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Prabuddha Bharata

OR
AWAKENED INDIA



By Karma, Jnana, Bhakti, and Yoga, by one or more or
all of these the vision of the Paramatman is obtained.

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PRABUDDHA BHARATA

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उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

—:0:—

LETTERS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

(123)

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Belur, Howrah
4 November 1922

Dear Sriman—,

I learnt all from your letter. I am glad to know that you are doing your might with regard to spiritual practices and the work of the Centre. It is very good that a few young men come to study the books about the Master and Swamiji and hold discussion over the same. It is further encouraging that these young men do service to the Centre by collecting small doles. One becomes blessed if one can pass one's life in doing good to others along with *japa* and meditation. What greater ill-luck can there be for one who, having been taken over by attachment, forgets God in this transitory world which is like a mirage? Fortunately you have taken refuge in the Master and you need no longer have any fear. Know it for certain. What you have understood about the true import of the Master's sayings as well as the verses of *Śrīmad Bhagavad-Gītā* is correct. Therefore I need not write to you any more on it. My love and heartfelt blessings to you! I shall be happy to hear from you from time to time.

Your well-wisher,
Shivananda

—

UNPUBLISHED LETTERS OF SISTER NIVEDITA

[Dedicated completely to Ramakrishna-Vivekananda, Sister Nivedita was never tired of thinking about the future regeneration of India and the Indian people. The following two letters, addressed to Swami Akhandananda, one of the direct disciples of Sri Ramakrishna, bespeak the determined tone of that wholehearted dedication and utmost self-sacrifice with which she always moved ahead to actualize her ideal. We are grateful to Swami Niramayananda, Head of the Ramakrishna Mission, Cherrapunji, Assam, for making these two letters available to us—Ed]

49, Park Street,
Calcutta
Eastern Sunday Morning (1898)

My dear Swami Akhandananda,

It was so good of you to write and let me know about the journey. So far, I have had no other letters from Darjeeling, only a couple of telegrams.

I was so much relieved to know that the Rev. Mother and Miss Bell had borne the journey well. How lovely that the King had gone off to see the snow. Of course I am sorry for you, for I am sure you were looking forward to meeting him, but he loves the snow so much!

Why do you say, you take undue advantage of my kindness? I have never done anything but accept things from you, and cannot think what you mean. I mean to accept more things, too—for I am sure that you will do more of the practical work of our Educational Schemes than anyone else, and you shall be very very hard-worked Swamiji! I think I am so stupid about Bengali, I ought to be talking it by now!

Now I am going to tell you what I have been doing. I took your advice and went straight to Sarada on Thursday morning. It was so lovely—Gopal's mother was there and Swami Brahmananda & Sw. Sadananda and some others. It was warm and beautiful and like home.

Then on Good Friday I went to Belur—for the whole day and night. We heard Swami Saradananda lecture at Rishra Hall, and then came down the river and landed at Dakshineswar and the two Swamis, Miss Mc. L. and I went wandering about in the garden. Presently we sat down under the Tree and Swami Sarada chanted wonderful Sanskrit prayers and the Great Night was all round us and it was beautiful. And *our* thoughts were full of another Eastern Garden and another Good Friday long ago, when the Disciples' hearts were heavy with the sense of failure, but it was all peaceful and happy at the foot of the Tree!

I do hope, you will enjoy Darjeeling and come back strong and well for fresh quarrels.

Nivedita

PS. What India wants is good house-holders, I am sure of it!

21A, High Street, London S.W.
Aug. 10th, 1899

My dear Swami Akhandananda,

All through the voyage, I have been intending to write to you—and tell you how often and how warmly Swamiji has spoken of you for the way in which you have struggled to do and carry out the ideas that we have all received. He seems to place great confidence in you—and to approve of all your efforts in a very special way.

I am sure it would have done you good if you could have heard even one or two of the many things he has said.

I hope the little work on Physics is nearly through the press, not so much because I want Dr. Bose to have the original, as because I should like to see the Bengali work when I come back. But I do not think that your friend can possibly understand what is meant by some of the materials. If he would write out a list of questions or allusions, on which he wants help, I would try to get them elucidated for him.

In a museum here the other day, I found a most beautiful carved ivory Durgā. Swamiji said that it was easy to get such things in Murshidabad. Are they very expensive? For I hope to do some interpretation of our Hindu Symbols in the West, and if a brass or wooden Durgā were not impossibly expensive, I should be very glad to have it. Ivory is of course out of the question. I am afraid you must address your reply to C/O F. H. Leggett, Ridgley Manor, Stone Ridge, New York, U.S.A. It was quite small.

Swamiji was in splendid form when he landed—apparently—but he has begun to suffer again off and on—and he means to go on quickly to America, where they will take care of him.

I am to wait here till a family wedding is over and after that, I am to follow him, and start work in America, too. You must ask Sri Ramakrishna to let me be of some real use to Him, as well as my girls. I am sure He will let me find the money I want for them—but oh—how I want to do something for my *Guru* himself! England seems very pretty to me—but Society is so unsympathetic to one's real life that I find myself longing for India all my time! So the Mother *must* grant some of my prayers to make up for sending me away—Must She not?

This is the holiday season here, and few people are to be seen. But still, some who 'Love the Lord' gather round our King and worship Him there.

Ever-dear Swami—
Your loving First-of-many Sisters,
Nivedita

RULE OF LAW

[EDITORIAL]

Politics and Progress: Idea of a political government, according to the French Philosopher Rousseau, was first set in motion by men through a 'social contract' where early human society voluntarily put itself into the chains of some common law. Men, in Rousseau's famous thesis, *Contract Social*, first learnt to organize themselves under the banner of a ruling political authority to which they surrendered their unfettered rights and thus sought to gather round a common will of political law. Whatever might have been the nature of any such first political unity, the men who pioneered the cause, no doubt, made one fateful decision of history. But the second political experience of these pioneer politicians was perhaps far more important than the first one. They discovered that political power corrupted and absolute political power corrupted absolutely and, to think objectively, the real political history of human society started from the moment of this second experience which taught these pioneer thinkers to review politics as a mud-puddle where good men became clever and not the clever men good. The voice of the multitude is seldom their own. No body knows whether the truth of politics made them free but it is a fact that its falsehood enslaved them in many more chains not foreseen by them. Since the beginning, forms of government came to be misused one after another and degenerated. Monarchy degenerated into arbitrary rule of one individual, aristocracy turned into the rule of a clique, and democracy ended in ochlocracy or the rule of the mob. The breaking of the fetters, the cries of freedom, the revolutionary tribunals, the guillotine, the bloodbaths, wars, the countless parties with their countless shades of opinions and

ideals brought in no new hope but only new inequalities and despotism. There remains the same Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes*—with no agency to resolve conflicts except by physical force and fraud. Everywhere the *demos* or the masses become the victims of the vagaries of changing political winds. One time they are told of 'God and religion' and next they hear 'Religion is a superstition'. Now they are taught that private right is 'necessary' and again they are asked to see it as 'arbitrary'. Quite meaningfully did Shakespeare remark—'Mad world! Mad Kings! Mad composition!' (*King John*, II. i. 561) and did Disraeli say in disgust—'Damn your principles! Stick to your party.' Politics has been introduced as an art of getting along together—the agreement of individuals with the community which they create for the general good, on a large as well as little scale. But the baseness of politicians gives it a bad name. This baseness makes the climate of politics dirty, cynical, amoral and asocial. Thrown out of its inherent norm it breeds restlessness and chaos in every walk of our life and as a result our social reunion fails our patriotism becomes a plunder and politics in such circumstances is taken up as a profession where men come to hold greatest amount of power with the least amount of training and responsibility. Is it then that Politics is always destined to be a dirty game? What is the norm, if there be any, that can preserve the balance of political climate? Can such norm be accepted as universal? These are the questions that one may be tempted to ask.

Meaning of Responsibility in Politics: The relation obtaining between the ruler and the ruled anywhere cannot be merely legal or political. United apparently for political

need both the parties are committed to a deep and comprehensive common purpose which, to put in political terminology, is the 'greatest good of the greatest number'. This 'greatest good of the greatest number' is a multiplex concept composed of all the other possible concepts—social, economic, spiritual and cultural. It is a commonwealth of human relations bound together by a complicated tie. Evidently such a relation is something more than a 'social contract'. For, contract includes within it the idea of a bargain that ultimately goes to loosen the original unity. Neither is it a routine process in which all the factors are known and all contingencies are well anticipated. It is, on the other hand, a world of mistakes and failures, disappointments and conflicts where every new fact requires a total involvement of both the leaders and their followers. Men differ congenitally in the acuteness of their habits and behaviour. So long the instinct of love remains the passion for jealousy would also survive. The responsibility of a politician therefore defies any ready-made formulation. His sole strength rests not in his shrewdness or diplomatic manoeuvrings but in the good will of the people. No depth of learning, no spectacular oratory will rescue him from any failure if he lacks the capacity to place himself in touch with those whose trust endows him the right to become a politician. And how can that rare relation be established except by the power to understand and feel that to which sympathetic insight is the only guide? Experiences of history will scarcely act as substitute though, doubtless, they render invaluable help. One can derive no benefit from such experiences unless one is able to test them, correct them and amplify them by the exercise of wise, sympathetic and disciplined foresight. This is no hasty analysis that eliminates, separates and strips off the surrounding circumstances of each event to make everything a common generalization. It is rather a move-

ment from opposite direction through which one will transport oneself back into the picture of the past with a mission to restore the special character of any instance, its colour and stir, which drier annals have failed to preserve and which the ordinary mind can never see. With this imaginative as well as sympathetic insight the politician resolves the complicated issues of politics, confidently meets with the views of his opponents and champions his every cause. Perhaps Weber meant this quality when he coined the term 'charismatic leaders'. Question of labour and commitment to responsibility will always be there with regard to the cultivation of such virtue so rare and so necessary in the practical political realm.

The concept of the rule of law has been discussed by the authorities, ancient and modern, in various different ways. The *Mahābhārata* too looks to this relation as something more than a 'social contract' that might have possibly been arrived at between the two parties. On the question of the origin of States it puts forward two accounts on two different occasions: (a) People in ancient days lived in righteousness. But taken over by greed and lust, they lost their moral balance and discrimination. So they prayed to the creator for a ruler and a code of law and thus the ruler and the rule of law first came to be introduced. (*Sānti-parvan*, 287) (b) Lawlessness prevailed at the beginning. Men found this intolerable and they agreed among themselves to put an end to the situation. But as all of them could not voluntarily follow such common resolve, they prayed for a ruler or leader who might enforce their common will. (*ibid.*, LXV)

Verses in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (X. viii. 12 and I. i. 14) affirm that once when the gods were defeated by the demons, the former felt that it was due to their having no proper leader. So they all unanimously elected Indra as their King who by virtue of his foresight, power and wisdom could

unify them for their common welfare. One instance in the *R̥g-Veda* (I. 80-81) says that Indra, the King of the gods derived his title and power from the combined strength and will of all the gods and this power was but wisdom and foresight. The other instance in the *Kena Upaniṣad* (II. 1-2) states that the real strength of the gods rested not in their respective individual capacities but in their inherent unity in the realization of Brahman, the Supreme Unifier. Gods, on one occasion, after their victory over the demons in a crucial battle became forgetful of Brahman, their source of strength and boasted of their individual valour. Thereupon Brahman, the supreme divine power appeared before the gods in disguise, defeated them one by one and laid bare the utter futility of their vanity and short-sightedness. Thus the three instances cited above—'praying for a ruler' by men in the *Mahābhārata*, 'election of a leader among the gods' in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, and the 'lesson on the real strength of the gods' in the *Upaniṣad* focus our attention to some of the basic questions of political wisdom. They confirm that rulership is a trust which is placed on the ruler or rulers by the ruled and the ruler's commitment towards the people is not merely social or political but total. It is total because it is moral and this sense of a moral commitment makes the ruler a servant of the ruled and not their master, for the ruler here before he gives any ruling of law to the people has to weigh his judgement carefully in his own moral balance within. The entire relation becomes divined here.

Manu, one of the earliest of the social thinkers of the world, considers the moral responsibility in politics as *dharma*. There is always a definite compatibility between the good of the individual and the common good, because the idea of common good is deduced from the conception of a supreme good and this supreme good, according to Manu, is metaphysical. Even

the ruler could not override this *dharma* and the people had the moral right to rebel against any such despotic ruler. (VII. 111-12) This *dharma* in politics is *ṛta* which has its both ethico-rational and material dimensions. It is natural as well as moral law and this concept of *ṛta*, in the view of some thinkers, influenced the Romans to develop their own basis of the law of morality. A King in the *Mahābhārata*, was required to take the following oath while he was enthroned:

'I will govern or protect always all that belongs to the country as Brahman Itself. All the law that there is and endorsed by *dharma* that I will doubtlessly preserve by resorting to punishment. I will never be arbitrary or selfish.' (*Śāntiparvan*, LVIII. 115-16)

A ruler transgressing this oath was no better than a split boat (*ibid.*, 57, 44-47) or a mad dog. (*Anuśāsana parvan*, 61. 32-33) *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (22) describes a ruler as law abiding as well as law protecting; the *Jātaka* says that he is not the master of all citizens but only of the law breakers. In the view of the *Arthaśāstra* the ruler will rule by sword but the inner content of the sword is required to be righteousness, (*asinā dharmagarbheṇa pālayasva*).

Kung-Fu-Tse's (551 B.C.) political wisdom which withstood the trials of time also attempted to realize political harmony by realizing the moral harmony of the individuals. It was humanism avoiding all speculative metaphysics.

Aristotle described man as a 'political animal' but maintained that persons who would govern the people were required to be the servants of law. Platonic conception of political stability envisaged rule by the wise men of the state. Even the ruler could not escape the laws.

Ibn Khaldūn (A.D. 1332), the great scientific sociologist of Tunisia before

Comte, defined three possible relations between the ruler and the ruled:

- (1) 'The state is best when the ruler aims at the well-being of the ruled both in this world and in the other world.'
- (2) 'The second best is the rule that aims at the good of the people in this world only.'
- (3) 'The third is the worst form and it is one where the ruler aims at his own well-being in this world'.

The first form, to Ibn, is the 'regime of law' (*śarīya*) and the second and the third are the 'regimes of reason (*aqqlia*). Law here is not the religion in the orthodox sense. It is, on the other hand, a consequence of religion, which by nature and aim is all comprehensive.

All the above references from Manu to Khaldūn may be boiled down to certain specific deductions and they are the following:

- (1) The commitment of a ruler to the people is always a moral one.
- (2) The ruler or the leader must necessarily qualify himself for such a great moral responsibility before he assumes his rulership or leadership.
- (3) One without the second requisite is a bad ruler and one who does not accept the first, is an ambitious political climber.

Politics and ethics in modern sociological thoughts, stand widely separated from each other. Advocates of the modern school aver that ethical injunctions make political authority limpid, immobile and dogmatic. The leader, under these circumstances, is more a philosopher than a real politician. These philosopher-politicians indulge in flattering dreams and superstitions, make idols of some unattainable perfection, caring little for history, contemporary facts or general reasoning. Thus they create political opinions that oscillate, with a giddy and sickening motion, from one absurdity to another, put every fact into a

metaphysical crucible and prevent every step of practical improvement. So a political leader today goes on to say that political objectives must be achieved only by political means. He, therefore, in Burke's phrase, has to 'disembowel himself of his natural entrails, and be stuffed with paltry blurred sheets of parchment about the rights' of the few. He not only repeats but also invents lies. By flattering one to his face, and abusing another behind his back, by lending himself to the short-comings of some and pampering the wicked propensities of others he has to pass for a great man in a little society. The weight of authority or the propriety of tradition makes no impression on his desperate opinions. To win over the public by fair means is to him an insipid mode of popularity; he would either force it by threats or seduce it by potions.

Politics divorced from its moral mooring brings in such a form of extremism and extremism is extremism no matter what banner is flown from its halberd. It always suffers from its inherent instability. In the *Mahābhārata* (*Śāntiparvan*) there are and augmentation of strength by a ruler through any means but those are meant for only desperate situations where the foundation of the very state is at stake. (*Tanmūlain sarva dharmānām*—strength of the ruler is the basis of righteousness) They are therefore exceptional cases and the exceptions only make the general rule—the preponderance of a moral commitment in politics—all the more valid and abiding. Machiavellian despotism, fascism or chauvinism can never be the order of a healthy political climate. Thinkers of West, therefore, look for a *raison d'être* of practical politics. Sorokin (1889-) speaks of a 'crisis' in Western culture, Hobhouse (1864-1929) enlarges the principle of 'co-operation and harmony'; Max Scheler thinks of the 'unity of human nature'; Durkheim talks of 'collective conscience';

Karl Mannheim (1893-1947) asks, 'who should plan the planners?' and Pope John XXIII (1881-1963) in his famous treatise *Pacem in Terris* speaks of 'spiritual values which continually give life and basic orientation to cultural expression, economic and social institutions, political movements and forms, laws and other structures by which society is outwardly established and constantly developed'. *Pacem in Terris* or *Peace on Earth* is regarded as the manifesto of a good and great man of modern time and it has been welcomed by all the nations of the world including U.S.S.R. There was one International Seminar on the book in New York in February 1965 when two thousand two hundred scientists, scholars, statesmen, and politicians all over the world took part in it. Search for a moral dynamic becomes also evident from the emphasis attached by the Britishers on the sacredness of the unwritten conventions of the British Parliament and from the awareness of the Americans towards the inviolability of the U.S. constitution. Even the atheistic political systems today look for a moral basis of their own. May be the Europeans still falter in their full acceptance of ethics in politics; may be they are yet to make a real choice of their ideal. But they now understand that extremism could not be taken to be a settled fact. There is a beautiful story centering round Turgenev and one of his friends. The friend once wrote to Turgenev, 'It seems to me that to put oneself in the second place is the whole significance of life.' Turgenev replied through a quick repartee, 'It seems to me that to discover what to put before oneself, in the first place, is the whole problem of life.' Europe, too, still finds a problem to rehabilitate her changing political enthusiasm. Explorations still continue to find out the exact ethical dynamic suitable to the European political trends. Victims of the medieval political

frustration and degeneration, Europeans cannot help doing it.

The Correct Emphasis: Yet it makes too vague an observation when one speaks of reorienting politics on ethical and moral considerations. Historical perspectives are of varying patterns; cultural mores do not remain the same; the climate of social thoughts too is not uniform everywhere. So the meaning of the ethical norm or moral commitment is required to be co-extensive with the peculiar political trend and the particular sociological movement of any age. Politics in Europe and politics in India, for example, do not and cannot be the same thing; neither the Indians nor the Europeans need to make their amends in the same way and in the same pattern. Herein lies the crux of the question. Each nation is to have a political personality of its own rooted in its own political soil. Each is to find out its moral responsibility in politics in its own way. Yet these varying norms of politics unequivocally formulate certain universal political vices. They are insincerity, dishonesty, love of power and jealousy which no political tradition can afford to tolerate. Whether in Manu's *dharma*, Ibn Khaldūn's *ṣarīya*, Plato's *wisdom*, *injunctions* of *Mahābhārata* and Upaniṣads, Rousseau's *social contract*, or the parliamentary practices of Western democracy, they are equally despised and discarded as vices. And under the shade of these vices spring up not the real leaders of people but shrewd political opportunists and hypocrites who only make jargons of the rule of Law, badger the people with the nuances of false celebrations and thus deceive them. But as Abraham Lincoln would say, 'You can fool the people some of the time, and some of people all the time, but, you cannot fool all the people all of the time.' So jargons do not last long; Rule of Law takes its own course.

THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN CULTURE*

DR. RALPH W. G. WYCKOFF

There must be few people anywhere whose lives, compared with those of their immediate ancestors, have not been transformed by the growth of modern science. This is true of primitive cultures, and individuals, as well as of the more advanced. We all are served by the same dams and the same generators, we ride in the same automobiles and airplanes and listen to the same radios. On the average we are much healthier, we suffer fewer hardships and can have, if we wish, more leisure than our grandfathers. To the extent that peoples are willing to work, they can be richer than ever before in the material resources and conveniences of life. This is, of course, the result of our being able, through the utilization of scientific knowledge, to control many of the processes of nature and to use them to man's advantage—and we are only beginning to exploit the knowledge we already have. These are the obvious material rewards growing out of science.

There is, however, another side to the development of modern science which I believe to be far more important to the future of mankind, and it is about this that I wish to talk. As self-conscious individuals each of us lives within the framework of a world of ideas about ourselves and our relations to our fellow men, and about the material universe of which we form so insignificant a part. This ideological world sets the pattern for the culture that we inherit from our forebears, that each generation acquires anew through education and that it enlarges in the measure of its creative capacity. In the past a number of these cultures, organized on national or regional

lines, have coexisted in various parts of the earth; and they have differed from one another not only in their richness but in their ideas about man and nature. You have had a culture related to but different from that of the Chinese, we in the United States now have a culture which resembles but is far from being identical with that of the present-day western European, while to take another example, the Hindus have an ancient culture in which both you and we find familiar elements.

These cultures and the patterns of life they define have differed in many fundamental respects. Their separate outlooks on life have developed and persisted not only because men are not all alike, but because communication between cultures has in the past been very limited. The most fateful consequence of the development of modern science is that it has destroyed forever this isolation while at the same time providing a body of knowledge about the material world which all advancing cultures must share no matter how different they may be in other respects. This is what we mean when we say that science is international in character and a potential way towards better understanding between peoples. It is the focal point for the evolution of a single culture common to all men—and this may be a great step forward or a tragedy, depending on the form it takes and the breadth of its vision of man and his destiny. We are unique among earthly creatures in the diversity that exists between individuals, and our creativity is an expression of this diversity. As a scientist I believe that while working towards a human culture which is common in its acceptance of all that science can show about the material world and how it

* Excerpt from a talk given in Japan in the fall of 1966.

functions, we should try to leave to each individual, and nation, the freedom to express its own genius in other aspects of experience. A scientifically oriented civilization for all mankind is inevitable. We can only hope that enthusiasm for the material power and quick riches, as well as the deep understanding of nature, that science brings will not give this civilization, inescapably materialistic in emphasis, a form that interferes with the expression of the non-materialistic aspects of experience which must in the long run shape man's destiny.

In the West we are now seeing how the impact of science on our cultural life can be disruptive as well as beneficial, and I presume that this is more or less true everywhere. It is of the utmost importance that we try to understand why this should be so, and to what degree these dislocations of culture are unavoidable consequences of the scientific knowledge so often cited to justify them. Every culture has its own picture of what the world is like; we, as material creatures, have always used these pictured worlds as a sort of stage upon which the real drama of human life is played. Such notions, constructed before the days of modern science, were unavoidably wrong in detail and it is not surprising that many human truths, expressed in their terms, must be restated to substitute what science has discovered for the guesses of our forebears. Where ideas about the material world have been woven into inherited beliefs, such restatements may be drastic but nobody will mourn the passing of these false notions no matter how temporarily disturbing their replacement may be. Serious difficulties arise, however, when we scientists who are the carpenters of this truer world stage show signs of being so intrigued with our handiwork that we lose sight of the fact that what we are remaking is not the real

drama of life but only its setting. Too many of us have begun telling ourselves and trying to persuade others that the stage upon which we are at work is all that matters. This is the dangerous bias of the technician.

Since science seems destined from now on to be the central element in the civilization we share, we ought to be clear as to what it covers and what aspects of experience important to culture lie outside its scope. Science is, I believe, most appropriately defined as the pursuit of the demonstrably true, where by true we mean that which corresponds to experience. Evidently under so broad a definition there can be many sciences. The modern era began with the development of those that describe the universe of matter. Some of these natural sciences like astronomy and geology must draw their conclusions only from what is observed in nature. In the experimental sciences—physics, chemistry and biology—we can intervene to make things happen which would not naturally take place and in this way greatly increase our understanding. It is the development of this planned experimentation designed to answer specific questions which has been so largely responsible for the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and the command of nature that has followed. The resulting picture of the universe of matter is comprehensive and authoritative but we must never forget that a definite limit to the scope of what can be learned is set by the fact that man's contact with this universe is through the human senses.

Other sciences we may build up to describe what is true are not so closely tied to sensory experience. This is the case with mathematics and psychology for both of which, in spite of their differences, the primary data are mental. Still other sciences such as economics and those dealing with the phenomena of society seek to

establish valid relations of a very different character. They are primarily based on observation but as their ideas become familiar to politicians they, like psychology, are beginning to toy with experiment. Knowledge incorporated in these sciences is directly applicable to problems of human welfare and out of it have come branches of engineering to put it to use. This engineering and scientific knowledge is now available to all who will discipline themselves to take advantage of it.

Apart from the reconstruction of material existence which science has brought about, it seems to me that its most profound effects are twofold. One is the demonstration that everything that happens in the world of matter follows immutable laws which the human mind can discover and formulate. The other arises from the observation that evolutionary principles correlate the phenomena of life as far backward in time as observation can reach. The mechanization of world processes initiated by the discovery of physical laws is being completed by the present-day demonstrations through bio-chemistry of the reactions that give life its dynamism.

What, then, lies outside the reach of science? To answer this we need to consider how the human mind functions. Evolution makes it very clear that the mental activity of animals has developed so that their lives are a succession of two very different kinds of decision. There are the judgments about truth which have always been so important in determining survival; these may be instinctive or, as in the higher animals, more or less under the conscious control of evolving mind. The completely different decisions we make as to desirability go in rudimentary form equally far back into the origins of life. We can within our own minds see the intimate relation between our developed sense of values and the more primitive judg-

ments as to desirability that we share with the higher animals. We can appreciate for ourselves how unlike they are to our decisions as to truth and how different is their underlying logic. Decisions of truth are yes-or-no; the situation as we picture it either corresponds to reality or it does not. Desirability on the contrary is multi-valued; there are numberless gradations between the ugly and the beautiful or between hate and love, between the evil and the saintly. Problems of desirability are as universally encountered as those of truth, and all peoples have chosen sets of values as standards regulating the relations between men. These values are not the same for all, but developed cultures have agreed in rating most highly the aesthetic and that which in English we mean by the spiritual. Though questions of desirability have no place in the sciences built around truth, questions of truth do appropriately interact with those of value. This is why modern science is having a disturbing effect on our western culture. Our culture traditionally has an ethical orientation different from yours and this ethics has always been presented in terms of religious dogma. Our God is, among His other attributes, the embodiment of the good and the sworn enemy of that which is evil; our conduct is right when we as His children eschew evil and practise the good. We are now seeing how the pseudoscientific doubts being expressed as to the reality of this God are in practice corroding our social fabric and leading to a state of civic lawlessness. I say pseudoscientific because, though natural science unquestionably disproves many of the statements of church dogma, a discussion of Godly attributes that are not sense-connected is outside its province. I have no intention of introducing these theological matters into what I have to say here for they do not seem to me to strike at the

heart of the important question which the growth of science has emphasized but is incompetent to answer. This is whether man is nothing but the elaborate biological mechanism whose operation biochemistry explains, or whether there exists some transcendental reality greater than we whose influence can be deeply felt through discipline and attention but whose nature now eludes intellectual definition. It is my position that an individual must decide this for himself on the basis of his own inner experience for it is something outside the competence of sensory-based science.

Returning to my thesis I would like to assert that both science and the higher values have essential but independent places within a culture that expresses to the full man's potentialities. I would go farther and point out that a society which emphasizes one at the expense of the others is in jeopardy. One could point to national cultures which survive with difficulty through disregard for the facts of material existence; and there are others whose stability is imperiled by over-emphasis of the material at the expense of the truly spiritual and of its practical arm, the ethical.

This ideal for cultures, and individuals, could be defined as a life which cultivates the higher values within the framework of a material existence defined by science and enriched by the engineering that grows out of it. The development of science is an essential means to the end but not by itself an adequate end for man. We need very badly the knowledge about the material universe and especially about ourselves which only science can give; but we must never forget that science by itself is incapable of creating the better world we seek.

This can only arise through understanding between men who hold such a high goal in life. Material well-being, riches,

health and longer life do not constitute such a goal, though they are essential to it. It seems to me that we must have active cultivation of the three factors we have enumerated: science, as the solid background of material reality through which one can develop a sympathetic understanding of other men, the spiritual values whose cultivation gives real meaning and purpose to life, and the aesthetic values that enrich it through cultivation of the beauty and feeling for existence they can bring. This should be our objective both individual and social.

This brings me to my last point. What can be done to advance an international understanding of the place science should occupy within the culture it increasingly dominates? This is far too broad a question for us here but I would like to make a few comments based on my experience as one of the early American science attaches and as someone who has had to deal with problems of an international scientific union. Twenty years ago we worried about how to increase contacts between scientists from different countries through more student exchanges and the development of congresses at which mature scientists could become personally acquainted with one another and discuss the latest advances in their subjects. Nowadays these no longer are problems; instead we wonder about the nature of the exchanges that should be fostered.

I want to urge the advantages that would come from prolonged exchange visits by older scientists who by reason of their experience of life can appreciate the relation between the total culture of a country and its science. This was in fact a principal objective of our programme when years ago I was a science attache; what I saw then made me enthusiastic as to its possibilities. You may think I have in mind the sort of exchange that the United States-

Japan Cooperative Science Programme has been organized to effect—opportunities for scientists of one country to work in the laboratories of another and for exchange visits of professors eminent in some speciality. Both of these are much to be desired but they are not what I am suggesting since their objectives are to further particular branches of science.

Perhaps I can most simply indicate the kind of activity I have in mind by saying a little about my job as science attache. We gave advice on scientific matters to embassy officials if they sought it but spent most of our time observing the role of science in the country of our assignment. This was done through active participation in its scientific life and through personal contacts with its scientific leaders. Obviously this is the sort of thing a young scientist, no matter how brilliant, could not do. We did not live in the closed circle of other diplomats but rather were integrated into the life of the country and, as would not have been the case were we visiting professors, we were not limited to one university or laboratory. Our contacts were as broad as we cared to make them and as deep as the friendships we established. If we sincerely sought it, we obtained a feeling and sympathy for the life of the country which it would have been difficult to acquire in any other way. Irrespective of the use made of them then

or later, this assignment gave me insights I should not like to have missed.

What one actually did was very ordinary—visiting university friends throughout the country, talking with innumerable people some of whom were fellow scientists, helping Americans to settle into laboratories they intended to visit and aiding their counterparts in trips to the United States. But perhaps what surprises me most as I look back upon it is the amount of time spent in explaining to older, influential scientists, often hostile in attitude, the reasons for many actions of my government and for many American attitudes in fields outside the scientific. I always felt this a most useful thing to do simply because most of these people would not have discussed such matters with professional diplomats or with persons whose interests were economic rather than broadly cultural. We would be listened to because we were *confreeres* who could be trusted, and because of our position we spoke with some authority. I like to feel that though I probably did not change the mind of many as to the correctness of the American point of view, our discussions made it better understood and less resented. I have always felt that our programme was proving itself a very rewarding way to develop international relations at the scientific and cultural level and was sorry to see it later discontinued.

THE GREAT ILLUSION

SRI M. K. VENKATARAMA IYER

To account for ordinary things like pots and jugs we find it necessary to posit at least two causes—the clay out of which they are made and the potter who gives the particular shape and form to them.

The former is known as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) and the latter as the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*). Attempts have been made by thinkers to explain the world in its entirety on the analogy of

common things that are to be found in it. Accordingly they have posited two causes, primeval matter and God. If the analogy is to be strictly applied they can posit only one or more human beings to take the place of the efficient cause. But since the world as a whole is such a vast thing exhibiting much intricate design they find it necessary to extend the analogy and posit God as the efficient cause. According to these thinkers God is supposed to fashion the world out of the primeval Matter. Among the orthodox systems of Indian thought, the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya adopt this view. It is true they differ in some important respects both in regard to their conception of matter and the nature of the efficient cause but, broadly speaking, they agree in positing two causes, existing independently of each other, to explain the origin of the world. The Vaiśeṣika system reduces matter to atoms of various kinds and to bring them into relation it introduces an external agency who is spoken of as God. For all practical purposes the two are independent of each other. God's function is very strictly limited. He has only to start the initial movement whereby the ultimate particles of matter called *paramāṇus* come into relation as dyads, triads and so forth. The Sāṅkhya conception of both is different. Matter, composed of the three constituents, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, is one and entire. It is called Prakṛti. Puruṣa, the sentient principle, takes the place of God. Its mere presence is enough to disturb the equilibrium of Prakṛti and set it into motion (*sarga*). In the course of its evolution it produces *Mahat*, *Ahaṁkāra* and the rest.

Reflection will show that this way of accounting for the origin of the world is not at all satisfactory. It is not acceptable to our deeper thinking. Apart from the fact that it is too *naïve* to apply a line of reasoning which is all right so far as the

ordinary things in the world are concerned to the world as a whole and to stretch it beyond its limits to bring in God, there are other difficulties involved in recognizing two independent realities such as Matter and God. The former is bound to offer resistance and God will not therefore be free to fashion the world according to His own plan. Matter, being an independent reality will act as a check on the omnipotence and omniscience of God and reduce Him to the level of an ordinary human being.

There is also the further difficulty that the deeper reason in us refuses to reconcile itself to an ultimate dualism. It tries hard to reduce them to a unity. As a first step in this direction it seeks to make matter subordinate to spirit and therefore fully under its control. Instead of being an independent reality, it becomes subservient to God. We find echoes of this view in some statements of the *Gītā*. (IX. 10; IX. 8) 'Under My guidance Nature gives birth to all things—those that move and those that do not move—and by this means, O Arjuna, the world revolves. Controlling Nature which is My own, I send forth again and again all the multitude of beings which are helpless under the sway of nature.' Though subordinated to God, Prakṛti is still reckoned as a separate entity and, to that extent, it militates against the monistic conception of Reality towards which the human mind is striving.

The next step therefore is to go beyond Prakṛti and Puruṣa to the conception of Īśvara who is both the efficient and the material cause of the world rolled up into one (*abhinna-nimitta-upādāna-kāraṇa*). As the spider weaves the web out of its own saliva and finally withdraws it into its own bosom, even so Īśvara, impelled by an inner urge, goes forth into the forms of finitude and, at the end of the world-period

(*kalpa*), reabsorbs the same into Himself. As the world comes out of Īśvara and ultimately gets back into Him, He is its material cause. We regard clay as the material cause of the pot because the latter is made of clay, is sustained by it during the period of its existence, and, finally when it is broken, it gets back into it. In this sense Īśvara is the material cause of the world and, since it emanates by an act of His will, He is its efficient cause, as well.

There is no question of creation or dissolution according to this view but only manifestation and reabsorption. We are to understand that what is implicit at one stage becomes explicit at a later stage. What is a mere potentiality at one time becomes an actuality later. The variety of the world is only a concrete manifestation in time and space of the glory of God. It follows that God is not outside of the world but inside of it, controlling and guiding it from within. He is its inner ruler (*antaryāmin*). Being the immanent Spirit, He is always with us in sunshine and in shower as 'friend, philosopher and guide'. In the *Gītā* we find a reference to this conception of godhead in two contexts (VII. 24; XI. 41-42): 'Not knowing My supreme nature, immutable and transcendental, foolish men think that I am the unmanifest and endowed with a manifest form.' 'If thinking Thou art my friend and unaware of Thy greatness I addressed Thee in ignorance or love as "Kṛṣṇa", "Yādava" or "friend", if in my mirth I showed no reverence to Thee while playing or resting, while sitting or eating, while alone or in the presence of other, I implore Thee to pardon me.' Apart from being slighted by men, a God who is immanent in the world must be deemed as being equally manifest in every part of it. Such a view will lead to stocks and stones being treated on a footing of equality with human beings. Since He is present every-

where in equal measure we have no reason to differentiate between one form of manifestation and another. This is crude pantheism and it is most revolting to commonsense.

To get over these difficulties we have to suppose that God is not completely lost in the world but is only partially manifest in it. There is another aspect or part which is beyond the world. He is therefore both immanent and transcendent. Just as a part of His glory remains unmanifest, even so the manifest part of it is not in evidence in equal measure everywhere. There are therefore degrees of manifestation. That accounts for the difference between the different orders of living beings. The recognition that He is far greater than we know Him to be induces in us an attitude of awe and reverence. We find it fully in evidence in Arjuna's attitude to the Lord when He showed Himself in His Cosmic form (*viśva-rūpa*).

This notion of God being partly manifest in the world and partly unmanifest is as old as the Vedas. In the *Puruṣa-Sūkta* of the *R̥g-Veda* it is said that only a fourth of Him is all this world while the remaining three-fourth is hidden in the empyrean (*pādo'asya viśvā bhūtāni tri-pādasya amṛtam divi*). After setting forth His various manifestations in the world, the Lord concludes by saying (X. 42): 'But what avails thee this detailed knowledge, O Arjuna? I stand pervading the whole universe with a single fragment of Myself.' In another context also it is made clear that although God is the indwelling principle of the world He is not completely merged in it but maintains His transcendence (XIII. 14-15). This view that God is both in the world and far beyond it also has found favour with several eminent thinkers like Śrī Rāmānuja and Sri Aurobindo. In a

famous passage in his *Science and the Modern World* A. N. Whitehead writes: 'Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and within the passing flow of immediate things, something which is real and yet waiting to be realized, something which is a remote possibility and yet the greatest of present facts, something that gives meaning to all that passes and yet eludes apprehension, something whose possession is the final good and yet is beyond all reach, something which is the ultimate ideal and the hopeless quest.'

This is the Concrete Absolute of the Vedānta philosophy. It is known as Saguṇa Brahman or Īśvara. It is a complex of Spirit and Matter. Closer examination will show that the two components are not real in the same sense. There is no organic or vital relationship between them. In the superconscious state known as *nirvikalpaka-samādhi* the world of diversity, of which Matter is the matrix, completely disappears leaving Spirit to shine in its pristine glory. We have a foretaste of it in dreamless sleep where we do not have any particular experience. This is because even the mind becomes quiescent. But root cause, *mūla-ajñāna*, persists in the *kāraṇa-śarīra*. In the state of Absolute Consciousness even this root cause disappears. It is not a mere blank as it may appear to superficial observers. In one of his minor poems Śrī Śaṅkara writes 'When the world of diversity together with its root cause, namely Māyā, has been denied, the great yogins in the state of *samādhi* experience Brahman what is Pure Consciousness, one without a second, beyond the three states, *Pūrṇa* and identical with their inmost Self.' It is therefore utter folly to confound it with the void (*śūnya*) of the *Mādhyamika* school of Buddhists.

If diversity together with its cause drops

away in the state of *samādhi*, it is proof positive that Matter is not organically related to spirit but only accidentally. Its disappearance does not affect Spirit in the least. The relationship between Spirit and Matter is like that between a piece of rope and the snake that it appears like. When light is brought and the place is carefully scrutinized, the snake completely disappears leaving the rope intact. The disappearance of the snake does not affect the rope in the least. But the presence of the rope is necessary for the snake-illusion to arise. It is the substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which the snake is superimposed. It is a case of *adhyāropa*. Without the rope there is no possibility of the snake-illusion arising at all. It is therefore one-sided dependence as is evident from the fact that even after the illusion has cleared up, the rope remains as before. There is therefore no organic or causal relationship between the rope and the snake in the strict sense. The rope can exist by itself but the snake has no such independent existence. It is therefore not an effect of the rope in the usual sense of the term. If it were so, it would not disappear. A real effect is sustained by its cause as long as it exists. But in the case of the snake, the rope never enters into it. It remains only as its substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*). The rope is therefore the ground of which the snake is a mere appearance. The relation is not *pariṇāma* but *vivarta*. In the former case, both cause and effect belong to the same order of reality and consequently enjoy the same ontological status. In the latter, cause and effect belong to different orders of reality.

Pariṇāmo nāma sama sattāka

kāryāpattiḥ

Vivarto nāma viśama sattāka

kāryāpattiḥ.

Since the rope exists independently of the

snake, it belongs to a higher order whereas the snake-illusion, since it has no such existence, belongs to a lower order. The rope is *vyāvahārika* while the snake-illusion is *prātibhāsika*.

In the same manner Spirit can shine in its own native glory even when there is no matter to illumine. But the latter cannot reveal itself independently of Spirit. Matter or Prakṛti is therefore neither an independent entity nor one which is subservient to God but just an adventitious adjunct (*upādhi*) of Spirit. This is clear from our experience of profound sleep also. Since the sense-organs and even the mind cease to function in that state there is no particular knowledge, but consciousness does not go out on that account. *Na hi vijñātuḥ vijñāteḥ viparīlopo vidyate avināśituāt*. It is this complex of spirit having Prakṛti as its adjunct that is known as Īśvara in Advaita Vedānta.

At a lower level of experience, the world is perceived and hence it cannot be dismissed as wholly unreal (*asat*). But since it disappears, as we have already stated, at the level of *nirvikalpaka-samādhi*, it cannot be recognized as wholly real either (*sat*). It cannot be both real and unreal as that conception is self-contradictory. We have therefore to treat diversity as neither real nor unreal. It is therefore *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* or *anirvacanīya*. In his major philosophical poem, *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (109) Śrī Śaṅkara writes: 'She (Māyā) is neither existent nor non-existent nor partaking of both characters; neither same nor different nor both; neither composed of parts nor an indivisible whole nor both. She is most wonderful and cannot be described in words.' This is the idea connoted by the term 'Māyā'. It is an elusive conception which cannot stand to reason. It is like a ghost which haunts dark places and disappears

as soon as light is brought in. To seek to determine its nature and its abode by means of the accepted *pramāṇas* is like seeking to determine the nature and abode of darkness with the aid of a lamp. Much of the misconception relating to Śrī Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā arises from ignorance of this important fact. By nature it is indeterminable. It can neither be rejected as a baseless hallucination nor accepted as a solid fact. The only way of characterizing it is to say that it is *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* or *anirvacanīya*. It is neither a pseudo-idea nor something borrowed from Buddhistic sources. The notion is germane to the central thought of the Upaniṣads. If we accept the conception of the sole reality of Brahman as taught in the Upaniṣads we are under a logical obligation to subscribe to the doctrine of Māyā also. The latter is the inevitable and necessary complement of the former. The term itself appears in two Upaniṣads, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (II. v. 19) and *Śvetāśvatara* (IV. 10). In these two contexts the term is used in the same sense in which Śrī Śaṅkara has used it in his writings. Its equivalent, *avidyā* occurs in many places in the Upaniṣads. Its connotation is the same as that of Māyā. The only difference is that Māyā stands for ignorance in its collective sense whereas *avidyā* stands for its incidence on particular individuals.

Māyā is not mere absence of knowledge but positive error. It is therefore a *bhāva-padārtha*. It is made up of three constituents, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. This is inferential knowledge arising from an analysis of human behaviour on different occasions. When we are calm, composed, cool and self-possessed we say it is *sāttvika* behaviour, when we are in a fit of rage, excited, agitated restless and active we say it is *rājasika* behaviour and when we are prone to idleness, laziness, lassitude and

procrastination we call it *tāmasika*. We must mentally suppose that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* must be the component elements of *Māyā*.

It has two powers, *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa*. The former conceals the nature of reality while the latter projects something else in its place. The rope cannot appear as the snake unless the underlying reality is effectively hidden from our view and something wholly different is projected in its place. The shell, to take another familiar example, must be completely concealed from the view of the observer and something which is not really there, a piece of silver, must be shown as being present in that place. The male actor who plays the part of Candramatī in the play of Hariścandra must first conceal all his masculine features from the view of the spectators and show himself, in his mode of dress, walking and talking, as a woman. Concealment must precede projection. These two are the central features of *Māyā*.

So far as Brahman is concerned it appears as *Īśvara*, *jīva* and *prapañca* under the influence of *Māyā*. The one Supreme Reality is made to appear as God, soul and nature. In his short poem known as *Māyāpañcakam* Śrī Śaṅkara refers to this fact: 'Māyā, skilled in showing unreal things as if they were related, breaks up the unity of Brahman and presents it as different entities, nature (*jagat*), God (*Īśa*) and soul (*jīva*).

*Nirupama-nitya-niraṁśake apyakhaṇḍe
mayi citi sarva-vikalpanādi-sūnye ;
Ghaṭayati Jagadīśa-jīva-bhedam tu
aghaṭita-ghaṭanā-paṭīyasī Māyā.*

The same idea is expressed in a slightly different manner in his *Dakṣiṇāmūrtivarna-mālāstrotram* (st., 22): '*Avidyā* is the curtain which hides the real nature of Brahman and presents in its place the world (*viśva*), the soul (*jīva*) and God (*Īśvara*)'.

We have said that ignorance in its collective aspect is known as *Māyā* and that is the adjunct of *Īśvara* while in its incidence on particular individuals it is known as *avidyā* and is the adjunct of the *jīva*. So far as the operation of *Māyā* is concerned there is this difference between *Īśvara* and *jīva*. Both perceive the world of diversity but while the latter is deceived by it, the former is not. That is because *Īśvara*'s *Māyā* is composed of pure *sattva* and the underlying Reality (Brahman) is not completely hidden from His view. The *jīva*'s *avidyā* is made up of impure *sattva* and hence it completely loses sight of Brahman. *Īśvara* sees the world of diversity much in the same manner in which we witness a magician's performance. From an empty bag he brings out all sorts of things. He sows a mango seed and in a few minutes it sprouts, grows up into a sapling, then a plant and then a fully grown up tree with foliage, flowers and fruits. We witness the whole show and simply smile at it. We are never deceived by it and so we do not take it seriously. The same is the attitude of *Īśvara* towards the world of diversity. Since the latter is a projection caused by *Māyā* which is His adjunct, He is Himself spoken of as the creator of the world. Strictly speaking, *Māyā* is the material cause of the world and not *Īśvara*. At the end of the world-period, the world is re-absorbed into *Māyā* which is its material cause and not into *Īśvara*. The spiritual element in *Īśvara* is unconcerned in these operations and simply remains as the witness.

: Just as *Māyā* is the material cause of the world which is public because it is *Īśvara-sṛṣṭa*, even so *avidyā* is the material cause of our dream-objects and illusions. The lion that we see in the dream and the silver that we see where there is only a shell are real creations arising out of *avidyā*. These are purely subjective and are experienced

only by one particular individual and not by others. They are therefore private. That is the point in saying that they are *jīva-sṛṣṭa*. They last only so long as the dream or the illusion lasts. The lion, for example, comes into existence when the dream starts and goes out of existence when the dream breaks up. Its existence is closely bound up with the perception of the dream. The same is the case with the world so far as *Īśvara* is concerned. When He opens His eyes the world comes into being and when He closes them the world ceases to exist. But so far as the *jīvas* are concerned, the world is already there and they perceive an independently existing fact. It is not a case of something springing into existence along with the perception thereof but a case of perceiving something which is already in existence. Since the world is *Īśvara-sṛṣṭa*, it is a public reality and it is the same to the same individual (*jīva*) at different times and the same to different individuals at the same time. The dream-lion or the silver is private, being purely subjective (*jīva-sṛṣṭa*). They are not the same to different individuals at the same time, not even the same to the same individual at different times. The world is a public reality and is perceived by all in the same manner at all times. The dream-lion is a private reality and is perceived by only one individual at one particular moment. The difference between what is public and what is purely private arises from the difference between *Māyā* and *Avidyā*.

In spite of the difference between *Māyā* and *Avidyā* in certain respects, there is much that is common to them. Both agree in concealing reality and presenting it as something wholly different. We have seen that owing to the operation of *Māyā*, Brahman is hidden from our view and we see in its place three realities, God, soul and Nature. *Avidyā* does the same so far

as the real nature of the *jīva* is concerned. In reality it is the *Ātman* which is only another name for Brahman. Owing to the *avidyā* that is lodged in our hearts we forget our real nature and identify ourselves with the intellect, the mind, the sense-organs and the gross physical body. Sometimes we go farther afield and identify ourselves with other people who are connected with us through the body. The identification with the body is the parent of all evil. It creates the feeling of 'I' and 'mine' which leads to egoism, conceit, arrogance and pride. The identification with the body also creates the impression that all that is outside the body does not belong to us. Naturally there arises desire to possess them. Desire leads to activity. Its end is to enjoy the good things that are outside of us. Thus *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* are attributed to the self, though in reality the spiritual element in us is unconcerned with all this. Just as the spiritual element in *Īśvara* remains as the mere witness of the operations of its adjunct, namely *Māyā*, even so the spiritual element in the *jīva* is the mere witness of all the activities of the intellect, the mind, the sense-organs and the body.

The *Ātman* is not only existence (*sat*) and knowledge (*cit*) but also bliss (*ānanda*). Owing to the operation of *avidyā*, we imagine that bliss is to be obtained by the enjoyment of the objects of sense such as garlands and scents. Consequently we feverishly run after the good things of life. Infatuation for women has a powerful hold on the imagination of people. Highly learned men, even disciplined saints and sages, succumb to the lure of sex. In his *Māyāpañcakam* Śrī Śaṅkara says (st. 2): 'Māyā, skilled in relating unreal things, confuses by a show of wealth and the like even wise men who are well learned in

hundreds of Vedāntic texts. Under its spell their behaviour is hardly distinguishable from that of beasts.' In *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (st. 114) he writes: 'Even wise and learned men who are clever and adepts in the comprehension of the subtle Ātman are overpowered by Māyā.' 'Under the powerful influence of Māyā even learned men develop lust, anger, avarice, arrogance, spite, egotism, envy, jealousy and the like.' (st. 112)

We have said that owing to the operation of *avidyā* we miss the Reality which is the Ātman and see something wholly different in its place. The Ātman appears as the *jīva*, the empirical, finite self subject to several limitations. In explaining the Upaniṣadic texts which speak of Brahman entering the world of His creation by means of the *jīva* Śrī Śaṅkara observes that this entering only means that Brahman viewed through the intellect appears as the finite self. Explaining the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV. iii. 7), 'yo ayam vijñānamaya prāṇesu hr̥dyantarjyotiḥ', he writes: '*vijñānamaya* means identified with the intellect; the Supreme Self (Brahman) is so called because of our failure to discriminate its association with its limiting adjunct, the intellect.'

There are two ways of knowing things—the intuitive and the intellectual. To intuit anything is to comprehend it as a whole, to realize its uniqueness, to enter into communion with it and to grasp it from within. Strictly speaking it is not a way of knowing at all for the usual distinction between knower and known, subject and object is transcended in it. The term 'intuition' stands for both the integral experience and the method whereby it is attained. This line of approach to Reality presupposes much discipline of a spiritual nature. Ordinarily our approach to reality is through the intellect. Its tendency is to break up the original unity

and present it as subject and object in the first instance and then to show the latter as a substance possessed of attributes or as a case in relation to an effect, as a whole consisting of parts or as the element of identity running through the differences. This is the way we know the things around us. Differentiation and integration are the essential features involved in the intellectual approach to reality. Though the intellect tries to heal the differences that it creates, it never wholly succeeds in the attempt. The consciousness of the difference lurks at the back of the mind.

If we seek to know Brahman through the intellect, the inevitable result will be to break it up into Īśvara, *jīva* and *prapañca*. Kant has come very nearly to this conclusion. After a thorough analysis of the intellectual mode of knowing reality, he states that we never know it exactly as it is and that we miss its real nature. The thing-in-itself is for ever hidden from our view. The Buddhists meant the same thing when they made a distinction between the *svalakṣaṇas* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇas*.

Much controversy has raged round the question relating to the locus of *avidyā*. Wherefrom does it operate? Śrī Rāmānuja argues that being the exact opposite of Brahman it can have no place in the latter; nor can it have its base of operation in the *jīva* which is its creation. For want of a *locus standi* it simply falls to the ground. In other ways also he tries to show that it is a figment of Śaṅkara's imagination. In the course of this paper it is not possible either to state his criticism in full or to meet it. We will only say that much of it is irrelevant since it is based on the assumption that time is a prior reality. It also ignores that *avidyā* is a given fact of experience, that it is vouched for by Śruti and that it has the support of reason. The feeling that one

is ignorant (*aham ajñah*) is a common experience. The Upaniṣad speaks of the breaking asunder of the 'knot of the heart' (*hr̥daya granthiḥ*) which means the dispelling of ignorance. Inference based on reasoning forces us to posit it.

A consideration of the nature of Brahman as set forth in several purportful passages of the Upaniṣads and the possible relationship that could exist between the world and such a Brahman will throw further light on the question relating to the seat of *avidyā*. In *Kaṭha* (I. iii. 15) we read that Brahman is 'devoid of sound, of touch, of form; that it is undecaying, beginningless, endless' and so forth. In *Muṇḍaka* (I.i.6) Brahman is spoken of *Para*, beyond seeing, beyond comprehension, having no *gotra* or *varṇa* and the like. In *Māṇḍūkya* Brahman is said to be that which is unseen, incapable of being expressed in language, which cannot be comprehended and so on. In *Taittirīya* (II. 4 and II. 9) Brahman is said to be beyond mind and speech. In (II. 7) the same *Upaniṣad* Brahman is characterized as invisible (not an object of perception), selfless (having no form or body) undefined (not a phenomenon) and as non-abode (not a substratum of attributes). In the *Chāndogya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* we come across similar negative definitions. That these are the really purportful texts is clear from the fact that the highest reward, *mokṣa*, is promised to the man who understands them aright.

Between such a Brahman and the world it is impossible to establish a relationship in any of the accepted modes. The only possible connexion is an apparent relationship. It means that the world is neither an effect of Brahman nor its manifestation in time and space but only a superimposition on it. When the silver is superimposed on the shell or the snake on the rope, the shell and the rope remain

intact, without undergoing the least change. Neither the appearance of the silver nor its subsequent disappearance affects the substratum in the least. It is clear that in the state of ignorance we see the silver and in the latter state of enlightenment we deny it and affirm only the shell. The superimposition is due to our ignorance. In the same manner if we see the world where there is only Brahman we do so under a beginningless and foundational ignorance. This is *avidyā* or *Māyā* and it goes without saying that it is lodged in the heart of the *jīva* or finite self. We have said above that the intellect presents a multiplicity where there is only a unity. The intellect, according to the Upaniṣads, has its seat in the heart and no one can have any doubt about the location of the heart.

By way of further proof that *avidyā* is lodged in the finite soul, we may refer to the discipline consisting of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāsana* and *samādhi* that the Upaniṣads enjoin on us. It is stated that we can overcome our congenital limitations by the steady practice of this discipline. Medicine is administered to the man who is suffering from a disease and not to any one else. If *avidyā* or *Māyā* had its seat not in the *jīva* but in the Brahman then no amount of discipline or other effort on our part would eradicate it. To reinforce the injunction relating to the cultivation of mental concentration and the like the Upaniṣads mention the specific instances of Naciketas, Nārada, Vāmadeva and Emperor Janaka who successfully overcame their *avidyā* and attained unity with Brahman. In view of all this, it is a futile controversy to raise objections relating to the base of operation of *Māyā* or *avidyā*.

We have said that the purely intellectual approach shuts out the real nature of Brahman from our view. 'Like the dome

of many coloured glass which stains the white radiance of eternity', the intellect acts as an effective screen between the finite self and the Supreme Self. Wordsworth speaks of the 'meddling intellect which misshapes the beauteous forms of things' ! This is of course from the standpoint of the poet. From the point of view of the seeker after truth we have to alter it a little and say that the differentiating intellect distorts the true nature of Reality.

The only thing to do is to go beyond intellect to intuition. One who is installed in that state will leave the great illusion far behind. The scales will fall from his eyes when he rises to that state and he will be able to see men and things with other eyes. It will lead to a transvaluation of all the old values which he had

cherished for long. It will mean a total transformation of his being. It has been said that enlightenment does not mean going to a place where we have not been from the beginning or attaining something which we did not possess before ; it only means tearing off the veil and awakening to our own real nature.

Desire is the root of activity. With the dawn of enlightenment the great illusion will disappear completely putting an end to all desires. Activity in the usual sense will thenceforward cease for the liberated soul. He may exert himself just to give a helping hand to his less fortunate fellowmen, but it will not forge fetters for him. When his *prārabdha-karma* ends and his body falls he will have transcended once and for all the realm of the great illusion.

PAVHARI BABA : A SAINT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

SWAMI NIRVEDANANDA*

Among the galaxy of great saints that were born in India during the nineteenth century, the name of Pavhari Baba who lived near Ghazipur in Uttar Pradesh, is well-known to the readers of Swami Vivekananda's life. Unfortunately, however, nothing much is known of his parentage, though Swami Vivekananda's article on him and references to him in letters throw some light on his otherwise obscure life. The deep impressions he had made on Swamiji's life is reflected in the lines the latter wrote : 'The present writer owes a deep debt of gratitude to the departed saint and dedicates these lines, however unworthy, to the memory of one of the greatest Masters he has loved and served.'

* Of Vasistha Guha, Rishikesh.

The following is an attempt to present a brief life-sketch of the saint from information gathered from his family-members (it may be added in passing that the house in the basement of which Pavhari Baba lived is in their possession to this day). The chronology of events here, however, slightly differs from that of Swamiji's account of Pavhari Baba's life.

Pavhari Baba was born in the year A.D. 1840 in Premapur, near Jaunpur, in Uttar Pradesh. He was the second son of Ayodhya Tiwari, a pious Brahmin, and had two brothers and a sister. When a child, he had an attack of small-pox, as a result of which he lost an eye. Harbhajan Das—for that was his boyhood name—was, although he had lost an eye, the best look-

ing and most well-built among the three brothers. Harbhajan came to study and live with his uncle, Lakshminarayan, younger brother of Ayodhya Tiwari. This uncle of his had taken the vow of *naiṣṭhika-brahmacarya* (life-long celibacy) and left home early in his life to lead the life of an ascetic. He belonged to the *Vaḍakalai* sect of Śrī Saṁpradāya, Śrī Rāmānuja's Order of Viśiṣṭādvaitins. After many years of travel, he settled near Kurtha, a village three miles south of Gadhipur, (popularly known as Ghazipur), where he was given a piece of land by the Government. The chief attraction of this place was the *Uttaravāhinī* Gangā (the river Gangā flowing northwards as in Varanasi), the banks of which are considered very auspicious for spiritual practices. He was quite old when he brought Harbhajan to assist him, with the intention that he would succeed to his *āśrama* and property. When Lakshminarayan came to know that Harbhajan had lost an eye, he remarked: 'This is a good sign. Raja Ranjit Singh also had only one eye.' He had preferred Harbhajan to latter's elder brother Ganga Tiwari, saying that he had the signs of becoming a great *yogin*. True to his prophecy, the boy in later life did become a Rājā—not a king of earthly possessions, but a king of the *yogins*..

Lakshminarayan invested his nephew with the sacred thread (*upanayana*) and the boy's education began. He studied Sanskrit from a Pandit of a nearby village for a year and then studied under various teachers the different Vedas and other religious texts, which took a few years. Finally, he spent a year, learning *Pañcadaśī* under a very learned and well-known *sannyāsin*, Sri Gopal Parvat Paramahansa. He showed keen interest in studies and his teachers found him the most brilliant among their students.

The boy attended to the *āśrama* duties,

assisted his uncle's disciples in preparing food offerings for Śrī Raghunātha and other deities and served his uncle. If any boys of the village came to play, he would join them; otherwise, whenever he was free, he would spend the time in solitude on the banks of the Gangā or in the wood nearby. Even from childhood, it is said that he was of a quiet temperament. However, we learn from Swami Vivekananda's sketch of the life of the saint that the boy's jollity 'at times found vent in hard practical jokes at the expense of his fellow-students'. 'There was scarcely anything in the open cheerful, playful student life to foreshadow the tremendous seriousness which was to culminate in a most curious and awful sacrifice.'

In due course, Harbhajan had completed the study of the Vedas and other texts when his father came and talked to him of marriage. The boy had understood the utter transitoriness of the happiness that the world could offer and had determined to strive for that spiritual perfection, attaining which nothing remains to be attained. So, in spite of his father's persuasion and entreaties, he emphatically refused to marry, and the father had to return disappointed.

Thus days passed on. Then came a shock that was to change his life for ever. One day, in the year 1856, his uncle, Lakshminarayan, passed away. He was a spiritually awakened person and, coming in contact with him, Harbhajan's innate spiritual tendency had been kindled. The uncle's passing away was the turning point in his career. The worship of Śrī Raghunātha and other deities now fell on his shoulders. For a few months, he carried on, but not finding peace, he transferred these duties to the other disciples of his uncle and left on a pilgrimage. He visited the sacred spots on the four corners of the land, viz. Puri in the east, Rame-

swaram in the south, Dwaraka in the west, and Badrinath in the north. On his way to Dwaraka, he spent some time on the Mount Girnar, which is considered the seat of the great saint, Avadhūta Guru Dattātreya. There he found an anchorite living in a cave, unnoticed by anybody. The saint taught him many secret lessons on *yoga*. Harbhajan wanted to live there and serve him, but the saint would not allow anybody to stay with him. So Harbhajan had to come away. However, the teacher blessed him, saying: 'You will become a great *yogin* and none in the present day will equal you.'

And it is said that, in the Himalayas, he served another great soul who also lived in a cave far away from human habitation. The saint was very pleased with Harbhajan and gave him some herbs, eating which one could live without food or drink for a long time. After a few years of pilgrimage, study, and discipline, Harbhajan returned to the *āśrama*. His boyhood friends and others noticed a great change in his face—the face was beaming with lustre. If his uncle were alive, he would have discovered in that beaming lustre the same ancient light of supreme knowledge which the great ancient sage saw in the face of Satyākāma. Perhaps he would have welcomed the boy with the words: 'Child, thy face shines with the glory of Brahman.'

But, then, there was nobody who could understand his inner enlightenment, though the change in him spontaneously called forth respect from those around him. From this time, Pavhari (henceforth we shall refer to him by the name by which he became famous), engaged himself in the worship of the Lord, worship of guests, and other duties. A change had come over him in all matters. He would address or refer to any living being as '*bābā*', all ladies as '*mātājī*' (Mother), and himself as a '*dāsa*' (servant). '*Sarvam viṣṇu-*

mayam—Everything is filled with the Lord' became a direct and intense realization for him. A few years later, when he was bitten by a black cobra, he was given up for dead. After many hours, when he regained consciousness, his friends enquired about it. His reply was that the cobra was a 'messenger from the beloved'. He narrated that a 'rat *bābā*' came and fell on his lap and was given shelter under his cloth, so the 'cobra *bābā*' who was chasing it got angry and bit him on his shoulder. That was his way of looking at things, adhering to the Vedāntic dictum, '*Udāra-caritānām vai vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam*—For the liberal-minded the whole world, indeed, is the family'.

At another time thieves entered the *āśrama* and stole the idols, ornaments etc. and when they were about to depart, Pavhari entered the room. They left the bundle and ran away. Pavhari chased and overtook them and with all humility said: 'Thou *bābās* have come and if these things are needed, they are thine. Why do *bābās* abandon the things? What wrong has this servant committed? Kindly take these things; they are thine'; and so on. For him, everybody, even a cobra or a rat or a thief—was a *bābā*—God.

Worship of the Lord, feeding the guests, reading and explaining religious texts, became his daily routine. In the afternoon, he used to retire into the thorny bush near the *āśrama* and meditate. Again, after the evening *ārati* (vespers), when everyone else went home, Pavhari would go to the Gaṅgā and spend the whole night in the practice of *yoga* and in prayer and meditation. Before the dawn, he was back in the *āśrama* to start his routine. He prepared delicious food for the Lord and served it to the guests as *prasāda*. His own diet was the juice of red pepper and milk. For a time, he lived on the juice of *bilva* leaves

alone. It was then that people started calling him Pavhari (air-eater) Baba.

Again, he was away from the *āśrama* for some period when he studied the Advaita system under a learned *sannyāsin* Niranjana Swami at Varanasi. He also learnt more about *yoga* from a saint living in a cave near Ghazipur. When he came back, he had a long burrow dug out in his *āśrama*, where he spent most of his time, practising *yoga*.

After some time, he started for Girnar with the intention of getting initiation into *yoga*. On the way, he came to know at Ayodhya that the Master to whom he was going, had passed away. So, as it is said, he took initiation from a Vaiṣṇava saint of Ayodhya, and returned to the *āśrama*. Like his uncle, he also belonged to the *Vadakalai* sect of Śrī Saṁpradāya. Slowly his spiritual practices became more and more intense day by day. He stayed in the cave for days together and came out once a fortnight on *ekādaśī* days (eleventh day of the fortnight) in response to the villagers' requests. The door of the temple was never opened on other days. The villagers brought milk, fruits, etc. and placed them in an adjoining room. Baba would sometimes collect them at night when there was nobody to see him. In the meantime, his fame was spreading. His elder brother, Ganga Tiwari, came and settled in Kurtha to serve him. Gradually, his fortnightly appearance also stopped and only once in a year he came out and it became an event for celebration. But the urge for a pilgrimage was again on him, and he left for Puri. On his way to Puri, he fell ill, and stayed in a village near Murshidabad. The villagers erected a hut by the side of a river and a devotee served him well. Babaji learnt Bengali from him and brought many books on Vaiṣṇavism of Bengal when he returned. He studied *Śrī Caitanya Caritāmṛta* and

other books. His knowledge of Tamil and Telugu was also deep. He had studied the works of South Indian Vaiṣṇava saints, the *Ālwārs*, in their original. On Pavhari Baba's return to his cave at Kurtha, obtaining *darśana* of him was not so difficult. Therefore, visitors from far and wide came to Kurtha everyday to seek his blessings. He would talk to them and answer their questions from behind the door of his cave. Ascetics and monks of all denominations came, and all were looked after by his elder brother who was managing the *āśrama*. Worship of guests was an important function. Nobody returned without food. Meanwhile, the river Gaṅgā had changed course slightly and moved eastwards and the land thus vacated was put under the plough by Ganga Tiwari. Subsequently, the Government gave that additional piece of land also to the *āśrama*, which enabled them to feed the guests without any difficulty.

After his return from Bengal, Pavhari Baba used to come out of his seclusion on *ekādaśī* days as of old. Once in the year A.D. 1884, he did not make his usual appearance, and remained inside for a long period. On former occasions, whenever he was about to come out from his cave, people outside would guess it from the smoke that emanated from the oblations in his fire. He would also make arrangements for worship. And he used to converse with them from behind the door. But this time, no activity was noticed. People guessed he would have left his body; yet none had the courage to break open the door. Thus days passed on and at last, after four or five years, one day the bell rang and the worship of the Lord was going on. After *pūjā*, Pavhari Baba came out. The joy of the people knew no bounds. A big feast was arranged and many *sādhus*, Brahmins, and the poor were fed.

Once again, the *āśrama* was humming

with activity. Pavhari Baba used to explain the religious texts every day. One day he noticed a man on the bank of the Gaṅgā while practising *yoga* before dawn. This 'intrusion' affected his health and he had to give up the practice for a few weeks. Then he decided to have a well dug out in the *āśrama* premises so that he could bathe there itself. It is said he dug it out all by himself! Even today, the water of this well is in good condition and is used. Later, he arranged for a great *yajña* or sacrifice which lasted a month. Hundreds of monks, ascetics, householders, and learned men gathered on the spot to participate in it. A township of tents and huts was erected near the *āśrama*. The scholars arranged for a discussion on scriptural matters in which arguments and counter-arguments went on. Pavhari Baba was also requested to participate but 'what does this servant know?' was his humble answer. On the last day, Baba himself washed the feet of the monks, worshipped them, and offered them clothes and other gifts. With a grand feast the *yajña* came to a close.

After the *yajña*, Pavhari Baba shut himself up in his cell once more. He had a pit dug out behind the *āśrama*. One day, he said from inside that if some mud were heaped in front of the door 'this servant' would do some work. The next day about thirty labourers were engaged for the job. Before evening, they heaped huge quantities of mud near the door. And lo! when people came the next morning, all the mud had been removed and the compound wall was ready; Baba had done a miraculous job during the night! Another incident is also worth mentioning: He asked for a wooden hut. Carpenters were engaged and a strong hut was ready. Nearly forty strong men lifted it over the compound wall and Babaji received it single-handed from inside.

'Patience, purity, perseverance'—Swami Vivekananda was never tired of stressing on these qualities in his letters to his brother-disciples and others, as a sure way to success in any undertaking. Pavhari Baba had all these qualities in abundance. Whether he was worshipping his Lord or cleaning his vessel, his entire absorption was in the task in hand. He used to say: 'The means should be loved and cared for as if it were the end itself.' Due to these qualities, he became a 'master of all trades'. He knew stone-work, carpentry, masonry, and a number of other trades, and could do everything with perfection. He used to make clay models (specimen) of ornaments and send them to the goldsmith for making golden ornaments for the Lord. The goldsmiths used to be wonder-struck at the beauty of them and often they had to make and re-make the ornaments many times before they could tally them with the Baba's clay models.

The physical stamina as well as strength of the Baba was something verging on the supernatural. We have already mentioned how he constructed a compound wall overnight, lifting all the mud himself and also received single-handed a hut lifted by forty men. One more incident reveals his speed in walking. Once he fell ill at Prayag (Allahabad) where he had been to attend the Kumbha Fair. After he had recovered, he walked back to his cave at Kurtha in a single night—a distance of 112 miles.

During his long periods of seclusion, the Babaji used to ask for various religious texts and writing material. He copied many books in a neat and beautiful handwriting. Many of them were burnt or destroyed, but a few of them are still preserved in the *āśrama*. Some of the books may be mentioned: *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* with Śrīdhara Swāmin's commentary, *Vedānta-Sūtras* with Śrī Rāmānuja's *Śrī*

Bhāṣya, *Pañcadaśī* of Śrī Vidyāraṇya with Ramakṛṣṇa's *Tīkā*—all in Sanskrit—and *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa* and *Prema Vilāsa*, a treatise on *bhakti* in Hindi verse. All these are written in the loose-leaf pattern. What amount of patience he must have had to copy so many huge volumes in a neat handwriting! Not only his writing, but everything he did was a thing of beauty: even his voice was very sweet 'the sweetest we have ever heard' says Swami Vivekananda.

The life of such an illustrious *yogin* was nearing its end. For the last few years of his life, he withdrew himself from the gaze of mankind. He used to talk from behind the door whenever he came up from his cave. But he never came out into the open. Once he told his nephew, Badri Narayan, that after his (Pavhari's) leaving the body, Badri Narayan should look after the worship and take care of 'this servant's books'.

It was a Friday and a New Moon day in May-June in the year A.D. 1898. Early morning, Ganga Baba, Badri Narayan, and a few others were sitting outside after their bath. They noticed a huge column of smoke going up from inside the cave. They thought that Babaji was doing the *homa*, the fire sacrifice. Plenty of *homa* materials and *ghee* (clarified butter) had been brought by devotees only a few days earlier.

Within a short time, they observed flames going up. Badri Narayan went near the compound wall and cried out, asking permission to put out the fire. Babaji did not answer. When they felt the fire would go out of control, Badri Narayan climbed up on a stone and peeped inside. The wooden cottage was ablaze. He observed Babaji applying *ghee* on his hair and anointing something on his body. Badri Narayan again cried out: 'If we have your orders, we will arrange

to extinguish the fire.' The Babaji simply raised his head and looked at him and taking his *kamaṇḍalu* (water-pot) in the hand, quietly walked into the burning hut. In the meantime, seeing the fire, many villagers had come there running. Badri Narayan narrated what he saw, but nobody had the courage to enter the premises, but on the insistence of some prominent people, the door was broken open at last. When they entered, they found Pavhari Baba sitting in *padmāsana* (lotus pose) in front of his *homa-kunḍa* (vessel for fire sacrifice). The wooden cottage was burning. His body was also burning. A few tins of *ghee*, *homa* material, and some of his books were by his side. Within a short while, Pavhari Baba's *brahma-randhra* (crown of the head) burst open and his life came to an end. The saint, an embodiment of humility, did not wish to give trouble to anyone even after death, and performed this last sacrifice of an *Arya*, in full possession of body and mind, even as the great Sage Śarabhaṅga of yore, did. In a tribute paid to the saint, Swami Vivekananda refers to him as one of the greatest masters he had loved and served.

Even today one can find a small memorial tablet that stands on the spot where he sacrificed his body. The building seen today enclosing the place as well as the surrounding area was later constructed by a devotee of Pavhari Baba.

During his life time, many great men came to him and they ranged from devotees and saints to thinkers and religious reformers of different orders.

SOME INCIDENTS OF HIS LIFE

Every *yogin* or spiritual man possesses certain supernatural powers. But a real *yogin* seldom exhibits these. Nevertheless, some events do occur. Many are the supernatural incidents that are attributed to the life of Pavhari Baba or his uncle

and we shall presently mention here two of them :

There is a story about how Mahatma Lakshminarayan settled in Kurtha. Wandering along the side of Gaṅgā he reached Kurtha. The place was quiet and there was a thick jungle. And the Gaṅgā flowing northwards was also considered auspicious. Hence he liked the place and wished to spend three nights there and then move on. On the very first day, when he was performing his worship, he was noticed by a certain Government Official and a few others who had come to the rifle range close by. The officer, who was an Englishman, asked him to leave the place immediately as it was dangerous to live there. Lakshminarayan told him his wish to stay three nights, after which he would leave. The officer looked upon ascetics with contempt, and so did not like his staying there. Therefore he ordered Lakshminarayan that he should vacate the place immediately after finishing his *pūjā* or else face dire consequences. When the officer returned home, he found one of the members of his family suffering from a sudden and mysterious disease which the doctors failed to diagnose. He was very much worried. Then his peon suggested that he had incurred the displeasure of a holy man who perhaps pronounced a curse. The only remedy is to apologize and beg his pardon. Finding no other way, the officer rushed to Lakshminarayan and fell at his feet. The latter pleaded ignorance : He said that he was not a man to curse and therefore, he could not suggest a remedy. However, on the officer's insisting he gave a little ash as *prasāda*. The officer returned home and to his great astonishment, the sick person was all-right even before the *prasāda* reached home. The disease had vanished as mysteriously as it had appeared ! Next day, the officer came to Lakshminarayan and requested him

to stay there permanently and he sanctioned a piece of land for him. It was thus that Lakshminarayan settled in Kurtha.

Concerning Pavhari Baba, we may cite the following incident. Once a grand feast was being arranged and many holy men were gathering for the same. Pavhari Baba was guiding everything from behind the door. When only a week remained for the proposed feast, Ganga Tiwari (his brother) informed him that they were proposing to dig some wells as the river Gaṅgā was far away and it would inconvenience the *sādhus* to go there for washing etc. Cooking water was also needed at hand. It was mid-summer and carrying water from the Gaṅgā was out of question. No one could walk through the long stretch of hot sand. Pavhari Baba queried : 'Have you invited Mother Gaṅgā?' When answered in the negative, he insisted that it should have been done. And as directed by him, his brother took huge quantities of sweets, fruits, a good *śārī*, flowers, garlands, and other materials for worship, went to the midstream by boat, offered worship to Mother Gaṅgā. He offered all the materials in the river along with a written invitation to Mother Gaṅgā to grace the occasion. Some people, no doubt, laughed at this. But he had faith in Pavhari Baba's words. Now only three days remained and Ganga Baba was worried. But Pavhari Baba allayed his fears. In the front of the *āśrama* there was a dry canal which brought rain water during the monsoon from a distance of about ten miles and discharged it into the Gaṅgā, half a mile north of the *āśrama*. This canal is seen to this day. When the Gaṅgā, is in floods, the waters enter the canal, too, and go up a long distance. But during the summer, there is no chance whatever of the Gaṅgā water entering the canal. However, whether it was Pavhari Baba's prayers or his powers, Gaṅgā slowly

moved westward and entered the canal bit by bit, and on the third day i.e. the day of the feast, the canal was full! People were all wonderstruck. The feast was over in a great way, and the next day, the canal was dry again! Mother Gaṅgā did come to grace her child's function!

We have seen how Pavhari Baba saw divinity in every being and addressed them as 'bābā'. In his underground cave, there were cobras and rats. Born enemies, they lived in amity in his presence. On the day, Pavhari Baba sacrificed his body, when people entered inside, they noticed, in an adjoining room, a cobra and a rat partaking of milk from the same bowl! Patañjali's aphorism '*Tat sannidhau vaira tyāgaḥ*—in his (Yogin's) presence enmity disappears' was proved in this case. Even today, it is stated that there are cobras in the cave and nobody goes down. The pedestal on which the idols are placed is close to the mouth of the cave which is

loosely covered by wooden planks and priests sit there and perform *pūjā*, *ārati*, etc., but no cobra comes up. Only when one or two attempts were made to go inside the cave, then people heard the hissing sound and had to hurry back. Thus, today, this underground tunnel where the great saint lived and sacrificed his body into the flames, remains a mystery to us, as nobody dares to enter it.

The significance the lives of such saints hold to the world is tremendous, though for all outward appearance, they are useless. For Pavhari Baba himself told Swami Vivekananda in answer to the latter's question as to why the saint did not go out into the world preaching so as to help the world: 'And do you think that physical help is the only help possible? Is it not possible that one mind can help other minds, even without the activity of the body?'

'THE ABSOLUTE' ACCORDING TO JIVA GOSWAMI

DR. (MISS) DEVKANYA ARYA

Jīva Goswāmī, the chief exponent of the Caitanya School of Vaiṣṇavism, accepts the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* as the most authoritative scripture. The Absolute, therefore, according to him is the '*advaya-jñāna-tattva*' of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. The simple meaning of this phrase *advaya-jñāna-tattva* is that the Absolute Reality is the knowledge or consciousness which is one without a second. But this non-duality is not the absolute monism of the Advaita Vedāntins. It signifies that the Ultimate Reality is qualified by an infinity of the divine powers. In its true essence this Reality is a totality of existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*). It is of

the nature of the highest bliss, eternity and is the supreme object of all desires (*parama-purusārtha*). The terms '*advaya*', '*jñāna*' and '*tattva*' are interpreted so as to involve the principles of existence, consciousness, bliss and it is by virtue of this difference in interpretation of these terms that the Caitanya School of philosophy distinguishes itself from the other Schools of Vaiṣṇavism.

MEANING OF THE TERMS

The word '*tattva*' generally implies 'the essence of all the things'. The essence of a thing is the same as bliss for the very aim of a man is to attain as much happiness as he can and all his activities whether mental

or physical are naturally directed towards the attainment of bliss. Thus the word 'tattva' itself inheres the idea of bliss and in this context means the Ultimate Reality consisting of pure ecstatic bliss. (Jīva Goswāmī: *Tattvasandarbhā*, Acyuta Granthamala Karyalaya, Varanasi, p. 131)

The word 'jñāna' conveys the meaning of consciousness because it has been explained by Jīva Goswāmī as that of which consciousness is the only form. (ibid., p. 130) This Ultimate Reality (*tattva*) which is all blissful and has been explained, in this school, as consciousness is eternal because what is transitory can never produce the everlasting pleasure. It may be objected that the knowledge appearing to our vision as 'blue' or 'yellow', is but momentary, because when the knowledge of 'being blue' is destroyed, that of 'being yellow' is produced and therefore, it is not worthwhile to regard knowledge and consciousness as something permanent. (ibid., p. 133) But this objection can be refuted on the ground that it is only the senses which are responsible for this kind of sensation. On account of the experiences of the senses one eternal real knowledge (*sat-jñāna*) appears as manifold. It is only the impression (*vṛttis*) in the form of blue or yellow that is produced or destroyed not the consciousness which is eternal par excellence. (ibid., p. 143)

According to Jīva Goswāmī, the word 'advaya' which qualifies the Ultimate Reality which is in the form of consciousness, conveys three meanings. It means:

- (i) that the Ultimate Reality is self-existent,
- (ii) that it has nothing similar or dissimilar to it,
- (iii) that it has its own potencies as its only accompaniment and is the supreme asylum of all the powers which cannot exist without it. (ibid., pp. 130-131)

This self-existence means that it exists of its own accord and does not require any

other proof for its existence. (ibid., p. 130)

So also the Ultimate Reality has nothing similar to it as for example the individual soul (*jīva*) which also consists of pure-consciousness and has been in other schools of Vaiṣṇavism, recognized as an independent Entity. It does not have anything dissimilar also as for instance the primeval matter and the time which are unconscious principles. (ibid.) The same has been further explained by Jīva Goswāmī in his *Sarvasamvādinī*. What he means by the phrase '*tādṛśātādrśatattvāntarābhāvāt*' is that the Ultimate Reality is devoid of all kinds of difference.

Three kinds of difference have been recognized by the Vaiṣṇava thinkers as:

- (1) *Svajātiya-bheda* (Homogeneous difference).

The difference which exists between the two things of the same class is called homogeneous-difference. For example, there is the difference between a mango-tree and a jack-tree. The two belonging to the same species of 'tree' are quite different from each other. The mango-tree cannot be the jack-tree or the *vice-versa*. So far as the class is concerned, they are similar, but they differ with regard to their individual characteristics.

- (2) *Vijātiya-bheda* (Heterogeneous difference).

This means of different species. The difference existing between the objects of different classes is called heterogeneous-difference. For instance, we have the man and the lion, the man belonging to the species of human being and a lion to that of the animal.

- (3) *Svagata-bheda* (Internal difference).

The difference which manifests within the same entity is called internal difference. Thus, for example, the individual soul (*jīva*) has the internal variety in the organs of sense as eye, ear or nose and the like. The main cause of this kind of difference is

the difference in *upādāna* or material. Thus the eye has the visualizing capacity on account of the excess of light-element in it, the ear has got the auditory-capacity on account of the excess of air-element in it and so on.

In this connexion it is to be noted that a real difference can manifest only between two such substances as are purely independent of one another in respect of their existences. It is only the self-existing nature of the entity which accounts for all kinds of difference. Therefore while dealing with this point the non-relativity (*nirapekṣatā*) of the entities is always to be kept in mind. (Radhagovinda Natha: *Gouḍīya Vaiṣṇava Darśana*, Part III, p. 1702)

NATURE OF ADVAYA-JNANA-TATTVA

Following the same lines, Jīva Goswāmī asserts that the *advaya-jñāna-tattva* is destitute of all these three kinds of the difference. It has been maintained that the Ultimate Reality is pure-consciousness and the individual soul also, in its essential nature, consists of pure-consciousness. Therefore, there is an apparent homogeneous-difference between the two. But the individual-soul being purely a manifestation of the *Jīva-potency* of the Supreme Being, solely depends upon Him for its existence. Without the existence of the Ultimate Reality, the existence of *jīva* cannot be established. Lord's abode, retinue etc. consisting of pure-consciousness are merely a *vilāsa* of His essential-power and therefore only a partial aspect of Him. Thus the Ultimate Reality is devoid of homogeneous-difference. (Jīva Goswāmī: *The Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 56)

The illusory universe full of miseries is an unconscious principle and therefore just contradictory to the consciousness or *cit* which constitutes the very essence of the Ultimate Reality. Therefore, it appears that there exists a heterogeneous-difference between the two. But this is not so. Be-

cause the deluding potency (*Māyā*) being one of the powers of the Ultimate Reality is dependent upon it. This universe is nothing but the transformation of the *Māyā-potency*. Thus *Māyā* and the universe are not the self-existing entities and hence not different from the Ultimate Reality. So we cannot account for the heterogeneous-difference also. (ibid., p. 56) In order to further emphasize this fact Jīva Goswāmī gives other reasons also. Just as the Naiyāyikas designate the non-existence of light as the 'darkness', in the same way, this can also be asserted that what is called unconscious (*jada*) or is experienced as misery arises from the non-existence of the powers known as consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*). Thus '*jada*' is the negation or non-existence of '*cit*' and '*duḥkha*' that of '*ānanda*'. From this it follows that '*abhāva*' (negation) is the origin of '*jada*' and '*duḥkha*', and that '*jada*' and '*duḥkha*' are not existing entities (*bhāva-vastu*). If such a view is accepted, then of course, the heterogeneous-difference arises. Even to the Advaita Vedāntins, this kind of '*bheda*' would become indispensable. (ibid.) But we cannot account for the existence of all such things as '*jada*' and '*duḥkha*' because they consist of '*duḥkha*' and '*jada*' is no entity at all and so not different from the Ultimate Reality. If '*abhāva*' itself could be regarded as a separate entity, then only there would have been some scope for this difference; but such a view is not tenable and not acceptable even to the Advaita Vādins.

The Ultimate Reality is devoid of '*svagata-bheda*' or internal-difference also. As we have seen that the basis of this difference is '*upādāna-bheda*', so only that thing which contains a number of *upādānas* can have the internal difference. The Supreme Being is not subject to this difference because His essence consists of pure consciousness or pure bliss. There is noth-

ing in Him except pure consciousness or bliss. But Śruti speaks of the innumerable manifestations of the Supreme Reality and on the authority of the same one has to accept the internal-difference in the Absolute. This statement obviously contradicts the view that the Ultimate Reality is devoid of all distinctions. In order to obviate this contradiction Jīva Goswāmī has quoted two *Vedānta-sūtras* which establish the essential unity of the Ultimate Reality inspite of the apparent plurality in It. Although the Lord manifests Himself in different forms, yet He does not forsake His essential Unity. He is one among many. (III. i. 12) Text from the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* also points towards the same conclusion. (XI. xix. 17)

In the conclusion it may be argued that when gold is transformed in the form of an ear-ring, it appears as if the gold and the ear-ring are two different entities but no other material being inter-mixed with gold, the ear-ring also in its true nature is but gold only. There is no internal-difference as such. Thus the Ultimate Reality has no difference whether—homogeneous, heterogeneous or internal.

ULTIMATE REALITY OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

According to those also who hold a purely monistic view, the Ultimate-Reality is absolutely differenceless. The Advaitins belonging to the School of Śaṅkara, hold that the word *jñāna* is '*bhāva-sādhanā*'.

(1) *Jñāna* in the sense of *bhāva*.

In this context the word '*jñāna*' is derived from the root *jñā* 'to know' with the suffix '*lyut*' in the sense of *bhāva*. (*Pāṇini*, III. iii. 115) Only in this sense the word '*jñāna*' is included in the word '*advaya*' and thus being devoid of homogeneous, heterogeneous and internal differences, it is declared as infinite and real. In case the *bhāvasā-dhanatā* of the word '*jñāna*' is not accept-

ed and if the word is derived in one of the following senses, the '*advaya-jñāna-tattva*' becomes limited and defective.

(2) *Jñāna* in the sense of *Kāraka*

(Accusative).

The word '*jñāna*', derived from the root *jñā* 'to know' in the sense of *kāraka* (*karma*) with suffix '*lyut*', means the knowledge which is known by somebody. (*ibid.*, III. iii. 117) In this sense we have the knowable (*jñeya*) the knowledge (*jñāna*) and the instrument of knowledge (*jñāna-sādhanā*). This derivation makes the '*advaya-jñāna-tattva*' as the finite one.

(3) *Jñāna* in the sense of *Kartr*

(Nominative).

The word '*jñāna*' can also be derived by the root *jñā* to know in the sense of nominative with the suffix '*lyut*'. (*ibid.*, III. i. 34) Here the word '*jñāna*' is equivalent to *sādhanā* and means the knower. Thus the word '*jñāna*' being a nominative (*kartr*) becomes changeable. Hence the derivation in the sense of nominative is rejected due to the fact that the *advaya-jñāna-tattva* becomes changeable and consequently perishable.

(4) *Jñāna* in the sense of *Karāṇa*

(Instrumental).

The word '*jñāna*' can likewise be derived from the root *jñā* 'to know' with suffix '*lyut*' in the sense of *karāṇa* (instrumental) and thus meaning 'by which it is known'. (*ibid.*, III. iii. 117) This derivation is also a defective one because an instrument is always an inanimate object e.g. the mouth, by which edibles are eaten, is itself an inanimate one. On the other hand the Vaiṣṇava philosophy admits the *advaya-jñāna-tattva* as a conscious principle. Hence this derivation is also not acceptable.

In *siddhāntapakṣa* the word '*jñāna*' is derived in the sense of *bhāva* as stated above. According to this derivation there is no defect and all the fundamental notions

of Vaiṣṇava philosophy are distinctly reconciled.

Not only this but in order to establish the absolute unity of the Ultimate Reality, Śāṅkara holds that It is pure-consciousness devoid of any power whatsoever. He also refutes the view-point of those who say—that although the Ultimate Reality does not possess any power which is of the extraneous character, yet it is definitely endowed with the power which is identical with its essence. He argues—what is called essential-power (*svarūpa-śakti*), is it identical with the essence or is it different from it? If the essential power be accepted as different from the Ultimate Reality, it could not be regarded as 'essential' (*svarūpa*). The theory, that the Ultimate Reality has essential-power, is itself nullified. If it were its identical-essence it could not account for the Lord's form as consisting of six divine virtues, for His diverse manifestations and the like. Being identical with the essence, the power would also be pure-consciousness alone. Even if the '*vṛtti-bheda*' could account for the diversity of forms, the 'act of seeing' or 'thinking' (*īkṣāṇa*) would be utterly impossible.

Moreover, it is not possible to regard that power, which is inferred from beholding the effect (*kārya*) and without which no effect could be achieved, either as real (*tāttvika*) or unreal (*atāttvika*). Being incapable of being described in words, it is considered false, and therefore cannot be the identical essence of the Ultimate Reality. *Bhāga* and the like which are the essential attributes of the Lord according to the Vaiṣṇavas, are here regarded as mere elliptical expressions.

This is how Śāṅkara establishes the Ultimate Reality as unqualified and purely destitute of all the differences.

LORD'S POWER

But this absolutely monistic view-point is not acceptable to Jīva Goswāmī because ac-

ording to him the word '*advaya*' evidently connotes an Ultimate Reality which is possessed of an infinity of potencies which are identical with It. He gives the following arguments in support of his doctrine.

(1) Even if the Ultimate Reality which is pure-consciousness, could be regarded as '*bhāva-rūpa*', nevertheless, the essential power is inevitably to be accepted in order to account for the creation of universe and the like (*The Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 29)

(2) The very property of the entity can be considered as its power and no effect as such can be produced without it. The same power resides as essential-nature in all the causes whether material or efficient, because otherwise the existence of a particular entity in the act of producing a particular effect is simply futile. In '*vivartavāda*' also, in the cognition of silver for shell, we have to accept the existence of shell—which bears some similarity towards silver, as its substratum. Similarly in the present case we have to understand that Brahman alone and none else is the substratum of this universe. Hence is the essential power of the Lord. (ibid.)

(3) As to the doubt raised whether Brahman has to do something with the creation of this universe or not, it may be said that if Brahman has nothing to do with it, we have to assume that it is only the nescience which is responsible for world-creation and the like, and if it is so, it is no good accepting the independent and separate existence of Brahman because nescience will be all in all. But if Brahman is regarded as the real creator of the universe, the power of creating automatically comes to It. So the power of the Ultimate Reality has to be accepted. (ibid., p. 30)

What more, Śāṅkara himself writes that power is assumed in order to account for the particular effect of some particular cause. If we regard power as different from the cause and effect or as non-existent like

the effect, it cannot determine any effect because in that case the power also will become non-existent. From this it follows that power is identical with the cause and effect is identical with power. (*Vedānta-Sūtras*, II. i. 18, Śaṅkarasārīrakabhāṣya)

(4) The etymology itself of the word Brahman implies the existence of power and its qualified nature, because the word is derived as 'one who is great and has got the power of making others also great'. (*The Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 54)

(5) Non-recognition of power will lead to a fault in the state of *Kaivalya*. *Kaivalya* is simply the state of ecstatic and infinite bliss. In this state of *Kaivalya* or final beatitude self-consciousness is not felt and therefore the sense-organs due to the absence of other excitants (*udbodhaka*) are not the cause of any knowledge whatsoever; and so they are called unconscious material objects. The same unconsciousness will occur in the state of final beatitude (*kaivalya*) if the existence of power is not recognized. Also the negation of self-consciousness or everything else will lead to mere void, (*śūnya*) which again will lead to the disinclination of everyone towards the attainment of *puruṣārtha*. In order to avoid all these difficulties and discrepancies, the essential power of the Lord has to be admitted. (*ibid.*, p. 32)

(6) Nor can it be maintained that it is superfluous to accept a separate power because of the fact that the Ultimate Reality is self-luminous. Self-luminosity itself implies the existence of some power. That of which it is self-luminous may be regarded as its power. (*ibid.*)

VIŚEṢA OF RAMĀNUJA AND ŚAKTI OF JĪVA GOSWĀMĪ

Rāmānuja states that *Nirviśeṣa-vādin*s cannot give any proof with regard to any matter because all sources of knowledge always depend on something qualified

(*saviśeṣa*) (*Śribhāṣya, Vedānta-Sūtras*, I. i. 12). No means of knowledge can be proved if the *Nirviśeṣa-vāda* is accepted, because according to them 'prameya' or 'the thing to be known' is perishable and regarding Brahman as 'prameya' means that It is also perishable, which is absolutely untenable. (Jīva Goswāmī: *The Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 33)

Nor can it be said that Brahman is an object of experience because in that case also Brahman becomes something qualified produced by the self-experience which is a doctrine purely opposed to that of the Advaita-vādins themselves.

Thus according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Rāmānuja philosophy Brahman is qualified.

Thus the concept of 'Viśeṣa' of Rāmānuja is identical with Jīva Goswāmī's concept of 'Śakti'. The powers of the Lord being thus established it has been asserted that they are very spontaneous in Him. Just as heat is a natural attribute of fire, so is the power of the Ultimate Reality. (Jīva Goswāmī: *The Bhāgavat Sandarbha*, p. 64) But the powers of the Lord, are not destroyed by any thing in any way. (*ibid.*, p. 65) The power of the Lord is not adventitious in Him, like the heat of the water which it acquires on account of its contact with fire. (*ibid.*, p. 65)

It is this fact of the spontaneity of the power which refutes the view that the powers are ascribed to Brahman due to nescience. (*The Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 60) We cannot think of the existence of nescience in Brahman whose essence consists of pure-consciousness. Nescience cannot exist independent of any substratum. As in the instance of silver and shell, the ignorance takes resort to shell. Shell is the asylum of false cognition (*ibid.*, p. 60)

Rāmānuja also holds the same view regarding the spontaneous and inconceivable nature of the power of the Lord. He says that nescience cannot be dependent upon

Brahman who is pure-knowledge, because it is nescience. For instance, there is the erroneous-cognition of silver in shell, because this cognition resides in the knowing subject. Such cannot be the case with Brahman because It does not have any cognizer. (*Śrībhāṣya, Vedānta-Sūtras*, I. i. 1) For these reasons all the means of knowledge tend to prove only the powers of the Lord. Brahman being a transcendental Entity, the existence of power is very natural in It. (Jīva Goswāmī: *The Sarvasamvādinī*, p. 61) Thus the word 'advaya' is said to imply that the Absolute Reality is the self-existent Entity devoid of all differences but qualified by a number of transcendental virtues, and is always rejoicing in the midst of Its own potencies unneeded of anything else.

BRAHMA, PARAMATMA AND BHAGAVAN

This 'advaya-tattva' is called by three different names as Brahma, Paramātmā and Bhagavān. (*Śrīmad Bhāgavata Mahāpurāṇa*, II. i. 11) Basically all the three principles are one and the same but appearing differently to the *sādhakas* on account of the difference in their capacity of realizations. (Jīva Goswāmī: *The Bhāgavata Sandarbha*, p. 47) In the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* itself at many other places the Ultimate Reality is exhibited as Brahma and the like but nowhere is it designated as *jīva* obviously because the *jīva* has no separate existence apart from the Paramātmāpuruṣa. Although these principles are, very often used to indicate any one of the three principles and as a matter of fact there is no special line of demarcation among these three still the different designations are given to them in order to emphasize a particular aspect of the Ultimate Reality at a particular place. (ibid., p. 47)

Of these Brahma is not here the Supreme Reality of the Upaniṣads. It is here the unqualified and undifferentiated state of the Ultimate Reality whose real nature consists in pure-indivisible-bliss.

Paramātmā is the direct cause of the creation and the like. It is on account of the inducement from the Paramātmā Puruṣa that the ingredients (*tattvas*) like individual soul and the matter are engaged in their respective activities. (ibid., p. 58)

The same Reality on account of the diversity of Its essential power possesses a particular form and becomes the root asylum of the rest of the powers viz. *jīva-potency* and *Māyā-potency*. In this state it receives the designation Bhagavān. In this form of the Ultimate Reality is recognized a real distinction between the power and its possessor. This blissful form of the Reality is revealed to the devotees by the constant practice of devotion. (ibid., p. 50)

On a close scrutiny of the above principles, it appears that the difference is mainly due to the proportion of the display of divine energy in them. They are three different states of one indivisible Ultimate Reality, so designated on account of the difference in qualities and on account of the difference in the experiences of the worshippers. (ibid., p. 454)

To sum up these concepts: Brahma signifies the state of pure consciousness (*kevala-jñāna*) and is absolutely unqualified. The partial manifestation of Bhagavān is called Paramātmā and is the inner-ruler of all and is endowed with *Māyā* as well as *jīva-potencies* of the Lord. Bhagavān is omnipotent and the most perfect form of the Ultimate Reality.

Thus the Absolute Reality or the Supreme object of men's pursuit, designated as 'advaya-jñāna-tattva' in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, is identical with the concept of Bhagavān of the followers of Caitanya School, and it is represented in the form of Śrī Kṛṣṇa or rather more appropriately in the most charming dual form of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa.

A CRITICAL NOTE ON SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

DR. G. SRINIVASAN

Jean-Paul Sartre is to be classed among those philosophers who being dissatisfied with the traditional systems of metaphysics have attempted to reconstruct Philosophy on a new foundation. Kant and Dewey are the two other important philosophers who seem to have made a similar attempt before Sartre. But Sartre's reconstruction fundamentally differs from that of Kant and Dewey. Kant's refutation of metaphysics results in his equation of Philosophy with morphology of knowledge which in other words is an analysis of the conditions and limitations of human knowledge about phenomena. Similarly Dewey's repudiation of metaphysics reduces his philosophy mainly to an analysis of the social problems and ways of solving them. But Sartre's non-acceptance of metaphysics has resulted in his identification of Philosophy with Ontology which means for him a descriptive analysis of the constitutive conditions of human existence.

The two ontological conditions of human existence which Sartre describes in great detail are the being-for-itself (*pour-soi*) and the being-in-itself (*en-soi*). Sartre's being-for-itself is consciousness. Consciousness is consciousness of itself and is also consciousness of something other than itself. What is other than consciousness exists in itself. It is the being-in-itself.

The being-for-itself (consciousness) is not a 'soul' or transcendent reality. It has no independent existence or positive content in itself but depends on the being-in-itself for its content and existence. Its dependence on the being-in-itself is two-fold: firstly, being a pure 'possibility' it can exist only by projecting and realizing itself in the being-in-itself, and secondly,

being a pure 'separation' it can exist only by distinguishing itself from its own projective identification with the being-in-itself. Thus, both as a 'possibility' and as a 'separation' it is dependent on the being-in-itself (*en-soi*) and has no reality or existence apart from this dependence. Human personality is neither mere *pour-soi* nor mere *en-soi*, but the realization of the *pour-soi* in the *en-soi*, a *pour-soi-en-soi*, from which the *pour-soi* distinguishes itself and constitutes itself as 'separation'.

Since consciousness is always a 'separation' and a 'possibility', it can never find itself on the being-in-itself securely or permanently; the being-in-itself slips away sooner or later, and gets rejected as the 'past'. Hence arises the temporality of human existence beyond which consciousness has no reality or existence. Since consciousness has no existence beyond the temporal human existence in the world, it has no liberation from the world; its liberation is only from the present states of the world, which it has realized, towards the future states of the world which it has yet to realize. The present world is brought into existence by its projective identification with the being-in-itself and it distinguishes itself from its present identification with the being-in-itself so as to constitute itself a 'separation' and a 'possibility' for further modes of realization. The future states of the world, thus, coincide with the future possibilities of consciousness and the basic truth of the historicity of human existence in the world is the identification of consciousness with being-in-itself and 'separation' therefrom.

Sartre's non-admission of the existence of the 'soul' or transcendent spiritual substance seems to be mainly due to his pre-

supposition that the existence of the 'soul' implies the presence of a pre-determined transcendent ethical goal which would contradict human 'freedom'. But it is difficult to see how the admission of the 'soul' is incompatible with human 'freedom'. The admission of the 'soul' as a metaphysical reality only implies the 'possibility' of a transcendent ethical goal, and this 'possibility' does not deny or contradict the other 'possibility' of man's 'free involvement' in the world. Man's choice would then be between 'release' and 'bondage', between a transcendent existence and an empirical existence, and his freedom consists in the exercise of this choice. The admission of the 'soul' and the 'possibility' of attaining a transcendent state of existence do not in any way deny or reduce man's responsibility and freedom in the matter of choosing his goal—either transcendent or empirical—but all the more affirm it since what he is going to be entirely rests on what he strives to be. Sartre's non-admission of the 'soul' hence seems to be more a matter of his anti-metaphysical presupposition than a logical necessity in his system. With the non-admission of the 'soul' and the possibility of a transcendent ethical goal, Sartre reduces human consciousness to a state of perpetual tension. There is no liberation for human consciousness from the tension and self-division caused by its own two-fold activity of identification with the being-in-itself and 'separation' therefrom. To say that this must be so and not otherwise, and that man should not aspire for a transcendent state of existence does not answer his spiritual longing for transcendence but renders it meaningless and useless. This seems to be the logical conclusion of Sartre's non-admission of the soul and a transcendent ethical goal.

While Sartre thus deprives human consciousness of any positive content and re-

duces it to mere 'separation', 'possibility' and 'nothingness', his conception of being-in-itself is poorer still. The being-in-itself is not active and hence cannot evolve itself into the world of objects. It has no purpose in it, and hence the world of objects and events which appear on its surface are basically meaningless and purposeless. It does not include in itself any principle of self-differentiation, and hence the different objects of the world are only the 'structural determinations' brought about by the nihilizing activity of consciousness. The being-in-itself is thus only an inert, homogeneous, opaque mass, 'unintelligible' and 'absurd' in itself. The universe made of such stuff would be basically purposeless despite its appearance to the contrary.

Sartre does not provide an adequate ground for inter-subjective communication in his ontology. The nature of the two ontological principles as described by him renders it an insoluble problem. Consciousness is by itself only a pure 'separation', a 'possibility', a 'nothingness' which has no inherent positive property in common with any other consciousness. Each consciousness is strictly a particular which cannot be generalized. The being-in-itself, on the other hand, is opaque and 'absurd' and can hardly provide an intelligible 'medium' for inter-subjective communication. The evidence which Sartre gives for the existence of the other consciousness is mainly based on the affective or emotional grounds; I know that the other person exists, not when I look at him, but when I am looked at by him, and caught especially in a shameful act. But this argument seems to presuppose the existence of the other consciousness rather than prove it. Sartre's system thus seems to be on the verge of solipsism, because of his conception of consciousness as a principle of 'separation' or 'nothingness',

and his conception of the being-in-itself as inert, homogeneous and 'absurd'.

Sartre is an atheist and he believes that the conception of God is not only superfluous but self-contradictory when conceived to be the impossible union of the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself. This union is the ideal of man and man in pursuit of this ideal is a useless passion. The main reason for Sartre's non-admission of God is however the contradiction he sees

between man's dependence on God and his freedom. But the contradiction between dependence and freedom seems to be more verbal than real. It is, in fact, possible to conceive of man's dependence on God as the very basis of his freedom. In proportion to man's realization of dependence on God, he will be able to overcome the self-imposed artificial and material limitations so as to be able to exercise his freedom fully.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IN THIS NUMBER

Dr. Ralph W. G. Wyckoff, is the Professor of Physics and Bacteriology at the University of Arizona U.S.A. He received his Bachelor of Science degree at Hobart College in 1916 and a Ph.D. in Chemistry from Cornell in 1919. His honorary degrees include M.D., Masaryk University (Czechoslovakia) 1947; Sc.D., Strasbourg 1952. He was Associate Member in charge of the subdivision of biophysics of the Rockefeller Institute from 1927 to 1938; Associate Director of Research of the Lederle Laboratories from 1938 to 1942; Lecturer, University of Michigan from 1943 to 1945; Senior Scientist, Scientist Director and Biophysicist at the National Institutes of Health, U.S. Public Health Service from 1945 to 1959, with two years as Science Attaché at the American Embassy, London (1952-1954). He was Research Associate at the California Institute of Technology from 1921 to 1922 and a Director of Research in the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique of France from 1958 to 1962; he is an editor of *Biochimica et Biophysica Acta*, of *Experimental Cell Research* and of the

Journal of Ultrastructure Research. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a Member of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a Foreign Member of the Royal Society (London) and of the Royal Netherlands Academy, *Corr spondant* of the *Acad mie des Sciences (Paris)*, Honorary Member of the Royal Microscopical Society, of the French Society of Mineralogy and Crystallography, of the French Society for Microbiology, of the Indian Academy, and is a Medalist of the Pasteur Institute. His research interests have been in the structure of crystals, in the effects of radiation on cells, in the development of the ultra-centrifuge, in the purification of viruses and macromolecules, in electron microscopy and applied electron optics, in the physics of soft x-rays and in the application of these and other physical techniques to problems of the microstructure of hard tissues, both fossil and modern. His scientific publications include 19 books and about 350 technical papers, of which 85 deal with crystallography, 30 with other phases of pure physics and the rest with various aspects of biophysical research. Besides

the above, Dr. Wyckoff is devoted to the message of Sri Ramakrishna and the Ramakrishna Movement. We are deeply grateful to him for his present article 'The Place of Science in Culture' that he has so kindly given to us for publication in *Prabuddha Bharata*.

In the article 'The Great Illusion' Prof. M. K. Venkatarama Iyer M.A., formerly Head of the Department of Philosophy, Annamalai University penetrates into the root of the Illusion of Many around us from the point of view of Advaita Vedānta.

Swami Nirvedananda of Vasistha Guha, Rishikesh presents in his article a short life sketch of Pavhari Baba, the great saint

with whom Swami Vivekananda came into intimate contact during the latter's wandering days.

(Miss) Devkanya Arya, M.A., Ph.D. of Delhi makes an analytical study on 'The Absolute' according to Jīva Goswāmī. The article forms part of Dr. Arya's thesis which was approved by the University of Delhi for the award of the Ph.D. Degree in 1965.

G. Srinivasan, M.A., Ph.D., is the Reader in the Post-Graduate Department of Philosophy, University of Mysore. We are thankful to Dr. Srinivasan for his present short but learned article 'A Critical Note on Sartre's Ontology'.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

THOUGHTS OF A SHAKTA-YOGISANANDA-NATHA. COMPILED BY SRI M. P. PANDIT. Ganesh & Co., (Madras), Private Ltd., Madras-7. Price Rs. 2.

This is in the manner of answers, arranged subject-wise, to questions put by a śākta to a śākta, whose descent is traced in the short biography appended, to the famous Maharashtra Tāntrika 'Amritanandanatha of Śākta tradition', who had established *Trikūṭālayanātha paddhati* of worship in the Sri Ramanatha Temple at Rameswaram. The answers are illuminating and cover a vast range of subjects such as śakti, creation, *mudrās*, *guru*, *devatā*, *upāsana*, *anusthāna*, *mantra-sādhanā*, *cikitsā*, *kaula* and *vāma-mārgas*, etc., besides a

glossary, in effect, of yogic terms, all in the light of Tāntrika interpretation. Corresponding to the precepts of Vedānta, we have here the sheaths of *ghrāṇa*, *śabda*, *tvaka* etc., all encircling the nucleus of *jīvātman*, in concentric circles one after the other in succession. Some important yogic *mudrās* like *lelihāna*, *kāla-saṅkarṣiṇī*, *vyomeśvarī* etc. have been referred to, but it cannot be said whether they correspond to some of the ones of *Śiva-Saṅhitā* and *Devī-Māhātmya*, for their manipulation is not given. These 'Thoughts' may indeed be useful to a śākta. As is usual with the publishers, this book has an attractive get-up.

SRI P. SAMA RAO

NEWS AND REPORTS

VIVEKANANDA VEDANTA SOCIETY, CHICAGO
DEDICATION OF NEW TEMPLE AND SYMPOSIUM OF
RELIGIONS

As announced earlier, through the invitation card and the bulletin for the month of September 1966, the new Temple of the Vivekananda Vedanta Society of Chicago, 5423 South Hyde Park Blvd., Chicago, Illinois 60615, was dedicated on Wednes-

day, September 7th in the presence of seven other Swamis of the order, and a large congregation. Swami Satprakashananda of St. Louis, Swami Pavitrananda of the Vedanta Society of New York, Swami Vividishananda of the Ramakrishna Vedanta Centre, Seattle, Washington, Swami Sarvagatananda of the Ramakrishna Vedanta Society of Boston, Swami Shraddhananda of the Vedanta Society of Northern California (San Francisco), Swami

Vandananda and Swami Shastrananda of the Vedanta Society of Southern California, Hollywood, arrived a day or two earlier than the day of dedication. Their presence created an atmosphere of festivity and holiness. The new house was nicely renovated and painted to bear the appearance of a new building. The work was going on for almost two months, and with the help of contractors and *brahmacārins* and devotees of the Centre, who were working almost around the clock so that the work could be completed in time. The new Chapel accommodates comfortably 130 people. It has a beautiful platform and pedestal on which a bronze relief of Sri Ramakrishna has been installed. The statue was made by Mr. Herman Garfield, one of the best artists of Chicago, and bears the likeness of the original picture of Sri Ramakrishna. On the second floor of the new Temple a Shrine Room has been fixed with four thrones made of Rosewood, beautifully carved, and sent from India just a couple of days prior to the dedication.

On the day of dedication, early in the morning at 5-30 A.M., the visiting Swamis and some of the local devotees, as well as devotees who had arrived in Chicago from other Centres, assembled in the Chapel. Swami Bhashyananda, the Head of the Vivekananda Vedanta Society of Chicago, performed the morning vesper service. This service was followed by peace chants from the Upaniṣads, and hymns in praise of Brahman, Sri Ramakrishna, the Holy Mother and Swamiji. This was followed by meditation. The whole morning service created a deep spiritual atmosphere in the Chapel. The regular worship began at 8.30 A.M. Swami Shraddhananda of the Vedanta Society of Northern California, performed the worship. He was assisted by Swami Vandananda of Hollywood Centre and the *brahmacārins* of the Chicago Centre. Swami Satprakashananda, the Head of the Vedanta Society of St. Louis, read the *Candī*. His reading created a very serious and holy atmosphere throughout the whole morning worship. The *pūjā* was over at 11.00 A.M., and it was followed by a *homa* service. It was for the first time that *homa* was performed in Chicago. The devotees were thrilled to see this worship. Most of them had not seen the *homa* in their lifetime. The morning worship ended with an offering of cooked food specially prepared by Swami Sarvagatananda and *ārati* to Sri Ramakrishna. The morning worship was witnessed by over 50 devotees. The devotees were then served with lunch consisting of offered food. Thus, the first part of the service came to an end at 1.30 P.M.

In the evening at 6.30 P.M. the devotees and the invited guests began to pour in for the reception. An accommodation for 200 people was made for this function. It was found out that by 7.00 P.M., the whole of the Chapel was filled as well as the *foyer*. All the Swamis, headed by Swami Bhashyananda, formed a procession from the second floor to the Chapel on the first floor. They came to the platform and took their seats at the right side of the Chapel. Swami Bhashyananda conducted the proceedings of the evening reception. The whole atmosphere of the Chapel was surcharged with deep feelings of spiritual inspiration and devotion. The proceedings began with the opening chant, by the Swami, in Sanskrit, followed by its English rendering. He made a short introduction, giving the background of the occasion, and thanked all those who helped him in this project. He then introduced, one by one, the guest Swamis who had come for this special function, and requested them to speak a few words to the congregation. The Swamis made very inspiring speeches and elevated the atmosphere already created by the worship in the morning. Swami Bhashyananda then concluded the service, and the congregation and the guests were thanked by Mr. Miller, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Society. The whole congregation was then ushered to the outside *patio* for buffet. The devotees of the Centre, headed by Mrs. Miller, had arranged a very grand buffet dinner. Over 200 devotees and guests enjoyed these refreshments. The day's function came an end at 10.30 P.M.

As a part of the dedication, a symposium of religions was arranged on Sunday, September 11th, to commemorate the 73rd anniversary of the Parliament of Religions, held in Chicago in 1893. There were six speakers representing Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Unitarianism. The proceedings began at 7.00 P.M., with an invocation by Swami Bhashyananda who presided over the function. He introduced the speakers and referred to that memorable event 73 years back, when the great Swami Vivekananda of India spoke at the Parliament of Religions, and made his unique contribution to the world religions by striking a note of harmony and understanding among the faiths of the world. The speakers on that evening kept up the tradition by voicing a similar note of harmony and peace and mutual respect for Prophets and Faiths of the world. Swami Bhashyananda then concluded the proceedings, quoting significant passages from the speeches of Swami Vivekananda during the Parliament. Over 100 men and women attended the symposium.