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Prabuddha Bharata

OR

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By Karma, Jnana, Bhakti, and Yoga, by one or more or all of these the vision of the Paramatman is obtained.

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Vol. LXXI

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उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

—:o:—

LETTERS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

(106)

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Bangalore City
1 October, 1921

Dear Sriman —,

I am much delighted to receive your letter. I know that you would remain busy during this period and as such I did not write to you. However, I get the news of the Math almost everyday. Whispers of the boys at the back are nothing new ; so do not mind all these. There is a proverb prevalent in Bengal,—‘A saint is least known in his own place’ ; therefore, do not pay any heed to the things. For the sake of the Master do what you consider expedient. That you look to the inmates of the Math with all brotherly love, is known to us and we have the least doubt in that respect. Even the richest of the rich can not have the same measure of treatment, diet and nursing what one can get at the Math by His grace and we are sure of the fact. It is as a result of the accumulated virtue of many a life that one is able to take refuge in the order of the Master where nothing relating to the well being of life is wanting, be that spiritual or physical. Only one is to get at the things. Of course, the health in the Math does not always run well and it has become something like inevitable. Still it is hoped that by the wil of the Master, things wil improve after some time ; surrounding areas too will improve much. When, by the grace of the Master, His Math has come into being there, such are sure to happen.

I do not know how to express the joy that I will have to learn that this year too Divine Mother Durgā will be worshipped at the Math in image. Let all the arrangements of the boys in this regard become perfect. This will be the innermost desire of our heart, although we will not be physically present there on the occasion. Certainly that will be so. To fulfil the religious aspirations of the Age Swamiji (Swami Vivekananda) carried the Master in his head to the Math and enshrined Him there according to His will. So there is a divine dispensation behind this. Many cannot think of those great missions that are likely to be materialized through this Math in future. All these had been predicted by Swamiji who could foresee the things long before. It is just only a beginning of the work that has so far been made. Both physically and mentally Maharaj and others had to strive hard for the consolidation of this Math from its very inception. Many devotees have been benefited and many will be so in future. Not to speak of Bengal alone, Belur Math has now turned into a centre of ideal for the whole of India and for the whole world. We have been hearing much about the Math in this region. Those at the Math can hardly feel all these. Great good is being served by our visit to these areas; name and fame of the Math are being gradually extended. The educated people of this area feel diffident that they have not been able to do any mentionable good work. Efforts, of course, are being made and those, too, are being initiated at the instance of the devotees of the Master. May the worship of the Divine Mother be performed without any difficulty and the health of the boys be not impaired much. May you have serene joy and the devotees too have great rejoicings. Let there be an increase of devotion, love, compassion and faith in them. This is the prayer of my heart. You are fortunate and blessed that, dedicated to such a great cause, you stay at the Math. Surely the Master will look to much increase of your love and faith, purity and devotion and compassion. Undoubtedly you will attain to bliss and rise very high. Let the bond of fraternal love among you become strong, for that is most essential. Let me pray to the feet of the Master with all earnestness for this. This is sure to be achieved.

It is very heartening to learn that A—has come round; a change to some health-giving place after the *pūjā* will be good for him. Prakash will soon recover himself, for his health is not so bad; it is quite sturdy. We will be starting for Madras on the 4th of October next. Accept my heartfelt love and affection and convey the same to all in the Math.

Ever well-wisher,
Shivananda

REINCARNATION OF HISTORY

[EDITORIAL]

The Soul of a Nation : Every nation in every age must find out its soul. This soul is not a very popular subject of discussion no doubt but it has got to be discovered. It may be years before we get down to this much needed national requirement. But a nation that aspires after social and political maturity can hardly ignore this hard fact. Mere political independence is not enough, mere sedative thinking of a bright future is abortive and mere wishful backward gaze at the hoary antiquity, however great, can never make a nation self-sustaining. Specified contribution of a nation to the world it lives in is required to be derived from what remains of its past. Through mistakes and misfortunes some coherent body of thought has got to emerge so that it may be translated into a decisive movement of the present. 'Many countries', observes Andre Malraux, the outstanding French intellectual of this century, 'may be free but few have found their souls.' The question is ticklish and the problem is certainly an abstruse one yet the need is no less important than anything that may concern the growth and stability of a new born nation. True identity of a nation has never been political or economic. It is always historical, because a nation is a collection of individuals wedded to a set of historical relations that stand in perpetuity from generation to generation. Individuals, being organisms, may die but the nation gains a certain sort of potential immortality that is alive and in motion with an inner historical urge to reincarnate itself again and again. In a larger perspective of historical parallelism this urge may crystallize into an un-

flinching sincerity with exceptionally rational morals dedicated to great creativity and culture or it may degenerate into socio-economic and cultural inequalities commonly manifesting themselves in the purest of prudery and highest of snobbery. It may drive the nation to ride the crest of some imagined infallibility vanishing ultimately in utter collapse of wisdom and confidence or it may serve as a key to the new vistas of vision or new conquests of perception. But, viewed in human terms, all these are not scrap heaps of mutually contradictory unrelated episodes ; in a totality they can be knit together in a single thread ; as a whole they combine into one to make the much needed soul of the nation. 'The actors in human history', says Professor Arnold Toynbee, 'are living and moving all the time, because human history is a constantly changing network of relations between human beings.' The nation, so long as it fails to read this urge correctly, remains underdeveloped in its heritage and suffers a retrogression ; on the other hand a patriot, when he can grasp the signal of history with his immaculate feel for the country, assumes the stature of a national leader of unmatched courage and unsparing dedication. He becomes the spokesman of the entire people. When Lincoln leads America he is no longer an American ; he becomes America itself. Such leaders may be younger in age, they may be Pitts of England or Wilsons of U.S.A. ; but by their intuitive perception of the inarticulated needs and aspirations of the great masses of people they can successfully commandeer the historical urge of their motherland. By extravagantly emptying all that

they have to give they become one with their national heritage. Shakespeare would probably say of any such personality of history as :

His years but young but his experience
old,

His head unmellowed, but his judgement
ripe.

The finding of the soul of a nation, therefore, is not the precious reflection of some frail aesthete. There is an inevitable active exploration of the conditions of the present in the context of the past, be that immediate or remote. It always consists in reassessing the history and revaluating the heritage that would culminate into a mandate of confidence and courage for correct decisions by disclaiming any pretence to the eternal validity for a set pattern of thinking and ideas.

Heritage is required to be Reinvested : Culture or heritage is never a settled fact once for all. For want of a proper reinterpretation they are bound to become vague and underdeveloped. Although they may have acquired unequalled excellence through the long experience of the past, they may yet prove to be sterile and dead if their roots fail to go deeper into the minds of the people for not being precisely defined. Instead they may develop into a cult of certain conventions, may mean simple cheer-leading or end in paying empty homages to the past. In such pitiful perspectives the cultural heritage and historical past abound in a few rituals that follow set patterns and, like all rituals, they grow increasingly rigid with their emphasis on form rather than substance, on pretentious display rather than deep reverence. History is so often loudly referred to, centenaries are observed with due *éclat*; but there being very little attempt at understanding the occasions or instances for which they stand, they become

no better than mere frivolous shows so often making things utterly inapposite and miserably incongruous. Mad romanticism being the order, often some fugitive ideas are expressed of the need for reorganization and renewal of heritage that may want to dissolve in a mystical maize of misleading manifestations, the challenge that such renewal may possibly confront a nation. The hard truth is that underdeveloped heritage is far worse than no heritage at all as it involves a process of stimulating national expectations that can never be fulfilled and as such, it creates a dangerous disequilibrium to persist in the values and the virtues of national life rendering the situation an additional obstacle to the ordered progress of the society. Aldous Huxley quite severely warns us against such self-deception in culture. Mentioning ironically of the anniversary celebrations he says that on such occasions we make 'rather a second burial, a reaffirmation of deadness of the great ones'.

Moreover, narrow vision does not merely render the judgements obstructed but it makes the things altogether different too. Want of revaluation may give way to wrong valuation and wrong assertions as well. It dares not accept the responsibility of the past failures of history squarely and thoroughly; on the other hand it makes small of great things and great of small and develops into a state of cultural infirmity and historical diffidence. To such a state of perversion the epic grandeur of the *Mahābhārata* does not inspire one any more to greater exertion, Rajput chivalry appears to be sporadic exercise of pointless bravado and all exhortations of the past become cry in wilderness. Unable to rewrite the history one may even continue to believe what Lord Curzon would say about India: 'The vast majority of them (Indians) have been trained to agriculture, are only physically fitted for agri-

culture and will never practise any thing but agriculture.' History becomes a burden, heritage stands as a huge encrustation of precedents accumulated through the centuries to cater for idle curiosity and the people get addicted to a sort of lust for remembering only. There is a negative pleasure in growing old; the older you get, the more you are your own and in the end it could just be no more than gazing at a cracking mirror. The backward gazing at times proves to be so much intoxicating that men cannot get away from the barmy charm of this lust for culture under the pretence that they are engaged in the vast exercise of modernization, although they really do not mean it. Weakness merits affliction and so one evidently lulls the fears and anxieties of the moments into an ignorance of the danger; but by that way one madly rushes into multiplied miseries and confusion worse confounded. Underdeveloped heritage is like the undeveloped economy where the poverty of thinking is chronic, where there is neither the sagacity to foresee calamities nor the necessary strength to shake them off and as a result a nation with such undeveloped heredity cannot help indulging in presumptuous imaginations, basically a motley collection of undigested and unassimilated slogans which are characterized generally as the expressions of the national fundamentals—social, political, cultural and economic.

Time and tide tarry for none; so also is history. If you fail to move with the motion of history it will leave you far behind to suffer and lament. But no amount of lamenting and repenting can be of any help unless you are up and doing to get rid of the yawning gap that has developed between the past and present. By your obscure vision you may make a snake of a rope in darkness but for that you cannot blame the rope and so long there is

no transformation of the vision towards the awareness of the reality you are weakened to suffer. Reevaluation of the history then is that sort of transformation in mood and approach, a shift in thinking that represents a release from the narrow confines of obscure past, an escape from the flattering unction of blind compliance of the overweening pride and awful stupefaction to the awareness of the inescapability of the test of performances. They all add upto a strategy of considerable variance with what was accepted long ago as a direct pathway to a happy heaven with a simple faith that refused to recognize that even though we were on the right road, we were unmistakably headed backward. To deal with the unharnessed stock of national history requires a positive progressiveness having its roots in practicality, forbearance and wisdom and one must have enough courage in this venture. One cannot jump over the hurdle of history; nor can one make an ignominious retreat from it. One has to deal with it, face it with courage and fortitude, invest it in new undertakings and start new achievements. If it is not invested there is no progress; if it is not dealt with it tends to be dry. Again it must be taken as a whole and not in chosen segments; it must involve the entire society. Failures and successes both contribute to the making of a succinct summation of historical past. The fostering ethic is contained in both. It is not to dismiss or diminish the interdependence of the aspects or periods but is a choice of aggregate progression or regression that it presents in totality. And above all it is for the people as a whole to keep the flow of the inspiration unimpeded and to maintain the vigour of values undimmed and undisturbed for which the history stands and, therefore, the nation as a whole is to rally round to win a common patriotic crusade for historical self-suffi-

ciency by initiating a new historical movement—a rehearsal of the virtues which it behoved every individual to practise in every transaction of his social and cultural life. Initiation into this new movement means toiling hard, a composite effort to get rid of the fetters of complacencies, to break through the entanglements that stand in the way of a national 'becoming'. If, therefore, the nation is to get at its soul, the history must reincarnate itself again and the task of the historian is to make that reincarnation possible. His is a mission which is not merely to collect the specimens of bygone days but is also to provide a new blueprint of bold imagination. He may be stern in his analytic treatment but he has also to add some creative leaven into it. While making a reference on Indian history and traditions Dr. Johans Voight, the eminent Oxford historian of this century, hits at the right point and describes history as a 'constant process of rewriting and rethinking anew of the past. Changed conditions, a refurbished set of values, a discovery of additional documentary and other material make it necessary to rewrite history, if history is to be given a meaning appropriate to our times. The danger that the contemporary historian needs to bear in mind is the tendency to interlard his work with an excess of footnotes and appendices. These can turn the best histories into lifeless and dry-as-dust stuff. History must not only be scholarly; it must be readable too.'

Rewriting the National History: Considered in the background of the foregoing analysis there can be no observation more significant and timely than that of Dr. Voight in regard to India's national history. In fact, no serious attempt has so far been made to build up any comprehensive history of this subcontinent. Barring a few attempts here and there, Indian history,

upto the advent of British rule, primarily consisted of some incoherent patchworks based on the memoirs and despatches of the court historians of the kings and emperors ruling the country. These sources are more analytic accounts of glorifications of the regimes than a compact chronicle of the entire nation and they have little to do with the general feeling of the people. A larger comprehension of the details came to be made during the British rule, no doubt, but it attempted to impose upon us a new version where we felt deceived and deluded in many respects of national interest. Like actors in a perfect dramatic scene these foreign rulers preserved their consistency of roles upto the last; they lived here without virtue and they departed without repentance leaving behind a compiled history of distorted facts and peremptory words which we would still slavishly echo. This has led us to an ignominious situation where, notwithstanding a best historical heritage, we cannot act with success nor suffer with honour. Our national past does not call upon us to remonstrate with strongest and loudest language of truth which our time demands to rescue ourselves from the tangles of misfortunes and unworthy opinions heaped upon our path. In spite of our great philosophies we are betrayed by ignorance, our virtues are worst understood; in spite of the best precedents of history we humble ourselves repeatedly in our errors. Notwithstanding the great sagas of courage, strength and harmony we are disintegrated to suffer the disgrace of mortifying defeat that makes us ridiculous and contemptible. In a sense we betray our past by our mistakes which have no justification. We prove ourselves unworthy of our culture by riding rough-shod upon the noble traditions. Mere claim to something ancient, mere resting in the consciousness of having inherited something unique cannot make us

wise; grey hairs do never make the folly venerable.

Need of such history consciousness becomes all the more imperative at a time when in the present decade of this century we are celebrating centenaries of the great builders of modern India. The celebrations queuing up one after the other unmistakably signify that the history of the century, immediately preceding the present one had witnessed certain culminations that would project their shadow even to this day. One Swami Vivekananda is enough for the entire world for many centuries to come; hundred of years of Tagore, Gandhi, Gokhale and Tilak may serve as a powerful influence to give any nation a boost towards new vitality provided we can have that necessary clarity of vision and zeal to visualize the impact. For historian, says H.A.L. Fisher, history is without meaning. It becomes meaningful and, to borrow the dictum of Prof. Toynbee, 'intelligible' when it is interpreted in philosophical concepts. To think in these terms a greater responsibility devolves upon the historian of the posterity to revalue and reinterpret the rare heritage of the past centuries. The centenary celebrations should at least serve as occasions for us when we can pause and ponder over our national worthiness to inherit such a great legacy, to retrace our shortcomings and to review the meagreness of our achievements.

Like the balance of power in politics there is also an inherent balance of culture and its impact upon political stability of a nation is no less severe than anything else. In view of the storm of uncertainty raging in the Afro-Asian sky today there has appeared an inevitable vacuum of history which needs to be filled in soon. Ancient China of Confucius is no more, Buddhistic Japan is war weary and entire Africa is groping towards some stable regeneration. India today virtually stands

alone as the last guard of the ancient heritage in the whole of Asia which is being rocked by the tremors of unrest and unsatisfactoriness. Therefore, if India of the traditions is to survive against the brewing storm it is high time that we started playing down the closed-circuit self-viewing orgies of a cheap culture and dedicated ourselves to the task of modernizing our heritage towards the building up of a comprehensive philosophy of history. Modern India must find out the missing link of the past.

To another French historian M. Riencourt there can be no political wisdom without historical perspective. History, according to Riencourt, is both cyclical and linear. Cyclical rhythms are evident from the occurrences of definite patterns as birth growth and decay of societies followed by other new societies being fed on them; but taking the entire process with its ups and downs it gives a linear view. Culture is the youthful awakening of a new society, a new life resulting from a contact of the ancient with some new dynamism. In this the ancient dissolves itself to emerge in a new form giving rise to the growth of a new vital society which again crystallizes and lapses into morbidity until again it receives a fresh impact from some other dynamism. Culture when it begins to be stable, lends support to the substratum of this growing society. It is like the oil in the lamp of civilization where it burns as heritage of illumination and conviction. The degenerated history of Greece brought its ruin and the same history when reincarnated again served as a measure of new dynamic movement to the development of the Roman world. Thus the fall of Greece was the opportunity to Rome. A 'comprehensive philosophy of history' is therefore a great necessity which can mightily improve the image of the nation by enlisting a broad spectrum

of support for its ideal that would strengthen both internal as well as external position and generate an aura of invincibility capable of lending verisimilitude to a new national future by carrying powerful conviction and confidence to the millions. This comprehensive philosophy of history is the strongest and perhaps the last barrage of defence of a nation against any possible invasion from abroad and it is no less an imperative in the present day defence of India than all the political and economic defence measures.

Great heritage never dies, great events never become stale and great histories never cease to inspire the posterity; and by remembering those great achievements a country peeps into its dusty attic of memory to draw fresh inspirations from them. Longer the periods of time, greater is the freshness of recollections and deeper become the impressions of events with which they are historically connected. Washington after two hundred years today has grown much bigger in stature than Washington of his own time. Swami Vivekananda after another one hundred years will certainly grow enormous in historical proportion and far more dynamic in his call. With the passage of time they become reborn in million hearts and as such they grow in stature. Such also are the cases of the great historical places. Ordinary spots on earth's surface become sites of history and as time rolls on they become parts of the human mind. Places like Bunker Hill, Camden or Monmouth are more vivid in American mind today than what they are in American geography. They have struck deep roots there. Heritage, when it ceases to be abstractions, when it becomes embodied in national character capable enough to the release of the unharnessed energies as a broad offensive against the country's narrow base of creative thinking, assumes a new life.

The nation with such living history gains a velocity of progress, acquires the lost sanctity and firmness of its culture and it can no longer indulge in frivolous shows of dance, drama, music. For the wrongs suffered in the past, it no more sinks into submission but rises to resistance and strength. Actuality is what the world wants and not a mere vague mysticism of circumstances. No life is possible without sacrifice and no nation can live by being lumbered with its own past. Adaptive culture is incompatible with static social structure. The spirit of freedom contradicts the complacencies of despair. As such a nation aspiring after regeneration has to be less flippant and more solemn in its outlook on history, less academic and more practical in its profession of culture. For this we need to have men who can rewrite and revalue our past by breaking through the morbid obsession of contemporary thinking.

As a nation conducts geological explorations for new sources of minerals beneath the surface of its territory so by revaluation of its history it studies the geology of the layers of cultural heritage and discovers newer sources of power to make itself self-sufficient and strong. Investments in such explorations are as paying as the investments in dams and the barrages and the industrial installations of the country. The history and heritage of Buddha, Śaṅkara and Swami Vivekananda are as important as the nuclear reactors of Trombay or the installations at Bhilai and Rourkela in India. It is true that Gibbons interpreting history with their touches of irony and brilliance are not always available in every land, Boswells portraying the rare geniuses of Johnsons cannot be had in every age; but if we are sincere, our endeavours may prove to be correctives to all the existing drab and negative thinking conveying at the same time a

drama of choice with which the *élite* is faced today. Rewriting the history and heritage may be analytically acute but if heeded and acted upon it can make all the differences; instead of the helpless

descent into darkness it can be the noon of the future. By inheriting a great heritage, India carries a mighty burden of its reincarnation and the responsibility of this burden cannot be easily dispensed with.

PSYCHIATRY AND VEDĀNTA

SWAMI SATPRAKASHANANDA

The treatment of mental illness is the primary role of psychiatry, of Vedānta it is a subsidiary function. While psychiatry, a special branch of medical science, is concerned particularly with ailing persons, the religion and philosophy of Vedānta—like other systems of thought and culture in general—deals specially with normal human beings. Its primary function is to develop man intellectually, morally, and spiritually and to prevent his deterioration. Normal individuals, too, have mental troubles, such as disquiet and distractions and emotional disturbances. When occasion arises the Vedāntic teachers undertake therapeutic work. The knowledge of the human mind that Vedānta provides is adequate for the purpose, as far as I can see.

The scope of Vedāntic therapy is however limited in a sense. Mental ailments due solely or primarily to physical causes, such as the diseases of the nervous system and the bodily organs, Vedāntic teachers leave to the care of the psychiatrists and the medical doctors. They usually restrict themselves to psychogenic cases, the treatment of which must be, in their view, at the psychological level. According to certain statistical accounts eighty percent of medical cases in America are psychogenic. Actual cause of the trouble being in the

mind it cannot be reached by purely physical treatment, such as insulin therapy, lobectomy. The cause has to be determined by psychological analysis, which need not be the same as psychoanalysis, that is, probing into the lowest depths of the mind. The Vedāntic psychotherapy aims to cure mental and functional disorders due to fear, anxiety, grief, frustration, internal conflict, sense of guilt, suppressed desire, and so forth, by rectifying the patient's inner attitude towards the objects concerned—things, beings, or events, as the case may be—and thereby transforming his reactions to them. He is taught how to adapt himself to the varying conditions of life, since the stress due to social maladjustment contributes to neurosis and psychosis as well. But to effect the permanent cure Vedānta recommends the change of outlook on life, because the root cause of mental ailments is man's wrong view of life. All the while the patient is to be treated with due consideration of his capacities. He who feels for him heals his heart.

As long as a person looks upon pleasures and possessions as the primary objectives of life he cannot be free from emotional involvement. Whoever is attached to his riches must have the fear of losing them and the consequent cares and worries. He

will be envious of those who have more than what he has, contemptuous of those who have not enough, and proud of what he has. Greed invariably takes hold of him. Sense desires are insatiable, while the means of their fulfilment are inadequate. The objects of desire, transitory as they are, cannot be easily acquired. The body and the organs, the instruments of sense enjoyment, give way before the mind is satisfied. The baneful effects of modern living—constant tension, discontent, competition, clash and conflict, are inevitable, inasmuch as one and all clamour for maximum power and prosperity as the very goal of life. Vedānta does not condemn the search for pleasures and possessions but urges the seekers not to look upon them as ends in themselves. It draws man's attention from the lower to the higher ideals until he finds the highest. When the mind turns to the higher values it invariably becomes detached from the lower. This is the way to outgrow sense-desires. This is what Vedānta recommends and condemns their suppression and repression no less than over-indulgence. Detachment does not however mean indifference. Human desires and emotions are not wrong in themselves. Otherwise they could not be sublimated. They have to be given higher and higher directions until they turn to God, the Highest. Self-control implies self-upliftment.

Vedānta agrees with psychiatry on the point that man should be viewed as an integrated whole. But the difference is this. Psychiatry conceives man as a psychophysical organism, of which the physical system is the prime factor, and ignores his spiritual self. Vedānta recognizes, as religions generally do, three distinct factors in human personality—body, mind, and spirit, among which the spiritual self is the basic unifying principle. So the real man is not the unity of the three factors

but the central principle of consciousness that integrates the body and the mind and functions as the knower and as the doer in association with them. The mind has the capacity to transmit consciousness that belongs to the knowing self. Though distinct the body and the mind are closely associated and influence each other. A man's problems cannot be solved effectively unless he has a correct view of himself. The truer the view the better is the life. Not only should he be acquainted with his present status or the stage of development but also with his fundamental nature. Is man basically a physical, or a psychophysical, or a spiritual being? On his answer to these questions depend his ideal and plan of living—the key to the integration of personality. Until he knows the true meaning of life no inner stability is possible. None can be at peace with himself unless he can find a satisfactory answer to the question 'what do I live for?'

It is the recognition of the spiritual self, ever shining, birthless, growthless, decayless, deathless, that gives man a sense of security amidst all the uncertainties of life, removes his fears, awakens his self-faith, the key to his development, and makes him the master of himself—his mind, the body and the organs. At the same time he recognizes the spiritual self of others and treats them with love and respect. The root cause of man's troubles is the ignorance of the true nature of the self.

One of the Upaniṣads gives a graphic picture of man's journey to the ultimate Goal with self-mastery:

'Know the (spiritual) self to be the master of the chariot and the body, the chariot. Know the right understanding to be the charioteer and the mind (volitional) the reins. The senses are said to be the horses and the objects, the

roads. The wise call the self associated with the body, the senses, and the mind the experiencer.... A man who has right understanding for his charioteer and holds the reins of the mind firmly, reaches the end of the road; and that is the supreme position of the omnipresent, all transcendent Being.' (*Katha* I. iii. 3)

Man's self-fulfilment is not in his physical, intellectual, aesthetic, or moral well-being, but in his spiritual enlightenment. Being conducive to the highest good, spiritual life is of supreme importance in the Vedāntic thought and culture. Next to this is man's moral life. To neither of these has psychiatry paid much attention, as far as I can see. Moral goodness is a prerequisite for spiritual awakening. Not only that; it sustains man's intellectual, aesthetic, physical, and social well-being. Who can expect to maintain good health unless he lives with moderation and self-restraint? Virtue brightens intellect and develops the power of discrimination between the pleasant and the beneficial, the apparent and the real, the ephemeral and the eternal. It counteracts emotional imbalance. Humility overcomes pride, charity unkindness, loving sympathy anger and hate. Unsupported by moral judgement aesthetic sensuousness turns into sensuality. Without fair dealings with our fellow-beings no sound interpersonal relationship is possible; tension and hostility in collective life, potent causes of nervous breakdown and mental disorder, are inevitable.

Besides the conscious and the subconscious state on which man usually dwells, Vedānta recognizes the superconscious state, which none but the specially qualified can reach. In the conscious, that is, the waking state, a person experiences the external objects and the internal facts as well. But he cannot see the entire mind.

The part of the mind that is open to the waking ego is the conscious level, below this is the subconscious and beyond this is the superconscious. In dream and deep sleep the experiencer dwells on the subconscious level. Normally, every individual experiences three different states—waking, dream, and deep sleep—every day. They do not bring about radical change in his vision of life and the world. It is the superconscious experience that reveals unto him the truth regarding the self and the universe and its Ruler, removes his bondages forever and reinstates him in his native purity, freedom, and blissfulness. The basic urge in man is the urge for perfection. This he attains by Self-realization which is the same as the realization of God, the Soul of all souls.

Vedānta highly values the conscious or the waking state. It is then and then only that man's reason and volition function. It is by the exercise of the will backed by reason that man has to regulate his emotions and actions and achieve anything worthwhile. There is no progress in the subconscious level. No moral judgement is possible there. In dream and so in drunkenness and drowsiness all mental operations are involuntary, only emotions and instincts prevail. What can man achieve then? Any intoxicant or drug that robs man of his self-awareness must overwhelm his self-determination and benumb his will-power. What positive good can man expect to come out of it? It is his volitional action that demarcates the human level from the subhuman and enables him to rise above the sense-plane. His intellectual, aesthetic, moral and spiritual unfoldments await cultural operation. He can even rectify the subconscious region by conscious efforts. To counteract the evil propensities lying there he has to cultivate the contrary tendencies with a will.

The performance of volitional action is

the special privilege of human life. In lower levels instinct prevails. Any volitional operation, physical or mental, is *karma*, the Sanskrit term with which you are familiar. Right or wrong, high or low, this leaves a corresponding impression on the mind. By our deliberate actions and experiences we are constantly storing in the mind various impressions (*samskāras*). Our ideas and emotions, tendencies and desires, capabilities and memories, are derived from them. Being manifest as such on the conscious mind they control behaviour. The impressions also dwell within as retributive moral forces that fructify in due course here or hereafter and create favourable or unfavourable situation for man. Among the unmanifest impressions some become attenuated, some overpowered. Being close to the surface these influence the conscious mind and behaviour more or less. They account for what some psychologists like to call 'the unconscious mental processes' in preference to 'the unconscious.' But most of the unmanifest impressions lie dormant in the bottom of the mind. They affect neither the conscious mind nor behaviour as long as they remain as such. They may become manifest in the conscious level in due course. Some stimulating cause may awaken any of them. Thus in the Vedāntic view the subsoil of the mind is the repository of both good and evil elements; it is not dreadful or abominable as the unconscious of Freud. It cannot be said that only repressed and suppressed urges dwell there. Whatever thoughts, emotions, and propensities prevail in the conscious mind naturally gravitate to the subconscious level. Necessarily the endogenous cause of mental ailments has to be traced there.

When the departing spirit leaves the physical body he retains the mind with all its contents in seed form. In due course

he is reborn with them, unless he attains liberation. It is the unredeemed souls that become reincarnate. The mind and the body being distinct, the characteristics of the one cannot inhere in the other. Psychiatry acknowledges hereditary transmission to account for the endogenous cause of mental illness. But in the Vedāntic view this is not possible unless we acknowledge that some parts of the parents' mind enter into the gene at the conception. In that case it is to be admitted that each time a child is born the parents must lose portions of their minds. But actually it is not so. It is also a fact that children do not necessarily inherit the parent's intellectual, aesthetic, moral, or spiritual nature. Wicked children are born of saintly parents, morons of normal parents, sane children of the insane parents. A congenital defect mental or physical is not necessarily hereditary.

The direct knowledge of the human mind is possible only by introspection. The study of behaviour is an indirect approach. Vedānta does not depend on the latter as much as on the former. Generally speaking, human behaviour is not instinctive as the animal behaviour. Man's judgement intervenes between his thoughts and emotions and their expressions. A person may be aware of a fact, still he may deny it and pretend ignorance. He may not eat the food offered to him even though he may like it. With no happiness within one may appear to be happy. With no love within one can make a show of love. Experimental psychology, on which psychiatry mainly depends, being based primarily on the observation of animal behaviour, cannot be expected to provide adequate knowledge of the human mind.

The main difference between psychiatry and Vedānta is in their conceptions of human personality. I have tried to indicate that in the treatment of mental illness

both physical therapy and mental therapy have their respective places. But both have to be supplemented with a comprehensive and consistent view of human

personality and the values of life. Man lives on different levels of life. He is meant for the highest. Until he finds a way to it he cannot have peace of mind.

CĀRVĀKA VIEWS ON CAUSATION: AN ADVAITIC STUDY

DR. DEVAPRASAD BHATTACHARYA

Cārvāka philosophy is as old as any other system of thought is in India. Orthodox systems basing on the Vedas and the Upaniṣads flourished and collaterally with them heterodox system of Cārvāka developed. Even in the heart of many orthodox systems Cārvāka contentions are pronounced. Professor Muir emphasizes the early origin of the Cārvāka school of thought. In the *Rg-Veda* itself there is some one who questions the causal supremacy of Indra. In the *Nirukta* there is Kautsa who holds the causal efficacy of the Vedic hymns in doubt. The *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata* are interspersed with the Cārvāka tenets of doubt. Orthodox Kumārila refers to the Lokāyatikas who entertain doubt regarding God and the future existence. As to the grand antiquity of Cārvāka Prof. Muir observes: 'I am not aware how far back the sect of the Cārvākas can be traced in Indian literature. Nastikas (nihilists) Pashandīs (heretics) and revilers of the Vedas are mentioned in many parts of Manu's Institutes II. 11; III. 150, 161; IV. 30, 61, 163 ...' (Prof. Muir: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London, Part III, Vol. XIX, 1862, pp. 309 ff.)

However, there can be no denial that the sceptic and negativistic approach to inference and causality held out by the Cārvāka exerted a considerable influence on other schools of Indian Thought. Cārvāka

is often times referred to by these systems by way of criticism. Causation comes under the severe criticism of the Indian Materialist. But in the human mind the belief in causation is firm and traces to primitive ages. However, this in itself constitutes no reason why causation has to be placed above all doubts. Cārvākas are absolutely unwilling to admit any unseen cause so long as the seen causes are found adequate in themselves to explain seen and known facts. It is useless to erect a God for the birth of animals when the union of parents can explain it. In the first place there can be no invariable cause or effect of any event. Who can be the witness of the invariable cause and the effect? Certainly we are not since we come into existence and pass out of it at a certain point of time. Two events are only perceived but the causal relation is not perceived. According to the Cārvāka sensuous perception which is the only source of genuine knowledge cannot be adduced as any evidence for the absolute certainty, universality, invariability, and relevancy attached to causation. Perception means only sense-perception and is tethered to the present moment and some particular truth. Perception may be either external or internal. But the knownness of the invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term serving to demonstrate the causal relation remains

unproven. In regard to the future and the past the external perception is helpless. The mind is not free in perception but thoroughly determined by objects. So the internal or mental perception is of no avail. Inference and its process are always open to doubt. So inference cannot be invoked to establish causation. Perception does not indubitably remove the possibilities of all conditions that may lie hidden and unnoticed and as such the unconditionality and invariability the dire need of inference cannot be established. That some inference comes true sometimes is by no means any positive evidence of the certainty of all inferences. It is a bare chance-occurrence that inference sometimes comes out true. There is no universal class-character which may be related to some other universal class-character by way of the relation of cause and effect. Any piece of universality is a fictitious product. Without the presupposition of some Universal proposition inference cannot work at all. Inference and the invariable concomitance are derived from each other. There will be no end to the series of inferences for proving the universal invariable proposition. Testimony involving inference as it does, is useless. Testimony sunk in the use of language is often arbitrary and has no reason to be backed. Without the basis of perception how testimony will work at all? If testimony be invoked as the only source of the knownness of the invariable relation between the middle term and the major term then we shall not be able to know the relation between smoke and fire as long as we are not instructed to this effect by some other authoritative person. Comparison cannot establish such invariable relation since it posits the relation between the name and a thing so named. Anyway causal connexion cannot be proved by perception, inference, testimony and compari-

son. The arguments used by Śrīharṣa who is obviously no Cārvāka Materialist in his *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa Khāḍya* seem to lend support to the Cārvāka. How can we know, Śrīharṣa argues, that all smokes are related to all fires. Particular smoke may be related to particular fire by way of the causal connexion. Space and time are both indefinite. It may happen that there is smoke but no fire. Again, if the coexistence of smoke and fire be the ground of general statement that smoke is always related to fire then many irrelevant things will be causally related.

Relevantly the Cārvāka points out that the bare sequence of events is quite enough and any search for the cause is useless. *Svetāsvatara Upaniṣad* also refers to the time, nature, destiny and accidents as the cause. Accidentalism is also mentioned in *Suśrūta-Saṁhitā*. (*Svabhāvam Isvaram Icālam yadṛcchām niyatīm tathā. Pariṇāmam ca manyante Prakṛtim pṛthudarśināḥ*—I. ii. 3) Fire is warm, water is cold, air is mild. Nobody makes the thorn sharp, animals of different nature, and sugar sweet. Everything is due to the inherent nature. Things may have their material cause but no efficient cause. (*animittaracanāviśeṣāḥ śarīrādauḥ saṁsthānavattvāt kantakādi vaditi*—*Nyāya Vārtika*, IV. i. 22) Cārvāka resorts either to *nisarga* or *svabhāva* to explain facts. *Nisarga* is some habit formed through many repetitions. *Svabhāva* is the self-evident nature of an object and does not expect any other external cause or causal influence. Regular activities of an object are included in the nature of an object. According to some nature, destiny etc. are not different from primordial Prakṛti. The relation of causation is introduced by us into things which are produced and destroyed. We are not satisfied with the mere position of things but aspire to get in intimate touch with them so that they may be subservient

to our pragmatic purposes. Cārvāka repudiates causality as he happens to repudiate an illusory snake. It is only imagination that constructs causality. That which is not perceived cannot be in existence. (*yannopalabhyate tannāsti*) In fine, it is the rigorous nature of an object that is the determinant of the pot out of a lump of clay. Others deny the nature of an object and argue that all occurrences are mere chance-events.

Hume bears close resemblance to the Cārvāka standpoint. According to Hume it is all experience and no logic that testifies to the causal connexions. But experience cannot give us the reason of the causal connexion. There is nothing in a particular event A which can bring about necessarily another event B. But necessity is something which exists in the mind and not in objects. On an analysis of causation we get either conjunction or succession. But neither of them is strictly speaking causation. Like the Cārvāka Hume holds that causation is after all a belief generated by custom.

In his celebrated work *Nyāyakusumāñjali* Udayana argues if causality is of no avail why the Cārvāka himself employs arguments to refute causality and hopes in return that causality is refuted by his arguments or his arguments have been the cause of conviction about the nullity of causality in the minds of his ardent listeners. (*parapratipattiphālaka vacanam*) Natural origination may prove useful of the occasionalness of transient things but it fails miserably of external objects like space, time and so on. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view on causation is in exact antithesis to the Cārvāka view. The Naiyāyika holds the view that the law of causality cannot be denied. In his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* Udayana appeals to the positive experience of every rational being. No man in his senses can reasonably argue

that if he takes enough of food, his appetite for food will not be appeased. The determinate character of the effect at some point of time and space and occasionalness of its existence which are all patent facts can be explained only on the assumption of causality. Were there no cause of anything any and every thing would have arisen out of any and every thing. Origination is a patent fact and cannot be doubted in the least. It is a violence to reason to think that there is no effect or that the effect does not occur at all. Assumption like this one would leave all our practical attempts and behaviours completely unexplained. If an effect comes out of the cause by itself, then there will be complete identity of the cause and the effect which is away from our common experience and pragmatic truth. Moreover, the simple question why the wheat in the field is not made into bread by itself remains unanswered. Thus naturalism is found deficient. A self-same thing cannot be the antecedent and the consequent at one and the same time. The unreal or non-existent object cannot bring about anything for it is simply *anupākhya* or characterless. A thing before its origination remains non-existent and something absolutely non-existent cannot act as the cause. If the absolute non-entity were the cause we could not explain why an event occurs only at a determinate point of time and not always since the absolute non-entity is available always. If through the force of arguments it be supposed that a thing is produced from something then there remains no convincing ground why this something should be a bare negative fact or a pure blank. This something must be positive in its bearing and thus the nihilistic possibilities of the Buddhists are also ruled out. Vardhamāna Upādhyāya rises equal to the Cārvāka and seeks to establish

causality through the direct perceptual cognition in the form this is cognized to appear after this and this is cognized not to occur in the absence of this. For the Naiyāyika causality is categorical, universal, necessary and self-evident. Causality is not fictitious but has some objective basis.

The Nyāya criticizes the accidentalism of the Cārvāka view on which there is no need of maintaining any separate efficient cause. Naiyāyika argues it is the very shape of a thing that hints at the efficient cause. The accidentalism of Cārvāka may either point out that it is only some particular objects that are causeless or that all objects are causeless. The first alternative does not go a long way with the Cārvāka philosopher, because denial of causation to some objects means admission of causation of some other objects. The Cārvāka accidentalism following the second alternative is suicidal. It may assume two forms. The cause is the very nature of the thing itself or there is no cause at all. The first alternative leads to the eternity of the thing and the second to the non-production of the thing. Spontaneous origination suggests that the effect originates always or does not originate at all. Particularity of the effect loses all impact. Again *svabhāva* which the Cārvāka propounds must belong either to the effect or to the cause. If it be pertaining to the effect, it cannot exist prior to the origination of the effect as a determinant of the effect. If the *svabhāva* belongs to the cause, then the *svabhāva* is admittedly the cause of the effect. So the Cārvāka has to admit causality for explaining the mundane purposes. A thing's being and a thing's doing are related to each other as cause and effect.

The Cārvāka allows things which are produced and destroyed. But this is tantamount to the assertion of causality.

The very notion of object involves causation in some way or other. Object is an object of perception or of knowledge. But knowledge as well as perception involves causal affection. How can we deny that our minds are moved by motives and we act according to our motives and impulses? The feeling of ourselves as determining or being determined is not a bare succession of disconnected events but a pointer to causation. This can likewise be applicable to the external world. But Cārvāka and Hume pose the question how certainty can be reached through induction per simple enumeration? To this question the reply is ready with the opponents of Cārvāka. There may be doubts but we should not go on doubting ceaselessly even when there is no genuine scope for doubts. (*tarkaḥ saṅkāvādhī*) If nothing can be ascertained on the basis of one observation then we shall have no right to establish any certainty regarding anything on the basis of plurality of observations. What is, after all, the plurality of observations? It consists in many singular observations. The certainty is reached in a single instance. The certainty is made more certain and free from doubts through repeated observations. Our mind is fluid and has no fixed form of its own. It reveals only what comes in the way of it. The mind according to the Naiyāyika realist does not create causal relation. The mind only reveals causality. It may happen that our mind and the intelligence are on the wrong. But if there be no object and relation how the mind can be in the 'wrong' even. Mistake means some kind of superimposition and superimposition implies the existence of something. One type of causal explanation may not be deemed enough. But this constitutes no ground in favour of the view that every type of causal explanation is foredoomed to failure.

Cārvāka does not lend support to inference and so to causation. But how can he explain the fact of cognition of others' thoughts, ascertainment of validity or otherwise of cognitions on the basis of the similarity of the past experience and the knowledge of negation without the active help of inference? And if inference be admitted once, the claim of causation will be irresistible. Now the Cārvāka may point out that both inference and causation are deliverances of a fictitious consciousness or apprehension which is held to be apart from the body. Here the opponent of Cārvāka points out 'Apprehension of an object must be distinct from the thing apprehended. By means of a lamp or other light, objects are visible; if a lamp be present, the thing is seen; not so, if there be no light. Yet apprehension is no property of the lamp; nor is it a property of body, though only where a corporeal body is. Body is but instrumental to apprehension.' (Colebrook: *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 405) Apprehension cannot be reduced to objects and as such objects and their causal sequences can easily be apprehended.

Hume is our modern Cārvāka. Refutation of Cārvāka views on causality may by implication be a refutation of the Humean views on causation. If Hume is to be understood seriously we cannot find any relation between his thoughts in the mind on the one hand and the actual utterances on the other. It will result in that the Humean views on causality are left in the dark. Moreover, the Humean views on causality cannot satisfy the instincts of a common man who works in order that he may reap the result. Causal connectedness has certainly to be distinguished from mere sequence.

Prof. Whitehead's criticism of Hume in modern times is typical. Hume finds points in the complete independence of objects.

But according to Prof. Whitehead instead of independence of objects there are mutual immanence, pervasion and inter-penetration in the organic system of the world. Distinct configurations of matter and commonsense notion of simple location are also denied. 'Hume denies any direct perception of causal determination. This Whitehead thinks is bound up (i) with Hume's *a priori* dogma, that we are only aware of a succession of sensa, and (ii) his attempt to reduce the man's feeling of compulsion to one of expectancy that the blink would follow the flash, i.e., to the feeling of a habit. But Whitehead asks how can a habit be felt when a cause cannot. Hume then seems to confuse a habit with our presumed feeling of it. One is a dispositional concept which on Hume's own test is a purely metaphysical chimera since there is no impression of it; the other is our supposed awareness of this non-entity. To identify them in any case would be like identifying a general law with a particular instance of it.' (W. Mays: *The Philosophy of Whitehead*, pp. 184-5) Prof. Whitehead points out that the Humean explanation of causality is wholly inapplicable to reflex actions where there is a definite awareness of determination and a connected pattern of experience. A staunch realist Dr. Moore also criticizes Humean views. It may be that the belief in causation is generated by prevalent customs and customs by themselves cannot guarantee the truth. But we cannot say in our turn because the belief in causation is generated by custom it must be false and condemned. Dr. Moore urges 'We must, I think, grant the premiss that, from the fact that two things have been conjoined, no matter, how often, it does not strictly follow that they always are conjoined. But it by no means follows this that we may not know that as a matter of fact, when two things are conjoined sufficiently

often, they are always conjoined. We may quite well know many things which do not logically follow from anything else which we know. And so in this case, we may know that two things are causally connected, although this does not logically follow from our past experience, nor yet from anything else that we know.' (Moore: *Philosophical Studies*, p. 161) Both Hume and Cārvāka dogmatically criticize causality. They do not realize that their own point is not strengthened by the defects in other views. Certainly an argument is not a frank statement about its own merits. The sceptic can by no means avoid the expectation that something will follow some other thing from the psychological view-point. There is enough to show that the sceptics are crossing beyond the immediate experience and courting induction. Induction cannot be discarded as memory cannot be discarded. How can we deny that the man will die after he is shot through the heart? When we remember past objects in memory we feel ourselves objectively controlled to remember the past object and cannot think of them as our sweet will pleases. This all is due to causation.

The Advaitin criticizes also causality but his criticism differs widely from the Cārvāka criticism of causality. The Advaitin like a strict realist admits cause and effect in the empiric existence and as long as empirical purposes are valid. On a critical examination of the root and process of causality the Advaitin arrives at the conclusion that the category of causality has only empirical validity but has no claim to the ultimate reality. If the Category of Causality were applicable to the Absolute Reality, then the Absolute Reality would have been reduced to a phenomenal appearance. Kant is nearer to the Advaitin. Kant holds that objective succession which is causality is not derived

from experience but experience presupposes objective succession. To a critical metaphysical analysis the category of causality is self-contradictory at heart. Kant also does not ascribe causality to noumenon. The Advaitin urges that which is self-contradictory at heart but quite right on surface appearance is simply indescribable. Be that as it may, causelessness of the Absolute Reality at the transcendental level is quite logical, yet causality is *tatastha-lakṣaṇa* of the Absolute Brahman. Causality cannot be repudiated at the level of existence where we take our respective stands. Empirically we find that any event with its peculiar characteristics is bound to some other event with its inherent peculiarities. This mutual relation of pervasion we call the relation of causality. Seeing that a certain state of the thing acts as the cause we cannot disbelieve ourselves, though according to the Advaitin our seeing does not and cannot ensure the supreme validity of causation. Causation may be for all times and for all changes. But it has no reference to that which is out of time. Causality cannot be dissociated from all temporal references and be made applicable to the super-sensible Absolute. But *Kalpataru* refers to both *svabhāva* and *yadr̥cchā* i.e. nature and accident—*niyatanimittamānapekṣya yadā kadācit pravṛttyudayo yadr̥cchā svabhāvastu sa eva yāvad vastu-bhāva yathā śvāsādau*. (II. i. 33) The Advaitin seems to accommodate all systems and theories. Though none is completely true, yet none is completely false. To quote Sri Ramakrishna 'yata mata tata patha' i.e. all doctrines are only so many paths. The Advaitin recommends different levels of existence and different standpoints. At the initial stage it is quite natural that the aspirant starts with the sceptic attitude of the Cārvāka but he must not stop with it.

THE LIFE AND TEACHINGS OF ŚRĪ MADHVA

DR. P. NAGARAJA RAO

Śrī Madhva's Philosophy which goes under the name of *Dvaita Vedānta* is the most powerful theistic account of the Vedānta Philosophy. It is at once an imposing system of metaphysics and a moving school of theism, without undermining the power and the sanctity of morality. Madhva reconciles the omnipotence of God and human freedom. He finds room for divine grace without impairing human responsibility and abandoning virtue. He does not make God arbitrary or unjust, nor His grace whimsical. It is not received apart from merit. He does not magnify the grace of God to the point of vain idolatry making Him throw over board virtue as an unnecessary lumber. Adoration to the Lord is not adulation. Madhva's system is a constructive inspiring school of Religious Philosophy based on a synthetic interpretation of the *triple texts*, challenging the prior twenty one interpretations of others. Madhva is not a natural theologian. He believes in revealed scripture intelligible in the light of reasoning.

He was born in 1238 (to the other opinion, in A.D. 1197) on the *Vijayā-daśamī* day (the tenth day of *Navarātri*), at a place eight miles from Udipi in the modern south Kanara district of the Mysore State. His parents were poor Tulu Brāhmins. His father was known as Madhya-geha Bhaṭṭ. His name was Vāsudeva. The child was a precious one. After the investiture of the sacred thread, Vāsudeva studied the Vedas under a *guru*. Roughly speaking at sixteen he was initiated into *sannyāsa* i.e., the holy order. From his sixteenth year to his seventy-ninth year he wrote and preached the

word of God and carried out his mission. Tradition holds the view that he was a messiah of Lord Nārāyaṇa. As Hanumāna he served Śrī Rāmacandra, and as Bhīma he served Kṛṣṇa and as Madhva he served Bādarāyaṇa. In all the three births he served the Lord. He took *sannāyasa* from Acyutaprekṣa, and bore the name of the 'completely enlightened' (Pūrṇaprajñā) and wrote under the name of Ānanda Tīrtha all his thirty seven works.

For some years he stayed in his native region engaging scholars of the Advaita, Jaina and other persuasions in disputations. He won in many a dispute and routed the opponents. To propagate his faith he undertook, a south Indian tour covering important places, e.g., Kanyakumari, Ramesvaram. In his tour he challenged Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Sūtra* and gave his own interpretation. He grew strong in his resolve and deep in his conviction after his encounters. He thereafter undertook a north Indian tour to Badri at the foot of the Himalayas. He stayed there fasting and praying to Lord Nārāyaṇa for forty-eight days in the hermitage of Vyāsa. After a divine call he went to upper Badri and was directly blessed by the Lord to compose his commentaries which he wrote. After a long tour through several places he returned to his home town Udipi.

While returning home Madhva by the dint of his scholarship and the powers of argumentation, blessed by Lord, converted two great Advaita thinkers—Swāmi Śāstrī and Śobhana Bhaṭṭ, to his fold. They latter became Narahari Tīrtha and Padmanābha Tīrtha.

After coming to Udipi he converted to

his fold his first master Acyutaprekṣa. By the time he returned home this commentary on the *Gītā* and *Brahma-Sūtra* had become famous. To foster community worships he installed the idol of Kṛṣṇa at Udipi and established eight small monasteries round the temple. He put eight boy *sannyāsins* to conduct the worship by turns. He also explained the importance of fasting on the *ekādaśī* day (the eleventh day of each fortnight). The worship is being conducted for the last seven hundred years every day.

Śrī Madhva undertook a second north Indian tour and added to his list of disciples. Many new works of Madhva were composed.

Madhva's reputation was on the increase. He defeated one Puṇḍarīka in a great debate at Udipi. Some of his enemies stole the manuscripts from his library but those were restored to him by the ruler of Kubla Jayasimha. Madhva engaged the court pundit of Jayasimha, Trivikrama, a great Advaita scholar in a continuous debate for fifteen days in the temple of Viṣṇumaṅgala and routed him. As a consequence Trivikrama became a disciple of Madhva. Trivikrama's brother and seven others joined Madhva whom he appointed as the first set of heads of eight monasteries to conduct the *pūjā* of Kṛṣṇa. After establishing the monasteries and writing thirty-seven works, Madhva passed away.

Madhva's works can be divided into different classes: ten Upaniṣads, two works on the *Gītā*, four works on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, ten independent philosophical tracts, a work on *Mahābhārata* and one on *Bhāgavata*, and one on the daily rites. The rest seven are (*stotras*) hymns in praise of God. The one *Dvādaśa stotra* is in twelve little chapters. They all total up thirty-seven in number.

Śrī Madhva represents a unique type

of Vedānta, which has neither a before nor an after. His system is based on the authority of the Vedas, Purāṇas, *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata*, and *Pañcarātra Āgamas*. He is against the discrimination of one part of the Vedas as against the other. For Madhva the entire Veda is authoritative. The unique feature of his interpretation is, he harmonizes all the passages in the light of single principle namely that they adore and glorify the infinite auspicious qualities of the Lord Nārāyaṇa. Lord Nārāyaṇa is the ultimate Reality (*para tattva*). God is the supreme Reality. He is the only independent category, and the rest of the categories, though they are reals, are still dependent on Him. God is the Real of reals. He is not an indeterminate, indefinable, vague spiritual substance, devoid of all predicates. He is the infinite home of all auspicious qualities in an infinite degree. He has no detestable material qualities (*heya guṇas*). He is not of the same stuff as Prakṛti. He is made of stuff that transcends the Prakṛti, and that is not a complex of the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The Lord is the supreme person. When we describe Him as a person, He is not to be compared to the humans. There is no difference between the Lord and His qualities or limbs. There is also no difference between the Lord and His incarnations (*avatāras*). He is full of knowledge, power and love. There is nothing greater than He. He has the power in Him to put out of existence souls, space and time and destroy them. But He does not choose to do so. He is in no way in need of anything. The consort of the Lord, Lakṣmī, too, does not add to His glory. It is for her happiness that she loves the Lord. The stark, unexceptional independence of the Lord and the utter abject dependence of all others on the Lord is beautifully brought out by Śrī Madhva. The souls are creatures. He is

the creator. We depend on Him for our knowledge, activity and existence. We are free, because He has given us a gift of freedom. It is a *datta-svātantrya*. The glory of the Lord is nowhere so warmly, so unconditionally and so exaltingly described. He leaves us in no doubt about the relation of man's dependence on God.

The God of Śrī Madhva's philosophy is not the limited infinite God of the Nyāya school, nor is He held in inseparable relation with Matter and Souls as in Rāmānuja's school. He is an independent supreme Lord. One special feature of Madhva's God is, He is not easily apprehended by all alike. The lord of Madhva reveals Himself to the devotees in different measures, according to their spiritual eligibility. All know the Lord in their own measure. None can know Him completely. The God of Madhva's philosophy is not a sentimental king or ruler who wipes out the sins of all men and saves their souls. He never overrules the claims of morality. He lays down that each soul should work out its moral life and must prepare itself to receive the grace of the Lord. The preparation is all that man can do. It is again the Lord's grace that is the primary cause for the *mokṣa* of the soul. *Mokṣa* is the bestowal of the Lord's grace. The way to it is pure *bhakti*, love of the Lord. The love of the Lord grows in us with ceremonial purity and ethical excellence. These two are necessary for *bhakti*. The individual soul is atomic, and real. The souls are infinite in number. Their nature, i.e., *svarūpa* is unchangeable. Every soul knows not what its exact nature is. The *svarūpa* of the soul is hidden from itself, by two covers (*ācchādakas*). One of the covers hides the soul from the true vision of the Lord, the second hides the true nature of God itself. The soul, to know its true nature, needs God's grace. Grace is the Lord's gift. The true vision of one's

own nature is called *mokṣa*. For the realization of this the only method is pure *bhakti* (*amalā bhakti*). *Bhakti* results in the *prasāda* of the Lord, that ensures the true vision of the self. The Lord does not create the souls. The souls are uncreated and eternal. They have a beginningless association with a positive *karma* and that is responsible for their births. The *karma* is destroyed at the time of *mokṣa*.

The God of Śrī Madhva's philosophy does not bestow the prizes of Life, e.g., wealth, honour, progeny on the souls in a whimsical, arbitrary manner. Each gets his desserts according to his *karma*. The Lord sees that the good accrues to the soul after it has toiled for it and earned it. The evil-minded souls are not punished at once because of their mere evil dispositions. They are punished only after these dispositions have expressed themselves in specific acts. The God of Śrī Madhva's philosophy is just and moral God. If the Lord's activity governed by the sense of justice is described as cruel, it does not affect His greatness. Dealing out moral retribution is His characteristic. He has neither cruelty nor inequity.

The nature of the souls is unalterable. All the souls are not equal in their moral value. It is true that the nature of the soul is also characterized by consciousness and bliss. But these characteristics are not so perfect in the souls as in God. The *svarūpa* of the souls determines their destiny. Some souls are called *muktinoḥyas*. They have in them the potency and power to achieve *mokṣa*. They are destined to achieve it. There is a second class of souls called *nitya-samsārins*, who eternally revolve being bound to the wheel of *samsāra*. They never attain *mokṣa*. There is a third type of souls called *tamoḥyas* whose nature leads them to eternal hell. These souls are destined to languish in hell for ever. There is no hope for them. No

soul can outstrip the limits of its nature.

The classification of souls into three divisions has angered the critics of Madhva a good deal. Some describe this aspect of his philosophy as unprogressive and sectarian and inhuman. They cry out, is it not possible for one type of soul to improve by its moral efforts to attain excellence? Further, they declare, is it spiritual to shut the door against the moral progress of individuals? It is a philosophy of predestination very much like Christian Calvinism. It mocks the concept of the freedom of man in the face, and makes it a nullity. It also makes God a legal-minded, punctilious bureaucrat that works in a fetish manner according to law.

The critics are asking for something which is not possible according to the tenets, of Madhva's philosophy. The supreme sanction for the threefold classification of the soul is scripture. As for moral progress, the commentators of Madhva argue that to admit the endless possibility of progress is to destroy the very nature of the soul. The nature of the soul is eternal. If we admit the possibility of the *tamoyogya* becoming a *sāttvika* soul, that virtually means the very nature of the *tamoyogya* soul is changed out of all recognition. Then he does not become *sāttvika*. Total moral progress, if it is conceived in a miraculous manner, destroys the very *svarūpa* of the soul. Such a destruction is not envisaged in the scripture. As for the freedom of man, it is the gift from the Lord and it is completely circumscribed. As for the expectation that the Lord must do the impossible Madhva does not admit it. God, according to Madhva, works according to His own laws, which He has Himself chosen to obey. So He is not unfeeling bureaucrat. He is the law-giver and the laws are His. His adherence to them is the result of His sweet will. Those who have faith in

Madhva's interpretation of the scripture, and some actual knowledge of the limits of human nature, its goodness and perfectibility, will not find it so difficult to believe this doctrine. It is very difficult to overcome one's true nature however much one may try it. *Svabhāvo duratikramah*. Rāvaṇa accepted this before Sītā. Duryodhana affirms it. We cannot jump over ourselves. It is not of course flattering to be told that there are definite limits for our growth. But that is the hard truth and there is no running away from it. Madhva has been bold to state it in clear terms. He has neither whitewashed the nature of man nor ignored the evil elements in man. It is a fair though not flattering picture of man.

Śrī Madhva's philosophy is a theistic and pluralistic realism. But here one must notice that the unique nature of his system is not only its theism but also its realism and pluralism. His God is not deistic, nor pantheistic nor limited. His God is the efficient cause and not the material cause of the world. He does not suffer from any taint due to anything in the universe. His reality or independence is of distinct order. He is the upholder of the moral law and not an exception to it or destroyer of it to vindicate His glory.

The pluralism of Madhva's philosophy is radical. There are pluralisms in Indian Philosophy: but Madhva's pluralism is ultra radical. No two things in the world are alike, nor two qualities are alike. Difference is fundamental and foundational to reality. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems have sundered reality into a number of categories and have sought to connect them by a network of relational categories, e.g., *sāmānya* (Universals), *samavāya* (inherence) and *saṁyogo* (conjunction). Madhva goes one step further in his logic and does not admit that there is an universal present common in the things that

belong to a group. He does not admit an *anugata dharma* (common characteristic among the objects belonging to group). He explains concepts on the basis of similarity. Again similarity is not the same in two objects. He seeks to distinguish objects which look like one another on the basis of a characteristic inherent in each object that distinguishes it from others, while it itself needs no other distinguishing to isolate it. The unique characteristic of each object is self-differentiating. The unique characteristic of each object is called *Viśeṣa*. Madhva's doctrine of *Viśeṣa* is the fulcrum of the system. His concept of difference, his pluralism, his realism revolve round the pivot of his doctrine of *Viśeṣa*. It is this doctrine that enables him to expound his pluralism. Pluralism cannot go farther than this.

Let us turn to understand Madhva's realism. According to Madhva, objects of the world exist independent of the knowing. Knowledge does not create objects. Knowing does not produce objects, but only reveals them as they are. It is like a searchlight. Knowledge is revelation and not construction. The mind of man reveals objects. Experiencing makes no difference to objects or facts experienced. Knowledge always refers to something external. Objects of knowledge have an external reference. Even in delusive cognition there is an objective reference. Delusion arises from our wrong predication and not from lack of content. The content is misapprehended. Even in delusive cognition there is fact of immediacy. The realism of Madhva asserts that there is the cognition of even the absolute non-existent. Madhva admits an infinite plurality of souls. He proclaims a five-fold difference as eternal. The souls are different from one another, as well as from God and the world. The world is different from

the souls. The different aspects of matter differ among themselves. This is the celebrated *pañcabheda*. This difference persists even in *mokṣa*. Even after release souls are graded in respect of their perfection. The souls are also of the nature of three *guṇas*. According to Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti alone is a mixture of three *guṇas*, but not souls. According to Madhva souls also are of the nature of Prakṛti. This must have been at the root of his three-fold classification of souls, according to the predominant proportion of *guṇas*.

The most significant doctrine in Madhva's theory of knowledge is his conception of *sākṣin*: *Sākṣin* is of the very nature of sentience. It can directly apprehend itself, pleasure, pain, time and space and in addition to it knows what is presented through one or other of the senses. The knowledge derived through the *sākṣin* is self-valid. In this respect Madhva differs from other systems like the Nyāya for example which assigns the duties of the *sākṣin* to *manas*. Madhva's doctrine of *sākṣin* has saved him from the fallacy of infinite regress in respect of the determination of the validity of knowledge. The concept of *sākṣin* is responsible for our general knowledge of things and the concept of time and space during sleep.

The physical world is the creation of the Lord. The Lord is its efficient cause. He is not its material cause. The purpose of creation is to enable each individual soul to work out its salvation. The Lord has nothing to gain from His creation. It affords the souls opportunities to achieve through devotion to the Lord and discipline salvation. The phenomenal world is not illusory. It is real. Madhva's concept of the real has to be clearly understood. It does not mean that the real must eternally exist and should not be sublated at any time. The real is that which is not super-

imposed, *anāropitam tattvam*. There are two types of reals, independent and dependent. The Lord alone is the independent real. The rest are dependent reals. For a thing to be real it is enough if it is located for sometime and in some space. We should not confuse the *anitya* (non-eternal) with the unreal. Understood in this grand sense the world is real (*satyam*). The world of pots and pans, mountains and rivers is not the mere transformation of Nature, nor is it the result of evolution. It is the creation of God. In one of his moving devotional hymns Śrī Madhva explains the need for God thus : 'If the world is not the creation of the Lord, who created it? It may be argued that men created it. If that is truth, men would have created themselves perfectly happy (*nitya sukham*). The experience of men falsifies this hope. So from this it follows, that the Lord created the world, none else'. Madhva is opposed to scientific naturalism and atheistic materialism, but he does not ignore the existence of matter or Nature. He does not relegate them to the level of illusion. He gives a place for all the categories. He explains the nature and function of each of the categories in relation to other. There is nothing baffling to commonsense in the philosophy of Madhva.

He insists on *bhakti* as the supreme method to attain the Lord and his apostle

Jaya Tīrtha describes *bhakti*, in a celebrated classic as follows : 'It is supreme attachment to the Lord based on the complete understanding of the greatness and supremacy of the Lord, which transcends the love of one's own self and possession and which remains unaffected and unshaken in the face of a thousand difficulties. It flows uninterruptedly. This kind of *bhakti* secures *mokṣa* (*Mokṣaśca Viṣṇu-prasādena vinā na labhyate*).' The worship of the Lord is to be conducted in a proper manner.

The Lord must be worshipped with all His company (*parivāra*). Each deity must be worshipped in a proper manner, according to the status and position he is given in the hierarchy (*tāratamya*). This order must not be violated. The supremacy and the glory of the Lord Viṣṇu is intelligible only when there is a huge body of dependent gods on Him. The presence of Prakṛti, the existence of other reals in no way affects or limits the glory of Nārāyaṇa. On the other hand, the legion of dependents constitutes His glory and power.

In his theory of knowledge Śrī Madhva admits three *pramāṇas* : perception, inference, and scripture. He gives the highest place to scripture. He has however many minor, but still significant differences with the Nyāya and other schools. He believes in the reality of dreams and the validity of memory.

AN EXAMINATION OF PROF. CREIGHTON'S VIEWS ON JUDGEMENT

SRI AMALENDU CHAKRABORTY

The main object of this paper is a critical examination of the traditional theory of Judgement in the light of Prof. Creighton's views in his *Introductory Logic*.

Modern logic is mainly of two types, de-

ductive and inductive. The deductive logic is one in which we arrive at a conclusion by means of an inference, be it fit or fallacious. Some of these fallacies which are known as *argumentum ad*

hominem, argumentum ad baculum etc., occur in syllogisms. There are also some other forms of reasoning in deduction such as the dilemma to refute which would have to be taken by the horns.

Inductive reasoning is not literally arithmetical as the deductive logic: in it more thought is bestowed on and the incidents are fully discussed. It goes to such an extreme in the course of its discussion as to examine and analyse the judgement or the proposition or the sentence itself which we use in expressing an idea or impression of the mind. Prof. Creighton, in his exposition on inductive reasoning, has at length dealt with the characteristics of a judgement. A judgement is nothing but an idea put in the form of a sentence. If you say, 'This is a picture', in logic this is known as a proposition or a judgement. The famous logician has assigned the functions of analysis and synthesis to the judgement. He means thereby that every judgement in its purest and simplest form is, surprisingly, not only analytical but also synthetic.

'This is a red flower' is a judgement in which some idea has been expressed about a flower. The above judgement tells us that it is a red flower; if we take Creighton's view into consideration it amounts to: it is a flower and it is red—this is the analytical part of the judgement. Because the proposition says that 'It is a red flower', in that judgement itself there are two elements jointly, of analysis and synthesis; i.e., it is mainly a mental process in which we both analyse and synthesize our ideas. If I say, 'This is my pen', it follows that it is a pen; it is mine (analysis); as I say 'This is my pen', I thereby both associate the presence of a pen with me and also associate it with my ownership of it. For all outward purposes the judgement seems to be a straightforward, simple and single idea. But in

fact almost all judgements are both analytical and synthetic when we explore the component parts of them.

There seems to have some other types of judgements which do have neither analysis nor synthesis. They convey only a single indivisible and inseparable idea of an object to the subjective mind. For instance if I say 'This is water', a layman or a villager, who does not know much about chemistry will think that it is water pure and simple; and if he is a bit wise he will feel it is good to drink in summer. But a student of science will be generally able to infer from the above proposition that it is water and that it is the composition of H_2O . Now, it clearly indicates that every judgement will be made with some personal knowledge of the thing or object in view.

Let us now re-examine how far the much learned and universally accepted view of Prof. Creighton that judgements are both analytic and synthetic is acceptable. The proposition 'This is water' has nevertheless proved that all judgements are not *ipso facto* adjunctive and disjunctive. Only those propositions which contain an adjective before the noun are to be accepted as complying with the presumptions of the famous logician. If there is no adjective qualifying the noun, there is not much room either to associate the qualities with the object or the object with the qualities. Likewise it is crystal clear that we can use our mental process of imagining things which have already been seen or heard about; but we cannot either imagine or speak of something which we never have seen or heard of. In that case the theory that propositions are both analytic and synthetic utterly fails. Knowledge is essential to conceive or perceive a thing either with the sense-organs like eyes or ears or with the mind. But if I go to a man in the street or even, for

the matter of that to an educated young man fresh from school and say to him 'vorstenlungenomnibus' he will simply take me for one out of wits. He does not know whether it is a big ghost or the biggest volcano or something else. Here the knowledge of the fact expressed is lacking but it is very essential either to analyse or synthesize the ideas.

Most of our knowledge is obtained by means of perceiving or hearing and the things we perceive last long in our minds. Our knowledge about things we know forms a picture of those things in our mind's eye. When we hear or speak about a certain thing or object we immediately form a picture of the thing referred to in the proposition, provided of course, we have some cognizance about it. Hence in conclusion, we may arrive at the following finding that every proposition made by a man with some acquaintance of the object referred to in the judgement whether it analyses or synthesizes or does both or

neither, has got a 'photographic' element about it.

When we say 'Man is a rational animal', everyone will understand what it means. But if we say to a layman in Greek and Latin something like *Dictum de omni et nullo* or *Cogito ergo sum* he cannot understand anything about them. So also a speech in a language which is unfamiliar to the listener has the same effect in so far as it does not convey any sense to him. All knowledge about facts is acquired by us only by means of the senses which make us feel their shape and presence. Summing up, all judgements are not analytic and synthetic, but every judgement is primarily and necessarily pictorial or photographic, provided we have some experiences of it already. Prof. Creighton has unfortunately overlooked the most fundamental feature of the judgement and its primary characteristic having considered only the secondary functions of the proposition.

THE LAW OF KARMA

SRI S. S. KUNDU

It is impossible for a human being to conceive a phenomenon as fortuitous in the sense that it has no cause. We must commit intellectual suicide before we can challenge the truth of the saying: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. We must believe it for certain that every event has a cause. This is what the general law of causation states. The law of Karma is based upon this scientific principle.

All schools of Indian philosophy, orthodox and heterodox, save and except the Cārvāka school believe in the law of Karma. The conception of *ṛta* in the *Rg-*

Veda is an anticipation of the law. In simple language, the law states that one will have to bear the fruits of one's action. The consequences of one's action one cannot escape and any one will not have to bear the fruits of an action if that was not done by him. The same idea is conveyed by St. Paul when he writes: 'Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.' Carlyle puts the principle thus: 'Fool! thinkest thou that no Boswell is there to note thy jargon, it therefore dies and is buried? Nothing dies, nothing can die. The idlest word thou speakest is a seed cast

into time, which brings forth fruit to all eternity.' The law is inexorable. As Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it: 'The attempt to overleap the law of Karma is as futile as the attempt to leap over one's shadow.'

The term '*karma*' means both this law and also the force produced by an action which has the power of bearing fruit. In the second sense, there are three kinds of *karma*: (i) *sañcita* or *prāktana karma* is *karma* which is done in the previous birth and has not begun to bear fruits; (ii) *prāradha karma* is *karma* which has begun to bear fruits and (iii) *kriyamāna* or *sañciyamāna* or *āgāmī karma* is *karma* which is being accumulated in this present life.

There is a law in physics that every action has an equal and opposite reaction. This law holds good in the moral sphere also. Every act reacts upon the actor with similar force and effect. If the action be a good one, the result is happiness; if the action be a bad one, the consequence is misery.

The world in which we live is full of differences and inequalities. What are all these due to? God who is all-powerful, all-good and all-merciful cannot be the cause of all these; for we cannot expect Him to be partial. In the *Gītā* (IX. 29) Lord Kṛṣṇa says: '*Samohām sarvabhūteṣu na me dveṣyo'sti na priyaḥ*—I am the same to all beings; to Me there is none hateful or dear.' Gross materialists have a ready answer. The diversities found in the world, they would say, are all due to a blind will which is the motive force behind this world. A true scientist cannot believe in chance. The Indian thinkers try to solve this problem by the law of Karma. It is a fact that some are born in one family and not in another. Some live long while some die young. Some live happily while others are miserable. Some are intelligent while others are idiots. Some

are ugly while others are handsome. Some roll in gold while others die of starvation. What is the cause of all these? The answer given by the Indian philosophers is that all these diversities are due to acts done by them either in this life or in the previous lives. As we have sown, so we must reap. Some of our joys and sorrows are due to the deeds done by us in this life. So it is a legitimate hypothesis that others are due to the actions performed by us in the previous births. We often find that the virtuous suffer while the vicious prosper. So we are led to doubt in the truth of this law. But the reason according to the Indian thinkers is this: the enjoyment of the blessings of life by the vicious is due to their deeds done in the previous lives but the fruits of the actions they are doing in the present life must be borne by them if not in this life, surely in the life to come. The deeds done by the virtuous in this life will also bear fruits in due course of time. The sorrows and sufferings of their present life are due to actions done by them in their previous births. So when the Indian thinkers believe in the law of Karma they must believe in the immortality of the soul. Kant holds the view that good will alone is good. Its value is intrinsic, unconditional. Like a diamond it shines by its own light. But he maintains that justice demands that the virtuous must be rewarded and the vicious must meet due damnation. He believes in the immortality of the soul and in the existence of God who would synthesize virtue with happiness and vice with pain. According to Kant, this is a postulate of Practical Reason.

It may not be out of place to mention in this connexion that the Mīmāṃsakas mean by *karma*, *yajñas* or sacrificial rites. The value of the rites and rituals performed by a man is conserved and it directly produces the result.

The Indian philosophers are not fatalists. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy *adr̥ṣṭa* means the unseen stock of merit and demerit arising out of good and evil deeds and it determines the actions of a man in his present life. But this unseen principle does not negate freedom of will altogether. If he performs good actions, he earns merit and if he performs bad ones, he incurs demerit. The fruits of the actions done by him in the past he must bear but when he performs actions in the living present, he is a free agent, a monarch of all he surveys, the master of his own destiny.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers believe that the law being an unintelligent principle cannot by itself lead to just that kind and degree our joys and sorrows which are our dues because of our actions done previously. So we must believe in the existence of an intelligent Being who is none but God Himself.

According to the Sāṅkhya thinkers, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jainas and the Buddhists the law is not under the clutches of

any being finite, or infinite. If a man places his hands on fire, his hands will be burnt, if a man takes a few drops of iodine, he will die. Here no interference of any other being is necessary. The law of Karma acts by itself.

It is to be noted in this connexion that only *sakāma-karma* comes under the jurisdiction of this law. *Niṣkāma-karma* does not come under its sway.

By performing *niṣkāma-karma* i.e. actions not done through the attachment of the result—actions not initiated by a sense of egotism—actions done after complete self-surrender to God, we gain the purification of the heart and attain liberation, the highest stage of perfection.

We must also point out that one who believes in the law of Karma is a *L'allegro* and not an *Il penseroso*; for it leaves none for the freedom of will—for the personal efforts of man. In this law a man finds a ray of hope, he sees that he can be a better man, can make his future bright, can be more spiritual than he is today and can reach the *summum bonum* of life.

'THE ESSENTIAL RILKE'

PROF. RAMESH CHANDRA SHAH

Among modern poets, Rilke's sensibility seems to provide the strangest meeting ground for the Muses and the Angels. Here is a poet who, at times, makes the Religious Man in us tremble. Yet, we are seldom inclined to relate this peculiar religious fervour, this angelic quality to our reading experience of poets like Herbert, Blake, or Hopkins. In the same way, coming nearer home, we find that Rilke's religious poetry—if one can at all describe his work in this way,—does not seem to

bear any likeness to the poetry of our saint-poets like Tulsī, Sur or Kabīr. There the poetry is inspired—nay, in fact made possible by a wholehearted unquestioning. Their poetry has all the emotional intensity of realized experience—the experience of an essentially devout personality. But they cannot be called philosophic poets, for their imagination is anything but metaphysical. Rilke, on the other hand has no set faith, he is inspired by no particular religious sentiment.

Religious by nature, he had lost his moorings and needed a new faith. It is rather the largeness, the scope, the immediate transcendence, or the essential mysterious quality of his experience that would make him a religious poet. The Beauty he perceives has, for him, an immediate other-worldly significance. His perceptions are invariably accompanied by the strange power of liberation, that intense insight into the life of things, that illuminated state of being in which the continual invasions of the Unknown become possible and everything is transformed. As such states of mind become habitual with the poet, such visions of the Unknown also become frequent. Death is, then, seen in its true perspective: it is not the extinction of life, but only an extension, a transformation of being. The fear of the Unknown has already become the love of the Unknown and immortality no longer remains a mere philosophic abstraction. It is no longer an idea but an experience.

The experience as well as the expression of this 'immortality' is richer and finer than Wordsworth's *'Intimations of Immortality'*. It is, in Rilke, at once more philosophical and more lyrical—perhaps the philosophic beauty with its richness is at least one reason why it is lyrically richer and subtler too.

In Rilke, what strikes us at once is the subtle delicacy of expression. Here everything is essentialized—words seem to be the final residue of experience as well as of language and as such they catch and register the very throb, the very evanescent glory of the moment of perfect realization. The words seem to spring from the 'Wordless power' itself. Rilke's poetry has, like his 'Deity', 'so mild a way of being.' He has his visions of 'Deity' direct and immediate—without having to invoke the aid of nature; whereas the pantheistic worship of Nature is of funda-

mental importance to the 'Religiousness' of Wordsworth's poetry. The mind of Wordsworth seems to have a little unconscious affinity with the mind of Spinoza. But Rilke, we feel, could hardly have found Spinoza congenial, even if he had cared to read him at all. His poetry on the whole, has greater freedom of movement than that of the elder poet. Above all, there is a finer balance in him of body-soul consciousness and spiritual-mental consciousness. Very characteristically he sees the redemption of man in the gradual unfolding of his 'inwardness'. That is why, in a way, the scope of his religious emotion is wider than that of other poets like Hopkins, Blake or even Wordsworth, for that matter. But although the scope may be wider, yet the appeal is restricted to the initiated few—to those endowed with a certain musical order of sensibility. Wordsworth, on the other hand, can reach a wider audience because his poetry takes its origin from 'Joy—in widest commonality spread', i.e., from simple raptures. Rilke's experience is of a rarer, subtler and far more complex quality: hence his expression too achieves a compression beyond average understanding:

How the hour bows down, it touches me,
throbs metallic and lucid and bold:
my senses are trembling. I feel my own
power—on the plastic day I lay hold.

Until I perceived it, no thing was
complete

But waited, hushed, unfulfilled.

My vision is ripe, to each glance like a
bride comes softly the thing that was
willed.

These are lines,—for instance, which might be equally and unanimously liked and praised by poets of such varied constitutions as Lawrence, Wordsworth, Hopkins and Keats—yes even Keats;—the worshipper of mere and sheer beauty with 'an

exquisite sense of the luxurious'. It is so because, here the poet has been able to harmonize the exquisite, the lyrical, the erotic qualities of experience into a single rich complex of deep religious emotion.

Rilke is primarily the poet of mystic experiences. He could feel his way to the Lawrentian 'Otherness'. And he sought expression to preserve, prolong, define and intensify that experience. In an age in which Reality itself was crumbling, Rilke resolved to live and create by the utter subjectiveness of his great, all-enthraling feeling. As time went on, his speculations grew into something like a metaphysics of feeling. Grappling with the deepest and the gravest malaise of modern times—the utter loneliness and hollowness of human spirit, deprived of all certainties and condemned like all modern poets to stark subjectivity, Rilke came to view feeling as the measure of all being and all knowledge. For him reality resides where feeling enjoys its inviolate self, where it is perfected. Belief in this perfection of feeling lies at the root of his entire work. As Holthusen has pointed out, 'The grand conception of his poetry is a kind of monism of feeling; hence the alluring power of his message, but hence, too, all the defects and errors of his cosmology'. For, with this poet everything becomes immanent. Even God ceases to be a Transcendental Reality outside the scope of human emotions. He becomes a direction of the heart's journey, a creation of heart. This conception of God is, justly criticized as anti-Christian. But from the point of view of a tradition which views God as transcendent as well as immanent both at once, this conception of God, though it may and does appear one-sided, is neither surprising nor disconcerting. The Indian mind takes easily to Rilke—there is no dearth of Rilke enthusiasts in modern Indian poetry. And this enthusiasm is destined to grow in

future years. What fascinates us Indians in Rilke is not so much his art—which is by no means easy of access—but his message, his apotheosis of feeling and his account of the World as pure inwardness. As inheritors of the great philosophies and with our knowledge of the ancient achievements it is natural for us to feel enthusiastic about this great monist of feeling. Since Vedic times, something like this monism has always been present in our blood. Did it not assert itself in full vigour during this century—in the poetry of Tagore? One has only to remind oneself of passages from his poetry—and they are so numerous—which show his impatience with and whole-hearted abhorrence of dry and narrow asceticism in any form whatever. In fact Tagore's poetry realizes a fundamental strain in the philosophy of Upaniṣads according to which the Self or Immanent Reality can be realized only through intensification of feeling and creative joy. Indian mysticism glorifies this power of feeling—this spirit of delight inherent in human soul above everything and Rilke's insistence on the 'full flowering of inwardness' is after all not so alien to it. The energy released by inward delight creates Self through the self itself. Hence there is no feeling of strangeness in us where we hear Rilke sing:

I am, you anxious one. Do you not hear me rush to claim you with each eager sense?

Now my feelings have found wings, and, circling,

Whitely fly about your countenance.

Here my spirit in its dress of stillness stands before you,—oh, do you not see?

In your glance does not my Maytime prayer grow to ripeness as upon a tree?

Rilke's philosophy of 'inwardness' is of fundamental importance to his art as

Eliot's definition of poetry as 'an escape from personality' is fundamental to his own poetry. Confronted with the same problem—the Loneliness of man in Modern Age—the two poets have sought to solve it in very different ways. After a life time of creative endeavour Eliot comes to the clear perception that 'hope here would be hope for the wrong thing'. For him the journey of the soul through this world should be the journey of the Magi—if it is to come to anything at all. In order to attain to Grace, one must steadily go on dying to self. But for the mature Rilke, the joy of feeling is infinite and every moment in which the spirit of man establishes its supremacy over the real is a moment of magic. For him, poetry is a record of such moments. As H. E. Holthusen has so aptly remarked, 'The value in which Rilke believes is being: Being as pure and immense intensity, as feeling made tangible, as energy made world.' All Rilke's mature

poetry is permeated and inspired by his reverence to the splendour of pure Being that transcends and embraces all contradiction. Eliot's prayer is—'perfect your will'; Rilke's—'perfect your feeling.' We see this perfection even in his early work—*The Book of Hours*. They

Who name you loudly when they come
to pray know not your nearness. From
your hands that tower

Above us, mountainously, lo, there soars,
to give the law where by our senses live
dark-browed, your wordless power.

We see another manifestation of it in his 'Duinese Elegies':

Some day, emerging at last from this
vision of dread

Jubilant praise let me sing toward the
assenting angel.

And we see it most triumphant in the
epitaph he composed for himself:

Rose, O pure contradiction, Joy
To be no man's sleep under so many lids.

'LEAD, KINDLY LIGHT'

SRI JATINDRA NATH MUKHERJEE

After the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, his disciples could not forget the experiences they had had. Returning to Jerusalem with Mary, the mother of Jesus, and certain of his brothers, who had now accepted his teachings, they spent some time in re-adjusting their thoughts. Their Master's life had been glorious and his personality had been vital, loving and strong. They idolized him, they worshipped him. His spirit of love, and purity, and utter trust in God had healed men and women of sin and trouble. The naturalness and simplicity of Jesus, who walked the earth

in their company, reappeared in their thoughts into a vivid picture of a heavenly Messiah, sitting at the right hand of God. They believed that this heavenly Christ would return to earth, and establish the Kingdom of God once again. Therefore, they must go forth and prepare the hearts of men to make them worthy of his coming.

Soon the apostles appeared again teaching in the temple, healing sin and sickness and gathering great crowds to them. Their followers sold their possessions, owned all things in common and ate at a common table. The leaders were Peter, John and

James, the brother of Jesus with Barnabas, a Jew from Cyprus and Stephen, a man full of faith.

The chief priests, the Pharisees and the Saducees of the Jewish faith had thought that by killing Jesus, they would eradicate the religion, preached by him. But the nascent religion of Jesus cropped up again, claiming greater number with the efflux of time. In their rage, they seized Peter and John, tried them and caused them to be flogged. The persecutions and sufferings could not deter the disciples of Jesus from boldly coming and preaching in the temples. At last the chief priests captured Stephen and tried him for his life, but as they stared at him steadily, they saw no fear in his face, which shone with a glad inward light, like the glowing face of an angel. Stephen answered the charges against him and cried, 'I see the heavens opened and the son of Man sitting at the right hand of God'. The mob dragged Stephen out of the city and stoned him. Stephen fell on his knees and cried, 'Lord, lay not this sin up against them'. And with these words he gave up his ghost.

The followers of Jesus were persecuted and driven from Jerusalem. A fiery young man, named Saul, a member of the Council, who had consented to Stephen's murder and stood by, and watched the stoning, went searching from house to house, dragging out men and women, seeing them flogged and slain. This resolute, energetic, vigorous young Saul was a native of Tarsus of Jewish extraction. In accordance with the fashion of the time his name had been Latinized into that of 'Paul'. In course of his relentless persecution of the followers of the new faith, there shone round him a light. He fell to the earth and heard a voice saying unto him. 'Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?' And he said, 'Who art thou, Lord?' And the Lord

said, 'I am Jesus, whom thou persecutest. It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks'. And Saul, trembling and astonished, said, 'Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?' And the Lord said, 'Arise and go into the city and it shall be told thee what to do.' The light of the glorious gospel of Christ had shone on Paul. He was free at last from the bondage of the Law. He was free through love alone. It was like being born again. Never did he doubt that Jesus himself had appeared to him, and commissioned him to go forth and preach this glorious tidings to all the nations of the earth.

Paul went off alone to Arabia to digest his one great moment, and to put on his whole armour as a fighting soldier of Christ. He knew Greek thought and feeling. Jesus brought easy spontaneity, naturalness, dignity, simplicity and love, the qualities appreciated by the Greeks. The Law had come by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus. The Greek needed the Jew. They were not at enmity as they thought. The Greeks needed Hebrew uprightness, love of moral value and warm living sense of God. The Jews needed Greek love of beauty, of freedom and of truth. There should be neither Greek nor Jew, but Christ as all in all, so Paul continued to muse.

Paul came back to Damascus to preach for three years in Jesus name. But the Jews there were infuriated and took counsel to kill him. Paul's disciples secretly let him down in a basket over the city-wall, and he escaped to Jerusalem. Peter, John and James, the brother of Jesus, and the head of the Church in Jerusalem could not really believe that Paul had been converted until the intercession of their friend Barnabas. Thereafter, Paul boldly preached in the temple. The Jews in a rage sought to slay him. The brethren took

him to Caesarea and sent him back to Tarsus.

For seven years henceforth in the city of his birth and the country around, Paul was to tackle the problem of how to present the teachings of Jesus to the Gentiles. The mass of common Greeks thought fate or chance as the ruler of human destiny. But the Greek Xenophanes, six hundred years before Christ, had said that there was one God only, and that He could not be represented in human form, because He is 'all sight, all mind, all ear, and without efforts rules everything by thought.' The philosophies of Epicureanism and Stoicism then prevailed in Greece. For the Epicurean, truth lay in what one could feel, hear and see. To the Stoic, the primary thing was reason, or rational force, the force of intelligent thinking. In the days of Paul, Stoicism was the finest and most widely accepted philosophy of the Gentile world. Nevertheless, their God remained a cold intellectual theory, by which men could neither warm their hearts nor fire their spirits. Philosophers seemed to ignore feeling as the key to the soul of man. Paul seized on such truth as was in vogue in all contemporary Greek thought. He explained Christianity on terms, the Gentiles could understand. His listeners understood him in varying degrees.

The internationalizing of Christianity was by no means an easy affair. Certain Jewish Christians looked on the teachings of Jesus as merely a new chapter in the history of Judaism. They insisted that all Christians must keep the Mosaic Laws, observing Sabbaths and eating only such meats as Mosaic Law declared clean. The controversy was bitter. Paul and Barnabas had to go to Jerusalem with the Gentile Titus, who, the Jewish Christians insisted, should be circumcised. Paul fought for his principle of freedom with all the strength of his spirit. At last Peter, James

and John agreed. It was settled Paul should preach Christ without circumcision to the Gentiles, and they would preach in Jerusalem, and conserve the Law there. Thereafter Peter paid Paul a visit at Antioch and sat down and ate with the Gentiles. The Jewish Christians were horrified at the violation of the Law by Peter. Peter surrendered to their arguments, refused to eat with the Gentiles, and carried all the Jews, including Barnabas. Another real crisis had thus come in Paul's battle for the freedom of the Gospel. Publicly he rebuked Peter, and brought the Jews back to his liberal point of view.

After this trouble with Peter, Paul proposed to go on a second missionary journey. But Paul and Barnabas differed so sharply that at last they separated. Barnabas took Mark and sailed for Cyprus. Paul selected Silas and set out for the main land of Greece, carrying Christianity, the Hebrew gift to the Greeks, over almost exactly the same route followed by Alexander the Great, when he had come bearing Greek culture and civilization to the Jews. Timothy, the son of a Jew mother and a Greek, and Luke, a Greek physician, were added to the group. Paul and his followers preached. Many converts were added.

Paul came to Athens, the centre of culture in the then world. He had discussions with the Jews, the Epicureans and the Stoics. He stood in the midst of multitude and said, 'Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious'. Here he struck fire. Paul found an altar of Athens with the inscription, 'To the unknown God'. Paul preached, 'Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, Him I declare unto you. God that made the world and all things therein dwelleth not in temples made with hands, neither is He worshipped with men's hands nor is He in need of anything, seeing He giveth to all life

and breath and all things; for in Him we live and move and have our being as certain of your own poets have said: "For we are e'en his off-spring". Some jeered and some few followed. Soon Paul left Athens for Corinth, a bustling business centre. For a year and a half, he stayed there. The Jews opposed him, and accused him to the pro-consul Galilio, who acquitted him. Paul's churches gradually grew up.

In his second missionary journey, Paul travelled two thousand miles for almost two years and founded churches at many places. He did not remain long at Antioch-Cilicia on his return. Soon he was off for a third time, aiming at Ephesus, the largest and the most influential city, where lay the world-famous temple of Diana. The Jews cast him out of the synagogue. Following his usual custom, Paul healed the sick and drove the evil spirits out of many people. And thus Paul preached and went on growing in influence and power. A certain silver smith, named Demetrius, who had been making profits by the sale of silver-images of Diana, grew alarmed at the destruction of his thriving business, and incited the mob in the name of Great Diana in peril. The commotion spread all over the city, and the rabble dragged with them the two companions of Paul, whom his disciples would not allow to go to the theatre to preach. Paul left the city quietly. His work there had been done.

Paul now longed to go to Rome, where Christians, scattered from Jerusalem during the persecutions of Stephen had made some converts. That would be the climax of all his far reaching adventures. But he could not go now to Rome, because he had decided for a third time to take up a collection from his Macedonian Churches for the poor Christians in Jerusalem. There was not much hatred against him there in

Jerusalem. He would carry the collection himself in order to cement more permanently, the unity of the church. Jewish legalists were saying that Paul was encouraging even Jews to disregard the Law. Christians earnestly warned Paul to turn back from Jerusalem. He went on his way as resolutely as Jesus had done before him. James and other apostles advised Paul to go through the ceremony of purification in the Temple to soothe the orthodox Jewish feeling that he also observed the Law. To their solicitations, Paul consented. Some Jews falsely declared that Paul had ventured to bring a Gentile into the forbidden inner court of the temple, seized him and dragged him out of the precincts of the temple to kill him. The news reached the Centurion of the guard that all Jerusalem was in a tumult. Because of the confusion, he ordered Paul to be taken to the barracks. As Paul tried to speak to the people from the steps, the mob in a fury, cried 'Kill him'. The Centurion commanded Paul to be examined under the lash, but Paul said 'Is it legal for you to flog a Roman citizen without giving him a trial?' The Centurion, alarmed at his treatment, meted out to a Roman citizen, took all precautions to save Paul from the mob-fury. For two years, Felix, the Governor, kept Paul a prisoner. The Jews asked the new Governor Festus to return Paul to Jerusalem for trial. The obliging Governor was about to consent, when Paul boldly said, 'I appeal my case unto Caesar.' Within the next few days, Paul was sent to Rome under Julius, a Greek physician.

After an arduous journey and vicissitudes of fortune, Paul attained the city of his dreams, namely, Rome. He was allowed much freedom. He lived in his own hired house for two years, with only a soldier to guard him. During these years, Peter came to Rome, accompanied by Peter's former companion Mark. And then a real

church was founded in Rome. But after the burning of Rome in A.D. 64, the Emperor Nero began the first persecution of the Christians. For the outbreak of fire in Rome the Christians were falsely charged with guilt and punished with the utmost tortures. They were made the subjects of sport. They were covered with the hides of wild beasts, and worried to death by days or nailed to crosses or set fire to, and when the day waned, they were burnt to serve for the evening light. During these persecutions, Paul and Peter were put to death. The last that was heard of Paul was his second letter to Timothy, when he knew that the end was near, a letter full of affection, unquenchable courage and fire. With Peter, the western world had lost its one great source of information concerning the life of Jesus. No more would the energetic impetuous old fisherman stand on the corner of the street and tell what Jesus had done and said by the lake of Galilee. The life of Paul shows the transformation of the erstwhile Christians into the great and sturdy soldiers of Christ, who smilingly passed through all trials and tribulations to carry Christianity to the Gentiles. Paul changed the narrow conception of a merely national Messiah into a world-wide Christ, for whom all mankind had been groping. He proved by his life that: 'Christ dwells not in Jerusalem, but in the hearts of men.'

It was becoming a dangerous thing to be a Christian in Rome. Under Nero and Domitians the Christians had experienced the most terrible persecutions. At first their ranks had consisted largely of the poorer class, to whom the doctrine of humility, mercy and brotherhood made an especial appeal, but the teaching was spreading now. The richer and the better educated were beginning to take it up also. Harmful and sensual pleasures had reached their

acme of debauchery in the days of Nero and later, and brought no satisfaction, but only dull satiety and impossible insane cravings for something wilder still. Men were ready to seek a more lasting sort of happiness, and Christian converts seemed to shine with a steady and inward joy. In order to avoid persecution, they met in the catacombs, those miles of underground passage ways, where they likewise buried their dead. People began to call them a mysterious secret society. They would not serve as soldiers, and one and all, they refused to worship the image of the emperor, who throughout the empire, declared himself to be a god. About A.D. 112 the great Roman writer Pling found Christianity growing rapidly.

By the year A.D. 100, Christianity and Judaism had definitely parted company. Henceforth Christianity was to be distinctly a Gentile movement. Yet the forms, in which it was stated, remained entirely Jewish. The gospel of John presented a new interpretation of the spiritual significance of Jesus in the terms of Greek thought. To the writer of the Gospel of John, the Jewish term Messiah did not express the full religious significance of Jesus. So he flung his thought in his very first sentence, 'In the beginning was Word and Word was with God and Word was God. . . . And Word was expressed in the flesh and (he) dwelt among us and we beheld his glory, full of grace and truth'. Reason and revelation were at last made one for the Christians. The slow Greek process of logic and the quick Hebrew enlightenment of a moment of inspiration both culminated in the same truth. In this interpretation of Word, and God, there was no disappointment because Jesus had not returned physically to earth as all the older apostles had believed he would. The second coming of Christ was for ever taking place, when the spirit which had

animated Jesus, came into the hearts of men. The coming of the Kingdom of God was sought to be presented to be a wholly spiritual experience.

During the third century A.D., the Roman Empire was too large, too cumbersome, and unweildly. Christianity was by that time well organized and strong.

The Greeks had insisted on freedom of thought for every individual. They fought for this right and defended it against Oriental despotism in the shape of invasions of the Persian Emperor Cyrus and Darius. Their love for beauty and individual freedom and their fearless demand for truth were their great gifts to the world. The Romans were not great creators. They took over Greek ideas, and they had a wonderful genius for organization and government. Because of the organi-

zation and unity they built up the vast empire. Christianity, by espousing the cause of the weak and the down-trodden, especially the numerous slaves, and by presenting martyrs with high ideals at the altar of the new religion was able to spread and secure its place very rapidly in the hearts of men. The era of conquest by the sword, which had commenced since the birth of the vast Roman Empire was ended in glorious reversal by the gentle doctrines, preached by Christ's followers, who though ordinary men, could, by their sacrifice and untold suffering bring about a new atmosphere in Europe by superseding the ancient religions of Greece. No matter how much the Christians would fall below the teachings of Jesus, they have at least, subscribed once to his great doctrine of brotherhood and unbound love.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IN THIS NUMBER

'Psychiatry and Vedānta' is the text of a paper presented by Swami Satprakashananda, founder-head of the Vedanta Society of St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.A., at the psychotherapeutic round table conference held on March 10, 1966, at Central State Hospital, Louisville, Kentucky. The Swami served as Moderator. A senior member of the Ramakrishna Order, the Swami is the author of *Methods of Knowledge* published by George Allen & Unwin of London. He has served the United States as a spiritual teacher for twenty-eight years.

The Cārvāka School of thinking is as old as any of the other classical views of Indian philosophy. In the present article 'Cārvāka Views on Causation: An Ad-

vaitic Study' Devaprasad Bhattacharya M.A., D.Phil (Calcutta), Senior Lecturer, Sripat Singh College, Murshidabad, West Bengal examines the views and philosophical postulations of the Cārvākas.

P. Nagaraja Rao, M.A., D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy, Sri Venkateswara University, Andhra Pradesh discusses 'The Life and Teachings of Śrī Madhva' and attempts to reconcile the same with the traditional trend of Indian philosophies.

'An Examination of Prof. Creighton's Views on Judgement' is a short critical study made by Sri Amalendu Chakraborty, M.A., Lecturer, Chandernagore College, West Bengal on the Logical Propositions of Prof. Creighton.

Sri S. S. Kundu of Calcutta attempts to explore in his short article the philosophical foundations of 'The Law of Karma'.

In 'The Essential Rilke' Prof. Ramesh Chandra Shah, Asstt. Professor of English, Govt. Degree College, Sidhi, Madhya

Pradesh, studies the poetical visions of Rilke.

In the article 'Lead, Kindly Light' Sri Jatindra Nath Mukherjee M.A., B.L. Advocate, Purulia, West Bengal, describes the great early missions of the disciples of Christ in different parts of Europe.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

A CRITIQUE OF MĀDHVA REFUTATION OF THE ŚĀMKARA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA. BY DR. K. NARAIN. Udayana Publications, Allahabad, 1964. Pages 392. Price Rs. 35.

The Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara had to fight first against the Sāṅkhya thinkers, then against a section of Buddhists, next against the logical realists, and finally against the Mādhva dualists and pluralists. The last phase led to a magnificent development of the dialectical method wielded by such powerful thinkers as Śrīharsa, Citsukha and Madhusūdana. The Mādhva thinkers included profound logicians like Jayatīrtha, Vyāsātīrtha, Rāmācārya and Vādīrāja. This movement led to a more precise logical statement of the metaphysics of Advaita.

Dr. K. Narain studies this phase of the controversy in the present scholarly and stimulating work. Spread over eleven chapters, the book examines the Mādhva attack and the Advaita restatement on problems concerning the criterion of Reality, the nature of Reality, the theory of knowledge, identity, causation, Māyā, Soul and *mukti*.

The criterion of reality in Advaita is founded on the principle of non-contradiction. This has led post-Śaṅkara thinkers to speak of three grades of truth or reality. Śaṅkara was aware of *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika* levels alone. It was Prakāśātman of Vivaraṇa, and not Vidyāraṇya (pp. 27, 345), who was responsible for the three levels, though the three appeared under different names in pre-Śaṅkara Buddhism. The five definitions of *mithyātva* are explained and examined in detail in the third chapter. The fourth chapter dealing with the theory of knowledge is the best part of the work. Here we have a valuable examination of the nature of knowledge, the relation between knowledge and its object, the relation between Knowledge and Ātman, the nature of the ego and Ātman, the stages and

forms of knowledge, the means of knowledge, and the validity of knowledge. There is also a brief enquiry into the nature of error and Māyā. One of the usual errors in the study of the concept of Māyā is to hunt up the places where the word is used in the earlier texts. One can know from the *Vivaraṇa* that the concept, not the word, Māyā appears in the R̥g-Vedic passage, '*nītāreṇa prāvṛtā jalpyā ca*'. Failure to look at the concept and eagerness to locate the word has made the author sceptical of the Advaitic meaning in the Vedic texts (pp. 174-5).

The fifth chapter is a vigorous defence of the concept of pure identity. The next three take us to the various problems connected with *Māyā*. The ninth is on the individual soul. This chapter almost ignores the theories of Sureśvara and Prakāśānanda. The treatment is not so thorough here.

'*Nrisimhāśrama*' is consistently mis-spelt in the work.

The work is a valuable addition, and it is a *must* for every serious student of realism and absolutism.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

PLATO, THE FOUNDER OF PHILOSOPHY AS DIALECTIC. BY DR. G. E. MUELLER. Philosophical Library Inc., 15 East 40th Street, New York 16, N. Y. 1965. Pages 331. Price \$ 4.75.

There have been diverse interpretations of Plato's dialogues, since Aristotle came to give us his version of the master. According to Whitehead the various philosophers in the West have been writing footnotes to Plato. Now Dr. Gustav Emil Mueller presents yet another study. The author pays the closest attention to Plato's dialectic and finds that Plato's *real* theme in every dialogue is the presentation of Philosophy as dialectic. The dialectic of the whole controls and regulates the logical argument.

A Platonic dialogue is then like a symphony, and Plato was a supreme artist. The dialogues reveal the dialectic of life. Since life and dialectic are inseparable, Plato has recreated life as a creative artist who is also a profound philosopher.

The book is in four parts. The first is 'Towards Plato', a brief history of Greek thought and an interesting biography of the master. The second part deals with 'some problems' concerning the Soul, the Good, and the Beautiful. The third is a consideration of *Hippias Major*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*, followed by the dialectical cosmology. Here we have a brilliant account of the dialectic. The last part is significantly entitled 'Footnotes to Plato', and it surveys the Platonic influence on Aristotle and Hegel.

The work offers the best introduction to the philosophy of Plato; and of all European thinkers, it is Plato who has a vitality. His thought is of great relevance to the modern times.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

PHILOSOPHY OF MEDITATION. BY DR. HARIDAS CHAUDHURI. Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40th Street, New York 16, N.Y. 1965. Pages 55. Price \$3.75.

Dr. Haridas Chaudhuri knows the western mind. He has lived in the United States for nearly two decades and has been conducting cultural and spiritual meetings with a sense of mission. His expositions of topics like *yoga*, meditation, etc. are marked by clarity, directness, and graded approach to suit the temperament and equipment of his listeners.

In the present series of talks on meditation, he develops the subject systematically. He distinguishes *dhyāna*, meditation, from contemplation, concentration, reflection and prayer; he describes the various techniques adopted at different stages of meditation and underlines the fact that true meditation is not only mental, but concerns the whole of oneself. 'It is an affair not of the intellect alone, but of the total self, involving one's whole being. One's entire existence is engaged in meditation aiming at an integration of the different aspects of personality: physical, emotional, intellectual, moral, and spiritual.'

What are the ideas or forms on which one is to meditate? Can one meditate on the Formless? What is to be done if the mind is tossed about by waves of restless thoughts when one seriously turns to quiet it? Why do unexpected obstructions arise from one's own nature when one seeks to harness it to the higher purpose? All these questions are answered by Dr. Chaudhuri in an informal way.

M. P. PANDIT

THUS SPAKE BASAVA. TRANSLATED BY A. SUNDERRAJ THEODORE AND DEVENDRA KUMAR HAKARI. Basava Samiti, Bangalore 9. 1965. Pages 82. Price not mentioned.

Vasava was the Prime Minister at the court of Bijjala of Kalyāṇ in the twelfth century A.D., before he turned to the kingdom of the Spirit. He was one of the pioneers of the *Anubhava Maṅṭapa* led by Allama Prabhu, spearheading the protestant movement in Karmāṭaka against the ritual and caste-ridden orthodoxy of those times. He realized and practised the truth of a common Fatherhood in God, Lord Śiva, and prescribed surrender as the sole means to attain Him. His teachings are epitomized in his epigrammatic *vacanas*, sayings, in Kannada, and they cover a very wide field embracing life at all levels. *Bhakti*, devotion, is the keynote; common sense, their bed-rock. Work, meditation, worship, grace are some of the topics which are touched upon in the selections in the present collection. The renderings, though not close to the originals, at times too wide of the mark, give an idea of the excellence of the aphoristic sayings of Basava.

M. P. PANDIT

THE DIVINITY OF HARANATH THE CRAZY. BY S. LAKSHMINARASAYYA, Rayachoti, Dt. Cuddapah, Andhra Pradesh. 1963. Pages 78. Price Rs. 2.

The book under review gives a brief life-sketch of the Bengali saint, Haranath, who lived about the same time as Sri Ramakrishna. The lives of such saints reassure us of the eternal verities of life in a sceptical age.

P. SAMA RAO

TULASĪDĀSA. BY CHANDRA KUMARI HANDOO. Orient Longmans Limited, 17 Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta 13. 1964. Pages 300. Price not mentioned.

The *Rāma-carita-mānasa* of Tulasīdāsa is not merely the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa* retold. It is an inspired guide-book for elevated life in this world as much as for the joyous journey to the feet of the Lord in the next. The poet-saint has woven round the narration a vast corpus of knowledge and experience gained by him in his intense life, in an imagery and idiom that would captivate the reader and stay in his consciousness.

Srinati Handoo has done commendable service in presenting to the non-Hindi world a graphic account of the career of the saint, his ideals, and his work. She follows up the biographical portion with representative selections from his writings in her English renderings, which are as sweet as the originals. The

selections are not only from the epic poem, but also from his other writings, e.g. *Hanūmāna Bāhuka*, *Dohāvālī*, *Kavitāvālī*, *Vinaya Patṛikā*, etc. Her introductions, a separate one for each section are very informative and apposite.

The Appendix contains the original texts which have been translated in English verse by the writer.

A very welcome and useful publication.

M. P. PANDIT

RELIGION AND MAN. BY HIS HIGHNESS JAYACHAMARAJA WADIYAR. Orient Longmans Ltd., 17 Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta 13. 1965. Pages 40. Price Rs. 3.

In this small and compact book His Highness Sri Jayachamaraja Wadiyar, Governor of Madras, has brought into focus the fundamentals of Hinduism. His Highness inaugurated the series of lectures in memory of Prof. Ranede, sponsored by the Karnatak University in 1961, by delivering two lectures which are now offered to the public in this book-form. The publishers are to be congratulated not only on their good workmanship, but also on their foresight and wisdom in making these lectures available to the public.

It is not easy to write a book on Hinduism. It is a multifaced, many splendoured thing and it becomes impossible to catch it and present it in definite dimensions. The totality is elusive and any representation can only be a biased and partial one. His Highness has achieved this almost impossible task and has presented Hinduism with all its myriad forms in a very succinct readable form.

In the first lecture, which constitutes the first chapter 'Roots of Religion in Vedic Thought', the importance of the philosophic basis of Hinduism is brought out. While mysticism is accepted as a way to solving religious problems, still, the learned author makes out a case for the necessity for a rational approach to Vedic Religion (p. 9). In these days there are many masqueraders of religion. Therefore, it is necessary that such an attitude be recommended by learned leaders of society, for they are the guides and moulders of popular opinions and practices. Great, indeed, is their burden for many are the pitfalls in so-called popular Hinduism of today. His Highness, therefore, is perfectly right when he emphasizes that the rationale of Hinduism is to be sought in her metaphysical theories.

To a person who is intellectually convinced of the greatness of Śaṅkara's Advaita and yet is struggling to reconcile such an absolutism with the age old roots of theistic beliefs, the words of His Highness, 'Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are presented as deities

to be worshipped and adored for the reason that they are the personal aspects of an Impersonal Absolute', come as a great solace. This is why the learned author believes that a religious discipline should follow the understanding of the metaphysical principles. It is in the light of this that the salient points of the whole gamut of the basic Vedic religious ideas are given a rapid survey in this chapter.

In the second chapter entitled 'Religion and the Values of Life in Hindu Thought', the author presents the foundational values of Hinduism and stresses the fact that Hinduism itself is a practical adventure into the mystic heights of self-realization and as such it can never be divorced from practical considerations. He brings out clearly the fact that religion is experimental and that authority can only be a help in such experiments and not a mandate (pp. 27 and 33).

An excellent, though short, account of the philosophy of the *Gītā* forms a part of this chapter. The last note in the chapter, sounded by His Highness, about the scheme for a right living based on a proper understanding of our *dharma* is worth bearing in mind.

That an administrator of such deep acumen as His Highness is, can find time to devote to philosophic studies is praiseworthy. It is a pointer to those who argue that philosophy or religion is for the old, disabled and retired people. His Highness though young in age, is deep in scholarship. The enthusiastic and scholarly earnestness of the author is well testified to by the very appreciative foreward written by His Holiness Jagadguru Sri Abhinava Vidyatirtha Swamiguru of Sringeri. The book is a mighty combination of worldly wisdom and religious depth of attainment. A book well worth study by all.

DR. (MRS.) SARASVATI CHENNAKESAVAN

FRENCH

LE BOUDDHISME JAPONAIS: TEXTES FONDAMENTAUX. TRANSLATED BY G. RENON-DEAU. Editions Albin Michel, 22 Rue Huygens, Paris. 1965. Pages 315. Price 19 fr. 20.

Buddhism exercises in Japan as profound an influence as Shintoism, not merely in the sphere of religion, but even in secular thought. This volume contains the main writings of four Buddhist monks on three influential sects of Japanese Buddhism. The testament of Honen expounds the doctrine of the pure Land, paradise, where are admitted the believers in *Amida Buddha*, irrespective of their merit or otherwise. The 'Words of Shinran' included

in this book concerns this widespread Buddhist sect.

The *Notes* conforming to the 'Treasure of the True Law', taught by Dogen, who introduced the Zen Soto sect, call upon the human mind to liberate itself from all attachment and awake into true meditation.

The two *Treatises* and *Letters* of Nichiren, who founded his doctrine on the 'Sūtra of the Lotus of

the Marvellous Law', permit each person to reveal his innate Buddha nature by prescribed exercises. Nichiren has added an esoteric element to the original doctrine. The influence of this monk is on the increase in the religious thinking of Japan today.

The translation is scrupulous and readable.

M. P. PANDIT

NEWS AND REPORTS

SWAMI ATULANANDA

We announce with deep sorrow that Swami Atulanandaji, popularly known as Gurudas Maharaj, passed away in the early hours of 10th August 1966 at Sarada Kutir, Barlowganj, near Mussoorie. He was 97, and had not been in good health for the last few years.

Before he embraced monastic life, his name was Mr. C. J. Heijblom. He came of a Dutch family that had settled in the U.S.A. During Swami Vivekananda's second visit to America in 1899-1900, he had the rare privilege of meeting him. Later, he came in close touch with Swami Turiyananda, another disciple of Sri Ramakrishna, in San Francisco. He was much attracted by the personality of the Swami and lived with him as a *brahmacārī* for several years in the newly-founded Shanti Ashrama, near San Francisco.

He came away to India for good in 1918 and had his initiation from the Holy Mother, Sri Sarada Devi, at the Udbodhan Office, Baghbazār, Calcutta. He then joined the staff of the Advaita Ashrama at Mayavati and contributed a good many valuable articles to *Prabuddha Bharata*. He was ordained, first as a *brahmacārī* on 1st April 1899 in New York

and later on as a *sannyāsī* in 1923 at the Belur Math, by Swami Abhedananda, with whom he had been previously acquainted during his stay in America.

In the last stage of his life, Swami Atulananda lived the life of a recluse for more than thirty years, first at Almora, then at Ranikhet, and finally at Barlowganj. He was greatly loved and respected by the monks and devotees of the Ramakrishna Order for his simple and loving manners and for leading a highly spiritual life. Some notes of his reminiscences in America were compiled and published in book form under the title 'With the Swamis in America'.

His body was taken to Hardwar and was carried in procession to Nildhārā (a stream of the Gaṅgā), accompanied by nearly 150 monks of different *mathas* and *āśramas* around Hardwar. The last rites were performed there by submerging the body in the Gaṅgā (*jalasamādhi*).

Swami Atulananda's passing away leaves a void in the minds of the monks of the Order. May his soul rest in Peace!
