in either way, because otherwise [there would be] an inconsistency [in the Scriptures].

(30) [Such a statement that one may meditate on either of the two according to his own wish] is quite proper because we find an object of such a nature [in the Scripture] as we find such a one in the world.
SECTION 8.

Number of Thoughts to be collected for
Meditation on puruṣa.

"(31) There is no obligation (niyama) that all the
thoughts on pradhyāna should be collected for meditation on
it; [but] there is no opposition [to such a collection] because
of the Word1 and of Inference.

NOTE:—

The collection of the thoughts was taught for the first
time by the Sūtrakāra; the Śrutis, whenever they described
the meditation on puruṣa, enumerated a few of these attributes
and said that the meditator on puruṣa so far described would
thereby reach his goal.

SECTION 9.

No Collection of the Thoughts during adhikāra.

(32) [The thoughts'] which belong to the religious
qualification (adhikāra) should [be allowed to] remain [in
the meditation] only so long as the qualification lasts.

[Or, the collection of adhikārika thoughts should be
restricted to as many of them as are in accordance with the
meditator's qualification].

NOTE:—

"Adhikārikānām" in the Sūtra suggests that dhiyām is
understood; and this is further confirmed by dhiyām in the
next Sūtra.

SECTION 10.

Meditation on 'akṣara'.

(33) But [to collect] the thoughts on akṣara for the
purpose of meditation on it is discountenanced (avarodhaḥ)
because of [their] common [negative] character1 and because
of [the meditator's] becoming that (i.e. akṣara); the case is
similar to that of the aupasada rite; this has been already said2.

(34) Because of the Scripture stating (that) "so many" are the attributes of akṣara.

21
Notes:—

1. The word "śāmānya", which is variously interpreted by the commentators seems to have in fact only the simple sense of "common character" and this common character of the aksārap-assages is their negative nature, which renders the collection of the thoughts on aksara unnecessary.

2. A reference to Br. Śū. III. 3. 8 and 10, or to Br. Śū. III. 3. 11.

3. The Sūtrakāra seems to refer to the fact that the aksara texts mention the attributes of aksara in such a way as if they intended to exhaust all the attributes in that single list. See e.g. Br. Up. III. 8. 3-11.

Section 11.

Method of Meditation on aksara (see Sec. 13).

(35) The meditator on aksara is to think of aksara as [present] within his own self, as in the case of [meditation on] the group of bhūtas.

(36) If it be said: "[Aksara is to be thought of as within the meditator's self because] otherwise the difference [between aksara and pradhāna] will remain unexplained", we reply: "No. The case is like that of a second precept².

Notes:—

1. The five elements of the body and their deities.

2. According to the Sūtrakāra, puruṣa and aksara form the basis of two precepts for the same goal.

Section 12.

Interchange of Thoughts on puruṣa and aksara.

(37) [In the texts about aksara and puruṣa we find] an interchange [of (some of) the attributes or thoughts of aksara and puruṣa], because [the Srutis] distinguish (aksara) as they do the other (puruṣa).

(38) [For example, we may point out that that same Sruti which describes puruṣa as ānanda etc. distinguishes aksara with such distinctions as properly belong to puruṣa].
(39) The attributes satya and others may be, at the wish of the meditator, taken in the meditation on the other [than that with reference to which they are mentioned in Tai. Up. II. 1] (i.e. in the meditation on purusa), and in that [with reference to which satya and others are mentioned] (i.e. in the meditation on akṣara) [the meditator, may, at his will, collect attributes] from "ayıatana" and those that follow.

(40) [The attributes of purusa when mentioned by the Sruti with reference to akṣara should, out of respect [for the Sruti] not be dropped [in the meditation on akṣara].

(41) [This rule of non-dropping or "interchange" applies to an attribute of purusa] when it is present [in an akṣara-text]. [This is done] out of this [respect for the Sruti] because it is the word of the Sruti.

(42) There is no rule for deciding [which are] those [interchangeable attributes]; the fruit of such a standpoint is that there is no objection [from the side of the Scripture] to (akṣara and purusa) being thought of separately (prthag dhit).NOTES:—

1. Tai. Up. II. describes purusa in II. 7 and akṣara or Brahman in II. 1.

2. The Sutrakāra has in his mind "Satyam jñānam anantam brahma."—Tai. Up. II. 1, as is evident from the word satyādayah in the next Sutra (according to my suggestion). He thinks that satya, jñāna, ananita are properly speaking the attributes of purusa, but by way of "interchange of attributes", the Sruti assigns them to akṣara.

3. I have divided the words in Sutras 38–39 in a different way from that in which they are found in all existing pāṭhas; and in place of 'kāmāditaratra' (in 41) I have substituted 'kāmād itaratra' which is the reading according to Madhva; thus, Sutra 38 is 'saiva it' and Sutra 39 reads "satyādayah kāmād itaratra tatva c āyatanaśīlawah.

4. No commentator has been able to quote as viṣayavāky a Sruti which gives a list of attributes beginning with satya, as is required by the Sutra. All the conjectures of Śaṅkara and others seem to me unnecessary; they are a proof of the loss of tradition.
5. *Āyatanaś dibhyāḥ* is explained by no interpreter in a satisfactory way. I believe, the Śūtrakāra refers to the attributes that he has enumerated in Br. Śū. I. 3–4 which begins with *dyaubhādyāyatanam svasaabdāt* (Br. Śū. I. 3 1). This also shows that in Br Śū. I. 3–4 the Śūtrakāra has discussed such texts as primarily refer to *aṇḍara.*

6. "*Praśasana*" in Br. Up. III. 8. 9 (Br. Śū. I. 3. 11) is an example.

7. This sounds rather tautological and tautology was strictly avoided in the Śūtra literature. A better explanation if suggested by any scholar will be welcomed.

8. Saṅkara reads "*prthāḥ hi*", but others have the reading which I have followed. Śūtra 50 (praṇāntara) confirms the correctness of the latter.

**SECTION 13.**

*Method of Meditation on aṇḍara (contd.).*

(43) [During meditation, aṇḍara is to be conceived of] in that very way in which *pradhāna* is comprehended for the same purpose; thus has been already said.¹

**Notes:**

1. Here, again, all the available recensions read *pradānavat* the meaning of which none has been able to explain satisfactorily; I have taken "*pradhānavat*" to have been the original reading. (See the notes below.)

2. This refers to *‘ itaravad’* in Br. Śū. III. 3. 16, and it also proves the correctness of the change in reading I have proposed above.

**SECTION 14.**

*Superiority of aṇḍara to puṇḍra.*

(44) Because of the majority of the texts [describing aṇḍara], that (i.e. aṇḍara) is more important [as an object of meditation] (than *pradhāna*).

(45) Even then¹, the option already stated [holds good] because of the context of the texts [describing it]; so it may be as is the case with (optional) rites and with the mind of man.
(46) And [the former option holds good also] because of the transference [of the attributes of the one to the other in case of aksara and purusa].

(47) But, [the meditation on purusa is] nothing else but vidya (the doctrine of liberation), because of the affirmation [in the Sruti].

(48) And because we see a text [to the effect].

(49) And there is no objection [to purusa-upasana] because of the superiority of the evidence of the Sruti text and other proofs [to that of pure reason].

(50) And this ('option' purvavikalpa) is seen from [the evidence of] the theme (or 'introductory remarks') etc. to have the difference (prthaktavaat) of another (way of) understanding; this has been already said.

(51) Though there is an analogy [between the purusa-attainment and a world like the worlds of Indra, Aditya, etc. mentioned e.g. in Br. Sū. IV. 3], there arises no "fault of purusa being regarded as a world" (lokapatii), because [the idea of purusa as the goal in absolution in the form in which we have to understand it] is found [in the Scripture, and the Scripture is the highest authority], nor indeed [is there any possibility of purusa being looked upon as 'a world' loka] just as there is no possibility of Death [in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad being looked upon as the death known in the human world].

(52) And [the former option holds good because both aksara and purusa have] a similarity of words with para (the Highest), but the application [of a term particularly to either of the two] is based upon the frequency (of usage).

NOTES:—

1. "Tad api" should be transferred to this Sūtra from the preceding one where it stands according to all the commentators.

2. This is a reference to Mu. Up. I. 2. 13.

3. This is a reference to Br. Sū. III. 3. 42 (prīhag dhi).
4. Tai. Up. II. 1 says that the liberated soul enjoys all objects of desire in company of the intelligent Brahman: this sounds as if the liberated soul were to reside in a world (loka) like the worlds of Indra, Prajapati, etc., where also similar enjoyment of desires is described as taking place.

5. The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that words like ātman, jyotih, Brahman, etc. which are used for the Highest Being (para) can be used for either of akṣara and puruṣa; he means also that even the words akṣara, puruṣa etc. may have been used interchangeably, but the frequency of usage helps us in deciding the sense of any particular passage.

SECTION 15.

Choice of One only out of the Two.

(53) One [of the two options should be accepted for meditation, because that one which is accepted is to be meditated upon as identical with the self of the meditator, and] because the self [of the meditator] exists [already] in the body [and the meditation involves the identity of two only, not that of three].

SECTION 16.

No Invariable Co-existence of the Object of Meditation and the Meditator.

(54) There is a logical non-co-existence [of akṣara or puruṣa and the jīva], because [the first two] do not [necessarily] exist where the [last] one exists; but the case is different from what we find [in Śruti and Smṛti].

Notes:

1. Upalabhi, in the Sūtras, means “the finding of a statement in the Śruti” e. g. in Br. Śū. II. 1. 36. Bh. Gī. XVIII 61 says that Iśvara (not “jīva” who does, of necessity, reside in the human body) resides in the heart of all beings. The Sūtrakāra says that it is not so in meditation. He seems to think that akṣara or puruṣa does not reside in the heart by nature, but one of the two may manifest itself therein after the meditation is carried out.

2. The Sūtras (54 ff) refer to aṅgopāsanā and therefore are not discussed here.

Two Aupanisāda views are here criticised by the Sūtrakāra.

(a) Br. Sū. III. 2. 11–21.

These Sūtras embody a refutation of the view that in the Highest there is a “distinction of place” (sthānabheda):

(11) [It can] not [be said that] [the two sets of characteristics mentioned in] the two-fold texts¹ are those of the Highest One² even³ with regard to [different] places (sthānatah) [within the Highest One], for, [they belong to it] everywhere.

(12) If it be said: “No [i. e. the two-fold attributes do not belong to para ‘in every part of it’ sarvatra], because there is a difference [in para itself, viz., the difference of space or place—sthāna⁴]”; we reply: “Not so, because a statement about that (i. e. about the difference of space) is not found in each text⁵” or “In each text there is a reverse statement⁶”.

(13) Moreover, the followers of one Branch of the Vedas [really say] so⁷.

(14) For, it (the Highest) is certainly, formless, that [formlessness] being its chief [aspect]⁸.

(15) And it is like the Light⁹, because [its description] cannot be futile.

(16) And the Śruti does describe it (i. e. para) as “only that” (tānmātra)¹⁰.

(17) And the Śruti¹¹ shows [that the “whole” of para has all the attributes that belong to it], and the Smṛti does the same.

(18) And for this very reason, [we have in the Śruti¹² para brahman’s] comparison like that of the Sun and water (kam)¹³ and others.

(19) But, in so far as (para brahman) cannot be reflected as [the Sun] in the water, (Brahman) is not like that (i. e. the Sun) [in becoming “many”]¹⁴.
(20) [Para brahman’s] participating in increase and decrease is explicable on the ground of that characteristic being included [in the coincidentia oppositorum]; it is so because both the [mutually contrary] attributes are reconcilable [in para brahman].

(21) And because the Scriptures show it ↑.

Notes:—

1. The texts giving separately the coincidentia oppositorum.

2. Note that para is used by the Sūtrakāra when he speaks of the Supreme Being, without any particular reference to it as pradhāna or aksara. Para was so used in III. 3. 52.

3. ‘Even’ api implies the Sūtrakāra’s rejection of the view that the two-fold texts can be explained as describing two forms (rūpas) of the Highest or as describing aksara and puruṣa as two separate entities instead of two places (sthāna) in the Highest.

4. This pūrvaśaṅka seems to state that aksara and puruṣa are numerically one, but aksara is the lower place and puruṣa is the higher place in the Highest One which has got this spatial distinction within itself; so that the negative sentences (anau, ahrasva etc.) and the positive ones (satyakāma, satyasamkalpa) should respectively be applied to these two. The opponent seems to have referred to such texts as Mu. Up. II. 1. 2 which says that puruṣa is above aksara.

5. The Sūtrakāra means two texts which describe only puruṣa or only aksara.

6. Here the Sūtrakāra may refer to the attributes of puruṣa (prasāsana etc.) mentioned with reference to aksara (e. g. in Br. Up. III. 8. 9) or vice versa.

7. Probably the Sūtrakāra refers to Mu. Up. I. 2. 13 where “aksara puruṣa” is mentioned so that there is no difference of place in the two as is mentioned in Mu. Up. II. 1. 3 where puruṣa is said to be above aksara.

8. According to the Sūtrakāra, puruṣa and aksara are, as it were, two aspects for meditation. The former has a form (Br. Śū. I. 2. 23); the latter has none. Aksara is more important than puruṣa (Br. Śū. III. 3. 44).
9. The *pūrvaḥaksin* seems to have pointed to such texts as Mu. Up. II. 1. 4. The Śūtrakāra says that the description in II. 1. 4 is not futile because the *para* is itself like the Light.

10. "He is like a solid mass of salt, which is without an inward and without an outward, a mass of juice, the whole of it (*kṛṣṇa ṛṣaṅgana eva*) ................." Br. Up. III. 2. 16.

11. The Śūtrakāra refers to such texts as describe *para brahman* to be possessed of contrary attributes e. g. Sve. Up. III. 19, 20; Kaṭha Up. II. 10, 20; Īśa Up. 5; and Bh. Gī. XIII. 12–13.

12. The reference is to the Brahmacindu Upaniṣad as quoted by Śaṅkara and other commentators.

13. *Kam,* is used in the sense of water in the Maitrāyaṇiya Samhitā, Satapathā Brāhmaṇa and even in the Yajñavālkiya Śrītu. The word *ambu* in the next Śūtra also shows that *kam* in this Śūtra stands for 'water'.

14. i.e. the manner in which *para* becomes many is not that in which the Sun, the Moon etc. become many. This restricts the comparison of *para* with the Sun etc.

(15) See e. g. Sve. Up. III. 20., Bh. Gī. XIII. 16.

(b) Br. Sū. III. 2. 32–38.

These Śūtras embody a refutation of the view that there are two goals:—

(31) "[The Supreme One* is] higher than this [avyakta, as described in Br. Sū. III. 2. 23], because of the designations of a bridge*, measure*, connection*, and difference* [which are applied to *avyakta*]."

(32) But [it is not so] because [the designation "bridge" is] due to the common characteristic*.

(33) [Because the designation of measure is] for the ease of understanding, like [the designation of] its [four] feet [which cannot mean that the *para* is a quadruped].

(34) [The designation of the connection of the Unmanifest with *purusa*] is due to the mention of a particular place in the Supreme One*; [otherwise everything is *para* and those with
which *anyakta* is connected are different places in *para*; it is similar to the case of the Light etc.

(35) And because [in the case of the difference of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*] there is the possibility of an explanation.

(36) And, because the Śruti negatives the existence of any other principle [besides *akṣara*].

(37) Hence the omnipresence* of *anyakta* which is established in the texts which mention the extent (of Brahman) and in others.

**NOTES:**

1. As *tu* in the next Śūtra shows, this is a *purvaṇaṇa* Śūtra.

2. Chā. Up. VIII. 4. 1—*anyakta* or *ātman* is a bridge.

3. Chā. Up. III. 18. 2—Brahman has four feet; therefore it is limited; the unlimited must be beyond it.

4. *Avyakta* is connected with *puruṣa* on the one side and *mahād* or the lower Nature on the other e.g. in Kāṭha Up. III. 11.

5. *Aksara* is different from *puruṣa* e.g. in Mu. Up. II. 2, Bh. Gī. XV. 18, Sve. Up. 1. 6.

6. The Śūtrakāra does not admit that *puruṣa* is higher or other than *akṣara*, and that therefore there are two goals. *Atman* is called a bridge because like a bridge which helps in crossing a river, *ātman* helps in crossing the sea of worldly existence.

7. The Śūtrakāra does not believe that the twofold contradictory attributes belong to different parts or places in the *para*; they belong to every place in the Supreme Being; but he admits the distinction of place as such in *para* without reference to its attributes. So there is no inconsistency in the Śūtrakāra’s position in III. 2. 11 and in this Śūtra.

8. The Light is called star, Moon, Sun, fire, flame, with reference to its presence in different places, so the *para* is called *puruṣa, akṣara* etc. with reference to its presence in various places,
9. In Br. Sū. I. 4. 3. avyakta (in Kaṭha Up. III. 11) is explained to be lower than puṇaṣa, because as the Nature it is dependent on the latter. This seems to be the upapatti in the Sūtra.

10. The Sūtrakāra, naturally, refers to such texts as deny the existence of any principle other than akṣara e. g. Br. Up. III. 8. 11.

11. There cannot be two omnipresent goals like akṣara and puṇaṣa both of which are omnipresent according to the texts; so they are the names of one and the same goal. Cf. Br. Sū. III. 3. 9.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.

Other and perhaps better explanations of Śve. Up. I. 7a–b and V. 1 (than those given in App. I. C) can be given as follows:—

(I.7a–b) This is the Supreme Brahman (paramam vrahma) celebrated in song. The three and the Mutable are well established in it.

(V.1) There are, with Brahma above them (brahmaāpare) two infinite Immutable Ones, wherein Knowledge (vidyā) and not-Knowledge (āvidyā) are placed concealed. Not-Knowledge is the Mutable (kṣara), Knowledge is the Immortal. He who rules over the Knowledge and not-Knowledge is other than these two.

NOTE:—

1. I accept Prof. Schrader’s suggestion to read supratīṣṭha-ākṣaram ca as supratīṣṭham kṣaram ca instead of dividing the compound as supratīṣṭham aksaram ca as I have done in App. I. C. The advantages of accepting this suggestion are obvious. Firstly, trayaṃ (the three) in I. 7b are, in this case, the same as the three in I. 9 and 12, viz., the Lord, the Immutable, and the Jīva, since kṣara is, according to this suggested reading, to be counted separately (see note 3 in App. I. C. 1). Secondly, supratīṣṭham aksaram ca, the division of the compound, that I had proposed, required “aksaram” to be applied to kṣaram and in a secondary sense, viz., “impensurable” instead of the usual sense, viz., “the Immutable”. Thirdly, the construction of “ca” (and) at the end of I. 7b had to be left out of account in my rendering of the verse, since, the compound supratīṣṭha-ākṣaram could itself be explained as supratīṣṭham aksaram ca, according to the rules of samāsa. As a matter of fact, the ca at the end of I. 7b requires the splitting up of supratīṣṭha-ākṣaram into “supratīṣṭham kṣaram” and thus confirms Prof. Schrader’s suggestion. And lastly, etat in Śve. Up. I. 8a requires kṣara and aksara to have been mentioned in I. 7.
and this requirement can be best fulfilled according to the suggested correction of the text.

2. *Paramam brahma* (Sve. Up. I. 7a) is, in this case, the Triad as a whole as distinguished from the *traya* or the three taken singly. Thus, *paramam brahma* is equivalent to *brahmam* in I. 9 and 12.

3. *Brahma* in *brahma-par* (in Sve. Up. V. 1a) seems to be *brahmam* mentioned in Sve. Up. I. 9 and 12 (see 1. on p. 140). *Brahmam* is the Triad (Sve. Up. I. 9, 12) which is certainly higher than, or above, the two Immutable Ones, to be explained in the next note.

4. The two Immutable Ones (*dve aksa-ra*) seem to be the two *ajas*, viz., *Iša* and the Immutable (*akṣara*) mentioned in Sve. Up. I. 8a–b, the *jīva* and the *aśā* in Sve. Up. I. 9a–b, the *deva* and the *atman* in Sve. Up. I. 10a–b, and the *pratīc* and *bhogya* in Sve. Up. I. 12c–d. Only these two can be properly said to be *aksaras* or the Immutable Ones among the principles mentioned in the Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad. Moreover, V. 1b can be consistently explained only with this interpretation of *dve aksa-ra* (see note 5 below). And again if *brahma* in *brahma-par* is *brahmam* or the Triad, *dve aksa-ra* must mean the Lord and the *aksara* or the Immutable. So, Sve. Up. V. 1 is to be noted because it calls the *Iša* (or *puruṣa*) *aksara*, besides designating the usual *aksara* as such.

5. Sve. Up. V. 1b states that in the two *aksaras* *vidyā* and *avidyā* are placed concealed. Thus, the two *aksaras* are the hiding places of *vidyā* and *avidyā* and as such cannot be identical with *vidyā* or *avidyā*. *Vidyā* is explained as *amṛta* or *aksara* (see note 11 on Sve. Up. I. 7–12 in App. I) in Sve. Up. V. 1c, and *vidyā* is said to be placed concealed in one of the two *aksaras* in V. 1 a–b. This can only mean that the *aksara* called both *amṛta* and *vidyā* is lower than, or to be traced to, another *aksara*, which *aksara*, again, can be none else but the *puruṣa* or *Iša* as the Sve. Up. likes to call him (Sve. Up. I. 8–9). This meaning of V. 1 justifies the explanation of *dve aksa-ra* in V. 1a as the Lord and the Immutable.

6. *Avidyā* is placed in one of the two *aksaras* (V. 1b); it is also explained as *kṣara* (V. 1c); so the *aksara* in which *avidyā* is concealed is the Immutable or *aksara* properly so called.
7. Thus, the order of the principles mentioned in V. 1 is as follows: (1) brahmam or the Triad, (2) akṣara, the hiding place of  
vidyā otherwise called aksara also, i.e. puruṣa or īṣa, (3) aksara the hiding place of avidyā, (4) avidyā or kṣara. 
So, this is a preparatory stage towards the evolitional series 
of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Ka. Up. III. 11).

8. *Dve in dve aksara* (V. 1a) should be noticed. It is the 
first definite departure from the "ekam eva advitiyam" of the 
Oldest Prose Upaniṣads (e.g. Chā. Up VI. 2. 1); as is also 
the expression *hvividham brahmam*. Such a statement about 
the dualism (in this case, the spiritual dualism) of puruṣa and 
aksara is quite consistent with the sharp distinction between 
these two principles met with in the Gītā, and the yet sharper 
one found in the later Mahābhārata.

9. As the Knowledge (along with the not-Knowledge) 
is said to be ruled over by the īṣa (Śve. Up. V. 1. c-d), it 
cannot be the Jīva who is declared to be the not-ruler (aniṣṭa) 

CONCLUSION:—

It must be admitted that the explanation of Śve; Up. V.1 
proposed above is more in harmony with that of Śve. Up. I. 
7-12, than the one given in App. I; because thereby the same 
principles as are mentioned in Śve. Up. I, are to be found in 
Śve. Up. V. Moreover, to understand the two aksaras in V. 1 
as referring to puruṣa or īṣa and aksara is besides being 
consistent with the teaching of the verse (V. 1) itself, far better 
than taking the term aksara to mean "imperishable" and referring one aksara to what is called kṣara.

The above interpretation further supports the reconstruction of the meaning of the term aksara proposed in this Thesis as a whole.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

I, Prataprai M. Modi, was born on the 9th February 1898 in Bhavnagar (Br. India). I am a Hindu by religion and a Bania by caste. My first lessons I had for two years from a private teacher in Bhavnagar. Then I visited the Sanātana Dharma High School at Bhavnagar for seven years and passed the Matriculation Examination of the Bombay University in 1916. After having studied for four years in the Samaldas College (Bhavnagar), the Bahauddin College (Junagadh), and the Gujarat College (Ahmedabad) I passed the B.A. Examination of the Bombay University from the last mentioned College, with Honours in Sanskrit in 1920. During 1920–21 I worked as the Dakṣiṇā Fellow in Sanskrit in the Gujarat College. Then for further two years I studied at the Central Hindu College and at the College of Oriental Learning of the Benares Hindu University and passed the M.A. Examination in the Second Division with Sanskrit as my subject and Vedanta as my Special Group in July 1923. In September of the same year I was appointed Assistant Professor of Sanskrit at the Samaldas College, Bhavnagar and was made the Senior Professor after two years. In 1926 I won the Zala Vedanta Prize of the Bombay University in an All-India competition for a work on Madhusudana Sarasvati’s Sudhāntabindu (a philosophical Sanskrit work) which has been published in 1929. Being enabled by the Council of Administration, Bhavnagar State, Bhavnagar to prosecute my studies in Oriental Research in Germany, I left India in June 1929 and after four months’ study of the German language in Goettingen I joined the Kiel University, where since
then I have studied Sanskrit, English, and History of Religion. I have attended the lectures of Prof. Dr. F. O. Schrader, Prof. Dr. K. Wildhagen, and Prof. Dr. H. Mandel. I heartily thank all my teachers of this place. I am particularly indebted to Prof. Dr. F. O. Schrader whose never failing help and invaluable advice in the important questions of technical and philosophical nature I urgently needed and readily secured for the interpretation of the various texts I had to deal with during the preparation of this Work. Above all, what I shall always value most is the great joy and inspiration which I derived when I had the privilege of discussing with him various crucial points of Indian Philosophy. It often reminded me of the cordial relations which existed between the disciple and the teacher in the happy days of Ancient India. My bow to him.