SPIRITUAL TALKS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

April 2, 1930

At the news of the riot in Calcutta, Mahapurushji expressed great sorrow, saying: “This is summer; and the bullocks and buffaloes drawing carts at noon certainly suffer very much. It is necessary to stop the rolling of these carts at noon by passing some law. And yet, look at the consequence. The attempt at saving the cattle by law leads to the killing of people in a riot! The world is passing through a thousand calamities. Today, you have a railway collision; tomorrow, a riot; and there are malaria and other nature’s visitations.”

Dhanagopal Mukherji, who lived in the U.S.A., came and bowed down to Mahapurushji. Seeing the poor state of Mahapurushji’s health, he began to shed tears. At this, Mahapurushji said: “When Buddha was about to leave his body, Ānanda became overwhelmed with grief, at which Buddha said: “Why do you weep, Ānanda? Life lasts only for fifty or sixty years, or at most for a hundred years. But I now depart to attain an infinite life after this.” When the talk drifted to the question of caste, he remarked: ‘Howsoever caste may count in society, the devotees of God can have none of it. The Master used to say that devotees of God belong to a different class. As for ourselves, we are monks; we have no caste or any such thing; we gave up such conceits long ago.’ Then the topics of the guru and the chosen deity were raised, and he remarked: ‘The guru and the chosen deity are non-different; but so long as you are in this relative world, you have to make a distinction between them. When you realize the truth, you find that both of them are one and the same. That, of course, depends on hard spiritual struggle.’

April 7, 1930

To a Muslim devotee, Mahapurushji said: “You should know that the Master and God are non-different. You have certainly read about the Master. The Master and God are one. So you have no need to leave your formless and attributeless God.... You know that he practised the Islamic way of spiritual life to demonstrate that that, too, is a path to realize God. He himself attained success in it.”
When somebody told him that the Rāma-nāma-kīrtana would be sung, he said: ‘The name and the personality named are non-different; the name itself denotes the personality. Again, the name of Rāma is the same as the name of Hari.’

April 10, 1930

Lying on his bed, Mahapurushji recited these verses from the Guru-Gītā: ‘Salutations to the guru who has shown the reality of that entity by which is pervaded this entire universe, infinite and spherical, with all its moving and non-moving objects. Salutations to that guru who, with the collyrium-stick of knowledge, has opened the eyes of one blinded by the disease of ignorance.’ Then he saluted with folded hands.

April 12, 1930

When Dhanagopal Mukherji came and bowed down to him, Mahapurushji said: ‘I hope you meditate a little every day. It is an excellent practice. With the utterance of the name of Sri Ramakrishna, you will feel a stir of Consciousness within your heart, and the Mother will wake up. In this age, the Mother wakes up when called upon through this name, Ramakrishna. Repeat the name; you will attain the knowledge of Brahman if you keep on repeating the name along with meditation.’

April 14, 1930

Speaking to someone, Mahapurushji said: ‘Such statements you will not find in any book; these are our own expressions. For instance, Swamiji used to say: “The form of my chosen deity is everlasting; He has an eternal form.” The Master used to say: “There are places where the snow never melts.” It is perpetual snow. The Absolute itself assumes an eternal form.’ Questioned about his body, he said: ‘There is nothing left in it. It is just an effigy of hay with which the Master is having his work done. As to that, let it work so long as it pleases him. He was Truth incarnate, and he came to the world to establish Truth, You, too, proceed along the path of Truth and stick to Truth for evermore. Now you are all here for fulfilling his mission; he is getting his work done through you. Your lives have no other purpose and no other work. God is Truth, hold on to Truth.’

April 19, 1930

To a devotee from upper India, Mahapurushji said: ‘As for this bondage of the world, it snaps by God’s grace. His grace, God’s compassion, is necessary. What is there in initiation? Go on calling on Rāma or Ramakrishna—and that is as good as initiation. Ask your wife also to call on Ramakrishna. And if you find an opportunity in future, bring her once to Calcutta after proper preparation, and the initiation will come off. You have only two children, a son and a daughter; they are not many. Now go on thinking that everything belongs to Nārāyaṇa, to God; and nothing to yourself. Everything came from Him, and will return to Him. Even now, they are in Him alone; everything is a manifestation of God.’

April 20, 1930

We have been studying the Gītā for some days. In the course of a talk on the subject, Mahapurushji said: “I am the goal, the supporter, the lord, the witness, the abode, the refuge, the friend, the origin, the dissolution, the substratum, the store-house, the seed immutable” (Gītā, IX.18). This is a favourite verse of mine; it is very beautiful. In it is embedded the special message of the Gītā. The Lord has made a direct declaration; there is no hide and seek about it. He has declared clearly: “I am the goal, supporter, witness, place to abide in, refuge, and friend.”

April 21, 1930

The foundation-stone of the temple of Sri Ramakrishna at the Advaita Ashrama, Varanasi, was brought by a monk to Mahapurushji after worship. Touching it, he said: ‘So you have finished worship, fine! Glory to our
Lord! Let me have a look at it. It is excellent. So Chandra (Swami Nirbharananda) is going to build a temple for the Master; a grand idea.' With his hands on the stone, he meditated for a while; then he said: 'The Master had his seat established at Varanasi long ago. But now, there will be a better shrine for him; and that will help many people spiritually. Master, may this temple at Varanasi become an accomplished fact—there at Kāśi, the capital of Viśvanātha (Śiva).’ To the monk, he said: 'Tie up everything, including the flowers and sandal paste, in a piece of cloth and take them with you to Varanasi.'

_May 4, 1930_

As, owing to the negligence of the monk on duty, Swamiji's room had become drenched during the rainfall and storm at night, Mahapurushji said: 'Be careful that there is never more a repetition of this. Remember that it is Swamiji's room, a room still vibrant with his presence. This is not just an ordinary room, for here lived a veritable incarnation of Śiva. What deep meditation, moods of divine communion, and samādhi have been witnessed by this room! How can you know all that, my boy? I warn you, my boy, be very careful. Look after this room with the fullest attention, else you will be in trouble. Be careful; never more do such a thing. I warn you, it is Swamiji's room.'

_May 12, 1930_

'It is the full moon day of Vaiśākha, sanctified by the birth of Bhagavān Buddha, as well as his full enlightenment and great passing away—the thrice blessed day’, related Mahapurushji. ‘Aha! you seldom find such an intellect and such a great heart. It is all divine mystery. As for our Master, he is Buddha, Śaṅkara, and Caitanya in one. It is all surpassingly strange this time. Glory to the Lord, glory to the gracious One! Kindly grant peace everywhere, O Lord—peace to India, peace to the world. Let good prevail, let blessings be showered everywhere. The ideal of renunciation is nowhere to be found as bright as in India. If India lives, the world lives. In earlier days, there was no fight between the Hindus and the Mohammedans; they did not have any enmity between them. But such things have cropped up recently. This is the result of the accumulation of sins and misdeeds over a long period. What is wanted now is hard spiritual practice. For, if the Mother be gracious even a little, you will find how everything becomes favourable.'

He reverted to the topic of Buddha; and about nirvāṇa, he sang a song composed by Swami Vivekananda (The Hymn of Samādhi):

Lo! The sun is not, nor the comely moon, All light extinct; in the great void of space Floats shadow-like the image-universe. In the void of mind involute, here floats The fleeting universe, rises and floats, Sinks again, ceaseless, in the current ‘T’. Slowly, slowly, the shadow-multitude Entered the primal womb, and flowed ceaseless, The only current, the ‘I am’, ‘I am’. Lo! ‘Tis stopped, ev’n that current flows no more, Void merged into void—beyond speech and mind! Whose heart understands, he verily does.

He kept silent for some time and then said: ‘A fine consummation.... All is quiet. Grand!’

_May 13, 1930_

Mahapurushji heard the news that at Pegu, in Burma, thirty thousand people had been rendered homeless by an earthquake, followed by fire; and he said: 'The doings of Mahāmāyā (the great cosmic Māyā) are inscrutable. All this is the effect of Her power of destruction. This is why the Master would say: “Mother, I don’t understand all this, nor can I try to understand. Be merciful to me; and grant me pure love for your blessed feet; and grant me pure knowledge.” It is all Mother’s will. How can you help it? Yours is now to start relief work.'
May 16, 1930

Mahapurushji said: ‘Nobody has any peace of mind; such a discontent has spread over the whole world that even God’s throne seems to be shaken. And yet, if He looks down with compassion, howsoever little it may be, peace will reign everywhere. Just to expose the holiness of man’s egoism, God has given him a long rope to discover for himself how far his intellect can carry him. He is just watching how far man succeeds in bringing peace through his own intellectual effort. When that egoism is gone, men will turn towards God; and that will usher in a new era.’

May 20, 1930

‘It will never be in vain if one takes refuge with the Master’, said Mahapurushji. ‘Ramlal Dada’ said the other day that Rasik, the sweeper, used to address the Master as father. At the time of his death, he cried out: “Ah! father, so you are here, you are here!” With these words on his lips, he left the body amidst the tulasi bushes. Ah, the deep mood the Master would be in! He was just like a boy of five years. Let alone men, even women could not think of him otherwise.’

May 21, 1930

Some ladies from the West had written to Mahapurushji. For an answer to one of them, he directed thus: “Write to her, “If you like, you may correspond with me”. She is a very devoted soul. All that I care for is that one should be a devotee; it is of little consequence whether one is a man or a woman. When the inner vision opens, all are seen as Brahman; what difference can there be to one who realizes the One, the One without a second?”

May 25, 1930

At the sight of a monk approaching him,

Mahapurushji recited a poem of Śaṅkarācārya:

‘As a drop of water on a lotus leaf is extremely unsteady, so is life very unstable. Therefore, O fool, worship Govinda, worship Govinda, worship Govinda.’

The talk turned to Bansberia (a village on the western bank of the Gaṅgā, some miles north of Belur). Mahapurushji said: ‘The image of the goddess Harinārāyani there is very beautiful and inspiring. But I can no longer move out. The Mother is playing with this worn out toy of Hers; so let Her play as long as it pleases Her. I have no other desire. It is true, of course, that I cannot walk about; but what do I lose thereby? Have I not roamed about long enough? I walked over hills and dales and in forests for thirty years. One finds happiness everywhere if Existence-Knowledge-Bliss is within the heart. And how little of this universe do we know! The astronomers say that there are stars whose lights have not reached the earth as yet; and this universe is held only on a fraction of Her.’ Then he lay down, uttering a line from a song:

‘Consider your lying down in bed as bowing down to Mother;
And your sleep a meditation on Her.’

Then he recited a verse from the Gītā (VI.22):

‘Getting which, one considers no other acquisition superior to that; and established in which, one is not perturbed even by the greatest sorrow.’ He continued: ‘Now I have to go to a place where Bliss exists, where the six kinds of changes that come over the body find no scope—where there is no birth, continuance, growth, transformation, decay, and death. My mind now longs to go there. Such ideas come vividly to my mind whenever I close my eyes. “This is my divine Māyā, consisting of the three guṇas, which is very difficult to transcend. Those who take refuge in Me alone go across this Māyā” (Gītā, VII.14). What you should know is that everything depends on the Lord.’
MANKIND AT THE CROSS-ROADS

Of all the forces that have worked and are still working to mould the destinies of the human race, none, certainly, is more potent than that, the manifestation of which we call religion.

—SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

I

There are two powerful forces exerting their influences on the minds of men in the world today. They are science and humanism. Science and humanism have become the characteristics of the modern age. Science has achieved astounding results for the happiness of man and, let us hasten to add, also for the unhappiness of man: we shall explain. Humanism has led mankind in two different directions: proletarian socialistic authoritarianism, on the one hand, and secularized democratic governments and institutions, on the other, both of which, working purely on secular humanistic principles, have betrayed man and robbed him of his spiritual essence.

The significance of even such lofty pronouncements as 'Man is the measure of all things' and 'Man is an end in himself', which are pregnant with immense possibilities for the full growth of man in all aspects—physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual—has been narrowed down and applied only to the extent of the psycho-physical being of man. No doubt the sentiments contained in these statements initiated great humanistic movements, which aimed at the amelioration of the social and economic conditions of mankind. But there they have stopped, and have not proceeded any further. Humanism, in its present form, is thoroughly secular, and does not strive after any other end than the psycho-physical well-being of man.

The progress that science has made today is the symbol of man’s untiring efforts to conquer nature and to make it serve his own ends. In this, he has taken amazing strides, which are nothing short of a miracle. Science is still probing deeper into the secrets of nature. What will yet be possible for the future man in the realm of science is beyond one’s imagination or guess.

Applied science has conferred on man innumerable benefits, making his life more comfortable and less burdensome. In our daily lives, we have to do so much and so often with the things of science that we can hardly realize what would have happened to us without them. Hundred and one articles of daily need and utility have become part and parcel of our modern way of life and we rarely ponder over their novelty or the human effort and ingenuity that are behind them. All these articles are taken for granted in our lives like nature’s own light and air. In every sphere of activity, public or private, science and the things of science have got mixed up inextricably with human life. They have become indispensable to modern life. Man’s labour has been saved, and his leisure increased, which he can turn to more purposeful and profitable pursuits. New discoveries in the field of medicine have added a few more years to the longevity of man. They have lessened the physical sufferings of man and made life more enjoyable and enduring. In the increase of agricultural produce, in the manufacture of various types of goods needed for the daily use of man, in providing several media of entertainment for man, science and technology have played an and are still playing no insignificant role. That is the picture of science we get when we look at its beneficial aspect, its constructive side, which has brought ease and comfort to the physical existence of man. But science, with all its gifts to humanity, has not touched even the fringe of the life of the spirit. The soul of man is hungering for spiritual solace.

Look at the other side of the picture of science, its dreadful and destructive side.
Humanity today is at the mercy of science. Man has created a Frankenstein’s monster which is threatening to destroy its very creator. Science has placed in the hands of man such deadly instruments of death and destruction which, if let loose in a moment of miscalculation or misunderstanding, will make short work of all our boasted human civilization. Any stupid, war-mongering leader of a nation that possesses these weapons can unleash, in a crazy mood, destructive forces that can annihilate the whole of mankind. Such possibilities have been created by science, and are within the power of a few nations. Day after day, fresh experiments are conducted, and these instruments of mass destruction are tested and perfected with a sense of competition and urgency. When huge stocks of these weapons are piled up in different countries, some inadvertance on the part of some unknown man, or somebody’s itch for a real show-down, may touch off these death dealing weapons, which may envelope the entire earth in a great conflagration. This is a possibility which science has created for man today. Is this to be the end of all human culture, civilization, and its proud achievements? What is the drawback in our scientific culture? The answer is that while man is extending the limits of his knowledge, he is not correspondingly growing in wisdom that comes from spiritual culture. Man today is losing faith in religious values, and lacks a spiritual basis for his life.

II

Secularized humanism, in its extreme form, has gradually led to the formation of totalitarian socialistic states, where all human endeavour is turned towards the glorification of the state. In the opposite direction, secularized humanism has led to the establishment of democratic governments and institutions, where the dignity and worth of the individual are recognized and respected, and where individual efforts and state endeavours are all directed towards the welfare of the community. In the one form, the state is supreme; the individual, his good and welfare, all must fit into the pattern of the state. The individual’s interests must be subservient to the interests of the state—the will of the government that is. In the other form, the individual is supreme; the government is a servant of the people. The individual’s interests count most. He is perfectly free in what he thinks, speaks, and does. The state is a welfare state, which works for the happiness and progress of all the members of the community. Both these forms of society, purely humanistic in approach and working in two different directions, are contending for leadership in the world today.

With the emergence of leftist ideologies in the social and political lives of certain nations, people there have begun to show scant respect for the traditional ideals which their forefathers cherished and practised for centuries in their social, cultural, and religious lives. Their present plans and programmes are chiefly concerned with the socio-economic life of the community. They have nothing to do with the higher culture of their spiritual life. Religion simply has no place in the pattern of their concept of society. The state is the new god of these socialistic countries. At the altar of this mighty god of the monolithic state, the high priests are the handful of men at the summit of the social pyramid, in whose hands are concentrated all forms of power, social, economic, and political, and who ‘know all, do all, and decide all’. Their word is law, and no opposition to it is countenanced. All others must hold themselves in readiness to be sacrificed at the altar of this all-powerful god of the state.

Traditional, cultural and religious ideals, which had preserved the beauty and peculiar characteristics of these nations, are thrown to the winds. Human sentiments operative in the mutual relationships between man and man, between man and woman, are ruthlessly and systematically suppressed. There is no talk of personal freedom in the way of life that one wishes to live. Every little detail is directed from above—the education that one may get, the association that one may cultivate, the
entertainments that one may enjoy, the type of work that one may be engaged in, all are determined and directed from the top. There is no personal choice in any of these. Communes are formed for what is called ‘the collectivization of the livelihood of the people’. The individual is only a cog in the wheel of the state. All personal interests are to be renounced and subordinated to the interests of the state. The state is all, and the individual is nothing.

Of course, there is no question of religious freedom, for religion is taboo in communist states. Religion, it is believed by them, creates hierarchy and causes class distinctions among the people. Religion, it has been said, is ‘the opium of the people’, used by the priestly classes to exploit the poorer classes for their selfish gain. All the existing evils in human society are attributed to religion and to the wicked designs of religious leaders. Religion, according to the communist ideology, has been an evil force in the affairs of men. Hence it should be done away with. It has no function or part to play in human affairs. As such, it should be blotted out of existence. It should find no place in any plan of social reconstruction. That, in the main, is the attitude of communism towards religion.

Under the aegis of democracy, however, humanism takes on a different colour. Though it maintains its secular character to the full, its effect on the social and cultural lives of the people is more humane. There is perfect freedom of the individual in a democracy, provided he is a law-abiding citizen. The government in a democracy is ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people’. Every citizen has a right to vote for the type of government he wants. He has a voice in all the matters concerning the state through his representatives. He exercises his full freedom in what he thinks, speaks, and does. The state does not interfere in his personal life or beliefs, so long as they do not come into conflict with the lives and beliefs of others in the community. There is scope for propagating one’s ideas or ventilating one’s views. In chalking out plans for social welfare and progress, the government seeks the willing co-operation of all the individuals and institutions in the community. In personal preferences with regard to one’s occupation or profession, there is no state interference whatsoever. In a word, democracy grows in an atmosphere of perfect freedom, individual as well as social, in striking contrast to the communist concepts of the individual and the community.

Religion, in a democracy, is the personal concern of the individual. The state, being secular, is neutral to religion. It neither encourages nor discourages any particular religious faith. Its chief concern is the social and economic betterment of the people, maintaining law and order in the community. That is how secularized humanism functions in a democracy.

III

In the international sphere, humanism is finding expression in the laudable efforts of men and nations for the advancement of mankind, through world organizations, not only in the political, social, and economic spheres, but also in the educational, scientific, and cultural fields. These organizations are attempting to bring together on one common platform representatives belonging to several racial groups, speaking diverse languages, coming from different social and cultural patterns, and to create opportunities for mutual understanding, appreciation, and exchange of their cultural ideas and ideals. In these organizations, one can notice genuine interest among the members to come closer to one another and to strengthen the idea of the oneness of mankind. They are working with the idea that the whole of humanity is one vast family, and that every nation, whatever be the form of its social and political structure, whatever be its cultural background, should be given equal opportunities for its full expression and development.

It is now accepted in the comity of nations that the fundamental rights of every human
being and the peculiar characteristics of every nation should be recognized and respected, and that it should be helped to preserve and practise them without any hindrance or interference. The natural law of unity in diversity, where variety adds colour and beauty to the fundamental unity, enhancing its charm and appeal, is the animating principle behind the workings of these international institutions. Their plans and programmes have embraced the whole of mankind. Their success in providing economic, technological, and educational aids to backward and under-developed countries, too, has been of no mean order. Science and technology have made the physical integration of humanity a reality today; but for its emotional integration, which is so very essential for its future progress, it is lacking the requisite spiritual approach and basis.

The tragedy of our times is that, with all the progress achieved by science and humanism, mankind is nowhere near the goal of peace. On the contrary, we have before us the nightmarish spectacle of the spectre of war menacingly brandishing its sword in the face of humanity. Any moment it may thrust the sword in the heart of humanity and kill all hopes of peace and future progress. The two power blocs, which have come to stay and which are evenly poised in their striking power, are unyielding on any serious issue when they get down to brass tacks. Suspicion and fear rule the minds of leaders on either side. While talking of peace before the world, enormous preparations go on breathlessly on both sides to create a ‘position of strength’. The tempo of cold war is maintained unabated. Disarmament talks and the like, it appears, are only a ruse, a cover, to shield secret preparations of war. Recent events culminating in the failure of the Summit Conference, on which an anxious humanity had pinned its hopes for the future, have only increased the agony of mankind. Whither mankind?

IV

In such a situation, where is humanity to turn for consolation and peace? Mankind has arrived at the cross-roads; it is facing a crisis in civilization. Neither science, nor humanism, nor war can restore it to a settled condition. It is only the understanding of the spiritual values and bringing them to work in all the spheres of human activity that can restore man’s lost equilibrium. We have seen how both science, which is secular in its aim, and secularized humanism have not been able to deliver the goods. They have not taken humanity one step nearer to its cherished goal of everlasting peace. They have not brought real happiness to mankind. That is because science, in its present form, and humanism, with its present ideology, are both secular in their content as well as intent. So long as their only aim is the secular well-being of mankind, they are bound to be baffled, and the goal of peace to mankind will always elude their grasp. If they have to do real service to humanity, they must start rethinking all over again and make a fresh approach on a spiritual basis.

What is needed at this juncture is a widening of horizons, a spiritual reawakening, a recovery of faith, to go beyond the merely physical and the psychological and recognize the spiritual, which is the deepest core and the real basis of the whole universe. Far deeper than any social, economic, or political readjustment, mankind is in need of a readjustment on the spiritual plane. The present crisis of the world is due to its purely secular pursuits, whether scientific or humanistic, both of which ignore the spiritual foundations of mankind.

Man has to be understood in his full stature, as well as in his essential nature. Neither the physical nor the psychological being of man exhausts him. He has a spiritual being too, which is one and common with all other beings. This spiritual essence is the innermost core of all manifestations in the universe, human or animal, plant or mineral. In their spiritual essence, all manifestations are one. On that basis, all are equal and have equal value. Differences of race, culture,
and the like are of only secondary importance. True reconstruction of humanity can take place only on that spiritual basis, which will ensure lasting peace and happiness for mankind.

Unfortunately, both science and humanism ignored this fundamental fact of the spirit, with the result that neither of them has been able to rescue humanity from the dangers facing it. The awareness of the spiritual oneness of mankind can help man to resolve the present conflicts. This awareness unites all human beings under one banner of love and fellowship, removing all sources of friction, fear, and hatred, unifies all endeavour, and aids in the realization of the one common goal of all mankind, viz. peace—peace built on the spiritual foundations of mankind.

Mankind should recover its faith in things spiritual. Science and humanism must work with a new spiritual vision and shed their secular character. It is then that these two powerful forces will find fulfilment and bring satisfaction to one and all. As it is, with all the gifts bestowed by science and humanism, man is still miserable; there is anguish in his soul; he is groping in the dark. He is on the look out for a saving faith which can bring him solace and satisfaction. There is a hunger in his soul for faith in spiritual values. The spiritual hunger cannot be satisfied either by science or by humanism. It can be quenched only by faith in spiritual values and by living a truly spiritual life. Nurtured for decades in the thought and atmosphere of science, mankind had forgotten to believe in the spiritual order of things. But, today, when it has arrived at the cross-roads, it is willing to believe. As Kingsley Martin says: 'Men and women are now unable to face the loneliness and aridity of the gospel of science, and therefore, though without any settled faith in religious dogmas, seek a personal religion to give them inner comfort. They do not believe, but they desire to believe. I see very clearly every day... that the will to believe cannot be overcome.'

Man must recover his faith and return to religion—which he has neglected under the influences of science and humanism. True religion is opposed neither to the end of science nor to the aim of humanism. They all want the happiness of man. While science and humanism seek to bring comfort to man at his physical level, religion goes beyond and brings solace to his mind and salvation to his soul. Science and humanism combined with faith in spiritual values would have become an unfailling source of peace and happiness to mankind. Lacking that faith, they have grown unrestrained, and are posing critical problems before humanity.

Blake said: 'Man must and will have some religion. If he has not the religion of Jesus, he will have the religion of Satan.' This is precisely what has happened in the realms of science and secularized humanism. Mankind is in despair today. A sense of spiritual homelessness is growing strong in the mind of man. It cannot continue for long. To live without faith is impossible. Even as nature abhors a vacuum, the soul of man has horror of emptiness. Man is feeling a spiritual insecurity under the aegis of modern secular pursuits. He longs to get back the security which religion provides him. He is in search of a rational faith, a religious message. We must present him with a religion that is 'distinctive, universally valid, sufficient, and authoritative, one that has an understanding of the fresh sense of truth and the awakened social passion... which does not mock the free spirit of man by arbitrary dogmas or hesitating negations, a new vision of God in whose name we can launch a crusade against the strange cults which are now competing for mastery over the souls of men' (Radhakrishnan, Recovery of Faith, p. 74). Vedânta offers a religion which fulfils all these conditions; it is rational and universal, non-dogmatic and all-comprehensive, intensely human and profoundly spiritual.
While discussing the viewpoint of the Brahma-Sūtra, it was suggested that the system of the Vedānta was really built for the first time by Śaṅkara on the lines indicated by Gauḍapāda. When we remember what supreme regard Śaṅkara had for scriptural authority, and how he was even prepared to discredit experience, if it came in conflict with Śruti, we must say that he, indeed, took a very bold step in trying to reconcile the apparently contradictory statements of Śruti, keeping, unlike the Buddhists, within the limits of orthodoxy. Even the Brahma-Sūtra explained away the contradictions by an appeal to Śruti. And we can say, without fear of contradiction, that it was only the Śaṅkara school of the Vedānta that did not blindly accept every bit of information supplied by Śruti, but took courage to apply reasoning with a view, perhaps, to establishing firmly the teachings of Śruti on a philosophical basis. Śaṅkara says: ‘When there are scriptural passages declaring the origin etc. of the world, inference, in so far as it does not conflict with these passages, is not forbidden as a means of confirming the meaning of these texts; and Śruti itself allows argumentation as an aid.’ As a true philosopher, he was obliged to apply the test of reasoning to the teachings of the scriptures without, however, contradicting them, and this probably led him to the extent of being ridiculed as a pseudo-Buddhist by the more orthodox schools. Thus Śaṅkara stands unique in the whole field of Indian philosophy, and his philosophy may rightly be styled as a rational philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

Śruti says: ‘That thou art.’ The individual soul (jīva) is declared to be perfectly identical with the absolute Brahman. And Śaṅkara takes Brahman as essentially nirguṇa (without any attribute), niṣkriya (without any activity or movement), nīravrayavva (without any part), nirupādika (unconditioned and absolute), and niroiṣesā (without any distinguishing element in It, a simple homogeneous entity). Even the words ‘sat’, ‘cit’, and ‘ānanda’, Śaṅkara says, do not imply any quality or differentiation in the Being of Brahman; what they simply mean is pure Being, pure Consciousness, and pure Blessedness, each implying the other. Now jīva is just the reverse of It. How could then jīva and Brahman be identical?

Again, the world—a flux—is said to have the selfsame Brahman as its cause, both material (upādāna) and efficient (nimitta). In what sense could the phenomenal world be spoken of as emanating from, subsisting in, and finally merging into the absolute Brahman? How could the non-relational Brahman be linked with the relational world (a world containing the individual jīvas as well)? Śaṅkara says that in no way could this impossibility be made possible. And ultimately, it must be held that the world is not, neither did it ever exist, nor will it exist in future. The only truly existing thing is Brahman, and all else is not. Again, what would be the meaning of Brahman’s sarvagatātva (complete pervasion)? When it is declared that Brahman pervades everything, does it not deny the existence of any other thing except Brahman? Complete pervasion by Brahman means that the so-called pervaded thing is a non-entity, for it cannot have any character or form apart from that of the pervading thing. To say that A is

1 See commentary on Brahma-Sūtra (B.S.), I.1.4; II.1.27.  
2 B.S., I.1.27.  
3 See commentary on B.S., I.1.2.  
4 See commentary on Taṇṭirīya, Brahnavali, I.  
5 See B.S., I.1.2; I.4.23.  
6 See the very first sentence of Śaṅkara’s commentary on B.S. The Mahāyānists also hold exactly the same view and confess their inability to demonstrate logically as to how the absolute ‘Thatness’ could ever become the conditional ‘Thisness’.  
7 See commentary on Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, I.17.
pervaded, in every bit of it, by B is tantamount to saying that A is the same as B. It would be sheer nonsense to say that A is different from B and is, at the same time, pervaded through and through by B.

Now, this negation of the world of time, space, and causality in the Being of Brahman, the ultimate Truth (paramārtha-satya), itself is an attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction between Śruti and experience. But any attempt at such reconciliation would be bringing down Śruti to the realm of logic. The importance of Śruti lies not in its rationality, but in its authority. If it were otherwise, there would have been no sense in accepting Śruti as an independent source of knowledge. In fact, Śruti supplies information about things which cannot be gathered by any other means, of knowledge, and therein lies its sole value. Yet, so long as we are what we are, i.e. slaves of rationality, the absolute self-sufficiency of Śruti can have little appeal to us, and a rational explanation of the contradictions becomes necessary.

It is needless to expose the shortcomings of the realists, idealists, and qualified monists of the East and West and to show the futility of their arguments to explain the relation of the Absolute and the empirical world. Śaṅkara's attempt at reconciliation of contradictions accepts, of course, the existence of the diversity with the unity tentatively. To explain how diversity comes from unity, we need not annul in the beginning diversity. We may accept it as it is, as a fact. But when we find it impossible to justify it as real, we come to the position of Śaṅkara.

There cannot be any true relationship between the Absolute and the phenomenal. Yet, when one is said to be the source or sub-stratum of the other, some kind of relation is certainly presumed. This relation Śaṅkara characterizes as adhyāsa. It is the principle of contradiction, contradiction between the self and the not-self, the ego and the non-ego, the subject and the object, the cause and the effect, Brahman, and the world. Contradictions are contradictions, and can never be reconciled. But all experience involves contradictions, and yet no experience would be possible unless and until they are somehow unified. Relation implies contradiction, and the non-relational is unknowable. Adhyāsa is therefore the principle that mysteriously unifies contradictions and is, as such, inexplicable and indefinable (anirvacanīya). In other words, it is the principle of identification of contradictions, or the principle that makes one thing appear as what it is not. One takes a rope for a snake—this is adhyāsa, superimposition of snakeness upon the rope. One takes Brahman to be jīva—this is adhyāsa. One takes Brahman to be the world—this is adhyāsa. Nay, one takes a (so-called) rope for a rope—this is also adhyāsa; for the thing-in-itself is unknown and unknowable, and the ropeness is only an aggregate of relations superimposed upon that. In reality, one cannot be the other, and there should be no superimposition. It is the inherent nature of man to make such unwarranted identification. This principle of adhyāsa is therefore such as has no reason to exist, and yet it is most indispensable for all human affairs. It is the law that regulates all our actions, all our movements; nay, it is the law that makes the world what it is.

Adhyāsa, Śaṅkara says, is practically the identification of truth with falsehood. In every perception, there is the identification of truth and falsehood. According to Śaṅkara, in every perception—subjective and objective—there is an identification of the subject and the object. But the subject, in reality, can never be the object. Now, identification of two mutually contradictory things can be possible only if one of them is false. If both of them are true, one can never be identified with the

---

8 See commentary on B.S., I.3.1.
9 Ibid., II.1.27.
10 See Introduction to commentary on B.S.
11 See commentary on Gītā, XII.26. The Mahāyānists also bring in the theory of ignorance for the same purpose.
12 See Introduction to commentary on B.S.
13 Ibid.; also commentary on B.S., I.4.3.
14 See Introduction to commentary on B.S.
15 See Vedāntaparībhāṣā, Pratyakṣa.
other. Neither can both of them be false, for, in that case, no perception would be possible. Now the subject (sākṣīn) cannot be false, for it persists in all the three states (waking, dreaming, and sleeping), whereas the object does not persist in all the three states, and has to depend entirely for its existence upon the subject. So the object must be held to be false.²⁶

An objection is raised that this definition of adhyāśa (identification of truth with falsehood) is inapplicable to jñānādhyāśa,²⁷ for, although there the object is false, yet the knowledge, being in the nature of the witness intelligence (sākṣī-caitanya), is certainly not so. In artha-dhyāśa, the true shell is identified with the false silver. But in jñānādhyāśa, the sākṣīn is conscious of its distinction from silver. The judgement is 'I know the silver', and not 'I am the silver'. Now, just as knowledge is not held to be false, if the object is true, so also should not the object be held to be false, when the knowledge is true. False knowledge (bhrama-jñāna) would be that where both the knowledge and the object are false. Bādha (sublation) also implies the falsity of both. Bādha is the ascertainment of falsehood of an anterior piece of knowledge by another subsequent one. The badhajñāna assumes the forms like, 'It is shell and not silver'; 'Falsely did silver appear so long'; 'The knowledge of silver was false'. This implies that both the knowledge and the object are detected to be false by the badhajñāna. So it is not proper to say that in adhyāśa there is identification of truth with falsehood.

To refute such objections, Śaṅkara further elucidates his definition by an explanatory sentence: 'Adhyāśa is the awareness, which is like memory, but not memory proper, of something previously experienced, upon a locus other than its own.'²⁸ Here Śaṅkara compares illusory perception with smṛti (remembrance), thereby indicating that even artha-dhyāśa is grounded on perception. The illusory object (say, silver) is produced synchronously with the perception, and this fact constitutes its illusoriness. So whether the adhyāśa be of perception-cum-object (jñānādhyāśa) or of object-cum-perception (artha-dhyāśa), 'the identification of truth with falsehood is always present.²⁹

Śaṅkara then refers to a few definitions of adhyāśa as given by other thinkers and concludes that everybody agrees that adhyāśa is superimposition of one thing upon another.³²

When adhyāśa is defined as the identification of the subject with the object, a serious question arises regarding the very possibility of such identification. It must be admitted that the subject and the object are opposed to each other like light and darkness. Consequently, one can never be identified with the other.³³ The identification of subject and object presupposes a knowledge of the two. But this knowledge cannot be valid, for it is the apprehension of something as other than what it is. Again, knowledge, by itself, is never denied. Even when an illusory perception is detected, nobody

²⁶Note in this connection the remarks of Nārāyana Sarasvati in his Vārttika (C.S.S.), Vol. I, p. 119.
²⁷Adhyāśa is called artha-dhyāśa when it is viewed objectively, and it is called jñānādhyāśa when viewed subjectively: one is the material aspect and the other is the epistemological aspect of adhyāśa.
²⁸The explanation of this simple definition of adhyāśa by later Advaitins aptly illustrates the excess to which they pushed their dialectics. One after another, no less than thirty explanations are offered, criticized, and rejected; and in the long list, the thirty-first explanation is found faultless and satisfactory. See Vārttika (C.S.S.), Vol. I, pp. 178 ff.
²⁹See Siddhāntalāsāṅgha, Šaṅkara-dhyāśa-vicāra.
³¹It may be noted in this connection that the Vārttikkākāra speaks of three kinds of illusion: (i) characterized as it is by perception; (ii) characterized as it is by ignorance; and (iii) characterized as it is partly by perception and partly by ignorance. The shell-silver illusion is an example of the first kind, inasmuch as the silver is produced synchronously with its perception. The phenomenal world is an illustration of the second kind of illusion, and inferential illusions illustrate the third kind.
³²For a detailed account, see Bhāmati.
³³See Introduction to commentary on B.S.; also Sarvaṇedānta-siddhānta-sāṅgha, 297, 497.
³⁴This opposition, however, is to be understood in the sense of incompatibility of two opposites being identified with each other, and not in the sense of their being incapable of occupying the same locus. See Vārttika (C.O.S.), p. 58.
can say that the perception itself did not occur. A piece of knowledge is said to be false only if the object be found to be so.\textsuperscript{24} Śaṅkara is fully aware of the fact that there cannot be any real identification of subject and object. He begins his great commentary on the Brahma-Sūtra by clearly pointing out this impossibility. His school knows it thoroughly well that adhyāśa can never be logically proved. Yet the entire Advaita philosophy is built on this fundamental theory of adhyāśa. The Advaitins are, in fact, jubilant to see that adhyāśa has no reasonableness to substantiate it.\textsuperscript{25} They make it perfectly clear that adhyāśa certainly does not stand logical scrutiny, yet its existence, as a fact of experience, can never be denied. To deny the possibility of adhyāśa would be betraying common experience. In fact, experience is nothing if it were not identification of the self with the non-self, although such identification is a logical anomaly.

Having thus examined the fact of adhyāśa, Śaṅkara points out that it is a product of ajñāna (ignorance).\textsuperscript{26} In fact, it is ajñāna or avidyā that makes one thing appear as another. That ajñāna is at the root of adhyāśa has been sought to be finally proved by Appayadikṣita in his Siddhāntaleśasāngraha (Chapter I). Of course, Śaṅkara does not discuss this point elaborately. He simply lays down the first principles of adhyāśa, and practically of ajñāna or avidyā, and these were thoroughly worked out by his successors. It should, however, be noted that his successors could hardly find out any new characteristic of ajñāna which he did not indicate. They simply sought to establish those very characteristics with logical precision. Śaṅkara’s main thesis was to show that the appearance of the world is merely an adhyāśa and is due to ajñāna. So he dealt with ajñāna only as much as was necessary for his purpose. His successors analysed and put the theory of adhyāśa, as laid down by Śaṅkara, in such a logical way as would meet the objections of the opponents of different systems of philosophy, and thereby brought forth the deep inner meaning and importance of his theory.

Here I note down the chief characteristics of ajñāna as given by Śaṅkara. I should make it clear, at the very outset, that Śaṅkara practically makes no distinction between ajñāna as a psychological principle and ajñāna as a metaphysical principle. With him, it is the selfsame principle, only looked at from different points of view. Consequently, he uses various terms to denote it. Thus in the Brahma-Sūtra-bhāṣya (I.4.3), he says that the terms ‘bijaśakti’, ‘avidyā’, ‘avayakta’, ‘ākāśa’, ‘aksara’, ‘māyā’, and ‘mahāsūṣṭy’ are synonymous. The terms used by him, besides the above, are ‘ajñāna’, ‘prakṛti’, ‘sakti’,\textsuperscript{27} ‘adhyāśa’, ‘samvṛti’,\textsuperscript{28} ‘iṣa’,\textsuperscript{29} ‘nāmarūpabijaśakti’, ‘bhūtasūkṣma’.\textsuperscript{30}

Śaṅkara thus defines avidyā or ajñāna: ‘Ajñāna is a positive principle, consisting of the three guṇas (sattva, rajas, and tamas). It cannot be determined either as real or as unreal. It can be destroyed only by true knowledge.’\textsuperscript{31}

‘Avidyā is an inexplicable non-reality. The Self is its locus as well as object. It is apprehended and made manifest by the Self. Just as darkness in the interior of a room is said to conceal the interior, so does avidyā veil the Self, immutable and consciousness per se, and project.’\textsuperscript{32}

‘Avidyā is to apprehend plurality, which is the essential characteristic of conditions.\textsuperscript{33} ‘Avidyā is that which presents plurality.’\textsuperscript{34}

Śaṅkara takes the world-appearance as an effect of ajñāna. But even an illusory appearance presupposes its previous experience. Now to regard all experiences as illusory—which

\textsuperscript{24} See Vārttika (C.O.S.), p. 82.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 98.
\textsuperscript{26} Sarvasvedānta-siddhānta-saṅgṛaha, 50, 299, 509.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 305.
\textsuperscript{28} See commentary on Māndūka-kārikā, IV.37. The objective world is here referred to by samvṛti, and the Buddhists also use the word in the same sense. See also Pañcapadikā on Adhyāśabhaśya.
\textsuperscript{29} Sarvasvedānta-siddhānta-saṅgṛaha, 311.
\textsuperscript{30} See commentary on B.S., I.2.12.
\textsuperscript{31} Sarvasvedānta-siddhānta-saṅgṛaha, 302; also ibid., 305, 307; commentary on B.S., II.2.27; Tattpa-pada, 51-52, 111.
\textsuperscript{32} Ajñānabodhi, 6.
\textsuperscript{33} See commentary on Katha, IV.10.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., IV.11.
Śaṅkara does—would make ajñāna beginningless.35

As to the locus (āśraya) and object (viśaya) of ajñāna, Śaṅkara maintains that the Self is both the locus and the object.36 Although ajñāna is located in Brahman, yet it must not be supposed that it is inherent in the nature of Brahman. ‘Avidyā is no natural attribute of Ātman, for, as knowledge increases, avidyā diminishes; and when knowledge is complete and universal, Selfhood is finally established. Avidyā altogether vanishes, just as the perception of snake in a piece of rope vanishes when the rope is known to be a rope. Hence avidyā is not an inherent quality of the Self; a natural attribute can never be destroyed.’37 And owing to this localization of avidyā upon Brahman, avidyā cannot effect any real change in the nature of Brahman, because it is itself by nature unreal.38

Most of the plausible objections raised by the non-Advaita thinkers against the principle of adhyāsa, Śaṅkara himself anticipated and met them in the following manner.

1. Objection: Adhyāsa is possible only on a known (prāsiddha) object; but Ātman, is held to be no object of knowledge.

Reply: Although Ātman, in its real nature, is never an object of knowledge, yet, in our consciousness, a general knowledge of Ātman is evident from the fact that ‘I am’. So it can be regarded as the ground of adhyāsa.39

2. Objection: Adhyāsa may be on the object visible in front of the person who makes the adhyāsa. But Ātman is not so visible; hence there cannot be any adhyāsa upon Ātman.

Reply: There is no fixed rule that adhyāsa must invariably be made on an object visible in front, for blueness, dirt, etc. are imputed to the invisible sky.40

3. Objection: Similarity is one of the causes of adhyāsa. A shell is mistaken for silver, for shell has some similarity with silver. But the pure Self bears no similarity with the impure world.

Reply: Similarity may be a condition in some cases of illusion, but it is no indispensable criterion of adhyāsa. When a white conch is mistaken as yellow, there is evidently no similarity. In fact, similarity is found in cases of empirical illusions only, but when adhyāsa is made on the unconditional (nirūpādhika) Self, the question of similarity cannot arise, for similarity pertains to conditions and attributes only.41 Yet, if insisted upon, some sort of similarity can be shown between the pure Ātman and antahkaranā, both being luminous due to sattvaguna.42

4. Objection: Ātman is said to be absolutely unaffected (kūṭasha). Who would then make the adhyāsa?

Reply: Although Ātman is really kūṭasha, yet it is to be supposed to be the maker of adhyāsa. It should be remembered that the inquirers into the maker of adhyāsa is legitimate only so long as we are thinking within the empirical plane. Beyond that plane, adhyāsa itself is false, and the question of its maker does not arise.43

5. Objection: If avidyā is said to be beginningless, how is it to be destroyed?

Reply: Although avidyā is beginningless, yet it vanishes, like a dream on awakening, as soon as knowledge dawns. Beginninglessness does not necessarily imply endlessness. Prior non-existence (prāgabhāva) is beginningless, and yet it ends with the production of the thing.44

While dealing with the views of Bādarāyaṇa on māyā and avidyā, I tried to show how Śaṅkara, in order to build a system of the Vedānta, had to interpret, in the light of the theory of avidyā, a large number of sūtras of the Brahma-Sūtra in which Bādarāyaṇa explicitly advocated

35See Introduction to commentary on B.S.; commentary on B.S., II.1.36; commentary on Gitā, XIII.19.
36Aṭṭhanabodhini, 6.
37See commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyaka, IV.3.20.
38Sarvavedānta-siddhānta-saṅgraha, 393, 464.
39Ibid., 475; also 472; Upaniṣadasthānī, I.51.
40See Introduction to commentary on B.S.; also see Sarvavedānta-siddhānta-saṅgraha, 478.
41Sarvavedānta-siddhānta-saṅgraha, 478-480.
42Ibid., 491-492. Note the series ātma-buddhiyam indraś-śāstra.
43See Upaniṣadasthānī, I.64 ff.; also commentary on Gitā, XIII.2.
44Tattvopadesa, 200-201.
the theory of transformation and the difference of jīva from Brahman. His attempt at reconciliation of the apparently contradictory statements of the Upaniṣads naturally led him to adopt the theory of avidyā as the only rational way of reconciliation. He argues thus: "The same thing cannot be conceived of as endowed with such qualities as agentship etc. and, at the same time, devoid of these. One of these must be false. And it is proper to admit the falsity of plurality, the object of habitual ignorance, on the authority of hundreds of Śruti texts, such as "When there is duality as it were" etc. On the other hand, the truth of oneness is proved by such texts as "It should be realized in one form only" etc."

Plurality being false, it must be admitted that, whenever Śruti speaks of the production of the world out of Brahman, it must be doing so keeping in view the fact of adhyāsa. Moreover, causality itself is inexplicable. For one asat (non-existent) cannot produce another asat, nor one asat can produce one sat (existent), nor one sat another sat (one pot does not produce another pot), nor one sat another asat. Even to say that the effect is merely a state of the cause and no new creation will also lead to contradiction, for to speak of the diversity of the world as a state of the ultimate sat would render the sat subject to modification; and modification is unthinkable in the sat, which is kūṭaṣṭha and niravayava (changeless and partless).

Śaṅkara, however, speaks of the world as a state of the cause only after ascribing imaginary parts to the sat. That parts are solely imaginary can be ascertained by such Śruti texts as, 'All modification is but name based upon words, and the clay alone is real', which prove that the only reality is sat and the so-called modifications are merely words without any reality.

In the Aitareya-bhāṣya, Śaṅkara offers apparently two explanations of creation: (i) Assuming causality as a fact, he says that the unmanifested names and forms (nāma-rūpa) are inherent in the Lord, and they become manifest and modified and form the material (upādāna) of the world. Here Śaṅkara apparently seems to accept the doctrine of modification. But when we remember that he regards names and forms as only superimposed on Brahman, which is the vivartopādāna, names and forms, having no reality of their own, do not disturb the absolute oneness of Brahman. Moreover, Śaṅkara regards all discourses on creation as mere arthāvīda (laudatory).

(ii) But Śaṅkara is not satisfied with this explanation, for he says that the very conception of causality is wrong. Hence a better explanation is that, just as a māyāvin creates things without any material, the great Lord creates the world. In other words, the creation is simply illusory and false. (Of course, the best explanation is offered by Gauḍapāda when he says that there is no creation at all.)

In explaining the text, 'He willed, let me be many' (Taittiriya, II.6), Śaṅkara remarks that the statement is made with reference to the names and forms that are to be manifested and not with reference to the One in itself, for the One is partless and therefore cannot multiply, just as the limitedness and multiplication of ākāśa are spoken of in respect of other things only. Now because there exists no other thing, past, present, or future; except Brahman, these names and forms must be spoken of as non-different from Brahman (ātmabhūta). And when names and forms are spoken of as ātmabhūta, they must not be understood to mean that Brahman is also of the nature of names and forms. These names and forms have no existence if Brahman is denied, and hence they are ātmabhūta of Brahman. So, in reality, the world is never produced, nor is it ever destroyed; it is merely an illusion. Even the term 'aja' (unborn) is not applicable to the ultimate Reality in a transcendental sense.

This is how Śaṅkara establishes his theory of avidyā and concludes that creation is impossible except through māyā or avidyā. This he

---

43 See commentary on Taittiriya, I.11; also commentary on B.S., I.3.1; IV.3.14.
44 See commentary on Taittiriya, II.5.
45 See commentary on Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, I.17; IV. 71; also commentary on Isā, 7.
46 See commentary on Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, IV.74.
makes sufficiently clear in his other works, especially in his commentary on the Māṇḍūkyakārīkā. ‘Advaita is neither produced nor destroyed. It is contradictory to say that the thing is advaita and, at the same time, attended by production and destruction. The conception of plurality is simply a superimposition upon the Ātman, just like snake upon a piece of rope.749 In the matter of the appearance of a rope as a snake, no other cause except ignorance can be found.80 Exactly the same is the case with the appearance of advaita as dvaita.

‘The Vedāntic statements of origination out of the supreme Ātman are like the statement of the origination of ghaṭākāśa (space within a pot) out of the mahākāśa (universal space). They do not mean real production.81

‘The unborn, unchangeable Reality, the Ātman, can have differentiation only through māyā, and never in reality.82

‘The Reality is absolute, inactive, and formless. No relationship with objects can be conceived of except through error, like that of the blueness of sky.83

While commenting on the Gitā, IV.6, Śaṅkara says that the birth of the Unborn is only illusory. He further shows that the Gitā, IV.13 unmistakably implies that the Lord’s kārtṛtvā is merely illusory.

81 Ibid., III.3.
82 Ibid., III.19.
83 Tattvopadeśa, 197. See also commentary on Māṇḍūkyakārīkā, III.10; III.14; III.23; commentary on Ītā, 1.4; commentary on Praśna, VI.2; commentary on Muṇḍaka, II.1.1; II.2.12.

MUSIC AND RELIGION—1

BY MR. JOHN M. SCHLENCK

I. THE AMORALITY OF MUSIC

Music, from one standpoint, is simply an instrument, like science; it may be utilized to uplift and ennoble human life, or to degrade and pervert it. Music has proven itself a very potent means for arousing all the various human passions, from the bestial to the spiritual. On the one hand, it may be very helpful in cultivating and intensifying religious feeling. From the earliest times, in nearly every society, music has been a helpmate to religion. On the other hand, it has often been used to stimulate collective egotism, raising warlike, chauvinistic feelings to a feverish pitch. Or again, as in the case of modern commercial music, it may be used to evoke a tawdry, erotic sentimentalism. Likewise, it can call forth valour, gaiety, depression, restlessness, intellectual amusement, confidence, hopelessness, or any other state of mind. We need not go into the question here of whether there is any absolute correspondence between particular sounds and particular feelings. The fact remains that all these various mental states are aroused by music.

Music has a tremendous power to idealize whatever feeling it expresses. Philosophically, this may or may not indicate an intuition of the religious realization that the divine exists behind and within all phenomena, both good and evil. But in practical life, it constitutes a danger. Such idealization may act as a moral sedative, making what is base and ignoble seem beautiful and legitimate; making the commonplace and mundane seem glorious and profound; or giving the illusion of permanent value to what is transient and perishable. For example, the major part of American popular music is devoted to the glorification of sex love. This helps to nurture in the popular mind the delusion that such love is the sumnum bonum.
of human life. But popular music is not alone at fault. Sensuality runs rampant in a great deal of serious Western music, as well.

In effect, any work of art is an idealization of human experience and perception. Art formally sublimates and unifies human life and experience. It does not alter its intrinsic character. Not that through art we see everything with rose-coloured glasses; but even the degrading, the disgusting, the cruel, the hopeless may be made to seem tolerable and even glorious when beautifully expressed through an art form. The beauty with which it is executed obscures the value of the thing represented. Impure food becomes palatable to us when it is served on a silver platter, well cooked and attractively arranged.

Those who preach 'Art for art's sake' will declare that, if our attention is fixed upon the skill, the insight with which a work of art has been created, the moral value of the subject-matter cannot influence us, and is of no importance. This is an unnatural attempt to disintegrate and compartmentalize human experience. And even if this attitude were desirable, it is doubtful whether it can be successfully put into practice. Although we may discriminate in this way with our conscious minds, the total impression will be stored in the subconscious mind, and so influence our character.

Abstract or 'absolute' music admittedly avoids this danger. And it has the capacity to lift the mind temporarily out of the mire of gross sensuality. However, for most persons, it is simply a refined form of sense and intellectual pleasure, and is usually conceived as an end in itself; whereas the best religious music or music expressing a noble ideal or experience can and does have a genuinely spiritualizing influence. Such music is intentionally a means to something beyond itself, and is integrally related to life.

It is perhaps well to recognize that the musical faculty is, by itself, amoral. It is not necessarily a force for good in human life. It is passive, pliable, ready to be taken advantage of. This is not to say that its utilization for various purposes is always, or even usually, conscious and deliberate. It is more often a spontaneous expression of feeling and experience. But we cannot deny that its effect is to intensify all the emotions, and only in certain particular cases, to sublimate them. Sublimation is more apt to occur in the mind of the musician than in the mind of the listener, since direct participation involves greater concentration of thought and feeling. But the effect would seem to be only temporary: there is no evidence that musicians as a group are ethically more advanced than the social average. Some of the finest musicians are ‘full of egoism, vanity, lust, wrath, and consciousness of power’.

This is admittedly the dark side of the picture. But there has been so much vague and flowery sentimentalism about the glory of music that one feels the need for setting forth a few unadorned facts. As we delve more deeply into our problem, we shall see that, beneath this indifferent exterior, there is a vital relationship between honest musical endeavour and spiritual growth.

II. THE SUPRAMORALITY OF RELIGION

In the larger sense, all life, all evolution, from the amino acid to the God-man, may be viewed as spiritual aspiration, conscious or unconscious. As Swami Vivekananda said so beautifully: ‘That voice has been heard by everyone, whether he knows it or not, that voice which declares: “Come unto Me all ye that labour and are heavy laden.” . . . We are all rushing towards freedom, we are all following that voice, whether we know it or not. . . . Not only the human soul, but all creatures from the lowest to the highest have heard the voice and are rushing towards it; and in the struggle are either combining with each other, or pushing each other out of the way. Thus come competition, joys, struggles, life, pleasure, and death, and the whole universe is nothing but the result of this mad struggle to reach the voice.’

Indeed, what else can explain this phenomenon

1 Complete Works, Vol. II. p. 126.
of evolution but the struggle of involved consciousness to free itself from the bondage of matter?

As the evolving soul nears the threshold of conscious spiritual striving, the subjective pace of life accelerates rapidly—perceptions are quickened, experience becomes more and more intense, moods plunge and soar to extremes, a sense of crisis and desperation pervades the mental atmosphere. The soul is thrashing out in all directions, as it were, trying to break through the barrier: to know the meaning of life. At this stage, the soul may try to find fulfillment through art, or philosophy, or fighting for a cause, or intense human attachments, or travel, or non-conformity, or various gross and refined sense pleasures, or any combination of these. To the average person, such torment ed souls may seem at best peculiars, at worst morally depraved, and in any case not very spiritual. But, actually, spiritual evolution involves much more than nice outward behaviour. To quote Swami Vivekananda again: 'Stones and trees neither break the law, but stones and trees remain.' If honest atheism is better than lukewarm devotion, may not moral rebellion be superior to unthinking conformity?

The fact that many musicians, like other artists, are social and moral rebels does not mean that music bears no relationship to spirituality. This very rebellion is an aspect of spiritual striving, in the larger sense of the term. At that level, it is blind, without proper direction; but given time, that impulse will develop and find its right application: in the spiritual rebellion against the tyranny of nature. The numerous examples of sinner-turned-saint prove that it is often impossible to judge a man's spiritual ripeness from the standpoint of conventional morality. But in such persons, we can detect other qualities—such as intense desire to know the meaning of life, boldness to put into practice whatever they believe will lead them towards reality, uncommon sensitivity to beauty, great capacity for love, genuine sympathy for the sufferings of others, and so on—which may indicate how near they are to spiritual unfoldment.

Certainly, ethical discipline is absolutely necessary for the deliberate cultivation of religious life. But it is not the only vital factor. Aesthetic sensibility is also of no mean importance. Swami Vivekananda once said: 'The artistic faculty was highly developed in our Lord, Sri Ramakrishna, and he used to say that without this faculty none can be truly spiritual.' And although the intellect cannot give us direct access to spiritual truth, it also has a vital function in religious striving—the function of discrimination, control, and proper direction. Indeed, religion must utilize, integrate, and sublimate all the aspects of man's being, if it is to reach fruition. And only if this fruition occurs, can human life reach fulfilment.

But before spiritual striving becomes conscious and deliberate, the personality is more or less non-integrated. There is as yet no single rallying point around which all facets of one's character can gather. Art cannot make one ethical; an ethical code cannot inspire genuine love; love without reason is blind; reason without feeling is sterile; and so on. Without some deeper, all-embracing motivation in life, each element of the personality will seek fulfilment by and for itself, more or less exclusive of, or even at the expense of, the other elements. At best, a precarious balance can be maintained. At worst, there is outright war and ensuing disintegration. We should like to suggest that this applies to societies as well as individuals.

Religion alone can truly integrate man's life, individual or social. If, as we said before, art is the formal sublimation and unification of human life, religion is its essential sublimation and unification. As Dr. Radhakrishnan says: 'Here we find the essence of religion, which is a synthetic realization of life. The religious man has the knowledge that everything is significant, the feeling that there is harmony underneath the conflicts, and the power to realize the significance and the harmony. He traces the values of truth, goodness, and beauty to a

---

Ibid., Vol. IV. p. 321.

Ibid., Vol. V. p. 186.
common background, God, the holy, who is both without and within us. The truth we discern, the beauty we feel, and the good we strive after is the God we apprehend as believers. While art or beauty or goodness in isolation may not generate religious insight, in their intimate fusion they lead us to something greater than themselves. The religious man lives in a new world, which fills his mind with light, his heart with joy, and his soul with love.  

III. MUSIC AND CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT

Whether or not the personality is integrated, some aspects will be more prominent than others, according to individual temperament and experience. And the soul, in its struggle for freedom, tries to work its way through whatever channels are available to it. In some persons, the musical faculty is the most highly sensitive aspect of the mind. It therefore becomes the most promising path for the soul in its upward journey. Other aspects of the personality may lag behind awhile, and true integration will not be possible unless and until spiritual striving becomes conscious. But the spirit gradually melts through nature, as it were; and its warming effect on one aspect of a man's life cannot but have some influence on the whole of his being. Few of us are outright schizophranics. And when the musical impulse is strong in a man, it becomes the dominant factor of his personality; and so the spirit, working through it, becomes all the more revealed.

Music has served as the focal point in the lives of many individuals, and as such has inspired some of the qualities important to religious life. Let us see what these qualities are.

As we indicated before, aesthetic sensibility itself is an important factor in spiritual growth. The love of beauty and the striving to attain it; the ordering of our experiences into a meaningful and coherent unity; the sense of direction and inner growth; the sublimation of our emotions—all these, as we can readily see, are aspects of spiritual striving.

Then, there is the struggle for perfection, which is a part of any serious artistic endeavor. This struggle requires intense self-discipline. The regular daily practice required in musical training develops patience and perseverance, helps overcome lethargy and restlessness, and necessitates some disregard of physical comfort and the fluctuations of bodily health. And the mind is lifted, even if only temporarily, above ordinary material pursuits, above bread and butter, television and automobile values.

Musical practice involves the direction and discipline of both the intellect and the emotions, both the mind and the body. The musician must develop the power to fix his mind and change his mood at will, according to the demands of the music. At the same time, the body must be a completely submissive and coordinated instrument—an appendage, as it were, of the mind.

The discipline in music has perhaps greater immediacy and requires greater concentration than in the graphic arts, because music has its existence in the time domain. A painter or sculptor can stand back and look at his creation and decide at his leisure how to improve it. Whereas in music perfection must come at a given moment, if it is to come at all. From this standpoint, the composer is more akin to the painter than to the performer, as he, too, may take his time (if he is not meeting a deadline!) in perfecting his score. This applies to Western music, where there is division of labour. In India, composing and performing are combined, which would seem to require even greater concentration. One might say that this is true of certain areas in Western music also, such as jazz. However, the discipline in classical Indian improvisation appears to this observer to be much more rigorous than in jazz, which emphasizes spontaneity (intuition or instinct?)! In any case, there is the struggle for an ideal, the struggle for perfection.

But perfection is like a will-o’-the-wisp—

---

every great artist, in whatever dimension he works, comes sooner or later to realize that it is not completely attainable. Nevertheless, there is something within, which impels the artist to continue to strive for it, even if he knows that it is not objectively attainable. Is this not a marvellous example of ‘moral gymnastics’?

Of course, real greatness in music depends upon something beyond mere brilliance of technique, even beyond keen aesthetic discrimination. We shall return to this later.

This character development, which comes through serious musical endeavour, can serve as a valuable preparation for spiritual life, as can be easily seen. Habits of regular daily practice, patience and perseverance, striving for an ideal, for perfection, for beauty, etc.—all these qualities are necessary in religious life.

However, they are not the only requisite elements. This becomes painfully clear, as we study the lives of the great musicians. For one thing, many have been victims of egotism and self-centredness—‘My art, my career, my gift to humanity, my sensitiveness, and everyone else’s callousness, etc.’ Then, the line between subtle and gross sense pleasures is often difficult to trace. An artist is naturally susceptible to beautiful forms, sounds, colours—he would not be an artist if he were not. But without some extra-aesthetic discipline to keep these susceptibilities in hand, he may go astray. Other pitfalls are the desires for name and fame, power and wealth, which sometimes crop up, unawares.

So it would seem that, valuable as musical training and practice can be for spiritual development, it must be supplemented by ethical discipline, if all-round progress is to be insured.

IV. MUSIC AS WORSHIP

In the last section, we discussed how musical endeavour can serve as a preparation for spiritual life. Now, let us see to what extent music can be deliberately utilized as a form of spiritual practice.

In a letter to an American lady, Swami Vivekananda wrote: ‘Music is the highest art, and to those who understand, is the highest worship.’ He elucidates further in another passage: ‘The greatest aid to this practice of keeping God in memory is, perhaps, music. The Lord says to Nārada, the great teacher of bhakti: “I do not live in heaven, nor do I live in the heart of the yogi, but where my devotees sing My praise, there am I.” Music has such tremendous power over the human mind; it brings it to concentration in a moment.’

Christianity also, from the earliest times, has recognized and utilized the power of music. This manifested itself first in the community singing of psalms and other Biblical songs. (Deriving as it did from the Jewish tradition of congregational worship, religious singing in the West has almost always been a group activity, whether monastic or lay.) Around the year A.D. 600, a large body of chants which had accumulated over the centuries was standardized and authorized by St. Gregory. Gregorian chant ‘follows the phrasing, the emphasis, and the natural inflections of the voice in reciting the text, at the same time that it idealizes them. It is a sort of heightened form of speech, a musical declamation, having for its object the intensifying of the emotional powers of ordinary spoken language.’ From the basis of these chants, there ensued a slow but wonderful development of religious music, culminating in the sublime masses and motets of Palestrina and Victoria in the late sixteenth century.

It is interesting to note the personal philosophy and intense devotion of these two men. Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina (1525?-1594), though a householder, energetically dedicated his musical ability to the service of God. In dedicating his first book of motets, he writes: ‘Music exerts a great influence on the minds of mankind, and is intended not only to cheer these, but also to guide and control them...

The sharper blame, therefore, do those deserve who misemploy so great and splendid a gift of God in light or unworthy things.\(^8\) Tomas Luis de Victoria (1548-1611), born in the same diocese as St. Teresa of Avila, was an ordained priest. He spent much of his life in Italy, and for five years was in intimate association with St. Philip Neri.\(^9\) He prefaced one of his works with the following conviction: ‘Many evil and depraved men abuse music as an excitan in order to plunge into earthly delights, instead of raising themselves by means of it to the contemplation of God and divine things. The art of song should be entirely devoted to the end and aim for which it was originally intended, namely, to the praise and honour of God’\(^{10}\) (italics ours). We can see that both of them regarded music as a means to spiritual attainment.

Shortly before this, the Protestant Reformation had provided a new spur to religious music, particularly in Germany. Luther's own musical ability and taste were in no small way responsible for this. Unlike some other reformers, he strongly encouraged the use of music in religious services, himself selecting and adapting many of the melodies to be used. He said: ‘I would willingly see all the arts, especially music, in the service of Him who has given and created them.’\(^{11}\) This new wave of religious music crested in the glorious cantatas, passions, and Mass of Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750). Writing of Bach, Albert Schweitzer says: ‘Music is an act of worship with Bach. His artistic activity and his personality are both based on his piety.... For him art was religion, and so had no concern with the world or with worldly success.’\(^{12}\) ‘In his innermost essence, he belongs to the history of German mysticism.... His whole thought was transfigured by a wonderful, serene longing for death. Again and again, whenever the text affords the least pretext for it, he gives voice to this longing in his music.’\(^{13}\)

The fact that, since Bach, no major Western composer has devoted the larger part of his energy to religious music bears eloquent testimony to the growing secularization of Western civilization. However, a number of later composers have been personally religious, even if most of their music has been expressed through abstract forms. And, of course, spirituality is not necessarily confined to the established Churches.

Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827) was nominally a Catholic, but as one of his biographers writes: ‘His conviction was probably better expressed in the mystical sentences he was fond of copying down from Eastern literature. Such phrases as “I am that which is, I am all that was, that is, and that shall be”, part of a creed that Beethoven copied out in his own handwriting and kept permanently framed on his desk, probably expressed better... Beethoven’s intuitions.’\(^{14}\) Indian thought was just beginning to make itself felt in Germany at that time.

We do not know for sure what was the degree of Beethoven’s spiritual realization. Many people believe that his later works (the last piano sonatas, the Missa Solemnis, the Ninth Symphony, and the last string quartets) constitute the greatest spiritual treasure in Western music. Some authorities, notably J. W. N. Sullivan, are of the opinion that one or two of these works were inspired by superconscious experiences. Romain Rolland writes that Beethoven exulted in ‘a conscious feeling of the God within’,\(^{15}\) that he ‘tasted perfect Joy’.\(^{16}\) Admittedly, we are a bit disappointed when we examine Beethoven's life. Even after writing the compositions which are believed to embody spiritual experiences, his words and

---

\(^8\) Mason, Beethoven and His Forerunners, p. 64.
\(^9\) Palestrina also knew this saint.
\(^{10}\) Lyricheord disc L146.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 167.

---

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 167.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 47.
actions are not those of a saint. If he had a mystical vision, it would seem that he stumbled upon it, and, because of inadequate preparation, was unable to make it a permanent possession. As Swami Brahmananda once said: 'If you do not keep up a regular spiritual struggle, you will not be able to hold It, when It comes.'

But even if Beethoven did not deliberately do spiritual practices, his intense one-pointed absorption in his art could be considered as spontaneous karma-yoga. In addition, he experienced what we might call the 'yoga of grief'. His deafness and inability to work out happy human relationships caused him profound sorrow and loneliness, which in his case had a purifying effect. And it seems he even came 'to realize that his creative energy, which he at one time opposed to his destiny, in reality owed its very life to that destiny. ... To be willing to suffer in order to create is one thing; to realize that one's creation necessitates one's suffering, that suffering is one of the greatest of God's gifts, is almost to reach a mystical solution of the problem of evil.'

Beethoven himself coined the motto: 'Joy through suffering.'

With the possible exception of Beethoven, we do not know of any musicians in the West who have had God-realization. But then, God-realization is not an everyday occurrence in any occupational group. And as we have seen, there is no doubt that music may be used to spiritual advantage in various ways.

There are several possible spiritual attitudes which a musician may take up in regard to his work, corresponding to the different forms of karma-yoga. First of all, there is work for the work's sake, following the law of one's own nature, doing the work to the best of one's ability, renouncing all attachment to the results, all desire for the fruits. Beethoven probably best fits into this category. Many musicians do this unconsciously, to a greater or lesser extent. Perhaps, the most difficult thing here is the renunciation of the fruits, name and fame in particular. Few hope to amass a fortune through music, especially nowadays. But the lure of the applauding crowd does draw some. Most simply follow the law of their own nature: a strong musical talent. And as we said before, striving for perfection is an intrinsic part of any serious artistic endeavour. A spiritual aspirant can deliberately strive to follow this path, and will be that much ahead of those who work from mixed motives.

Secondly, a musician may do his work as an act of devotion to God. Bach is an example of this approach. He did not reflect, writes Schweitzer, 'whether they (musicians) could perform his works properly, or whether the congregation understood them. He had put all his devotion into them, and God at any rate certainly understood them. The S. D. G. (Soli Deo Gloria, 'to God alone be praise') and the J. J. (Jesu juva, 'Help me Jesus!'), with which he garnishes his scores, are for him no formulas, but the Credo that runs through all his work.'

The third possible attitude—service to the 'living God', worship of the God in man, as taught by Swami Vivekananda—has yet to be worked out fully in regard to music, as far as we know. There are hints of it in Palestrina and Victoria, in that they intentionally wrote music which could be of spiritual help to devotees. There is also an indication of it in one or two of Beethoven's utterances.

Music might also be thought of in connection with raja-yoga—as a means of developing concentration, one-pointedness of mind. As we said before, this happens unconsciously to a certain extent with all musicians. We have heard that there are some in India who have deliberately utilized music in this way.

For the spiritual aspirant who is not a

---

11 Vedanta and the West, No. 142, p. 79.
13 Rolland, Beethoven, p. 54.
15 See Sullivan, Beethoven: His Spiritual Development, p. 4.
musician, music is most generally used in connection with bhakti-yoga—as a means to stimulate devotional fervour. This is too widely known and successfully practised to need further comment. It is more difficult to see how music can be related to jñāna-yoga, although the highest music might be regarded as a form of pure ‘food’ for the mind.

(To be continued)

THE NATURE OF GOOD

By Sri Suresh Chandra

It is generally believed by philosophers that, to understand the nature of good, we have to see how the word ‘good’ is used in the ethical sentences, such as ‘philanthropy is good’ or ‘Rāma is a good boy’, i.e. to attempt an analysis or explanation of our usage of the word ‘good’. Various philosophical theories about the nature of good are based on such an analysis and explanation. The judgements expressed by these theories are themselves not ethical judgements, they are meta-ethical judgements. They are obtained as a result of analysis and explanation of the ordinary ethical judgements.

Though in this discussion we shall use some meta-ethical judgements, our method of understanding the nature of good is different from that of other philosophers. Instead of giving a new theory or adding one more explanation to the stock of already existing explanations, we would like to examine an existing theory and to see whether that theory is consistent with the facts as they are given to us. Therefore we have selected for our present discussion the theory of good advocated by G. E. Moore in his famous book Principia Ethica.

This book is not merely an outstanding contribution to ethical philosophy, but to contemporary philosophy in general. There is hardly a corner of the philosophical world which has not been stimulated by the arguments of this book. Hence we cannot be sure whether the objections raised against Moore, in the course of this discussion, have not already been raised by some other philosophers in a different language or even in a similar language. But it is worth while to consider them, even if they have already been expressed by some other philosophers.

Moore’s theory of good has been described by various epithets, such as ‘non-naturalism’, ‘intuitionism’, ‘absolutism’, ‘ideal utilitarianism’, and ‘realism’. These epithets describe its character in its various aspects. We shall avoid here the discussion of Moore’s utilitarian assertions, such as ‘obligation is definable in terms of goodness’. Such assertions form a necessary part of the discussion as to the nature of ‘ought’ or ‘obligation’, but not as to the nature of ‘good’. We are concerned here exclusively with his analytic assertions as to the nature of ‘good’, whether these assertions are consistent with how we, as a matter of fact, use ‘good’ in our ordinary ethical sentences.

According to Moore, the word ‘good’ plays in language the same role that is played by the word ‘yellow’. The logic of an ethical judgement containing ‘good’ as its element, namely, ‘this is good’, is similar to the logic of an empirical statement containing ‘yellow’ as its element, namely, ‘this is yellow’. ‘Good’, like ‘yellow’, is used as the name of a simple quality with which definitions are composed, without itself being able to be defined. What is definable and analysable is ‘the good’, that which possesses goodness, but not ‘good’ itself. The case is analogous to our use of the word ‘yellow’. We can define and analyse an object which is yellow, but not yellow itself. The
only difference in 'good' and 'yellow' is that the former refers to a 'non-natural' quality, whereas the latter to a 'natural' quality of objects. When Moore says that 'good' and 'yellow' are indefinable and unanalysable, he is using the terms 'definition' and 'analysis' in such a sense that only complex objects such as 'book', 'table', 'good conduct', 'beautiful flower', etc. are definable and analysable.

So if an opponent argues against Moore that simple objects, such as 'good' and 'yellow', can also have their definitions and analyses, Moore's position remains unaffected, unless the opponent uses the terms 'definition' and 'analysis' in the same sense in which Moore himself uses them. Most of the objections raised by the opponents of Moore on this issue are based on the fact that they have given different meanings to the terms 'definition' and 'analysis' from what Moore means by these terms, and therefore these objections are logically pointless, and fail to disprove Moore's view. It is impossible to disprove the view of Moore on this ground, because it is a matter of self-determined definitions of words. Moore does not deny that there may be some sense of the word 'definition' or 'analysis' in which simple objects can be defined or analysed. What he says is simply that there is also a sense in which simple objects cannot be defined or analysed; and in his book, he is concerned only with this sense of the term.

We do not object against Moore's position, when he says that good cannot be defined and analysed. Where we object is his assertion that the word 'good' refers to a simple non-natural quality and that the quality to which it refers cannot be conceived apart from the object which possesses it. While describing the nature of good, Moore, in his book, does not simply maintain that the word 'good' refers to a simple non-natural quality, but he also explicitly maintains that 'good' is such a quality which cannot be conceived apart from the object which possesses it. It is this assertion of Moore which has been criticized by philosophers like C. D. Broad. But our criticism is based on a different ground. In the case of natural qualities, such as 'yellow', 'red', etc., we can conceive them apart from the object which possesses them. We can independently conceive a 'yellow patch of colour', in the same way in which we, as a matter of fact, dependently conceive a yellow patch of colour as the surface of a material object. But Moore denies the possibility of such a conception in the case of value qualities in general.

Moore's view that there are objective value qualities, as there are objective empirical qualities, is based on his metaphysical belief that the universe is not a mere system of existential or spatial entities, that it is a system of both the existential and the subsistent or non-spatial entities, and that the existential entities are copresent with the subsistent entities. The value qualities like good do not exist or occupy space, they subsist or merely have being. 'Being' has a wider meaning than 'existence'. But it seems to be beyond our power to apprehend how a non-spatial something is related to a spatial something, or what sort of 'togetherness' is expressed by a non-natural quality when it is together with a natural quality. It also seems to be absurd to talk about something attached to something else, and also to talk that that something cannot be conceived apart from that something else, unless one is using language merely metaphorically.

No doubt, in ordinary language, for example, referring to two persons generally seen together, we sometimes say that they cannot be conceived apart from each other, but this is merely a metaphorical use of language. If something can be conceived with or as a part of something else, then it can also be conceived without or apart from that thing. If a thing cannot be conceived apart from the other, then it cannot also be conceived as a part of the other. To say that good cannot be conceived apart from the object which is good produces doubt whether it can at all be conceived as a part of the object which is good. For good, which is a quality of an object or is possessed
by the object, is not itself the object which possesses it. To think that ‘good’ and ‘the object which is good’ are the same is to commit the naturalistic fallacy, as Moore himself would say, which is to identify the words which have different meanings. If good and the object which is good are different, how can it be true to say that one cannot be conceived apart from the other? When they are different, they can differently be conceived. But if they are not different, then Moore’s famous invention ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ has no sense.

Our objection may not seem to be applicable to those who do not maintain the distinction of ‘good’ and ‘that which is good’. For example, some one may find it meaningful to say such a thing as ‘God is goodness itself’, i.e. he may not maintain the distinction of ‘good’ and ‘that which is good’. Such a man can rightly maintain that good cannot be conceived apart from the object which is good. But Moore’s view is open to our objections, because he would think it fallacious to maintain that good and the object which is good are the same.

Moore seems to have dissolved the distinction of ‘value’ and ‘fact’ by his belief that value words name qualities. To think that value words are used as names of qualities is to believe that the sentences in which value words are used are descriptive rather than expressive and normative. The distinction of ‘value’ and ‘fact’ is such that the sentences of value are of logically different kind from those of the sentences of fact. Their grammatical similarity cannot be a reason to think that they are also logically similar. The sentences of value are normative and expressive, whereas the sentences of fact are descriptive. For example, to say ‘this is wrong’ is not to describe the object referred by the word ‘this’; it is partly to express one’s anti-attitude towards the thing referred and partly to command others not to do that thing. It is in this sense that sentences of value may be called normative and expressive. But this is not the case with the sentences of fact. To say ‘this is yellow’ is neither to express one’s pro- or anti-attitude towards the object referred by the word ‘this’, nor to command to do or to refrain from doing that thing. The sentence, this is ‘yellow’, describes the nature of ‘this’, whereas the sentence ‘this is wrong’ merely expresses one’s attitude and sets up a norm.

Now, to believe that value words stand for qualities is to believe that the sentences of value are descriptive rather than normative and expressive. They may be of a different kind than the sentences of empirical sciences, but their descriptive significance cannot be denied, since they do describe some facts, the facts of non-natural variety. To maintain the distinction of value and fact, Moore, in his paper on ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’ (philosophical Studies), denies that value predicates are descriptive. He says: ‘Intrinsic properties seem to describe the nature of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value never do. If you could enumerate all the intrinsic properties a given thing possessed, you would have given a complete description of it, and would not need to mention any predicates of value it possessed; whereas no description of a given thing could be complete which omitted any intrinsic property.’ By intrinsic properties, Moore means empirical properties, such as ‘red’ and ‘yellow’. By this remark, it becomes clear that Moore thinks that the distinction of value and fact is such that value predicates are not descriptive in the sense in which empirical or intrinsic qualities are descriptive.

But if naming is a form of describing, then to use the name of good in connection with an object is to describe it. When we describe an object, we name its qualities; and if an ethical word names a quality, its use in a sentence must be descriptive. It seems to be inconsistent to maintain that an ethical word names a quality of an object, but it does not describe it. The inconsistency is of the same sort as we have discussed above, when Moore says that good is different from that which is good and still maintains that it cannot be conceived apart from that which is good. The very supposition that good is the name of a quality dissolves the
distinction of value and fact. Moore’s merely not using the word ‘description’ for a value word, or even his open denial to use it in this sense, does not imply that in spirit he does not mean that a value word or sentence is descriptive. The proposition that good is the name of a quality of an object entails the proposition that it describes that object. If Moore does not want to use the word ‘description’ for a value predicate, then he is logically driven to abandon both—that it names a quality and that it is a simple object of thought out of which definitions are composed. One cannot kill two birds with one stone.

The categories like ‘fact’, ‘description’, ‘true’, ‘assertion’, etc. are not applicable to the notion of value. The belief that value is a fact or a quality—whether natural or non-natural makes no difference—implies that the notion of value has not been given its proper unique sense. Moore’s non-naturalism is as much a fallacious view as is the view of those whom Moore brands as naturalists. A naturalist dissolves the distinction of value and fact by analysing a value judgement in terms of factual or descriptively statements. In so far as Moore points out that a naturalist is mistaken in his supposition that value sentences can be analysed in terms of factual sentences, he is absolutely right. But Moore’s own view has lost the value character of a value sentence through a different way. Moore thinks that the word ‘good’ means a quality in its characteristic ethical sense, but we think, if it means a quality, then the word ‘good’ has not been used in its characteristic ethical sense. We do not disagree on the issue that ‘good’ may have various meanings, and it is only in some particular meaning that its use can be called a genuine ethical use. Where we disagree is that, when the ‘codified ethical word’ like ‘good’ is used as the name of a quality, it is ethically used. If one uses the word ‘good’ as an assertion of a quality, then he is not using it as an ethical term, because the normative and expressive content is absent from such an usage. No word can be described to express an ethical term, unless it also implies normative and expressive content.

If ‘X is good’ means ‘X has the property goodness’, then it has not been used in the sense that ‘X should be promoted’, i.e. it has not been used in its normative sense. It is paradoxical to say that ‘X is good’ in its characteristic ethical sense is just like saying ‘X is yellow’. Our saying ‘X is yellow’ does not imply that ‘X should be produced or promoted’, which is an example of asserting a quality. In the same way, if the word ‘good’ names a quality, then our saying ‘X is good’ does not imply that ‘X should be produced or promoted, or that it should be the object of choice and action’. In the predication of a quality to ‘X’, whether the quality predicated is natural or non-natural, it is not written that ‘X’ should be an object of preference and approval. But the use of an ethical word like ‘good’ in connection with an object must imply that the object in question should be preferred, approved, and promoted, that it should be an object of choice and action. All codified words of ethics, such as ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘evil’, etc., lose their normative and expressive character if they are treated as names of qualities. It is fallacious to maintain like Moore that the word ‘good’, in its characteristic ethical sense, means a quality, because it means to say that, in its characteristic ethical sense, it does not have normative and expressive implications.

Our judgement that moral terms are normative and expressive may be disputed on the ground that, as a matter of fact, we sometimes use moral terms like ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ to describe the objects possessing them. So it may seem to be a mistaken claim to say that moral terms are not descriptive. But the objection is based on a mistake. When we say that moral terms are not descriptive, or that they are normative and expressive, we do not mean that the codified words, which generally express moral terms, cannot be used for descriptive purposes. The words like ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ are codified words, which generally express moral terms. We do not deny that they may not sometimes express moral terms, or they may
not be sometimes used in the normative and
descriptive sense. Ayer rightly says: 'The ethical
terms can also be given a descriptive meaning,
but it is not qua descriptive that they are
ethical. If, for example, the word “wrong” is
simply equated with “not conducive to happi-
ness”, some other term will be needed to carry
the normative implication that the conduct of
this sort is to be avoided' (On Analysis of
Moral Judgements). Ayer rightly thinks that
it is only in the non-descriptive or normative
sense that the use of the word ‘wrong’ can be
called its ethical use. And we think, if the
word ‘wrong’ is used as a symbol which names
a quality, as Moore has done in the case of
‘good’, the difficulty remains the same. If the
word ‘wrong’ denotes a quality of some sort,
we have still to search some other word, or the
other senses and uses of the same word, to
denote that the conduct of this sort is to be
avoided.

It is clear when a particular word of
language, be that ‘good’ or ‘yellow’, refers to
a quality, then there does not lie any value in
its usage, because in such an use of a word,
there is no reference to our actions, attitudes,
choices, and preferences. A naturalist explains
away the sense of value by asserting that an
ethical judgement can be translated into dif-
f erent statements of fact, whereas Moore ex-
plains away its value by asserting that an
ethical judgement is itself a statement of fact.
In whatever way an ethical judgement is be-
lieved to be a statement of fact, it is not an
expression of value. The analysis and ex-
planation of good given by Moore is no less
fallacious than the analysis given by his
opponents, the naturalists.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

BY SRI M. K. VENKATARAMA IYER

It was the fashion in the last century to speak
of the irreconcilable opposition between science
and religion. The opposition began in the
seventeenth century, when Galileo and Coper-
nicus propounded a new astronomical doctrine,
which ran counter to what was taught in the
Bible. The old Ptolemaic notion that the
earth was at the centre and all other heav-
 enly bodies, including the sun, moved in circular
orbits round it was holding the field for such
a length of time that it found its way into the
Bible also. When Galileo upset this notion and
said that it was the sun which was at the cen-
tre and that other planets, including our earth,
went round it, he came into direct conflict with
what was regarded as gospel truth and incurr-
ed the serious displeasure of the Pope.

It never occurred to the Pope or other reli-
gious thinkers that the Bible as such had
nothing to do with astronomical or other
scientific notions that had somehow crept into
it and that opposition to doctrines which came
within the purview of science did not really
mean a challenge to the fundamental truths of
Christianity. They thought that every word of
the Bible was sacrosanct, and it was the
most sacred duty of the Pope, who was the
custodian of religion, to punish the exponent
of heterodox doctrines and bring him to his
senses. When Copernicus confirmed the dis-
cov erys of Galileo, the Pope found that his
feeble voice could no longer stem the rising
tide of revolutionary doctrines, and he chose
to keep his peace. But theologians never
learnt the lesson that the scientific notions that
are incorporated into a religion are its perish-
able part, and it was not incumbent on them
to defend them against new theories. The
opposition therefore continued in a slightly at-
tenuated form down the ages.

It again came to a head when Charles
Darwin published his Origin of the Species in
The new doctrine that man was descended of the monkey and that his immediate ancestor was the anthropoid ape was too much for the theologians to swallow. They had learnt that man was made in the image of God, but here was a scientist who said that human beings were evolved out of the monkey. This took their breath away. The miracles attributed to Christ have also been questioned in the wake of the widespread belief fostered by science that nature behaves in a uniform way subject to unalterable laws and that there could be no deviations from them.

The opposition has also been in respect of method. The scientific method is to collect all the facts that are relevant to a question and then explain them by means of a suitable hypothesis. In collecting the facts that have a bearing on the subject of study, the scientist lays aside all his likes and dislikes, all prejudices and preoccupations, all his 'kinks', and brings a thoroughly objective attitude. It may be that he does not quite succeed in eliminating all the subjective factors, but there is no doubt that he makes an honest attempt to view things as impartially as possible. He collects his facts partly by the process of scientific observation and partly by experiments in specially designed laboratories, where nature is, so to say, under his control. When he is in possession of all the relevant facts, he seeks to bring them into intelligible relationship. For this purpose, he coins a hypothesis, though it is not entirely of his coining. It is a principle of connection that is inherent in the facts and suggested by them. He simply brings it to light and states it in the proper form. Such inner affinities between what appear to be disparate facts are perceived only by the eyes of the trained scientist who has an uncanny knack of looking quite into the heart of things. If the hypothesis explains all the material facts satisfactorily, it is accepted for further verification and proof; if, on the other hand, it breaks down even in the initial stages, it is most unceremoniously rejected. Such is the scientist's love of truth that he has no use for partial explanations and half-baked theories. He does not cling to an exploded hypothesis, merely because he spent much time and energy in forging it, or because it has some special attractions for him.

Neither the observation of facts nor their explanation in terms of a hypothesis can be said to be complete at any stage. The successful hypothesis will open up new vistas of observation, and the old hypothesis may require to be restated to suit the new set of facts. Thus, when Albert Einstein propounded his 'Special Theory of Relativity' in 1905, his object was simply to show that time and space were not two different entities, but aspects of one and the same reality, which he called a 'continuum'. Time became the fourth dimension of space. We had to speak of space-time and not of space and time. This discovery led to the synthesis of matter and energy, matter being frozen energy and energy being matter in a fluid condition. His 'General Theory of Relativity', published in 1916, brought space, time, matter, energy, gravitation, and inertia into one comprehensive intellectual concept. Electromagnetism still remained outside. In 1950, he stated his theory in a more comprehensive form so as to include the phenomenon of electromagnetism also. The latest theory is known as the 'Generalized Theory of Gravitation' or 'Unified Field Theory'. According to this theory, the two major fields known as the gravitational field and the electro-magnetic field can be viewed as two manifestations of one united cosmic activity. It attempts to interrelate all known physical phenomena into one all-embracing intellectual concept, thus providing one major master-key to all the multiple phenomena and forces in which the material universe manifests itself to man.

Einstein's aim is to express everything in terms of fields of forces. His latest work promises to bridge the gap that now separates the infinite universe of the stars and the galaxies, on the one hand, and the equally infinite universe of the atom, on the other. The universe of the stars and the galaxies is explained by the theory of relativity, while the universe of the
atom is explained by the quantum theory. Einstein now brings the relativity and the quantum theories into one, all-embracing, comprehensive whole. His work illustrates very well how facts react on theories and theories react on facts. On account of this interaction, the scientist’s universe goes on expanding, and his aim is to present a systematic picture of as much of the universe as is in his power. Quantitative determinations lend mathematical precision to his conclusions.

How does the method of religion compare with all this? The facts of religion are wholly subjective, and do not admit of scientific observation, experiment, or quantitative analysis. Belief in God, soul, rebirth, and so forth are matters of faith. They have to be taken on the authority of the sacred scriptures. One should not ask for reasons, but place implicit faith in the words of the Saviour or Prophet or Messiah. Some religions go to the length of distrusting reason and banning it altogether. The inevitable result of the banishment of reason is bigotry and fanaticism, intolerance and persecution. Truth will be the first casualty in these factious quarrels. If it survives at all, it will be imprisoned within a narrow creed or even a formula.

Religion is too often identified with the performance of rituals, the acceptance of a dogma, or subscription to a formula. It encourages ceremonials and practices, which soon lose their original significance and degenerate into mechanical routine. It substitutes emotion and sentimentality in the place of reasoned thought and enquiry. It has trained the people in habits of submission to existing evils, and it has taught them the virtues of accepting the social order as it prevails at any particular time and discovering authority for it in the sacred scriptures. By and large, the attitude of mind fostered by religion is one of unquestioning acceptance of whatever is and one of opposition to change and progress, whereas the temper of science is to accept nothing without proof, to change previous conclusions in the face of new evidence, to march forward in a spirit of adventure, and to stop at nothing short of the absolute truth. How, in the course of this march, science has had to come into conflict with religion, which had identified itself with superstitions and outworn notions, is narrated in a most interesting manner and with a copiousness of detail by Bertrand Russel in his book Religion and Science.

In the field of astronomy, biology, medicine, physiology, and psychology, in almost every branch of knowledge, science has had to contend with false notions which almost always had the backing of religion. Religious heads thought it their sacred duty to halt the continuous inroads which science was making into the region of established beliefs and doctrines. On the whole, religion has identified itself with the forces of reaction and obscurantism, and it has encouraged passivity and quietism as the supreme virtues of life. It has rarely been understood as a summons to spiritual life, which is one of adventure in a trackless region. True religion is something quite different from religiosity. Its essence is prayer and meditation, loyalty to the abiding values of life, self-surrender, and the readiness to carry out God’s purpose. If religion dissociates itself from the scientific notions, which are its encumbrances, and becomes simply a way of life characterized by utter sincerity and selflessness, then it will come to its own and shine in its native splendour. Such true religion will not only not come into conflict with science, but will command the respect of scientists.

‘A purely personal religion,’ writes Bertrand Russell, ‘so long as it is content to avoid assertions which science can disprove, may survive undisturbed in the most scientific age.’ In another place, he writes: ‘In so far as religion consists in a way of feeling rather than in a set of beliefs, science cannot touch it.’ ‘The man who feels deeply the problems of human destiny, the desire to diminish the sufferings of mankind, and the hope that the future will realize the best possibilities of our species is said to have a religious outlook.’ In his little book What Religion Is, Bernard Bosanquet observes:
'Wherever a man is so carried beyond himself, whether for any other being or for a cause or for a nation, that his personal fate seems to him as nothing in comparison with the happiness or the triumph of the other, there you have the universal basis and structure of religion.'

It is necessary to add that devotion to a noble cause, such as social service, may have the semblance of religion in it, but it is not religion in the true sense of the word. Service of men is not the same thing as service of God. Humanitarian work may sometimes pass as a substitute for religion, but it cannot be mistaken for religion proper. It is only when devotion is directed to God as the highest value that we have religion in the strict sense of the term. Love of God may lead to love of fellowmen and to work for their well-being, but there must be no confusion about the two. The philanthropist, the social worker, and the soldier are all devoted to a great cause, and do their service in a spirit of utter self-forgetfulness, but it would be wrong to suppose that they require no higher religion. Devotion to God is something unique. It belongs to a class by itself. There is an overlap in it which is indefinable.

If religion therefore sheds everything that is in the nature of an incrustation and confines itself to devotion to God as the supreme value, there is absolutely no reason why it should come into conflict with science or, for that matter, with any other knowledge. The spheres of religion and science are so clearly marked that there is no possibility of any clash between them. It was the mistaken identification of religion with the quasi-scientific beliefs that were current at the time when the early Fathers of the Church wrote the Bible that led to so many unhappy conflicts at a later age. The progress of science is bound to give a rude shock to many popular beliefs, but these have no vital connection with religion proper. Science may go on advancing to any extent, but it need cause no terrors to true religion, so long as the latter keeps to its proper sphere—devotion to God and a way of life strictly arising from it. In his minor poem called Upadesașaṅkara, Śrī Saṅkara has indicated such a way of life arising from faith in God.

Science also has seen reason to shed its old militant attitude towards religion. Recent developments in the realm of physics have awakened scientists to a sense of the mystery that is enshrined in the heart of things. Molecules have made place for atoms, and atoms, in their turn, have been replaced by electrons and protons. Round a central nucleus of protons, a definite number of electrons are said to be revolving much in the same manner as the planets revolve round the sun. It is also said that the energy that is concentrated in an atom, if released, is sufficient to blow up the universe. Matter has therefore been dematerialized, and it has come to be looked upon as a centre of energy. What exactly may be the nature of this energy—material or spiritual—has yet to be determined.

There is a general realization among scientists of today that there are more things in heaven and earth than are known to them. Extrasensory perception, telepathy, communication with spirits, all these have been accepted as sober scientific facts. They are no longer dismissed as the aberrations of an unbalanced mind. That there is a realm of mind and spirit, quite apart from the realm of matter and energy, has come to be generally recognized by scientists. They are more or less consciously aware of the illimitable mystery that surrounds the frontiers to which their investigations have brought them. As a class, however, they fight shy of this realization, and are unwilling to proclaim that they are filled with a new vision. They simply put it in negative terms and say that science has yet to make considerable headway before it can claim to have resolved the central mystery. ‘The outstanding achievement of twentieth century physics’, writes Sir James Jeans in The Mysterious Universe, ‘is not the theory of relativity with its welding together of space and time, or the theory of quanta with its present apparent negation of the laws of causation, or the dissection of the atom with the resultant discovery that things are not what
they seem; it is the general recognition that we are not yet in contact with ultimate reality.'

This realization has made the scientists sober. Religion is no longer dismissed as misdirected sex or opiate for the weak. It is admitted as a genuine product of the human mind, which meets a real need. It has its origin in the finite-infinite nature of man, which is as real as his physical or his psychological nature. Just as he has a body and mind, man has also a spark of divinity planted deep in him, which refuses to be suppressed. In the initial stages, it finds vague expression in man’s dissatisfaction with his possessions, and later develops into a dissatisfaction with what one is rather than with what one has. At this stage, the discontent becomes spiritual. It points to an ideal of knowledge and of love, which in its fullness is realized only in God. It is by these steps that the finite-infinite nature of man leads him to belief in God, and when belief ripens, it is transformed into unshakable faith in the supreme Being. Utter devotion and self-surrender follow as a necessary consequence. When man is filled with the god-sense, naturally he sees the same god everywhere and in every human being. Out of compassion, and not out of pity or in a mood of condescension, he extends his helping hand to his less fortunate brethren. Even love of fame, ‘the last infirmity of noble minds’, will have fallen away from his mind. ‘Having themselves crossed the fearful ocean of transmigratory existence, they spontaneously lend a hand to others desirous of doing so’, writes Śrī Śaṅkara in his Vivekacūḍāmaṇi.

In view of what has been said above, it will become clear that the old opposition between science and religion has now become a thing of the past. The science which opposed and the religion which was opposed are both dead. They have come nearer to each other, and they have realized that each has to learn something from the other. Religion will do well to learn from science its temper and approach, its single-minded devotion to truth, its hatred of dogma, and, finally, its broad and catholic outlook. The chief bane of religion, as it is practised today, is that it is weighted too much with soulless and mechanical formula. Another defect is its dogmatism and intolerance. There is no doubt that the scientific temper will serve as a corrective to these shortcomings. There is no need to distrust reason or treat it with suspicion. Reason is always a liberalizing force, and makes for enlightenment. It is a great unifier, and teaches us respect for the views of others. Men may hold divergent opinions, but that is no reason why they should not remain friends.

Science also has much to learn from religion. All knowledge is power, and scientific knowledge is specially so. The practical application of the principles of science, called technology, has led to the invention of not only many useful things like the radio and television, but also several frightful weapons like the bomber, the flame-thrower, and the atom bomb. It is said that, by pressing a button in a certain place, the inter-continental ballistic missile can rush through space and descend with mathematical precision on a town five thousand miles away and reduce it to ashes in no time. Such powerful engines of destruction are a menace to humanity, unless their wielders are educated in the principles of morals and religion. Those in whose hands such weapons are placed must learn from religion that life is sacred and that the human personality is worthy of respect. Albert Schweitzer made it his great mission in life to preach ‘reverence for life’.

Today, it is all the more important that education in the principles of religion should go hand in hand with education in the truths of science. And, again, science, while it has placed plenty of means at our disposal, has not told us anything about ends. Science is positive and matter of fact; it has nothing to do with purposes. The labour-saving machines devised by technology have spared man from much drudgery and have provided leisure to him; but the important question is: How best could man use his leisure time. If he puts it to wrong use, it would be worse than if he had no leisure at all. Everything depends on the use to which we put scientific knowledge and the amenities
it provides. It can be employed for the good of mankind and also for its harm. Knowledge is like a double-edged sword which can cut both ways. Unless scientists are imbued with the spirit of religion, they are not likely to desist from sin.

Lastly, we may add that science may help us to harness the forces of nature and exploit them to serve the ends of man, but in doing so, it creates a feeling of separateness and even hostility between man and nature. Science may give us power over nature, but power is not the same thing as vision or insight. What we want is not a dichotomy of reality into man and nature, but the unitive vision that both man and nature are aspects of one and the same reality. This sense of unity was well realized by the ancient sages of India. It is taught in several passages of the Upaniṣads.

Science and religion therefore should go hand in hand. One is incomplete without the other. The deficiencies of the one are made good by the other. The two should form integral elements in any comprehensive scheme of education. Science without religion is likely to prove a potent source of danger, while religion without the temper of science may easily degenerate into a mass of soulless and wooden formula.

---

**ŚRĪ-BHĀṢYA**

**BY SWAMI VĪRESWARANANDA**

*(Continued from previous issue)*

अत एव चोपमा सुर्यकाविभस्तः ॥१३॥२॥९॥

18. Therefore also (with respect to Brahman we have) comparisons like the images of the sun etc.

Though Brahman abides in various places like the earth etc., yet It always has the twofold characteristics, and is not in the least affected by the imperfections attached to the places. Therefore the scripture uses the simile of the reflected sun in a sheet of water or in a mirror with respect to Brahman. Just as the sun is not in anyway contaminated by the imperfections in the water, so is Brahman not affected by the imperfections of the various places like earth etc.

अम्बुवद्रश्चप्यात्तु न तथात्तयः ॥१३॥२॥९॥

19. But (there is) no similarity, for It is not apprehended (there) like (the sun in the) water.

An objection is raised in this sūtra against what was said in the previous one. The existence of the sun in the water is not real, but the existence of Brahman in the earth etc. is real. So the two cases are not similar, and therefore it cannot be said, on the basis of this analogy, that It is not affected by the imperfections of the places in which It abides.

बृहदार्थसाध्वमत्तत्त्तप्राणलमसामुपांमयें दर्शनातः ॥१३॥२॥१॥

20. Brahman’s participation in the increase and decrease (of the earth etc.) due to Its abiding within (is denied by the example cited before); for both (the examples) are appropriate. It is also so seen in the world.

The example given in sūtra 18 is meant only to deny Brahman’s participation in the imperfections of the earth and other beings within which It abides. It is only on this supposition that the two examples in the following text are appropriate: ‘As the one ether is rendered manifold by jars etc., or as the one sun becomes
manifold in several sheets of water, thus the one Self is rendered manifold by abiding in many places.’ Ether actually exists in the jars etc., while the sun does not actually exist in the water. The only common factor in these two examples is the fact of not being contaminated by the imperfections. So, since both the examples are appropriate, they are meant to teach this particular fact only with respect to Brahman, viz. Its not being contaminated by the imperfections of the places wherein It abides. The comparison is restricted to this fact only. In common parlance also, comparisons are often made with respect to a particular quality in two things, as, for example, when we say, ‘This boy is a lion’, only the quality of courage is common to both the boy and the lion. So the example cited in sūtra 18 of the reflected images of the sun is apt. The conclusion therefore is that Brahman is not sullied in the least by the imperfections of the sentient and non-sentient beings in which It abides.

In Br.U., II.3.6, we have, ‘Now therefore the description (of Brahman): “Not this, not this”’ etc. Since this text denies the gross and subtle forms of Brahman taught immediately before, it shows that Brahman is only pure Being bereft of all qualities. So how can It have the twofold characteristics described earlier, viz. being free from all imperfections and being endowed with infinite auspicious qualities? This doubt is removed in the next sūtra.  

21. The text denies that muchness of Brahman (described earlier) and says more than that.

Since the gross and subtle worlds are not known by other means of knowledge than through the scriptures as modes of Brahman, one cannot think of the scriptures denying what they had expressly taught first. So what the text denies is only that muchness of Brahman’s qualities. These two forms do not exhaust Its qualities, for the text speaks of further qualities of Brahman after that: ‘There is nothing higher than this (Brahman) that has been de-

scribed’, i.e. there is nothing superior to Brahman either by nature or by qualities. ‘Then comes the name, the Truth of truth; for the praṇas are true, and It is the Truth of them.’ Praṇas here mean the souls, because they accompany the latter at death. The souls are true, because they do not undergo any change in their essential nature at the time of creation. ‘The Lord is the Truth of these true souls’, for the souls contract and expand with respect to intelligence, while He is unaffected. Thus the subsequent part of the text connects Brahman with some more qualities. So the ‘Not this, not this’ does not deny the attributes of Brahman already taught earlier, but denies that Its nature is confined to those two forms or attributes only. Brahman therefore possesses the twofold characteristics.

A further objection is raised. Brahman is apprehended through perception as merely pure Being. All the rest is illusory. This is what ‘Not this, not this’ teaches. This is refuted in the next sūtra.

22. That (Brahman) is not manifest, for (so the scripture) says.

This sūtra establishes that Brahman cannot be apprehended by any other proof than the scripture. ‘He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by the other sources, nor by penance’ etc. (Mu. U., III.1.8); ‘His form does not exist within the range of vision; nobody sees Him with the eyes’ (Ka.U., II.6.9).

23. And moreover (Brahman is experienced) in perfect meditation, according to Śruti and Smṛti.

He is experienced in deep meditation only. Otherwise than by this method of love in the form of deep meditation, He is not experienced. So declare the Śruti and Smṛti: ‘This Self is not attained by learning’ (Ka.U., I.2.23); ‘Neither by the Vedas ... can I be seen’ etc. (Gītā, XI. 53). The Śruti in Br.U., III.2.1. teaches for the sake of meditation that the gross and the
subtle universe are two forms of Brahman. Having taught so, the Shruti cannot evidently deny this teaching later. So what is denied is only that muchness of Brahman’s nature or qualities described in Br.U., III.2.1.

24. There is non-difference (in the qualities of Brahman with respect to apprehension) as in the case of light (knowledge) ; that apprehension (of Brahman) takes place by constant practice of meditation.

When Brahman is experienced, then, just as one finds Knowledge and Bliss to be the essential nature of Brahman, so also one finds that the gross and subtle universes are Its modes or attributes. Vāmdeva and other rśis experienced like that. “Seeing this, Rśi Vāmdeva understood, “I have become Manu, the sun”’ etc. (Br.U., I.4.10). This apprehension of Brahman is attained through constant meditation.

25. Hence Brahman is qualified by endless qualities; thus His (twofold) characteristics (hold good).

Thus it is stated by the scriptures that Brahman is distinguished by infinite number of blessed qualities. Therefore His twofold characteristics are established.

(To be continued)

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TO OUR READERS

Professor Surendranath Bhattacharya, M.A., formerly of Bihar National College, Patna, has been contributing a series of learned articles on māyā and avidyā, five of which have already appeared in Prabuddha Bharata during the past two years. The sixth article entitled ‘Saṅkara on Māyā and Avidyā’ is included in this issue. . .

Music has a great power to idealize whatever feeling it expresses. In the sphere of religion, musical endeavour can serve as a preparation for spiritual life. How and to what extent music can be utilized as a form of spiritual practice is discussed by Mr. John M. Schlenck in his instructive paper on ‘Music and Religion’, only the first part of which is given in this issue. We propose to include the second part of the article in the next issue. Mr. Schlenck, who has a degree in music from the University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, is closely associated with the Vedanta Society of New York. . .

The article by Sri Suresh Chandra, M.A., of the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, offers a thoughtful analysis and explanation of ‘The Nature of Good’ . . .

The true spirit of science is not opposed to genuine religious spirit. In fact, both the disciplines should be combined for a fuller growth of the heart and the head of man. The article on ‘Science and Religion’ by Sri M. K. Venkatarama Iyer, M.A., points out that science without religion may prove a potential source of danger to mankind, while religion without the temper of science may degenerate into a mass of superstition and soulless formalism.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE SOUTH TO THE HERITAGE OF INDIA

The national programmes arranged by the All India Radio now and then, featuring the diverse aspects of Indian culture, are of immense value in bringing about greater understanding among the people belonging to the different regions of India. Recently, the All
India Radio broadcasted a series of seven talks on the contribution of the South to the heritage of India. We quote below a few extracts from three of the talks for the benefit of our readers. The extracts are taken from Free India, Madras, of 24.4.1960, 1.5.1960, and 15.5.1960.

**Philosophy and Religion**

In the first talk of the series, Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan says about the actual contributions of the South to the philosophic and religious thought of India: "For the evolution of the Mimāṃsā philosophy, the South has done a great deal. . . . Sabara wrote a commentary on Jaimini's sūtras, which is interpreted in two different ways by two outstanding scholars generally believed to be South Indians. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who was an elder contemporary of Śaṅkara, is regarded as an Andhra by birth; and Prabhākara, who founded the rival school, was, according to tradition, a native of North Travancore and a pupil of Kumārila. . . . A great volume of Mimāṃsā literature of either persuasion came to be written in South India. In the hands of Vedāntic teachers such as Vedānta Deśika, the atheistic Mimāṃsā got transformed into theistic Mimāṃsā. Śāyaṇa, whose commentary on the Veda is well-known, and his brother Mādhava, who wrote a work explaining the Mimāṃsā rules, were scholars patronized by the founders of the Vaiṣyāyanagar kingdom. . . . It is universally recognized that the correct intonation of the Vedic texts has been best preserved in the South.

Much greater has been its (of the South) distinction in the field of Vedānta. The very mention of Vedānta makes one think of Śaṅkara, who was born at Kaladi in Kerala. . . . There were Vedāntins, and even Advaitins, before Śaṅkara. One of them bore the name Dārmaṭa or Dravīḍaśārya, which is indicative of his Southern origin. He is referred to with reverence both by Śaṅkara and by Rāmānuja who came after him and systematized another school of Vedānta called Viśiṣṭādvaita. . . . Madhva, born towards the end of the twelfth century near Udipi, . . . interpreted Vedānta as a radical pluralism (atyanta-bheda-vāda). Profoundly influenced by the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, which is believed to have been composed somewhere in South India, Madhva propagated the cult of Kṛṣṇa-worship. The Cāttanya movement of Bengal, in its later phase, elected to follow the pluralistic philosophy of Madhva. . . .

'Dvaiteśvāda is the name of the system of Vedānta founded by Nimbārka of the eleventh century, a Telugu by birth, who made Vrindavana in the North his place of residence. . . . The other Vaiṣṇava school is Śuddhādvaita, which is associated with the name of Vallabha of the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, who was a Telugu living at Banaras, and who, like Nimbārka, started another Kṛṣṇa cult.

Parallel to the Vaiṣṇava schools of philosophy, there are in South India equally powerful schools of Śaivism. The most important of these are Śaivasiddhānta, Vīraśaivism, and Śvādvaita. . . .

'Jaina and Baudhā writers have enriched the literatures of the Southern languages by their writings. Tiruvāḷjavar, author of the Tirukkural, which contains a comprehensive code of ethics and has become a world-class, is claimed as their own by Jainas and Baudhās, and Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas alike. Mani-mekalai is a Baudha poem in Tamil by Sāttanār. . . . Kācī has had the unique distinction of producing Dīnāgā, the distinguished Baudha logician, and of sending Dharmapāla to Nālandā as its head in the sixth century. The Jainas have had great influence in Karnataka; there are several Jain works in Kannada, many of which have for their theme the lives of tirthaikaras and other Jaina saints. Madurai was the stronghold of Jainism for a while. . . .

'Philosophy in India is closely associated with religion. . . . Every one of the philosophers mentioned so far was an accredited religious leader also. . . . Sixty-three are the canonized saints of Southern Śaivism; they are significantly called Nāyanmārs, meaning
“leaders”. The most important of them, Jñānasambandhar, Appar, Sundarar, and Māṇikkavācakar, were inspired poets, who flooded the country with a great wave of devotion. . . . Aļvārs, the Vaiṣṇava saints, twelve in number, were “divers into divinity”, as their name indicates. The greatest of them (was) Nammālvār, and his poetical work is Tiruvāyumōli. Viraśaivism in Karnātaka produced a number of mystics, who expounded the doctrine in a popular and arresting manner. There were over two hundred of them, including women, with Mahādeviyakka as their head. Their writings are called by the collective name vacana-lāstra. . . Vaiṣṇavism in the Kannada area inspired the movement of the Haridāsas, the greatest of whom was Purandaradāsa, saint and composer of great merit. His pādas in simple Kannada pour forth in an abundant measure God-devotion and God-love. A similar movement took place in Maharāstra; with it are associated the names of Jñānadev, Nāmadev, Ekanāṭha, Tukārām, and Rāmadevās . . .

“In recent centuries, and even in our own time, the South has produced eminent sages and saints. To mention but a few of them: Tāyumānavar, Sādāsiva Brahman, Tyagaraja, Ramālingasvami, Narayana Guru, and Ramana Maharshi. . . . In them, “one meets again ancient and eternal India”.

Sculpture, Art, and Architecture

The second talk of the series was on the contribution of the South in the field of art, sculpture, and architecture, by Dr. Charles Fabri. Dr. Fabri says therein: “South Indian sculptors were among the earliest pioneers of Indian stone carving. . . . Among the finds in the early Buddhist sites of Andhra, notably at Amaravati and around Visakhapatnam, there are statues that must be recognized as undoubtedly among the earliest ever made in stone by Indian Buddhist sculptors. In particular, I refer to a yakṣa image now in the Madras Museum. . . . All the most important and the most exquisite sculptural remains (of the first to fourth centuries A.D.), now in our hands, are located in the Southern regions. Amaravati is a wonder in itself; Nagarjunakonda, not far away, also in the Andhra country, has yielded in the last few years evidence of an intense artistic activity quite unmatched in the north of India. . . .

“In South India, we have an unbroken succession of sculptural remains, in which the gradual discovery of freely moving figures, bold action, and correct proportions can be studied with growing wonder. . . . Indeed, it would not be incorrect to say that true classical art, much of which has disappeared in Northern India, is now best represented in the later phases of Nagarjunakonda. . . . The rock-cut shrines at Mamallapuram are the direct continuation of this art. . . . Their exquisite balance, the restrained classical poses of their sculptures, the superb mastery of form, the chaste use of space in composition, all these and many more declare them as among the finest flowers of classical Indian sculpture. . . . Whilst the “rathas” belong to this classical style, the surrounding caves and the large rock-face carving, called “Arjuna’s Penance”, show all the subsequent styles, from mannerism to complete baroque. . . .

“The Dravidian masters . . . were also the greatest painters of Indian art history. . . . The vast mass of surviving Indian painting of antiquity is in the Deccan. . . . The superb painterly quality of even the earliest wall paintings at Ajanta has been a matter of wonder to all students of art. . . . There is almost an uninterrupted history of South Indian painting, through the murals of the Bagh Caves, the Jaina wall paintings at Sittanavasal, the temple paintings at Tanjore, the palaces at Padmanabhapuram and Krishnapuram in Kerala, to the nineteenth century mural in the Mattancheri palace at Cochin.

“Cave architecture is no less distinguished in the South. There are old caves around Visakhapatnam, followed by a flourishing period during Pallava dynasty, of which the most outstanding examples are, perhaps, those at Tiruchirappalli. The cave temples and monasteries
of Ellora and Ajanta are well known enough, though much less is heard of Aurangabad caves that contain some of the most strikingly beautiful rock-cut sculpture of the baroque times. Around Bombay, once part of the southern empires, there are over 150 caves, and they include the early Buddhist caves of Bhaja, Karle, and Nasik, as well as the later examples at Kanheri.

'Volumes could be written of Dravidian temple architecture. ... The vast and splendid temple complexes of Tanjore, Madurai, Tiruchirappalli, Chidambaram, the later masterpieces of the Hoysalas at Somnathapura, Belur, and Halebid are widely known. ... Aihoale, Badami, and Pattadakal are places that ought to be included in every artistic itinerary in India.

'The vast body of bronzes, an art in which South India vastly excelled, ... are among the most priceless heirlooms of Indian art, and include, besides the more famous Dancing Siva images, some of the best effigies of royalty and of the Vaishnava and Shaiva saints. ... Much could also be said of the folk arts of South India, many of which flourished well into the twentieth century.'

Music and Dance

The fourth talk of the series by Srimati Rukmini Devi is devoted to the contribution of South India in the field of music and dance. Srimati Rukmini Devi says: ‘(The) basic concepts of Indian music have been understood and preserved in the South Indian tradition. From the days of the Nayamārs ... to the period in which we live, when authentic South Indian music of a very high order is being composed, this concept of the art as the very voice of God has been jealously kept and guarded. Nothing has survived that has not been the result of a deep spiritual and religious impulse.

'It is also in South India that most of the important works on music, after the Saṅgīta Ratnākara, were written. In his Caturdaṇḍi Prakāśikā, Veṅkaṭa Makhi made a great and highly original contribution to musical theory by his classification of rāgas and by his arrangement of the melakarta scheme. He has exerted considerable influence on the work of Bhatkande and his pupils with regard to Hindustani music.

'Dance in South India has closely followed the way of the music. The variety in folk dancing is incredibly rich. ... Classical dancing in common with classical music has a religious basis. In South India, the main body of dance tradition was maintained intact by the devadāsīs, who were attached to temples. ... Many devadāsīs were great dancers who had a perfect technique and, often, great devotion. ...'

'Dance dramas also developed out of the Bharatanātya tradition, using the Bharata-nātya technique. Some of them, as in Tanjore and Kuchupudi, were performed in temples by men dancers of the priestly class, who were called bhāgavatars. ... The kuravaňjis were performed in temples by the devadāsīs. All kuravaňjis are alike in subject-matter, and portray the human soul, represented by the heroine, in search of God. ...'

'In Kerala, the kathakalī developed. ... Kathakali is rich in four kinds of abhinaya. It is more a play than a dance. ...'

'Many of the greatest musicians of the North have been Muslims, but it is obvious that their music was great because Indian music was great, and Indian music was Hindu. The music in other Muslim countries has neither the greatness of Indian music nor as much variety and richness. Just as all dance has its origin in Bharata's Nāṭya-sāstra, though branching out into different styles, known as kathakali, manipuri, kathak, etc., all Indian music had a common origin. The variety has come in the blending of local influences with the original art. South has been more untouched by all these influences, and one can therefore assume that it is more ancient and truly Indian. I am quite sure, for example, that the music and dance of Orissa in the past was far more truly South Indian than North Indian. The art forms of Orissa and Andhra must have had
very much in common. Curiously enough, in the ancient days, those who went from Orissa and colonized parts of South East Asia have influenced art there to such an extent that not only is the dance of South East Asia obviously Indian, but South Indian in origin, as can be seen today by those who go to Cambodia and other countries.

---

REVIEWS AND NOTICES


This volume, the last under the series, contains the translation of the Taittiriya and Chandogya Upanishads. With the publication of the fourth volume, the translator says in the Preface to the book, 'my rather ambitious undertaking to present before the English-reading public the wisdom contained in the eleven major Upaniṣads is, by God's grace, completed.'

Like the other volumes, this volume also contains notes and explanations. Both the translation and the notes are based on the commentary of Śaṅkara-cārya. In the Preface, the Swami explains briefly the ideals set forth in the Upaniṣads, and says: 'The Upaniṣads, called the Brahma-vidyā, or Science of Brahman, and also the Ātma-vidyā, or Science of Ātman, describe the ultimate objective of life, which is the liberation of the self from the bondage of the phenomenal world through knowledge and realization. The Upaniṣads by no means preach an anti-social or other worldly gospel. They ask a man to cultivate righteousness (dharma) and to enjoy wealth (artha) and sense pleasures (kāma), and they finally exhort him to realize Freedom (mokṣa), in which alone all desires find their fulfillment. They lay the foundation of an enduring society whose welfare depends upon the co-operation of all beings: superhuman, human, and sub-human. They ask all embodied souls seeking material happiness to enter into society, and at last show them the way to transcend it in order to enjoy peace and freedom.'

The Introductions to the Upaniṣads, a separate one for each, are beautifully written. They give in a nutshell the essence of the teachings contained in the two Upaniṣads. They, together with the glossary, are very useful in following the main texts. Śrī Śaṅkara-cārya’s introductions to the two Upaniṣads are translated in full, at the beginning of each Upaniṣad. The volume is a valuable addition to the already existing translations of the Upaniṣads.


The recent conquest of Tibet by China, resulting in the flight of Tibet's spiritual and temporal leader to India, is an event of greatest historical importance, and may have far-reaching consequences in the latter half of this century. It took the world by surprise and pin-pointed its attention on this mountain kingdom. The interest aroused could be gauged from the fact that news correspondents from all corners of the world flocked to the north-east frontier of India and strained every nerve to meet the Dalai Lama as soon as he stepped on the Indian soil on the 31st March 1959. It is in the fitness of things that this should inspire the publication of a book explaining the situation that compelled the 'god-king' of Tibet to abandon his capital and escape with a handful of followers, under the most dramatic and trying circumstances. The speculations about its outcome will naturally be varied. All these form the subject of this not too lengthy volume from the pen of a news correspondent who has travelled in obscure corners of the world.

While going through the book, one gets the impression that the author, with all his resourcefulness, could not gather enough material. Perhaps that explains his constant invectives against India’s Prime Minister, against whom he does not conceal his anger, for not permitting the correspondents to get in touch with the Dalai Lama for about a month after his arrival in India.

The author’s bitter attack on India’s policy towards Tibet during the past few years and the language he uses to indicate his disgust and indignation at it are, to say the least, undignified. He would have liked India to adopt a bellicose attitude towards China on the Tibetan issue right from the beginning. Whether India has been right or wrong in what she did, future history alone can tell. As regards India’s Tibetan policy, there has been a difference of opinion within the country itself. To differ from Nehru's policy, and to sympathize with Tibet,
is one thing; but the use of abusive language in referring to Nehru or India is uncalled for. Such expressions as 'Nehru's wickedest lie' (p. 24), 'Pandit Nehru's special brand of two-faced politics' (p. 127), 'hypocrisy of Pandit Nehru' (p. 134), to quote only a few from the book, are not really worthy of any notable writer, while referring to a personality like the Prime Minister of India.

The author has told the facts as his disposal vividly and in a vigorous language. He has also enriched the volume by presenting as many as 26 rare photographs. He has clearly shown that what the Chinese are up to in Tibet is nothing short of complete extermination or absorption of the Tibetan race.

No one can deny that the book serves the very useful purpose of bringing before the world many facts concerning one of the tragic dramas in recent history; and that will be a yeoman service to the cause of the Tibetan people.

The volume is printed and got up excellently.

S. S.

HISTORY OF THE GĀHĀDAVĀLA DYNASTY.

A thesis submitted to the Calcutta University by the author in 1952, this work is the result of a systematic research on the political and cultural history of the Gāhādaūala family of Kanūj. It deals with the dynastic history of the Gāhādaūala family, which played an important role in North India at a very critical period, when Islam was gaining ground in India and the fate of India hung in the balance.

Generally, historical geography is treated in the beginning of a book, but Dr. Roma Niyogi has placed her geographical study in the middle of the work. She has tried to place all the geographical data in the Gāhādaūala inscriptions and to give the extent of the dominion on this basis. The mere statement on page 124 that most of the villages referred to in the record have been identified will not satisfy the students of history. Some more researches are essential to identify the list of places mentioned on page 134 of the book.

The book is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter gives the history of Antarvedi and Varanasi which were included in the dominion of the Gāhādaūala. The second chapter deals with the origin of this family. The third and fourth chapters are devoted to a study of the rise and achievements of the Gāhādaūala dynasty. The next two chapters describe the fall of the family in Antarvedi. The last two chapters contain the cultural history of this dynasty, viz. administration, revenue and expenditure, religion, society, and culture. The study of the economic condition and the coinage in detail have not attracted the attention of the author. Emphasis has not been given on the religious toleration of the kings; and the system and process of 'Donation' should have been dealt with in a more elaborate manner. In Appendix B, the epigraphic notes are very helpful for those readers who desire to examine the original texts of the records.

The coin-plates and maps are badly wanting in this historical work. Dr. Niyogi has chosen a worthy theme for her research, and she has done it with admirable earnestness.

DR. BASUDEVA UPADHYAY


The Gurugranth Sāhib is the holy scripture of the Sikhs. It is to the Sikhs what the Vedas are to the Hindus, the Bible to the Christians, and the Koran to the Mohammedans. It contains the spiritual and philosophical teachings of the Sikh Gurus beginning from Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism. This sacred book was compiled by the Fifth Guru, Guru Arjan. Guru Nanak was a Hindu by birth. He was deeply influenced by the teachings and the catholic spirit of the Vedānta. In order to adequately meet the exigencies of his times, particularly in the religious sphere, as a result of the impact of the Islamic religion and culture, he initiated a reformist movement in the Hindu religion. This grew into Sikhism and became more dynamic, and rather militant, during the periods of the later Gurus, mainly due to the oppression it had to face at the hands of the Mogul rulers of this country.

The Gurugranth Sāhib also contains in it several devotional hymns and songs composed by other saints of India. As the language of this sacred scripture is Punjabi, it was not easily accessible to non-Punjabi people. Dr. Jayaram Misra's present book in Hindi throws open the gates of this spiritual treasure to all Hindi-knowing people. Though Dr. Misra's book is not a complete translation of the Gurugranth Sāhib, it makes an elaborate and devout study of the main trends of the spiritual and philosophical thoughts of the original scripture.

The following are some of the important subjects discussed in the book:

1. Different views had been expressed by Trumpp, Macauliffe, and Sahib Singh about the compilation of the Gurugranth Sāhib. An attempt is made here to find out a common viewpoint underlying those views.

2. A detailed study of the social and political conditions in India which were responsible for the founding of this faith, as well as its later development.
3. A comparative study of Sikhism in relation to the other religions of India.
5. The idea of Dr. Sher Singh that the theory of Advaita has no place in the Sikh religion has been ably refuted.
6. The concluding pages of the book present the characteristics of a sadguru (real teacher), as well as the spiritual significance of nāma-japa (repetition of God’s name).

Dr. Misra also refers to an important point of difference between Hinduism and Sikhism. This is in regard to the theory of incarnation of God. Guru Nanak does not accept this theory. One would have wished our author to go into a little greater detail on this subject (p. 91), and express himself in a clearer manner.

Our congratulations to the author for placing this commendable work before the Hindi-knowing people. This is the first book of its kind in Hindi. Written by a deeply religious person, it reveals the great amount of painstaking study and labour that have gone into the preparation of the book.

Typographical errors are too many, and should have been eliminated in a good book like this.

Swami Nirgunananda

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION STUDENTS’ HOME, MYPALORE, MADRAS

REPORT FOR 1959

The Home has three sections—the high school section, the collegiate section, and the technical section. There are two hostels, one for the boys studying in the high school, and the other for those studying in the collegiate and technical sections. The high school and the technical sections are entirely residential; the collegiate section provides only board and lodging for the boys. The Home also conducts two elementary schools.

The High School Section: Number of students at the end of the year: 170. Number of teachers: 11. The boys themselves do the household duties of the Home, such as cleaning the premises, purchasing the provisions, serving the food, nursing the sick, performing the pūjā, and maintaining the garden. The school laboratory is well-equipped. There is a school library containing 6,626 books. Spinning, weaving, wood work, and gardening formed the hobbies of the students. A variety of games, sports, and gymnastics is provided for the physical development of the students. The school has one A.C.C. unit and a scout troop. The extra-curricular activities of the students during the year were: an exhibition of their drawings, paintings, and other handicraft; staging of a drama on ‘Prahláda’ and performance of a harikathā on Gandhiji; publication of manuscript magazines on special occasions like Poṅgal, Sarasvatī Pūjā, Dipāvali, and Kārtīgai; participation in competitions conducted by various organizations; the school parliament and the pupils' literary union; and visit to different places of interest.

The Collegiate Section: Strength: 37 students.

The Technical Section: The section comprises a technical institute and a workshop. The institute hitherto imparted instruction only in automobile engineering. During the year under review, a diploma course in mechanical engineering was started with 20 students on the rolls. The automobile workshop is fully equipped with up-to-date precision tools and machines for maintenance, repair, and complete overhaul of all types of automobiles. The general mechanical workshop can undertake all kinds of turning, machining, milling, and fabrication of roof trusses, gate grilles, and light castings of iron and non-ferrous metals. Strength at the end of the year: 96. There is adequate arrangement for the physical training of the students and also for their extra-curricular activities. There is a library containing 1,578 books.

The Ramakrishna Centenary Elementary School, Mypalore: The school had 11 sections in all in its five standards. Strength at the end of the year: students: 413 (boys: 225; girls: 188); staff: 12.

The Higher Elementary School, Malliankaranai, Chingleput District: The school caters mainly to the needs of the backward classes and scheduled castes. Agriculture is taught as a pre-vocational subject. Strength at the end of the year: students: 166 (boys: 135; girls: 31); staff: 8. In the free Harijan hostel attached to the school, there were 39 boarders during the year.