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Prabuddha Bharata

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By Karma, Jnana, Bhakti, and Yoga, by one or more or
all of these the vision of the Paramatman is obtained.

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PRABUDDHA BHARATA

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Vol. LXX

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No. 2



उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

—:o:—

LETTERS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

(58)

Chilkapeta
Almora, U.P.
10 October 1915

Dear —,

I am in receipt of your affectionate letter. Convey our heartfelt love and blessings to the devotees there. Our meditation and prayer here have, by the grace of the Lord, no other purpose in view than the welfare of the people the world over. The moment we sit to repeat the name of the Lord and meditate on Him, the feeling rises in us: 'Lord, may you bring about the welfare of the world—you who are the embodiment of pure mercy !'

The Lord, to be sure, is ever existent ; the Vedas and other scriptures, too, are ever there ; the places of pilgrimage are also ever present, yet there is a decline of righteousness. The understanding of all the people and the nations becomes clouded, and at that moment, the Lord, out of His motiveless mercy, incarnates Himself ; otherwise there is no way of redeeming the world. This is the evidence of history, and in the present age, Sri Ramakrishna, the embodiment of mercy, and his own inherent Power Sri Sri Ma (the Holy Mother Sri Sarada Devi) and the retinue of his followers headed by Swami Vivekananda have come for the welfare of the world only. What more shall I write ? ...

Your sincere well-wisher,
Shivananda

(59)

Chilkapeta
Almora, Uttar Pradesh
12 October 1915

Most Beloved Baburam Maharaj,

I feel highly gratified on receiving your long letter giving all the information in detail. This is indicative of your kindness and love. Mind becomes dry

if I don't get such letter from you for a long time. The Master's grace transcends all limitations and barriers. The current of his mercy moves with great velocity and force—even a downward drift is drawn upwards. The 'pumping system' that is at work now has surpassed the limits of natural laws. There is a fight going on with science and nature. What to speak of this hill, the current of your love passes over the unsurmountable and intractable mountain of *avidyā* even, and makes the ordinary mortal's life blessed. You have all truly understood the Master alone to be the doer—there is no doubt about it. You are all chiselled out of his hands—how can the sense of being the doer arise in your minds? Never. The egoism in you all is the egoism of the servant, the egoism of the child, the egoism of the devotee—not so much the ordinary harmful egoism. Your letter, full of advice and instruction, has been very pleasing to me. You were no doubt speaking to your own self; but I felt as if you were addressing those ambrosial words of the Master to myself. If I get such letters from you at times, I shall derive indescribable bliss and encouragement. There is life in what you all say. If the words are not vibrant with life, they do not kindle our hearts. . . .

C. R. Das has come here with his family; he will go to Mayavati. . . . Poor Frank's liver is very much upset; with the result, he is unwell from the last so many days. Moreover, the poor fellow has no money with him; Mother Sevier gives him something. But his nature has become very fine now—his mind has turned towards prayer and other spiritual practices. He has a great desire to spend some days at the Math and Calcutta this time. . . .

Hari Maharaj continues to be in the same condition. At this season in the Math, you should be a little careful about your health—this season is very bad there. . . . Accept my heartfelt love and salutations, as also Hari Maharaj's. Kindly write now and then letters of affection and love.

Servant—Tarak

PS. One day, the Master was conversing with a Marwari devotee seated in his room at Dakshineswar. After a little discussion on the topic of attachment, the Master told the devotee in the end: 'All the modifications (*vṛttis*) of a *sādhu's* mind drop off, except one, namely, compassion.' In our language, we call it love, by which the Lord binds together for ever the devotees of various temperaments and, overcome by which compassion or love, He bodies Himself forth in every age, undergoing much suffering, and brings about the welfare of humanity; and but for which the welfare of the ordinary mortals of the world can never come about. The Vedas and other scriptures are always there; the places of pilgrimage are also always there; saints and holy persons are also to be found somewhere or other at all times—but still there occurs a decline of righteousness in the world. This is the verdict of history. Therefore, for the sake of ordinary mortals, in other words, 'for the welfare of the many, for the happiness of the many', the Lord, out of compassion, bodies Himself forth sometimes.

RELIGION: THE SUBSTANCE AND THE SHADOW

[EDITORIAL]

What is religion? There would possibly be no single answer to the question. Each one would answer in his own way. In the course of its long history and development, it has woven round itself so many ideas, associations, and external practices that it means different things to different people. Some would say that it is the realization of Truth; some others that it is the experience of the highest love; some others that it is the practice of virtue and righteousness; and still others regard it variously as the apprehension of the Infinite, unravelling the mystery of the universe, a disposition that makes for piety, reverence, and dependence on God; or as an emotional reaction to the idea of the supernatural imbedded in us, a harmonious adjustment to an unseen order on which our supreme good depends, and so on and so forth. Many identify it with mythology, ritualistic practices, magic, dreams, visions, austerity, and rites and ceremonies, not to speak of the sceptic moderners who, with Freudians, cast it off as a mere myth and illusion, or with Marx and Engels, dub it as 'the keystone of a perverted civilization, a lie cooked up by the priests to keep the masses in ignorance and subjection, the sob of the oppressed creature, the opium of the poor, which provides an illusory happiness'. The last mentioned view, of course, is itself 'the keystone of a perverted civilization', but even among those who take a kindly and reasonable attitude towards religion, a uniform answer to the question 'What is religion?' seems to be impossible, as we see from the diversity of the opinions referred to above. But if such an answer is to be given, it can only be that religion is fundamentally a matter of experience, which can be had by anybody, anywhere,

who has the necessary will and desire to divest himself of his inordinate longing for the trivialities of life and dive deep into the recesses of his consciousness. That is the fundamental fact of religion, its alpha and omega; the rest are only views, partial views, about the real truth, the external opinions of outsiders, who have no access to that experience.

All religions emphasize this importance of experience; only some do it more clearly, others less clearly. In fact, religions have their origin in the experiences of their founders, and derive their vitality and sustenance by the experiences of the successors to whom the torch of wisdom is handed on by the founders. Moses saw God in the burning bush; Jesus 'saw the heavens opened and the Spirit like a dove descending upon him'; Saul, the persecutor, had the vision of light and was transformed into Paul, the saint and apostle; Mohammed heard the voice of God; and so every prophet. And when we study Hinduism, we find this idea of realizing, experiencing religion and religious truths, and not merely talking about them, taking the form of a passion with its adherents. This is its distinctive characteristic. Throughout the Vedic and subsequent literature, the idea of realizing religion rings in resonant voice. 'I have realized the great Being who shines effulgent, like the sun, beyond all darkness', declares the Vedic seer, and this declaration is reiterated again and again in later literature by others who stand as witnesses to its truth. That is why in the Vedas the sages and composers are called *ṛṣis* or *mantra-draṣṭas*, the seers of the *mantras* and not mere composers. Their compositions are not merely the product of their in-

tellec or emotion, but verily the truths they perceived through introspection and inner searching. This experience of the seers forms the background, the main plank of Indian philosophy.

In the West, it is only theology, if at all, that has some basis in experience. But it tends to be dogmatic in its assertions. It exclusively confines itself to the particular experiences of the saints belonging to the Christian church, and upholds only the doctrines which that church formulates for its followers. Philosophy, however, is largely speculative there, having no roots in experience. It is satisfied with an intellectual assessment and affirmation of the plausibility of the existence of an ultimate reality, whose nature is set forth in logical terms through an *a posteriori* analysis of the phenomena visible to senses and mind. Such conclusions drawn from such a one-sided analysis, based on pure reasoning and on data supplied by the impure senses and mind and on premises regarded as universally valid though not necessarily so, can have and has in fact no relevance to the practical life of the philosopher himself or to the layman. It brings no conviction or solace to the heart, and provides no incentive to translate philosophy into practice. At the most, it may provide an intellectual enjoyment and satisfaction.

In India, on the other hand, philosophy has been a vehicle to convey, in as logical and systematic a way as possible, the spiritual truths realized by a succession of teachers—ancient and contemporary. The philosophers who attempted to present these body of truths couched in a logical form were themselves men of extraordinary spiritual attainments and were saints of exemplary lives, and they brought to bear upon the particular systems of philosophy they propounded the light of their own spiritual wisdom. Philosophy, thus, became in their hands an instrument developed to

establish the truths realized by them and others on the firm foundation of reason and logic. In this, they were motivated by two considerations: Firstly, by the need to confirm for themselves the reality of their experiences, that they were not mere hallucinations of their sick brains, but could stand the severest tests of logic and reason and fit in with the tested laws and principles of the universe; secondly, by the humanitarian desire to convince others about the truth of these experiences, so that they, too, may strive to realize them. And in formulating the reality about man's being and that of the universe around him, which is the essence of the spiritual experience and the subject of their system of philosophy, they took their stand on the intrinsic nature of the spiritual experience as such and on the universal character of that experience, and not on the singular experiences of particular individuals, as many theologians do.

Now, we must make a distinction between the spiritual experience in itself and its interpretation given by the different systems of philosophy. The experience is one and integral and direct (*pratyakṣa*), and inexpressible except through symbols and imagery. The interpretations of that experience, however, may be and are many and they are based on mere inference (*anumāna*); and they differ in the degree of their approximation to truth. Theory, dogma, speculation, the various doctrines about reality, all fall into the latter category, and change from place to place and time to time, but the experience itself is eternal and authoritative. For a person who has come in direct contact with God, who has apprehended Him in his inner consciousness, that experience is as real as, if not more real than, the perception of the external world by others or by himself. The feeling of communion with the Divine, the awe and reverence It evokes in him, are

the normal state of his being. He himself is not troubled by the doubt whether his experience stands the test of logic or not, whether the object of his experience is real or not. The feeling of certitude is so strong in him. Such men represent religion at its best; their integral vision is the authority for religion. And we see them acting in a particular way, behaving in a particular manner, in the light of their experience. When we who are strangers to that experience try to understand and interpret this behaviour of theirs, we do so in the light of our own experiences. Moreover, we have perforce to make use of the powers of the mind—the intellect, emotion, and will, and we interpret it according to the predilections of our mind. It is the case even if the experiencers themselves were to attempt to describe their experience. They have to do so in terms of the different powers of the mind and its previous contents prior to the dawn of that experience. That is how we come to have such different readings of that experience even by the experiencers themselves. Mohammed claimed that the Angel Gabriel came to him in a cave and took him on the heavenly horse, Harak, and he visited the heavens. Christ felt God descending on him in the form of a dove. The tools of sense and intellect are inadequate to describe that reality. So symbols, myths, and metaphors, taken from the environment in which the saint or seer is bred and brought up, are made use of to transmit it to others. These symbolic representations and the interpretations given by various systems of philosophy give us but a glimpse of that experience. They should not be mistaken for the experience itself, which transcends them. They are like the theories of science regarding the nature of the external world. These theories are just a sort of 'pictorial representation of the reality of the external world.

These, as Sir James Jeans observes, will never describe nature itself, but only our observations on nature. Even so, the different forms of religion, the vivid descriptions of the spiritual experience given by them, just give a graphic picture of an ineffable experience which is beyond them. The experience is the substance of religion; the forms, its shadow. So we should be wary in accepting uncritically the superficial estimation of the psychologists and others who dismiss spiritual experience as a kind of hallucination or hysteria or mental aberration of a highly-strung sensitive brain, relying merely on the physical effects visible in the person who has that experience or on the ordinary standards of judgement of our workaday world.

The experience itself, as we said, is inexpressible. Yet it is easy to recognize it when it manifests itself in a person. For the person himself it is self-evident, and does not require any proof. External standards of logic or metaphysics neither prove nor disprove its reality. It is a complete and sufficient experience in itself. Absorbed in it, one does not feel the need of any other. It is of the nature of integral, undivided consciousness, blissful, and whole. In it all distinctions of the subject and object, knower and the known disappear; past and present merge in the timeless Spirit; and man is aware of his own pristine glory. The individual self is absorbed in the universal Self. The sense of I and mine ceases to be. Only God is, and nothing else. All the powers of the mind—thoughts, feelings, emotions, instincts—are integrated and transcended. They are purified and sublimated and gain significance and validity. That highest experience is the response of the whole personality to the call of the Divine in him. All the faculties and energies of the human mind are employed in seeking and enjoying the object of the experience. 'The in-

tellest is active in cognizing the glory and majesty of God, the emotion in experiencing the delight of divine bliss, and the will in consecrating all activities by complete surrender to Him.'

Each view of that experience is only a partial view of the whole truth. Each aspirant may conceive of God, the object of that experience, in his own way as the most perfect ideal. One may think of Him as Christ, another as Buddha, still another as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc., or as the absolute Brahman. As the *Bhāgavata* (I. ii. 11) tells us, 'The knowers of Truth speak of Reality as knowledge of the (unchanging) One without a second; the same (Reality) is declared to be Brahman (by the Upaniṣads), Paramātmān (by those who worship Hiraṇyagarbha), and God (by the devotees)'. Only one should not think that his own view of it is the real one and the rest are false. The personal God and the impersonal Absolute are not two different entities. They appear as different in different stages of our development, and in the highest stage they merge into one and are seen as our own self. It is the same indwelling Spirit that is looked upon in the initial stages of our spiritual life as a personal God, infinitely superior and full of blessed qualities. This God is not an extracosmic entity dwelling somewhere in heavens, but is the man's inner ideal, the ideal into which he has to develop himself by effort. This ideal is objectified in the beginning stages of our spiritual endeavour through imagination. The individual gradually acquires all the fundamental characteristics of his ideal, which he does not possess at the start of his spiritual quest, and in course of time feels himself as part of God, and finally as one with him. These are the three gradations of spiritual life—Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Advaita. It is very well expressed in a Sanskrit verse attributed to Hanumān :

'When I think of myself as an embodied being, I am your servant; when I think of myself as an individual soul, I am a part of you; but when I realize I am the Ātman, I am one with you.'

The spiritual experience confers on the individual immortality, freedom, and bliss. He is freed from the ordinary trammels and tensions of life and enjoys perfect inward peace and tranquillity in the midst of external pains and miseries. Success and defeat, pain and pleasure, do not disturb his equanimity, well established as he is in his own self, and he is ever full of joy, confidence, and strength. As Nārada says in his *Bhakti-Sūtra*, 'Gaining that, man realizes his perfection and divinity and becomes thoroughly contented. Attaining that, man has no more desire for anything; is free from grief and hatred; he does not rejoice over anything; he does not exert himself in furtherance of self-interest. Realizing that, man becomes intoxicated and fascinated, as it were, because he is completely immersed in the enjoyment of the bliss of the Ātman, the truest and highest self.' The heavens of which the scriptures speak are not an extracosmic region, but this state of existence where we are completely satisfied with ourselves, where all ignorance and darkness have disappeared, and we are bereft of sadness and misery and despair. The ordinary joys of life are nothing compared with the infinite joy we derive from the spiritual experience. In the face of Reality, the mystery of the universe stands revealed.

The vision of the Infinite, the insight into the beyond, transforms the life of the individual. His old self is dead, and he now lives in God. His outlook on life is transfigured. His conflicts are resolved. The enlightened man is not afraid of anything or tormented by such doubt and remorse as 'Why did I not perform good deeds, and why did I perform bad deeds?',

as the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (II. ix. 1) puts it. He lives in perfect harmony with himself and the universe around him. His body, mind, and soul work in unison. For him there is no contradiction between the temporal and the transcendental, the secular and the sacred. When everything has become the Lord Himself, what is there to be rejected and what accepted? Everything is welcome, happiness, misery, good, evil. The spiritual life of the really religious is not an exclusive thing, lived alone in the recesses of solitude; it embraces the whole of his being and invests all his activities with a nobility of character and splendour of realization. Identified with the entire universe, the realized man feels the misery of mankind intensely, and stretches his hand for its redemption, braving the sorrows and crises of life that may come in the way. He himself is beyond all sorrow and suffering, having touched the feet of the Lord, but his heart goes out in sympathy for the suffering humanity. To be religious is not to be stony-hearted and dry and indifferent to the agonies of the world. Rather, the religious man welcomes misery if he could remove the misery of others by

that. He does not even care for his own salvation, leaving others to their own fate. 'I desire not the supreme state with all its perfections nor the release from rebirth; may I assume the sorrow of all creatures who suffer and enter into them so that they may be made free from grief' is the prayer of Rantideva (*Bhāgavata*, IX. xxi. 12), and many other devotees. So he immerses himself in the service of the entire humanity. And in extending his helping hand, he makes no distinction between friend and foe. All are equal to him, and his love flows towards all in an equal measure. Love for the entire humanity is the very nature of his being, and he cannot help loving all. Consequently, local loyalties, dogmatism, sectarianism, etc. are alien to him. As a Sanskrit verse says: 'The considerations of mine and the other afflict only small-witted persons. For the broad-minded, the entire universe is their family.' They see in every human being and in every form of worship the same divinity working. These men are the guiding spirits of the earth. Their realization of divinity within all is the essence of religion. Nay, that is real religion, the rest is mere shadow.

VALIDITY OF CATEGORIES

DR. P. S. SASTRI

Philosophical thinking seeks to explain the universe or Reality with the aid of a few basic categories which are revealed or presented to the mind because of the reasoning activity. Reasoning cannot take place if doubt has not arisen. (*Parīśuddhi* on I.i.23) Doubt presupposes truth and knowledge of truth. The doubt actually refers to the problem whether our knowledge is true. That there may be some ab-

solutely valid truth is admitted by the very emergence of doubt. At the same time, doubting presumes the operation of certain necessary laws of thought.

LIMITED SCOPE AND RELATIVE VALUE OF CATEGORIES

Doubt is a wavering judgement in which the definite cognition of the specific character of an object is not found. It arises

from the cognition of the characters common to the objects concerned, or from the cognition of the characters that distinguish an object from others, or from the presence of contradictory views. Such a wavering judgement appears because of the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions. (*Nyāya-Sūtra*, I. i. 23)

A man and a post can have similar qualities of length and breadth. When one is not able to decide whether the object is a man or a post, he has an uncertain cognition. The specific characters of the objects are remembered, but not perceived. (*Tātparyatīkā*, I. i. 23) Yet he takes it to be a perceptual experience, and the confusion begets doubt, which can be set at rest only by appealing to actual experience.

A doubt can arise even from the cognition of the specific features of an object. When two entities are disjoined, or when they come into contact, sound is produced. The cognition of this specific feature can land us in doubt as to the real nature of sound. It is an entity like substance, quality, and action. (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, I. i. 23) This multiple reference is a fruitful ground of doubt, when each referent is not treated separately. It is to ward off such doubts that philosophers have introduced categories with which they seek to interpret the universe or Reality.

We have a doubt also when contradictory notions are incapable of either proof or disproof. (*ibid.*, I. i. 23) This evidently would tell us that a doubt can be set at rest not by an appeal to reason or to any category, but to actual fact. The categories, too, refer to the facts. But doubt appears to have a wider field of operation. Then the categories cannot evidently set at rest all possible doubts.

Doubt is based on the cognition of properties common to two or more objects, not on the cognition of properties alone.

When we cognize a property as belonging to a definite object, or as being common to two objects, we can have no doubt. When the cognition of common properties appears in regard to one thing, say colour, doubt cannot arise with reference to another like touch. And doubt cannot also arise about an object regarding which we have a true or valid cognition. (*ibid.*, II. i. 1) The person who doubts is one who knows that there are diverse views about the object concerned, one who is aware of the uncertainty. Of the diverse views, each view is the settled conviction of one who thinks that that is capable of proving its truth. The doubt is for one who finds both the views equally convincing. The cognizer who cognizes an object as having a certain character has no uncertainty about this character or about the object not possessing some other character. (*ibid.*, II. i. 2-3) There can be no uncertainty about any cognition as long as it is actually a cognition. Moreover, even if I have an uncertainty about something, I am certain as far as this uncertainty is concerned. In other words, there does not appear to be any ground for the emergence of a doubt. If I am not certain about my uncertainty, I do not have a real uncertainty. Then, too, no doubt can arise. (*ibid.*, II. i. 4) Doubt is said to arise from the cognition of a property common to two or more entities. This property remains the same even when the differentiating feature of the object is clearly perceived. As long as the common property persists, so long should doubt, too, persist. (*ibid.*, II. i. 5) When we have the cognition of such a common property, we have also to account for its existence. Doubt does imply a certain kind or form of existence which appears to be more or less similar to the entity emerging in an erroneous cognition. There, too, we admit later the existence of a common property. It is the cognition

of the common property that gives rise to doubt. (ibid., II. i. 6) The doubt here is subsequent to the cognition, and this order in time introduces into the situation the activities like comparison and contrast, and also a felt need to have a clean and orderly picture of the universe. This felt need is at the root of many philosophies.

At the time when doubt arises, the idea we have appears to be of the form : 'I am now perceiving a property that is common to two entities known to me ; and I am not perceiving any property that belongs to any one of these specifically. How can I find some such specific property whereby I may be certain as to one or the other ?' Such a doubt does not cease merely on the cognition of a common property. (ibid., II. i. 6) It demands the apprehension of a unique feature. The awareness of the unique is one of the ways to quieten the doubting activity ; and uniqueness in its turn is determined by the knowledge, application, and awareness of the categories.

Two contradictory statements can be true if the object possesses the contradictory qualities. Such a possession would need a specific attending circumstance. When we do not perceive such a circumstance, we cannot be certain as to the truth of this or that view. (ibid., II. i. 6) This possibility again limits the operation of the categories.

When the real character of a thing is not known well, there is put forward a reasoning in support of a certain conclusion. This is done for the purpose of ascertaining the real character. The function of the reasoning is to show the undesirability or absurdity of a contrary conclusion. This is the nature of the hypothetical argument (*Nyāya-Sūtra*, II. i. 40), and it does admit the valid possibility of a genuine doubt. The hypothetical judgement presupposes as its basis a disjunctive one. Out of the possible alternatives, one is chosen to prove

that the others are faulty. (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, II. i. 40) But the either-or basis surely admits the inapplicability or inadequacy of the categories. We have a desire to know the real character of an entity like space. Then arises the doubt whether it is limited or unlimited. If we accept one of these and show that the other lands us in absurdity, we employ the hypothetical judgement. The conclusion we thus reach is at best tentative and not final. But till the contradictory emerges, we take the conclusion to be final. These conclusions are like the categories having a relative value.

INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS IN THE REALIST VIEW

NO PURELY OBJECTIVE REAL WORLD

To understand and interpret the universe intelligibly and without self-contradiction, categories are employed by us. These categories may be derived from the mind or from the universe. But this is not important. The important factor is elsewhere. In any metaphysical enquiry, we have to start with the world of experience (*saṃvid eva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam*—quoted in *Vaiśeṣika Upa-skāra* on VII. ii. 26). This world is revealed to the normal man as made up of many independent reals ; and one's knowledge is said to acquire its specific character from these reals. (*Nyāyamañjarī*, I. 124) These are presupposed in all experience, and they include the entities traditionally treated as primary and secondary qualities along with life and consciousness. But by categories we mean the pervasive characters of the existents.

The term *padārtha* is employed by the realist to denote a category. *Padārtha* means the meaning of a word ; and by extension, it means the thing denoted by a word. This usage

implies that reality can be expressed or denoted by language. The categories are then words denoting various reals which are objective facts. They seek to classify the reals in a convenient way. A category may then be said to represent a class of reals, or a form of reality. But the reality covered by these categories appears in realism to exclude the self. The categories are designed to study that aspect of reality which is intrinsically unconscious and which at the same time is substantive. (*Praśastapāda*, 20) Time, relative position and space or *ākāśa* constitute the general framework of the cosmos (*ibid.*, 22), which is said to be rendered intelligible by the application of the categories.

The categories, observes *Praśastapāda*, have certain specific common characteristics. Isness, nameability, and knowability are the properties of each category. (*ibid.*, 16 ; cf. *Nyāyakandaḥ*, 16) Each category has a distinct form or isness ; it has a name, and it is an object of cognition. Consequently, the category is not a mental construction, but an objective real. Then it cannot stand for a class. It ought to be like any other particular existent. How can it then be a class inclusive of particulars ? It can be a class only when we can deny an objective physical existence to it.

Since reality is said to be revealed to us in and through the categories, reality, too, must have isness besides a name and knowability. But once we admit knowability to be a property of reality, we have also to accept all that which knowability implies. The most important implication is that an entity is not knowable in the absence of a conscious thinking subject. Reality, which is no other than the extended universe for the realist, ought to be relative to a subject. In other words, there can be no purely objective real world. Moreover, each of these characteristics is said to be indistinguishable from

the very being of reality. (*Nyāyakandaḥ*, 16) Any one of these can define reality fully. (*Tarkadīpikā*, 2 ; *Saptapadārthā*, 2) Then reality will be a particular existent.

PROPERTY OF ISNESS

By isness is meant the specific or distinctive form of a thing. (*Nyāyakandaḥ*, 16) It is an exclusive characteristic. We are told that isness is not the same as existence. The Vaiśeṣika considers existence to be the highest or most comprehensive universal. It brings together all existents, irrespective of their mutual differences. (*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, I. ii. 4) Moreover, while the isness of a thing is not other than its own self, its existence can be a separable feature. The isness seems to be the essence of a thing. It is the essence that makes an entity a real one ; and it is existence which transforms it into an existent one. Before it can be an existent, it must be a real. (*Nyāyakandaḥ*, 16) Here is a paradox. The real need not be an existent, though every existent is a real. This paradox is the result of holding that the categories are the basic properties of the external universe. This position ignores the mental character of the categories. It is quite likely that the categories partake of the subjective and objective qualities.

While existence ignores the individual differences, it is isness which distinguishes an entity from any other. To say that something is real is to admit that it is identical with itself and different from any other. (*ibid.*, 29) It is as such a determinate entity ; and yet it can remain without the property called existence. But how can a non-existent fact be a determinate one ? A determinate fact is always an existent and this implies that isness cannot be distinguished from existence in such a facile way as is done by the realist. 'A is' and 'A exists' cannot be distinguish-

able statements. At least, popular usage takes them to be synonymous. But the realist cannot accept such a position because of the primacy of the category of relation in his system of thought.

THE CONCEPT OF BEING

The concept of being is in trouble in the realist metaphysics. When we predicate 'being', what do we mean? To say that it is what is only affirmed is to offer a synonym instead of a reply. Nor can we admit that being denotes the unique essence of a thing, since non-being, too, has its own unique essence. Being is a class concept applicable to all the six affirmative categories; and a unique essence excludes the idea of a class concept. (*Khandana-khāṇḍa-khāḍya*, 1043) To argue that being is the subject of the predicate 'is' is to include non-being. When we say that there is the non-being of the jar here, we are actually predicating 'is' to non-being. (Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā*, 274; *Khandana*, 1043) The subject of 'is' can be being or non-being. Then 'is' is other than both being and non-being.

It may be argued that being is that which is not understood as the negation of the other. (*Khandana*, 1046) Here the qualification 'of the other' is vague and misleading. Even non-being can be the negation 'of the other'. Being is relative to non-being. Only by negating or excluding non-being can being be being. (ibid., 1047) If the realist argues that being is never apprehended as the negation of non-being, his definition of isness or essence contradicts him. A determination by affirmation or even by negation is thus found to be inadequate to answer the category of isness. Nor can we take these two apart from one another. Pure being which is unrelated to non-being is a fiction. For instance, consider the statement: 'There is not the non-being of a vase on

the table.' Here we are not affirming the mere being of the vase, nor are we affirming non-being. The being of the vase is only implied by this statement. (ibid., 1049) Such an implication does not, however, carry us far. The negation of non-being can directly imply being only when these are the only two forms of an entity. That these are the only forms is suggested by the law of the excluded middle. But our analysis of the erroneous apprehension reveals that this law is not actually valid. There we have the law of the excluded fourth or fifth, since we get at least four possibilities, each of which is unacceptable. Hence the negation of being or of non-being need not imply the affirmation of the other.

Being is not definable, though it is experienced. Indefinability cannot eliminate it. But when the realist claims to know and to designate reality, we have a right to expect a valid definition of being. Designation implies concreteness or particularity, and this would then deny the predication of being to everything except to itself. Then, being would have to be both the subject and the predicate. Where we have the identity of subject and predicate, there we have the absolutist position, and the entire realist movement is actually driving us to this conclusion.

It may be contended that being is the subject of a judgement which does not own non-being as its subject. Then we should first know what non-being is. And Mathuranātha has admitted that non-being is an unanalysable characteristic of reality. (On *Tattvacintāmani*, I. 175; cf. McTaggart: *Nature of Existence*, I. 5) Reality should then be both being and non-being. This would vitiate the validity of the law of contradiction. But it would show that the reality we apprehend around us is a unique blend of being and non-being, of the real and the unreal, of the true and the false. Such a blend is

spoken of as inexplicable, as an appearance, in Advaita.

CHARACTER OF EXISTENCE

Existence is assumed by the realist as the common character of all existents. (*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, I. ii. 7) It is a class-concept referring, however, only to substance, quality, and action. Even though the other categories are not non-existents, they are not credited by the realist with the attribute of existence. (*Nyāyakandalī*, 19; *Kiraṇāvalī*, 31) Still they are said to function as if they are existential objects of cognitions. Some categories exist and some appear *as if* they exist. The difference expressed by *as if* here is only that one is perceivable while the other is conceivable. The purely conceivable is also said, therefore, to have a kind of existence. Universal, particularity, and inherence are said to have a being of their own, unconnected with existence. (*Nyāyakandalī*, 19) This being makes them particulars. The being of a particular which is unconnected with existence may be a conceptual possibility. But while being makes an object concrete and definite, what does existence determine? Does it contribute anything specific? Is it merely a repetition of the former without a reason? Later realists tried to overcome this difficulty by arguing that the first three categories have the character of existence directly through inherence, and that the universal and particularity are only indirectly qualified by existence, because they inhere along with existence in a common substratum. Inherence, too, is said to exist along with existence in the same substratum. (*Kiraṇāvalī Bhāskara* of Padmanābha, 44, S. B. Text) In other words, the first three have a direct positive relation to existence, while the other three are related to the same through a common substratum. (*Dinakarī*,

40-41) If inherence exists along with existence, what is the kind of existence that mere inherence has? This difficulty is created by an untenable distinction between being and existence. The being of an entity is no other than its existence. But the expression 'the being of an entity' gives rise to the mistaken notion that the entity in itself is other than being.

The trouble with these categories increases as we examine these two groups of categories. Anything contingent or destructible, anything that can bring forth merit or demerit, is an existent fact. Such facts can be only substances, qualities, or actions. (cf. *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, VIII. ii. 2) The second group gives us eternal entities (*Nyāyakandalī*, 17; *Vaiśeṣika Upaskāra* on I. i. 8), or at least those that subsist permanently. This is another way of pointing to the old distinction between the perceivable and the conceivable. The conceivable in this context is more of the nature of a relation. Thus we get back to the problem of terms and relation, or terms in relation. Since the terms are in relation, existence would then involve both terms and relations.

The first group of three categories function causally among themselves, and they can also give rise to knowledge. The second group does not have such a causal function in the objective world. The universal gives rise to the concept of identity, particularity to that of difference, and inherence to that of a constitutive ground. With the help of these subjective concepts, we are said to infer their existence. (*Kiraṇāvalī*, 30) Then the categories of the second group are only our mental constructions. Universal and particularity depend for their very existence on human thought. (*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, I. ii. 3) Then, how can we establish a relation between a mental construct and an objective entity? One would appear to be independent of the

other, and as such one may not need the other for its existence or completeness. This difficulty is in addition to all the troubles entailed by the concept of relation. Moreover, mere causal efficacy between the mental and the physical is not easily intelligible or explicable, if only because non-being, too, is causally efficient. The non-existence of thorns on a certain road enables me to go freely. In this, it differs from pure nothingness, which cannot cause either knowledge or activity. (*Kusumāñjali*, I. 101-2) That is, non-being or non-existence is other than nothingness.

NATURE OF CATEGORIES IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PHYSICS

Indian systems of thought differ from one another in their lists of categories. Kumārila accepts substance, quality, activity, universal, and non-being. Prabhākara accepts the first four, and adds inherence, potency, similarity, and number. Potency and number are taken by Kumārila to be qualities. The Vaiśeṣika accepts the first four of Kumārila, and adds universal and particularity. The later realists have added negation to this list. (*Nyāyakandaṭṭhī*, 7; *Saptapadārthā*, 3; *Kiraṇāvalī*, 6) The logical realists enumerate sixteen categories called the means of valid cognition, objects of cognition, doubt, motive, example, established conclusions, members of a syllogism, hypothetical reasoning, demonstrated knowledge, discussion, disputation, wrangling, fallacious reason, casuistry, pointless rejoinder, and vulnerable points in an argument. (*Nyāya-Sūtra*, I. i. 1) Of these sixteen, the second covers the universe, and the Vaiśeṣika categories refer to this alone. The other categories of the logical realist are mostly epistemological and not ontological. (*Nyāyamañjarī*, I. 11) In the examination of the categories, we are concerned with epistemology only so far as it concerns ontology. Thus, in a

way, the sixteen categories of the realist are exhaustive, involving wider problems of enquiry. But our basic problem is an ontological one.

Consider the nature of the category called quality. The quality that can be predicated of a subject can be objectively real, or unreal, or both real and unreal. (*Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, p. 64) A real quality cannot be predicated of a totally unreal subject. But we can predicate and later negate an unreal quality of an unreal subject; we can also similarly negate the presence of a jar said to be resting on the horns of a hare. Since negation is not possible in the absence of a prior cognition, the unreal becomes cognizable. Then we may have to devise categories that can apply even to the unreal.

The new scientific approach to the nature of the world appears to put an end to the old lists of categories. But this does not simplify or solve any of our major difficulties in question. To the modern mind, there are only two ultimate substances called positive and negative electricity. One can take these two as the basic categories and proceed. But we have only to take a careful look at the picture. For the special theory of relativity has given rise to the fusion of time and space in one unitary concept. Their relation to each other, says Planck, is similar to that between a real number and an imaginary number, when these are fused to form a concept of a complex number. (Max Planck: *The Philosophy of Physics*, p. 18) Here we may note the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view that the subjective and the objective categories are alike deduced from one principle only. In the hierarchy of evolution, the subjective categories have a precedence.

Science begins by assuming that a general rule or law dominates throughout nature. As Kant said, the concept of causality is one of the categories said to be

given *a priori*. But pure thought cannot reveal the nature and content of these laws. It is the investigation of nature that can reveal this. Hence, one can never predict exactly and precisely anything about a natural event. Even the validity of the law of causality cannot be demonstrated by an exact experiment, because every measurement necessarily involves errors of observation; 'and Planck's quantum implies a fixed objective limitation of the exactitude which can be reached, within which limit there is no causality but only doubt and contingency' (ibid., pp. 24-25). This takes us back to a rejection of the possibility of knowing the universe, or to an acceptance of the world of objects for a fresh enquiry.

RELATION BETWEEN SUBJECT AND OBJECT

The existence of objects implies a subject. When we speak of the relation of subject and object, we are talking of something untenable. (See *Advaitasiddhi*, 453-4; *Pañcadaśī*, I. 50, 52; Śaṅkara's *Brahma-Sūtra-bhāṣya*, 6) The subject is subject, and the object, too, is object. The relation should be between these two. But when I say that I see an apple, the relation has a meaning only to the subject. Meaning is psychological or ideational or both. The relation and the meaning are true to the subject, and they are of the subject. The object, then, is not a term of the relation. What is supposed to be outside does not figure in knowledge. All relation, thus, appears to be within knowledge, not between knowledge and something outside it. If there is a relation with the external, this relation can be neither known nor verified. This difficulty is more clearly manifested when we get back to the concept of existence.

In what way are the categories related

to existence? If the existence of the categories is accepted to be the property subsisting in what is an object made known by a means of right cognition, this property would have to be distinct from the categories. (*Tattva-saṅgraha*, 573) Existence would be an additional category, though it is said to be a property. Then, what is the relation that subsists between the categories and this property? It cannot be one of conjunction, since the realist restricts it only to substances. Any other relation is equally impossible. (ibid., 574-5) There can be no inherent relation, because it would lead to a regress. If no relation is possible, the property of existence cannot belong to the categories. If it is related merely because it is produced by them, then there are other entities like water which would be related to objects like tank in the same way. Then one need not postulate the reality of relations. (ibid., 576) Moreover, if existence is a category, we may have to postulate the existence of this existence, and this will land us in an infinite regress. (ibid., 577)

As we seek to understand and apply the categories, we seem to be withdrawing from the external world. The modern physicist, for example, seeks to establish a law which can connect the events of the world of sense with one another and also with those of the real world. (See Max Planck: *The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics*, p. 12) But as his understanding of the physical world advances, it also recedes from the world of sense. Thus, we have the fusion of momentum and energy, and the identity of mass with energy. The laws of gravitation are reduced to Riemann's geometry. While a new set of entities has been released by the theory of relativity, the quantum theory has introduced a new and universal constant, which establishes an equation between energy and frequency. This en-

deavour shows that the reality of the existence of any entity is not beyond doubt; and yet, in the absence of our presumption of its existence, no argument is possible. When the very existence of the entity is doubted, all inference will come to a standstill. All that an argument can do is to apply a middle term to the subject affirmatively or negatively; but no middle term is capable of proving the existence of a subject whose existence is unproven. As the middle term of an unproven entity, it will be ungrounded. If it negates something of such a subject, it will be implying the affirmation of the contradictory of the unproven; and this is dubious, since the unproven need not necessarily be a non-existent. If it affirms and also negates something of such a subject, the middle term will be inconclusive. (*Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā*, 412-3; *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, 74)

THE INTEGRAL APPROACH OF ADVAITA

In order to avoid these difficulties and also to affirm a reality, the Advaita offers the important concept of Saccidānanda. 'Sat' refers to being, existence, self-existence, real. 'Cit' is thinking, thought, knowledge, intellect. 'Ānanda' is joy, bliss, value. The first implies action and covers all the so-called categories of realism. The second is knowledge and may be said to cover idealism. The third is the category of value. This concept is an integral one. It implies that in order to apprehend a world of objects, we need a ground that can reveal it. Revealing implies that the object is hidden or enveloped earlier and that it is revealed in and to the apprehending self. The removal of any such enveloping form can be due to the activity of a valid cognition or to the revelatory character of consciousness. We cannot invoke the former, since we do have at times

the cognition of two moons even without the operation of any valid means of cognition. Nor can we take up the second alternative, since the enveloping form, too, must depend on consciousness. The object, as the not-self, has no self-revelatory character; and in such a situation, the enveloping form serves no purpose.

It is this form appearing to us as the spatio-temporal universe which is a phenomenal appearance. Is this character of appearance true or false? If we accept the former, we will have a true appearance beside a true reality. But the being of the universe is negated like the being of the snake in the rope. In this negation, the ground of the appearance is not eliminated. Negation does not exist independently of its ground. As such, the negation of the universe is no other than the affirmation of its ground, which is the absolute reality. Even then, these two are liable to imply the identity of the Absolute with the spatio-temporal universe. If the world is an appearance, then the appearance like the snake has a character other than that of its ground, the rope. The snake appears by participating in the existence of the rope. In other words, the character of appearance cannot be designated by the term true. Can we take it to be false? If it is false, the world is no longer an appearance, but a hard reality.

But when it is argued that 'the world is real, because it is falsely treated as an appearance', there is no necessary invariable relation between the major term 'real' and the middle 'falsely treated as an appearance'. A false appearance is other than truth. The appearance of nacre as silver is a false appearance; and it is not as such true. And since there can be a false appearance which can validly be negated, it is not logical to establish a necessary relation between false appear-

ance and truth.

The nacre-silver cannot be viewed as truly true, as non-erroneously true, or as truly false. Silver itself being unreal, this appearance cannot be true. (*Nyāyāmṛta*, 43) To this silver, we can predicate truth or falsehood. But the silver being false, both the predications are false. When the silver is unreal, its unreality cannot be described as real, because reality and unreality do not refer to the same order of reality. In whatever way we pursue, the concepts of existence, real, and true do not appear to solve the difficulty that faced us at the outset. Of two contradictory notions, when one is negated, the other cannot be said to be affirmed. Thus, when I state that the barren woman's son is not tall, I am not affirming his shortness, for the simple reason that there is no such son. Tallness and shortness are here equally false, because the barren woman's son has no reality. (*ibid.*, 43) In other words, the characteristics of the non-existent thing are necessarily non-existent. Qualities cannot exist in the absence of the substances on which alone they can depend.

Two contradictory features can coexist at least in a negative way. This possibility has to be conceded without any difficulty. Here the approach is through non-existence. Cowness and horseness do not co-exist. But with regard to an elephant, I can deny cowness without affirming horseness. As such, of two contradictory concepts, one can be denied without affirming the other. If we are to maintain the law of non-contradiction and hold that the denial of one would mean the affirmation of the other, then we should have only those cases in which the specific features of unreality are not grounded in two mutually contradictory concepts. (See *Advaitasiddhi*, 211-2) Thus, we have the two contradictory concepts of silver and its absolute negation. They exclude one another.

When we affirm silver, its absolute negation is denied. The specific features of the two differ. In the negation of silver, silverhood is the specific mark of the counterpart of negation. Silverhood and its negation are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. But though cowness and horseness cannot coexist, they share the common feature, which is the absolute negation of elephantness. Similarly, the truth and untruth of the phenomenal world are contradictory; and yet they share the common feature of being experienced, of being objective. It is this which makes both these predications untrue. And when the untruth of the phenomenal world is itself untrue, this cannot imply the truth of the world. That is, truth and untruth with regard to the world are only contraries, not contradictories. (*ibid.*, 213, commentary) Since they are contraries, they may not coexist, but their absolute negation can exist in a third ground.

We can then predicate both truth and untruth to the phenomenal world. But they do not have the same form of being. Thus, when we consider the misperceptions like nacre-silver and rope-snake, we admit that the reality of this empirically misperceived existences is not empirical, nor absolute. It is an imaginary reality with which they are invested. The empirically false nacre-silver misleads the perceiver, because he considers it to be real silver. The silver in itself is an unreal one. This unreal silver and the notion of its reality have different orders of reality. The unreal silver is a pragmatic one, while the notion of its reality is imaginary; and both these coexist in the silver. (*ibid.*, 216) These arguments point to the inadequacy of any approach through the categories, because the nature of the world, to which they apply, is itself indeterminate. But the unreality of the phenomenal appearances does not put an end to

the idea of existent truth. It only falsifies that truth; and since it is contradicted only by the absolute experience, it has

an empirical or pragmatic reality. (ibid., 222) The absolute experience is itself beyond the categories.

THE PĀTANJALA YOGA DARŚANA

SWAMI HARSHANANDA

An Indian philosophical system is termed a *darśana*, which literally means seeing or knowing. The secondary meaning, viz a philosophical system containing the way leading to the direct realization of the Truth, is derived from this primary meaning.

The Pātañjala Yoga Darśana is one such philosophical system, associated, as its very name indicates, with the great sage Patañjali.

According to the Hindu traditional view, the Yoga system is one of the most ancient sciences. Its founder is supposed to be Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahmā) himself. Sage Patañjali just followed in the footsteps of the great *yogins* who were his predecessors and systematized their philosophy in his aphorisms. Tradition also attributes two more works to this Patañjali, viz the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini's grammatical aphorisms and a treatise on the science of medicine, as revealed by the following verse :

*Yogena cittasya padena vācam
Malam śarīrasya tu vaidyakena;
Yo' pākarot tam pravaram munīnām
Patañjalim prāñjalir ānato'smi—*

'I bow down to that Patañjali, the best among sages, who destroyed the dirt accruing to the mind, speech, and body through the sciences of Yoga, word, and medical treatment.'

However, the modern scholars do not

subscribe to this view of the identity of the two Patañjalis. They concede that the Yogī Patañjali must have flourished before the 3rd century A.D.

The earliest commentary extant on this terse and technical work of Patañjali is that of one Vyāsa. It is well known as *Vyāsabhāṣya* or *Yoga-bhāṣya*. This Vyāsa should not be mistaken with the famous Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana, the author of the *Mahābhārata*. He is generally placed in the 5th century A.D.

Though *Vyāsabhāṣya* is a little ambiguous in a few places, but for its invaluable help, the *Yoga-Sūtra* could not have been understood clearly.

The *Tattvavaiśārādī* of the famous Vācaspati (9th century A.D.) is a commentary on *Vyāsabhāṣya* and is of great help, especially where the latter is laconic or ambiguous.

There are a few other manuals on Yoga which are very useful: *Vṛtti* and *Yoga-maniprabhā* of Bhojarāja, *Yoga-vārttika* and *Yogasārasaṅgraha* of Vijñānabhikṣu, and the *Yogasudhākara* of Sadāśiva-brahmendra.

The *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali is divided into four *pādas* or parts: *samādhipāda*, *sādhana-pāda*, *vibhūtipāda*, and *kaivalya-pāda*. The first deals with the nature, aim, and forms of *yoga*, modifications of the *citta* (mind-stuff), and the different methods of attaining *yoga*. The second deals with *kriyā-yoga* as a means of attain-

ing *samādhi*, the *kleśas* or mental afflictions, *karmaphala* or fruits of actions and their painful nature, and the fourfold theme of suffering, its cause, its cessation, and the means thereof. The third gives the inward aspects of *yoga* and also deals with the supernormal powers acquired by the practice of *yoga*. The last describes the nature and forms of liberation, the reality of the transcendent self and other world, etc.

THE PHILOSOPHIC BACKGROUND

The Yoga system is very closely associated with the Sāṅkhya system, so much so that many scholars believe that the twin systems have originated from a common source. The former accepts all the categories of the latter, but substitutes its atheism with theism. The conception of God is the special contribution made by the Yoga.

The ultimate Reality is threefold: Prakṛti (Nature), Puruṣa (individual Self), and Īśvara (God). Prakṛti is insentient and is made up of the three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. When associated with the Puruṣa, who is consciousness itself, it evolves into this world through the stages of *mahat* (intelligence), *ahankāra* (egoism), *manas* (mind), the five sense-organs, the five motor-organs, the five subtle elements, and the five gross elements.

The Puruṣas are many in number. Though they are of the nature of pure consciousness and absolutely unattached, they become attached to and identified with Prakṛti and its modifications owing to *aviveka* or indiscrimination. This results in sorrow and suffering, and is rightly called bondage. Hence, the way to liberation lies through the separation of the Puruṣa from the Prakṛti. Looking from this angle, *yoga* is actually *viyoga* (separation).

It is this *viveka-jñāna* that ultimately brings about the sense of distinction of the Puruṣa from Prakṛti. Yoga lays down a

series of exercises aimed at achieving this. These are detailed later on.

Īśvara is the supreme Person who is above all the individual selves and is free from all defects. The conception of Īśvara, being a special contribution of Yoga *vis-à-vis* the Sāṅkhya, will be dealt with in a separate section.

YOGA PSYCHOLOGY

In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system, the Puruṣa, who is pure consciousness, is associated and identified with the gross body and the subtle body, the latter being constituted of the eighteen products of Prakṛti beginning with *mahat* and ending with the five subtle elements. (*vide Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 40) It is through this subtle body that the Puruṣa, who is essentially free, appears to know and enjoy the things of the world. What is termed *citta* in the Yoga system is very comprehensive in its scope and actually represents the subtle body. But, for all practical purposes, we can translate it as 'mind-stuff'. This *citta* or mind-stuff, though essentially unconscious, appears to be conscious because of its proximity to the Puruṣa, who is reflected in it.

The process by which the Puruṣa cognizes the external objects is like this: The *citta* gets related to the *antahkaraṇa* (the internal organ or the mind) and flows out through the respective sense-organ and envelops the object, itself assuming the shape of the object in the process. Then, the consciousness of the Puruṣa is reflected in the modified *citta*, and there is a reciprocal reflection of this in the Puruṣa himself. Then arises the knowledge of that external object, and the Puruṣa 'knows' it.

Ordinarily, the *citta* will be constantly modified in this manner, and the Puruṣa, owing to *aviveka*, appropriates to himself those states of the *citta*, thus enjoying

pleasure or suffering pain. (*Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 4) This is bondage.

The *citta-vṛttis* or modifications of the *citta* (i.e. the cognitive mental states) are many and varied. But the Yoga classifies them under five heads: *pramāṇa* (true cognition), *viparyaya* (false cognition), *vikalpa* (verbal cognition), *nidrā* (deep sleep), and *smṛti* (memory). *Pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), and *āgama* (verbal testimony) constitute true cognition. False cognition is wrong knowledge of things as they really are not, and includes doubts or uncertain cognitions. Verbal cognition arises by hearing a word which has no corresponding reality. Sleep stands for dreamless sleep, and is due to the preponderance of *tamas* in the *citta*, which *tamas* is the cause of absence of ordinary perception at that time. Memory is the reproduction of past experiences without any alteration or innovation. All other cognitive mental states can be included under these heads.

All these *citta-vṛttis* can again be classified as *kliṣṭa* (afflicted) and *akliṣṭa* (unafflicted). *Kleśas* or sources of afflictions are five in number: (1) *avidyā* or wrong knowledge of the non-eternal as eternal, of the not-self as self, of the unpleasant as pleasant, and of the impure as pure; (2) *asmitā* or the false notion of the self as identical with the *buddhi* or the faculty of perception; (3) *rāga* or desire for pleasure and the means of its attainment; (4) *dveṣa* or aversion to pain and the causes thereof; and (5) *abhiniveśa* or the instinctive fear of death common to all creatures. (ibid., II. 3-9)

The *vṛttis*, when free from these *kleśas*, have true knowledge for their object and oppose the activity of the *guṇas* to become *akliṣṭa*.

THE NATURE AND FORMS OF YOGA

So long as there are changes and modi-

fications in the *citta*, the reflection of the Puruṣa therein, as also the identification owing to the absence of discriminative knowledge, is bound to occur. Consequently, the Puruṣa feels pleasure and pain out of the objects of the world, which generate attachment or hatred accordingly. This, as we have seen, is the bondage of the Puruṣa. If, therefore, he has to attain *kaivalya* or liberation (literally, aloofness), the activities of this *citta* have to be restrained and, finally, suppressed *in toto*. It is this restraining (*nirodha*) of the modifications of the *citta*, with a view to realizing the distinction of the self from it, that is termed as 'yoga' in the Yoga system. When the waves of the empirical consciousness (*kāryacitta*) die down and leave the *citta* in its causal state (*kāranacitta*), which is a state of perfect placidity, the Puruṣa realizes his distinction from the mind-body complex and attains freedom.

Patañjali defines *yoga* as *citta-vṛtti-nirodha*. (ibid., I. 2) Hence, *yoga*, according to him, is cessation of all mental modifications and not any kind of union or contact between an individual self and God or the Absolute. (*vide* Vācaspati on *Vyāsa-bhāṣya*, *Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 1)

The *citta*, which is constituted by the elements of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, has five states, viz *kṣipta* (restless), *mūḍha* (dull), *vikṣipta* (distracted), *ekāgra* (concentrated), and *niruddha* (restrained). In each of these states, there exists some kind of repression of mental modifications, and each state excludes all the other states. Though there is repression of mental modifications in all these states, *yoga* is possible only in the last two states. (*vide* *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on *Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 1)

In the first state, viz *kṣipta*, the mind is under the sway of *rajas* and *tamas*. Hence it jumps from one object to another without resting on anything in particular. This being the case, *yoga* is impossible in this

state. In the second, viz *mūḍha*, there is an excess of *tamas*, and hence the tendency is towards vice, sleep, ignorance, etc. Obviously, *yoga* is not possible in this state also. In the third state, viz *vikṣipta*, the mind is distracted, being free from *tamas* and having only a trace of *rajas*. This state has the capacity to manifest all objects, and makes for knowledge, virtue, etc. It is thus a temporary stage of concentration followed by distraction. This also is not *yoga*, since it does not permanently stop all the modifications of the mind-stuff or put an end to *avidyā*.

The fifth state is *ekāgra* (concentrated). Here the *citta* is purged of all impurity of *rajas* and there is the perfect manifestation of *sattva*. It marks the beginning of prolonged concentration of the *citta* on any object so as to reveal its true nature, and paves the way for the final cessation of all mental modifications. The *citta* which was being modified in hundreds of ways before is now modified in only one way, viz flowing towards the object of concentration. Thus, in this state, all mental modifications, except one, are restrained. Hence, *yoga* is very near to achievement.

At the last stage called *niruddha*, there is the cessation of all mental modifications, including even that of concentration, which marks the previous stage. Here the succession of mental states and processes is completely checked, and the *citta* is left in its original unmodified state of tranquillity. This state, when well established, is itself *yoga*.

Actually, in the language of Yoga, the last two stages of *ekāgra* and *niruddha*, when well established, are called *samprajñāta samādhi* and *asamprajñāta samādhi* respectively. In the *samprajñāta samādhi*, also called *samāpatti*, there is perfect concentration on the object of contemplation, with a clear and distinct consciousness of the same. In the *asamprajñāta samādhi*,

all mental modifications are stopped and, consequently, nothing is known or thought of by the mind. Both these states of *samādhi* are known by the common name of *samādhi-yoga*, since both are conducive to self-realization.

Samprajñāta samādhi is of four kinds, the distinction being made according to the object of contemplation. They are *savitarka*, *savicāra*, *sānanda*, and *sāsmīta*. (*Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 17) The *samādhi* is said to be *savitarka* when the mind is perfectly concentrated on any external gross object, like the image of a god or goddess. When the object of contemplation is subtle like the *tanmātras* (the subtle elements), the *samādhi* is called *savicāra*. It is termed as *sānanda* when the object of concentration is still subtler like the senses. It becomes *sāsmīta* when the concentration is upon *asmīta* or ego-sense.

Thus, the mind realizes the nature of different objects within or without the body and leaves them, one after another, till it becomes completely free from thoughts of all objects and attains what is called *asamprajñāta samādhi*. This puts a stop to all mental modifications and does not rest on any object. This being the final stage of *samādhi*, the whole world of objects ceases to affect and to exist for the *yogin*. He then abides in his own essence as pure consciousness enjoying the still vision of isolated self-shining existence. He is liberated.

OBSTACLES TO YOGA

There are nine obstacles to *yoga*. They are: *vyādhī* (sickness), *styāna* (languor), *saṁśaya* (doubt), *pramāda* (heedlessness), *ālasya* (sloth), *avirati* (absence of non-attachment), *bhrāntidarśana* (mistaken notion), *alabdhabhūmikatva* (non-attainment of the stage of communion), and *anavasthitatva* (instability). (*ibid.*, I. 30)

Vyādhī is physical sickness brought about

by disturbance of the equilibrium of the humours. *Styāna* is the inability of the mind to work, resulting in the lack of will and drive. *Samśaya* is vacillation, lack of definiteness. *Pramāda* is the lack of reflection upon the means of attaining concentration. *Ālasya* is the inactivity of body and mind. *Avirati* is the yearning of the mind in the form of hankering after contact with the external objects. *Bhrānti-darśana* is misconception. *Alabdha-bhūmikatva* means not reaching the stage of communion. *Anavasthitatva* is the failure of the mind to remain steady in the stage attained.

The Yoga system lists five more obstacles and calls them *vikṣepasahabhavaḥ* (companions of distraction). They are: *duḥkha* (pain), *daurmanasya* (irritation), *aṅgamejayatva* (trembling), *śvāsa* (in-breathing), and *praśvāsa* (out-breathing). (ibid., I. 31)

Duḥkha is the pain caused by internal, external, and supernatural causes. *Daurmanasya* is the irritation caused by the failure of a cherished wish. *Aṅgamejayatva* is trembling of the body. The last two refer to the involuntary breathing.

These have to be checked by *abhyāsa* (practice) and *vairāgya* (dispassion) in general, and each of them has to be met by an antidote of its own. By fixing the mind on *Īśvara*, the one Principle, these distractions can be obstructed. (ibid., I. 32) By the cultivation of *maitrī* (friendliness), *karuṇā* (compassion), *muditā* (joy), and *upekṣā* (indifference) towards people who are happy, unhappy, righteous, and unrighteous respectively, composure of mind is gained. (ibid., I. 33) Controlling of the *prāṇa* through *prāṇāyāma* will also help in the achievement of concentration. (ibid., I. 34)

THE EIGHTFOLD DISCIPLINE

None can realize the spiritual truths as

long as one's mind is tainted with impurities and one's intellect is vitiated by evil thoughts. It is in the pure heart and clear understanding that the truth of the spirit is revealed and directly experienced. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga system maintains that liberation is to be attained by means of *prajñā*, spiritual insight into the reality of the self as the pure immortal spirit which is quite distinct from the body and mind. But spiritual insight can be got only when the mind is purged of all the impurities and consequently rendered perfectly calm and serene. In order to achieve this, Yoga prescribes the eightfold discipline to the aspirant: (1) *yama* (restraint); (2) *niyama* (culture); (3) *āsana* (posture); (4) *prāṇāyāma* (control of the psychic *prāṇa* through breath-control); (5) *pratyāhāra* (withdrawal of the senses); (6) *dhāraṇā* (fixed attention); (7) *dhyāna* (meditation); (8) *samādhi* (perfect concentration). (ibid., II. 29)

Yama is a moral discipline and consists of: (1) *ahimsā* (abstention from all kinds of injury to life); (2) *satya* (truthfulness in thought and speech); (3) *asteya* (non-stealing); (4) *brahmacarya* (control of carnal desires and passions); (5) *aparigraha* (non-acceptance of unnecessary gifts). The *yogin* must scrupulously follow them. (ibid., II. 30)

Niyama consists in cultivating the following good habits: (1) *śauca* (purification of body and mind); (2) *santoṣa* (contentment); (3) *tapas* (penances); (4) *svādhyāya* (study of religious books); and (5) *Īśvarapranidhāna* (meditation on and resignation to God). (ibid., II. 32)

Āsana is a discipline of the body, and consists in the adoption of steady and comfortable postures for the sake of meditation. This is achieved through relaxing the physical and mental exertions and through the contemplation on Ananta (the earth-bearing serpent or the infinite sky).

The steadiness of the body thus achieved is conducive to the steady flow of the mind towards the ideal.

Prāṇāyāma is to be practised after attaining steadiness in posture. It aims at controlling the psychic *prāṇa* (nervous energy) through the control of breath, which is closely linked with it. The process of breath regulation consists of *recaka* (exhalation), *pūraka* (inhalation), and *kumbhaka* (retention), the last one being external or internal.

It is interesting to note that the great sage Patañjali has finished all about the *āsanas* and *prāṇāyāma*, about which so much fuss is often made, in only eight aphorisms (ibid., II. 46-53). It must be remembered that the object of practising these two disciplines as also the others is to obtain *samādhi* and that one gets a right to practise them only after scrupulously following moral disciplines and culture as enjoined by *yama* and *niyama*.

Pratyāhāra is the withdrawal of the senses from their respective external objects and keeping them under the control of the mind. (ibid., II. 54) When the senses are effectively controlled, they follow not their objects, but the mind itself. So, in this state, the mind is not disturbed by sights and sounds coming through the eye and the ear, but makes these senses follow itself and see and hear its own object.

These five disciplines are regarded as *bahirāṅga-sādhana* (external aids) of *yoga*.

Dhāraṇā is the fixing of the mind on a definite locus, such as the lotus of the heart, the light in the brain, the tip of the nose or the tongue, or on an external object like the moon or the image of gods, etc. (Vyāsa and Vācaspati on *Yoga-Sūtra*, III. 1)

When *dhāraṇā* ripens so that the flow of the thought current becomes unbroken, it becomes *dhyaṇa*. (*Yoga-Sūtra*, III. 2) Here the mind hovers round the object of

meditation. There is still the consciousness of the trio—the ego-sense, the object of meditation, and the process of meditation.

When *dhyaṇa* becomes perfect and the mind is so deeply absorbed in the object that it loses itself and has no awareness of itself, then the state attained is called *samādhi*. (ibid., III. 3) So, here only the object of meditation will be shining in the mind and the *yogin* is not even aware of the thought process involved in it. It should be observed here that this *samādhi* as a discipline is different from the *samādhi-yoga* previously defined as *citta-vṛtti-nirodha*. The former is the *means*, and the latter is the *end*. A long and continuous practice of the one with devotion leads to the other.

These last three steps in the practice of *yoga* are called *antarāṅgasādhana*, the internal means. They should have the same object, i.e. the same object should first be attended to, then meditated upon, resulting in perfect concentration. When thus combined, the three constitute *saṁyama* (ibid., III. 4), which is very necessary for the attainment of *samādhi-yoga*.

THE YOGIC POWERS

Patañjali says that the *yogin*, during the different stages of his practice attains a number of extraordinary powers. For instance, the practice of *ahimsā* leads to the creation of such an atmosphere about him that the tame as well as the ferocious animals will live in harmony there. (ibid., II. 35) Practice of truth gives him the power to grant boons. (ibid., II. 36) Steady establishment in *aparigraha* leads to the knowledge of previous lives. (ibid., II. 39, III. 18) By making *saṁyama* on the sun, he gains the knowledge of the celestial regions. (ibid., III. 26) If he does *saṁyama* on the throat pit, he becomes free from the pangs of hunger and thirst.

(ibid., III. 31) Similarly, by making *saṁyama* on other corresponding things, he can also gain the perception of supernatural sights, sounds, etc., get mastery over the material substances, the eight *siddhis* like *animā* (the power to become atomic) etc., become omniscient, fly in the sky, etc. (ibid., III. 36, 44, 45, 49, and 42)

But Patañjali severely warns the aspirant against running after them, saying that these are obstacles to *samādhi*. (ibid., III. 39) *Yoga* is meant for attaining liberation, and hence the *yogin* must not get himself entangled in the quagmire of these powers.

THE PLACE OF GOD IN YOGA

As distinguished from the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga is theistic. It admits of Īśvara or God on both practical and theoretical grounds. To Patañjali, God has more a practical than a theoretical value. Devotion to God is *one* of the means for the final attainment of *samādhi-yoga*. But the subsequent commentators evince also a theoretical interest in God and discuss more fully the speculative problems regarding the nature of God and the proofs for His existence.

According to the Yoga, God is a *Puruṣa-viśeṣa*, the supreme Person above all the individual selves, and is eternally free from all defects like *kleśa* (afflictions), *karma* (work), *vipāka* (result of work), and *āśaya* (latent impressions of past actions) which invariably accrue to the individual souls. (ibid., I. 24) He is omniscient. (ibid., I. 25) He is the teacher of all teachers, since He is unaffected by time. (ibid., I. 26) The *praṇava* (the syllable *Om*) indicates Him, and hence the *yogin* can repeat it, meditating on its meaning. If he continues like this without break for a long time with sufficient devotion, then he realizes his real nature. (ibid., I. 29) This shows that the *samādhi-yoga*, which has to be achieved

through the eightfold discipline can also be achieved independently through meditation upon Īśvara. (ibid., I. 23)

Yoga adduces the following arguments to prove the existence of God: (1) The Śāstra, viz Śruti (the Vedas), *Smṛti* (of Manu and others), Itihāsa (the epics), Purāṇa (like the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*), declares the existence of God or the supreme Self; (2) According to the law of continuity, whatever has degrees must have a lower and an upper limit. Since there are different degrees of knowledge and power in the selves, there must be a self in whom there is perfect knowledge and perfect power. Such a supreme Self is God; (3) The creation and dissolution of this world is due respectively to the association of the *Puruṣa* with the *Prakṛti* and his dissociation therefrom. Since neither of them is capable of bringing this about, one has to assume the existence of an intelligent, efficient cause which brings about this association and dissociation in accordance with the *adṛṣṭa* (unseen moral desert) of the individual selves. Therefore, there must be such a perfect and omniscient Being.

Devotion to God is not only a part of the practice of *yoga*, but is the best means for the attainment of concentration and restraint of the mind (*samādhi-yoga*). The reason is that God is not only an object of *dhyāna*, like other objects, but is the supreme Lord, who, by His grace, purges away the sins and evils in the life of His devotee and makes the attainment of *yoga* easier for him. (*vide* Vyāsa on *Yoga-Sūtra*, I. 23) But the *yogin* has to do *saṁyama* on Him to obtain His grace.

CONCLUSION

Though the philosophical tenets of the Yoga system have been criticized (*vide* *Vedānta-Sūtra*, II. ii. 37-41), its practical approach has been largely appreciated and accepted. A substance of the criticism

may be summed up as follows : The presence of superior and inferior types of beings in this world will give rise to the doubt that Īśvara has *rāga* and *dveṣa*. Since it is well known that it is *rāga* and *dveṣa* that instigate men into action (*vide Nyāya-Sūtra*, I. i. 18), Īśvara also must be considered to be subject to the same since He is engaged in action. If selfishness is admitted to be the motive force behind human actions, then, by extending that principle, it is to be admitted that Īśvara also is selfish. Again, by the very nature of the definitions given, it is impossible to conceive of any kind of relationship or connexion between Him and the other Puruṣas as also the Prakṛti. Logical difficulties will also arise with respect to His eternity and omniscience, since Yoga admits of

three eternal entities.

To an unsympathetic eye, this system may appear to be not so much a system of philosophy as a school of mysticism and magic. It has been abused by charlatans, half-baked psychic people, and quacks, so much so that the common man has come to think of it as synonymous with magic. But to a discerning eye, the fact of its being a philosophy and religion does not go unnoticed.

It must not be forgotten that the Yoga is essentially a *darśana*, a way leading to the realization of Truth. It is well grounded in the powerful Sāṅkhyan metaphysics, and the way it recommends for the purification and discipline of the mind is highly efficacious. That is why its eightfold discipline is universally acknowledged.

KATHA UPANIṢAD SĀNKHYA POINT OF VIEW—2

DR. ANIMA SEN GUPTA

*Anyatra dharmād anyatra adharmād
anyatrāsmāt kṛtākṛtāt ;
Anyatra bhūtācca bhavyācca
yattat paśyasi tadvada—*

(Naciketas said) 'That which thou behold-est as different from *dharmā* and *adharma*, as different from cause and effect, as different from what had been and what shall be, please tell (me) that.' (I. ii. 14)

Adhyātmayoga has already been described as the means to be adopted in the path of spiritual *sādhana* for attaining the highest end of human life. This path has also been described as *modanīya*. Now, Yama has to give instructions to Naciketas regarding the nature of that highest principle which is different from *dharmā* and *adharma*, from cause and effect, and is also

unrelated to past, present, and future.

According to the Sāṅkhya, Puruṣa is pure, revealing consciousness. As mere revealing consciousness, Puruṣa is unrelated to *dharmā*, *adharma*, and time. It is also neither the cause nor the effect. It is only due to *aviveka* that the unchangeable, ever free soul appears to be associated with *dharmā*, *adharma*, etc., which are the products of Prakṛti. The object about which Naciketas is making an earnest enquiry is this pure revealing consciousness (*prakāśātmaka caitanya*). He seeks to know the Self because, in the opinion of the Sāṅkhya Darśana, liberation is to be gained through Self-knowledge (*Ātmajñāna*). That the Puruṣa is neither the cause nor the effect has been clearly stated in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (*na prakṛtirna vikṛtiḥ*).

The very fact that the Puruṣa cannot be regarded as the cause goes to prove that the Puruṣa is simply of the form of revealing consciousness. Although *sannidhāna* between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is necessary for creation, still there is no need for holding that the Puruṣa is the cause of the world. This is because the real (*vastutat*) Prakṛti, being intelligized by the Puruṣa and having *aviveka* as the creative power, is quite potent to be the cause of creation. The Puruṣa can therefore be rightly described as different from *lertam* and *akṛtam*.

While commenting on the *Brahma-Sūtra* (I. iv. 6), Śaṅkara has said that in this *śloka* (*Anyatra dharmād anyatra adharmāt* etc.), Naciketas has made an enquiry about the nature of pure consciousness, whereas in one of the previous *ślokas*, namely, '*Yeyam prete vicikitsā manuṣye*' etc., *jīva* was the object of his enquiry. Both the Śrutis are consistent because, in the opinion of Śaṅkara, *jīva* is nothing but an impure and limited manifestation of pure consciousness or Brahman.

According to the Sāṅkhya view also, the Puruṣa is not different from the individual soul. *Jīva* refers to that Puruṣa the reflection of which is caught in a particular *buddhi*. According to the Advaita Vedānta, *jīvahood* arises when, through ignorance, consciousness is identified with *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, etc. (which are products of ignorance). The Sāṅkhya, on the other hand, believes that *jīvahood* arises when, due to *aviveka*, there is non-discrimination (*bhedāgrahana*) between consciousness and *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, etc. (which are products of Prakṛti). The difference in the attitudes of these two systems lies in this: According to the Advaita Vedānta, ignorance is false and imaginary; whereas, according to the Sāṅkhya, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, etc., being the products of a real Prakṛti, are real. What is false is the non-admission of the difference

between the Puruṣa and the *cetanāvat buddhi*.

Since the Sāṅkhya does not admit difference between the Puruṣa and the *jīva*, the object about which an enquiry was made by Naciketas in the prior Śruti (*Yeyam prete* etc.) is not really different from the object of enquiry of the present Śruti from the Sāṅkhya standpoint also.

Sarve vedā yatpadamāmananti

Tapāṃsi sarvāṇi ca yadvadanti;

Yadicchanto brahmacaryam caranti

Tatte padam saṅgrahena

bravīmyomityetat—

(Yama said) 'The goal which all the Vedas proclaim, which all penances declare, and desiring which they lead the life of *brahmacarya*, I tell it to thee in brief—it is "Om".' (I. ii. 15)

Om stands for pure consciousness. In Advaita Vedānta, pure consciousness has been described as Brahman, whereas, in the Sāṅkhya, Puruṣa is the term that has been used to refer to pure consciousness. Both the Puruṣa of the Sāṅkhya school and Brahman of the Advaita Vedānta are qualityless, impersonal consciousness. So, in the opinion of the Sāṅkhya also, the teacher is incapable of giving instructions to his student regarding the supreme *tattva* by referring to its qualities. But the student who is eager to attain liberation must be enlightened in regard to pure consciousness. He has to realize the true nature of the Ātman. So, the Vedic word '*Om*' has been accepted as a symbol for meditating on the nature of pure consciousness. It is the significance and importance of *Om* that has been stressed upon by Yama in this Śruti of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*.

In the *Yoga-Sūtra*, *Om* has been accepted as the *vācaka* of God, who is a symbol of perfection in knowledge. Since the function of the *vācaka* is to reveal the *vācya*,

there is a natural and intimate relation between the two.

*Etaddhyevākṣaram Brahma etaddhye-
vākṣaram param;*

*Etaddhyevākṣaram jñātvā yo yadicchaṭi
tasya tat—*

‘This syllable is Brahman; this syllable is also the highest. Having known this syllable, whatever one desires, one gets that.’ (I. ii. 16)

*Etadāmbanam śreṣṭham etadāmba-
nam param;*

*Etadāmbanam jñātvā Brahmaloke
mahīyate—*

‘This support is the best, this support is the supreme. Knowing this support, one is worshipped in the world of Brahman.’ (I. ii. 17)

In the opinion of Yama, the God of death, *Om* is to be regarded as the lower Brahman and also as the highest One. When the aspirant realizes the significance of *Om*, he gets everything he asks for. Of all the means prescribed for the realization of the lower Brahman, meditation on the symbol *Om* is the most praiseworthy. *Onkāra sādhanā* is also the chief means for the realization of the highest Brahman. It is only by meditating on the symbol *Om* that the aspirant becomes an object of respect and adoration in the *Brahmaloka*.

According to Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya, we may suggest that the lower Brahman refers to consciousness reflected in the universal *buddhi-tattva* or *mahat-tattva* which is not associated with a gross body. In other words, we can say that Apra Brahman (lower Brahman) refers to consciousness, the limiting adjunct of which is the *samaṣṭi buddhi*. So, in the Sāṅkhya too, the lower Brahman is of a form which is similar to the Hiranyagarbha of the Advaita Vedānta. Para Brahman or the highest Brahman

refers to pure consciousness which is fully differentiated from the *buddhi-tattva*.

In view of what is stated above, we can say that, according to the classical Sāṅkhya, *mahat-tattva*, permeated with consciousness, is to be regarded as Saguna Brahman. Like Saguna Brahman, *mahat-tattva* also possesses lordly excellences. It is due to the presence of lordly powers in the *mahat-tattva* that the worshipper of the said principle can be blessed with attainments other than liberation (which is to be gained only by realizing the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti). Meditation on the symbol *Om* is regarded as the best of all forms of *pratīka upāsanā* owing to the fact that *Om* alone has been regarded as the *vācaka* of pure consciousness in the Vedas.

Under ordinary conditions, the worldly soul experiences only that much of consciousness which is reflected in its particular *buddhi* and is also not discriminated from it. This is the reason why the soul appears as a limited individual and is not in a position to realize universal consciousness (*sāmānya caitanya*) which is reflected in the *mahat-tattva*. Therefore, an individual person is incapable of realizing ordinarily his identity with all other persons in respect of consciousness. This feeling of identity is attained by a person only when he reaches the stage of *mahat-tattva*. It is through meditation on the symbol *Om* that this feeling of identity can be aroused. This condition (acceptable from the Sāṅkhya point of view) may also be regarded as the attainment of *Brahmaloka*.

When the aspirant reaches this stage, he realizes that he is different from the gross body, the sense organs, etc., but he is not in a position as yet to distinguish the soul from the predominantly *sāttvika* and subtle *mahat-tattva*. Real *tattva-jñāna* arises when the soul is distinguished even from the *mahat-tattva*. Meditation on the symbol *Om* is the only means for gaining

this knowledge. Hence, *Oṅkāra sādhanā* has been mentioned here as the principal means for reaching the highest goal.

*Āsīno dūram vrajati śayāno yāti
sarvataḥ ;*

*Kastam madāmadam devam madanyo
jñātumarhati—*

‘Though still, He travels far ; though lying down, He goes everywhere. Who can know, besides me, that effulgent Being who rejoices and rejoices not ?’ (I. ii. 21)

The pure all-pervading soul is motionless. That which is all-pervading cannot move. Nevertheless, in the state of bondage, the soul, being limited by *buddhi*, sense organs, etc., goes even to a distant object. In deep sleep, owing to the presence of *śūnya-bhāva*, there is no knowledge of specific worldly objects. (*Yoga-Sūtra*) Only a general knowledge exists in the state of deep sleep. It is because, in that condition, knowledge does not remain limited to a particular object that knowledge can be regarded as all-pervading (*yāti sarvataḥ*). In the state of freedom, the soul is not affected by worldly pleasures, but in the state of bondage, it swings like a pendulum between joys and griefs. In the waking state, the soul experiences pleasure ; whereas, in deep sleep, there is no feeling of enjoyment. Such a wonderful Puruṣa can be fully realized only by a truly wise man.

*Aśarīram śarīreṣvanavastheṣvavasthitam ;
Mahāntam vibhumātmānam matvā
dhīro na śocati—*

‘The wise one does not grieve having known the bodiless, all-pervading supreme Ātman which dwells in all impermanent bodies.’ (I. ii. 22)

The Sāṅkhya believes in *jīvanmukti*. Although the *jīvanmukta* Puruṣa dwells in the mind-body system, yet the mind-body

system (being a product of Prakṛti) appears to him as something inferior, destructible, and unworthy as an object of desire. He also realizes that the mind-body system is radically different in nature from the soul or Puruṣa and that the relation between the body and the soul is artificial, i.e. the effect of *aviveka*. The *abhedāgrahaṇa* (in regard to the body and the soul), which is the basic feature of the embodied life, appears as false in the state of liberation. Hence, although, in the state of *jīvanmukti*, Puruṣa resides in the mind-body system, the free soul has always the feeling of its pure and non-embodied form. This is the feeling of bodilessness. Puruṣa is eternal, but the mind-body system is not so.

Even though encased in a body owing to the influence of *prārabdha karma*, the liberated Puruṣa has always the realization that he is pure self-revealing consciousness, eternal, all-pervading, devoid of pleasures and pains. Hence, it has been stated here that the wise man does not grieve because he has been able to realize his essentially unchangeable and eternal nature in the form of *śuddha caitanya*.

Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyo

Na medhayā na bahunā śrutena ;

Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ

Tasyaiṣa Ātmā vivṛṇute tanūm

svām—

‘This Ātman cannot be attained by the study of the Vedas, nor by intellect, nor even by much hearing of the sacred scriptures. By him it is attained whom it chooses ; this, his own Ātman reveals his own form.’ (I. ii. 23)

The Sāṅkhya school believes that the realization of the true form of Ātman can be attained through knowledge. This knowledge, however, does not originate from a mere study of the scriptures. The

aspirant who realizes fully that the consciousness reflected through *buddhi-tattva* (*samaṣṭi buddhi*) is his true self is alone capable of knowing the *sāmānya svarūpa* of consciousness. After the attainment of this knowledge, the aspirant rises up automatically to that state where he feels his distinction from the *sāttvika buddhi-tattva* and shines forth in his true Ātmic form.

[It is not proper to say that in the so-called Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya, there is no scope for the worship of a superior being. This Sāṅkhya is called *nirīśvara* because according to this system, there is no other *conscious principle except Puruṣa*. The Yoga system or the Seśvara Sāṅkhya has frankly admitted the existence of God. But God in the Yoga system is just a special type of

Puruṣa which is eternally free from *kleśas*, *karmas*, fruits of *karmas*, etc. In the Sāṅkhya, however, no Puruṣa has been openly given the place of God. Even then the Sāṅkhya has not forbidden the worship of a Puruṣa as God, if that Puruṣa manifests infinite lordly powers. A bound Puruṣa possesses limited powers and, as such, it cannot be an object of worship. The eternally free Puruṣas like Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc. possess infinite lordly powers, and there is no reason to disbelieve that, according to the Sāṅkhya school, these Puruṣas can be worshipped by the ordinary persons as ideals to be attained in the future life. Hence worship of the extraordinary Puruṣas will also serve as a means for reaching the highest goal according to the Sāṅkhya.]

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA: A STUDY OF HIS PERSONALITY

SRI P. M. BHASKARAN NAMBUDIRIPAD

The great significant feature of the present age is its crying need for a harmonious synthesis of the spiritual culture of India with the modern scientific thought of the West. The conviction is growing day by day that the advance of material science without a moral and spiritual foundation will ultimately lead to the total destruction of the universe. So it is now generally recognized that the knowledge of material science should be firmly founded on moral and spiritual truths for the peace, progress, and well-being of mankind. The supreme and the highest ideal, according to the Hindu conception, is the realization of the divinity in man, and herein lies the glory of India. On the other hand, the greatness of the West consists in discovering

the material scientific truths. But the perfect ideal is the universal man in whom there will be a harmonious synthesis of the material civilization of the West and the spiritual culture of India; in other words, a harmonious blending of what is best in the West with what is best in the East.

It is for this grand universal ideal that Swami Vivekananda dedicated his life, and truly he himself was an embodiment and an exemplar of such a great ideal. That is why Swami Vivekananda taught theoretical Vedānta or the spiritual truths of Vedānta in the West by the intuitive method of self-revelation, and a strong man-making practical Vedānta by the inductive method of science in India. While the Swami knew well that the spiritual truths

of Vedānta will alone enable the West to lead a better, happier, and more peaceful life, he believed that the progress or salvation of India consisted in applying Vedāntic principles in the day-to-day life of man. For an ideal civilization visualized by the Swami evolved out of a harmonious synthesis of Vedānta and science. Therefore, in the West, Swami Vivekananda is remembered as a great spiritual teacher of Vedānta and a messenger of universal love, tolerance, and fellowship. Whereas in India, he is regarded as a unique religious teacher who taught a religion of God-centred humanism by glorifying the dignity of the human personality; as a great exponent of practical Vedānta, who brought Vedānta from the solitary caves and forests to the everyday life of common man; as a great patriot-saint who lived and served his countrymen by glorifying service as a spiritual discipline for the realization of one's self; as a grand intellectual harmonizer who bridged the gulf between the East and the West, between reason and faith, between theory and practice, between renunciation and service, between religion and science, and between different schools of thought. Thus, Swami Vivekananda's personality is unique, rare, and a many-sided one. He is a philosopher, a man of action, a true and sincere devotee of God, and a great patriot-saint, all in one. But through all of them runs the undercurrent of his spirituality, which is based on his message of the divine oneness of all. It is this spiritual depth of his being which flavours the various messages he delivered both in India and in the West. It is this same aspect of his personality which gives life and vigour to all that he said and did. He became a source of inspiration to millions and millions of people both in the East and the West mainly due to his intense spirituality; for his utterances went to the depth of their hearts, and they felt

emboldened to jump into action with confidence. It is his spiritual fervour which gives colour, light, and beauty to his many-sided personality. Again, it is the spiritual depth of his being which makes him and his inspiring teachings eternal, fresh, and charming. The edifice of his character is built on the bed-rock of spirituality, which finds its expression through his powerful intellect and loving heart. Herein lies the unique greatness of Swami Vivekananda: in him we see both these qualities of universal love and infinite knowledge blended harmoniously in a striking manner. Such a rare and blessed combination of the intellect and heart is what we badly need.

Now we shall see how this wonderful and rare blending of universal love with infinite knowledge is expressed in Swami Vivekananda's personality. His intellectual greatness is manifested in his synthesis of the three schools of Vedānta, namely, the Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Advaita, as three steps to the state of the highest spiritual experience of non-duality. The Swami says: "These are the salient points of the three steps which Indian religious thought has taken in regard to Reality. We have seen that it began with the personal, the extracosmic God. It went from the external to the internal cosmic body, God immanent in the universe, and it ended in identifying the soul itself with that God and making one soul, one unit of all these various manifestations in the universe. This is the last word of the Vedas. It begins with dualism, goes through a qualified monism, and ends in perfect monism." (*The Complete Works*, Vol. II, p. 252, 10th edition) These three schools of Vedānta are thus the three stages of spiritual growth in man, according to Swami Vivekananda. Each is necessary, and is a fulfilment of the other. The Swami says: 'Now I will tell you my dis-

covery. All of religion is contained in the Vedānta, that is, in the three stages of the Vedānta philosophy, the Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Advaita, one comes after the other. These are the three stages of spiritual growth in man. Each one is necessary. This is the essence of religion.' (ibid., Vol. V, p. 82, 7th edition) He further declares : 'But the one fact I found is that in all the Upaniṣads, they begin with dualistic ideas, with worship and all that, and end with a grand flourish of Advaitic ideas.' (ibid., Vol. III, pp. 233-4, 8th edition)

He admits that he was able to find this harmonious unity of these three schools of Vedānta in the light of the teachings of his illustrious Master Sri Ramakrishna. 'Therefore, I now find in the light of this man's (meaning Sri Ramakrishna's) life that the dualist and the Advaitist need not fight each other; each has a place and a great place in the national life; the dualist remains, for he is as much part and parcel of national religious life as the Advaitist; one cannot exist without the other. One is the fulfilment of the other; one is the building, the other is the top; the one the root, the other the fruit and so on.' (ibid., Vol. III, p. 234) All these sayings of the Swami clearly show the wonderful power of his intellect in synthesizing the three apparently contradictory schools of Vedānta in a harmonious manner.

So also, his exposition of practical Vedānta in a very simple and lucid manner is magnificent, and shows great intellectual acumen. He points out that the Vedānta is the most practical religion ever known to us; for its ideal is to study man as he is : 'In one word, the ideal of Vedānta is to know man as he really is; and this is its message : that, if you cannot worship your brother man, the manifested God, how can you worship a God who is unmanifested? ... If you cannot see God in the human

face, how can you see Him in the clouds, or in images made of dull dead matter, or in the mere fictitious stories of our brain? I shall call you religious from the day you begin to see God in men and women.' (ibid., Vol. II, pp. 325-6) The Swami then asks : 'If this is not preaching a practical God, how else could you teach a practical God? Where is there a more practical God than He whom I see before me—a God omnipresent, in every being, more real than our senses?' (ibid., Vol. II, p. 305)

Again, the Swami shows that by applying some fundamental principles of Vedānta like faith in one's self, strength of body and mind, fearlessness, seeing divinity in all, and showing love to all will help everyone to lead a better, happier, and more peaceful life. In the words of the Swami : 'The remedy for weakness is not brooding over weakness, but thinking of strength. Teach men of the strength that is already within them.' 'The ideal of faith in ourselves is of the greatest help to us. If faith in ourselves had been more extensively taught and practised, I am sure a very large portion of the evils and miseries that we have would have vanished.' (ibid., Vol. II, pp. 300, 301)

The Swami's intellectual genius is also seen in his conception of a universal religion, which must include and be suitable to all the different types of minds, namely, the active, the emotional, the mystical, and the philosophical. 'What I want to propagate is a religion that will be equally acceptable to all minds. It must be equally philosophic, equally emotional, equally mystic, and equally conducive to action. ... And this combination will be the ideal of the nearest approach to a universal religion.' (ibid., Vol. II, pp. 387, 388)

Swami Vivekananda was a realized soul, and he was essentially spiritual. While his

spiritual fervour inclined him to plunge into the depths of contemplation to realize the eternal and the ultimate truths of Vedānta, his kind, loving heart yearned to love and serve all. As an example of his spiritual power, we may quote the following passage from the biography of the Swami: 'His mind longed for the highest experience of non-dualistic Vedānta, the *nirvikalpa samādhi*. . . . One evening, the experience came to him quite unexpectedly. He was absorbed in his usual meditation, when he suddenly felt as if a lamp were burning at the back of his head. The light glowed more and more intensely and finally burst. Narendra was overwhelmed by that light and fell unconscious. After some time, as he began to regain his normal mood, he could feel only his head and not the rest of his body. . . . For a long time, Narendra remained unconscious, and when he regained his normal state of mind, he was bathed in an ineffable peace.' (Swami Nikhilananda: *Vivekananda: The Yogas and Other Works*, Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, New York, 1953, p. 33)

This reveals his thirst for the realization of the highest spiritual truth in the depth of his own being and his great spiritual power to realize them in himself. But his nature, with its boundless compassion binding him to all the suffering humanity, never allowed him to lose himself in contemplation for ever. The universal soul of the Swami was rooted in its human soil, and he realized that his first duty was towards his nearest neighbour, his own people. He passionately cried: 'Let each one of us pray day and night for the down-trodden millions in India who are held fast by poverty, priestcraft, and tyranny—pray day and night for them. . . . I am poor, I love the poor. . . . Who feels there (in India) for the two hundred millions of men and women sunken for ever in poverty and ignorance? Where is the way out?

Who feels for them? . . . Let these people be your God—think of them, work for them, pray for them incessantly—the Lord will show you the way. Him I call a *mahātman*, a noble soul, whose heart bleeds for the poor; otherwise he is a *durātman*, a wicked soul.' (*The Complete Works*, Vol. V, p. 58) Here we observe his patriotism, making him lose his personality with the well-being of his fellow men.

Swami Vivekananda believed that if service is done in the right and true spirit of worship, it is the most efficacious means to spiritual progress. For 'without doubt man is the highest symbol of God and his worship is the highest form of worship on earth.' He eloquently declares: 'I should see God in the poor, and it is for my salvation that I go and worship them. The poor and the miserable are for our salvation, so that we may serve the Lord coming in the shape of the diseased, coming in the shape of the lunatic, the leper, and the sinner. Bold are my words; and let me repeat that it is the greatest privilege in our life that we are allowed to serve the Lord in all these shapes.' Salvation, according to him, consists in discovering God in all human beings. 'The moment I have realized God sitting in the temple of every human body, the moment I stand in reverence before every human being and see God in him—that moment I am free from bondage, everything that binds vanishes, and I am free. This is the most practical of all worship.' (*ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 321) Herein we find a fusion of the patriot and the saint in one in the Swami. Thus the Swami glorified the human personality, and gave dignity to it by spiritualizing it. The only prayer of his compassionate heart was: 'May I be born again and again, and suffer thousands of miseries so that I may worship the only God that exists, the only God I believe in, the sum total of all souls, and, above all, my God the

wicked, my God the miserable, my God the poor of all races, of all species !' (ibid., Vol. V, p. 136)

It is this love for the poor which prompted him to glorify service as a spiritual discipline for the realization of one's self. He coined the phrase 'Daridra Nārāyaṇa' and 'surrounded service with a divine aureole', raising it to the dignity of a religion, as his heart bled for the poor and throbbed in anguish at the sight of their miseries. This striking phrase was taken up by Gandhiji and was used by him constantly.

Thus, the personality of Swami Vivekananda is rare, unique, and magnanimous. In the words of Subhas Chandra Bose: 'Swami Vivekananda, reckless in his sacrifice, unceasing in his activity, boundless in his love, profound and versatile in his wisdom, exuberant in his emotions, merciless in his attack, but yet simple as a child—he was a rare personality in this world of ours.' (*Bhavan's Journal*, 20 January 1963, p. 18) Swami Vivekananda's aim was to reawaken the real spirit in man and 'to guide individuals and nations to the conquest of their inner kingdom by

their own ways which are best suited to them, by the means corresponding best to the needs from which they suffer most'. Therefore, his message aims at a complete rejuvenation of India's spiritual and national life, and it is now time to understand and apply this noble message in all aspects and spheres of our life. Romain Rolland sums up Swami Vivekananda's great personality thus: 'In the two words equilibrium and synthesis, Vivekananda's constructive genius may be summed up. He embraced all the paths of the spirit, the four *yogas* in their entirety, renunciation and service, art and science, religion and action from the most spiritual to the most practical. Each of the ways that he taught had its own limits, but he himself had been through them all. As in a quadriga, he held the reins of all four ways of truth, and he travelled towards unity along them all simultaneously. He was the personification of the harmony of all human energy.' (*The Life of Vivekananda and the Universal Gospel*, p. 281) Of such a master mind we can say: 'Here was a great world teacher, when comes such another?'

VIVEKANANDA'S VIEWS ON WORK

DR. B. KUPPUSWAMY

It is proposed in this short essay to give an exposition of the views of Swami Vivekananda on work. The material is limited to his lectures on *Karma-yoga*.

He starts with the view of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* that work is inevitable for all human beings; he makes it clear that no man can live without work, because living itself involves breathing, which is a kind of work. He further makes it clear that every action of an individual leaves a mark on one's

character. This is the way in which our action influences our character and our character influences our action. This leads him on to the view that we are responsible for what we are. Our actions determine us in the same way in which we can determine our actions. In other words, our past action is responsible for our present being and our present action, in its turn, will be responsible for our future being.

He also emphasizes that all human achievements such as the cities, the ships, the machines, and the tools are all the result of work. As a consequence, he asserts that no man can get anything unless he earns it by work. So, it is both an individual as well as a social obligation to do some work. In a later part of the essay, an attempt will be made to show how work not only leads to the satisfaction of economic wants, but also helps in the development of the individual.

The Swami makes it very clear that no work can be done without a motive. In a brief way, he even tries to analyse the various kinds of motives which are at the back of work, e.g. name, fame, wealth, power, service to mankind, and so on. He also mentions how the motive for work here may be the enjoyment hereafter, or it may be as a penance for the crimes that a man has done.

However, he makes it very clear that the best work is that which is done for the sake of work, or, as he puts it, 'work for work's sake'.

In a broad way, we may say that the Swami distinguishes three stages of work or rather three stages in the growth of an individual. From the point of view of work in the first stage, all individuals are prompted by motives which are selfish. The desire for things or the desire for recognition leads to work. Gradually, in the second stage, this selfishness yields place to selfless type of work. It is with a good deal of persistent thought that it is possible finally to reach the stage when work is done for work's sake.

The Swami distinguishes between the work that is done with selfish motives and work that is done with selfless motives. He says that the work that is done with selfish motives fritters away our energy. In other words, it may lead to inefficiency, on the one hand, and lack of satisfaction, on

the other; but the higher type of work, viz the one that is done with the work itself in view, produces more energy in work. This is because that kind of work can arise only when there is self-restraint, and self-restraint leads to augmentation of energy, on the one hand, and efficiency and satisfaction, on the other. This may be re-interpreted in the following way.

The work that is done with some selfish motive is purely for consumption. Work is meant for money or power or recognition. Consequently, a person at this level is eager for the results of his work. On the other hand, when the motive for work is the satisfaction which one derives out of the work itself, then one does not bother about the fruits of one's action. We lift work from the mere plane of consumption to the plane of satisfaction.

Incidentally, the Swami shows the relationship between disapproval and inefficiency. The disapproval of the work may be by the self or by others. When we are overwhelmed by the disapproval, whatever may be the origin of it, it is not possible to be efficient. This also points to the need for a proper attitude among the supervisors as well as among the parents and teachers. It is true that we have a general belief that we can eliminate faults by making the individual concentrate his attention and become conscious of the faults. But there may be another consequence, viz that instead of the individual becoming conscious of his defects, he may become self-conscious and look upon himself as a person with many errors. This will lead to inferiority feelings with disastrous consequences on the development of the individual.

The Swami also draws our attention to the fact that a person who is eagerly attached to the work or to the fruits of the work may become a grumbler. But when a person is not attached either to the

work he does or to the consequences or the fruits of the work, for him any type of work is satisfactory and he will be able to complete the work. The Swami draws our pointed attention to the reality of individual differences. All men cannot do all kinds of work with equal efficiency. The conclusion that he draws from this is that every man should cherish his own ideal and should endeavour to accomplish it. Another conclusion is that no man should imagine that the work that the other man is doing is inferior. He asserts that the duty of every person is to encourage the persons around him to struggle to live up to their own ideals. As a concrete form of behaviour, the Swami asserts that no man should be judged by the mere nature of his duties. We should only judge him on the basis of the manner in which he performs his work.

In the whole book *Karma Yoga*, we get many times the phrase 'secret of work'. It will be interesting to put in one section all these comments that are scattered in the various parts of the book regarding the secret of work. As we have seen already, one of the secrets of work consists in non-attachment to the work itself. If a man attaches too much value to the work that he is doing, he will identify himself with his work. It is true that this kind of identification may help him up to a point; it may lead to efficiency to begin with, but ultimately it leads to inefficiency, because there are wrong identifications. After all, work is only a part of one's life and not the whole of it, and the person who imagines that it is the whole will ultimately land himself in trouble. Probably there may be a mental breakdown. Secondly, the Swami constantly repeats the *Gītā* ideal of work, viz 'to work you have the right and not to the fruits thereof'. The person who concentrates on the fruits of work cannot be an efficient man, whatever

be the nature of his work. The output is more important than the process. He is dominated by desire. This also spoils his human relations, whether he is the producer of the whole product or of a part of the product. This implies, as I have stated earlier, that our aim in working should not be to enjoy for ourselves the fruits of action. Economists have now very clearly shown that immediate consumption of all the fruits of action leads to economic stagnation rather than to economic growth. Further, concentration of attention on the fruits of the action will not lead to efficiency. Thus we find that one of the secrets of work is self-restraint. The Swami repeats this idea of self-restraint as a very important characteristic of work. He shows that a person who works with self-restraint develops more energy and so is capable of more work. Another important point to which the Swami draws our attention is that intense effort should go with a sense of ease. This appears to be a contradiction in terms; but a little reflection will show that the master does his work with effortlessness. It is the beginner who works with a great deal of effort. With proper development, a man is capable of doing any amount of work and that with a sense of ease. He is not oppressed by a sense of effort; he works, as it were, spontaneously. The Swami shows, as we have already seen above, that one of the secrets of work is the overcoming of selfish motives. Another aspect to which the Swami draws our attention is that a person should be capable of taking up the works that come his way. In other words, he should not be elated or oppressed or overwhelmed by the tasks which come his way. Many problems in human relations arise because of the lack of this attitude. The Swami distinguishes between attachment to work and whole-hearted effort.

While attachment to work leads to inefficiency, doing the work in a whole-hearted manner, whatever the person happens to be doing, leads to efficiency. Another aspect to which he draws our attention is that no man should imagine that he is indispensable. He should not think that without him that work cannot be accomplished or that the organization will come to a standstill. He warns us against this kind of vanity. Another aspect which leads to efficiency is non-expectation of any return. This is only another form of expressing the views which have been expressed earlier. If he expects something in return and if that does not turn up, he becomes frustrated. He particularly warns us against expecting gratitude for what we have done. He asserts that any such expectation will only lead to misery rather than to satisfaction.

In understanding the Swami's view on work, we should bear clearly the following two aspects in our mind :

Firstly, there are different stages in the development of our attitude towards work. In the beginning, all of us are prompted by what he calls selfish motives. It is only with a good deal of effort that we can overcome this and develop an unselfish attitude towards work, when we can 'work for work's sake', as the Swami puts it, expecting nothing in return.

Secondly, this can be achieved only with constant effort and long practice. So it is only an ideal that we must have

in front of us, so that by gradual stages it is possible for us to achieve it.

Finally, the Swami's ideas regarding the way in which the attitude towards work helps in the development of our personality may be described. According to the Swami, the development of the individual is attained through the performance of work. While the person who attaches importance either to the work itself or to the rewards arising out of the work is at a very low level of development, the person who works with a sense of duty is, as it were, of intermediate level. The person who works with a sense of duty is also under the grip of compulsion. In the first case, he is compelled to do the work for the sake of the fruit of the work. In the second case, he is compelled to do the work because of his sense of duty. But at the next stage, where a person transcends both the reward of work as well as the sense of duty, he is able to work incessantly without any kind of attachment or compulsion whatever. Such a man is really free. Such a man is prompted neither by fear nor by desire. So, he is neither happy nor unhappy when he is doing his work. He is not overwhelmed either by success or by failure. In other words, he is a master of the situation. The Swami shows that this state of non-attachment is a state of mind which can be cultivated only through long effort. It is in this way, by developing the right attitude towards work, that a person can develop his personality.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IN THIS NUMBER

In his article on the 'Validity of Categories', Dr. P. S. Sastri, M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., Head of the Department of English, Nagpur University, analyses the

problem in his usual crisp manner, and shows, with thoroughgoing logic, the inadequacy of any approach through the categories in leading us to the absolute truth, which is beyond all categories.

In his article on 'The Pātañjala Yoga Darśana', Swami Harshananda, of the Ramakrishna Order, neatly sums up and delineates the salient features of the Yoga system of Indian philosophy, both in its theoretical and practical aspects.

In her article on 'Kāṭha Upaniṣad : Sāṅkhya Point of View—2', Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., Reader in Philosophy, Patna University, deals with the *ślokas* 14-17 and 21-23 of the second canto of the first part of the *Kāṭha Upaniṣad*. 'Kāṭha Upaniṣad : Sāṅkhya Point of

View—1' appeared in the August 64 number of *Prabuddha Bharata*.

'Swami Vivekananda : A Study of His Personality', by Sri P. M. Bhaskaran Nambudiripad, M.A., M.Litt., Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, is a brief exposition of the work and message of the great Swami.

Dr. B. Kuppuswamy, M.A., Ph.D., Research Consultant, India International Centre, New Delhi, sums up 'Vivekananda's Views on Work' in his article on the subject.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

VIVEKANANDA : PROPHET OF THE NEW AGE, OF INDIA AND THE WORLD. By T. MUTTUCUMARU. Ramakrishna Mission (Ceylon Branch), Colombo 6. 1963. Pages 206. Price Rs. 5.

The author, a well-known historian and an educationist of Ceylon, gives in this book, brought out in commemoration of the birth centenary of Swami Vivekananda, a graphic account of the great Swami's life. He vividly describes the various incidents of the Swami's life so as to give us a living picture of his diverse personality—the monk, the ascetic, the *yogin*, the teacher and leader of men, the artist, the mystic, the conversationalist, the patriot, and, above all, the saint and the seer of Truth. The writer's close contact with the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda literature and his intimate association with the Ramakrishna Mission, Ceylon, have enabled him to give a correct and faithful account of the Swami's life. The last four chapters are devoted to an original exposition of the actual theme of the book, 'Vivekananda, the Prophet of the New Age, of India and the World', and the author is at his best here. The exposition of the subject is well supported by appropriate quotations from the Swami's works. The inclusion of 'Homage to Swami Vivekananda' and a short bibliography enhance the value of the book, though proper references to the quotations and an index would have increased the utility of the book. The book is a valuable addition to the increasing volume of Vivekananda literature, and a good introduction to the life and work of the great Swami.

SWAMI SIVARUPANANDA

THE QUINTESSENCE OF VIVEKANANDA. By PROFESSOR G. S. BANHATTI. Suvichar Prakashan Mandal, Dhantoli, Nagpur 1, (also 461/10 Sadashiv Peth, Poona 2). 1963. Pages 296. Price Rs. 12.

Published on the occasion of Swami Vivekananda's birth centenary, this book answers the need for a handy volume which gives the reader a short biography of the illustrious Swami, a study of his many-sided personality, and an interpretation of his message and work. The book is divided into seven sections of several chapters each. A short but vivid account of the Swami's life in sixty pages is given in the first section, preceded by a calendar of his life. The many facets of his personality—orator, teacher, patriot, conversationalist, etc.—are discussed in a section of nine chapters. The Swami's brilliant intellect and his views on such diverse subjects as science, his contemporaries, a common language for India, and so on are dealt with in the section 'A Rich Mine of Thought'. The Swami was also a lover of nature and art, a talented singer and poet. Attention is drawn to these aspects in the section on 'Swamiji as an Artist'. The Swami's exposition of Vedānta is discussed and interpreted at length in a section which begins appropriately with an assessment of the Swami's role in the national renaissance. In another section, 'Religion for Humanity', the author deals with the Swami's teachings on religion and the four paths—*jñāna-yoga*, *karma-yoga*, *bhakti-yoga*, and *rāja-yoga*—and the Swami's vision of a universal religion. The Swami's gospel of service and social revival is the theme for another section. There are a few illustrations and

also an index. References to the passages quoted from various books are given in most cases, but they are not always found correct, probably owing to the printer's mistake.

In writing this book, the author brings to his task his deep study of the Swami's works as also the large body of literature on the Swami, both biographical and interpretative. The author's interpretation of the Swami is marked by a clear grasp and critical appreciation of the Swami's teaching. The Swami's views on vegetarianism versus meat-eating 'bewilder' the author, and they are discussed at length. This thought-provoking work, which so neatly compresses such a vast mass of material regarding the Swami, will be read with great interest and benefit by all students, admirers, and devotees of the patriot-saint of modern India. The book, however, deserves better printing and get-up than what the publishers have provided.

SWAMI SANDHYANANDA

STUDIES IN HINDUISM. BY KALAI PULAVAR K. NAVARATNAM, WITH A FOREWORD BY DR. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN. Maheswari Devi Navaratnam, 'Santini-kanetan', 1 B.A. Thamby Lane, Jaffna, Ceylon. 1963. Pages 269. Price Rs. 10.

Scholarship and deep faith go hand in hand in the work of late Sri K. Navaratnam. The present work was originally delivered as a series of ten lectures on Hindu religion and philosophy, and they were meant for the non-Hindus. Influenced deeply by Swami Vivekananda, Swami Abhedananda, Sir John Woodroffe, and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Sri Navaratnam gives a lucid exposition of the fundamentals of the Hindu faith. Eager to emphasize the religious aspect of Hindu philosophy, he draws attention to the mystical and spiritual aspects of Hinduism.

After outlining the socio-religious aspect of Hinduism, he surveys the Vedāntic schools and the Āgamic schools. Here we come across his passionate demand for 'a new presentation' of the Hindu religious and philosophical doctrine. It is a much needed task the Hindus have to take up sooner or later.

The exposition of the Śaiva Siddhānta is masterly. There is also an able defence of the doctrines of Karma and reincarnation. The best chapters in the work are those dealing with the Hindu mysticism.

The work is a monument of profound erudition. It is bound to inspire all thinking minds to pay serious attention to the Hindu faith.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

TAKE MY HANDS. BY DOROTHY CLARKE WILSON. Hodder and Stoughton, London E.C.4. 1963. Pages 217. Price 21 shillings.

Extremely well told, this is a moving story of what faith in God, reliance on grace, and the soul's courage which refuses to be denied even by the worst adversity can achieve. Mary Verghese had always wanted, from her childhood, to obtain a very high education and make herself a useful member of the community. Thanks to favourable circumstances, she graduated and qualified to be a surgeon. It was then, on the threshold of her career, that disaster struck. She was involved in a car accident and became a paraplegic. A lesser spirit would have given up the struggle. But not Mary. With the strength of her will, support of her inner resources, and the humane co-operation and assistance of her colleagues—for which medical fraternity at the Vellore Mission is justly famous—she reconstructed her life and even started to perform delicate operations while seated in the wheel-chair.

Dorothy Wilson has a captivating style whenever she writes. In this case, her warm sympathy lends a peculiar glow to the writing. The story revolves round Dr. Verghese, but characters from three continents rub shoulders in these pages, pointing to a future which can be glorious, if only God and man would collaborate.

M. P. PANDIT

NEHRU IN HIS OWN WORDS. BY RAM-NARAYAN CHAUDHARY. Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad 14. 1964. Pages 218. Price Rs. 4.

Once, while Dr. Radhakrishnan was in Leningrad, there was a debate in the University there. Dr. Radhakrishnan said to them: 'You consider yourselves atheists. But do you believe in truth?' They said: 'We do.' Then he asked: 'Do you believe in goodness?' They said: 'Yes.' Again he asked, 'Do you believe in beauty?' Again the answer was: 'Yes.' Then he said: 'All this is God. These are other names of God.' The Russians said: 'If you call this God, we believe in Him.'

This is one of the several interesting anecdotes told by Pandit Nehru to the author of this remarkable document. It appears Sri Chaudhary had obtained a promise from Panditji for fifty exclusive interviews in which he could ask anything he liked; somehow only nineteen were done, and this book contains a verbatim account of the questions and answers. The range is comprehensive; and in his choice of questions, the author has been one in spirit with many of Panditji's countrymen who had

precisely these questions in mind. If Panditji is frank and dignified in his answers, Sri Ramnarayan is no less cultivated in the delicacy of his taste and persuasive approach.

One learns much about the human personality of Sri Nehru in these pages. Panditji might have disclaimed belief in God as such, but he had undoubtedly many godly qualities. He testifies to the influence exercised on him by the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā*, the ethical and the scientific spirit of the approach of the Buddha. (p. 13) Why did he love children so intensely? When did he start wearing the famous rose and why? How far did he believe in the practical philosophy of Gandhiji? What were his evaluations of colleagues like Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad, and Rajendra Prasad? Why did he not marry again? Why did he not wear *dhōti* more frequently? All these questions—light, serious, personal, political—are raised and answered in a delightful manner. The book is indeed a great human document for which the nation will be grateful to the author.

M. P. PANDIT

ESSAYS IN SANSKRIT CRITICISM. BY DR. K. KRISHNAMOORTHY, M.A., B.T., Ph.D. Karnatak University, Dharwar, Mysore State. 1964. Pages 325. Price Rs. 5.

The problem of defining beauty and art haunted Indian minds even before Kālidāsa produced his superb works of great literary excellence. The celebrated poet, in the prologue to his well-known literary work *Raghuvamśa*, states that he would be loath to take pride in his dramatic skill until the learned critics were satisfied with the performance of his play. As far back as A.D. 900, we get a well-written treatise on poetics by Rājaśekhara in his noted work *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, wherein he definitely tells us that Indian critics who lived earlier had a well-defined scale of assessment to measure 'not only poetic success but also poetic failure'. The hierarchy of poets as determined by Rājaśekhara would give rise to various aesthetic problems in the modern minds.

The concept of aesthetic delight as looked at from the creator's as well as the appreciator's points of view needs a thorough probe. Some thinkers have overlooked this subtle distinction and have unhesitatingly declared their fundamental unity and identity; they belong to our times and to the recent and distant past as well. But the ancient Indian poetics carefully distinguished between *alaṅkāra* and *rasa*. The logic of poetry is the very reversal of the normal logic; it is called *alaṅkāra*. Its magic is shared by all; in a sense, it is universal. Yet, it baffles analysis.

This magic may be termed *rasa*. Thus, *alaṅkāra* and *rasa* are the two magnetic poles in Sanskrit poetics. They look like opposing each other. They confuse both the initiated and the uninitiated alike, since both are often used simultaneously in the ancient texts and commentaries. It should be noted that they were complementary and not contradictory. When the poetic art is viewed from the creator's point of view, we get *alaṅkāra* as the aesthetic principle; when the work of art is reviewed from the appreciator's point of view, we have the principle of *rasa*. Thus, the two points of view answer to the 'how' and 'why' of art in the most scientific way. This definition takes us a long way in deciding such issues as the 'universality in art' or the problem of communication in the world of aesthetics.

This concept of *rasa* and the idea of its application as a literary principle to drama and lyrics were found in the older theorists. But the comparatively modern schools of Indian aesthetics headed by Ānandavardhana brilliantly pleaded for its unrestricted application to the epics as well. They considered it to be the only literary principle worth accepting. The artist's aesthetic delight is his own, and it had to be shared by all. That was the inner significance of universality in art. The poet or the artist had enjoyed in a peculiar psycho-physiological setting of his own. That could not be re-created *in toto*, and as such, the artist had his 'unique personal experience' de-personalized. This process has been described by the *rasa* theorists as *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa*; it is only when the artist's raw emotion was de-personalized and universalized under the impact of the poet's genius that we have *rasa*. Our ancient thinkers were of the opinion that *rasa* stood not only for the aesthetic value of emotions, but for their universal significance as well.

The whole range of aesthetic problems has thus been discussed by Dr. Krishnamoorthy from the points of view of well-known commentators of Indian aesthetics. Poetry and drama as viewed by the different schools of Indian aesthetics and their nature, composition, and significance as discovered by the great masters have figured prominently in the different chapters of the book under review. Ānandavardhana's estimate of the Sanskrit epics and his frank and critical appraisal of their message needs a careful perusal and scrutiny. Chapters XXIV and XXV deserve special mention for the critical acumen and proper sense of aesthetic evolution so abundantly displayed by the author.

I recommend this book to all serious students of aesthetics. A careful reading will dispel many doubts and confusions, and will enable the reader to have a correct appreciation of many of the much talked off

aesthetic and literary principles as found in the sanctuary of ancient Indian aesthetics.

DR. S. K. NANDI

THE METAPHYSICS OF WILLIAM JAMES AND JOHN DEWEY. BY THOMAS R. MARTLAND JR. Philosophical Library Inc., 15 East 40th Street, New York 16. Pages 210. Price \$ 4.75.

In some senses, this is an unusual book. The main theme of the volume is not unusual, but the choice of illustrations and arguments and the approach to a critical evaluation of pragmatic philosophy are out of the ordinary. Curiously enough the thesis of the book is indicated in the subtitle. It is the establishment of congruence between philosophy and religion, and this congruence is subject to be demonstrated through a reconciliation of being and becoming, of structure and process. There is nothing unusual in this attempt. But, in the first chapter of the book, the author makes unusual explorations into canaanite religion, the Greek city state, and early Christian experiences, to illustrate the polarity of *process* and *structure*. In the second chapter, the author switches over to a critical estimate of the metaphysics of James and Dewey. He holds that other critics of these two great pragmatic thinkers, sympathetic as well as unsympathetic, unjustifiably charge them with sacrificing structure and over-emphasizing process. Even when the critics find evidence of structure in James and Dewey, they use it to substantiate the principle 'Exceptions prove the rule'. Our author then proceeds to examine the metaphysical systems of James and Dewey, and discovers enough evidence to prove that in pragmatic naturalization, there is place for process and also for structure; for change, desire, and satisfaction, and also for stability, limitation, and control. There is a tendency at present to boost the concept of relativity, and to belittle eternal values and ends. This book is a much needed corrective to such misguided and useless thinking in philosophy.

PROFESSOR P. S. NAIDU

SANSKRIT

ŚUDDHA-ŚĀṆKARA-PRAKRIYĀ-BHĀSKARAH (PARTS 1-7, IN THREE VOLUMES). BY ŚRĪ SACCIDĀNANDENDRA SARASVATI SVAMĪ. Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarasipura, Hassan District, Mysore State. 1964. Pages 28, 48, and 50. Price First

Volume: 40 P; Second and Third Volumes: 60 P each.

Śrī Saccidānandendra Sarasvati Svamī had composed in Sanskrit a stimulating volume entitled '*Vedānta Prakriyā Pratyabhijñā*', which presents a comparative study of the systems of Vedānta. The basic standpoint is that of Śāṅkara's Advaita. To popularize the Advaita Vedānta, the Swamiji has written these three booklets, which are intended to initiate the layman into the fascinating philosophical system of Śāṅkara.

The first booklet determines the basic tenets of Vedānta, and the *Śāṅkara sampradāya*. The Swamiji argues that Advaita was the only system universally taught in the Upaniṣads up to the time of Śāṅkara. But why should Śāṅkara argue against the Sāṅkhya position frequently in the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*? The second booklet presents the specific doctrines of Śāṅkara Vedānta, the particular method accepted by Advaita, and the principle of *adhyāropa-apavāda*. The third booklet examines the criticism of Advaita made by the other schools of Vedānta, and presents lucidly the differences between Advaita and Buddhism.

The booklets are written in easy, graceful, flowing Sanskrit. One who has a general acquaintance with Sanskrit can easily follow them. These booklets deserve to be translated into the various languages.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

HINDI

NIDHI-SANCAYA. EDITED BY SRI VINOD MISHRA. Pandit Shyamlal Chaturvedi, 461 Bari Gali Chhatta Bazar, Mathura. 1964. Pages 225. Price Rs. 12.

This is a memorial edition of the writings of the late Sri Manmohan Lal Caturvedi, who passed away before he was eighteen, after showing a rich promise as a poet. The editor, Sri Mishra, has brought together, in these pages, all the poems written by the young author (in Hindi and English), his prose-poems and short stories, etc. The book is enriched by short accounts of the life and work of more than forty prodigies who passed away before they attained the age of 35. Christopher Marlow, John Keats, Rajam Iyer, Rupert Brooke, and a number of other gifted writers are included. There is also a long introduction on the subject of *rasa* in poetry.

The book is informative and useful.

M. P. PANDIT

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION VIDYALAYA
COIMBATORE DT.

REPORT FOR 1962-63

The activities of this institution during the year under review were as follows:

Teachers' College: Besides the regular lecture classes in English, physical science, natural science, mathematics, Tamil, history, basic education, and home science, group discussions, seminars, panel discussions were held and workshop techniques were utilized for the training of teachers appearing for the B.T. course. Arrangements were also made for observation and teaching practice in the surrounding schools for a period of five weeks. Morning conditioning classes, an extension services department, annual sports tournament, the college parliament, the college cabinet responsible for the smooth working of the college and the hostel, observance of important festivals, the central science club, and the departmental library, are the other activities of the college. The total number of students admitted: 90. Students who appeared in the examination: 71; passed: 51; in practical examination: 69.

M. Ed. Course: Total number of students: full time: 2; part time: 6.

Multi-purpose High School: This is a completely residential school, with standards VI to X. There is provision for the teaching of engineering and agriculture in standards IX to X under bifurcated courses. In the lower classes, wood-work, agriculture, and music are taught. A manuscript magazine brought out by the students of each class, the staging of the drama *Sacrifice* by Tagore, the annual sports, painting, music, essay writing and elocution competitions, excursions, the students' co-operative stores were the other features of the activities of the school. The total strength of the school: 186 (free: 30).

Gandhi Basic Training School: Total strength: 40 trainees.

T.A.T. Kalanilayam: The total strength: students: 580 (girls: 207); teachers: 19. Number

of children in the pre-basic nursery school: 26 (of age groups 3 to 4½).

Swami Shivananda High School: Started two years back, this high school caters to the needs of the neighbouring villages. Extra-curricular activities: Vocational guidance in the Vidyalyaya industrial section, science club, observance of important festivals, field trips music, community cleaning, school parliament, and games and sports.

Maruthi College of Physical Education: Number of teachers under training: higher grade: 12; lower grade: 68.

Rural Institute: Total strength: *School of Engineering:* 146 (1st year: 46; second year: 51; third year: 49); *School of Agriculture:* 67 (first year: 38; final year: 29); *College of Rural Higher Education:* 208 (preparatory class: 47; 1st year: 40; 2nd year: 50; 3rd year: 53; master's diploma course: 18).

Post-Graduate Course in Co-operation: Total strength: 14 students.

Certificate Course in Engineering: Total strength: 71 (general mechanics: 17; fitter and turner trade courses: 54).

Industrial Section: Total strength: 100 from the school of engineering; 75 from the certification course.

Short Course for Ryots: Total number of trainees: 16.

Social Education Organizers' Training Centre: Candidates deputed for training by the states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Madras are given job and refresher training for six months and one and a half months respectively.

Dispensary: Total number of cases treated: 21,695.

Central Library: Total number of books: 25,000; number of books issued during the year: students: 19,734; staff: 6,307.

Publications: The following are some of the books brought out in connexion with the birth centenary of Swami Vivekananda: 1. A research work on *Tirukkural*, the Tamil classic on ethics; 2. *Vivekananda and Gandhi*; and 3. Extracts from Swamiji's works in Tamil.

CORRIGENDUM

JANUARY 65 NUMBER: Readers are kindly requested to note that the author of the article 'Militant Mystic', appearing on page 10, is a staff member of the medical newsmagazine, *MD*, and not Dr. Félix Martí-Ibáñez. Dr. Martí-Ibáñez only conceived the idea of the article. Readers may also please note that Dr. Martí-Ibáñez is writing a pentalogy on the history of medicine, and not a tetralogy as mentioned on page 36 (column 1, line —18), and the first four in the series—*Centaur (Essays on the History of Medical Ideas)*; *Men, Molds, and History*; *Ariel (Essays on the Arts and History and Philosophy of Medicine)*; and *A Prelude to Medical History*—have already been published and the fifth, *The Fabric of Medicine*, is forthcoming. Please also read 'publish' in place of 'prepare' on the same page, column 1, line —6.