

Vol XI

EXPLORING INDIA AND THE
PROCESS OF SUBORDINATION AND
CONTROL OF ITS RULERS

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A- INDIAN FOREBODINGS

1. ALI WARDI KHAN TO HIS GRANDSON

British Museum: 1434 k 18, India Tracts; G.Z. Holwell. Letter from Holwell to Court of Directors E.I.Co: 48
paras: pages 180-221, dated 30.11.1756

November 11, 1756

18. And here I hope it will not be deemed impertinent, if I recite, verbatim, the last discourse and counsel which Mahabut Jung gave his grandson, a few days before his death; and which I had from very good authority at Muradabad, after my releasement.

"My life has been a life of war and stratagem; for what have I fought, for what have my counsels tended, but to secure you, my son, a quiet succession to my Subadary ? My fears for you have for many days robbed me of sleep. I perceived who had power to give you trouble after I am gone hence. Nessein Cooley Cawn, by his reputation, wisdom, courage, and affection to Shaw Amet Jung, and his house, I feared would obstruct your (193) government. His power is no more. Monichund Dewan, whose counsels might have been your dangerous enemy, I have taken into favour. Keep in view the power the European nations have in the country. This fear I would also have freed you from, if God had lengthened my days. The work, my son, must now be yours; their wars and politics in the Telinga country should keep you waking. On pretense of private contests between their kings, they have seized and divided the country of the King, and the goods of his people between them: think not to weaken all these together. The power of the English is great; they have lately conquered Angria, and possessed themselves of his country; reduce them first; the others will give you little trouble, when you have reduced them. Suffer them not, my son, to have fortifications or soldiers; if you do the country is not yours."

19. How consistent the Suba has been in his adherence to this last counsel of his grandfather, we have woefully felt, but that we were not solely the objects of his resentment and designs, is evident; his perwanah to the French was dispatched the same day with ours; when he marched against us, he sent parwanahs to the French and Dutch, with orders to provide, and join him with ships, men and ammunition, to attack us by water, whilst he attacked us by land; they refused; in consequence of their refusal, he invested their several forts and factories, and demanded an exorbitant sum from each. The French were glad to accommodate matters for the payment of three lakh and half of Rupees; the Dutch for four lakh and half, after having had, for a day and half, a body of the Suba's troops in their settlement, waiting orders to attack it, and a man stationed with an axe in his hands, to cut down the flag-staff and colours

2. HYDER'S CALL AGAINST BRITISH

(British Museum: T 686 (5))

TRANSLATION OF HYDER ALLY CAWN'S REMONSTRANCE TO THE PRINCES, NABOBS, RAJAHS, AND ALL THE NATIVES OF INDIA

The English nation, on account of their former good faith, humanity, and justice, were suffered to reside in different parts of this continent, and permitted to carry on trade, commerce, and merchandize; also to protect the same, they have been allowed to establish factories, and erect towns and fortifications on our coasts; and have at different times been invited to assist the weaker powers of India in war, and to preserve the balance among the Emperors, Potentates, and Nabobs in those extended dominions; and while the great leaders remained tolerably moderate in their views, and kept their plighted faith with any degree of honour, no grounds of jealousy, sufficient to alarm our country, appeared.

But our generosity in permitting all this to foreigners, and loading each man of rank home with rich presents, as a mark of our esteem, has lately drawn out persons of a very different cast; who have construed those acts of bounty, into timorous fear, and have attempted, in consequence, to exact, by threats and menaces and force, the wealth of individuals; many thousands of whom they have imprisoned, murdered and reduced to beggary, by means that would disgrace the most savage barbarians in Arabia. Till at length the great men and leaders in Bengal, whose thirst for gold all the wealth of that country could not satisfy, formed a scheme, and attempted to put it in execution, for plundering the whole country of Hindostan; and for that purpose they have marched troops quite across to rob the rich diamond countries, and then, by forming a chain of posts, to them in all the country, and render every power tributary; while their fleets and armies ravaged our sea coasts; and to complete this execrable plan, some of the most infamous of our natives are kept in pay by them, to commit every act of violence, cruelty, and oppression, and to extort money from individuals, till their leaders, by their great wealth, have rendered themselves justly dreaded by any single prince or power.

But besides these men, others of a more infamous cast have lately arrived at Bengal, who affect the solemn gravity of old age sinking into eternity. Their heads, as my Vakeel informs me, are covered with a vast quantity of grey hair, taken from the horse, or some other animal; they wear long robes, ornamented with the skin of mongoos, or some thing like it; and are at times placed on high seats, covered with black, and ornamented with gold; and are called sometimes Lords, sometimes Judges, which ever name they can get the most money by; and to all appearance, are of a different nation from the English. These men assume powers far superior to Princes and Emperors; they demand a large sum of money today, and if that is given to them, they repeat their demands for a much larger sum tomorrow; they send their servant for a larger sum the next day; and when they have stripped a man of his whole substance, and he cannot satisfy their voracious demands any further, he is then dragged from his family by force, carried many hundred miles to Calcutta, and there shut up for life in an old house, among the meanest wretches: or has a rope put about his neck, and there swung in the air till he is dead, and his wives and children are left to starve and perish. These hateful men have committed innumerable robberies and murders, by the help of their servants, who wear long black robes, and retain in their pay the most wicked and notorious of our countrymen, to single out the wealthiest inhabitants of India; and we have lately found them attempting to put the Rajahs and

Princes of the country to death, and all this by talking with their servants in a language we do not understand. Their thirst for gold and diamonds is so great, that they have even robbed the East-India Company of immense sums, and ruined numbers of Englishmen; they are now attempting to hire forces to spread death and desolation over great part of this land, and to raise themselves, on our ruins, to imperial dignities; and if any individual attempt to resist their force, his destruction is the inevitable consequence. If we do not, my fellow countrymen, unite our interests, and drive away those infamous invaders of rights and properties, we have nothing to expect but one by one to fall victims to their avarice and ambition. If we join our forces and interests, our numbers are so infinitely superior to any the British nation can bring into the field to support those cursed men, that they will soon be necessitated to fly into the salt waters. The difficulties that we can throw into their way, by cutting off all provisions and supplies, will soon put all their fortifications into our hands, without the risk of storming them; and you may be assured that the differences among themselves have so much oppressed the lower class of the British subjects, that we may have any number of them we please, to assist in fighting our battles. The divisions among them here are great; their wars with France, Spain, and their own friends in America, will prevent England from sending any large armaments to the assistance of those wicked oppressors; and the quarrels and animosities of every settlement in India have lately extended to such a height, that they have poisoned their leading men, and murdered their governor for the same(?) of sharing our gold; they have not only plundered the defenceless natives, but they rob and butcher each other, and have stripped their very masters of all their wealth, and are ready to seize on their possessions. The immense sums of money and diamonds that have been collected throughout this continent, for a few years past, by these men called Lords, and the several governors and their servants, as presents for the King of England, I am well assured have never come to his hands, but are intended to be employed against us and the East-India Company, to bring all under the subjection of those avaricious men, who set no bounds to their ambition. But in such a state of confusion and disorder, what have we to fear from a number so trifling, when compared to ours? If we are united together, we can destroy them or drive them on the board their ships at pleasure. If we are divided among ourselves, my fellow countrymen, these wicked men will swallow us up one after another. Let us therefore resist this torrent of foreign outrage, while we have it in our power. As to their allies, they are too insignificant to deserve notice; they have by their own villainy, outwitted themselves; they have plotted and executed schemes of the most atrocious nature, and have been encouraged in their wickedness by those Lords and great men, till they have completed the measures of their villainy, and then have been obliged to bribe those very men that countenanced them with their substance, to screen them from the range and resentment of the public. And there is not an officer or soldier in the service of any of their allies, that is ready to mutiny for want of pay, and to quit their service, and to enter into any other person's employment that will pay them regularly. As to their ships, though they may do us some damage on the sea coast, yet that damage cannot exceed the distance of cannon shot, and they will soon leave our coasts, when the sources of their darling gold, and their provisions are cut off. And as to recruiting their army from Europe, the distance is too great to do it with any effect. In short, my countrymen, the millions we have at command, if we are determined to use our united strength, are sufficient to confine them at once within the walls of their forts and either make them submit to our terms, or drive them into the sea, as we please, Let us therefore not hesitate a moment, not give those monsters in human form an opportunity to stir up dissensions among us. Let us pledge our honours, all that is sacred to warriors, to drive away for ever those common enemies, robbers, and disturbers of mankind, and set an example worthy of men and princes. I with pleasure will take the lead in this undertaking, and neither spare labour nor expense till it is fully accomplished. What can I say more ?

B. BRITISH VIEWS AND POLICIES

3. MAJOR MACKENZIE'S JOURNAL OF HIS TRAVELS IN THE EAST INDIA'S 1764

National Library of Scotland : MS 1337

On the 30th day of March 1761, we set sail from England on board the Plassey Indiaman, being ordered on his Majesty's service to Madrass; and on June 30th came to an anchor at the small island of Masambique, a Portuguese settlement on the East Coast of Africa situated in 15 D.S.L.

MASAMBIQUE

This island is about three miles in circumference, extremely barren. The Portuguese are supplied with the necessaries of life from the continent, which by their accounts is almost as poor as the island, and if we might judge from the entertainments they made for us, we had no reason to doubt their veracity. However, it abounds with limes, plantains, coconuts, pine-apples, oranges and other tropical fruits. Here I saw a few small cows and goats and a few small sheep of reddish colour, without any wool, I saw no horses and was told they had none in that country. The town is small and makes a mean appearance; it is defended by a paltry fort built on a point towards the sea and commands the entrance into the harbour. There are two small churches and one Convent. On our landing, we were conducted to the Governor, who received us very politely, but we understood very little of what each other said, because our interpreter was bad. His Excellency was of a good stature, agreeable aspect and genteel deportment.

He is respected with all the formalities of a crowned head even to the bending of the knee. He is not allowed to marry while Governor and (60V) to continue six years only in his office.

Our audience was short and after common compliments we went to view the town with thousands of slaves at our heels which the merchants buy up in the country and send to the Brazils.

We had not gone far, when we were accosted by a man, who spoke English very well. He told us he had been in our India Company's Service, kindly invited us to his house (which we made our home during our stay) and served us usefully in quality of interpreter.

This day being the Feast of St. Peter, and the Governor's birth-day, we were in the evening invited to a masquerade. Before the masques began to dance, we were entertained with a few songs in praise of the Governor. The words might be good, but the music was wretched. The number of masques did not exceed fifty, and no ladies amongst them, some few men dressed in women's apparel performed the office of the ladies. I asked our interpreter if they had any in the settlement. He told me they had, but that his countrymen being naturally jealous did not choose to produce their ladies in public assemblies, even though there should be no stranger in the place. The diversions of the night were closed with a supper consisting chiefly of trigacies and preserves. They had prepared for us a joint of sorry beef and a poor lean pig; great dainties and undoubtedly imagined we would think ourselves feasted, but to their great astonishment, the beef and pig were suffered to be carried off unmolested. However, if we did not eat, our entertainers eat for us, a ham and cheese presented by the Captain of our ship, was greedily devoured, particularly by the priests, who used their teeth and played their glasses, as if they were resolved to make up

for their days fast; but unhappily for them, they drank too freely, of beer and porter, which sent them down stairs tumbling over each other. (61R)

The climate is reckoned unhealthy and tho' we were here in the dead of winter. We thought the heat intolerable. Their whole trade consists in slaves, elephants teeth, and a little gold dust; they have no manufactures of any sort.

VISIGAPATNAM

After a week's stay we departed from this place and in a month arrived off Madras, but not being able to get in, steered for Visigapatnam, an English settlement, five degrees to the Northward of Madras, and dependent on it. We got to this place the 4th of August. Here I did not go ashore, being indisposed, but the officers who did assured me it was a very pretty place.

The inhabitants here and on the other parts of the Coromandel Coast, have a very curious kind of vessel called a Catamaran, which is nothing else than three or four logs of wood fastened together at each end with a rope, on this they kneel, their heels supporting their posteriors, and with a paddle in their hands, navigate their little bark with surprising dexterity and that too in the most tempestuous weather, when no boat of whatever size dare venture to sea.

I saw a sailor cut the ropes of a Catamaran in a frolick and presently the whole vessel was dismembered, however, the amphibious owners leaped into the sea and soon repaired her.

CALCUTTA

The Governor of this place would not receive his majesty's troops, so we were obliged to go for Bengal and on the 16th of August came to an anchor in the famous River Ganges having lost but one soldier since we left England. Soon after we were disembarked and sent up the river about 100 miles to Calcutta, the Company's settlement situated on the banks of the river, which even here is almost a mile in breadth. The town is large, irregular (61V) and populous, lying in 23 D.N.L. The houses are built very spacious, with flat roofs, a great many windows and doors for the benefit of air and are generally well contrived and make a handsome appearance. This settlement carries on a very extensive trade with the other parts of India, and the many private fortunes acquired here, is a convincing proof of its immense riches.

The climate of Bengal, is perhaps as bad as any in the universe, and remarkably fatal to our countrymen. It abounds so much with standing waters and the Earth is so much impregnated with salt-petre, that when the sun rarifies the water the air becomes absolutely putrid and this occasion the frequency of agues and putrid fevers. In the winter season, mists and fogs are very frequent in the evenings and mornings, which are very cold, yet the day is very hot. The whole country has a disagreeable aspect, so low that not a mole hill is to be seen, full of woods and thickets the haunt of tygers. The produce of Bengal, is wheat, rice and tropical fruits. Their beef when some time stall-fed, is good, the kid and mutton excellent, cabbage, pease, beans and other vegetables are good and in abundance during the months of November, December, January and February. Their poultry though plenty, is very dear and they have no fish, except what their river and ponds produce which are very bad.

It is a common observation that the English gentlemen finding unexpectedly this country to produce what is common to them in England, are too apt to indulge their appetites, so that it is become a saying they live like Englishmen, and die like Rotten Sheep.

Of eighty four rank and file, which our Company consisted off (62R); on our arrival, we had but thirty four remaining in three months. A convincing proof how fatal this climate is to Europeans. The most adult and robust, are most particularly unhealthy.

The inhabitants of Bengal wear turbans on their heads and a piece of cotton cloth rolled round their loins, all the rest of the body is naked, the better sort wear a habit like a night gown.

They are divided into a great number of tribes or casts. I mean the Gentoos, who are the original possessors of the country, the moors, (whose religion is mahomedan) are intruders only.

SATI

The Gentoos though Pagans, yet have a confused idea of one Supreme being and a future state; many of them adopt the opinions of Pythagoras. They are gentle, harmless and inoffensive people adhering strictly to their own ancient customs and manners, notwithstanding the moors, who conquered them, are almost as numerous as themselves. Simple indeed in their diet, but not so in their tempers, being greatly addicted to over-reaching and they think it meritorious to impose on a White man. They are slender in their persons and very agreeably featured. A very barbarous custom prevails among them, quite inconsistent with their character, and that is, they burn the living wives, with their deceased husbands.

When the husband is laid upon the pile, his wife must stretch herself on his body and her oldest son, or nearest male relation sets the first torch to it. Several instances of this happened while I was at Calcutta. If the woman declines or absolutely refuses to comply with this custom, they won't compel but excommunicate her, their tribe or cast (622v) after which life becomes indeed a burden, so that the poor unhappy woman is forced to choose either to be burnt or to starve.

But this custom is observed by the better sort, only, it prevails most among the Banyans, who are commonly, merchants.

I have often discoursed with the Banyans on this subject and they told me, as it was an injunction of their Bramanees or priests, from time immemorial, they thought themselves obliged to follow the example of their fathers in this, as well as every thing else.

ALLOWING THE SICK TO DIE

If the sick is thought past recovery (I mean among the common sort) they carry him to the river, and after stopping his nose, mouth and ears with meed, they commit him as yet living to the stream.

I have seen numbers floating at a time. They pay divine honours to this river. The Gentoos manner of taking an oath before a Court of Judicature is odd enough.

HINDU OATH TAKING

I once attended at a General Court martial when several of these people who had taken up the deserter were brought in, to give their evidence, with a Bramanee attending them, who administered out of a silver cup of spoon full a certain herb and water, which having swallowed, they wished, it might prove their poison, if they did not tell the truth.

Should any European enter their houses, they imagine them to be then polluted, neither will they eat or drink any thing that has been touched by Europeans or even moors, whom they hate and not without reason, for they are a lazy haughty people, oppressing without mercy where they have any power (63R).

The trade of Bengal, consists chiefly in Salt-Petre, muslins and silk handkerchieves, they export likewise a great quantity of rice.

MADRAS

After a stay of five months, we left this Golgotha, and arrived at Madras in February 1762 with the miserable remains of our Company and diseases sticking to us, from which the change of climate and skill of doctors, freed a few of us though not in a short time.

Madras or Fort St. George lies on the Coast of Coromandal and situated in 13 D.N.L., a pretty compact well built town and extremely well fortified. The trade of this place is not so flourishing as that of Bengal, but the climate much preferable. The sea breezes cooling the air and the adjacent country is not incumbered with woods and low shrubs, nor have they any standing waters, yet it too has its diseases, which are chiefly fluxes, and an inflammation in the liver, but in general it is healthy. In the months of May, June, July, August and September, the land or hot winds blow very strong and are very troublesome.

MANNERS AND CONDUCT OF EUROPEANS

This country produces very little wheat and rice, and except their fish, provisions and general are neither so good nor plenty as in Bengal. The country in general is ill peopled and ill cultivated. The inhabitants differ very little from those of Bengal, they seem to be the same sort of people. We had the pleasure of the Nabob's (63V) company here for a few months lately and he did us the honour to come and see us returned. His complexion is olive and person graceful. He has little or no retinue except Rabble of the common blacks may be called so. His Begam or Queen received the ladies of the settlement, but no gentleman was allowed to see her. It is the custom of the moors to lock up their wives from the sight of all mankind. Her majesty is ill favoured and awkward. She was greatly at a loss how to receive her visitors, however, she was polite enough to dismiss them all with presents. I must here observe, that the settlement of Calcutta and Madras, are abominably addicted to scandal. A great many young women, generally, material makers, milliners, etc. come annually to this country in quest of husbands and are amazingly successful, in so much, that one would be apt to think the gentlemen marry here for such a dowry as is some when mentioned in Plautcis.

What these ladies have formerly been is very conspicuous in their behaviour, which is an awkward attempt, to appear what they never were. This and the distant voyage, these bold adventurers make, who seldome have any relations or friends or even acquaintances in the

country, and who come upon the strength of recommendation only, naturally creates suspicions, which break out into scandal.

The people of these settlements live in astonishing luxury but notwithstanding, have very little politeness among them. One seldom meets with a father and son, two brothers, uncle (64R) or nephew or even cousins in one settlement, and as they have no ties of blood to cement their friendships, no wonder we find them so selfish. Every man's fortune seems to depend on the death, ruin or removal of another.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL GOVERNMENT OF ENGLISH SETTLEMENTS.

Having now given a description of the country, the customs and manners of the inhabitants I proceed next to give some account of the civil and political Government of these settlements.

COURTS OF JUSTICE

The different settlements belonging to the Hon'ble India Company, Bombay, Bengal, Madras or Fort St. George, and lately Fort Marlborough on the Coast of Sumatra are independent of each other. These have many subordinate settlements and are governed by a President and Council. This President and Council are constituted by their Charter Justices of Peace, and any five of them the Governor being one, can hold quarter sessions and courts of record in nature of courts of Oyer and Terminer for trying criminal offenders (High Treason excepted) and from their decision there is no appeal.

These settlements have likewise a corporation, of very extensive privileges, and of this body no counselor can be a member. They are indulged with a common seal for the business and affairs of their corporation, which they may break or change at pleasure. This body constitutes what they call the Mayors Court and from it any party that thinks himself aggrieved may appeal to the King in Council but not to any Court of Justice in England, but such appeal does not suspended the execution of their sentence. (64V) When any dispute arises between the India natives within the limits of the settlements they are allowed to decide it among themselves or submit it to the decision of this Court, but no one native can sue another at this Court unless they mutually agree to submit to its determination, and the party aggrieved may appeal to the King in Council, provided the value of the property exceeds 1000 Pagodas or 400 sterling. The English subjects are likewise restricted to this and any suit may be appealed first to the Governor and Council if the party chooses it.

They likewise have a Court of Requests not to consist of more than twenty Commissioners, or fewer than eight for the more speedy and easy method of recovering small debts.

By their Charter the Mayors Court is empowered that when any person shall happen to die, and by his will have appointed his Executors to grant under their seal, a probate of the will, upon proof made, of due execution of said will, whereby the persons so named executors shall have full power and authority to act as such, and when any person happens to die intestate and not having appointed executors, they are empowered to grant letters of administration. This prevents the property of the individuals who happen to die at so great a distance from their friends, from being embezzled a mischief unavoidable in so distant a country.

ACQUIRING OF RICHES

The political Government of the Company and the methods whereby they have acquired such immense riches, extended their territory and influence in India, seem to be but imperfectly known in England except to those who have the direction of their affairs (65R) and even from their knowledge many things are suppressed.

We need not wonder at this when we consider that all transactions in this country are either misrepresented, superficially related or plausibly accounted for, and afterwards undergo a scrutiny at the India House, so that the public is informed of no more than the Hon'ble Company chooses to make known.

RISE OF ENGLISH POWER IN CARNATICK 1758-9

We may date the rise of their greatness from the time the French were obliged to raise the siege of Madras, which happened on the 17th day of February 1759.

From this period they have been advancing with long strides to their present power; and their territory may for its extent be very properly termed the British Empire in the East. For the right understanding what follows, it is necessary to promise that the cause of the late war between the two Company's of France and England was the dispute who should succeed to the late Nabob, his own son, Mahomed Ali Cawn or Chunda Saib; a Grandee of the country.

The latter by dint of money got the French to espouse his interest and the first applied to the English, who undertook his cause.

This fate being now inseparable from theirs, he saw himself in a very short time stript of all his dominions and besieged with his allies in their capital town of Madras, where he remained a little while, and was then conveyed by sea to Negapatnam, a Dutch settlement from where he got to Trichinopoly in which there was an English garrison. Here he patiently waited the fate of Madras. The French were no sooner obliged to raise the siege, than the English, now reinforced emerged from their misfortunes, and were once more in a condition to cope with their (65V) enemies in the field. The successful progress of their arms is related at large in the history of the wars in India lately published and therefore unnecessary to give any account off here.

For this war, though undertaken on his behalf (and other political reasons by the by) Mahomed Ali Cawn, could nor for some time contribute any support. The Company were obliged to carry it on at their own expense, but they amply indemnified themselves afterwards as we shall see in the sequel.

As they proceeded in their conquests, they took the precaution to garrison every town with their own troops, so that when the French were cooped up in Pondichery, they were in actual possession of the greater part of the Carnatick. It may not be improper here to observe, before we proceed that in the Letter Patent, granted by his late Majesty to the Hon'ble Company, they were permitted to cede, restore, or dispose of such fortresses, districts or territories only, as they may have conquered from any Princes or powers in the country, but not of any possessed by known. As this is most particularly expressed in the Letter Patent, we shall give a quotation of that clause:

"And further we have of our like especial grace certain knowledge and mere motion, given and granted and by these presents, for us, our heirs and successors, do give and grant unto the said Company of Merchants of England, trading to the East Indies, that they shall and may by any Treaty or Treaties of peace made or to be made between them or any of their officers, servants or agents employed on their behalf and any of the Indian Princes or Governments to cede, dispose off (66R) or restore any fortresses, districts or territories acquired by conquest from any of the said Indian Princes or Governments or which shall be acquired in time coming, provided always, that the said Company shall not have any power or authority whatsoever to cede, restore, or dispose off any settlements, fortresses, districts or territories acquired from any European Power without the special licence and approbation of us, our heirs and successors."

The fortresses and towns which they reduced was in fact a conquest from the French whose troops composed the Garrisons and whose flag was displayed on them all and as we have never heard the Company have made any application to his Majesty for his royal permission either to restore them to the Nabob or keep possession themselves of those places (as they still do) it is plain they have exceeded their Patents and slighted his Majesty's authority.

A NOMINAL NABOB OF CARNATIC

Mahomed Ali Cawn now without a competitor, was universally acknowledged Nabob. He could not help however looking on himself as little better than a nominal one, while all his cities were in the possession of his England allies, and himself without an Army.

ENGLISH RETURN WITH NABOB

It never was the intention of the Council at Madras to deliver up to him his lawful inheritance. The French inflamed with ambition, conquered his country and the English after expelling the French kept possession of it, under pretence they had conquered it from the French. To force them to surrender it, was impossible. He could not attempt to raise any troops for want of money and to call any neighbouring Potentante to his assistance, would be exposing his country to all the miseries of war, and even supposing him to be successful with such help his new (66V) allies would very likely prove as bad, if not worse, than the old, for in these despatch countries convenience and interest supersede all other considerations. Our Nabob, therefore seeing himself destitute of men and money and without any resource quietly submitted to the English yoke. In this deplorable condition, he continued one year, and might have done to this day, but for a fortunate accident, which raised him in some degree from this low state.

The major part of the Council at Madras were for keeping possession and levying the revenue of his country not only to indemnify them for the expenses of the war but as their property by right of conquest. The President (Mr.Pigot) and one of the Council (Mr.Andrews) proposed however (because it was agreeable to their private views) that the Nabob should be permitted to collect the revenues of his country.

This occasioned a violent contest and after much debate, it was agreed to, that the Nabob should have leave to levy the rents of his dominions, provided that he would consent to indemnify them for the expenses of the war and the damage Madras had sustained during the siege. But still their troops were to keep possession of all the towns and fortresses in which they were then distributed. They term this in their records, a restoring of his country. The Nabob having consented to these conditions, they immediately like true merchants

opened an account in their books, in which they charged him with all their expenses, commencing in the year 1749 at which time his father died and the war broke out.

It was in vain for him to dispute the price of their services, and the first year 1761, he paid 53 lacks of rupees which is equal to (67R) £ 412,500 in the year 1763 24 lacks or £ 350,000. Besides this, in December this year he ceded a district to them, the revenues of which amount to 370,000 Pagodas or £ 148,000 annually. In all, he paid them one million four hundred and twenty thousand pounds sterling in the space of three years and if we value the district he ceded to them, at thirty years purchase it will amount to four millions, four hundred and forty thousand pounds more. An astonishing sum when we consider that their army never exceeded three thousand Europeans and eight thousand seapoys and of that number 2000 were his Majesty's troops. Yet this sum diminished his debt very little, and what is still more surprising this country which he yielded to them was not received as payment of any part of this debt. It is their maxim to find a fresh article of charge, as fast as an old one is paid off, so that the Nabobs debt in a great measure resembles our national debt in England never to have an end.

The Constitution of the country favours them very much in these practices. When the Nabob was permitted to collect his own revenues, he parcelled out his dominions to so many renters or farmers general, now it is usual with these people as they grow rich to aim at independency. Many of them it is true reside in or near those forts garrisoned by the Company's troops; but those who are remote and have no forces to over awe them, are very apt to rebel; and when it happens, so, (which awe it frequently does) the Nabob, having too small a force of his own, is obliged to apply to the Governor and Council at Madras for their assistance to reduce them; for which they charge him at pleasure.

Loyalty and allegiance are terms unknown in India; the Government being despotic and the change of their princes so frequent occasions, that any grandee amongst them, that is able to maintain it may raise an army with facility. Of this an instance lately happened, and as I served the campaign, some account of it may not be improper to insert here.

USOUFF CAWN

One Usouff Cawn or Consail, a person who has made a considerable figure in the troubles on the coast of Coromandel, was, as is supposed a native of the Nellore country, one of the northern provinces of the Carnatick; of mean birth, and had been employed early in life in some menial services at Pondichery, but being of an aspiring genius, took to the profession of arms, and in February 1752 was entertained at Madras by Captain (now Lord) Clive as a Subadar and sent with a company of seapoys, and a large detachment of Europeans under General Lawrence, to Trichinopoly. During the years of 1752, 1753 and 1754 and 1755, he saw almost constant service in the field, and by his very gallant behaviour and superior judgement to the rest of his country men in military matters, raised his reputation so high that he was nominated Commandant of all the Company's seapoys, and at the recommendation of General Lawrence, had a gold medal given him as a distinguished reward for his abilities and good conduct.(68R)

In 1756 Usouff Cawn was sent with a thousand seapoys and a Company of Coffers¹ from Trichinopoly into the Madurah and Tennevelly country to assist Mauphus Cawn, the

¹ Blacks from Africa

Nabob's brother, to reduce some rebellious Poligars², who were in arms against him. But before his arrival Mauphus Cawn's troops gained victory over the Poligars; after which he entertained a design of usurping the command of Madura, and made some attempts by force to oblige Usouff Cawn to return to Trichinopoly. To prevent the bad effects of Mauphus Cawn's design Colonel Caillaud who commanded at Trichinopoly marched with a body of Europeans, some seapoys and two guns by the way of Marawas country and joined Usouff Cawn who had maintained himself in the Tennevelly. About the middle of March 1757 the united force proceeded to Madurah where Mauphus Cawn had a strong garrison. The reduction of this place was attempted, first by an escalade, without success, afterwards a battery was erected and a breach made, which was assaulted, but the assailants were repulsed. The place was afterwards surrendered by the Commander of the garrison upon condition that rupees 170,000 or ~~2~~1,250 should be paid them for arrears. This sum Usouff Cawn who was to be left in the country undertook to see paid. Colonel Caillaud then departed from Madurah to Trichinopoly leaving Usouff Cawn Governor of that place, and his artillery behind him. Some time after this, the French undertook the seige of Madras and as Colonel (68V) Caillaud and Major Preston had still kept the field with flying parties, Usouff Cawn's assistance with what force he could bring was thought necessary and he came accordingly with 1500 or 2000 seapoys. He continued in this service till the French were driven from most of their conquests and cooped up within the limits of Pondichery, then returned with seapoys to Madurah in the end of the year 1760 being appointed Governor in form, by the Nabob (much against his inclination) at the recommendation of Mr. Pigot, President at Madras (for which Usouff Cawn afterwards proved very grateful). But by an unaccountable oversight no European troops were sent along with him to take possession of the city. Usouff Cawn quickly took the advantage of this and as he formed the country at very easy rate, soon became opulent and powerful. A body of seapoys, who had served the Company during the war, were, after the fall of Pondicherry, reduced to the number of 3000, he took into his service.

This gave cause of suspicion to the Nabob, to whom Usouff Cawn had always been obnoxious, but he pretended, that without he was allowed such a force, it would be impossible for him to keep people under his government in obedience, or collect the revenues, as the neighbouring Polygars and Collieries were very turbulent. The Nabob however continued very jealous of him, and though he frequently expressed his apprehension to the Council, yet no notice was taken of what he said. He insisted however on an increase of his revenues, and this Usouff (69R) Cawn complied with for a short time. Meanwhile he applied himself with assiduity to fortifying the city of Madura, and some other places in the neighbourhood, purchased from the Dutch who had settlements on the Coast near him, ammunitions and stores of all sorts, as he did likewise horses which he mounted with his best men.

Having now a good force, he marched into the Tennevelly country a part of his government, against a Polygar Chief who refused to submit, but he quickly reduced him. The capital of this country called Palem Cotty; a place well situated by nature, he fortified at great expense as he did several lesser forts. His ambition now increased with his good fortune, and upon some slight pretence he invaded the King of Travancore's country, which extends from the borders of Tennevelly to the Malabar coast, but meeting with a warm reception quickly returned again. He afterwards by his bounty and liberality allured into his service a number of French soldiers, who had escaped from Pondichery and taken shelter in

² A People who inhabit the woody parts of the country and pay an annual tribute to the Nabob.

different parts along the Coast, some among the Dutch at Negapatam, and some among the Danes at their settlement of Trinquebar.

These were mostly of Hussars and artillery men; the first he mounted and appointed after their own manner. Some French officers that had broke their parole, assisted him in fortifying his city and learning his troops the use of their arms. Seeing himself now at the head of a considerable force and his city in a good state of defence, he resolved (69R) to shake off his dependance on the Nabob. By this time his reputation became so high that the Nabob took the alarm and insisted on a second increase of his revenues, which Usouff Cawn refusing to comply with he complained to the Council at Madras, and demanded their assistance to reduce this rebel. They began now to think, that Usouff Cawn was growing too powerful and therefore granted the Nabob's request.

Accordingly an expedition against him was set on foot, under command of our Colonel the Hon'ble Mr. Monson.

On the 15th day of June 1763, our regiment embarked at Madras (to save the men the fatigue of marching in so hot a season as much as possible) and landed at Fort St. Davids the 25th.

From whence we marched to Trichinopoly distant from Madras 250 miles and upwards and got there the 17th of July.

The day before we arrived, Major Preston who commanded the Company's troops assembled at Trichinopoly for this expedition, consisting of three Companys of Europeans, one Coffre Company, a troop of Hussars and two battalions of seapoys with some guns had been sent on, towards Madura, to clear the roads and establish magazines. On the 2nd of August the regiment followed with the two troops of horse, two battalions of seapoys and some field pieces; the heavy cannon had been sent on a few days before, escorted by a battalion of seapoys.

We had marched but two days when we entered the Tondemans country, an independent Poligar in alliance with the Nabob.

This country is extremely woody and barren, and altogether wild as imagination can form it. We were obliged to cut and enlarge (70R) the roads through these woods for our artillery to pass, we had marched four days before we came to any village, some few deserted huts scattered along the skirts of the road, was all the sign of inhabitants we could see. We usually encamped on some small open spot, near to a tank or pool of water, which indeed was extremely bad. The fourth day we arrived at a village called Perrou, wherein there was a Pagoda. Here we had a magazine of rice and an officer with some companys of seapoys was left to take care of it.

On the 7th, we proceeded on our march through a country not so well affected as Tondemans, but equally barbarous, called the Nelocotta country. As there was reason to apprehend some attack might be made by the enemy so convenient for ambuscades, through which no army had ever marched, our Colonel thought proper to make dispositions against the worst; and his order of march was much admired by the oldest officers.

His extraordinary care and indefatigable industry in keeping his camp well supplied with provisions, examining strictly into every department under his direction and in preserving the different petty Poligar chiefs, steady to their engagements reflect a great deal of merit on his conduct, but he suffered much in his health, through fatigue and anxiety of mind. We continued our march without meeting the least interruption and arrived the 14th at a place Trevidour; a Pagoda with a square wall and a small Bastion at each corner. On the outside of this wall there was a hedge of thorns, plaited together so as to make it an excellent defence; large stakes were driven into the ground at convenient distances and the thorns wove between them. Here the enemy had a large garrison. A few days before we arrived, Major Preston with his party had besieged it, but the enemy (70V) thought proper to retire in the night. He did not however gain his point without a considerable loss, for as he was reconnoitring the fort with three companies of seapoys and 20 Hussars, the enemy had posted several hundred horse and seapoys behind a high bank, directly in the Major's way. As soon as he perceived them, he commanded the seapoys to advance to the bank, which would serve them as a breast work, and fire regularly by platoons, assuring them he would sustain them with his Hussars. He sent to camp for a reinforcement and pointed out to them the enemy's numbers, fired their pieces confusedly in the air, which the enemy's horse took immediate advantage off, charged in amongst them, broke them, and cut to pieces and wounded 150.

The Major with the twenty Hussars however made good his retreat and even conducted a considerable number of the fugitives who had rallied to camp. After halting here four or five days, we marched on, and joined Major Preston now within fifteen miles of Madura. Our whole united force amounted to 1000 Europeans, horse foot and artillery included, and 5000 seapoys. We had likewise a great number of Colliers, of whom I must take some notice before I proceed, as they are a wild savage people, and their customs so widely different from the other Indians. They inhabit the woods and mountains that make the pass called Natam, which is a shorter way from Trichinopoly to Madurah, than that we took; and the extent of this pass is computed upwards of 90 miles. They live by plunder and rapine, and when they meet but a few travellers together, they never fail to attack and murder them; if they see a considerable body, they are shy and timorous (71R) and keep close in their woods.

They are ghastly, meagre and truly barbarous in their aspect, wearing no turbans as the other Indians do, and they allow their nails to grow as long as they can; they roll dirty clout round their temples and loins and their weapon is pike. As oft as they kill a man, they roll some black feathers round the pike that has done the deed and he is esteemed a great warrior that has most feathers. They are very fond of their women and if a traveller loaded with gold and jewels can procure even an old woman to be his conductor, they will not only not molest him, but entertain him hospitably. Their princes are elective and it is not the son succeeds the father, but the grandson by a daughter. No right at all is allowed to the grand children of the male branch and if the father should die without female issue, they proceed to elect a prince, and totally exclude the male children of the deceased. If any two of them happen to quarrel and that they are married they are obliged by their customs to retire to their respective homes and put to death a male child if they have any, if not a female; this done they meet again, embrace and become friends.

If one of the parties should not comply and do as his neighbour has done, then the party injured applies to their Chief who orders him that refused to give the customary satisfaction to be put to death in the most cruel manner. But to return.

Soon after our junction with Major Preston, he was detached to attack a small fort of the enemy's called Terrembour, seven miles distant from Madura, with two European companys, one Coffre Company and three battalions of seapoys. The night of his arrival before this place, we heard in our camp, but three miles distance, a very small firing which continued five and thirty minutes without (71V) the least interruption. Soon after, the Grenadier Company of the 96th Regiment (to which I belonged) were ordered to march and join Major Preston with all expedition taking with us two field pieces and three companys of seapoys; about an hour after our departure, we arrived in the near of Major Preston's post, when our seapoys, who were in front, observing some black horse and foot, scattered along the skirts of the road, which here was woody, and mistaking them for the enemy, threw away their fire in the most disorderly and precipitate manner imaginable. This obliged us to stand and form. But not perceiving anymore of our supposed enemies, we began to think of our mistake, when Major Preston's party taking us for real enemies that had got round their rear, turned a field piece loaded with grape and fired at us, but happily it did no execution.

We then joined, and upon inquiry, found the long firing we had heard in camp, was an attack made by the Major on the enemy who lined a very fine high bank about two hundred yards in front of their fort, from which he had drove them with the loss of two men only. This bank served to cover all our men, and erect a battery on it across a small plain, from one side of the wood to the other. We besieged this place, which is of the very same construction with Trivandour, four days, and notwithstanding we had completely surrounded it, the enemy found means to get away in the night. We halted here to refresh ourselves for six or seven days, and to give time to our heavy artillery to join us, consisting of nine 18 and 24 Pounders.

On the 1st of September we again marched and the second day received orders to form the line of battle as soon as we came to (72R) the bed of the river Vigo, which runs close to Madura. At this time it was quite dry and the opposite bank very steep and bushy.

Here we laid our account with meeting the enemy, as they had every advantage of situation and could retreat too with safety.

We crossed however without molestation and encamped before the place. This city is very large and of a square form. The garrison consisted of 200 Europeans and 500 seapoys, plentifully stored with ammunition and provisions. The fortifications far exceeded report; the glacis was very good and the Esplanade very fine; nothing appearing to intercept the prospect, for two miles round about, a ditch near 80 feet wide, and deep surrounded the town, which had likewise several good bastions, though there were but few guns mounted.

Our force was by this time greatly diminished by sickness; the regiment consisting of nine Companys could muster only, 340 fit for duty, and two Company troops did not exceed 260, the artillery but 70, the two troops of horse and the troop of Hussars, 140 and lastly the pioneer company did not exceed 50. In all 860 Europeans, of which only 720 could do duty in the trenches. A force by no means equal to the undertaking. Our Colonel sensible of this applied for a reinforcement, but no regard was paid to his remonstrances, by General Lawrence to whom he applied as Commander in Chief. He determined however to besiege the place and to convince them at Madras, of their mistake.

On the 3rd of September he went to view the place, accompanied by all the European and black cavalry (which last were in the service of (72V) the Nabob) a battalion of seapoys, a picket of Europeans, and two field pieces. As he drew near the Fort, he perceived a large

body of the enemy's horse and resolved to attack them with his cavalry, his guns and infantry being unable to come up in time by reason of the badness of the ground. Unfortunately, our cavalry were terrified at the enemy's and to this the circumstance of being directly under the fire of the fort contributed very much. They did not observe that the enemy forbore to fire from the fort, for fear of hurting their own people, but giving way to their pannaick, after discharging their carbines, they turned, as if by consent to the right about, and galloped off; leaving their commandant, Captain Donald Campbell (a cool and intrepid officer) with a few resolute men to the mercy of the enemy. Colonel Monson was shocked and chagrined at this and did all that lay in his power to remedy the evil, but to no purpose. The fugitives once indeed did attempt to form again, but perceiving a few of the enemy in pursuit, betook themselves a second time to flight, and never halted till they came into camp, having lost 17 or 18 in the retreat and a subaltern officer. In the evening Captain Campbell was sent back by Usouff Cawn to whom he had been well known during the time, Usouff Cawn had served the Company. The joy occasioned by the return of an officer so universally esteemed, was a good deal damped (73R) when it was understood he was dangerously wounded. The enemy had surrounded him, and his few followers, but had not the courage to attack him till his horse dropped, then they fell upon him and cut him in seventeen different places and he likewise received a pistol shot in the belly. However, by the great care and skill of his surgeon, he recovered in the space of one month. After this, we began to prepare materials for the carrying on our approaches and on the 15th opened our trenches under the inspection of Engineer Call famous for his Journal of the Siege of Madras, inserted, in the History of the wars in India lately published.

He carried on his works in front of the fort, by which means they were flanked by the bastions on the right and left, but happily the enemy's guns were both few and ill served, so that they did us no great mischief. Whether this was a judicious manner of attacking a fort or not, those skilled in such business are the best judges, but we found it both inconvenient and dangerous.

We continued our approaches to the very Ditch, but being in want of a sufficiency of materials for filling it up, as well as men and ammunition, we could not proceed, and therefore having spent seven weeks in this fruitless undertaking. During the campaign his Majesty's order for us to return to England, arrived, so we left the Company troops to finish the siege.

I have been since credibly informed that this expedition cost the Nabob two Lacks and a half of rupees a month, which is equal to $\text{£}1,250$, so that for the five months we continued upon it, must have cost him $\text{£}56,250$ sterling.

(73V) From the transactions on the Coast of Coromandel, let us take a view of those of Bengal, which will afford us no less insight, into the conduct and affairs of the Hon'ble Company.

In the year 1757, the then reigning Nabob Surajud Dowla was deposed by Col. Clive after some signal defeats, and his prime Minister Meer Jaffier Ali Cawn elevated to that high station, who put his predecessor to death, a state he greatly deserved, on account of his cruel and perfidious disposition Meer Jaffier as he owed his good fortune to the assistance of the Company, so he granted them all the terms they required of him, and was particularly grateful to Col. Clive.

He continued in peaceable possession of his throne, till the year 1760, when Mr. Van Sittart, a Counsellor of Madras, arrived to take upon the Government of Calcutta. This gentleman, had from his youth been trained up in the Company's service, and being naturally acute, politick and ambitious, soon became conspicuous in Council at Madras where he held a great sway.

He found soon after his arrival in Bengal, that Meer Jaffier was a weak old man, very remiss in his Government and entirely influenced by his creatures. Mr. Van Sittart, therefore, contrived (but some say it was his predecessor Governor (74R) Holwell) to depose him. Be that as it may, it is certain Mr. Van Sittart executed the scheme. For the purpose, he commenced an intrigue with one Cassim Ali Cawn, Prime Minister to the Nabob, and married to his daughter, a man full of Asiatick subtlety and ambition. This Cassim Ali was rich and as powerfull. Glad to find the English Governor, disposed to favour his views; he let him to understand, he would not prove less grateful, than his predecessors, and to show he was in earnest, gave him a Silam, or present of twenty lacks of rupees or $\text{£}250,000$ sterling, but as the consent of a majority in Council was necessary, a few lacks more were distributed among the Governor's friends.

Soon after followed the deposition of Meer Jaffier, whose palace was surrounded and the surrender of his person demanded before he knew there was any mischief intended.

He was carried prisoner to Calcutta where he had quarters allotted him and a pension to live on. So bold and so secret an enterprise filled every one with astonishment, and therefore that the affair might not be attended with immediate his reasons, for deposing Meer Jaffier and elevating Cassim Ali to the throne.

This performance though writ with the dexterity of a politician contains very few substantial reasons for so extraordinary a step. Among other things, he accuses Meer Jaffier of inability to govern and a cruelty of disposition; that he defrauded his army of their pay, that he made a practice of putting his subjects to (74) death for very trivial offences, and the word murder shines throughout the whole piece.

But we shall see in the sequel that this new Nabob of his own making; committed these murders much more frequently than the former, for, which he was never so much as reprehended by this Indian king maker. The most plausible reason of all that he alleges, against Meer Jaffier, is his carrying on a secret correspondence with the Dutch, but whether this be true or not, is doubtful at this day.

Cassim Ali Cawn now raised to the dignity of Nabob soon gave evident proofs of his abilities. He wisely considered that there might be about person men as ambitious of rule as himself, and upon a change of Government at Calcutta; there possibly might such revolution be contrived as now happened. He had seen Surajud Dowla deposed, Meer Jaffier raised and dethroned, and himself made Nabob, in the space of three years, and all these changes he well knew were brought about by the irresistible power of rupees. To secure himself therefore in his kingdom and prevent the bad effects of such machinations, he applied assiduously to the regulating his Government; raising and well forming a good army and securing the persons or cutting off, those whom he had reason to suspect of treasonable practices.

The late frequent changes of their princes, and the remissness of Government, had so vitiated the minds of the subjects that (75R) every man possessed of riches, aimed at

independency. Cassim Ali knew this and as they were very numerous determined to exert himself, many therefore were put to death according to the custom of the asiatick Governments.

In the former part of this Journal, it has been observed that Bengal, is a very populous extensive and rich country and till the rupture between Serajud Dowla and the English, enjoyed profound peace. This enabled the succeeding Nabob to comply with the exorbitant demands of the Company without getting into their debt or submitting to receive their troops into the principal towns (of which there are but few of any strength in the kingdom) as happened to the Nabob of the Carnatick.

Cassim Ali continued for the space of two years to proceed on his own plan without any interruption. At the end of which thinking himself strong enough to resist any attempt that might be made against him, he resolved to suppress some malpractices carried on in trade lost him what he had been so anxious to preserve.

The former Nabob had granted a licence to the Company's servants to trade in European goods through all his territories without paying any duty; but in process of time this licence they extended to the staple commodities of his country, such as tobacco, beetle and salt from which he drew the best part of his revenues.

This soon became such a grievance that many of his subjects complained they could not perform their engagements or pay him his revenues, while the English were permitted to undersell them in these commodities, which they were enabled to as they paid no duties.

The Nabob represented the case to the Governor and Council (75V) at Calcutta, and many warm disputes arose upon it. After some time spent in alternation, it was agreed that Mr. Van Sittart should make a journey to Murshedabad, the residence of the Nabob, but he returned without satisfying either party. And it was confidently reported he meant only to patch up matters, till he got an opportunity to go to England. The Company's servants at Calcutta were very unwilling to give up so profitable a commerce, and they thought it equal to a written licence, to have been permitted to carry it on so long without interruption.

The most sanguine amongst them (Mr. Ellis) who was Chief of the Factory at Patna, perceiving matters were drawing near a rupture, determined to be beforehand with the Nabob and accordingly in the issue of an Embassy sent to the Nabob in the person of Mr. Amyatt, or for any order from the Council, made disposition with 250 Europeans and 3000 seapoys, to surprise Patna the second city in the kingdom. He effected this, but permitting his people to fall to plunder the Commanding Officer, in the place for the Nabob, who had a little before retreated, meeting with a reinforcement returned and surprised Mr. Ellis, and cut off or made prisoners of all his troops, himself with many officers being taken.

This precipitate conduct of Mr. Ellis, gave the Nabob a very fair and just pretence to hold measures with the English no longer, and being enraged at their attempt on Patna, gave orders (though he never owned it) to sieze Mr. Amyatt and all his Company as they were returning to Calcutta.

Soon after he put them as well as Mr. Ellis and his party, to death, their number amounted in all to 68 officers and civilians. (76R)

The news of this disaster filled them with consternation at Calcutta. A Council was held to deliberate on what measures they should follow for their common preservation. They exclaimed against Mr. Van Sittart for being so indolent in observing the conduct of Cassim Ali, since he had been made Nabob, and for not compromising matters, when he made a visit to them for that purpose. They accused him of avarice and double dealing; that while he pretended to be indefatigable in his office for the good of the Company he was conniving at the Nabob's measures, and in short that he was no better than a pensioner and had been bribed to silence. Mr. Van Sittart retorted; that their obstinacy in not complying with the just and reasonable demands of the Nabob when he required them to pay duty on the staple commodities of his country, as well as his own subjects and the unwarrantable and hasty conduct of Mr. Ellis, had been the occasion of these misfortunes. That he was conscious to himself his behaviour all along was irreproachable which he hoped he would be at all times able to make appear.

There was a great deal of truth in the allegations on both sides, but never after this Mr. Van Sittart had little to say in Council.

They determined however to make vigorous efforts to oppose the Nabob's progress and accordingly applied to Major Adams, commanding Col. Coote's regiment, an officer of valour and conduct; and happy was it for them they had this regiment then in Bengal for their own troops were very few, I mean Europeans and very bad, destitute of all discipline, as they plainly proved in the engagement, under Mr. Ellis where they gave way and run, whilst the seapoys stood their ground and maintained an obstinate conflict against (76V) greater numbers. Major Adam's force, the regiment and Company's troops included amounted to 1000 Europeans 2500 seapoys and 10 pieces of cannon. I shall here again give an extract of a letter that I received from a Captain an extract and brief account of the Major's successful proceedings.

Dacca October 3, 1763

"Since my last to you of the 8th of March there has been a strange revolution in Bengal, our Nabob taken down, and the former Nabob (Meer Jaffier) put up. How all this came about would be tedious to mention at present, but I must acquaint you that affairs bore a bad aspect, about the first of July last when accounts arrived of the defeat of the Patna Party, consisting of 250 Europeans, 3000 seapoys, four guns and a Horvet. The day following the Board received accounts of this place being lost, as also Cassimbuzar Factory and a party of seapoys, Mr. Amyatt had with him, being attacked and defeated, himself and all the gentlemen sent to Mongeer to the Nabob.

"In this situation affairs stood, when Major Adams marched with the army consisting of 1000 rank and file Europeans 2500 seapoys and 10 guns. (77R)

"He met the enemy upon their march to Calcutta, attacked them; took all their guns and killed 1000, this happened 19 July. He pursued and attacked them again in their trenches near Murshedabad, the 22nd defeated them and took about 70 pieces of large and small cannon, they then moved about 20 Course or 80 miles up the river, where they met with a large reinforcement and waited for our army at a place called Sooty, the Major came up to them the 2nd of August in the morning, and attacked them with much resolution; they defended themselves with great firmness, for four hours all the time within the reach of

small arms and grape, they had 24 fine brass field pieces mounted and equipped in every respect as ours and well served with about 100 Europeans of the Patna factory party who they forced to work the guns by having peons with drawn swords ready to cut them down if they did not point them well, they had eight complete Battalions of seapoys in the field, as well armed and disciplined as ours, with 30,000 chosen horse. This formidable army was at last obliged to leave the field, after losing all their guns, ammunition and 3000 of their best troops. 200 boats they had with them to push for Calcutta in when they had beat our army, fell into our hands.

"You would think that after such a total overthrow as this, they would never face our army again, but they did not retire above 15 course or 60 miles further up the river then they met with a large reinforcement, of men, guns, and everything they wanted, which determined them to make another stand, but they thought, with more security, for they intrenched their camp so strong, that there seemed no possibility to come at them but by regular approaches (77v), which were accordingly begun and carried on from the 12th of August till the 5th of September when it was actually found that our guns could not make any impression upon the fresh muded banks they threw up. Upon which it was resolved to attack a hill upon their right that very night which was accordingly carried by the European and seapoy grenadiers of the army, supported by the pickets, and they by the whole. Here a terrible slaughter ensued, for after the Hill was carried, their own guns were turned on the enemy which made great havock.

"They had no possible means to escape but by one single bridge, which they had made over the Onnullah in the rear of their camp, and you may easily judge what time an army of near 50,000 men with as many attendants would take to cross one bridge.

"They lost 5000 men in this affair which has frightened them so much, I believe they never will look an European in the face again, and indeed I don't wonder at it, for the best troops in Europe would be disheartened at so many successive defeats.

"You may judge in some respect with what resolution these people fought and what our army have suffered by the number of officers killed since the beginning of it, which amounts in all to twenty one commissioned officers; just about a third of the whole Corps. There has been in all 300 pieces of artillery taken. Our army is now at Patna and I am pretty sure will have no more fighting this season".

(78R) Cassim Ali Cawn, now no longer able to keep the field, retired with his treasure and the scattered remains of his army to the kingdom of Oud, situated to the northward of Patna, some hundred miles, the suba of which place, afforded him protection, there he continues, waiting without doubt for a favourable opportunity, to be revenged.

The Council at Calcutta now masters of the whole kingdom disposed of it, to Meer Jaffier, whom they released from his confinement and raised once more to be Nabob. To this Mr. Van Sittart never gave consent. He is now waiting for an opportunity to return to England after having well nigh ruined the Company's affairs, first by deposing Meer Jaffier, from whose feeble government nothing was to be feared, on the contrary so much afraid of the English, that they might have extorted from him what they pleased without drawing a sword, secondly by overlooking or winking at the spirited measures of Cassim Ali, and thirdly by disagreeing with his Council, the consequence of all which would have been the expulsion of the English from Bengal, but that fortunately one of his Majesty's regiment

commanded by an expert officer, happened to be at Calcutta at the commencement of the late hostilities.

Before we conclude, it may not be improper to relate in what manner these gentlemen who have the management of the Company's affairs in India, acquire their Private fortunes, (78v) and likewise touch in general upon their characters.

We shall begin with the Governors, as they are first in rank and acquire the greatest fortunes. As soon as he enters on his office, all the great people of the country, from the Nabob downwards, either come in person or send their representatives with a silam, or present, which is an ancient custom used in India, to procure friendship or good will and when they have any favour to ask they first offer their Silams, and a refusal is deemed a very great affront.

These presents to the Governor generally amount to very large sums in so much that the Government of Madras has been known to be worth £10,000 the first day. But as the Governor is a good deal circumscribed by the Council, it is requisite that they should be silamed likewise, though in smaller sums.

The Company allows the Governor of Madras £3000 and the Governor of Calcutta £5000, per annum.

A moderate salary enough, when we consider how expensive living is in India. But the other servants of the Company have scarce any allowance at all. In Madras there is little or no trade, therefore we find the Council more obsequious to the Governor than they are in Bengal, where commerce flourishes, and where independence is sooner acquired.

Most fortunes are made at Madras by the interest of money which is very great; eight per cent is the lowest, and I have known it at 30 per cent frequently at 24 and 16. But the most lucrative business is that of Nabob making. When the French were expelled from the coast of Coromandel, and the Nabob intirely at the mercy of the President and Council of Madras, we have seen the Governor (79R) and a Counsellor espouse his interest and prevail with the majority to permit him to levy his own revenues; for which he proved very grateful to the Governor Mr. Pigot, who is now gone home with a fortune of £300,000 or thereabouts all which he got since the taking of Pondicherry in 1761, a space of three years only.

This gentleman was remarkable for his indolence and expensive living, and though he received with an open hand the gifts and liberality of the Nabob, yet he did not scruple at the same time to accept the silams of Usouff Cawn, the rebel of Madura.

Usouff Cawn, when besieged by our army, and desired to give up the place declared, the would not, because he had conquered the country and bought the city at the price of 170,000 rupees or £21250 sterling, which the gentlemen at Madras knew very well, these were the very words of his letter to our Commanding Officer. Now it is worthy observation that Mr. Pigot was extremely averse to the expedition against this man, but finding the Council (where his influence was declining fast) were not to be diverted from it, he acquiesced.

A few months after, he signified his intention to the Nabob, of going home who condescended to come and take farewell of him in Madras. But he met with a reception from Mr. Pigot he little expected, and I have heard it from very good authority, that, he very absurdly as well as ungratefully inveighed against the Nabob for coming to extremities with

Usouff Cawn. He confirmed the truth of the saying, one cannot serve two masters. As he had accepted the silams of Usouff Cawn and the Nabob too, he could not oblige the one without prejudice to the other; and he accordingly preferred the interests of the first, probably because his silams were more frequent. (79v)

We have seen the Governor of Bengal (Mr. Van Sittart) receive £250,000 for deposing one and setting up another Nabob, which and the other presents he received he has so well improved that he is now going home with a fortune computed to be upwards of £600,000, all this treasure he acquired from the month of September 1760 till the month of February 1764, a space of three years and four months.

It is said that power is often attended with pride and insolence, how justly the Company's servants in India confirm this observation, may be judged from the following anecdotes.

A gentleman whose name was Orme, one of the Council, in the year 1758 a little before the siege of Madras (where the Nabob was obliged to reside being stripped of all his country) went privately to wait upon the Nabob and taking him into the garden, told him that he hoped by the interest of his friends in England to be very soon appointed Governor, and that he might depend at all times on this friendship and services, but in the meantime requested the favour of 20,000 Pagodas or £8000. The Nabob a good deal surprised at his extraordinary assured him he was not then worth as much money in the world.

The Counsellor was not to be put off so and therefore insisted on a compliance with his demand threatening to use his utmost endeavour to hurt his interest both at the Board, and by writing against him to the Directors at home. The Nabob was weak enough to be terrified at his menaces, and actually offered him one half of his demands, protesting with tears, it was all he then had in his coffers. But the insatiable Counsellor thinking him (80R) insincere, refused to accept anything less than his first demand, which so enraged the Nabob, that he went immediately to Governor Pigot and with a flood of tears complained, Mr. Orme has used him worse than if he had been a coolie (a coolie is a person that, does the meanest offices for hire). Mr. Orme's behavior was so gross and unprecedented, that he was dismissed from the Council and sent home to England.

His Majesty's troops to whose services they owe their very existence have during the course of the late War, met with such treatment, from these Gentlemen as deserves particular notice. I shall therefore mention two only of a thousand instances.

In 1759 (Major Brereton), the Commanding Officer of Col. Drapers Regiment and at this time Commander in Chief of the army, had, while they lay at a place called Conjeveram, sent out a party to collect some cattle; a small part of the adjacent country was the property of the Company, which the Nabob had some time before ceded to them, and which they had let to a renter. The party that was sent out made no distinction however, of places, and accordingly carried off what cattle they could find to a considerable number, and brought them to Camp. A few days after Major Brereton was obliged to leave the army, on account of his health and go to Madras, the Command then devolved on the Hon'ble Major Manson (now Colonel) who was likewise obliged to follow Major Brereton in a few days, to confer with him on the state of affairs. In the meantime (80v) the inhabitants of this little district made grievous complaints to the renter that they had been plundered by order of the Commanding Officer, and that they could not be answerable for payment of their rents. Major Monson had just got the Command when this complaint was made, and the renter believing the order proceeded from him writ to the Council against him. Major Monson

happend to arrive at Madras as soon as the accusation, and meting with Mr. Van Sittart, then one of the Council, was asked by him, if he had given such an order. Major Monson assured him on his honour he knew nothing of the matter. The Major stayed three days only in Madras and then returned to camp, sent for this renter and asked, how he came to make such a complaint against him.

The renter replied, that as he had refused the silam or present he had offered him some time ago, he deemed him his enemy, and had on that account the more readily believed him to be the person who gave out that order. The Major provoked at this answer as well as with many complaints made to him of this fellow's cruelty to the poor people under his jurisdiction, told him that if even he complained against him again to the Governor and Council, or if even he received any more complaints of his oppression, he would first flog and then cut off his ears. The renter greatly offended at this, went down to Madras, and represented Major Monson's behaviour in the worst light to the Council, particularly to Mr. Van Sittart by whose interest he had been appointed renter.

Credit was given for a considerable time to this fellow's story, and many sharp letters passed between the Council and the Major, in which they made use of this remarkable expression, (81R) that they were the sovereigns of India, and if he presumed to maltreat any of their servants they would convince him. They even wrote to the Court of Directors against Major Monson, who believing their servants had been ill used, carried their resentment so far as to go to Mr. Pitt, and lay their complaint before him. The Minister not choosing to disoblige them, offered to recall Mr. Manson but they knowing by experience, how needfull for their interest such an officer was in India, did not choose to accept Mr. Pitt's most gracious offer.

Some time before this happened, Major Brereton had accepted a silam or present of money from this renter, but having disagreed soon after, about some supplies for the camp, Major Brereton sent for him to his tent, and the fellow being very insolent, the Major laid hold of the bag with this money and threw at his head bedding him get about his business.

The renter writ a letter of complaint immediately to his friend, Mr. Van Sittart, who without taking time to enquire into the affair, writes a very sharp and unbecoming letter to Major Breteton. When the Major asked him afterwards how he could believe such a fellow so implicitly, and write him in such scurrilous terms, all the answer Mr. Van Sittart made him, was, that the Major must always make a distinction between his public and private character.(81v)

Upon the fall of Pondicherry, a dispute arose between the Governor's Council at Madras and Colonel Coote, who commanded the Army.

The Colonel was for keeping possession of the place till His Majesty's pleasure should be known, and the Council were for destroying it immediately. To put an end to the matter, Governor Pigot came in person to Pondicherry and told Col. Coote, that if he would not deliver up the place, he would dismiss immediately from the Army all the servants of the camp in the Company's pay with-draw their troops, stop payment of the gratuity given by the Company to His Majesty's forces (this gratuity is an allowance to make up the difference between the pay of the Company's troops and His Majesty's) and bid him in a very peremptory manner; subsist his troops as he could for that he would give him no assistance

whatever. He even yielded to his passion so far, as to say they should starve before he would give them any relief.

A speech, of which the Colonel took no further notice than by complying with his demand.

Fort St. George 1st May 1764

4. NOTES ON THE NAWAB OF ARCOT AND THE CARNATIC 1710-1803

IOR; HOME MISC 285 C: PP 10 516; pp 2-8 (1710-63); pp 9-23 (to 1773:); pp 25-516(1773-1803).

The Nabob ought to hold his commission from Delhi, and if at his death a successor has not been previously appointed by the great Mogul, the Soubah of the Deccan has the right of naming a person to administer the Nabobship until the will of the sovereign is known. But a Nabob thus appointed by the Soubah is not deemed authentically established until he is confirmed from Delhi. The Nabobs are also dependent on the Soubah of the Deccan in many other points, but since the death of the emperor Aurengzeebe, and more particularly since the invasion of Hindostan by Thomas(?) Kouli Cawn, these regulations have been little attended to. (p.2) The first Nabob which it was thought necessary to notice in this memoir is Sadatulla, who having no issue, appointed Doast Ally (his brothers, eldest son) to succeed to the Nabobship. But the appointment was much disapproved of by Nizam ul Muluck, then Soubah of the Deccan.*

(p 6)...About this time Chunda Saheb was ransomed from the Marrattas by Monsieur Duplex . (p 7)... Chunda Saheb was then declared Nabob of the Carnatic, but Mahomed Ally (Wallajah) set up his pretensions in opposition to him. The French continued to support Chunda Saheb, who was at last blocked up in the pagoda of Seringham near Trichinopoly, by the powers in the interest (p 8) of Mahomed Ally, and having delivered himself into the hands of Manjee (general of the Tanjore forces) was put to death at the express desire of Mahomed Ally. After this the French set up his son Rajah Saheb, the English on the contrary supported the pretensions of Mahomed Ally...At the peace of Paris (1763) the French acknowledged the title of Mahomed Ally to the Nabobship of Arcot.

(p.12)Wallajah (Mahomed Ally) accompanied the British forces; he gave the assistance of his advice, and the influence of his office. But so little at that time (p 13) did the Company think of conquering for him that their own flag was hoisted in all the forts which surrendered to their arms. Afterwards as a favour to the Nabob and to procure him the respect of the people, the Carnatic flag was hoisted in the country's forts.

The office of Nabob was uninterruptedly continued to Mahomed Ally. The company procured for him the sanction of the Mogul's name, and a genuine commission for the Nabobship. The term Nabob denoted a dependance; and that dependence was transferred only from the (p 14) Nizam (Soubadar of the Deccan) in the first instance, and the Mogul in the second, to the company, who had acquired it (that dependence) by their arms, and preserved it by their protection.

The office of Nabob was military. The Mogul Government unwilling to trust the Nabobs with the revenue, established the office of Duan as distinct from the Nabobship. Mahommed Ally found it difficult to prevail upon the Madras Government to unite these offices for a time. And even then this grant was to be forfeited (p 15) if he should fail in his engagements. The reasons assigned for this indulgence was that the Madras Government was then inexperienced, and that the Nabob was better to be depended on than the renters (because the Nabob looked to the English for protection) and that the Nabob engaged to pay his kists monthly in the same manner as the renters would, which renters were to be liable to be displaced by the Company if they failed in their payments thro bad management or design; And that it would be proper to remove all the Nabob's managers, and take

possession again for the Company, if he should be guilty of any secret practices or endeavour to alienate the (p 16) revenue, which he then solemnly promised to the Company, as he did by the payment of his former assignment.

...That if he should fail in the performance of that agreement, they should be justified in throwing off all regard for him; that they ought to give him reputation to (p.17) collect his rents as well as his tribute from the Poligars, of which the Company were to have half exclusive of the sums already stipulated; that if he should give just occasion, they should break all connection with him, and taken possession of the whole for the Company, only setting upon the Nabob and his family an allowance for his subsistence, without leaving them in any degree of authority.

The account is "taken from Bengal and Madras letters".

* The following is the succession to Nabobship of Arcot from Sadatulla to Mahommed Ally (better known as Wallajah) ie. 1710-179 , when Wallajah died. (taken from pp 2-8)

1. Sadatulla 1710-32

2. Doast Ally (eldest son of Sadatulla's brother) 1732-40. Doast Ally's appointment disapproved by Nizam ul Mulk,. Conquest of Trichinopoly at death of Raja, in 1736, his son and his son-in law, Chunda Saheb; Marrattas invade by encouragement in Nizam in 1740, Doast Ally killed.

3. Subder Ally (eldest son of 2.) 1740-2. Chunda Saheb taken prisoner by Marrattas to Satara. Subder Ally assassinated in 1742.

4. Mortiz Ally (brother in law of 3) 1742

5. Seid Mahomed (young son of 3. preserved by English at Madras) 1743. Nizam refuse confirmation, expels Marrattas, appoints Coza Abdulla Cawn as Nabob.

6. Coza Abdulla Cawn 1744 . Dies in bed soon after.

7. Anwar ud Deen 1744- Appointed by Nizam. As people averse to him is made guardian of 5 (Seid Mahomed), Seid Mahomed soon after assassinated, 7 resume Nabobship and little later is killed at Amboor.

8. Chunda Saheb (son in law of 2) 1749

Supported by French but soon put to death by power supporting Mahommed Ally [i.e. the British] after being trapped at Seringham temple.

9. Mahommed Ally (son of 7, i.e. Anwar ud Deen, the appointee of the Nizam) appointed in opposition to Chunda Saheb by English and their allies; 1748-179 .

5. STATE OF FACTS RELATING TO THE CARNATIC AND GENERAL POLITICS OF INDIA. (EXTRACT)

Home Misc : 211: pp 133-87; dated Madras 6th Jan 1780.

It has been our policy of late to pretend to a superiority over the prince of India. These who were not in a situation to show their resentment have submitted to indignities from us. Hyder Ally has returned our ill usage and on all occasions treated us in the same style we have treated him. There is a rooted enmity between him and the Marrattas and he has taken advantage of the dissention in their Government to seize extensive country belonging to them. The Marrattas sensible of their inability to contend with the Company and Hyder at the same time have concluded a treaty with Hyder upon condition of his paying 25 lacs of rupees a year for the country he has conquered. It is supposed the Marrattas have entered into this treaty upon the persuasion that the Company would continue the war, and therefore wished to be unembarrassed from all other enemies.

It is also said, that the Marrattas (p 181) Hyder Ally and the Nizam have formed a league against the English. These, next to the company, are the three greatest powers in India, whom, to our reproach, we have irritated by every species of ingratitude, breach of faith, and insolence.

The Marrattas we attacked because we thought the opportunity convenient from the dissentions in their state.. Hyder we were bound to, by a defensive alliance, with which we never complied, and, to the Nizam, we were indebted for the cession of an extensive and valuable territory for which we engaged to pay him a tribute of not a fifth part of its value, and afterwards, without cause, or reason, requested or in other language demanded, of him to relinquish the poor pittance.

To go to war with Hyder the Nizam will be very /and...

6. AS TO DANGER TO BE APPREHENDED FROM THE MARATTAS, IF THE POWER OF TIPPOO SULTAUN WAS TO BE EXTINGUISHED.

Scottish Record Office : GD/51/3/30/9 pages 520-531 dated 'about 1792': As to the danger to be apprehended from the Marattahs If the power of Tippoo Sulthaun was to be extinguished.

QUESTION: Mr. Dundas, would not the Mahrattah power be dangerous to the British Settlements if the power and political consequence of Tippoo Sultan were at an end ?

In all questions respecting government and administration, the reasonings may proceed on full, or on partial estimates of facts; in the first case, they will give a fair inference, in the second, they may be specious, but will not evolve the truth. Mr. Hipsley's argument respecting the present war in India is of the last kind. It consists of the following propositions:

1. Tippoo Sultan, as superior of Cochin, had a right to interfere in the disposal of the forts of Cranganore etc.
2. Our supporting the Rajah (520) of Travancore was an infraction of the Treaty of Mangalore.
3. If the war shall be _____ the Mahrattah power may become too great. At present the Mysore power serves as a balance to it, and as a barrier to our settlements.

To bring the subjects into fair view, we must state the events which produced the war, refer to the subsisting treaties, and to the actual situation and character of the political powers in Hindoostan. The Rajah of Cochin, and the Rajah of Travancore were, about 25 years ago, independent powers, and they formed a common line of defence against Mysore. Hyder Ali subdued Cochin but the Dutch retained the forts of Cochin, Cranganore, (520v) and the military post of Jayacottah.

The Rajah of Travancore, alarmed at the warlike preparations of Tippoo Sultan, purchased Craganore and Jayacottah from the Dutch, and the Government of Madras, did not discover the error of Mr. Powney, the Resident at Travancore, in not stopping this negotiation, till it was too late to remedy it. The Rubicon was passed. It is to be observed that a defensive treaty had subsisted betwixt the Rajah and the Dutch, respecting their settlements in Cochin, and under the Treaty of the Hague, they thought it was most (521r) proper to convey these places to the ally of the English.

Such are the facts respecting the forts in question.

In 1789 Tipoo Sultan, as superior of Cochin, required of the Rajah of Travancore a demolition of the lines, an evacuation and restitution of the forts, and the delivering up, of the Rajah of Calicut and c___ : who were protected (he says) by the Rajah of Travancore and _____ chief at Tellicherry. The Government of Madras were applied to and eventually, that of Bengal. Tippoo was required to produce documents, to show that he was superior of these places, but produced none. On the otherhand it (521v) was found, that the Dutch had acquired them from the Portugese, before the existence of the power of Hyder Ally, and therefore had a right to dispose of them, to the Rajah of Travancore, both as, a part of his line of defence and as the ally of the English, under the Treaty of the Hague.

See Article 4th

2. The invasion of Travancore was an infraction of the Treaty of Mangalore. Troops were sent for the protection of the Rajah, under Captain Knox, to act on the defensive and, under orders from Mr. Powney negotiations were proposed, but evaded by Tippoo. Intimation was, at last, given to Tippoo, that (522r) if he invaded Travancore, it would be considered, as a declaration of war, against the Company.

Orders for preparations were sent to Bombay, etc.

Tippoo applied at Pondicherry, for assistance. The Supreme Government wished if possible to negotiate, and to restore the places to the Dutch, but thought the English bound to defend the Rajah of Travancore, till the rights could be adjusted.

Such (are) the facts,

The conclusions from them are :

Tippoo Sultan had no right to the forts, or at best, it was a doubtful title, which he declined to prove. The places were no part of Cochin conquered by Hyder Ali and if conquered they had, (522r) the Dutch had acquired them before the present Mysore power existed.

2. Reasonings on tenures are absurd, when necessity required those places to be a part of the line of defence, and as the Mysore power has been built up by _____ such claims, it was natural in the Rajah of Travancore, to take this step, though not proper without the approbation of his ally the English.

3. By the Treaty of Mangalore Lord Cornwallis could not act otherwise, than he has done. The war was inevitable. The question as to the (523r) consequences of the war on the Indian powers, now comes forward.

(1) The Poonah Mahrattahs since the death of Ballajee Bajirow in 1761 have been in a state of political anarchy. The fates of Ragobah - the ultimate success of the Faction. The monarchy of the Peishwah - the independent power of several of the members of the confederacy, of Scindia, Holkar, etc. tend to show, that the Poonah Mahrattahs can never act as the great body.

(2) The Berar Mahrattahs, are in a situation not fitted for taking any but a secondary (523v) part. In force they are not superior to Scindia. The personal talents of the Berar chiefs have not fitted them for war, but for intrigues.

(3) The Nizamut, has been in such hands that we are less surprised at the _____ of its politics, than at the permanency of its secondary influence.

(4) The Mysore Government has been made up from the conquests of Hyder Ally, and would have been subverted, if Tippoo Sultan had not inherited his fathers's abilities and vigor. Considering (524r) then the territories, force and revenue of the Mysore Government we conclude:

1. That from its situation it is fitted to take advantage of all the neighbouring powers. It is from this point that the lines of its sovereignty have been gradually widening by districts being added from the Mahrattahs, from the Nizam, from the Carnatic etc.

2. That Tippoo Sultan has a hereditary hatred of the English, and the Carnatic is the tempting object of his ambition. But for the power of the (524v) English, nothing could resist him, the country of the Nizam would fall as a necessary consequence to him. This might open his way through the province of Orissa, to Bengal etc. If we could suppose Mysore to be a long established monarchy, in the habits of thinking of the natives, it would be itself of the most dangerous in India. But resting as it does, on the talents of an individual, it may melt away with his disappearance.

Mr. Hipsley then, when he supposes, that success (525r) in this war by destroying the Mysore power, would raise the Mahrattahs to universal empire in the Peninsula, does not advert to the circumstance, that the very same speculation will apply to any other power, better than to them. Tippoo Sultan possesses an independent power - has no ministers that can bound him. If he should prevail and oblige us to make a dishonourable peace, might he not retaliate on the (525v) Mahrattahs, and the Nizam? Might he not conquer from them, districts and thus become greater than the Peeswah could, supposing, (what never can happen) that, on his assuming the government, the present ministers, and usurpers of power were to lay all at his feet. But supposing that the Poonah Mahrattah is that power from whom a general _____ is to be _____, the following reasons will show, that they could not be dangerous even if the power and political consequence of Tippoo Sultan were at an end.

Mr. Dundas question 1. The Maharattah government is divided in itself, and, in fact, has become a cluster of independent confederated princes, with opposite interests.

2. These powers totally depend on the personal qualities of the usurper, and if we judge from what has happened, in the (526v) Mogul Empire, since the death of Aurangazebe, will shift and assume a new appearance on the death of their founders.

3. Supposing then the Mahrattahs to get a part of Mysore, in return for their services in the war it would only be the soil, out of which would rise up some new usurping minister to be another Scindia, or Holkar. (527r)

4. Supposing the Nizam to get a part of Mysore, in return for his services, in this war, then he would be a better balance on the dreaded might of the Poonah Mahrattahs - and the same hypothesis, will apply to the Berar Mahrattahs. (527v).

If the general bond of religion among the Mahrattahs shall be resorted to in order to support the speculation, about the universality of Empire, it would be as absurd, as if the religion of Tippoo Sultan was resorted to, and we supposed, that he would stop in his career because his enemy was a Mussulman. The fact is that the Hindoos themselves are divided in their opinions, since the fall of (528r) the Mogul power and are no longer tied together by the strong bond of being persecuted. They have formed speculative opinions of the most opposite kinds but which have no general influence on their political conduct.

The Seck (Sikh) is a mystic and theist, the Mahrattah is a superstitious polytheist.

In a different way the Musselman _____, but their religion no longer has the (528v) effect' on their political conduct, that it had in the times of the Moguls.

The Mogul conquered both to acquire Empire, and to propogate their faith.

The Mogul powers in Hindoostan at present, Tippoo Sultan in particular, only use their religion as a reason to their followers, for oppressing the Hindoos they have subdued, driving them as Tippoo Sultan has done from one part of (529r) his dominions to another. There does not then, in fact, at present exist any bond of religion sufficiently strong to influence the fates of the natives, among the Hindoos nor among the Mahomedans.

On the whole then the reasoning from the principles of a balance of power in Europe to a supposed similarity in Hindoostan, and arguing against thet war (529v) from the idea of his country being a barrier, like what Austrian was supposed in Europe, in the times of Louis 14th is comparing situations that are different, supposing them to be same and reasoning, but not observing, or judging agreeably to the facts. There seems to be no error in politics more troublesome, than the speculations which proceed on such analogy; Mr. Hipsley's is of this kind.

In India all energy of government has been lost, since the fall of the (530r) Mogul Empire, and nothing remains but the military establishments, which the immediate usurpers have formed, and which, on the death of any of them, is liable to new political vicissitudes. The Poonah Mahrattahs as little obey the Paiswah, as they do the Rajah at Sattarah, but are governed solely by the ministry of their minor prince. Should he prove as indolent as the Rajah from whom his predecessor first wrested the power, his minister, in his turn, may add another link to the (530v) political chain, and under a new name, ascend the throne, by a double species of investiture one from a nominal Peiswah and one from a nominal Rajah. If, on the contrary, the young Peishwah shall inherit the talents of the family, he represents, he may reassert the sovereignty and continue its lustre. Scindia and Holkar, at all events, control the Mahrattah chiefs. If their successors, in like manner, shall inherit their talents, as well rule over the territories, the seat of the sovereignty may be removed to Ougein or Indore, and leave open to Tippoo Sultan, or the Nizam, on the other hand, the new establishments of these confederated chiefs fall into feeble hands, either the Poonah greatness may increase, or the Seiks and Afghans, like other northern conquerers, spread themselves on the rich provinces of India. What has been said of one, may be said of the other Indian powers, and at once removes, after thus looking at the real history of that country, those distant evils which Mr. Hipsley's with the object of condemning the present war, has been conjuring up, in his political fancy (end p. 531v).

7. ELPHINSTONE ON INDIAN ALLIANCES

India Office Records: Elphinstone Papers: MSS European F88/14/E/18: Letter from Elphinstone to Governor General Ahmednagar July 17, 1815 (36 Pages): Extract.

I have now only to consider the alterations that might be made in our existing alliances and I have already intimated that I do not think they can be much improved. They are doubtless attended with great inconveniences, but those are not to be removed, being founded in the character of those princes with whom we are so closely connected, or in the incompatibility between their character and ours. The perfection of these alliances would be for the native powers to send their contingents in time of war and never to be meddled with or heard of at any other time, but their restlessness, their rapacity, their weakness and the general want of confidence in them that results from their want of faith, continually bring them into situations where we are forced to interfere, either to save them from utter ruin or to prevent their making our power instrumental to their injustice and oppression. The debt to us incurred by the Gykwar to preserve the existence of his Government, and the subsequent profusion and mismanagement of his servants, obliged us to take the control of finances which involves a (p.25) general superintendance of every branch of his administration. The unhappy state of the Nizam's mind and the hostile purposes for which his authority was made use of by those who had acquired an ascendancy over him, forced us on the course that has been taken with him, and it probably could not be changed in his life time without great danger. Though we have never directly influenced the Paishwah's Government, yet we have more numerous and more vexatious concerns with him than perhaps with any other power. If we were to examine the principal cases in which the British Government has taken a concern in His Highnesses' transactions as those with Amrut Row; with the chiefs of Calpee and Jhansee and his other dependents in Bundelcund; with his tributaries in Katteawaur and his southern Jageerdars, We should find that in all those cases it was reluctantly drawn on by events and by its engagements and not actuated by any deliberate intentions of taking part in the Paishwah's affairs. This consideration will lead us to doubt whether we can ever be certain of exemption from this interference; and indeed it seems probable that if entirely left to themselves even in their domestic transactions, the allied Governments would soon sink under their own vices. The fear is that the effects of this principle may (p.26) spread until we have entirely assumed the functions of the Government and until the power of our ally is totally extinguished. Something of this sort has no doubt taken place with several of our former connections, but we cannot justly attribute the fate of those ephemeral governments to our interference. Nearly the whole of the governments that were in existence in India (I might almost say in Asia) when we first established ourselves there, have expired, as well those that remained independent as those which came under our protection. The latter were generally in the last stage of decay when they connected themselves with us and our interference instead of accelerating their end, appears rather to have prolonged their existence and to have softened the evils incident to their dissolution. It is equally our duty and our interest to abstain from all unnecessary interference, especially when it is not derived by the Government to which it relates; but considering the irresistible train of events by which we have hitherto been carried on, it may not be safe to enter into any precise engagements respecting the course we are to pursue, and perhaps all that is within our power is to be attained by a silent resolution to avoid unnecessary interference, without any promise or declaration to the powers concerned. A constant source of annoyance to the British (p.27) Government, as well as of irritation to the allies, might apparently be removed by consolidating their dominions and doing away the claims they have on the lands and revenues of each other; but considering how unreasonable the natives are, and how complicated and obscure the claims in question,

it seems impossible to effect any arrangement with which they would not be dissatisfied, and if so, it is better they should remain in disputes among themselves than all unite in discontent with us. All consolidation that the allied governments are disposed to make among themselves ought however to be encouraged.

8. NECESSITY OF INTERFERENCE IN AFFAIRS OF NATIVE STATES

IOR: L/PS/2/45 : Pre-Com and Drafts on Jyepore and Kotah (withdrawn) Note by BS Jones: L/PS/2/46 is concerned with Oodeypoor.

The proposed paragraphs on the affairs of Jyepore appear to be written much more in the spirit of an advocate than of a judge. The writer, it must be confessed, has displayed much critical ability, and has certainly pointed out many apparent inconsistencies in the course of the policy which has been adopted at different times and under various circumstances. It is, however, much more easy for men at a distance to make observations, and to cast reflections, than for Political Agents to decide when emergencies arise.

The question of interference in the affairs of protected and dependent principalities has been repeatedly discussed. The sum of all that has been urged against the interposition of our authority amounts to this; that interference should never be exercised except in cases of obvious necessity, either for the enforcement of our own rights as the paramount (p 82) authority, or for the purpose of terminating or averting disputes, which, if permitted to take their course, might disturb the tranquility of countries over which our supremacy has been established; and eventually affect the peace and safety of our own provinces.

As it is manifestly impossible to prescribe for every case which may arise, much must necessarily be left to the discretion of those who are engaged in the local administration of affairs. Nothing could be more pleasant than to sit calmly upon the eminence which we occupy and to witness the prevalence of good order among the petty states who acknowledge our political superiority, without any strenuous effort on our part to prevent aggression, or to exact the fulfillment of tributary obligations. If this could be effected by the promulgation of those just and equitable principles of international law by which we are anxious to regulate our own conduct, it would be well. But the result of experience has unfortunately proved, that (p 83) the relaxation of the influence and authority which we have acquired by the expenditure of blood and treasure, is generally, not to say uniformly, followed by the manifestation of a desire to prosecute objects inconsistent with our views and interests. Hence the utmost vigilance is requisite in order to keep things in the proper places, and to ensure the continuance of the relations which we have established. Whilst all around us is in a state of mutation we cannot expect to maintain our ground by relinquishing a system of constant and active control adopted to current of events. The extension of our direct authority over the territories of vassal chieftains, will often be most effectually prevented, by a timely interposition of our power where it is obviously manifest that the ruler is pursuing a course which if unchecked would disable him for performing his engagements, and induce him to commit himself in hostile proceedings.

These observations are very trite. They have suggested themselves on the perusal (p 84) of the querulous and vituperative language of the paragraphs proposed for the Board's adoption, which after all the labour that has been bestowed in pointing out the errors of past proceedings, do not indicate the means of guarding against the evil of interference on the one hand, and against the still greater evil, on the other hand, of looking on with indifference upon the progress of a system of misrule which must terminate in the dissolution of an alliance, deliberately sought, by us, and established with considerable difficulty.

July 28th, 1829

B.S.J (B.S. Jones)

C - DOCUMENTS

I - ARCOT

1. WARREN HASTINGS TO L.SULLIVAN

Warren Hastings, Madras to L. Sullivan, 6.10.1771, ff 84-92:

But in truth nothing is given upto him (the Nabob). He has been told that this was a point on which we had no authority to decide (85v) and it was his own argument that if the Company should think they have a right to share in the acquisitions (that is Tanjore) they will always have the power to claim and take them, as his whole country is at their mercy should they ever choose to avail themselves of the means which they have of seizing it. This is indeed the truth. and we were besides too well assured that the Nabob would not consent to the expedition unless we yielded to his demands. Necessity therefore compelled us to yield. The rest depends on the success of the undertaking, and the justice of the court of directors.. on the 13th of the last month, Gen. Smith began his march... (discusses limitations imposed by numbers in army, etc.)

2. LETTER FROM NABOB'S REPRESENTATIVE IN POONA

British Museum: Add MS:22449: Macartney Correspondence with country powers: Folios 293 (Volume I to VI):
Translation of a letter from Rowjee to his brother Poona dated 22nd January 1782 (ff.32-42, also 42a to 45):
Received February: Written to Nabob for original: 21.2.1782: Rowjee seems to be the Nabob's representative at Poona.

(ff.33a) The Ministers said that the (p.33b) Gentleman of Bombay would not negotiate properly. That they were all deceitful and that if they wrote to Bombay, the Government would give out that they were necessitated to crave a peace. That therefore writing would avail nothing. I and the mediator upon this urged that his highness had exerted himself very much in this business and that by the blessings of God, everything would be happily settled to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned.....

(ff.34b)..... The (35a) Minister replied that they could not on any account confide in the English, who they said were void of faith. That I was fully acquainted with the engagements they (the English) made through Col. Upton and of what happened previous and subsequent thereto. That afterwards they received many letters from Col. Upton but they availed nothing for hostilities were continued. That I know when the English took Regnaut. Row under their protection, what happened, and what engagements they then made and which were all delusive. That after this several letters quite inconsistent with each other were written and general Goddard in a friendly manner obtained from them permission to pass through their country to Bombay and by way of return to their kindness, took the Fort of Bassej and penetrated the Ghauts in a hostile manner. That everyone knows what the General and his army then suffered for want of provision and water. That after much loss and distress he retired to Bombay. That it was in consideration of the very friendly (35b) and confidential letter received from my master at that time, that they permitted the General to go away in safety. That they had now received sundry letters, but in whom were they to confide. That they know of nobody except my master and his situation was this. That his country was plundered and destroyed, and the Europeans paid no regard to the most positive orders of their own King. That eight months have elapsed in obtaining an answer to their former letters and that though a Sardar of high rank have brought positive orders from the English King to make peace and have arrived with them four months ago at Bengal yet no answer has been received by them (the ministers) either from Bengal or Madras.

That by this the deceit of the Europeans is very manifest. That while they (the ministers) are flattering themselves with the hopes of friendship, the English are immersed in views of a quite different nature. That this is far from the road of friendship. That the only way of friendship is unanimity. That they have already informed me of their sentiments (36.a) which they say must be accorded with. That his highness must become bound in every respect and something be fixed on in which they can place a reliance..... That they had opened their hearts to me and had very plainly signified that they relied only on my master and (36b) in that consideration consented to everything, but were apprehensive that he, from a predilection in favour of the Europeans might probably hereafter be unmindful of their (the ministers) friendship.

.... (37a) that the Vackeels of Hyder Naik with money in their hands are daily urging the ministers to enter into a new treaty with their master and how long can the ministers put them off. That Hyder Naik have now entered upon a negotiation of a new kind viz. (37b) that the ministers should order our army to invade Bengal, and promises to defray the expenses that may be incurred thereby. That the Rajah of Benaras have also written to the ministers that he will pay 30 lakhs of Rs. for the expenses of their army till its arrival there and that he will afterwards consent to whatever they may propose. That Sindiah is arrived at Calluppee and have written repeatedly to the ministers to order their army to march to that place The English negotiation here is carried on by five different methods. The ministers rely only on the mediation of his highness

(38b)..... That from the conduct of the English they cannot be brought to believe, that they will settle matters by means of his highness.... That as the English will not confide in any one except their own nation, if they wish therefore to depute ant gentleman let them do it by means of his highness, and the negotiation be carried on, as formerly in one manner. In such case, they will certainly confide in it, and the mediator will be then enabled to exert himself....

3. LETTER FROM THE NABOB OF CARNATIC TO MACARTNEY, 1782

British Museum: Add.MS.22419: Macartney Papers: March-April 1782; Extract of a letter from the Nabob of Carnatic to Macartney.

...(818) The regulations and customs of every government are different. If any native of this country was possessed with full power in England, and took the management of affairs there, his surprise would not be less than that which your Lordship expresses at the management of affairs in the Carnatic.

The servants and people in different offices are the same in every country and every government, and will embazzle the revenue if not intimidated by an enquiry into their conduct, but I never knew before your Lordship's time that a prince was to be blamed for the ill conduct of his servants which he is ignorant of.

4. AN ARJEE FROM KILLEDAR OF VELLORE TO NAWAB OF ARCOT: SEPT 1783

IOR: Home Misc: 181 (pp 561-74, 607-10) marked at back "In Chairman and Deputy Chairman" 28.1.1784. The sender of the Arjee was Uzzemud Deen Cawn the Killedar of Vellore.

I have repeatedly represented to your highness the violences and oppressions exercised by the present amildar of Lord Macartney's appointment over the few remaining inhabitants of the districts of vellore, Ambore, Saulguda & c.

The outranges and violences now committed are of that astonishing nature as were never known, or heard of during the administration of the circar. Hyder naik the cruelest of tyrants used every kind of oppression (p 608) in the circar countries, but even his measures were not like those now pursued. Such of the inhabitants as had escaped the sword and pillage of Hyder Naik by taking refuge in the woods and within the walls of Vellore &c. on the arrival of Lord Macarney's amildar to Vellore and in consequence of his cowl of protection, and support they most cheerfully returned to the villages, set about the cultivation of the lands and with great pains rebuilt their cottages. But now the amildar has imprisoned the wives and children of the inhabitants, seized the few jewels that were on the bodies of the women and then, before the faces of their husbands flogged them in order to make them produce other jewels and effects, which he said they had buried some where under ground. And to make the inhabitants bring him (p 609) money notwithstanding there were yet no cultivation in the country. Terrified with the flagelations some of them produced the jewels and waring apparel of their women to the amount of ten or fifteen pagodas which they had hidden. Others who declined them they had none the amildar flogged their women severely, tied cords around their breasts and tore the sucking children from their teats and exposed them to scorching heat of the sun. These children died as did the wife of Ramasamy an inhabitant of Bungpoor. Even this could not stir up compassion in the heart of the amildar some of the children that were some what large he exposed to sale. In short the violences of the amildar are so astonishing that the people, on seeing the present situation remember the loss of Hyder with regret. With whomsoever the amildar finds a measure of Natchine ? or rice (p 610) he takes it away from him and appropriates it to the expences of the sobindy that he keeps up. No revenues are collected from the countries, but from the effects of the poor wretched inhabitants, These ryottss who intended to return to their habitations, on hearing of who intended to return to their habitations, on hearing of these violences have fled for refuge with their wives and children into Hyder's country. Every day is ushered in and closed with these violences and disturbance. I have no power to do anything and who will hear what I have to say. My business is to inform your highness who are my master. The people bring their complaints to me and I tell them I will write to your highness.

Nawab to Chairman and Deputy Chairman E.I.Co; 6.9.1783 (Extract)

(p.569).....Enclosed you have a translation of an Arzee from the Killedar of Vellore; I have thousands of the same kind, but this just now received will serve to give you some idea of the miseries brought upon this my devoted country and the wretched inhabitants that remain in it. by the oppressive hand of Lord Macartney's management. Nor will the embezzlements of collections thus obtained when brought before you (p 570) in proof appear less extraordinary, which shall certainly be done in due time. But I will cherish a hope that you will mark the rectitude of your measures to all the world, ...What can I say more.

Chepauk,

6th September 1783.

**5. BEGINNING OF EXTORTION, MOLESTATION, PLUNDER, PRESSING OF MEN,
CATTLE, SUPPLIES IN BRITISH DOMINATED ARCOT, AND THE LARGER CARNATIC
UNDER THE SHIELD OF THE HELPLESS AND HUMILIATED BRITISH APPOINTED
NABOB OF ARCOT: C. 1750 - 1800 ***

* Admiral Sir Robert Harland was a special envoy from the British Government especially to South India to report on the state of events at the time. The occurrences narrated here for 1770-72, are again similarly described by Lord Hobart, Governor of Madras Presidency, in his long minute of 1795 regarding what was happening in the Madras Presidency as also in Bengal, Bihar, etc., and wherever the British were beginning to dominate.

**5.1. ROBERT HARLAND CONVEYS NAWAB OF ARCOT'S HELPLESSNESS AND
HUMILIATION TO LONDON: SEPT 1772**

IOL: Home Misc. 111 (East Indies vol. 19) 1773: Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd
10.4.1773, pp.1-15

Fort St. George, 25th September 1772

My Lord,

It makes me extremely happy to be able to inform your Lordship, that by the arrival of His Majesty's Ship *Dolphin*, the ninth of August from the Mauritius, the accounts which have been already forwarded to your Lordship of the French leaving India are confirmed; and enclosed, I send a copy of the Remarks made at those islands by Mr. Colpoys who was acting Captain of His Majesty's ship at the time, and whom I cannot recommend too much for his extraordinary prudence and diligence in discharge of that duty.

The Nassau Indiaman arrived at this place the third of September, and brought a letter from the Cape of Good Hope dated the twenty ninth of June, by which I am informed, that *La Belle Poule* a French Frigate of 36 guns and 250 men, had just come into False Bay, on her way to the Isle de France, with Monsr. le Chevalier de Ternay on board, who is to succeed to the Government of the Islands, in the room of le Chavalier des Roches.

I had informed your Lordship in my letter No. IX (a triplicate of which accompanies this) of the Nabob's success against the Marwar and of the fall of Ramnahdporam his Capital, with other circumstances attending the reduction of that country. Since that time, the Naalcooty's country also has been reduced to the Nabob's obedience, the Polygar himself slain and Caracoil his capital taken by surprise. The circumstances attending which are fully related in the young Nabob's letter to his father. I also took occasion in Letter No. IX to mention the licentious spirit of the soldiery in this country; and I am very sorry that the behaviour of the officers who surprised Caracoil was such, both to the young Nabob and to the General, as to make it very evident, that they have not the smallest respect for dignity of character, nor a proper sense of military subordination.

On the receipt of your Lordship's dispatches of August the thirtieth 1771, I endeavoured to communicate to the Nabob everything contained in them respecting himself or country; but on his expressing a desire to have such articles in writing, as either required explanation, or to which an answer might be expected from him, I gave him copies of the correspondence between your Lordship and the Directors, accompanied with a letter of which the paper referred to is a copy. These were all translated into Persian, and after his Highness and his

Councillors had maturely considered everything which had been communicated to them from your Lordship's dispatches, and what had passed in several conversations I have had with them on the subject, I had the honour of receiving his answer dated the twenty fourth of September 1772 or 25 Jemadisanni 1186. A copy of which accompanies this.

This letter of the Nabob appears to me to be very full and very explicit. It seems to contain in as few words as possible, the heads of everything he had formerly communicated either to Sir John Lindsay or to me; and the particulars which had till now been variously told and diffused amongst a great number of papers, are in this Letter, presented in one series of articles to your Lordship.

The Nabob's principal aim seems to be, to convince His Majesty, that his real and sincere desire is to maintain the strictest connexion with the Company; and that nothing is farther from his mind, than any wish to diminish the friendship, that at present subsists between them and him. But he thinks he has great reason to complain of the conduct of their servants, and produces a number of instances, wherein their behaviour does not appear to him, to have corresponded with the friendly intentions of their masters. And he is firmly persuaded, that things are misrepresented in England, or the Company never could think they had any cause to find fault with his conduct, or to entertain a doubt of his friendship.

Besides the repetition of many things already set forth in former letters, the Nabob has entered much more fully with me into the discussion of some abuses, which have been continued to be practiced in his country till very lately. These, I am desirous to communicate to your Lordship, and as all those communications have been regularly entered in my Diary, the accompanying extracts with the copies of some letters, which have passed between His Highness and former Governors, will explain those matters very fully to your Lordship. At the same time the Nabob desires me to acquaint your Lordship that these communications have been made to me in the fullest confidence, and he seems exceedingly anxious, that they may not be made use of to the prejudice of any of the persons concerned. His purpose will be fully answered if the particular instances given, make it appear that his complaints have not been groundless, and that care may be taken to prevent such abuses for the future. This very anxiety, and the fear of losing friends and getting enemies by hurting individuals, have prevented him hitherto from speaking his mind so freely, as he otherwise would have done; and I have taken upon me to assure His Highness, that the wisdom of administration, will always have a very delicate regard, to whatever, he is pleased to communicate to them in confidence.

The practice of lending money to the Nabob began in the days of his greatest distress when his country was ruined by the ravages of the French and their Indian allies; and when he was obliged to borrow of any one who would lend him to defray the most trifling expences of his family at an interest of thirty or forty percent per annum or even more. He was also at that time obliged to make use of the same means of raising money, to pay the very large sums, even to sixty lacks of rupees in one year, to reimburse the Company immediately on the conclusion of the French War in India. When he had no resources left in his country already ruined and desolated by both European and Indian enemies. This heavy interest added half yearly or quarterly to the principal and bearing the same annual interest very soon produced immense fortunes to individuals, while such prospects of gain increased the (p.5) number of the Nabob's creditors, and the load of his private debt.

But whatever advantages were produced to individuals by this method of lending money to the Nabob, it was found by the Company's servants that much more was to be got by furnishing money to the Amuldahrs and Renters of the Circar, which they did at three four or five percent per mensem, renewing the bond and adding the interest to the principal every two months, so as together with the premium, to produce an annual profit of sixty, seventy or hundred percent. This very soon produced numberless bankruptcies amongst the Nabob's Renters; both the crops and effects, were seized upon to pay the money lenders to the utmost farthing and the farmers having neither money nor credit, were obliged to leave their habitations to others, who following the same stops, became involved in the same manner. Besides, any man of bad intentions, and in bad circumstances, either from his own extravagancies or otherwise, finding the ready disposition of the Company's servants to lend money, borrowed at any interest, and were willing to pay any premium. By this means, although they should prove deficient in their payments to the Circar, they were either sure to find protectors, from the interest of the Creditors, to keep them in their Amuldahry or Farm. Or should the Nabob insist on turning them out for bad management or non-payment, they were sure to make off with the money they had borrowed, leaving their all mortgaged to their creditors, which was seized upon for payment of their debts, while the Circar revenues or debts remained unpaid. (p.6)

Thus the Nabob not only lost revenues, but even the country lost inhabitants. The only remedy left was for the Nabob to take the whole debt upon himself and give bonds of his own for the payment of the whole principal and interest, at twenty or twenty five percent before the reduction of the interest and afterwards at ten percent per annum. By this means, he saved the country though at a great expence and an addition to his private debt. But there have also been instances when Renters have proved deficient to the company, and who were also involved with individuals though at the same time deeply indebted to the Nabob. That at the desire of the Governor (which had the force of a command to him then) he was obliged to take the whole debt upon himself and give bonds for the same, bearing interest according to the rate of the times and in this manner the money was secured to the lender, while the Nabob's debts were increased both to the Company and to individuals. The papers referred to are translations of Cadjanna Memorials, or what may be properly enough called orders on the Nabob's Treasury for the payment of such moneys as cannot be stated in their accounts, under any other head but that of Enaum or free gift. These will serve as illustrations of the above.

It seems this practice of lending money had always met with encouragement from the Governors, or at least had been winked at, and the money lenders met with protection and assistance from them; but about a month ago this Governor acquainted the Nabob that he was resolved to forbid this practice under the severest penalties which was done accordingly. This the Nabob long wished for, but never could obtain till now when he supposes the Governor had heard (p.7) of his making such communications to me.*

The instance that the Nabob gives of what he calls interfering with his justice happened in 1765, when a great Renter was confined by the Cutcherie of Arcot for money owing to the Circar and released by an order from the Governor without an application to the Nabob. I have sent copies of the correspondence between him and the Governor on that subject, by which it appears that although the one thought himself exceedingly injured, the other justifies the measure; but the Extract from the Diary referred to, will serve to throw some light on this transaction.

What he mentions about his Bazar happened in 1771, and which he tells me was communicated to Sir John Lindsay at the time, when the Mayor's Court of Madras shewed a disposition to subject his Bazar to their Jurisdiction. This alarmed him exceedingly as the Bazar makes a very necessary part of his household and he complained of it accordingly. Since that time no such attempt has been made; but he is not free of apprehension on that head; and he thinks it no more than common justice, that he should have the same authority over his own people in the Company's Jaghire, which they have over their people in this country. This with what the Nabob has expressed in his letter to me, I think sufficiently explains what he meant by the company's servants interfering with his justice that the liberty he required of exercising judicial authority was over his own people only, when in the Company's Jaghire, and by no means over the subjects of England anywhere.

The great abuses of the indulgence which the (p.8) Nabob never refused to all the Company's servants, of transporting their baggage and everything belonging to them through his country duty free, has been the source of the greatest inconvenience to the trading part of his subjects. For merchandize of all kinds being transported under the sanction of a commanding Officer or a paymaster of a Garrison, or some person of distinction in the Company's service, centres all the trade with them*. Some of the Company's servants have even applied for leave to transport goods duty free, but this the Nabob has absolutely refused, for though he should be disposed to favour one, the advantage could not rest entirely with him for any length of time, he would find himself deprived of a very considerable branch of revenue, and of every trading subject in his country; but to show favour, as he calls it he has compounded for a sum of money, with some of those, who from their interest, or station fancied themselves entitled to make a certain annual profit by their office.

The pressing of his people to serve as coolies, and their bullocks to carry baggage, which ought to be employed for the purpose of cultivation, are what would appear to be some of the Nabob's greatest grievances. This, with other practices of Europeans which are considered as exceedingly oppressive by the inhabitants are sufficiently explained in the papers referred to.*

The Nabob has summed up everything which he wants of the Company in twenty four articles, very few of which want any explanation, as most of them are either so plain of themselves, or have already been so very fully mentioned in other (p.9) papers communicated to the Secretary of State, either by Sir John Lindsay or me. However, there are some circumstances which I am desired by the Nabob to communicate to your Lordship which may assist in forming a judgement of the propriety of the request.

The Treaty of Peace and friendship with the Mahrattas, seems to be, in the Nabob's opinion, essentially necessary for the well being of his country, and of the English interest in India; but he desires that whatever conditions may be thought necessary on the part of the English nation, or of the Company, the acquisition of the Gatts as a western boundary to the Carnatick may be admitted to make a part of the basis of any Treaty, that may take place with the Mahrattas. This he says they are very well disposed to grant; it will add greatly to the security of the Carnatick, and it has been frequently promised him by the Company's servants.

With respect to the Jaghire, the Nabob wishes to have the renting of it confirmed to him and to his successor, for many reasons mentioned in several former letters already forwarded to the Secretary of State. But he has mentioned one more to me, that could he depend on being

continued renter, it would encourage him to lay out money in the cultivation and improvement of the country, which could not fail of being very advantageous both to the Company and to him; but which cannot be expected of him, while threatened with being deprived of the Jaghire every successive year. However, from a copy of the Company's letter by the Duke of Grafton, it appears they are disposed to continue the Jaghire in (p.10) his management.

The Nabob seems determined, not on any account whatever to increase the number of sepoy's on the establishment of the seven Battalions at present in the Company's pay, but says that he will provide sepoy's and force enough of his own against all emergencies. At present he says all is profound peace, and no increase of troops appears to him to be necessary; he has explained himself very fully on this subject in the fifth article; and it appears to me that though it may be possible to advise him to such concessions, he does not seem disposed to receive them as commands.

During the time of the siege of Tanjore, an agreement had been negotiated or was negotiating between the Nabob's son then in the field, and the Army, that should the place be taken by storm, they were to have a certain sum of money instead of the plunder; as an accommodation took place between the Nabob and the Rajah, this agreement fell to the ground, and the Army were disappointed in their expectations. Discontents, caballing and representations followed, which produced a letter from the Board to the General, wherein amongst other things the Board gave it as their opinion, that it was in consequence of taking place by storm only, that the Army were entitled to the plunder. But as Tanjore was not taken at all, there was no plunder; therefore they had no right to expect any gratification on that account. However, should the Nabob be disposed to give them a free gift, their regard for the Army, they said, would make them encourage such a disposition. The expeditions against the Marwar and Naalcooty followed soon afterwards; and as it was (p.11) the accommodation with Tanjore alone, which prevented the Army from receiving an immense sum of ransom money, Ramnadporam was stormed nobody knew how; but it was after terms had been partly agreed upon and might have been soon adjusted, had not the Troops rushed into the place, during some little misunderstanding, which happened at the time amongst the Marwar's people. Caracoil fell next, and was taken by surprise while the Naalcooty's Vaqueels were in actual treaty with the young Nabob and the General. By which the place became forfeited to the army.

After the siege of Tanjore was raised, the Nabob agreed to give five lacks of rupees to the army as a free gift, in recompence for their fatigues of the siege. At Ramnadporam which was taken by storm, his son agreed to give a certain sum to each officer to redeem the place from pillage and on the surprise of Caracoil the young Nabob was obliged to compound for fifty thousand Pagodas with the troops on the spot. Although the Circar troops were employed on all these services, and suffered inconveniences, dangers and fatigues alike with the Company's, yet the Company's officers claim the whole of the Nabob's present, to the total exclusion of his own natural troops*. This produced the eighteenth article in the Nabob's letter.

In those twenty four articles is contained the substance of everything the Nabob wishes in order to establish a firm and lasting friendship with the Company from which, I think, it will appear, that he is neither extravagant nor unreasonable. And he himself is now in hopes that since his affairs are so well understood, (p.12) they may be finally adjusted with the Company in England under the friendly protection of His Majesty; or on the spot, should the King be graciously disposed to follow that method, and should it be

more agreeable to the Company under the eye of one of His Majesty's own immediate servants, and any one whom the Company may depute for that purpose.*

This my Lord, I think, finishes all the Nabob's business, as far it depends on any information which can be transmitted either of the situation of his affairs, of his disputes with the Company's servants or of his applications for redress, and to complete everything which I can transmit of the state of the country. **I have also enclosed extracts from my Diary, of some transactions which are well known to almost everybody here. By which many of the inhabitations have been ruined, but by which Your Lordship will see, that the Company's servants in high stations, had other means of getting fortunes, besides improving their money either by Trade or lending it at interest and this will assist, to account for the immense riches, which have fallen to the share of some individuals in India.**

I have not had an opportunity of being so well acquainted with the state of the Northern Circars, as they are entirely under the direction of the Company's servants, and all will have the appearance of mystery and secrecy, but the fortunes made at Masulipatnam, Vizagapatnam, Ganjam and other residences both by the Chiefs themselves, the Councillors, their favourites and friends, are immense. I am very well informed that the Chief of Masulipatnam makes not less than one lack of Pagodas, and the (p.13) chief of Vizagapatnam two lacks of rupees every year exclusive of what may be got by trade, which indeed is but little attended to, and the allowance they make to the Governor of Fort. St. George. The methods therefore are, new letting the farms for which nazirs or fines are paid to the Chief and every person officially concerned. The making war and peace with the refractory Rajahs, each of which carries its reward with it and the lending money to the inhabitants at a high interest. These loans are not always voluntary; but they are means of getting fortunes well understood by the lender, and which the borrower dares not refuse. This practice prevails universally through all the Company's Circars, from the highest to the lowest in their service at this day. Money is frequently borrowed in Madras at eight percent to be improved to twenty five, thirty, forty or more percent per annum in the Company's Circars.*

Accounts from Bengal mention, that the new Governor Hastings is on a tour through the provinces, in order to introduce such regulations as may seem necessary; and that he has established a very rigid system of economy by which the company will be immense gainers every year.

The King Shah Allum is at Delhi, perfectly out of the Company's power, and has been ever since I came to this country. This has made me regret exceedingly that the situation of things has been such, as to put it absolutely out of my power, either to carry or to send by any proper messenger the King's letters (p.14) and presents to His Imperial Majesty. However, that he might not be ignorant of His Britannick Majesty's friendship and that he had been graciously pleased to entrust such testimonies of it to my care, I took the liberty to send copies and Persian Translations of His Majesty's letters to Shah Allum, with one from myself, of which the paper referred to is a copy. They were forwarded to Delhi by a Vaqueel sent expressly by the Nabob with an arshdaust from himself to the Patcha of Indostan. This measure I flatter myself will meet with His Majesty's approbation.

I have just received a letter from Mr. Du Pre of which the enclosed is a copy, acquainting me of his instructions from the Court of Directors, to be on his guard as they had cause to be apprehensive that the French still had hostile intentions with respect to India. I have sent

him such extracts as I judged necessary from Mr. Colpoys's Remarks made at the Mauritius together with Extracts of such articles of Intelligence as I have received from the Cape on the subject, and I have told him in the terms of the letter referred to, that as I have had no information from administration, I am apt to imagine there is no cause to be apprehensive of danger from that quarter at present. However, as I shall very soon sail for Bombay with the squadron to refit during the monsoon where I may expect to receive fresh instructions from your Lordship, I shall take such measures for ample information as shall seem expedient and that I shall communicate the same to the respective presidencies. But should he still think it either (p.15) useful or necessary, I shall be ready to send a sloop either to the Cape or to the Islands.

Since writing the above, I have received Mr. Du Pre's answer in which he agrees with me in opinion; but as I am informed that there is a probability that no ship will be dispatched from this presidency this year, and as I mean to leave nothing undone to promote the security of the Company's possessions, I have resolved to send the Hanke Sloop to the Cape of Good-Hope to endeavour to procure every possible information with respect to the state of the French force in India; with instructions to the Commanding Officer to use every such means on his return, as may best answer the intentions of his voyage. I intend sending my dispatches to your Lordship by the same opportunity under the care of the Honourable Mr. Finch, with directions to proceed with them from the Cape in the first homeward bound ship for England.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest Respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordships most obedient and most humble servant,

R. Harland

5.2. NAWAB'S HURT AT MADRAS GOVERNOR'S UNGRACIOUSNESS: SEPT. 1772

IOR: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773, pp. 17-19.

Fort St. George, 28 Sept 1772

My Lord,

The accompanying letter of the Nabob's, dated the Twenty sixth of September 1772 or 27th Jemadisanni 1186 Hizyra, which I have just received, wants very little explanation; but as many things are repeated in it, which are contained in the former letter, it may serve to give your Lordship some idea of the anxiety of the Nabob's mind, about the particulars therein mentioned; and of the sense he has of the ungracious conduct of the Governor, with respect to him, and to everything that belongs to his family.

I have sent along with this, all the papers enclosed in the Nabob's letter to me, except Mr. Pigot's agreement in 1760, and his letter to the Begum, and Mr. Bouchiers agreement in 1768, which I understand have already been sent to the Secretary of State by Sir John Lindsay. The Nabob, I believe, means by these to convince your Lordship that no former Governor would have refused him the same request he had made to Mr. Du Pre, and as I cannot conceive it possible, he never could think of giving any of the Nabob's family any support or protection against him, I am astonished the Governor refused this indulgence. (p.18)

The rest of the letter appears to me to want no explanation. The Nabob seems to think that after doing everything to oblige the company, their servants have made him but indifferent returns. That he has an undoubted right to the sole jurisdiction over his own people, in any part of his country, of which he esteems the Company's possessions as part, although enjoyed by them as Jaghire. That the conduct of the Company's Representatives, do not correspond with the favourable intentions of their Masters to him. That the advantage accruing both him and to the Company from his having English officers to his troops, and the necessity he is under of employing some Europeans immediately about his person, and in his family, such as Accountants and Surgeons, could not have been faithfully explained from hence or the Company, he thinks, would rather have contributed to his indulgence, than the contrary; and that he is still jealous of the encroachments of the Company's servants, unless their masters send positive orders to the contrary.

It has been told the Nabob, that Mr. Charles Smith, Mr. Monckton and others, who lent money at a high interest to the renters of the Jaghire, and who were complained against in the year 1770, have been severely censured in England for such practices. This has given him great concern as his wishes were to prevent the evil, but not on any account to hurt an individual. This benevolence of disposition has moved the Nabob to write a letter to the Governor, desiring (p.19) him to intercede for them in his name, and the accompanying paper is a copy of a translation which he has sent to me that I might forward it to your Lordship with the same request from the Nabob.*

I have the honour to be, with the greatest Respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordships most obedient and most humble servant,
Rb. Harland

5.3. NAWAB RESENTS COMPANY'S INTERFERENCE IN LIFE OF HIS SUBJECTS: SEPT. 1772

IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - (P/1. NAWAB TO SIR ROBERT HARLAND, 24.9.1772. (Translation), pp. 177-195 (extracts))

(181) It is true that since my residence at Madras, I have experienced no small inconvenience from the Company's servants interfering in matters of justice..

(182) ...have been relieved by an order from the Governor without making any application to me. By which my dignity is wounded and my revenue suffered. Also an attempt has been made to establish a judicial authority over my Bazar. Now my Bazar is a necessary part of my household over which I have a natural jurisdiction, which I cannot give up. I am always ready to do justice when any application is made to me. Or if the Company's servants agree to furnish my household with everything and in such manner as I may want, I can move my Bazar to my own country; but to suffer any other justice than my own, to intrude itself into my family is a privilege of a prince I cannot forego.

I never had the least idea or wish to have any judicial authority over the subjects of England; but to make the injustice of their assumed authority over my people the more striking, I mentioned the natural right I had to expect the same usage from them, which they required of me. There are many things which may appear but trifling circumstances to Europeans, and yet are of consequence to the good government of a people, different in their religions, peculiar in their customs, and distinct in their manners. Besides as the revenues of this country depend entirely on the cultivation and fertility of the ground, to promote these becomes the principal object of the prince's care. Need I complain then of that arbitrary exertion of authority in the Company's servants over my people? To press for purposes of servitude the natives and their bullocks which are destined for the cultivation of the ground. To oblige them to borrow money at an exorbitant interest for which their property and the produce of their industry is mortgaged. To take by force or to oblige them to furnish what they had laid up for the supply of their families, or for the purposes of husbandry, at a low price or for nothing, to enter into and to make use of their houses at pleasure; even to enter the apartments of the women whose cast require them to be seen by their husbands only. Are these hardships? And when all these exertions of power are exercised by the Dubashes also over their countrymen under the cloak of their masters. With the rod of authority constantly in their hands: and when consequent punishments follow the most trifling offence. When demands are made without end; and remission to be obtained for money only. All these are grievances much more intolerable than any attempt to interfere with justice. Because such prevent cultivation, disappoint industry, ruin and distress my people, diminish my revenues and desolate my country.

After six and twenty years constant and uniform attachment to the Company, after refusing every offer, and rejecting every temptation from European and Indian powers to detach myself from them, after embarking my whole fortune with theirs, and when we are so joined that our mutual prosperity must depend on a close union and intimate connexion with one another, it would be below my dignity, and an insult to their understanding, to think any fresh declarations of friendship necessary. I know it is my interest to be connected with the English Company forever, and they never had nor ever can have such a friend in India as I have been, and still am to them. Therefore, while mutual interests connects us so strongly to one another, let them never believe any insinuations, that it is my wish to detach myself

from them. But they may give me credit when I tell them, that such insinuations are produced by the decline of another interest, the support of which, is not consistent either with theirs or mine.

(i) LOANS FORCED ON PEOPLE AT 48% P.A.

IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - N/3. COPY OF A LETTER FROM SAID AASEM CAWN BAHADUR TO CAPT. FLETCHER BAHADUR, COMMANDING THE GARRISON AT ONGOLE, DATED THE 28TH JULY 1772, pp. 197-198.

I have received your letter to me - accompanied with an arzee for his Highness the Nabob, with a paper under the Signature of Ramiah renter. In yours you wrote that the said renter had given it under his hand to pay your money in twenty days; but that you had received the principal only without interest and that you required an order for him to pay the interest also. I have laid these before the Nabob and am commanded to acquaint you that his Highness is very sensible when the inhabitants want money they will borrow it at any interest without considering whether ever it will be in their power to repay the same, but when the time of payment comes, and they find it impossible to answer the demand of their creditors, they run away by which means the country is ruined by the loss of its inhabitants.

It is the custom and orders of the Company that no money should be lent at more than 10 percent per annum, **but you have made the inhabitants give it under their hands to pay you at the rate of forty eight (48) percent per annum. It is absolutely impossible for them to pay such interest, therefore they must be ruined and the country with them and even then the lender disappointed in his expectations***. To prevent all these His Highness commands me to acquaint you that out of pure friendship for you, he is willing to pay you this interest for this once himself, and has given orders to his amuldahr accordingly; but he has strictly enjoined me not to suffer any money to be lent to any of the inhabitants, amuldahrs or servants of the circar for the future. I am therefore to request the favour of you not to do so yourself, nor suffer any of your servants to do so, that we may be not brought into difficulties on that account. I am always your friend.

What can I say more?

P.S.: I send you herewith the Nabob's answer to your letter and an order from Rogal Pundet to Ramiah.

(ii) EXHORBITANT INTEREST

IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - N/4. TRANSLATION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM ONGOLE DATED 27 RABBISANNY 1186 REGYNA OR 29TH JULY 1772, pp. 327-330

Mr. Fletcher Bahadur (himself) has money transactions with fourteen village people in the time of Monudharam Cawn and Idrat Talab Cawn (Nabob's managers) which comes to a hundred (100) percent interest to this time, of which the inhabitants have paid part, which he deducted out of the interest. The remaining interest he added to the principal which is now is his account with the inhabitants, the whole bearing interest, that they may not be

ever clear from his debt giving them trouble and disturbance in such a manner that they cannot bear, of which the renter being informed he gave orders to some of the village people to clear the debt. Some of the inhabitants had no abilities to pay. There is one village called Woolagee the produce of which is seven hundred (700) pagodas per annum, and Capt. Fletcher's demand upon it is five hundred (500) pagodas. In such manner are the transactions of the Europeans with the inhabitants of fourteen villages. Therefore it is impossible they should flourish. Some of the inhabitants paid what money they could and afterwards finding they could not go any longer they ran away. Others of them considered that if they run away they would be brought back prisoners and therefore remain in their houses selling their cattle and everything else to pay the money. Besides the commands they give to the villages are such; Mr. Fletcher wanted some timbers for beams and obtained an order from the renter to a village called Pootour for that purpose, he sent people there who remained in the village twenty two days. They received twenty two Madras Pagodas allowance from the inhabitants, they required twenty bullocks to draw the timber. Now this is the time to plough and cultivate the ground and no time is to be lost; but when the bullocks are taken away this must cease; therefore the inhabitants have come and complained but the renter pacified them and sent them back. Besides which the demand of straw, sticks &c. made by Capt. Fletcher, the commandant and other sepoy officers and other people are beyond description. No revenues in this season, notwithstanding which the inhabitants purchase those things demanded from other countries and supply them. Therefore there is a dispute between the renter and European officers, on account of which they always make such demands. He demands four thousand nine hundred (4900) pagodas and the interest which is due to him from Idrat Talab Cawn, of which I have paid four thousand (4000) pagodas and nine hundred (900) pagodas are still which the renter promises to pay in one month; but the European gentleman requires it immediately and for which he gives a great deal of trouble. The renter says he will wait on him personally; but Capt. Fletcher refuses, therefore the business is transacted in writing between them.

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**(iii) EUROPEANS FORCE THEIR WAY INTO PRIVATE HOMES, PRESS PEOPLE, EVEN MILITARY MEN**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - N/15.  
 TRANSLATION OF AN ARZEE IN PERSIAN, BY CHOTTAR SING, VAQUEEL OF RAJAH BHANGAR  
 YATCHAM NAID JAMEDAR OF VENKETEGARY, RECEIVED 2ND AUGUST 1772.

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I have just received a letter from the Rajah Bhangar Yatcham Naid Bahadur my master. That the Europeans who came from Masulapatam to Naid Pettah on their way to Madras although there was a lodging for passengers and my master's people showed them the places, they did not chuse to halt there; but they went into my master's houses, breaking the locks and entering forcibly they took up their lodging there. They have received sheep, fowls, rice, &c. as much as they pleased for nothing, at their request as guests. When they departed from thence they gave treat trouble by pressing the coolies. At last they wrote a letter to my master in Gentoo language, the original and translation of which is here annexed. The Talka of Naid Pettah is assigned over to Rajahwar, Elaiwar and Cammewar casts, who are military men, and always have a most sacred regard for their honour. When they are brought to what they think such disgrace the country must be ruined, I therefore entreat your Highness will be pleased to take such measures, that they may not be liable to receive such injuries from the Europeans for the future.



3rd August, Chottar Sing present, declares about two months ago, a detachment passed from Masulapatam to Madras took everything, sheep, fowls, curries, pots, &c. &c. &c. without making the smallest allowance for anything. And they pressed coolies not minding who, even taking gentlemen if they came in their way for that purpose. They even went so far as to abuse them on their march. The inhabitants acquiesced in everything least the Nabob should be displeased; but the inhabitants had the Nabob's Dustuck for their protection, which they shewed to the soldiers without their paying any regard to it. These casts are the sepoy or soldiers of the Rajah, and as he is obliged to attend the Nabob with his force in war, these are his military; then leaving the cultivation of the ground to others but in time of peace they employ themselves this way.

#### (iv) THE PROCESS OF LENDING MONEY TO AMULDAHRS

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - ALLY NAVIS CAWN'S ACCOUNT OF THE METHODS USED BY THE COMPANY'S SERVANTS TO OBLIGE THE NABOB'S AMULDAHRS &C. TO BORROW MONEY. O/1. EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY - MONDAY 27TH JULY 1772.

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#### ALLY NAVIS CAWN

As soon the commanding officers of the different garrisons and the paymasters hear that the amuldahr is pressed for money, they go to him, you want money, I have ten or twenty thousand pagodas at your service and you may have it for whatever time you please. They then agree for an interest of two, three or four percent per mensem. And so much is to be paid at a certain time in money and so much in paddy. Then they say, as I lend you this money you will give me your paddy at a low price, that is to say, you will give me two markals per pagoda more than the market price, to which to gain favour they agree. And as the amuldahrs granaries are more convenient to keep it in, you will let it remain with you till I want it. Very well, servants peons, etc. are set over it to take care that the commanding officers paddy is kept separate from the amuldahrs, whose batta &c. he must pay as long as they are with him. And as paddy loses of its measure by keeping, the full quantity with the additional two markals on each pagoda must be measured out by the amuldahrs or by his people to the purchaser from the commanding officer, and whatever deficiency may happen the amuldahr must make it good. Besides as the officers are not acquainted with the manners of the country, the amuldahr must hire bullocks or coolies to carry it to whatever place, the commanding officer or paymaster pleases, and deliver it to his people free of all expense. The time of disposing of it always is when rice is at the highest, and during its sale every other market is shut up, so that the price on that account is increased also. By these means the amuldahrs loses ... percent, the country people are very much imposed upon, the Company's people receive not only extravagant interest upon the whole; but all this profit upon the paddy and acquire immense fortunes, while the Nabob by the frequent bankruptcies of his principal servants is deprived of a great part of his revenue. And should the Nabob make any complaint then they say what, you complain when we have lent you our money there is no money in your country, your country is ruined, what would you have done had we not lent you this money. And now you throw difficulties in the way of our recovering it, and making the usual advantages.

Should the paddy become cheaper and the purchase undisposed of, the paddy is then left in the hands of the amuldahrs who is to be accountable to them in money. In that case they speak to him in smooth words, telling him he know much better how to dispose of it than they do. Therefore the next time the amuldahr wants money they agree to let him have whatever he may want, to which they add the original price of the paddy undisposed of, the

two markals per pagoda addition, the servants wages and batta who took care of it, with the interest of the whole from the first day, of which they make one aggregate sum, and for which they receive the amuldahrs bond bearing the interest and payable in a certain time as may be agreed on.

Such practices very often oblige the Nabob to turn his amuldahrs out, as he cannot be but sensible that they never can pay such exorbitant demands of interest without ruining the inhabitants or defrauding the circar; and sometimes he has other reasons for appointing others in certain districts. Then those who have been the money lenders complain that such persons are so much in their debt and require that either the Nabob suffer them to remain in the management of their district till they be able to pay them what they owe, or that he take the debt upon himself. If the Nabob should be inclined to suffer the amuldahr to remain according to their request, he knows there would be no end of such practice, and his country would be inevitably ruined; he is therefore obliged to chuse the least of two evils and to take the accumulated sum the produce of such practices upon himself, and either to pay it or to give his bond for the whole, liable to ten percent interest per annum.

When the amuldahrs get in debt to the Company's servants they seldom live in the towns or forts; but retire into the countries to avoid the importunities of their creditors. The Dubashes then of the money lenders are sent to demand payment at the time it is due. These set out in a state little inferior to their masters, and on their arrival they are treated with all the elegance of the country. Their train of palanqueen boys, peons, &c. &c. &c. receive both wages and batta from the debtor, and even dancing girls and every species of expensive amusement are procured for them at the amuldahrs expence. And when they think it necessary to return, in consideration for a bribe which they accept they go back without the money, and make an excuse to their master on account of the poverty of the man &c. &c. &c. All these exorbitant exactions puts it more and more out of the power of the debtor to discharge his debt; and at last the whole with all the increase of a heavy interest comes upon the Nabob to pay.

It was the custom of Collendah Moodally who was the Dubash of the paymaster of Trichanopoly from the first time, the Europeans had a garrison there to Mr. Hoyer's time, to oblige all the amuldahrs, renters and servants of the circar to take money from him at an exorbitant interest. He not only did this to all those of the Trichanopoly district; but he came to Ally Navis Cawn then Manager in the Tinnevely country and asked him if he did not want money, and desired him to accept some from him at such an interest. He told him he did not want money, that he had three thousand pagodas by him, which he would give him free of interest to lend to any one he pleased, and that he only would expect it when called upon for money from the circar, he also told him that he would be much obliged to him if he would not insist on his borrowing from him; by such means and fair words he got off.

**This same Collendah was the man that went to the Rajah of Tanjore, and offered to raise the money agreed on for the ransom of his country last year, for which he received a present of fifty thousand rupees for himself; besides the premium and interest agreed on for his master, notwithstanding all which the Rajah was obliged to pawn plate and jewels to the full amount of the sum borrowed; one lack of pagodas of which remains as yet unpaid; and the interest continues to go on.\***

Narren Piellah who was the Dubash to the Commanding Officers of Trichanopoly from the first English garrison to Col. Hood's time used to carry on the same trade.

**(v) PRINCIPAL LOAN INCREASED BY 40% IN WANTING TO MAKE THE 8%  
INTEREST LOOK MODERATE**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - O/2. EXTRACT  
FROM THE DIARY, TUESDAY JULY 28TH 1772, PP.331.

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The commanding officer at Ongole had wrote to Assem Cawn Bahadur acquainting him that the Nabob's renter had not paid him some interest due on a certain sum of money which he had lent him, and requesting an order from the Nabob for the payment. And this day Assem Cawn wrote to him acquainting him that the Company's order was only ten percent, yet he had obliged the inhabitants to give obligations at the rate of forty eight percent per annum. That they could not pay so much without ruining both themselves and the country; however on his laying all this before the Nabob, out of pure friendship for him, and to prevent bad consequences both to his people and country, the Nabob was willing for this once to pay this interest himself; but absolutely forbid lending any money to his people for the future.

I was also informed that this practice was universal all over the Carnatick; and the Company's commanding officers or paymasters, not only employed their own money this way; but all their friends, and even people in high stations sent their money to be employed in this way. But now to avoid it being known as much as possible, the principal sum was first mentioned then the agreement for the interest; and if it was 48 percent per annum, the 40 percent was added to the principal both which added made the sum specified in the bond; and the 8 percent interest appears only as charged for the whole. By which means a charge of interest was made upon 40 percent more than the principal, or 48 for 60 every year.

**(vi) MADRAS BRITISH GOVERNOR MAKES MONEY EXTORTS BRIBES**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - O/3. EXTRACT  
FROM THE DIARY, SUNDAY 26TH JULY 1772, pp. 332

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In Mr. Palk's time there was one Poushpanadar Nincary a renter of Conjeevaram or Poonamalee, and who had formerly been a manager of the Nabob and was very much in debt to him on account of Wandiwash, &c. The Nabob sent him prisoner to Arcot, he complained to the Governor, who sent a very haughty message to the Nabob desiring to know why he dared to confine one of the Company's renters, and by the Governor's order without consulting the Nabob he was sent under a Guard from Arcot to Madras and delivered up to him. Nincary made interest, paid fifteen thousand pagodas to Mr. Palk and five or six thousand to his Dubash, and the same night he was suffered to escape. Next morning, Mr. Palk with all Nincary's creditors came to the Nabob. This man whom you just confined say they, and delivered over yesterday has made his escape; you must pay us all the money he owed us. It was in vain for the Nabob to urge the injustice of his demand; that they had taken the man out of his power, that he himself, and many of his servants were also losers; he was obliged to take the whole debt upon himself - both principal and the accumulated interest added, to near a lack of pagodas for which he was obliged to give interest bonds.

**(vii) REFUSING TO PAY CUSTOM DUTY FOR MERCHANDISE IN THEIR  
NAME, ALSO DEMANDING FORCED LABOUR, TRANSPORT**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - O/4. EXEMPTION FROM CUSTOMS AND TOWN DUTIES. EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY, TUESDAY JULY 28TH 1772, pp. 339-340

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There are certain offices established all over the Carnatick for collecting the duties of the circar upon all merchandize, or on all such goods as are transported from one place to another; but the baggage of the Company's servants have been exempted from this, not by any particular specification but they have always been considered as not liable to pay duty. However under colour of this priviledge, not only goods for sale have been transported by some; but the Dubashes of the principal servants either in the civil or military department have assumed all the authority of their masters on the like occasions, obliging the circar officer to pass whatever they pleased without examination, by placing their masters name on the parcels. If the officer should stop them, they complain to their masters, and they are always sure to be justified against the circar people, who are fortunate if they escape without some mark of resentment. And this has been carried to such a height that even common hawkers and pedlars, besides more considerable merchants have made a practice of writing the names of Commanding Officers of certain places or of some of the Company's servants upon packages and under this sanction have passed through all the Nabob's Cutcherries. Should the circar officer stop them, they immediately apply to the Dubash, who tells his master of a brother or a near relation bringing up a few things, silks, linnen cloths or some other goods for the use of the officers of the garrison and that they had wrote his name upon it; but that it had been stopped by the circar people. This is sufficient, the officer in a passion that any thing with his name on it should be stopped by these fellows, sends sepoys for their protection to bring it on, or perhaps apply to the Nabob for redress, and demands no less than the punishment, or the dismissal of the officer who had done his duty.

**But still a greater evil than the defrauding the Nabob of his revenues attends all this; for it has been accompanied with circumstances of oppression infinitely more destructive to the country. For the amuldahrs and the Nabob's officers have been forced to press the country people from their labour, to furnish coolies, not only to carry the baggage or effects belonging to the Company's servants; but it has been the common practice of their Dubashes, and for merchants hawkers and pedlars under their protection to transport goods merchandize &c. from place to place with their masters name affixed, and accompanied with a peon or cooley with the Company's badge, obliging all the circar officers wherever they went not only to pass them duty free; but also to furnish coolies to transport them free of all expense, threatening them if they refused, and sometimes throwing down the goods, telling them they must be answerable for the consequences if they did not forward them. For such services the merchants can well afford to pay high rewards to those, through whose favour they receive such indulgences, as in the inland countries they receive from thirty six to fifty percent to upwards upon Madras goods according to the distance; but this arbitrary manner of forcing the country people from their labour by which they maintain their family has obliged many of them to leave their habitations, and to search for shelter and more security under the Government of those Indian princes who are much less connected with Europeans and who we call despotism and slavery.\***

### **(viii) TWO LAKHS TO GOVERNOR FOR APPOINTMENT TO NORTHERN CIRCARS**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - O/5. EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY, FRIDAY 25TH SEPTEMBER 1772, pp. 345.

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Cootoobut Doulah is one of Hussun Ally Cawn's honorary names. So that by his arzee of the 19th March 1766 to the Nabob it appears that he had agreed to give two lacks of rupees to the Governor for his appointment to the circars to be paid through the Nabob's hands. Which was done partly by that means and partly by the hands of Mr. Pybus then Chief at Masulipatnam. This with other proportional Nazirs given to the Company's principal servants at the time appears to account for the preference given to Hussun Ally; although they had sent General Cailland to the Nabob on purpose to bring him to Madras, to settle this affair and to accept the management of the circars. The Nabob was then going into the Madura and Tinnevely countries to settle them; but left that business by which he suffered great loss, and came to Madras. He was however disappointed and Hussun Ally Cawn preferred.

### **(ix) THE MANNER OF MAKING BRITISH FORTUNES IN SOUTH INDIA**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - O/6. EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY, SUNDAY 26TH JULY 1772, pp. 347-348

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The Governor and Council are as well acquainted with the different times of the coming in of the rents of the Carnatick as the Nabob, and ought in friendship to suit their demands to the times when they know he can most easily answer them. This however has not been the case, for it has always been customary to press him most, when they could not be ignorant that he was least able to pay, which reduced him to the necessity either to be hard upon his country to raise money for them, to borrow from all hands at a high premium and great interest, or to shew favour to themselves in order to obtain a month or two's respite.

The money that they receive for the Company in the Carnatick and the Northern Circars comes nearly to between ninety and a hundred lacks of rupees a year, so that the Nabob can hardly suppose their necessities are so very pressing; but whenever he finds them particularly anxious for money for the Company, he knows they want him to shew favour. And after all, the difficulties he labours under his own country are not to be expressed; he cannot even buy a piece of cloth for his own wear; but he must employ one of his servants to buy it as if it were for themselves; should he do it, the Company's merchants would immediately complain to the Governor and Council and say that the Nabob had interfered with the weavers and spoiled their contracts.

Sometime ago there were merchants in the Nabob's country as well as in others. Those merchants used to buy up the grain of the inhabitants; and to furnish them with money for the circar for it is the custom in Indostan when the grain is cut down to divide it between the circar and the labourer in certain proportions according to the nature of the grain, the labour necessary in cultivating it, and the fertility of the country. In the Tanjore country for instance the labourer has only two tenths of the produce of his lands, which is perfect sufficient to repay him for all his labour. But the circar very often leaves what is its proportion with the inhabitants for which they pay money. This is bought by the merchants and in this manner the circar revenue used to be paid; but ever since the Company got such footing in the country the Commanding Officer and the paymaster oblige all the inhabitants to take money from them at two, three and four percent per mensem to pay the circar

demands. The merchants have entirely left the country, as there is no advantage to be got by any but by the Commanding Officer and the paymaster' people. The inhabitants know not how to dispose of their grain to refund the money borrowed of the Company's people; and when they find themselves beyond remedy, they run off. Their creditors then seize on their effects, and not only of the effects of their immediate debtors, but on their neighbours so far as is necessary to discharge the whole. Then unless the Nabob pay the whole debt, together with the high interest and sustain all the loss of the sale of the grain, the village becomes deserted and the country would be very soon depopulated. In this manner have the fortunes of all the Commanding Officers and paymasters been made.

### **(x) THE AVARICIOUS BRITISH COMMANDANT AND THE POLYGAR**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - O/7. EXTRACT  
FROM THE DIARY, SUNDAY 26TH JULY 1772, pp. 351-353.

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An account of the present Commandant at Ongole.

In 1768, the officer commanding the troops at Ongole having settled all that country, told Assem Cawn that they must do something with somebody else. And in the neighbourhood one of Bazalat Jungs Polygars commanded a very strong Fort called Venecondah. The Commandant said they must go and attack him; on Assem Cawn's representation that they had nothing to do with this Polygar and that as he belonged to Bazalut Jung, it might bring them into trouble. He still persisted telling him; why am I sent to command at their place but to get money, and I must not let such an opportunity slip. Accordingly without the least pretence or injury received he marched against him, Assem Cawn went with him. On coming before the place, the Commandant received letters from the Governor and Council (Hyder was then in the Carnatick) ordering him to send off an officer with 500 sepoys and as many Europeans to Madras immediately and to hold himself in readiness to march with the rest at a moment's warning. He communicated this to Assem Cawn, and told him we must reduce this fellow first, and you, says he, must bear witness for me that I did not receive this letter till afterwards, for we must not acknowledge the receipt of this now. He then summoned the Fort, which the Polygar refused to deliver. The Cawn then persuaded him to get some conversation with the Polygar and by his mediation they met in a tent between the army and the place. The Commandant, Assem Cawn and a third person with a few sepoys only, and the Polygar had above 2000 peons all round them. The Polygar then asked what he wanted with him and why he came before his Killa. The Commandant said, you have two guns belonging to one of our Polygars whom we have reduced, you must deliver them up. He answered, I have no guns of any of your Polygars; but I have twelve guns of my own, if you want two guns you may chuse which you please. Then says he a great many of our Polygar people have deserted to you, you must deliver them up. The Polygar answered, I know of none of your people in my Killa; but if you please you may go into the Fort, and if you find any of them you may take them with you. The reason of those questions was, he did not want either guns or men; but a pretence to demand money of the Polygar to make up matters. Every such pretence however proving in vain and Assem Cawn fearing his coming to extremities, offered to be a mediator and told them he would endeavour to get some money for him from the Polygar, and with great difficulty prevailed on him to give three thousand pagodas. The Commandant wanted more; but the Polygar would not. Then says he, I will take him prisoner with these sepoys; without considering that he was surrounded with the Polygars peons; and even went so far as to threaten to beat him, he was however dissuaded. Very well says the Captain, but I want a horse, I must have a horse,

you shall have one says he. And on the Polygars return to the fort, he sent him a dress, shawls and a horse; the horse did not please him. I don't want a horse says he to Assem Cawn, tell the Polygar to give me a thousand pagodas and keep his horse, the Polygar would not agree to that. I must have another horse then says the Commandant, a better one, he was promised one; but this horse not coming time enough, he rode to the Fort himself unattended, and was refused admittance by the peons guarding the barrier. He was in a great passion; and sent for Assem Cawn, who sent a message to the Polygar, requesting he would give him leave to come in. The Polygar was displeased, why says he should this officer come up demanding entrance into my Fort without my leave. The Cawn made the matter appear as favourable as possible telling him it was the European custom to visit after making friends, that he only came in friendship to see his place. They were admitted, and on mentioning the horse, the Polygar told him, I have twelve horses in my stables you shall have your choice. On hearing of twelve horses, Oh, I must have more, for some of my officers want horses, and he insisted on having four horses, he got them. The Polygar then appointed him a house to refresh in and sent him fruits &c. About this time, one of Bazalat Jung's Jamedahrs was passing on horseback, who had been there to collect the rents for his master. He was well mounted and the horse pleased the Commandant; he run up and stopped the horse, and swore he would have that horse. After much cavilling the Polygar was obliged to pay two thousand rupees to the Jamedahr and to give the horse. Assem Cawn then prevailed on the Commandant to return two of the former horses; so that he carried off three, shifting his own furniture on the Jamedahr's horse and rode off. But before went away, he pulled a watch out of his pocket, and presented it to the Polygar, telling him he was his best friend; that it had been sent him from Europe by his brother; but he insisted of this acceptance as a proof of friendship. The Polygar refused, saying he did not understand it. But the Commandant insisted on his taking as a token of remembrance. The Polygar told him, that was not necessary, for he should certainly remember him as long as he lived without any such proof; however he left the watch with the Polygar. The Commandant was scarce gone when he repented his giving the watch, saying as it was his brother's present, he ought not to have given it away ; and wanted to send for it. Assem Cawn told him; you gave it away as a proof of friendship, you cannot ask it back. However he sent his Dubash to the Fort, and halted his men till he brought the watch back, he also wanted to wait till he received the three thousand pagodas. But Assem Cawn agreed to pay that to him for the Polygar, that he might not be detained from more essential business; and accordingly did pay it to him.

#### **(xi) NAZARS ETC. TO GOVERNORS AND OTHERS TO GET RENTER APPOINTMENTS**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - O/8. RENTER AND OFFICIALS AND THE NEED TO BORROW. EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY, THURSDAY 13TH AUGUST 1772, pp. 355-356.

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One Rajow Pundit had been renter of St. Thome ever since the siege of Madras, and of Devicottah soon after, till very lately. He rented the former at 700 pagodas per annum and the latter at 1900 pagodas both from the Company. Mr. Palk [the GOVERNOR of Madras] a little before his departure let both these farms to the same man for five years for which over and above the rent he usually paid the company, he was to pay a Nazir to the Governor of 2000 pagodas a year; but as Mr. Palk was going to England he required the whole to be paid at once. Accordingly the man was obliged to borrow 10,000 pagodas at a very high interest to answer this demand. There had been a Nazir annually paid for every year before also; and when Mr. Bouchier came to the Government, he also expected his present although Mr.

Palk had made the renter pay for five succeeding years. And however far the Governor went, the Dubash always kept pace with his master. The consequence of this was that Rajow was able to stand it no longer and in the year 1770, he broke for 30,000 pagodas over and above his whole substance.

It seems some people who understood some of those transactions between him and the Governors, &c. &c. &c. advised him to write to Mr. Palk and to tell him his situation and what had been the cause of his misfortunes. Either the man or some other person did so; and last year an order came from Mr. Palk to Mr. Goodlad his attorney to pay him 5000 pagodas. Which I am told was done. But the man was ruined and this came much too late.

**This has been the fate of all the Company's renters in the Jaghire for many years past, all had been ruined by the same means. The Company's rents are easily paid; but the Nazir to the Governors, Councillors, Secretaries and Dubashes must also be paid, which obliges the renter to borrow money at a very high interest of forty, fifty or sixty percent and the produce of the farm not being able to discharge all those demands, the possessor must be inevitably ruined. At the same time mentioned several practices of the Dubashes for extorting money. Should any of those renters refuse to pay them a Nazir, the Dubash takes care to send heavy demands upon him from time to time, which he knows him unable to comply with. These he represents to his master as trifles and tells him of the refusal of the renters to oblige him in so small a matter. This the master believes and without enquiry orders the fellow to be flogged. This should infallibly be put in execution, if he do not buy off the disgrace by a sum of money, which he seldom fails to do; on which the Dubash tells his master that he will do better next time and begs him off. This is a common practice from the Governor of a province to the lowest officer civil or military when in command, or when they have any separate authority. Some thousand mangoes, hundreds of fowls, a great numbers of sheep &c. are demanded greatly above the man's abilities, and when he represents his situation and that he has not so many to send. The Dubash tells his master. I asked says he only a few mangoes of such a one, as you were to have company and the fellow refused them. And should these practices fail of producing the intended effect the renter is made appear to be so bad a man that his farm is taken from him and he is left to starve; which obliges him to borrow money at a very high premium and interest in order to wear out his time a little longer, for he is certain of being ruined at last.\***

**(xii) PRESSING OF MEN, CATTLE, SUPPLIES IN MADRAS PRESIDENCY: C. 1770s**

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IOL: Home Misc 111 : Sir Robert Harland to Earl of Rockford (No. XII) Recd. 10th April 1773 - O/10. EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY, FRIDAY 31ST JULY 1772, pp. 363-365.

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(p.363)

(From Tazud Dien Killedar of Ongole and Rayal Pundat, Omdaht al Omrah's Manager.)

After the taking of Ongole for the Nabob, one Mr. Bruce came there to command the troops in Garrison, both those of the Nabob and of the Company. In that country the seasons are divided into four months wet weather and four months dry. In the first period they cultivate the ground and keep all their cattle about them; but in dry weather as they have no provision either in grass, straw and even water for their cattle, they send them all out of the country towards the borders of the Krishna. However as the officers wanted butter and milk they obliged the inhabitants to bring cows and to keep and feed them at their own expense for that purpose, without allowing them any reward, although they were obliged to



send for what they wanted to a great distance. Nay if their cattle died, through want as the country could not maintain them, the poor inhabitants sustained the loss to their own ruin.

Ongole is but a small place, therefore the custom of pressing the inhabitants is the more felt, as they are but few. However if the commanding officer, his dubash, or any of his servants, wanted to go any where on business, orders were sent to the amuldahr to provide coolies with doolies &c. as many as they wanted. And as the Company's servants frequently travel between Madras and Masulapatnam, Ongole being in the high road, word is sent forward of their coming, and the amuldahr is obliged to provide everything necessary for their reception. But what distresses the country more than any thing is the pressing of the inhabitants to serve as coolies, which is done on (p.364) the above occasions; and as Ongole itself is not capable to furnish as many as those gentlemen want they must be pressed out of all the country round; so that the cultivation is perfectly neglected and the season lost for want of hands. Besides the poor people are kept waiting till those gentlemen arrive, and sometimes for several days while they amuse themselves with their friends, and then to carry them on so far for so many days more, without either receiving pay or batta, and are left to starve unless the amuldarh or some officer of the circar have compassion on them.

One Capt. Fitzgerald then came to the Commandant of this place, with a battalion of sepoy; houses were then ordered for all the officers both Europeans and Black officers and even for their servants which were all built and all the materials furnished at the amuldahr's expence. And detachments of sepoy were sent to collect those, all the country round at twenty or thirty miles distance, pressing and forcing the inhabitants and cattle to bring it to the garrison, the amuldahr paying the money. And afterwards they were obliged to furnish the straw for the garrison, which being exceeding scarce in that country it sometimes cost thirty, forty or fifty pagodas at a time. They were also obliged to supply the garrison with firewood, in both which not less than fifty coolies were employed everyday. For all which no pay nor batta was paid to the poor people; men and cattle were employed, the season lost, the circar deprived of its revenue and the inhabitants ruined. The same custom of supplying butter, milk &c. was also regularly insisted on; and very often the poor women were abused by sergeants, European soldiers, Topazes, &c. without redress. If a complaint was made the person was heard or not, according as the application was accompanied.

(p.365) About the end of 1766 Mr. Davis succeeded to the command, during which time and the time of the previous commander, one Mr. Perring who was paymaster used to lend money to the inhabitants at sixty percent per annum, forty eight to himself and twelve to the Dubash and Conicopillays about him.

The battalion of sepoy used sometimes to have 200 cattle belonging to them at a time. They were let loose in the country, and for want of grass the paddy fields of the poor people were eaten up, without any remedy, for if they should complain, perhaps sepoy were sent to protect them; but before that the whole crop was destroyed.

## 6. NABOB'S REVENUE TERMS

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Bodleian: Macartney Papers : MSS Eng. Hist B 184: Misc. Papers: (mostly military charts, data etc; some Arcot affairs; a key to cyphers; ff 1-196); the below is undated and unsigned (perhaps forms a part of the relevant Consultations in IOR).

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(ff 47r) His highness the Nabob having fixed his real revenue, of his different countries to a certain annual sum of an average; which sum at the most pacific time these countries cannot yield, now the revenue being made over to the honourable Company on condition that his Lordship is to rent out the countries. It is matter of the greatest consequence how to do it, at this present juncture and it is by no means eligible, just now to lower the amount which the Nabob says, his country has yielded him and as it is not possible that any one, will take the rent on these terms with the security of making good the payments it becomes a serious consideration how to determine the renting for the five years including the present Fusly 1191. It appears to be the most eligible plan at this juncture for the countries of Tinnevelly, Trichnopoly, Madura, Nellore, Sarvapuly, Palnad and Ongul that the present renters who are now in each of these countries fixed by the Nabob, should continue for the five years, from the beginning of this Phasly in following terms:

First: That they shall agree, to pay the sum of the real collection fixed by his Highness of their respective countries for which the kistbundy shall be made as normal and they shall give to his Lordship a security bond to that purpose and the payment of their kists to be made to the order of his Lordship regularly and on the failure of the payment of the first kist an amin shall be sent to inspect into the conduct, and on the failure of the second kist the renter shall be suspended and put under arrest in order to make (ff 47v) him answerable for the sums due and a new renter be appointed. But in case the renters fulfilling with their agreement then they shall be continued for five years; and when the enemy quit the country, they shall then give a saucar security for the future payments of their kists; also an allowance shall be made to them if the enemy causes any damage in their country. The charges of sebundy shall be allowed to them and they shall pay no other charges such as the expenses of the Tinayats and Muteena but those ordered by his Lordship and agreeable to his order only. The Hawaldar shall pay for which he will give him credit.

## 7. MANAGEMENT OF NABOB

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Bodleian: Macartney Papers: MSS Eng. Hist b 180: Accounts 1781-2, ff 228

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Letter to Lord Macartney, by Commissioners of Assigned Revenues (C.Oakley, Myles Irwin, Hall Plumer, David Halebruton, Geo Moubray) : dated 27.5.1782

(ff 158r) In considering the charges of the several districts, in order to establish better regulations, we were careful to discriminate those incurred for troops kept, or supposed to be kept up for the defence of the country, from those of the sibbendy, servants &c for the cultivation of the lands, and the collection of the revenues; as well as to pay attention to such of the established customs of the country, ancient privileges of the inhabitants, and public charities, as were necessarily allowed, and appeared proper to be continued; but which under the Nabob's Government were not only rated much higher, but had been blended under one confused and almost unintelligible title of expenses of the districts so joined perhaps to afford pleas and means of secreting and appropriating great part of the revenues to other purposes than fairly appeared; and certainly betraying the utmost neglect and mismanagement, as giving latitude for every species of fraud and oppression.

(ff 158v) ... The Nabob's accounts of the produce of these districts state as we have some reason to think, the sums which former renters engaged to pay to him (and which were seldom if ever made good) and not the sums actually produced by the districts; yet we have satisfaction to observe that the present aggregate rents upon an average are equal to these accounts....

(ff 162v - 163r)

Comparative Statement of the Revenue and Expenses of \_\_\_\_\_ while in the hands of the Nabob with those of the same countries on the terms of the leases lately granted for four years, to commence with the beginning of the Phaseley 1192 or the 12th July 1782 abstracted from the accounts received from the Nabob, and from the rents stipulated for and expenses allowed by the present leases.

| Gross Revenue                                                     |                                                        | Expenses                                |                                                              |                                  | Net Revenue                        |                                   |                         |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Annual Gross Rent by the Nabob's Account (at an average of the ?) | Annual Rent by present Leases at an average of 4 years | Annual Expenses by the Nabob's Accounts | Annual expenses allowed by the present leases at an estimate | Reduction in the Annual Expenses | Net Revenue by the Nabob's Account | Net revenue by the present Leases | Increase of Net revenue |
| <i>(Amounts in Star Pagodas)</i>                                  |                                                        |                                         |                                                              |                                  |                                    |                                   |                         |
| <b>Nellore &amp; Servapully</b>                                   |                                                        |                                         |                                                              |                                  |                                    |                                   |                         |
| 322,830                                                           | 361,900                                                | 198,794                                 | 33,000                                                       | 165,794                          | 124,036                            | 320,900                           | 204,864                 |
| <b>Ongle</b>                                                      |                                                        |                                         |                                                              |                                  |                                    |                                   |                         |
| 110,967                                                           | 55,000                                                 | 88,254                                  | -                                                            | 88,254                           | 22,713                             | 55,000                            | 32,287                  |
| <b>Palnad</b>                                                     |                                                        |                                         |                                                              |                                  |                                    |                                   |                         |
| 51,355                                                            | 53,500                                                 | 25,721                                  | 5,698                                                        | 20,023                           | 25,643                             | 47,802                            | 22,168                  |
| <b>Trichonopoly</b>                                               |                                                        |                                         |                                                              |                                  |                                    |                                   |                         |
| 289,993                                                           | 273,214                                                | 282,148                                 | 19,143                                                       | 263,005                          | 7,845                              | 254,071                           | 246,226                 |
| <b>Madura</b>                                                     |                                                        |                                         |                                                              |                                  |                                    |                                   |                         |
| 102,756                                                           | 60,290                                                 | 63,710                                  | 12,037                                                       | 51,673                           | 39,046                             | 48,253                            | 9,207                   |
| <b>Tinnevelly</b>                                                 |                                                        |                                         |                                                              |                                  |                                    |                                   |                         |
| 565,537                                                           | 579,713                                                | 164,098                                 | 70,368                                                       | 93,730                           | 401,439                            | 509,345                           | 107,906                 |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                                      |                                                        |                                         |                                                              |                                  |                                    |                                   |                         |
| <b>144,436</b>                                                    | <b>1383,617</b>                                        | <b>822,725</b>                          | <b>140,245</b>                                               | <b>682,479</b>                   | <b>622,658</b>                     | <b>1243,658</b>                   | <b>620,713</b>          |

(a) In the statement the Ongle country though it is included under the head of Gross Revenue, has been let for a certain sum exclusive of charges. If the expenses specified in the Nabob's Vasool Accounts for this district are added, the present Gross Revenue would appear to exceed the Nobob's and as this country is only let for one year, there may hereafter be an increase of its revenue.

(b) The Trichnopoly country is let for the above sum exclusive of the expenses of sibbendy and sadderward amounting by the Nabob's accounts to 130,000 per anum which are to be defrayed by the renter and the Jaghirs of Amir ul Ozrha and the Begum are not included in the present lease.

May 27, 1782

Chas Oakeley (& 4 others)

Note: 100 Madras Pagodas: 350 Rupees

## II. TANJORE

### 1. COPY OF A LETTER FROM JOHN SULLIVAN TO LORD MACARTNEY GOVERNOR OF MADRAS DATED PALAMCOTAH (IN THE COUNTRY OF TINNEVELLY) 16th Dec. 1781.

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Scottish Record Office : GD 51/3/499/9

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My Lord,

Since my arrival here, I have endeavoured to inform myself of the state of this country and its resources and I have infinite satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that all the accounts I have been able to obtain, show it to be the most productive province of the Carnatic, capable of further and great improvement under a well regulated administration, and of an immediate increase of revenue if the force now destined for the Southward should be employed to establish the authority of government, under the guarantee of the Company.

Under the separate management of the Nabob, this cannot be hoped for; nor can I encourage your Lordship to expect it, from the agency of native collectors, who at the distance of five hundred miles from Madras and in a country where more dignified representatives have been little respected will have both opportunities and excuses for misconduct.

This consideration would in itself induce me to submit to your Lordship whether it would not be advisable to except the province of Tinnevelly from the (539r) general regulation for the collection of the assigned revenue. But I am influenced by a stronger motive in the belief that your Lordship will improve the great work you have begun and obtain a permanent assignment of the country, not only equal to the Nabob's proportion of the Military expenses of the Carnatic, but to his quota towards a military fund; and there is no part of his dominion from which so much of this can be drawn, with so many political and commercial advantages, as from the province of Tinnevelly, which may now be estimated at a clear revenue of three lakhs of Pagodas, and in a few years of peace and good order might be increased to five lakhs of pagodas.

Since I have had any knowledge of India, the Nabob has made Tinnevelly the nursery for his own separate Army. The number and power of the Polygars furnished him with the excuse, and the distance from Madras made it difficult to ascertain the number or expense of his troops. The consequences of his having such an establishment were early foreseen, but it was (540r) reserved for your Lordship to know the extent of the evil, and to apply the only possible remedy by taking those troops into the service of the Company. Even this will prove but a partial remedy if the management of the Tinnevelly country should again fall into the hands of the Nabob, and all your Lordship's influence may not be sufficient to prevent it; if the present plan of employing on the spot the servants of the Company in the collection and general superintendancy should be discontinued. On the other hand, I will venture to say, that the great difficulty being now removed, by the Nabob's acquiescence to this plan for the present, he will soon be reconciled to the measure, and that an increase of revenue with a new and extensive commerce will be the reward of your Lordship's labour.

I may add that the vicinity of so attached a friend as the Raja of Travancore, and the certain aid that may be drawn from his troops, who are clothed and armed like our own, would render the revenue of Tinnevelly perfectly (540v) secure to us, whereas there is possibility that differences may be revived between the Nabob and the Rajah of Travancore.

To provide against such intestine feuds as much as can be and to complete the amount of the Nabob's subsidy, I will venture to suggest to your Lordship the idea of procuring an assignment of the Peishcush from all the southern Polygars together with the countries of Palnad and Ongole on the northern frontier of the Carnatic in like manner as I have proposed with regard to the country of Tinnevelly<sup>3</sup>. I am much mistaken, if the revenue from those assignments, under your Lordships direction would not fully acquit the Nabob to the Company.

In such an event, I am convinced your Lordship would wish that the rest of the Carnatic should be left at the disposition of the Nabob, and unless it should be grossly mismanaged, the revenue ought in a few years to liquidate his debts and enable him to leave a rich succession to his family.

I have the honour to be

Sd/-

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<sup>3</sup> The assignments here proposed may be estimated as follows :-

|                                         |     |           |             |
|-----------------------------------------|-----|-----------|-------------|
| Tinnevelly                              | ... | 500000    | Pagodas p.a |
| Madura                                  | ... | 100000    | Pagodas p.a |
| The Three Two Marwars                   | ... | 200000    | Pagodas p.a |
| Terriore, Warriar-<br>pollam & Arialore | ... | 125000    | Pagodas p.a |
| Ongole & Palnaud                        | ... | 125000    | Pagodas p.a |
| Total                                   | ... | 10,50,000 | Pagodas     |

## 2. LORD MACARTNEY TO Mr. LAURENCE SULLIVAN, LONDON (1782)

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Scottish Record Office: Nat Library of Scotland: MS 8327

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Private

Fort St. George  
January 28th, 1782

My dear Sir,

I wrote to you by the Nymph a few days since, and I now resume my pen to tell you by the swallow which sails tomorrow, that since my last Sir Eyre Coote is returned to Madras after having relieved Vellore and thrown near three months provision into it. He was attacked by the enemy both in going and returning, but his loss was very inconsiderable, not above 50 or 60 killed and wounded in both actions. Hyder finding that he could not make any impression retired with precipitation, and our troops for want of cavalry were unable to pursue him with any effect. Sir Eyre Coote seems much shaken by his late excursion. He was seized with an apoplectic fit at Trippassore on the 5th instant and it was some hours before he recovered. So great however was his zeal for the service that this accident did not prevent him from proceeding with the Army the next day in prosecution of his object. His mind is too active for the strength of his body, and the fatigues of his exertions seem considerably to have affected both. In truth on recollecting several passages I am almost led to think that the apoplexy has been hanging about him for a considerable time past. This hint will account to you for some strange letters he has written of late to the Select Committee; which have been answered with a temper, and in a manner which we hope you will approve. Our situation has been not a little delicate and embarrassing. We never could persuade him to come to Council or Committee, and from the conversations we have had with him, we never could collect any precise ideas of his opinions or intentions. To those accustomed to regularity of business and to act upon (32v) system and fixed principles, you will easily conceive how unpleasant my situation must be and nothing but a strong mind and steady temper could bear a man thro' the difficulties which daily arise from the failures of others. In this situation we are to look towards the next in Command. Sir Hector Munro is long known to you as a soldier, and in that line I have endeavoured to employ him to the best advantage for the Company. Whether arising solely from indisposition, or whether some little dissatisfaction at something that happened in Camp might not have been mixed with it, I know not, but when the Army returned to the field in September last, Sir Hector remained at Madras. He had it seems some time before made a rash vow never to sit in Council with Mr. Sadlier and nothing that I could urge was sufficient to induce him to alter his resolution. Here again we became lame for want of military assistance in our deliberations. In the beginning of October, I began to apprehend by the letters I received from Sir Edward Hughes and Colonel Braithwaite that my favourite project of getting possession of Vizagapatnam would be frustrated. I well knew the importance of it; I knew the mischief of delay, and determined to do everything that was possible to reduce it before the setting in of the Monsoon, or if not effected within that time even to risk continuing the siege during the Monsoon. Sir Hector Munro's taking the Command could give no umbrage to a junior officer; but the difficulty lay in Sir Hector Munro's determination not to act under orders signed by Mr. Sadlier. To obviate all objections and to accelerate the service, the select committee consisting of Mr. Sadlier, Mr. Williams and myself, very handsomely vested me with powers to enable me to carry on any expedition against the Dutch in conjunction with the Fleet. Sir Hector set out for Nagapatnam. The orders, instructions, letters &c were regularly laid before the Committee tho' signed only by me; and in less than a month we were masters of the place. At the same time that I give Sir Hector Munro full

credit for his share of merit on this occasion, I cannot but highly (33r) condemn any man in the Company's service suffering a private disagreement to influence his public conduct, and I cannot avoid mentioning here that the lead and authority which your military have been permitted to assume within these few years, if not soon properly checked and regulated, may prove as fatal to the public interests as the attacks of an enemy. Sir Hector has taken his passage on board the Rochcord and will sail for Euprope next month. By his departure together with that of Sir Eyre Coote, which seems now certain, the Command will devolve upon General Stuart; whose late mutilation will probably incapacitate him from any very active situation. He is however full of spirit and ardour and seems to make light of his late accident. Colonel Home is not yet arrived. Colonel Braithwaite according to your late orders follows in point of rank, as that of Colonel Lang's has been superseded by the appointment of those two officers above him. There seems to be a want of capital office in every line of the service. So much for the military process of this Government. I must now say a word or two of the civil ones.

Of the present Council, Mr. Holland, you know is at Hyderabad, the rest can give but little assistance to a Governor. Mr. Sadlier has the best abilities of them, but he is so obnoxious to the whole settlement, and so very much disliked that his standing forward in any measure is almost a certain method of defeating it. The proceedings will inform you at large of the Nabob's assignment of his revenue. In the course of my life I have had the conduct of several very difficult negotiations with very difficult men in different parts of the world, but never had I more occasion for although (33v) little prudence, caution and address that I may possess than on this occasion. And after all I will fairly confess to you that I believe I never could have made any impression upon him, if I had not given him the most convincing proofs that he could make no impressions upon me. And if any of my predecessors had acted upon my system, good God what a glorious situation would your affairs in the Carnatick have been in. I cannot without tears of grief and indignation think upon the subject for a moment. And here it may not be improper to mention that tho' there is not a man in the settlement white or black who does not firmly believe and even tell you, that he believes all the stories you have heard of Sir Thomas Rumbold, yet I don't think it possible to obtain evidence to any one of the facts which he is charged with. You will see on the consultations the steps we took in order to prosecute the Enquiry; but I confess to you I don't think the person sent from Bengal was the best qualified to conduct a business of the kind. Perhaps I may be able to write to you hereafter upon this subject. According to the lights that may appear at Madras there is little likelihood of obtaining any. What may break out from the Circars when the Committee of Circuit proceed I know not, but I shrewdly suspect that the same darkness will prevail there.

I had proceeded thus far in my letter when your packet to the Select Committee of the 9th of June last arrived here this day together with your private letter to me. I return you my best thanks for it. If all you recommend to me can restore your affairs here, it shall not be wanting: The most cordial concert, union and cooperation with the Supreme Council of Bengal. You may rely upon everything is now upon that footing and the most laborious diligence and attention to the public interests shall not be wanting. But let me (34R) observe that such diligence and attention joined to the steadiness with which I have acted has, and will always excite the enmity of those whose private views are disappointed or counteracted by them. This is a time in which it is necessary to speak plain. I have been much deceived in the opinion I had entertained of some persons. Most fortunately I have been undeceived in time; and I think it necessary to undeceive others, if it should happen that they may be in an error. There are few people who can resist showing their real character when vested with influence or power, and it is happy for the public that the want of principle is generally

discovered by the want of prudence; otherwise, men might go on imposing upon the world to the end of their lives. I have been led into these observations by the conduct of Mr. Benfield who was so strongly recommended to me and who carried matters so smoothly that I was disposed to entertain an opinion of him totally different from his real character. I accordingly put him at the head of the Committee of Assigned Revenue, but I soon discovered such conduct in him that I was obliged to take the first occasion to remove him. The Committee has gained exceedingly by the change. Instead of a dark Lanthorn, there is now Mr. Oakley, a man of bright parts, at their head; a man of open character and honourable principles who considers the public in the first place. Mr. B. is a man whom I think the Company ought never to employ on any pretext whatsoever. I think however that it is very likely he may some time or other be employed by them; If he be, you will remember what I now say to you. Tho' I do not enter into particulars at present, you may suppose almost any objection against him that you (34V) please, and you scarcely be mistaken.

Your system of peace with all the country powers you will observe by my letters is perfectly my own idea and believe me no other can now be adopted. If we crush Hyder, I hope we shall be disposed to set an example of moderation and equity in the partition of his spoil. I approve much of your idea of giving all power to the Governor General and Council of Bengal. The making the Governors of Bombay and Madras, Members of it will be necessary, otherwise they will have no authority in their own Presidencies, and such is the jealousy of this place at least that it will require great address and steadiness to engage the people here to relish the alteration.

With regard to myself, I will now say to you what is the real truth, upon the word of a gentleman. I feel so interested in the recovery of our affairs here that I am determined to sacrifice every private consideration to accomplish it and I will serve in such situation either here or at Bengal as may be judged most conducive to that end. When that is done, I may be allowed to expect some reward, and I will wait till then. **The appointments I have, are little more than maintenance; and I am now not a shilling richer than I was when I left England.** By observing this conduct, I am sure the public may gain millions. Such an example is absolutely necessary, and you may rely on my preserving to give it. At the same time, my Dear Sir, don't imagine that I wish to impose upon you with a system of this kind as arising from heroic virtue or better motives than those which actuate the generality of mankind. I will pretend to no such; but own frankly, that I have a stronger passion than (35R) the love of wealth; and if I can contribute to reinstate this country in its former glory, I shall feel infinitely more pride and satisfaction than all Sir Thomas Rumbold's fortune could give me. In truth I think it a very bad calculation in the accounts of the world, to sacrifice reputation for any increase of fortunes. And where a man has no children, if he leaves behind him his paternal estate without diminution no man has a right to complain of him. Such have always been the ideas of your humble servant upon this subject; who has had it twenty times in his power to make a large fortune, and yet never had it in his thoughts. But enough of this at present.

I will now at the close of the Packet just give you in two words a short sketch of our situation. The main Army is now encamped at 5 leagues distance from hence. We are doing everything that can be done to supply it with the means of taking the field again, and proceeding. I hope upon some decided object. The capture of Arcot seems to me to be of the first consequence. The possession of even tho' nominal capital of the country makes a very strong impression both on the people in the neighborhood and at a distance; and has been of infinite advantage to Hyder. If we take it, and I believe it practicable, I think the neck of



the war effectually broke. Sir Eyre Coote's health is so much impaired, to say no more, that I imagine he never can serve again in this part of the world. But God forbid that we should depend upon one man's services only.

Sir Edward Hughes is gone to Trincomallee and proposes to return here on the 15th of next month. We shall then concert with him such further operations as may be most expedient. Ceylon (Colombo) is the first object (35v) and must be attempted if there be the least probability of success. The capture of Batavia is, I believe not impracticable, and my idea would be to take it, blow it up, and leave it, without removing the Dutch. Let them settle with the Malays and new establishment there if they choose it; but the climate is so unhealthy it would cost us too dear to keep it. If Hyder were not on our backs, it would not be difficult totally to root the Dutch out of India. Be the circumstances what they may, we shall endeavour to do the best; and you shall have the earliest information of what is done. Our military expenses are enormous tho' I believe three times less than those of the other Presidencies. I do all in my power to reduce them, but wilst Sir Eyre Cotte is at the head of our Army, the Presidency cannot have that authority over the Army which it ought to have, without totally breaking with him; which we shall not do, if we can possibly help it. All the money we can by any means procure goes to the Army. The civil servants are greatly in arrears. Provisions at a most exorbitant prices, and no trade but in that article; upon which a most enormous profit is made at the expense of the Company and of the poor inhabitants. I endeavour to practice every possible economy where the Company's interest is concerned and by a comparison of the expenses here with those of other settlements I believe it will turn out much to our honour. But if peace were once re-established the savings only which ought to be made would amount to a great sum. We shall send out a Committee of Circuit to the Circars because it is the Company's orders. There can be no other reason for it. A thousand good ones might be urged (36R) against it. I shall endeavour however to pick out the best men I can for it. Good ones are very scarce.

At all events the Circars must be differently administered than they have been, but I fear very strong opposition to any new system where the profits of individuals are to be affected by it.

I have written you a long letter and I am quite ashamed when I look at the number of pages. I shall not therefore increase them, but conclude with those assurances of sincere regard and esteem with which I am, Dear Sir,

Very truly yours  
(Signed) Macartney

P.S.

I have a very satisfactory letter from the Resident of Tanjore. He is well, and very busy. I mentioned to you his Brother Mr. Richard Sullivan in my letter of September last and expressed my regret at the distance between us. I hope it will be soon removed. Harry is a very fine young fellow, and promises to be everything his friends can wish him.

I have waited to the last in hopes that before I sealed my letter I should be able to give you an account of the arrival of General Meadows and the ships of war. We expect the Hero, Monmouth, Iris with the transports and the Loche, Asia, Osterley and Hinchinbrooke India man, but have no news of them since the 27th of July. They were to recruit at Madagascar, and then proceed hither. They must arrive soon if no accident has happened to them. I think from my intelligence none was to be apprehended.

### 3. LORD MACARTNEY TO Mr. LAURENCE SULLIVAN, LONDON (1782)

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MS 8327: National Library of Scotland

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Private

Fort St. George  
January 28, 1782

Dear Sir,

In my other letter of this date, you will observe that I confined myself chiefly to matters within my own knowledge and avoided any political conjectures upon our affairs. It would not indeed be prudent for me to hazard any, as the negotiations for peace and war are lodged in better hands than ours, and I have not had any very recent account of their progress.

I waited also in hopes of hearing from my own spies at Poonah how matters went on there, and this moment I have received information that the wish there is strong for peace with us, and nothing impedes it, but a distrust of the sincerity of the Bengal Government. Measures have been taken I believe to remove that prejudice and upon the whole I think we may conclude that a Mahratta Peace is not very distant. In truth they never had a more happy opportunity, at once to secure our friendship, to recover their own territories and revenge themselves upon Hyder Ali. The Soubah's views ought to be the same and probably they are, but his cautious temper will probably prevent him from committing himself, till things are sufficiently ripe for him to adopt a system by which he may gain much and lose nothing.

Adieu once more, and believe me ever.

Most sincerely yours  
(Signed) Marcartney

Mr. Sullivan

#### 4. MACARTNEY TO JOHN SULLIVAN (1782 - 83)

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Bodleian: Macartney Papers: MSS Eng Hist C 111: Letters from Lord Macartney, Governor of Madras to John Sullivan: Jan 5, 1782 to 19. 5. 1783.

MSS Eng Hist C 99: (mostly) letters to L. Sullivan: Jan 28 to Feb 18, 1782: also 2 letters to J.S. one of Feb. 2, 1782, also given in C 111.

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January 5, 1782

(5) Herewith you will receive your appointment of Resident and Paymaster to the Rajah of Tanjore...

(6) P.S. If possible, you must endeavour to procure a supply from the Rajah for our expenses to the southward.

February 4, 1782

(8) ... Is it not possible to obtain an assignment of his country from him on the same terms as from the Nabob? Surely it is but just that all the powers of the Carnatic should contribute according to their abilities to the expense of the war in their defence. It is the decided opinion of the Company at home, and it is equally mine.

May 14, 1782

(20)... I sincerely pity your situation, which from your zeal and exertions is become so full of labour and anxiety... It is unwise to exasperate where we can not enforce or amend. But when we can do these for the public service (and we must be quite sure that we can do them) we must bid adieu to our delicacies. The Rajah's conduct however prejudicial to us at present may possibly in the end turn out to the advantage of the Company.... I have helped you to the best of my power with what money I could get. I sent you 8000 Pagodas by bills on... This money must be distributed to the best public use according to your judgement and discretion.

June 6, 1782

(26) ... With the powers that were given me by Bengal relative to the Nabob, I have accomplished a great deal, and wish it were in my power to explain to you the whole, because it has been mistaken by some and misrepresented by others. In two words it is this. I got the Nabob to assign over his whole country to me in behalf of the Company, and I have abolished every useless expense whatsoever, and among the rest, all his rabble of troops which are for the present forming into independent companies in our service entirely, conformably to a plan the General approved; so that the Nabob now has no other troops (27) than his guard, and in my opinion ought to have no other.

In the state of the Carnatic, no other plan in my opinion could possibly save the Company, the creditors, and the Nabob himself, but some wicked people have of late prevailed upon him to think otherwise, and many difficulties are thrown in the way. But I stick to the ground I have got for the public, and will not relinquish it...

December 18, 1782

(52) The account of the death of Hyder Aly are come by so many channels, and are corroborated by so many circumstances that no doubt appears to be now entertained (53) of the fact and I hasten to write to you jointly to acquaint you that every effort is now making here for putting the army near Madras in readiness to march, in order to take advantage of an event which opens a prospect so favourably to the Company's affairs.

May 19, 1783

(66) ... Indeed specific proposals must come relative to all the countries to be let otherwise the delay and inconvenience will be great.

Jan 28, 1782

(99 ff 1) ... The great point for us is to get hold of the Rajah's revenues in the same manner that we have of the Nabob's. He can have no pretext to refuse it.

**5. EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM JOHN SULLIVAN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF  
MADRAS, DATED TANJORE, 29th June 1783.**

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Scottish Record Office : GD 51/3/499/9

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I have had the honour of communicating to the Right Hon'ble the Resident the mode of arrangement which I had suggested to the Polygars of Warrierpallam, Terriore and Arialore, and his Lordship has been pleased to inform me that it met the approbation of the Committee.

I have now therefore the honour of transmitting a general account of the revenue which was collected in these districts during a period of five years immediately preceding the war.

From the medium of those receipts in each district, it is now proposed that from henceforward, one third part of that amount should be reserved for the Polygar who is to protect<sup>4</sup> the country, and that the remaining two thirds should be considered as the nett annual receipt to Government, to be augmented at every new settlement, in the fixed proportion of one quarter part and no more, of the increased collection in the country, to ascertain which, the revenue accounts (541v) of the districts are to be at all times open to the inspection of Government and a general account is to be delivered at the close of every year by the official Accountants of the country.

If the Committee will be pleased to cause the accounts of those districts, during any period or the whole term of the Nabob's administration, to be examined, I have reason to believe it will be found, that whatever may have been the nominal revenue; the expenses of collection and of the troops kept up to preserve order in the country, absorbed so much that the nett receipt to Government (the Nabob) fell considerably short of the sum now proposed.

This, tho' an argument of some weight in favour of the present arrangement, will appear but a secondary consideration, when it is recollected how much we suffered when the Polygars found themselves obliged to attach themselves to the party of the enemy; how much their separation from Hyder Aly at this critical (542R) moment has distressed him and facilitated our operations, and how much the situation of the woods of Warrierpallam, Arialore and Terriore must enable the Polygars of those districts in all times of war to become useful friends or very dangerous enemies.

With such motives of policy and of immediate interest to support the proposed arrangement, I need not appeal to the justice or humanity of the Committee, altho' both are interested in the re-establishment of the ancient families of Warriarpallam and Arialore.

I may venture to say that if the same mode of settlement were to be extended to all the Polygars of the Carnatic, they could in a short time be converted from disturbers of the country at every opportunity, into faithful subjects of his Highness, the Nabob and become the most formidable barriers against the inroads of an enemy.

I have the honour to be,

Sd/-

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<sup>4</sup> The protection here allowed to, is that of the police and not against an enemy.

Extract of a letter from John Sullivan to Lord Macartney, which accompanied the preceding.

The Polygars are strongly impressed with an apprehension of the Nabob's resentment if they should once again return under his immediate government. The assurances which I have given them of continued protection from the Company, and of positive support in their rights, cannot dissipate their apprehensions. They see in the single prerogative (if it may be so called) of purveyance, more danger than they can find encouragement in my assurances, for they know that the casual exertions of that prerogative may prove of weight sufficient to crush the most powerful of them.

### III - MYSORE

#### 1. THE MYSORE NEGOTIATIONS

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Scottish Record Office : GD 51/3/499/15

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In 1782 two persons appeared at Tanjore who declared themselves agents of the Ranny of Mysore (a prisoner at Seringapatam) whose husband and children had been put to death by Hyder, who usurped the country.

These persons entered into a negotiation with Mr.Sullivan, Resident of Tanjore, for the entire dissolution of Hyder's power, and the restoration of the legal heir, and an agreement was at length concluded under the sanction of the Madras Government, upon the following terms;

3 Lacks of Pagodas to be paid by instalments as we advanced in the reduction of the Coimbatore and other districts on this side the hills.

1 Lack on the fall of Ardinelli

1 Lack on the fall of Mysore

5 Lacks on the fall of Seringapatam

5 Lacks per annum for the protection of the country, and a jaghire of 6 Lacks in any part of the country the Company shall prefer.

The countries taken by Hyder from the Nizam and the Marattas, were not to be made over to the Ranny and the Company reserved to themselves the liberty of reinstating the family of Morarow in the Guty country.

The agents, as is usual on such occasions, gave the strongest assurances that the numerous adherents of the family of the late Rajah (some of whom were still in being) were ready on any reasonable prospect of success to risk their persons and property in the attempt to restore the ancient family.

The Cudapah country likewise, which had recently been subdued by Hyder, was claimed as to its immediate Government by persons who were confident of support from the inhabitants on the appearance of any from the Company and who were ripe for revolt. The sovereignty of the country is supposed to be in the Soubah of the Deccan, under whom there was little doubt that the immediate claimant would have been happy to be received as a tributary Chief.

There was at Tanjore at the same time a Vackeel from the Myrespatchet Pollygar, who was likewise employed (570V) on the part of a great number of other Pollygar Chiefs, who were ready to engage that a number of them to the amount of 5,000 should join our standard as soon as we entered their country.

The province of Coimbatore was described as commencing at Pallicatcherry; and the country from thence to Trichinopoly, as a valley from the most part in the possession of Pollygars, who, from their vicinity to the countries of Tinnevelly and Madura, are seldom in

obedience to Hyder's Government. In the month of March of that year (1782) they were in actual rebellion, and had applied to the Commanding Officer at Madura and Trichinopoly for assistance.

The Rajah of Palliatcherry also who had lived for many years in the most inaccessible part of the country was come down with his followers.

And the Polygars of Dindigul who were always distrusted by Hyder, and were ever inimical to him, had offered provisions and troops.

It was likewise said, that in May 1781, offers were made by the late Appage Row, formerly Governor of Sounda, to engage all the Pollygars south of the Kistna, to rise in favour of an English force, whenever it should appear on that side.

It was natural for Mr.Sullivan, to whom the overture from the Ranny of Mysore was first made, and who conducted the whole of the negociation to form great expeceptions from its success. Under the present treaty, says he, Bombay will have as great a share of political influence, as it could have had in the possession of all the Marratta conquests. It was in Mr.Sullivan's idea that the promised jaghire should be taken from the countries of Sounda and Onore, the revenues of which, independently of the commercial advantages in pepper and sandal, would defray the expense of a considerable army.

But General Stuart, who was at that time a member of the Madras Governemnt, differed from his colleagues in the opinion they had formed of the proposal made by the pretended agents. He saw "no solid ground of expectation of any assistance from any negotiation with the person called the Ranny of Mysore, neither is there reality in the idea of sentiment and attachment of neighbouring sovereings, and of others from their being old subjects, or from hatred to Hyder's assumed government, by whatever way acquired." (571R) In short, the General seemed convinced that Hyder himself was at the bottom of the negociation. The subsequent treaty with Tippoo rendered it impossible to bring his opinion to the test; but if a judgement might be formed from the admirable plan of operations proposed by one of the agents, one would be inclined to differ in opinion with the General upon this subject. Certain it is, however, that the agents of the Ranny of Mysore failed in their pecuniary engagements. The causes of these failures were expressed in Mr.Sullivan's letter to the Government of Madras 16th July, 1783, they were principally attributed to the measures adopted by the Commander of the Southern Army (Colonel Lang) being the reverse of those on which the agents had built their expectations.

Mr.Sullivan says that his conduct thro' the whole of the Mysore negociation was materially influenced by the following passage in a letter from the Court of Directors to the Government of Madras 17th March, 1769.

"If it should have happened when these advices reach you, that Hyder should be extirpated, and it should not be inconsistent with any engagements you may have entered into, our wish would be to have restored to the ancient Rajas and Powers, to whom they belonged, the several districts and countries taken from Hyder Ally; after reserving to us the passes and forts which serve as a barrier between the Mysore and the Carnatic. Such a step must demonstrate to all the Indian Powers with whom we are connected, that we mean to distribute to every man his own; and by a just, mild, and prudent conduct towards them, to evince that conquests and plunder are not the objects of our pursuits."

(S.J.) June 1790



## 2. COLONOL READ'S IDEAS REGARDING THE TERMS PROPER TO BE IMPOSED ON TIPOO SULTAN: 22 Feb 1799

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British Museum : Wellesley Papers : Add Ms 13670 : ff 208-213v.

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"Lord Mornington will be glad to secure Colonel Read's ideas of the terms which he thinks would be proper to impose on the Sultaun."

The object of the terms that may be imposed on him is clearly our own security. That is probably attainable in any degree between the power he actually possesses and the total subversion of it. Those are points extremely wide of each other, and I am unacquainted with the considerations that may weigh with his lordship in determining whether we shall deprive him of all his power, or a part or of what part he may leave him. These questions may depend on the (ff 208v) politics of India, and they may depend in a great measure on the policy of the British cabinet.

If we are justified in taking away part of his dominions from him, I conceive we may with the same justice strip him of the whole. Since it is his power that affects our security the subversion of it would be the certain accomplishment of our object. Our allies can have no objection to that if they participate. The other states (?) are so indifferent about what does not immediately affect themselves, that they look upon our aggrandizement as an inevitable occurrence in the chain of human events. They have been known (ff 209r) to combine against us, but they appear now reconciled to our establishment in India. For these reasons I imagine the subversion of Tippoo would not in the least excite their jealousy or create them any uneasiness. Hyder was a traitor to his prince and deposed him. He deprived him of all power but affecting moderation or loyalty he feigned to rule in his name, paid him homage at the annual ceremony of presenting him to the people, and allowed him to live within the walls of his palace with comfort. Tippoo usurped entirely the sovereignty (?), erected a throne for himself, and assumed the title Baudshaw or king and nominated himself Tippoo Sultaun. Assuming likewise the patriarchal (?) dignity he (ff 209v) declared himself an Emaum appointed by God to propagate Islamism and extirpate all who would not believe in Mahommed. He invited all Musselman by a proclamation circulated throughout the Decan to join and assist him in the execution of this ambitious project. He (acted ?) upon it by extending his conquests in every direction, by erecting mosques and schools in every district, and by forcing great number of his Gentoo subjects and christians to become Mussulman. His fanaticism seems to have abated as the folly of it has discovered itself, but he continues to prefer Mussulmans to all places of trust to the prejudice of his other subjects. For all these reasons his expulsion would no doubt be a desirable measure to (ff 210r) by the greatest part of the inhabitants of his own country, and Tippoo's character considered it would be no great subject of regret if he were reduced to the condition of a nijgwarry which was that of his grandfather. The possession of Seringapatam, the countries south of the Cauvery, and on the Malabar coast would render us secure against all attempts of our enemies. The countries north of the Cauvery and bounded by the mountains both eastward and westward would be ample compensation to our allies, and would probably far exceed their expectations.

If his lordship chose to adopt the policy of Indian conquerors and usurpers, he might place the heir of the curtars (?) or princes of Mysoor, on the throne of his ancestors, by way of conciliating the inhabitants, and setting an example of moderation and regard to the rights

of native princes. But if that were done all the Poligars and zemindars expelled by Hyder and Tippoo would expect to be restored likewise to their ancient possessions. The admitting them would impose the necessity of granting them their former privileges and the management of their respective districts. That would prevent all improvement, and the subsistence of so many intermediate classes on the rental paid by the cultivators would render the public revenue to a trifle under the name of (ff 211r) tribute or subsidy. The evils of such a policy would greatly over-balance the popularity that would arise from it. If adopted therefore it would be under certain reservations, which would leave the curtar and the zemindars a portion only of their ancient privileges. That would discredit our pretensions, be the source of endless disputes and litigations, and involve all the intricacy of the Hindoo system of revenue. It is much better to reduce all the occupants and descriptions of land to one denomination when it is in our power, and to admit of no other distinctions than such as have been acquired by or industry. (ff 211v) It may be opposed to the foregoing that having treated with Tippoo as a lawful and independent prince and concluded treaties with him as such we must continue to do so. This appears to me to be only arguing for consistency which is never of long duration in politics.

### 3. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LORD MORNINGTON AND WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK: c.1799

#### (i) COL W. KIRKPATRICK TO WELLESLEY ON MYSORE : 3.6.1799

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British Museum: Add Ms 13670: ff 27r-38v. The original of this is in Add Ms 37279: ff 195-202r.

Note: ff 39-42 consists of "Proposed partition of the Dominions of the late Tippoo Suldaun". The Memo on Bilgeey is on ff 43-4r. According to it the revenue value of Bilgeey was insignificant. (the value given to Bilgeey in the former is 18,929)

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To  
The Right Hon'ble the Earl or Mornington &C, &C, &C

My Lord

Yesterday Purneah accompanied by Col Close and Captain Macaulay came from camp. We immediately proceeded to the discussion of the revenue of the country being assisted on the occasion by Captain Macleod.

Purneah had previously insisted that the statement of the revenues formed from the accounts found in the cutcherry here and of which a copy has already been transmitted (ff 27v) to your lordship was absolutely illusory and fictitious; and that the real jumabundi of the country fell short of 30 lacs of pagodas. He had been in consequence desired to prepare an abstract of the revenues according to his information, the particular grounds of which we proposed sifting as closely as possible.

We had not proceeded on the examination of this abstract, the fidelity of which was vouched for by the two head Mutsuddies of the revenue department who attended before we discovered that it was neither nor more or less than the statement which had been given in by Tippoo's (ff 28r) deputies in 1792. Purneah and one of these Mutsuddies were the very persons who then contended that the revenue of the Suldaun scarcely amounted to 70 lacs of Pagodas; and they now no less warmly insisted that whatever fictitious or nominal increase had been put on them since, they had never actually amounted to more than from 29 to 30 lacs (speaking of the supposed moiety of the country which remained with the Suldaun at the peace of Seringapatam).

Your lordship may recollect that the allies were so little satisfied of the fairness of the statement of Tippoo's revenues produced (ff 28v) in 1792 that they insisted upon rating them at nine lacs higher to that statement; dividing in consequence upon 79 instead of 70 lacs. By this operation Purneah contended that instead of 35 lacs having been left to the Suldaun there only remained thirty lacs and a half of territory; out of which he privately ceded, it seems, a small tract to Hurry Pundit. In this manner he accounted for the actual jumabundy having fallen below 30 lacs.

He would not admit that Tippoo ever realized more than this since the peace of 1792. On the contrary he contended that the actual receipts had for the most part (ff 29r) seldom exceeded 26 or 27 lacs.

It is to be observed however that neither he nor any of the Mutsuddies who attended could support this assertion by any proof either of detailed account or of any other kind. In fact no

accounts of the receipts from the country have been found; nor are there, I understand, any treasury accounts remaining which can throw any light on this point.

It is proper to observe that Tippoo would appear to have received a very considerable part of his revenues in kind. Thus he drew from the country large supplies of grain and cattle for the use of his (ff 29v) army and garrisons, as well as other articles for his own more immediate consumption. But whether such supplies were exclusive of the jummabundy, or included in it has not yet, I believe been ascertained.

On the whole I do not think that Purneah's statement seriously affects the validity of Captain Macleod's which stands on as good ground as the other. He may have thought it necessary on the score of consistency to maintain that the revenue was no higher in 1792 than he then stated it to be, and he may have his reasons for not liking to admit that it has since (ff 30r) been increased. He himself has borne no part in the management of the revenues for several years past, and he appears to have been at enmity with Meer Saudick who was at the head of that department.

With respect to Captain Macleod's statement your lordship has already been informed by Mr Wellesley that a mistake was discovered in it yesterday of no less than ten lacs of Pagodas. It arose from a miscalculation of the new assessment laid on by Tippoo; or rather from the accidental substitution of a figure of 1 for the figure of 2. That assessment amounted to 29,67,877 and not to 19,67,877 Pagodas. (ff 30v)

The new division of the country by Tippoo involved the antient limits of the several districts as enumerated in the accounts discovered at Seringapatam in 1792, in such confusion, that it would be extremely difficult if not impracticable to make the necessary partition, under his capricious management, without a previous survey for the purpose of ascertaining the boundaries of what the Suldaun denominated Asophats. Besides were we to proceed to divide according to Asophat we must also assume the new jummabundy proper to that arrangement which considering the objections it is liable to (ff 31r) would I apprehend be rather unpalatable at Hyderabad, to say nothing of Poona. It therefore appeared to us that the best and simplest mode was to proceed to parcel out the country according both to the divisions and to the revenues recognized at Seringapatam in 1792. Those divisions are still as well known as even in Mysore as the new fangled ones of the Suldaun; and none other are known or would be understood by our allies. On the other hand these allies can make no reasonable objection any more than ourselves to taking the countries to be severally ceded to them at the same valuation as those which were ceded (ff 31v) in 1792 were taken by all parties. The risk of each party according to this mode is the same as they submitted to in 1792. I am satisfied however from the communications of Captain Macleod (who is a most able and intelligent man) that the value of the Company's share will very greatly exceed the amount stated in the enclosure. I am equally inclined to believe that the Mysore share if wisely managed will turn out much more than what it stands at in our proposed partition.

Proceeding upon these principles we began by calculating the value of the territories absolutely (ff 32r) necessary to be ceded to the Company. These are found to amount to 6,96,876 Conteroi Pagodas, exclusive of the heads and passes and of the forts proposed to be retained in those situations which require no territory of any value needing specification to be annexed to them.

We next proceeded to assign a country of equal value to the Nizam. The districts of Gooty, Gurrumcondah and Rydroog proving very inadequate to the purpose it became necessary to

make up His Highness's share from other adjacent districts. In doing this we carefully studied to secure as good a position (?) as possible to the (ff 32v) Mysoor state; and further more in order to retain to this state the complete possession of the high road of communication between Seringapatam, and Chittledroog, which goes through the town of Sera, we thought it expedient to confine the cessions (to the Nizam) from Sera to the single district of Omrahpoor which adjoins to Rydroog and is situated to the right or eastward of the road. The requisite attention to this important object led to the further necessity of allotting about half of the province of Chittledroog to the Nizam, to complete whose share the Kurnool Paishcush has been added, though there will (ff 33r) probably be some little demur made at Hyderabad to the admission of this article on the footing of a cession since the Nizam never allowed Tippoo's right to it. This is a difficulty however of too little consequence to be regarded.

The districts assigned to the Paishwah will be found to amount to no more than 2,65,754 Pags, and I am afraid that these are all which can be given to him without straitening Chittledroog to a degree that would materially lessen its utility as a barrier. The districts of that province remaining to the Mysoor state will be barely equal to the maintenance of the necessary garrison for (33v) the fort.

One Talook of Bidnore (Hurry.....) is proposed to be given to the Paishwah. I am not quite certain that this district can be ceded without injury to the barrier on that side: but there is reason to believe that no other part of that province can be parted with consistently with the preservation of a proper communication between Bidnore and Chittledroog.

If more therefore must be assigned to the Marhattas it can only be taken from the country allotted to the Nizam, who must have an equivalent given him in the Colar quarter. Possibly His Highness (ff 34r) might not object to resign some parts of Rydroog and Chittledroog for the purpose of disposing the Paishwah the more readily to relinquish the Choute of Bedar and to admit of the mediation of the British Government between the two courts.

I have all along been disposed to give to the Paishwah as liberal a share of this conquered country as might be practicable but admitting the necessity of preserving the Mysore state as strong a barrier as possible against the Marhattas and of leaving it enough to enable it to subsidise the proposed British force, as well as to contribute (ff 34v) to the maintenance of the excluded family and to the expence of other pensions I fear that we possess no other means of enlarging the Paishwah's share compatibly with the attainment of those objects than the one suggested in the foregoing paragraph.

According to the accompanying statement and assuming the revenue of the whole country to amount to no more than thirty lacs of Conteroi Pagodas (as pretended by Purneah) there would remain to the Mysore state a revenue of somewhat less than 13½lacs of Pagodas (Con).

When I consider the (ff 35r) extent of the country which would remain to the Mysoor state and the well known fertility of the greater part of that country (Bednore in particular being almost proverbial for its richness) I can entertain little doubt of the total revenue yielding under tolerable management at least 20 lacs of Conteroi Pagodas. This would abundantly admit of the pensions to be settled on the family of Tippoo and others. But if the revenue be taken at no more than 13½lacs of C.Pags, it will after payment of the subsidiary troops and pensions and after discharging (ff 35v) the indispensable civil expences of the Government, be hardly sufficient to maintain the prince who may be placed on the Musnud in any degree

of state; considering however who that prince is likely to be, is perhaps a point of no great moment.

With respect to pensions I think that three lacs of Pagodas is as much as need be provided for on that account. Of this sum two lacs would provide munificently for the sons of Tippoo and for the Mahls of the Sultaun and of Hyder Ally. The other lac would furnish a sufficient fund for supporting with great liberality all the sirdars and families who have any claim (ff 36r) on us, either on the score of policy or of compassion. The salaries of the highest among them under Tippoo's Government were very moderate.

Of the three lacs to be disbursed in pensions the Nizam ought to contribute one lac. The Mysore state another, and the Company the third. A lac of territory might be deducted from His Highness's share on this head, and be added to the Company's. The objections to this measure are that it would give us insulated possession above the Ghauts and that it would argue a distrust in His Highness which might be offensive to him. On the (ff 36v) other hand it must be owned that his regular payment of his pension contribution could not be depended on without some security of the kind.

If your lordship approves the general outline of the arrangement now submitted to you I see nothing to prevent a very speedy settlement of this country. The amount of revenue ceded respectively to the Company, to the Nizam and to the Paishwah may be left blank, until a few hours previous to the execution of the treaty, in order to admit as long as possible of any alteration that might appear necessary. Or perhaps (ff 37r) there is no necessity for stating the amount of revenue in the body of the treaty. It may be sufficient to notice the principle assumed in the distribution; and to refer the particulars to the schedules to be annexed to the treaty.

As the Mysoor state cannot, under the present arrangement be charged with all the pensions and stipends, perhaps there is no necessity for enumerating these, as suggested in the schedule of the treaty forwarded lately to your lordship. It may be enough to stipulate generally that the families in question shall be liberally provided for: that the contracting parties (ff37r) have determined to set apart three lacs of Pagodas annually for the purpose and that the Company engage to take upon themselves the due execution of the provisions of this article.

Seringapatam 3rd June 1799.

I have the honour to be &c &c &c  
William Kirkpatrick

P.S. I enclose a memorandum just received from Captain Macleod respecting Bilgeey which makes me doubt whether we need keep that district. It might be acceptable to the Paishwah as bordering on (ff 38v) Soondah above Ghaut. However in the present state of our knowledge of the matter the utmost that ought to be done perhaps would be to intimate (at the proper season) to the Paishwah that your lordship was disposed to make over to him the Company's right to Bilgay if upon further enquiry it did not appear to be a possession absolutely necessary to the security of the Company.

**(ii) COL KIRKPATRICK TO WELLESLEY**

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British Museum: Add Ms 13670: ff

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(ff 53v)

Referring to the establishments of the princes and of the Mahls during the life of Tippoo I continue to be of opinion that a stipend of two lacs of Conteroi Pagodas would be adequate to a most liberal provision for them. For expences on account of the building and some other items which may be incurred by the Company and which would not occur here it may be right to put Star for Conteroi Pagodas. Captain Macleod certainly concurs in this opinion.

We hourly expect to receive from Captain Macleod the materials necessary to our forming an estimate of the amount of pensions &c &c to be granted to surviving sirdars, the families of sirdars slain &c. I perceive that Kummer-ud-din wishes to receive from the Company a Jaghire, over and above that of Gurumcondah equivalent to what he enjoyed under Tippoo. This was very inconsiderable. Perhaps your lordship may think it right to gratify him in this point.

The general scale of ...

(ff55v)

P.S. As Bangalore would be nearly at one extremity of the new Mysoor state, and very close to the Nizam's new frontier it would be an inconvenient position, I think for the seat of Government which ought to be as central as possible. Old Mysoor would for more reasons than one be a preferable capital.

**(iii) W. KIRKPATRICK TO LORD MORNINGTON: 8.6.1799 <sup>5</sup>(Extract)**

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B.M. Add Ms 13670 (Mysore Commission Proceedings; also Papers found at Seringapatam, etc.)

NOTE: Lord Mornington's (the Later Wellesley) reply to the question about Seringapatam is on ff 101-109v; dated 13.6.1799.

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(ff 54v) The general scale of Tippoo's salaries to his civil and military servants was so very low that to provide very handsomely indeed for all who have the least pretension in any score whatever, to consideration, will not I believe require a lack of Pagodas. Your lordship will perceive from the enclosed copy of (ff 55r) a letter which we wrote to Colonel Read (previous to the receipt of your last instructions) that even the first Killedahr of the most important fortress in Mysoor (namely Chittledroog) received no more than 30 Conteroi Pagodas a month, and we are assured by the Mursuddies that it was not possible for any of them to make a Fanam more. We have pensioned for life at the expence of less than 80 Pagodas per month the Governors of seven of the principal fortresses of Mysoor which have been surrendered quietly into our hands; and cheap as this sacrifice may be considered we have every reason to believe from the manner in which (ff 55v) the measure was received by the Mursuddies, that it will produce the best effect not only towards securing the easy possession of the remaining forts; but in conciliating and reassuring people in general.

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<sup>5</sup> ff 49-55v is an extract in original

**(iv) W. KIRKPATRICK TO LORD\_MORNINGTON : 9.6.1799 <sup>6</sup> (Extract)**

Colonel Close is considerably staggered by the article of the treaty which transfers the absolute sovereignty of the Seringapatam to the Company. He thinks it a necessary indulgence to the prejudices of the Hindoos that the seat of the Government should be situated on the banks of the Cauvery to the waters of which these people attach great sanctity and especially to those which surround this island. It is also to (ff 56v) be feared that the removing of the Rajah and his family from the former seat of government would do some violence to their feelings. This objection would be of the less weight were the old town of Mysore in a condition to receive them, but this I understand is not the case. It is no doubt desirable in a military point of view that the fort of Seringapatam should be rendered as speedily as possible a secure military post; and it must be owned that the accomplishment of this object would be greatly retarded if not entirely prevented by the presence of the Rajah. Perhaps however the inconvenience ought to be submitted (ff 57r) to, until another arrangement agreeable to the new Government can be made. There would certainly be some inconsistency in the Rajah's fixing the seat of his Government in a town under the absolute sovereignty of the Company; but there would not be the same objection to his chusing it for a temporary residence. If the sovereignty of the fort and island remained with the Rajah under the condition of its always being garrisoned by our troops there would be no more objection to his holding the seat of his Government in it; (I mean on the score of religion or usage) than there is in the case (ff 57v) of the Rajah of Tanjore. On the whole I confess to your lordship, that I still incline to think that for the double purpose of gratifying the body of the people at large and of giving due weight and respectability to the Government the nominal sovereignty of the island (for it could be no more) should be vested in the Rajah.

Bangalore would no doubt answer extremely well in some respects as a capital but its local position with regard to the boundaries of the state seems to be an insuperable objection.  
(finances) ff57v-58v

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<sup>6</sup> ff 56-58 is an extract in the original



**(v) MEMORANDA RESPECTING JAGHEERS AND PENSIONS : 3 June 1799.**

British Museum : Add Ms 13670 : ff 234r-236v: on ff 236v: 1799-Memo from Oapt Macleod dated 3rd June respecting Pensions: Recd 3 June.

They should only get half allowance before they attain the age of 14.

1st The two sons of the Sultaun who are grown up viz Futtah Hyder and Abdul Khalikh were allowed each 12,000 Conteroi Pagodas annually in Jaghire - and to keep from this allowance 100 horse each; the annual expence of which would be 7,500 Conteroi Pagodas, which left for their private expences 4,500 C.Pags or S.Pags nearly 3,750. But as this quota of horse might be considered as their attendants - and the princes were allowed cloths and a variety of supplies exclusively - and it is supposed the pensions hereafter granted to them will be liberal - say that each son (ff 234v) shall be allowed 10,000 Pags yearly. For the thirteen sons the expence would be in S.Pagodas 1,30,000 1,30,000

ALLOWED BY THE  
SULTAUN

|            |                                                                                  |               |        |
|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------|
| <u>2nd</u> | The expence of Tippoo's Zenana may be                                            | 35,000        |        |
|            | The expence of Hyder's Zenana may be                                             | 15,000        |        |
|            | Contingent expences in the event of the princesses <sup>7</sup> being married &c | <u>15,000</u> | 65,000 |
| <u>3rd</u> | Jagheers for the support of families                                             | 12,000        |        |
|            | Syd Saheb's Cummur-ud-Deen                                                       | 4,000         |        |
|            | Bubber Jung                                                                      | 2,550         |        |
|            | The Polygar of Bulleam                                                           | 5,000         |        |
|            | Meer Mahmood                                                                     | <u>900</u>    | 24,450 |

(ff 235r) 4th Additional Jagheers proposed to be given to sirdars who held situations of trust under the late Government; to families who from their former rank, have a claim on our generosity, and to persons who may have afforded their assistance towards restoring the tranquility of the country without having recourse to arms after the capture of Seringapatam.

|                           |               |          |
|---------------------------|---------------|----------|
| Suppose                   | <u>20,000</u> | 20,000   |
| TOTAL FOR ANNUAL PENSIONS |               | 2,39,450 |

There may be policy in giving pensions in money instead of land to the sons of Tippoo. They would prefer land as it is considered to be more permanent. If they are to be allowed Jagheers they might be (ff 235v) scattered within the Company's territories not formerly belonging to their father.

If it be necessary to reduce the proposed allowances, I imagine the reduction should chiefly fall on the allowances of the sons - and the Jagheer of Syd Saheb who has left a large family.

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<sup>7</sup> Eleven in the Zenana

Cassiem Saheb, Tippoo's brother, is said to have lost his understanding. He had not a jagheer - and his allowances from the palace in money &c are estimated at about 1,000 Pags annually. If he should be granted a similar income to the other princes, the pensions as proposed would amount to SPags 2,49,450.

3<sup>rd</sup> June 1799

**The letter enclosing above (ff 232r) is as under:**

(Presumably addressed to Col W. Kirkpatrick, Mil Secy to G.General)

Dear Sir,

I have the pleasure to send two notes - one regarding Bi1gee - and the other on the subject of pensions. The latter is not so full as I could wish though it may answer some immediate purpose, for forming an idea of the expence. I am afraid I have been too penurious in the 4th article for sundries, and that the estimated sum should be 30,000 instead of 20,000 Pags.

I intend to call at the Dowlet Baugh about 1/2 past five.

Your faithful servant

3<sup>rd</sup> June 1799.

W. Macleod

(vi) ACCOUNT OF THE EXPENCES OF THE SERVANTS AT THE PALACE : 1799

British Museum : Add Ms 13670: ff 187r:

|    |                                        |          |       |              |
|----|----------------------------------------|----------|-------|--------------|
| 2  | Eunuchs at each Mahal :                | 4 total  |       |              |
|    | at 10 C. Pags per month                | 10 Cpags |       |              |
| 3  | at 5 C. Pags per month                 | 15 CPags | CPags | 25-0         |
| 4  | Derwans at 8 Rs. each per month        |          |       | 10-2         |
| 14 | Dobey at 8 Rs. each per month          |          |       | 37-1         |
| 12 | Puchalleer at 8 Rs. each per month     |          |       | 32-1         |
| 2  | Massalgies at 6 Rs. each per month     |          |       | 4-0          |
| 2  | Commatteys at 6 Rs. each per month     |          |       | 4-0          |
| 2  | Sweepers at 5 Rs. each per month       |          |       | 3-1          |
| 7  | Doctors                                |          |       |              |
| 1  | Doctors at 15 Pags per month           | 15       |       |              |
| 2  | Doctors at 6 Pags per month            | 12       |       |              |
| 3  | Doctors at 5 Pags per month            | 15       |       |              |
| 1  | Doctors at 4 Pags per month            | <u>4</u> |       | 46-0         |
| 1  | Mutsaddy at 8 Pags per month           |          |       | 8-0          |
| 6  | Nurses at 7 Rs. each per month         |          |       | 14-0         |
| 14 | Women for carrying water at 3 Rs. each |          |       | 14-0         |
| 1  | Barber at 8 Rs. per month              |          |       | <u>2-2</u>   |
|    | C. Pagodas                             |          |       | 201-0        |
|    | To Particular Women in Tippoo's Mahal  |          |       | 92-0         |
|    | To Particular Women in Hyder's Mahal   |          |       | 23-0         |
|    |                                        |          |       | <u>316-0</u> |

**(vii) W. KIRKPATRICK TO WELLESLEY : 9.6.1799 (Concluding part)**

From the enclosed memorandum abstracted from (58r) detailed statements prepared by Captain Macleod your lordship will perceive that the providing for all the principal people of the country on as liberal a scale as their most sanguine expectations can reach would not be so chargeable as your lordship appears to have estimated.

I Have the honour to be &c &c  
William Kirkpatrick

**(viii) MEMORANDUM : ANNUAL STIPENDS, ALLOWANCES AND PENSIONS**

|                                                                                                               |        |        |                 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|
| Hyder's Mahl                                                                                                  | C.PAGS | 24,680 |                 |
| Hyder's Tomb                                                                                                  |        | 4,000  |                 |
| Tippoo's Mahl                                                                                                 |        | 46,000 | 74,680          |
| Futteh Hyder                                                                                                  |        | 12,000 |                 |
| (p 58v) Abdul Kalick                                                                                          |        | 12,000 |                 |
| Mehyeed Dien                                                                                                  |        |        | 4,300           |
| Monied Dien                                                                                                   |        |        | 4,300           |
| The Remaining sons of Tippoo                                                                                  |        | 2,630  | 35,230          |
| Kurreem Sahib                                                                                                 |        | 2,206  | 2,206           |
| TOTAL Amount of Hyder And<br>Tippoo's Families                                                                |        |        | 1,12,116        |
| Various Jaghires and Pensions to the<br>Families of of Persons of distinction, about                          |        |        |                 |
|                                                                                                               |        |        | 31,000          |
| Total salaries to the Meers of principal officers<br>of the Seven Departments of state being 72 in<br>number: |        |        |                 |
|                                                                                                               |        |        | 40,886          |
| Total salaries to the Buckshees of every description<br>being 103 in number about                             |        |        |                 |
|                                                                                                               |        |        | 35,000          |
| C. Pags                                                                                                       |        |        | <u>2,19,002</u> |

**(ix) WELLESLEY TO COMMISSIONERS FOR MYSOOR : 19.6.1799 (?)**

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B.M.: Add Ms 13670:

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Through Lt Col Kirkpatrick I have learnt the outlines of the arrangements (ff 97r) which you have commenced with the Killedars of the several forts: and I entirely approve the principles which appear to have governed your proceedings in that respect.

The system of the Company's Government in India has always appeared to me radically defective in not having provided adequate means, either to conciliating or controlling those whom we have dispossessed of the Government. I desire to call your particular attention to this point in the adjustment of the claims of Tippoo Suldaun's family and officers, civil and military. You must endeavour in this new settlement (ff 97v) to avoid both the evils to which I have adverted, and I trust that you may not find it difficult to combine a just and liberal spirit of conciliation with the necessary precautions of a prudent system of due restraint.

Fort St George  
June 19, 1799. (?)

I have the honor to be Gentlemen,  
Your obedient servant  
Mornington

Wellesley's letter (date is not clear, may be 10th or 12th) begins:

Gentlemen

I received your letter (No 1) of the 8th of June at half past one P.M. this day.

A separate dispatch from it Col Kirkpatrick induces me to give you the power of magin certain alterations in the draft of the treaty of Mysore, which I directed him to lay before you. ...

Purneah to the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore : june 1799 (?) (Extract)

(ff 2v) Besides the Bar 2,000 peons must also be kept Rs. .... each per month.

There is forty four thousand, six hundred and seventy four Pagodas, and seven Fanams, and three quarters (Pags 44,674-7-3/4) for Dewastan and one lac and ninety three thousand, nine hundred and fifty nine Pagodas, and four and a half Fanams (Pags 1,93,959-4 1/2), for the Aggrahars of Brahmins. The details of both accompany. Examine them, and whatever you may order shall be observed.

Tippoo Suldaun having ordered a mosque to be built, in every Talook of his country, granted to each twenty Pagodas in land. There are about 600 mosques.

For the expence of the tomb of Hyder Ally Khan, and the Aksa Mosque, the Talook of Kussel Kerah is assigned. yearly 4,000 C.Pags

For the Expence of the Allas Mosque in the fort of Seringapatam. 1,200

For prayers &c. at the grave of Tippoo Suldaun, an allowance must be made.

(ff 3r) DIRGAHS &c

...The whole according to the jummandy of Tippoo Sultaun is about per anum  
20,000 (C.Pag)

For THE MUTTS OF BRAHMINS

Singeery Mutt, Shewogungas Soubramanmi Woorpi &c and various other Mutts there is at  
present allowed about per anum 20,000 (C.Pag)

(3v) There are about 300 Non-Purwerish people, who have about 400 C.Pags monthly

You desired to send an account of the number of persons (composing) the Rajah's family.  
The total is 7 persons. (Maharaja, Grand-mother, 5 step-mothers; mother dead). ... Besides  
these, there are about 50 concubines &c. ...

**(x) WILLIAM KIRKPATRICK TO LORD MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR GENERAL :  
12.6.1799**

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BM: Add Ms 13674: Letters and Papers of Mysore Commission 1799: Wellesley Papers (also in 13670). (ff 61r - 66v)

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Private

Serengapatam, 12 June 1799.

My Lord,

Although we have not yet been able to consider your lordship's letter of the 8th instant, so fully as is necessary, to our sending a detailed and official answer to it, there is one point in it, upon which our anxiety to receive your lordship's further sentiments and orders is so great, as to suggest the present private and more prompt mode of obtaining them.

I am therefore desired by my colleagues to state to your lordship, that we all of us entertain a strong doubt, whether the tenor of the 6th article of your lordship's draft of the treaty of Serengapatam is sufficiently conformable to the spirit and stipulation of the proposed treaty of Mysore; in as much as while this last appears to recognise the Rajah as an independent prince, capable of guaranteeing to the Company and to the Nizam their respective conquests, the 6th article of the other, places the prince on such a footing as seems to leave his sovereignty at the arbitrary and exclusive disposal of the Company, and to lower his political importance more than is compatible with his proposed and necessary relation to the Nizam. In fine, we apprehend that the terms of the 6th article - particularly when combined with some other stipulations of the treaty - would be but too likely to be universally considered as preparatory to our absolute assumption of the whole country.

For these reasons we wish to submit it to your lordship's consideration, whether the article in question might not be so qualified, as at once to give us every practicable degree of security for the realization of the proposed subsidy; to uphold in some measure, the political rank of the Rajah, and his intended relation to the Nizam (ff 2v) as well as to the Company, and to prevent the notion that we secretly meant at a favorable season, to seize for ourselves exclusively, what we judged it convenient for the present to give away in conjunction with His Highness. If no other equally substantial security for the faithful and regular discharge of the subsidy can be devised, a specific part of the country might be apportioned by the treaty of Serengapatam for the purpose. But neither of this nor for any other purpose does it appear expedient to us that we should hold districts so remote, from, and so unconnected with, our own possessions as those of Omrahpoor and Chittledroog.

Whatever may be judged indispensably necessary in the shape of territory, would be best chosen, we think from the countries immediately contiguous to our own; and in the Colar and Bangalore quarters, in preference perhaps to any bordering on Malabar or Canara, on account of the more efficient superintendance which they would be susceptible of (from the vicinity of the Madras Presidency) as well as because our holding any establishment in Bednore could not fail to be a source of perpetual jealousy and uneasiness to the Marhattas.

With respect to the districts proposed to be provisionally ceded to the Paishwa, it is our opinion that the temporary administration of them had better be intrusted to the Mysoor Government than to any officers of our own because they are inconveniently situated for being taken charge of us by us: because the measure would be received with suspicion by the

Marhattas; and because the probable period of our holding them would be so short, or at least so uncertain, as to make it difficult for us to realise their (ff 3r) revenue and to settle them properly.

I entirely concur in the necessity and reasonableness of our adopting effectual means for the purpose of ascertaining the actual resources of the country: but it strikes me that this object may be obtained without the extensive kind of interference in the contemplation of your lordship.

It might be avowed in the treaty, that as in the event of the Rajah's dominion being invaded, or threatened to be invaded, under circumstances which should require a large reinforcement of the established subsidiary force, it would be necessary to the assessing him with a just and reasonable share of the additional expence, occasioned by the stated danger, that we should and resources of His Highness's country. It was agreed for this purpose that certain officers should be nominated by the Company's Government, who should reside within the Mysore dominions, and who should be empowered to call, from time to time, for whatever accounts or other documents they might deem requisite to the execution of the trust. By putting the thing on this footing or something like it, we should if I judge rightly, sufficiently secure the substance of your lordship's plan, without furnishing either this state or the Nizam with any ground for objections of a weighty or embarrassing kind. It may be said that the power which we should derive from such a stipulation as the foregoing, would be too vague and disputable to answer our purpose essentially, and perhaps under any other circumstances than the actual there would be considerable force in this argument. But as it is obvious that the new government, must of necessity, and though it were left never so independent in appearance, be for a long while to come our creature, there can be no doubt. I should think, of our being able to give whatever degree of (ff 3v) efficiency, we may think proper to the general provision suggested above: or indeed to introduce gradually whatever arrangements we pleased.

My idea respecting Purneah, is that it is extremely desirable to set out, with him and that should we at any time have reason to suspect him of improper views nothing will be easier than to get rid of him. In the meanwhile others will be acquiring the necessary qualifications for supplying his place.<sup>8</sup>

Your lordship will learn from Captain Malcolm that Meer Allum's own opinion, respecting the powers with which it is desirable he should be vested, accords exactly with what I suggested two days ago to Mr Edmonstone without any communication on the subject with Meer Allum. Although we shall not be able, (on the basis of arrangement adopted by your lordship) to proclaim the Rajah, or to place him on the Musnud, until we shall have concluded with the Nizam, yet I trust that after getting rid of Tippoo's sons we shall find it

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<sup>8</sup> The underlined in the last two paras are in cypher. The coding is as under :

PURNEAH 55, 84, 85, 70, 8, 10, 21, 19

WITH HIM 56, 75, 77, 60, 21, 60, 89, 21, 33, 10

I SUSPECT HIM OF IMPROPER VIEWS 66, 84, 39, 55, 18, 13, 10,

77, 5, 87, 33, 36, 35, 87, 4, 55, 85, 36, 78, 8, 43, 53, 75,

8, 56, 39

TO GET RID OF HIM 50, 47, 21, 95, 8, 50, 79, 87, 30, 10, 69, 86, 5, 95, 32, 11

HIS PLACE 60, 21, 87, 39, 55, 76, 9, 10, 31, 74,

GETTING RID OF TIPPOO'S SONS 79, 75, 10, 30, 36, 35, 94, 90, 66, 39, 47, 70, 66



practicable to proceed a great way in the settlement of the country, and in our details preparatory to the final point.

I have the honour to be &c &c  
W. Kirkpatrick.

**(xi) LORD MORNINGTON (WELLESLEY) TO MYSORE COMMISSIONERS : 13.6.1799  
(Extract)**

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BM : ADD MS 13670 : ff 101-109v. (No official letter since 8.6.1799)

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5. Various circumstances stated in the separate articles which I have received from you, induce me to recommend in the strongest manner that you should if possible avoid placing Purneah at the head of affairs. The frequent fluctuation of his professions and plans of government warrant a (ff 103r) strong suspicion of the nature of his designs. It appears to me nearly impossible to bring that suspicion to proof in any other way than by reposing confidence in him, and placing him in a situation of power. The experiment in the present state of the country would be highly imprudent; under an active and able British Resident at Seringapatam invested with the full powers of control, which would be secured by the subsidiary treaty, I should hope that Trimul Row might be able to manage the country with advantage and under this arrangement Purneah must be compelled to reside in the Carnatic with a suitable (ff 103v) allowance from the Company.

6. An important question is raised in your separate letters with relation to the policy of retaining the fortress of Seringapatam for the Company in full sovereignty. You will observe throughout all my institutions, and other official papers, that my opinion has never varied on this subject, and it continues the same after the fullest consideration of your several suggestions.

7. The primary object of the war must form the basis of the peace and of the settlement of our conquests; this object was securing to our possessions in this quarter (ff 104r) of India.

8. The possession of Seringapatam which the providential success of our arms has placed within our reach, must not be embarrassed by any conditions or arrangements which can diminish its efficiency as a military post. Unless more powerful considerations of justice, humanity or policy absolutely demand the sacrifice of the greatest and most commanding advantage which we have obtained in the war. But no such considerations exist; perfect security, substantial strength, and invincible military power must be the primary objects of our policy in India.(ff 104v) The restoration of a fallen, persecuted, deserted and long imprisoned family to a large and respectable share of affluence and dignity, is an ample testimony of our attention to the claims of justice and humanity.

9. I am disposed to concede much to honest religious prejudices; but it would be a criminal excess of delicacy to offer to the religious prejudices of the Rajah of Mysore and of his Hindoo subjects a concession which should impair our means of maintaining the very power to which he is indebted for the restoration of his rank and dignity, as well as for the safety of (ff 105r) his life, and they, for deliverance from persecution, and for the free exercise of their religion.

10. Admitting therefore the local veneration of the Hindoos for the island of Seringapatam, and admitting that no other position on the Cauvery could hereafter be so advantageously allotted for their ceremonies and worship, such a sacrifice might justly be required of them by that Government, which has delivered their prince from prison, and themselves from the fury of a bigotted tyrant, nor does it appear unreasonable to expect that they should willingly part with one object of affection (ff 105v) reverence and devotion for the preservation of every other.

11. I assume that Seringapatam cannot be made an efficient military post excepting under the sovereignty of the Company because I conclude, that excepting it should be assigned to the Company it must become the seat of the Rajah's residence. In this event the influx of inhabitants, the confusion of authorities, and the necessary indulgence to the state and religious observances of the Rajah and his court most relax the strictness of military discipline and weaken if not frustrate, the means of defence.

12. In a political view the settlement of the Rajah at Seringapatam would open innumerable sources of intrigue and corruption and ultimately, of animosity, vexation and oppression.

13. The case of Tanjore (to which Col Kirkpatrick has adverted) furnishes in my opinion the strongest example to deter from a renewal of the scenes which have been occasioned by the natural progress of an arrangement similar to that now proposed for Seringapatam. I must therefore adhere to my fixed (and now unalterable) opinion, that Seringapatam must be retained in full sovereignty (ff 106v) by the Company, and must not be made the permanent seat of the Rajah's residence. If however it should appear that inconvenience or delay in the settlement of affairs would be likely to arise from determining to remove the Rajah from Seringapatam at the first moment of his accession to the Musnud, I am disposed to allow this part of the arrangement to be postponed to a convenient period of time after his accession. The position which I should prefer for the Rajah would be the fortress of Mysore, if it can be rendered habitable, if not we must resort to Bangalore, unless such an (ff 107r) arrangement of the Rajah's finance can be made as shall admit of a palace being built for him on the Cauvery in the vicinity of the fort of Mysore. Arrangements might be possibly framed, which under the British sovereignty might admit the Rajah and his Hindoo subjects to make temporary visits to the sacred buildings and to the various objects of their devotion situated on the island of Seringapatam. Upon the whole my final instructions to you upon this subject, to reserve the sovereignty of the Company over Seringapatam and to affect the removal of the Rajah (ff 107v) and his court by the speediest means compatible with an indulgent attention to the prejudices of his adherents and to the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants. I am aware that the same embarrassments must be encountered while the Rajah shall reside at Seringapatam, but considering the nature of his relation towards us, and the actual state of our power, I trust that the Resident at Mysoor will be able to make such arrangements as shall prevent any check to the cultivation of the country, and any material disturbance of the ease and comfort of the Rajah (ff 108r) or of his court.

14. In Colonel Kirkpatrick's letter of the 9th of June is enclosed an account of the annual allowances made by Tippoo Suldaun to his family, and that of Hyder, by which it appears that the total amount of the stipends paid to both did not exceed one lac and twelve thousand one hundred and sixteen Conteroi Pagodas, but when it is observed that many of Tippoo's children are at present of an age which requires but little expence, I think the sum cannot be taken upon a permanent scale below two lacs of Star Pagodas...

**(xii) LORD MORNINGTON TO COMMISSIONERS ON SUBSIDIARY TREATY :  
21.6.1799 (Extract)**

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BM. Add Ms 13670: ff 113-124

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9. I shall not object to any reasonable modification of the terms of the stipulation under which the right of the Company to interfere in the Rajah's administration is reserved; provided only that the substance of the right be effectually maintained. I therefore approve of (ff 115v) a part of your alteration of the 6th article of my first draft. I shall hereafter explain the reasons which have prevented my admitting the modification which you have proposed in its full extent.

19. Article Fifth: (ff 120v) This is the same as article 6th in your draft, with the addition of two provisions: The first of which is necessary to secure the Rajah a just account of the revenue, and consequently a fair allotment of his share. The last provision has been already explained.

**(xiii) INSTRUCTIONS FROM GOVERNOR GENERAL WELLESLEY TO RESIDENT,  
MYSORE: 4.9.1799. (Extract)**

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British Museum : Add Ms 13669: ff 5-20r: Wellesley Papers (also entered in Madras Military & Political Proceedings, dated 4.9.1799, in vol P/254/41 -pp 5899-5932 and is preceded by a Minute by Wellesly on pp 5893-99).

Paras 3-9 deal with subsidiary force, integration and interdependence of the forces in Madras Presidency, Malabar and Mysoor etc. Para 10-11 with "the realization of the subsidy stipulated by the 2nd article of the treaty of Seringapatam."

Note: Para 16 directs collection of information regarding commerce, export and import etc. Para 18 provides instructions regarding demolition of forts etc. Paras 23-4 provides instructions about details of expenditure ext. of

Mysoor Government to Fort St George. Para 25 is about the non-allowing of Europeans to Mysoor territory without previous authority. Para 26 lays down that the Mysoor Rajah adheres to the 6th article of the Mysore treaty. Para 27 (ff 17v-19r) deals with Coorg. Para 29 makes provision for suitable escort for the Resident. Para 30 provides instructions regarding the statistical and geographical survey by Colin Mackenzie and his assistants. Para 31 states in conclusion that though the Resident was directly under Fort St George the Governor General may at times also correspond with him directly.

Note: Col Barry Close was the first British Resident at Mysoor and was also a member of the above referred to Commission for the affairs of Mysore which functioned during June-August 1799. Other members were Harris, the commander in chief; Col Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington); Henry Wellesley, Wellesley's brother and private secretary; and W. Kirkpatrick, the military secretary.

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To  
Col Barry Close, Resident at Mysoor

Sir,

1. The Right Hon'ble the Governor General having appointed you Resident at the court of the Rajah of Mysoor, his lordship now directs me to furnish you with the following instructions for the regulation of your conduct in that station.

12. The third point to be attended to is the general administration, or in other words, the conduct and management of the Rajah's ministers. This must be (ff 11r) constantly superintended with the utmost diligence and vigilance with a view not only to the punctual realization of the subsidy and the improvement of the sources of the country, but to prevent of any necessity on the part of the Company, to assume charge of the country, an extremity to which if it is on many accounts to be wished they may never be reduced.

13. The branches of the Rajah's government which claim the most immediate and strict attention are those relating to the revenue and commerce of the country: with these is intimately and necessarily connected such an administration of justice as shall be calculated to encourage industry and thereby promote population.

14. With respect to the particular (ff 11v) system of revenue best adapted to the various circumstances of the country, no decisive judgement can be safely formed by his lordship until his knowledge of its products, of the genius and usages of its inhabitants, and of the existing revenue practice and regulations, shall be much more complete than it is at present. It will therefore be your business to acquire as soon as possible, and to transmit to the Government of Fort St George the fullest information in your power on the several points; accompanying your communication, as you may see occasion, with such suggestions for

improvement or alteration as your local observation and enquiries may enable you to offer. In the meanwhile you will employ every endeavour to restrain the officers of the (ff 12r) Rajah's Government from abuse of authority and to correct any erroneous or corrupt practices endangering the resources of the country, and the happiness of the people.

15. There is one point connected with the administration of the revenues which his lordship is aware presses for early decision. It relates to those Polygars within the Rajah's territories who have recently laid claim to certain districts heretofore wrested either from their ancestors or themselves, by Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Suldaun. His lordship wishes to defer his final determination on this point until you shall have communicated your sentiments upon it at length to the Government of Fort St George for his information. In the meanwhile however I am directed to (ff 12v) acquaint you that his lordship is clearly of opinion that the Polygars in question ought on no account to be put in possession of the countries they lay claim to. Whatever other concessions in the form of pensions or otherwise, may be made to them.

17. The importance of a steady and impartial administration of justice to the general prosperity of the country, and consequently, to the flourishing state of the Rajah's finances in which we are so deeply interested, as well as in the happiness (ff 13v) of his people, is too obvious to need being dwelt on in this place. His lordship is at the same time aware of the serious obstacles likely to be opposed to the introduction of an efficient system of civil and criminal justice into Mysore by the prejudices of the inhabitants and the usual looseness, not to say corruption, of the native Governments in general, in matters of jurisprudence. These difficulties, however must not prevent us from endeavouring to establish such regulations, with a view to the attainment of the great object, as may be found requisite and practicable. But previously to any direct attempt for the purpose, it is necessary to be accurately informed of the present state of the administration of justice in the territories (ff 14r) of the Rajah, and also its state during and previous to the Mahomedan usurpation; and his lordship accordingly desires that you will transmit to the Government of Fort St George as soon as possible a full report on this subject, accompanied by any suggestions for the improvement or alteration of the existing plan which shall occur to your mind, after an attentive consideration of the matter, and after due communication on it with the Rajah's Dewan. You will also report to the Government of Fort St George an account of the system of police established by Hyder Ali and Tippoo Suldaun, the actual state of this branch of Government, and such regulations as may appear to you most adviseable, for (ff 14v) its improvement.

19. (ff 15r) Although there is rarely any disposition to personal prodigality in Hindoo Governments, his lordship thinks it right to desire you to keep a constant eye on the general expenditure of the Rajah, and not only to inculcate as often as you may judge necessary, the propriety of his practising a due economy, but to expostulate in the strongest manner on occasion of any deviation from it which shall appear to you to be of a magnitude or tendency calling for your interference.

20. But though Hindoo princes are for the most part sufficiently frugal in their immediate personal expences, and though the same spirit of parsimony usually pervades all departments of their Governments, there is one kind of profusion which they are but too apt to practice to an extent that does not unfrequently involve their affairs in general embarrassment, namely the alienations of land in favor of individuals (ff 15v) (most commonly Bramins) and of pagodas. His lordship observes that Purniah has already proposed, and obtained the sanction of the late commission in Mysore for, every

considerable endowment of the latter description. His lordship is aware that these are stated to fall very short of what they amounted to before, the usurpation of Hyder Alli Khan, but he is also inclined to think that they are at least as liberal as the circumstances of the country will admit of. You must therefore be extremely careful how far you allow any augmentation of these establishments, or any other alienation of the sircar lands on whatever account. It will be proper that you should come to a very explicit understanding with Purneah on this head; letting him plainly know that no grants of the nature in question must ever be made without your approbation, and that (ff 16r) there is no instance of mismanagement which would be more likely to alarm his lordship or to impress him with the necessity of enforcing the stipulations of the 4th article of the treaty of Seringapatam than any departure either open or secret from his lordship's injunction in this particular.

21. If it is probable on the one hand that the Rajah Government may be disposed to be too profuse in its grants to the Hindoo religious establishments it may be apprehended that it will on the other be but too apt to depress those of the Mahomedan faith. His lordship therefore thinks it necessary to direct your particular attention to this point. For although he has no desire to encourage the increase of Mussulmans within the Rajah's territories, he would nevertheless highly disapprove any attempt to harrass or disturb in any shape those actually residing in them.

22. Although his lordship has no reason to suppose that there is any danger of Purneah's failure in any of the duties of respect and consideration which he owes to the Rajah and to his principal relations yet he thinks it right to call your attention to this point it being of importance that none of the family should (ever have) just cause of complaint afforded them either on the score of personal ease and comfort or on any other account.

28. His lordship having taken into consideration (ff 19v) the recommendation of the late commissioners for the affairs of Mysoor to allott a suitable salary to Purneah as Dewan to the Rajah directs me to inform you that besides a fixed allowance of 500 Conteroy Pagodas per month, he authorises Purneah to receive a commission of one half percent upon the nett revenu of the Rajah's territories.

Fort St George  
September 4, 1799.

William Krikpatrick,  
Military Secretary

**(xiv) REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFFAIRS OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF MYSOOR: December 1804.**

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Political Letter from Madras: 8.9.1805 IOR: Political Letters from Madras : L/PS/6/144 (19.5.1803-21.10.1806)

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88. At our consultation of the 28th june last we received a letter from the Governor General in council, transmitting for the purpose of being recorded in the proceedings of this Government a letter from Major Wilks with the copy of a report on the subject of the administration of the affairs of the Government of (P 271) Mysoor since the elevation of the present Rajah to the Musnud under the protection of the British Government, and of the general condition of the Mysoor territories and resources.

89. The Governor General in council observed, that the information communicated in that report was extensive and valuable, and that the real, diligence, and ability manifested by

Major Wilks in the collection and arrangement of the materials on which it was founded, were equally creditable to the public spirit, and to the talents of that respectable officer.

90. The Governor General in council having expressed his desire that we would convey to Major Wilks His Excellency's high approbation of the important service which that officer (p 272) had rendered by the communication of the result of his industrious and able enquiries, on the subject of the affairs of Mysore, we had accordingly great satisfaction in performing that duty in a letter which was addressed to Major Wilks for that purpose.

91. The Governor General in council having at the same time desired that we would record on the proceedings of this Government such observations as might occur to our judgement, from the perusal of the report of Major Wilks we informed the Governor General in council, that it appeared impossible for us to add to the valuable information contained in that document farther than to express our entire concurrence in the accuracy and justness of the conclusions which had been drawn by that officer.

**(xv) POLITICAL DESPATCH TO MADRAS: 17.12.1806**

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Political Despatches to Madras : L/PS/6/437 (23.11.1803-29.9.1809)

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(Reply to 88-91: Report of Major Wilks on the administration of the affairs of Mysore since the elevation of the present Rajah)

16. We entertain a due sense of the merits of Major Wilks, acting Resident at Mysore, in the compilation of his report on the administration of the affairs of that country since the elevation of the present Rajah which appears to be drawn up with considerable ability and to contain much important information with respect to the prosperous state of affairs under the able management of the present Dewan Poorneah.

No 4053

NOTE: The report arose out of the Governor General's instructions dated 4.9.1799 to the first Resident at Mysore, Col B. Close. An enquiry about this report was made in the Pol. Des. to Madras dated 10.6.1801 (para 13: Enquiries whether the Resident in Mysore has furnished a methodical reply to the instructions of the Governor General). The non-furnishing of it, thus far, was explained by the Governor Lord Clive on 10.11.1801 (P/316/117: pp 1168-70) but a letter to Col B. Close, who by now had been moved to Poona as Resident, was however addressed (ibid p 1319). Col Close's reply was received soon after (P/316/120 : pp 26,51-2) but he was then informed that the report would be prepared by his successor. (ibid 158)

The report was finally prepared by Wilks (earlier military secretary to Madras Governor Lord Clive) and is entered on pages 897-1129 in vol P/317/6 dated 28.6.1805. The report, as entered here, is also published, first in 1805, and later again in 1861 from Mysore.



#### 4. EXPLANATION OF COLONEL M.CUBBON AS TO CONVICTION ON SELF- CONFESSION IN MYSORE: 1830s

IOR: Board's Collections No. 72794 (F/4/1771 :1838-39)

54. Some reasons for confession can be traced to the peculiar habits and modes of thinking of the people, some to their condition in life, and others to the influence of former government.

55. The habits of criminals are very favorable to the practice of voluntary disclosures. Serious robberies and outrages of every kind are generally committed by gangs who whether lured for the occasion, or originating the enterprise among themselves, are bound together, by very weak ties, are often composed of several different castes, jealous of one another and constantly quarrelling about their shares of the plunder. Their own general safety renders separation necessary immediately that their design has been executed, and the capture of one, who has always some motive to gratify others, very commonly leads to the apprehension of all.

56. Each in his turn suspects the fidelity of his comrades, and discloses as much of the transaction as bears chiefly on others, and thus altho at the final commitment in the Talook, such a mass of irrefutable evidence is collected, and that so strengthened by various minute facts, as to make denial quite useless and incredible. (p.209)

57. Again, many prisoners are so reckless and destitute that to them the consequences of confession, and the subsequent conviction are matters of perfect indifference. A jail has no terrors for them, and they care not how soon they are immured in it.

58. There are others, especially Muhamedans who having perpetrated crime from motive of revenge glory in its confession, and some look upon apprehension as the first work of an inevitable fate, whose decrees it would be absurd and impossible to withstand.

59. All prisoners of low condition have a certain respect for authority, which lends them too upon apprehension, as much as they think may make on the committing power, some slight impression in their favor. A steady denial of guilt in the face of confronting witnesses, or opposed to plain proofs, would in their opinion aggravate their offence, and under former governments undoubtedly such a course would have enhanced their punishment.

60. It is evident however, that this last motive to confess is fast passing away.

61. The practice has become very common lately for these several members of a gang, after confessing voluntarily in the Talooks, to combine in the interval of their commitment deny all their talook statements and boldly charge the district authorities with extorting them, notwithstanding that the perfect coincidence (p.210) of the separate examinations, render it impossible but that the fact must have really occurred, and that not the slightest proof can be brought to support the assertion of ill-usage.

62. No doubt some cases may have occurred in the districts in which close confinement has induced a remanded prisoner to disclose more than he would have done if at large, and as old habits are but slowly eradicated, it has happened occasionally that threats of ill-treatment and ill-treatment itself, have been employed to induce the accused to give information on the charge on which they have been apprehended but prisoners it is amply

proved, are quite aware of the attention and enquiry charges of ill-usage call forth from revising tribunal, and amildars have been so strictly watched on this point that it is almost impossible that any violence can now be used towards prisoners without detection and disgrace.

63. Justice therefore being no wise compromised by the present practice of admitting and recording the voluntary disclosure of the accused it may be presumed that jealousy guarded as it is within these territories and received only as a corroboration not as the sole proof of guilt, little objection can be brought against it.(p.211)

## 5. POLITICAL DESPATCH TO INDIA: 30.10. 1839: NO.20 (AFFAIRS OF MYSORE)

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IOR: E/4/ 760. The letters referred to in Para 1 are: 4.4.1838(No 10) paras 71-6; 5.9.1838(No 45), paras 84-5; 15.9.1838 (No 48); 26.12. 1838 (No 63). The Collections to this despatch are 72794-5. @ (margin remark in pencil) I have some doubts about the expediency of this dissertation, altho the distinctions may be quite just."

Note: This Document has not been compared with the Original.

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1. The letters and paragraphs enumerated in the margin contain your reply to our separate Political Letter dated 20th September (No.20) 1837, and a continuation of your reports on Mysore affairs.

2. In consequence of (p.1032) our observations upon what we deemed the undue severity of the sentences on the Nuggur insurgents, Lt Col.Cubbon has under your orders released a few of those whom he considered the least guilty of the criminals. He has, at the same time transmitted to you some observations in vindication of the severity which had been exercised against this class of (p. 1033) offenders; and Col. Morison has recorded a minute to a similar effect. The substance of the defence is, that the punishments, which appeared to us too severe, were never inflicted for the mere offence of insurrection against the Raja's Government, and were in general confined to persons implicated in the subsequent proceedings of "the banditti under Surjapad Naik and other (p. 1034) leaders of less note, in the year 1833, when these territories had been upwards of a year under the British rule". Of the cruelties inflicted by these outlaws, a frightful but we have no doubt a true picture is presented; and it is stated that the distinction was always kept in view between "the excited and angry insurgents whose passions are roused in (p.1035) the cause of civil commotion, and those cold blooded assassins and gang robbers who rejoice in the season of public disorder not because it promises freedom from a particular government, but because it offers to them a temporary release from the restraint of all government, and impunity for their excesses."

3. We have quoted the words of Lt. Col. Cubbon, because (P. 1036) they express with sufficient correctness the distinction which we wish to be drawn. The comparative lenity which, especially on the first introduction of our administration, we think it both just and politic to shew in cases of political insurrection, (and even towards parties committing excesses in the course of such insurrection) there is certainly no ground for extending to persons who being already dacoits, take advantage of the facilities afforded by the disturbed state of the (P. 1037) country to commit acts of bloodshed and rapine. But we can not doubt that there must occasionally be considerable political difficulty in discriminating the one class of offenders from the other, and we entertain a suspicion (which some passages in Lt Col Cubbon's letter tend to confirm) that persons have in some cases been placed in the latter (p. 1038) and more atrocious class on presumptions we can not deem conclusive.<sup>9</sup> Yet it is evident that insurgents frequently have no means (p. 1039) of supporting the contest but laying hands upon whatever they can find, and when such is the case in a country like India such atrocities as those we have mentioned will necessarily be perpetrated, though we hope seldom to the extent of what is said to have taken place in this instance. Moreover, it is not asserted, nor is (p. 1040) it credible, that the leaders Sirjapah and Rungapah Naicks, both of whom we believe (the former certainly) have been capitally punished, were dacoits and common plunderers previously to the insurrection: they were state pensioners at the time,

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<sup>9</sup> The fact, for instance, of having put persons to death in cold blood, or inflicted torture for the purpose of extorting plunder, appears to have been considered sufficient to prove that the perpetrators were not political insurgents but gang robbers.

were the descendants of the ancient Poligars of the country, and, as is admitted by Lt Col Cubbon, may have had "a remote hope (P. 1041) of regaining their ascendancy in the Poligarship held by their ancestors". In fact when we consider how long it is before hopes and pretensions of this sort are abandoned, we can not entertain any doubt that this was the true origin of the participation of these persons in the insurrection, and that they therefore belonged to the more venial of the two (p. 1042) classes, the political insurgents, although (abstractedly considered) the acts they perpetrated in the course of the insurrection may deprive them, individually of any claim to sympathy.

4. We do not think it necessary to prolong (extend) these remarks, nor to prescribe to you any course with regard to the prisoners but such as you, after weighing our observations, may deem advisable. (p. 1043) But we must correct a very serious misapprehension of Lt. Col. Cubbon. Whatever degree of moderation might be observed in the infliction of punishment, it would not follow that persons who had plundered property during the insurrection should be permitted to "live at their ease upon it after the restoration of tranquility. Whether they were (in point of fact) insurgents or common depredators, all (p. 1044) property found in their possession ought to be made applicable as far as it will go to compensate those who have suffered by their excesses."

5. On another subject, the great number of prisoners who appeared to have been convicted on their own confession, the explanations given by Lt Col Cubbon are perfectly satisfactory and that officer is quite correct in (p. 1045) supposing that we had not the most distant idea of objecting to the admission of this (under some circumstances) most valuable species of evidence.

10. ...Proceeding upon the supposition that minor offences are (p.1057) on the increase, Lt Col Cubbon ascribes this circumstance to the abolition of corporal punishment. ...

11. This passage accurately describes the causes of the great difficulty of finding an unexceptionable or even tolerable kind of punishment; a difficulty which has not yet been overcome even in Europe, (p. 1061) and which is inherent in the nature of the case.

12. We think it unfortunate that a country like Mysore, which had so recently come under our management; which we had it in view ultimately to restore to a native government, and for that reason generally avoided any innovation inconsistent with the maxims and practices of the best (p. 1062) native governments, should have been made the subject of an experiment so embarrassing to any native government, as the total abolition of corporal punishment. ... We shall be prepared to consider with attention any suggestions which you may find it desirable to make on a reconsideration of the subject. <sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> ends on p. 1072, para 16. Paras 6-8 deal with the Raja's allowance and revenue affairs; 9-12 with criminal justice; 13-4 with civil justice; and 15-6 with pay etc. Para 14 draws attention to Pol. Des. of 25.9.1835 regarding judicial policy in Mysore.

#### iv. HYDERABAD

##### 1. RICHARD JOHNSON, RESIDENT HYDRABAD TO BENGAL: 30.10.1784

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IOR: Bengal Secret and Military Proceedings : P/B/3 : Proceedings 23.11.1784 : pp 946-57, post script 957-9.

The British Museum copy of this vol ( W. Hastings Papers, Add Ms 29014) does not seem to contain this letter. After the entry "Read letter from Resident Hyderabad" there is a blank of two pages followed by a communication from the Military Secretary of 17.11.1784.

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##### Richard Johnson, Resident at Hyderabad to Governer General & Council: 30.10.1784

##### (Extract)

Of the three powers above named, participating the Deccan with us, the Nizam altho the greatest name, is least in power, and last in point of position, having no seacoasts or good ports; consequently he is not the most sought and cultivated by the French, nor is he the most anxious of the three to suit (?) them. He may therefore be the easiest for us to detach and loosen from the combination: and hence the most advisable to begin with. The Nizam bears the highest rank and claims in the (p 951) Deckan, which is tacitly acknowledged as far as reconcilable with weightier (?) objects. He is hence the nominal and occasionally the actual channel for managing and settling their combinations and interests. He advises the general line adopted to their respective views, and it becomes often followed: as in the case of the last junction (?), which was planned, proposed and settled by him. I do not mean to assert that he is their actual leader, and that the rest would necessarily follow where he should lead. He wants (?) intrinsic power for this preeminence. Yet he is the best to begin with and success with him, might check and eventually turn the others.

The present Nizam, is, or has hitherto been, a decreasing power. Therefore his views aim chiefly at saving what remains to him, a necessary security, before he can look farther. (p.952) An uncommon mildness of disposition without habits of business, joined to a turn for pleasure, prevents his ambition strongly impelling him to aim at any great acquisitions of real power or of making the best use of what he has: but having been brought up, as he is, a member of the greatest family under the crown of Delhi and occupying the seat of the former great kings of the Deckan his vanity has been extremely inflated, and he would prefer (to) be universally acknowledged king of the<sup>11</sup> Deckan to enjoy its respect and pomp than obtain a great accession of absolute resources which would require great efforts to manage and defend. He is therefore a well adapted engine to be wielded by the powerful, provided they will yield to him all the appearances and undertake (?) the management of the joint resources with such constant nice attentions as are necessary to lull the jealousy of pride, always awake to the appearance and name of being guided, while (p 953) admitting the reality. His present minister from more than 20 years experience has discovered this and trusting no support within the court which he meant to rule, where every man whose envy should be excited would find a ready ear with an easy prince, so prompt to take umbrage at being thought to be ruled, he took the uncommon step of resting his support upon foreign aid which would for its own sake be always more disposed to urge the increase of his power

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<sup>11</sup> The above letter and other correspondence between Hyderabad and the Governor General in Council is extensively utilized and quoted in the Abstract of Hyderabad Correspondence (12.2.1784 to Jan 1785) in Home Misc 265, pp 225-64. This para is produced as follows : "The inference drawn from the whole is that the Nizam - (p253) is the most easy for us to obtain. That besides securing his own (very easy to out power and influence) we would increase his power to some equality to his pretensions; we should for our make him ours, and oppose through him a weighty barrier to Tippoo, who must then either be quiet or \_\_\_\_\_ the Marattas or us. The first not to be dreaded, and the latter a light evil, if not a means of a benefit."

than aim at undermining it. He accordingly found Nana's connection answer all his purposes; he seized it and of course threw his master at once into the French party which Nana already held by. Rukkum ul Dowla and Fazel Beg Khan upon similar principles would have kept him in the English interests, had they lived. Other circumstances helped the present minister in the decision he adopted. These will be detailed and considered in the plan and arguments for bringing the court back into the channel of our connection.

The Poona Government from (p 954) the confinement of their Rajah, and ...as well as imbecility of their Peshwa or Premier, is now an aristocracy in which the powerful and leading chiefs must necessarily divide against each other. No candidates for the general management rising above the rest and one of these affecting the English support, could not fail to throw the other into a similar chain upon the French. The Marrattas are strongly disposed towards conquest but while the first object of their leaders is to make conquest at home they will with little effort succeed in attempts abroad under their present divided from without a head. Under the extraordinary phenomenon of having no public treasury or common stock to answer general views, the Marrattas are in them-selves very little to be feared by any but the smallest powees. If they have not experienced, they have witnessed the progress of French ambition, and they have established it as a maxim among themselves that whosoever in their (p 955) internal feuds, shall first bring in European aid, all the rest shall join against him as a common enemy. Yet the violence of party contentions, have been often known to overthrow prudential considerations and hence they may afford openings for the French, while nothing lasting can be settled by us with so changeable an existence.

Remains Tipoo. He is neither a falling nor a divided power but a rising and united one inflamed by youth and success. From these circumstances he is intrinsically by far the most formidable of the three, particularly in the line now under consideration. By his long extended coasts, fine ports and habits of connection with the French, already possessing settlements on his coast. His compact country yields double the amount collected by the Nizam and altho perhaps only a third of what is collected under the Mahratta name, yet their divided extent is not superior to his compact the smaller lands, so that he is by far the strongest of the three with the additional advantage of large ready resources. He is so peculiarly surrounded that in prosecution (p 956) of his restless ambition, he must either attack the English or his allies. The first too powerful for him alone. The others are his natural allies in case of general danger. Of course an invasion of them is clogged with many objections. Yet as he must from the principles that were first stated as actuating him attempt conquest and push the attempt to his own destruction or elevation he will attempt the weakest of his allies while general interests do not claim an immediate junction of forces.

From a consideration of these three descriptions it may be inferred that the Nizam is the most easy for us to attain. For if, besides securing him his own, (very easy to our power and influence) we would increase his power to force equality to his pretensions, we should for ever make him ours, and thereby oppose through him a mighty barrier to Tippoo who must then either be quiet or be thrown upon the Marattas or English. The first would be little to our detriment as it would not be difficult to prevent (ff 957) great advantage on either side and the latter with the Nizam in our scale would be a light evil if not opening the way to a benefit.<sup>12</sup>

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I therefore conclude that our true interest lies in endeavouring to support the weakest and having thereby made him ours increase his power to at least a level in the scale. Should it even extend to preponderate it would still be in our favour.

I have thought it necessary to state this much, as an introduction to the plan of the negotiations my last address of the 21st pointed out. It should have attended you sooner but that another illness of near a week's continuance has scarcely permitted me to write this.

I have the honour to be

Hyderabad, 30th October, 1784.

Richard Johnson,  
Resident, Hyderabad.

(P.S) I have mentioned above an argument made among the Marhattas that whosoever shall (p 958) first introduce an European force for the dscision of their internal contentions for preeminence in their aristocracy is to be deemed a general enemy. This is exemplified by one fact : when Scindia, having advanced northward undertook to finish the negotiations with the English. The great power to a final consent on the part of his opponents in the Maratta Government (that is the party under Nana who spoke and acted in the Peshwah's name) arose and was founded in their suspicions and apprehensions of Scindia as connecting himself with us in the course of the negotiations. This operated so strongly as to make them restrict the final ratification and delivery until he should pledge himself not to make separate connection on his own behalf. Tukkojee and Hurry Punt altho his friends equally claimed this with Nana and further pledged themselves to defeat and oppose him (Scindia) whenever he should break this engagement. As this separate agreement was required, as a previous condition to their abiding to his act in the final interchange of definitive treaties, (p 959) it is not improbable that this was the secret paper which has been mentioned as dispatched by Scindia to Poona the very day when he delivered the ratified definitive treaty to Mr Anderson.

## 2. A REVIEW OF HYDERABAD AFFAIRS 1784 - 5

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IOR : Home Misc 563:

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(P 18) Altho his sovereignty in the Deccan was but nominal, he was occasionally consulted in the formation of plans. He might be regarded as an useful instrument who would readily afford his sanction to another power, whom he would allow to act as long as outward appearances should be conceded to him. He preferred being at Hyderabad, the seat of the kings of the Deccan, with an extensive (p 19) nominal authority, to a more limited domain with absolute power (an instance of Mahomedan pride as Mr..... observed on a subsequent occasion).

...Mr Johnson proceeded to notice the resources and revenues of the three great powers of the Deccan. The revenues of Tippoo Sultaun, owing to the compactness of his dominions (and vigorous Government) exceeded those of the Nizam by one half: and altho it might not amount to more than a third part of what was collected under the Maratta name, rendered him more (p 21) than an overmatch for that people. (Taking also into the account the superior discipline of his army and the character of their prince).

The Nizam's income was estimated by Mr Johnson at 1½crore of rupees (February 1785) and the treasure which he had accumulated was considerable.

His Highness's army was in an undisciplined state, and owing to long inactivity very unfit to enter into a contest with the Mysorean, who was now meditating acts of aggression.

With respect to the state of the interior little information could be communicated by the Resident Mr Johnson; it will therefore be expedient to introduce, at length, his letter to (p22) Bengal dated 12th February 1785.



### 3. A REVIEW OF THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF HYDERABAD 1784-98

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IOR: Home Misc 562:

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(p15) The price which the Nizam offered (at this time) for the CIRCARS was a crore of rupees, together with the remission of Peshcush. Mr Johnson stated the revenue of the Circars at 20 lacs of rupees per anum...

1 Dec. 1784

(p16) As to the four Northern Circars, he declared that the Nizam would never regard the British as friends, while they should remain possessors of them, because he had ceded them involuntarily. The Bengal Government having offered to sell the Guntoor Circar to the Nizam, the minister thought they might as well extend the offer to the inclusion of the four Circars.

...Earnestly desirous of (p17) obtaining possession of the Circars, the Nizam extended his offer from one crore to a crore and a half of rupees, besides the remission of the debt due to him by the Company, amounting, after deducting the nominal rent of Guntoor, to Rs.16,32,666 making the total offer Rs.1,66,32,666. This offer Mr Johnson considered to be very liberal, as he estimated the revenues of the Circars at less than 15 lacs of rupees per anum.

(p19) ...Regarding the Carnatic, as well as the Circars, as his right, the Nizam expressed his wish to purchase the former at 4 crores of rupees making in the whole 5 1/2 crores. Mr. Johnson gave it as his opinion that the offer would be stretched to 6 crores. The Company were to retain possession of the Jaghire of Madras and Masulipatam. The Nizam was to maintain 10 battalions of the Company's troops, being as many as the Nabob of Arcot had lately agreed to maintain (the troops to be at the Nizam's disposal).

### 4. ON STATE OF THE DECCAN (BY) CAPTAIN J.A. KIRKPATRICK: 4 June 1798

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British Museum : Add Ms 13582 : ff 59-80 : ends para 24. FF 1-58 is "Survey in Nizam's Dominions 1797" by Colin Mackenzie with remarks and observations dated 5.2.1799. FF 81-100 is "Journal from Caunpore to Beder (Boorhanpoor)" and ff 101-111 is (Journal) "From Delhi to Cabul" (in 15 stages).

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23. The domestic attention of the minister is at present directed to the improvement of the revenues, which he describes as having suffered a heavy decrease by the ruinous and impolitic system (ff.79r) pursued during his absence by the Rajah Roy Royam of granting indiscriminately jagheers for the payment of the troops of the state, as instanced in the case of the French party, though it is difficult to conceive that the whole amount of the Roy Royan's inconsiderable grants that way, could equal his own unjustifiable commitment of the public revenues to the disposal of such an unprincipled spendthrift as Muzuffer ul Mulk. With regard to the real revenue of the Nizam, I must acknowledge myself much in the dark, it being a subject on which accurate or authentic information is by no means easily procurable. According to Meer Allum it does not, or rather ought not, to fall greatly short of five crores of rupees. If the revenue bore any proportion indeed to the extent of the Nizam's dominions this calculation would perhaps be sufficiently moderate, as in square miles his highness's territories exceed those of Oude by nearly one third. It is to be recollected however, that owing to the occasional ravages of war and famine, and to the still more ruinous effects of systematic oppression, a great part of these fine countries is little more than a barren waste, (with the exception of the soubah of Hyderabad, and now also that of Beder) must (ff 79v) yield one fourth and more of its produce such as it is, to the Poonah and Berar Governments, upon the strength of their established and acknowledged claims,

known by the name of Chout, Kardanah(?), and Surdaish Mooky. Without pretending then to offer any opinion on the present state of the Nizam's revenues, I shall just beg leave to state for your lordship's information, what their amount was in the Fusly year 1200, that is seven years ago: premising that since that period, the greatest part of the Nizam's dominions have been visited by a famine of two years duration, which is supposed to have swept off one third of the inhabitants, and to have occasioned at least a proportionate decrease in the revenues. The jumma kaumil hausil or revenue actually forthcoming at the period above spoken of, including the Company's paishcush for the Northern Circars, is stated in the revenue office accounts of Hyderabad at four crores, twenty six lacs eighty six thousand four hundred and forty nine rupees, one anna and nine pye (Rs 4,26,86,449- 1 - 9), and after deducting therefrom, two crores, twenty three lacs, sixty six thousand, two hundred and thirteen rupees, fourteen annas nine pye, (Rs 2,23,66,213 -14 - 9), on account of jagheerdars, munsubdars, and enaumdars, a net balance of two crores, three lacs, twenty thousand two hundred (ff 80r) and thirty five rupees, three annas (Rs 2,03,20, 235 - 3 - 0) still remained for the personal use of the Nizam. Since then, an addition of thirty three lacs of rupees (Rs 33,00,000) has been made to his highness's revenue by his third of the countries ceded to the allies by the treaty of Seringapatam, and thirty nine lacs (Rs 39,00,000) more, by the resumption of the districts of Adoni and Raichore upon the death of Basalut Jung's son, the late Darah Jah. The whole of such (?) however is supposed by no means to counterbalance the loss which the revenue sustained by the two years famine of 1790 and 1791. The treasure possessed in specie by his highness was supposed to be very considerable at the conclusion of the late war with Tippoo, when it received one addition of one crore of rupees, being the Nizam's share of the pecuniary fine imposed upon the Suldaun by the allies. The late Mahratta war however, and the rebellion of Ali Jah, are said to have drained it of enormous sums, though there is still I apprehend a residue of at least one crore of rupees deposited in the fortress of Golcondah, whence the occasion must be urgent indeed, that could now induce His Highness to agree to any part of it being taken. ...

## 5. WELLESLEY INSTRUCTIONS TO RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD: 15.6.1800 (Extract)

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IOR : Home Misc 564B: pp 41-122; Wellesley Draft of Treaty pp 123-54.

NOTE: This volume is wholly on Hyderabad and has correspondence between the Resident and Governor General from 12.4 to 27.7.1800. In May the Resident (J. A. Kirkpatrick) on instructions dated 12.4.1800 concludes a treaty with the Nizam, subject to its conformation by the Governor General. The clauses and wording of this treaty angers the Governor General and the above letter while admonishing the Resident sends him detailed instructions with a draft from Wellesley. The Resident's reply to the above is dated 1.7.1800 (p 433-64) and his further letters on the steps taken by him are on pages 583-722 (dated 10.7., 13.7. 17.7, 22.7, 25.7, and 27.7; and numbered 92 to 97 respectively). Though no new treaty gets concluded by July 27 the Resident succeeds in gaining an interview with the Nizam and in getting back the Nizam's copy of the unconfirmed treaty.

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10. ... (p.48) Or if territory should be assigned, the cession might be burdened by conditions absolutely precluding such a system of management as must be adopted to render the assumed (?) revenues equal to the maintenance of the troops. Any expression in the grant calculated to raise a doubt of its performance, or to limit the power of the Company's internal government of the countries or to favor the Nizam's right of resumption, would eventually prevent us from concluding any settlement worthy of our character, or advantageous to our interests.

(p.56) 20. The revenues of the countries acquired by the Nizam under the treaty of 1792 are acknowledged to be greatly injured, and I have no satisfactory grounds for believing that those of the districts acquired by His Highness under the treaty of Mysoor, are now equal to the amount stated in the schedule of that treaty. It appears to be highly probable that the resources of the countries in question have materially declined since those countries came into the possession of His Highness. They have been ravaged by various insurgents, and it is to be feared that they have been managed on principles which must impair their future prosperity, whatever immediate advantage may have been extracted from those unhappy districts by their rapacious governors and managers.

(p.67) 39. I entertain no views of conquest upon the territories of Dowlut Rao Sindia, or of any other native power of India; I cannot therefore consent to a formal arrangement of the division of spoils which I have no wish to acquire. If Dowlut Rao Sindia, or any other power, after the conclusion of defensive engagements between the Company and the Nizam, should be guilty of any unprovoked aggression against either party, and war should appear inevitable, in concerting the operations to be undertaken against the aggressor, the allied states may proceed with propriety to adjust the division of such conquests as might appear attainable during the progress of hostilities, and convenient to be retained at the conclusion of peace.

(p.72) 46. By the new treaty every material object of the court of Hyderabad is more distinctly and effectually secured than by the treaty already executed by the Nizam. A long period of time must elapse before the territory which I require as a security for the subsidiary (p.73) payments can become equal to their discharge. It is ever doubtful whether the produce of the countries required will ever exceed, in any considerable degree, the amount of the subsidy. If the nett revenues of the districts specified in the new treaty should hereafter exceed the charges of the subsidiary force, or if the present nominal revenue of the districts (a revenue which under the management of his highness's officers, never has been realized, and under the same management never can be rendered more productive) should be realized, under a more wise and prudent system, ...by the abilities, experience and integrity of the Company's officers, it would be reasonable that the increased resources of those countries ...to him should be turned to the advantages of that power under whose happy auspices the (p.74) improvement has been carried into effect. The augmented revenue might be justly claimed by the Company on various grounds. First, because the Company must suffer immediate pecuniary loss and embarrassment by the commutation of the subsidy, in the actual declining condition of the districts to be ceded.

Secondly, because the expence incident to the Company's system of management for exceed those incurred by the Nizam's administration; consequently the probable amount of the surplus which may be realized by the Company is not to be estimated by the standard of the charges usually authorized by His Highness's Government.

Thirdly, because ...

Fifthly, because this treaty grants to the Nizam, without any specified (p 76) equivalent, the new and extraordinary benefit of the Company's aid in repressing the refractory spirit of such tributaries and dependents as owe a mixed allegiance to him, and to the Marhattas. In this view it may justly be expected that the resources of the territories retained in His Highness's hand may be improved to an amount proportioned to any excess in the produce of the countries to be ceded to the Company.

(Draft of Proposed Treaty as enclosed with above)

(p128) Article 5th: For the regular payment of the whole expence of the said augmented subsidiary force (consisting of 8,000 infantry, one thousand cavalry and the usual proportion of artillery) His Highness the (p 129) Nabob Asoph Jah hereby assigns, and cedes, to the Hon'ble East India Company in perpetuity, all the territories acquired by His Highness under the treaty of Seringapatam on the ...of March 1792, and also all the territories acquired by His Highness under the treaty of Mysoor on the 22nd of June 1799, according to the schedule annexed to this treaty.

Article 6th: (deals with adjustments above and below Tungbhudra)

Article 7th: (Exclusive management by the British of the ceded areas)

Article 8th: (No claims on each other for deficit or excess)

## 6. WELLESLEY TO LT COL KIRKPATRICK : 7.10.1801

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British Museum : Wellesley Papers : Add Ms: .....The letter ends on ff 283r.

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Private and Secret

Patna, October 7, 1801.

Lt Col Kirkpatrick

My Dear Sir,

It is with the utmost degree of pain and sorrow that I inform you that intelligence has reached me from various quarters which leaves no doubt an my mind, that your brother the Resident at Hyderabad, has abused my confidence in the most criminal manner and has deceived both me and yourself with respect to his conduct towards the daughter of Bauker Alli under circumstances of the most aggravated guilt. The accusation originally came before me, as charge against the Resident of having employed (ff 279v) the authority of his station to compel the family of this unfortunate woman to grant her to him in marriage. This charge led to reference to the Nizam himself, and I thought your brother fully acquitted by His Highness's reply, and by the report of some respectable gentlemen then at Hyderabad. But it now appears evident that whether Major K ever attempted to force such a marriage or not, he has debauched the daughter of Bauker Alli, he has a child born of this woman, and he now lives with her. The effect at Hyderabad is mischievous in the extreme as might be expected from such an outrage upon the general principles of morality, and upon (ff 280r) the most revered prejudices of the Musselmans. I will not press the aggravations of this most heinous crime to the extent which they would bear; because I know the justice, honour, and purity of your mind, too well to suppose that you do not anticipate every topic which I could derive from the principles of public duty, of private gratitude, and even of the common sense of integrity and honest dealing between man and man. I will therefore only add the determination which I have formed on this case.

Although thoroughly convinced of the truth of the charges preferred against Major K it is not my intention to proceed (ff 280v) extremities untill they shall have been verified by

evidence regularly taken by competent authority. When I shall have reduced the facts alleged to regular form, I shall remove the Resident from his station; and I shall afford him the fullest opportunity of entering upon any species of defence which can tend to exempt him from any more severe punishment. This course appears to me to be the most just, and expedient; the facts now alleged, when stated in a solemn manner by credible and respectable evidence will require the immediate removal of the person representing me at Hyderabad; because such a person's character (ff 281r) ought to stand above even the rumour of such crimes; It is due to the common principles of justice to admit the Resident to a full hearing although I fear that silence would be his best policy.

Now my dear sir, I wish to call your attention to the situation in which the offences of Major K against me and against the state have placed (what I know you value more than life) your character and honour...

## 7. THE NIZAMUT

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B.M.Add Ms. 37277: Wellesley Papers - These extracts are from 'Mr Dundas' notes on the Indian War 1791' and 'Notes made by, or for, Henry Dundas on questions relating to Indian Princes'. The second piece is the concluding part of the note which is from ff 1r-ff 6r.

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The Moguls had, for several reigns, projected and attempted to make a conquest of the Deccan. Acbar, Jehanguire, and Shah Jehan sent armies into it without effect. Aurangzebe, at last, after he had allowed the Mahrattahs to establish themselves at Gingee, conquered the kingdoms of Golconda, and Visiapour, the limits of which, as well as those of the dominions of Sevagee and Sambagee have been sent to Mr. Dundas, as memoranda.

From the death of Aurangzebe to the fall of the Empire in 1738-9 the greatest part of these conquests of the (ff 7v) Moguls in the Deccan were lost; the Mahrattas acquiring part of them; the Rajahs of Mysore, Bednore &c other parts of them; while those countries, situated between the Gauts and the seacoast, were nominally under the Nizam-ul-Muluck, and his successors, but, in reality, subject to the Nabobs who were laying the foundations of their independence of the Nizam.

Nizam, was accidently given as the title as sovereign of the Deccan, as ul-Muluck, who made it an independent sovereignty, held an office at Delhi distinguished by the name Nizam, or the officer who arranged and put in order the affairs of the Empire. After (ff 8r) the death of ul-Muluck, his successors in the Deccan retained the title, and they now hold in sovereignty the country marked in Rennell's map as the Nizam's, with claims of being superior of these countries which have come under the joint power of the Nabob of Arcot, and the English. The Nabob of Arcot, again, pretends that he was the superior of a number of lesser districts, Tanjore, Dindigul &c, and in this way from time to time, has been soliciting the English who support him, to recover those counties for him, and when at any time, they have made conquests of districts, has been putting in his claim upon the ground of (ff 8v) the former jurisdiction of the Nabobship as a feudatory sovereignty depending on the Nizamut, as it was a feudatory sovereignty depending upon the Mogul.

These facts show first, that the Moguls, soon after Aurangzebe's death, lost the greatest part of their conquests in ancient Golconda, and Visiapour; second, that the successors of ul-Muluck lost their sovereignty over the Nabob, and lastly, that the power of the Nabob himself never extended to the countries which form the theatre of the present war.

### **SOURCES OF THE TREATY OF HYDERABAD 1768**

(ff 6r) ... It appears first, that by this treaty, the Nizam relinquished the Mysore country, supposing it to be conquered by the English. It appears next, that the Nabob's claims upon that country, supposing it conquered, were done away.

## 8. HYDERABAD LIFE

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National Library of Scotland : MS.8326: James Stuart Papers

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### A Description of life in Hyderabad 1779

Letter from Alexander Read, Hyderabad, November 1779 (FF.43-46) (Extract)

...We walked all the way, not having far to go, before we met with two or three herds of deer, which had been collected and were confined in a space of about 10 or 12 miles in circumference enclosed by guards of sepoys for keeping them in and keeping off the people.

The dancing girls walked before us. There were about 50 (?) of them, none of them handsome. Five or six (himstrum ?) musicians followed barking out a mournful dirge, very different from our tallio. Several of the Mulks and daulaps (?) (the great men of the empire) were of the party, but it was difficult to distinguish them from other servants in the lowest capacity, the great difference in their appearance consisting in the cleanliness of their jamahs.

(45.a) Their manner of catching the wild deer is curious.

## 9. FROM WARREN HASTINGS CORRESPONDENCE

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Mr. Holland to Warren Hastings, Hyderabad, 9.4.1780, ff 10-17:

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"He (the Nizam) said that he could not depend upon his brother's discretion who on some sudden and groundless alarm of an attack from Hyder might hastily, without consulting with him adopt the measure of giving him the Circar (Guntur) in like manner as he (ff 13v) had given it to us. ... But he still persisted in wishing that I would write to you on the subject which to satisfy his Highness I promised I would do. It is in such cases as these that a Dewan in whom the Nizam confided would be useful; but there is no such person about him; His Highness confides mostly in Shumseul Dowla whom he considers as a brave faithful and honest servant attached by affection more than by interest to his person."

## 10. RUSSELL REPORT ON HYDERABAD

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Bodleion oxford: MS Eng Mis C 324 Russel Report on Hyderabad, if 110 ( closely written and easily legible) pp 23b to 43 contains statistics, pp 43b to 60 b contains details of the family of the Nizam, pp 60 b to 96 details about the nobles and pp 97 to 110 information about the Hindoo officers.

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(2r) ..... His (Nizam born 1771, succeeded 1803) government has never been marked by any public act of violence or aggression.

(6a) The government though Mahometan has no jealousy of employing Hindus among its officers. At present the efficient minister is a (p.6b) Hindoo. Rajah Purtab Kant was the late Nizam's prime minister before Rahimood Dawlah. The principal men of business under the Mahometan Minister has always been a Hindoo; the whole of the finance is in the hands of the Hindoos; and the farmers and managers of the revenue as many are Hindoos as Mahometans. The proportion which the Jagheer holding Hindoo bears to those held by Mahometans is as 1 to 7. The proportion which the troops commanded by Hindoos bears to those commanded by Mahometans is as 1 to 3.

(8b) The Nizam's annual revenue taken on an average of seven years from 1807 to 1814 after deducting the charges of collection and the chautes of the Marhattas as now paid amounted to Rs.2,92,86,985. The expenditure during the same period amounted on an average to Rs.2,96,04,756a year. The defalcations which the public accounts exhibited in 1814 was Rs.22,24,396. But if all charges entered under the expenditure were actually paid, and all sums borrowed were deducted from the receipts the real defalcation would probably be more than double the stated amount. On the other hand however this expenditure excludes a sum of about 15 lacks of Rs. of which eight lacks are paid by the minister into the Nizam's private Treasury, and seven lacks were the probable amount of the Nuzzurs received and retained by the Nizam.

The Jagheers which are included in the foregoing statement are rated in the publick (Bastart) Rs.1,19,13,263 of which 35,19,109 and personal and 83,94,254 are for the maintenance of troops. But the actual produce of both descriptions (p.9a) of Jagheers does not probably exceed 85,00,000.

Until the appointment of Mooneerool Moolk in 1809 who receives a fixed salary of six lacks of Rs. a year the minister was paid by a comission on the revenues called Jeunee or three annas on the rupee; that is for every Re that was levied for the Government an additional three annas were levied for the minister. But the commission was levied only when the demand of the Government had been previously satisfied, so that in many plaecs where public revenue fell short nothing was levied for the Minister. This commission during the time Meer Allum was in power produced on an average Rs.17,18,344 a year. Calculating on the rate of collection actually made, and on the probable produce of the Jagheers, it ought if fully realised to have given an annual produce of Rs.52,34,753.

Rajah Chundoo Lall as Peshcar or nominally deputy minister is still paid by a commission called neemunnee or half an anna on the Re levied in the same way as the Minister's commission used to be. Being a sixth of the Minister's commission it produced on average while Meer Allum was in office Rs.2,86,390 a year. If it had been completely realised it ought to have given during the seven years from 1807 to 1814 an annual average of Rs. 8,72,458.



The whole of the Nizam's Revenues with few and trifling expectations are formed, a sure (p.9b) proof the weakness of the Government and the misery of the people. They are levied by the farmer sometimes in kind but most frequently in money rent. When they are levied in kind the government if the grain be dry is generally one half. In rice the portion varies. Where the land is watered from tanks the government share is  $\frac{3}{5}$ ths, where the water is drawn from the wells it is  $\frac{11}{20}$ ths and where the water is brought from a distance by any tedious process it is only  $\frac{9}{20}$ ths.

(10b) .....The tenure of all Jagheers which are granted for the payment of troops is for life only but the command and the Jagheers are generally conferred on the son when the father dies.

(12r) .....The original provisions for the administration of justice are fair and rational under the Nizams' as they are under most other governments.....

## 11. NIZAM'S INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

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India Office Records : MSS: Eur:F.109(g): Adam MSS Hyderabad Affairs - 2 bound MSS volumes: (official).  
30.3.1814: Application for permission to start a mercantile firm; 22.4.1814: Permission granted by Government (J.Adam) - copy to Madras; 9.10.1819: Resident to Metcalfe, Secy. Govt. Details about the Nizam's Income & Expenditure

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### DETAILS ABOUT THE NIZAM'S INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

|                      | Income <sup>13</sup> (Rs.) | Expenditure (Rs.) | Balance (Rs.) |
|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| 1788/9               | 1,23,13,880                | 96,72,405         | 26,41,475     |
| <sup>14</sup> 1803/4 | 88,66,569                  | 1,40,15,337       | 51,48,768     |
| <sup>15</sup> 1807/8 | 1,85,58,321                | 1,90,99,307       | 5,40,986      |
| 1808/9               | 1,86,05,974                | 1,95,57,137       | 9,51,163      |
| 1809/10              | 1,85,97,340                | 2,01,27,518       | 15,30,178     |
| 1810/11              | 1,89,91,530                | 1,96,01,116       | 6,09,586      |
| 1813/4               | 2,03,64,127                | 2,02,03,687       | 1,60,440      |

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<sup>13</sup> Not collection of every description.

<sup>14</sup> Maratha War.

<sup>15</sup> Chundoolal Ministry.

## 12. METCALFE PAPERS

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India Office Records : MSS European: P 109/G: J.Adam Papers: Letter from the Resident Hyderabad: (C.T. Metcalfe) to Government: Dated 13.2.1821: (Extract)

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To  
G.Swinton, Esq.  
Secretary  
Secret and Political Department.

Sir,

In a former letter I adverted to an attempt made by the Nizam to alter the etiquette of his court with regard to the reception of the Resident. I now proceed to submit the particulars of that affair, with some other remarks on points of a similar nature.

2. There are forms in the intercourse between the court and the Residency, which appear to me to be objectionable. One is, that all gentlemen presented to the Nizam, with the exception of the Resident offer Nuzzurs, a practice which I had supposed to be exclusively confined to the court of the Great Mogul, the nominal and heretofore acknowledged emperor of India. The same practice however has hitherto existed at the court of his Viceroy in the Dekkan, with the exception above mentioned of the Resident.

3. On my introduction, though I was surprised and disappointed at the intelligence, that the gentlemen who accompanied me, would have to present Nuzzurs, I did not chuse to commence my intercourse with the Nizam by the abolition of an established practice, as such a measure would most probably have created a personal disgust.

4. Therefore in that respect and all others the established etiquette of the court was scrupulously attended to on my part, though it appeared to me in some respects to be inconsistent with the relation existing between our government and that of the Nizam.

5. I notice this because it makes His Highness's attempt to detract from the forms of attention hitherto observed towards the British Representative the more unreasonable.

6. It is customary for the Nizam to embrace the Resident on their meeting; and this form was duly observed towards Mr.Russel and myself at the interview at which he took leave and I was presented.

7. The ceremony of embracing implies that the Nizam must be on his legs at the time, and therefore that he must have risen to receive the person embraced.

8. The public compliment of rising, His Highness has always evaded, by not being in the Reception Chamber at the time of the Residents arrival, and by either making him wait, or coming to meet him from one door, as he enters at another. The last was the course adopted on the occasion of my introduction.

9. In short the embrace is the only ostensible compliment paid by the Nizam to the British Representative. In other respects generally the forms of Royalty are assumed by the Nizam, and admitted by the Resident, such as the application of the title Hoozoor i-poor-

Noor to his highness. The placing of his designation on at the top of any written communication, and not where the sense of the text would require it, with other similar forms.

10. On my second visit to His Highness undertaken for the purpose before described, he received me in a part of the palace called the Khawaubagh or sleeping apartment, where he was seated awaiting my arrival. He did not go through the form of embrace. I did not observe, or do not recollect, whether he rose to receive me or not, but as doing so, would not have been consistent with the manifest design of his avoiding the embrace, it is most probable that he did not.

11. It is singularly strange that I did not at the time notice any omission in the form of my reception. The truth is that my mind was so full of the object which I had in view, which was to lay the foundation of a cordial intercourse that I did not give a single thought to the affair of my own reception; not suspecting the possibility of any attempt to lower its respectability; and my only anxiety was, that every attention, which it rested with me to pay to His Highness's dignity should be strictly observed.

12. With the exception of the omission mentioned, His Highness's reception of me was kind and gracious as I could possibly wish; and the omission having entirely escaped my notice, did not in the least affect the cordiality of my communication, nor disturb the execution of the purpose for which I had gone to court.

13. It did not occur to me till after my return home, that the embrace had been omitted. I afterwards found that the circumstance had not escaped the notice of others.

14. It was my duty to make a remonstrance; and I was assured that the omission should not occur again; but I regret the circumstance described very much, for it is not improbable that the Nizam from being under the necessity of doing what he tried to evade, may do it with reluctance and ill will, and that it may be a perpetually recurring source of annoyance to him.

15. It will be in his Lordship's recollection that a similar attempt was made on the arrival of my predecessor.

16. Being on the subject of etiquette it may be right to mention, that in personal communication with the Ministers of the Nizam, it has been customary at this court for the Resident to wait on the Minister, and not for the Minister to come to him.

17. This appeared to me to be derogatory to the paramount dignity of the British Government in India, in as far as respects the want of reciprocal attention on the part of the Minister, and I was desirous of altering it.

18. In preference however to making any demand on the subject, I adopted another course, which I thought would affect my purpose, without the necessity of any discussion. When I had any communication to make to the Minister, which required personal intercourse, I sent my first assistant instead of going myself. In a short time the Minister proposed that he should pay me a visit on business; and our intercourse is now on what I consider a proper footing. He comes to me, or I go to him indifferently.

19. With reference to the practice of giving Nuzzurs alluded to in the first part of this letter, it is my intention to bring it gradually into disuse, and to drop it entirely in the end, if I can do so without giving great offence.

I have etc.

C.T. Metcalfe  
Resident

Hyderabad  
13th February, 1821.

### 13. SECRET DESPATCH TO BENGAL : 22nd June 1820

From Secret Despatches 1817-27, vol 34, pages 113-8, in the Political and Secret Department Records, India Office Library.

Secret

22nd June 1820

To  
The Governor General in Council at Fort William  
in Bengal

1. The Chairman of the Court of Directors has communicated to us a letter which he has recently received from the Governor General dated on the 21st of December 1819 enclosing copies of one addressed by his lordship to the Resident at Hyderabad on the 26th of October and of a despatch from the Resident of the 24th of November.

2. We will not here say anything of the irregularity of a mode of communication, by which a document of as great political importance as any that ever was transmitted to this country from India was placed entirely at the discretion of an individual, who might or might not think it advisable to make it over to the authority to which it ought properly to have been addressed. The tenor of the documents themselves requires an early and distinct expression of our sentiments.

3. We shall not until we are informed upon the subject in the regular mode by your lordship in council enter at any length into a consideration of the validity of the Nizam's claim upon the late acquisition of territory, or of our claim to the tribute due from that prince to the Peishwah, upon which points a discussion appears to have arisen.

4. Our attention is drawn by the Governor General's correspondence to the manifest danger of an eventual interference in the affairs of the Nizam tending finally to our assumption of his territory. While Lord Hastings expresses his conviction of the very unfavorable light in which this extremity would be viewed in England, his lordship nevertheless appears to view what would undoubtedly be the prevalent feeling here as likely to originate in an erroneous or incomplete understanding of the exigency of the case. It is an extremity however which would in our opinion upon any grounds yet stated to us be wholly without justification.

5. It has been with great reluctance that we have approved of acquisition of territory in wars occasioned by the wanton aggression of princes from whom that territory has been taken. But we do trust that no occasion will ever again be sought or found for deriving an increase of power or dominion from the necessities of an ally and a tributary.

6. That public feeling is not a mistaken feeling which regards as discreditable to the national character a system under which a series of pecuniary exactions, however just in their origin and principle, ends at last in the annihilation of the native power from whom those exactions have been made, and assuredly the discredit is greatly more manifest when the pecuniary difficulties of the native prince are enhanced by transactions, which professedly operating to his relief, and in the first instance really palliating his difficulties must ultimately lead to the utter ruin of his finances.

7. We will not now enquire whether the demand which Lord Hastings desires to make, in the form of a suggestion, upon the Nizam, be reasonable or not, nor shall we in this place make the observations which seem to us upon the objects to which (as we learn from another letter communicated to us by the chairman) Lord Hastings destines the sum to be received from the Nizam. Even if it was desirable to build a cathedral and an episcopal palace at Calcutta, we fear that the connection of those objects with the system proposed to be adopted towards the Nizam will more than counterbalance any moral advantage to be derived from them.

8. But there is in the present project (if it is so far advanced as to deserve that name) this peculiar cause of jealousy, in addition to all others which have attended former transactions of the kind, that at the very period in which the final ruin of the Nizam is become matter of no distant speculation, British subjects are encouraged and empowered to supply the pecuniary wants of that prince, in contravention of the repeated orders of the Court of Directors enforced by the Legislature. Upon this part of the subject you have already received the instructions of the Court in which we entirely concur.

9. We shall not now discuss the extent of interference on the part of the British Government through its accredited agent at the court of Hyderabad which it may be necessary to admit, with a view to the improvement of the Nizam's financial system. It is not easy to estimate the degree in which the extension of the sphere of interference recommended by the Resident in his despatch of November the 24th 1819 will tend to avert or to accelerate the crisis in which a more authoritative interposition would, according to the views of Lord Hastings, become unavoidable. But it is clear, that in so far as the line of policy suggested by Mr. Russell would tend to avert that crisis, its tendency to that effect must consist in correcting extravagant expenditure, in mitigating the rigour of the revenue system, and in avoiding the necessity of those loans which according to Mr. Russell can only be supplied by British subjects.

10. Under these impressions we have no hesitation in directing that no further step be taken, without our previous authority, for increasing in any shape, the sum to be paid to us by the Nizam, and particularly that the scheme of inducing the Nizam to contribute to the expense of public works at Calcutta be entirely abandoned.

India Board  
22nd June 1820

The Commissioners for the affairs of India direct that a letter be despatched by the Secret Committee in the usual form, according to the tenor of the foregoing Draft.

(signed) The Pere Courtenay

#### 14. SECURING A CONTRIBUTION FROM THE NIZAM

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From Enclosures to Secret Letters from Bengal 1819-23 vol 21. from Bengal Secret Letters 1820-22, vol 19, pages 423-7. Volume also contains Hastings Letter of 1.3.1820 (pages 5-169, 148 paras); Hastings letter of 21.8.1820 (pages 257-401, 125 paras) regarding Peshwa and Berar; and Hastings letter of 17.10.1822 (pages 467-540, 66 paras). Letter of 1.3.1820 is a review of events including Oodeypore etc.

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##### 11th Article in Treaty

11. His Highness the Nizam contemplating the great benefits which he has reaped from the late military operations in the extension of his rule, the protection of his people, and the security of his dominions, and being anxious to manifest his sense of those advantages, desires to contribute the sum of 16 lakhs (payable by annual instalments of four lakhs till the amount be completed) to be expended for public purposes in the capital city of Calcutta, and the neighbouring pergunnahs, on the condition that the expenditure of that sum for those purposes shall take place according to will and judgement of his excellency the Governor General.

C. T. Metcalfe  
Acting Resident

##### Secret Letter from Bengal: 13.1.1821.

7. Immediately after the perusal of your letter, injunctions were despatched to the Resident not to let the matter be broached to His Highness. They arrived a few days too late. The suggestion had been made to the Nizam by his minister, and His Highness instantly declared his most cordial assent to the preposition. An article notifying his spontaneous boon in token of gratitude for experienced benefits, was sent by him for our approbation of its being inserted in the treaty. A copy of it is enclosed. We shall profess a due sense of His Highness's generous wish; but shall consonantly to your command decline acceptance.

We have the honour to be with the greatest respect,  
Honourable Sirs,  
Your Most Faithful Humble Servants  
Hastings,  
J. Adam,  
John Fendall.



**15. GOVERNOR GENERAL EARL MOIRA TO MR. GEORGE CANNING, PRESIDENT,  
BOARD OF CONTROL: 2-2-1821**

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Leeds Public Library Archives: George Canning Papers: 99A Governor General Earl Moira to Mr.  
George Canning, President Board of Control: 2.2.1821

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**16. GEORGE CANNING TO MARQUIS HASTINGS: 20-8-1821**

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Leeds Public Libraries Archives: Canning 99A: Canning Papers: George Canning to Marquis Hastings: 20.8.1821

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**17. POLITICAL DESPATCH TO BENGAL: 21.1.1824 (EXTRACT)**

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IOL: From Draft Political Despatches (No. 137), vol 7, 1823-4, on pages 521-686. The extract is pages 634-686.  
No 137 is a revised version of Draft No. 274 (on pages 117-78, correspondence page 57-114) which was  
withdrawn after disagreements. It is also given in vol 6 of Precoms (Sept 1823 - Aug 1825) on pages 1 - 190

Note: The alterations were in para 67. The below text is unaltered.

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Sixthly general considerations affecting our practical policy in regard to the Nizam and other natives princes, suggested by the information derived from the correspondence between the Bengal Government and the late and present Residents of Hyderabad.

68. Important as are the transactions of the house of Mr. W. Palmer & Co with the Nizam's minister, both as they affect the interests of His Highness's state and the credit and character of the British Government, there still remains for consideration a question of far greater difficulty than any which they suggest, a question which sooner or later, would have required attention even if that house had never existed, because it has grown out of the system of policy which has been pursued by us in regard to the Nizam during a long period of time, although the crisis which has forced it into present discussion has doubtless been accelerated by the transactions of that mercantile firm. The question to which we allude is no other than this. By what means can the government of an ally be saved from dissolution, and the character of a substantive power be preserved or restored to the state of Hyderabad? In the successful solution of this problem, however perplexing and beset with difficulties it may be found, both our honour and interests are doubly involved.

69. The extinction of the Nizam's Government, the great evil to be apprehended, and the consummation of which we have most sincerely at heart to prevent, may be brought in two ways. It may be subverted should we withdraw our support from it; or it may be superceded by our active intervention.

70. The probability of its subversion in the event of our withdrawing our support is founded on the reigning Prince's alleged inaptitude for discharging the duties of a ruler; the state of his family; and the chances of a struggle among his sons for the succession; the habit in the Government of depending on foreign aid, and its consequent supposed disability for independent action if left to itself and lastly the corruption which pervades the whole system of internal administration and which in order to find the means of gratification might if unchecked by us resort to measures so intolerably oppressive as to excite the people to resistance and thereby throw the country into a state of inextricable confusion and anarchy at once incompatible with the stability of its own government and the tranquility of its neighbours.

71. From the minutes recorded by the members of the present Government it appears to us that whilst they over rate the danger of withdrawing and the immediate advantage of actively interfering in the Nizam's internal administration they are not sufficiently impressed with the consequences to which the latter course may eventually lead.

72. A desire to secure the objects of the alliance and to render the connection subservient to British interests led originally to our interference in the Nizam's internal government, and an apprehension whether well or ill-founded that we cannot withdraw that interference with safety to the interests of either state has been given by Sir Charles Metcalfe as a reason not only for continuing but greatly extending it.

73. The policy of this extended interference consisting not merely in a vigilant control on the part of the Company's resident over the different branches of internal administration but in an active concern and participation in all its details has been advocated by Sir Charles Metcalfe, Mr Adam, Mr Fendall, Mr Bayley, and latterly by Mr. Harrington since his accession to a seat in council as absolutely necessary to secure that reform which they deem indispensable to the salvation of the state; whilst on the other hand, it has been condemned by the late Governor General as a deviation from the line of conduct which had been prescribed to the Resident as an unwarrantable infringement of the just rights of the Nizam, and as more likely to defeat than to promote the object which it professed to have in view.

74. In many of the general observations contained in the minute of the Marquis of Hastings dated the 19th December 1822, we are disposed to concur but we cannot help observing that the objections so forcibly urged by His Lordship against a direct interference in the civil administration of the Nizam apply with equal justice to the measures which have been adopted for some years past with the view of improving the discipline and efficiency of His Highness's army, measures which notwithstanding the disapprobation of them expressed in the Despatch from our Secret Committee of the 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1815, have been preserved in and extensively applied both at Hyderabad and Nagpore, and were defended in your political Letter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1820 on the ground that the reformed corps as they are called "become in effect part of our army."

75. The Marquis of Hastings may have been right in considering all apprehensions of political danger to us from the system in question as unfounded and the contrast which had been drawn in the Secret Committee's Despatch of 1815 between the subsidiary system and the system of officering the native troops as not supported by facts. But it would not follow that after having taken on ourselves to defend the territories of our allies as we have done by our subsidiary treaties, we should also undertake the training and officering of the troops which they employ chiefly in the performance of municipal duties; neither can we conceive how the latter system can be reconciled with the argument against direct interference in the Nizam's affairs, so ably maintained in His Lordship's minute of the 19th December last.

76. In our view of the matter the policy of disciplining and officering the Nizam's army is as much part of the question now before us as the settlement of His Highness's land revenue undertaken by Sir Charles Metcalfe; and we regard both measures as open to the most serious objections.

77. These objections we proceed to state in the expectation that they will receive from you the most deliberate consideration and that, if you cannot retrace your steps (a course which we should nevertheless be sorry to consider as hopeless) they will at least have due

influence on the future policy of your Government in cases where you do not stand committed to a specific line of conduct, and have not yet advanced too far to recede.

78. In judging of any arrangements, it is desirable that all the good and all the evil attendant upon it should be brought distinctly into view, and it appears to us that all the advantages to be derived from appointing European officers to discipline and command the troops of states in alliance with us, consists in this; that the corps will thereby be rendered more efficient. This is doubtless an advantage, though by no means so important an advantage in the present state of India as it was when there was a greater probability of wars and warlike confederacies being directed against British interests; nay, it is not perhaps going too far to say that under existing circumstances it is desirable that the native princes should be discouraged from entertaining large military establishments, and it even merits consideration whether in cases where they are bound to us by treaty to maintain a certain force, it might not be politic, if not altogether to absolve them from such engagements, at least to modify or relax their obligations so as to bring the cost of them within the means of the native state. When a larger force is kept up than the state can afford to pay, revenue for a time is extorted from the people at the point of the bayonet. Rapacity soon defeats its own ends, the public resources instead of improving decline, the pay of the troops falls in arrear. Discontent leads to mutiny, the soldiers are converted into freebooters, and predatory associations are formed which the protection due to our subjects and the interest we have in preserving the general tranquility compel us to put down at whatever cost.

79. But supposing the advantage of securing to our allies the possession of an efficient military force to be far more (cons)equivocal than it appears to be, it surely will be allowed to be an advantage which may be purchased at too high a price. It is material therefore to enquire what is the price paid for this advantage, such as it is, or, in other words to consider the evils attendant on the policy, as it affects first, the native states, secondly, our own interests, and thirdly, the interests of both conjointly.

80. First; As it affects the native states. It appears to us to be humiliating and galling in the extreme. The proceeding of appointing European officers to the command of corps raised and maintained by princes whom we have not as yet at least professed to treat as dependent, must be felt as a fresh inroad on their remains of independence, as an exclusion of the higher class of natives from the places of power, trust and emolument which they have hitherto held and of which it is both cruel and unjust to deprive them and as indicative of further designs on our part which we assuredly do not entertain and which it is very undesirable to have implied to us.

81. With reference also, to the 13th article of the treaty of 1800 with the Nizam, it appears to us very doubtful whether the proceeding be consistent with good faith particularly if as stated by the Marquis of Hastings "the mode of officering and paying the reformed corps render them in effect a part of our army upon whose fidelity we may rely even in a rupture with their nominal chief."

82. The separation which this view implies of the military from the civil power cannot fail to paralyse the energies and, in course of time, to destroy the existence of any government which submits to it. That our subsidiary system tends to produce these results cannot be doubted but the results were at least retarded by the possession, on the part of the native states of a military force of their own over which we exercised no control. Deprived of control over that force they cannot long retain the internal management of the country, and when this is given up it is clear that the governments exist only in name.

83. Secondly: The inconvenience of this policy as it affects the Company's interests, though serious, may be stated in a few words. You are already in possession of our decided opinion that Company's officers ought exclusively to be selected for the service in question. But the narrower the field of selection, the greater in some respects is the inconvenience. If the officers be well selected they will be those who can be least spared; Men skilled in their profession, conversant with the languages of the country, and qualified, by their disposition, manners, and experience, to conciliate and influence the natives. Men of that description are extremely valuable and the loss of them must be most sensibly felt by the corps from which they are detached. If on the other hand they are chosen without discrimination, they will in many instances, be ill-qualified for the service in which they are deputed, and perhaps in some, discredit their appointment and bring into disrespect the European character.

84. Nor do we deem an arrangement well devised, or even reasonable under which the Company are subjected to the burthen of paying 50 or 60, or it may be 100 officers employed and paid also by the Nizam and the Nagpore Rajah or any other Indian princes.

85. Thirdly: A few observations remain to be added respecting the present policy as it affects the native states and British interests conjointly. The British Government is deeply interested in the good government of these particular states not only on account of its general concern for their welfare as allies but because of its constant and active interference for a series of years in the management of the affairs of the Nizam and more recently in the administration of the Nagpore Rajah have to a considerable extent staked its honour and character on the result. Seeing the importance, then, not only to our allies, but to ourselves, that our policy should be so shaped as to insure good government in so far as depends on us, let the arrangement under discussion be tried to that test.

86. It is a self evident proposition that in proportion to the extent of power vested in any individual ought to be the strictness of responsibility for its due exercise, and the checks upon its abuse. The European officers in the service of the Nizam and the Nagpore Rajah are vested with power civil as well as military. They (not) only discipline and command the corps to which they are severally attached but they are entrusted with the administration of revenue and police, and in both capacities they appear to us to be equally exempt from responsibility. The authority of the Residents however great in other respects does not legally extend to those officers; and, even were the native governments less inefficient it is not within the competence of the British Indian Government to render British subjects amenable to their laws. Setting aside, too, the anomaly in the constitution of a military force of which the troops would be subject to one law and the officers to another, we are doubtful whether the articles of war contain any provision applicable to offences committed by British officers when employed in the service of a foreign prince.

87. Here then are a number of individuals, many of them very young men, entrusted with most extraordinary powers placed in circumstances of strong temptation to abuse those powers and subject to little or no responsibility for the exercise of them. We are far from wishing to exaggerate the probable evils of such an arrangement, but a solemn sense of duty does not permit us to suppress our apprehensions that it will be attended with practical abuses most calamitous to the countries which may be the theatre of them, and injurious, little less to the reputation of the government which does not prevent them, than to the character of the immediate actors in them.

88. Our anticipations from such a state of things are unfortunately justified by experience. In 1775 the assistance of British officers was granted at his request, to Nabob Asoph ul Dowlah [of Awadh] to command six battalions of sepoy, six regiments of cavalry, and three companies of artillery. But in less than two years, it was found necessary to discontinue the plan for the following reasons, as set forth in a minute recorded by Mr Hastings on the 5th May 1777.

First; The superior pay and emoluments enjoyed by the officers in the Nabob's service, excited murmuring and dissatisfaction among those who remained in the Company's service, and by discouraging their zeal and attention to their duty, tended to the general relaxation of discipline.

Second: The want of effectual checks had been deeply felt, the principle of moderation which should actuate the conduct of officers in their public disbursements having been found to have little influence when the expense was defrayed by a state on which they had no natural and permanent dependence. Hence the burthen had become too enormous for the Nabob to bear.

Thirdly: The service having been too remote for the British government to observe and restrain all abuses in it, local interests were acquired, and opportunities of making undue advantages, afforded.

Fourthly: The officers employed on this service being exempt from the articles of war, the British government had no further influence over them than such as was created by a dread of losing their profits, which alone was insufficient to restrain excesses proceeding from, the same principle.

89. It may perhaps be said that the greatest change which has taken place in our political situation in India, renders any inference deducible from these early transactions inapplicable now. Although our situation doubtless has changed in many respects in the course of nearly half a century, yet this change does not in our judgement, prevent the military arrangements which took place in regard to Oude in 1775, 1777, and 1781 from being highly instructive at the present juncture. The Arrangements for disciplining the troops of the Nabob Vizier and the Nizam are exactly similar, and the results depending, not on accidental circumstances of time and place, but on the unalterable laws of human nature, we greatly fear will be the same in both cases.

90. Indeed the chances of abuse are greater now than they were then, in as much as the officers appointed to discipline and command the Nizam's corps (as has been already observed) have been entrusted with civil as well as military duties. Civil duties presenting strong temptation unaccompanied with any efficient check, or more than nominal responsibility. For their military duties, they may at least be qualified, but we cannot comprehend how a few young men with no other experience than they can have acquired in serving with their respective corps or in the office of a political Resident could without having the ordinary advantage of instruments of their own selection be at all competent to superintend the revenue settlement of an extensive country, a task requiring a combination of qualities which it is difficult to find even among those who have devoted a considerable portion of their lives to the practical study of revenue business.

91. But supposing the settlement to have been judiciously formed, the object of protecting the agricultural population would still be unattained unless security were afforded that the collection should not exceed the sums assessed. We were not, therefore, surprised to find it stated in Sir Charles Metcalfe's report of the 7th November 1821, that the satisfaction of the cultivators at the settlement was "clouded by a dread that the systematic bad faith of the Nizam's Government may render nugatory the benefits of the arrangement." That the

apprehensions of the cultivators were by no means groundless fully appears from Sir Charles Metcalfe's subsequent letter dated the 31st May 1823, wherein he states that he had been obliged to resort to the nomination of" officers charged with the general duty of receiving the complaints of cultivators or others oppressed by the Government, and obtaining redress for them either by application to local authorities or by representation to the Resident, and, through, him, to the Nizam's Government". These officers were also empowered to apprehend banditti and other criminals, and to deliver them over to the local authorities. Although these expedients did not quite amount to an assumption of the judicature of the country, they show how one act of interference naturally and almost necessarily leads to another; that revenue settlements are of little value unless security be afforded to the Malguzars that no more will be exacted from them than they engaged to pay; and that if our interference is to be effectual the protection of the people in whose behalf it professes to be exerted, we cannot stop short of taking into our hands the whole administration of the country, or, in other words, of entirely superceding the existing Government. This being an end which we (have) no right to compass, we cannot stand justified in pursuing a course of measures inevitably leading to it, however good may be the intentions by which they are dictated, and however considerable may be the immediate benefit derivable from them. But even were the end unobjectionable, the means far from being so, because consisting of power without check, and agents exempt from responsibility they constitute a certain guarantee for bad government.

92. Entertaining these sentiments, we cannot caution you with too much earnestness to avoid all interference in the internal administration of those states which we have lately, entered into subsidiary engagements and we wish you to consider the system of officering the troops of these states with European officers as a branch of that interference, from which we are very desirous to withdraw, whenever you shall see an occasion for accomplishing that object, with facility and safety. The obligation which we have incurred to act as arbitrators in their disputes with each other neither bind nor entitle us to interfere in their domestic concerns; and should you perceive any disposition to such interference on the part of your political Residents, we desire that it may be promptly and decisively checked.

93. The question as to the practical policy, to be observed in regard to the Nizam's Government is perplexed in some degree by the character of the reigning prince but still more by a long course of past interference and by the 17th article of the treaty of 1800, under which we are bound, in certain cases, to employ our military force in quelling disturbances within His Highness's dominions.

94. Sir Charles Metcalfe in his letter dated the 20th June 1822 expressed a doubt "whether His Highness's abstraction from public business, which is of long standing, proceeds from natural indolence and love of ease, or from the control exercised by his minister with our support." It is very desirable that this point should be settled because, if there be no natural incapacity in His Highness, one objection to our placing him in the exercise of his proper functions as sovereign of the country, would disappear.

95. With respect to our past course of interference, it may be traced to the appointment, in 1809, of Rajah Chundoo Lall to the office of Peshcar, at the instance of your Government, on an understanding that, nominally subordinate to Mooneer ul Moolk, he was to be active prime minister, or rather actual ruler of the country, and of course to attend to the views and wishes of the Government to which he owed his elevation, and from which he expected support. In so far as British interests are exclusively concerned, the Rajah seems to have furnished you with no ground of complaint; but of his internal administration, we fear that

little can be said in the way of praise. Although represented by Sir Charles Metcalfe as the best man of business about court, he is at the same time described as rapacious, extortionate, and wasteful of the public resources, which he prodigally expends in bribery for the preservation of his power, and as being in the habit of secretly counteracting plans of reform recommended by the Resident, which he professed to favour.

96. But, notwithstanding these representations of the character of the minister, Sir Charles Metcalfe was told in Mr. Swinton's letter dated the 25th October 1822, that "it would be the deepest stain to British honour were he (the minister) left to the ruin which must follow the discontinuance of our plighted support." And in the event of the Nizam manifesting any disposition to remove Rajah Chandoo Lall from office, the Resident was instructed to give His Highness to understand that such a step "would cause a material change in the connection between the two Governments"; and might give rise to a claim, on your part to all the rights possessed by the Peshwa over the Hyderabad dominions.

97. The instructions conveyed to the Resident in Mr. Swinton's letter do not appear to us to be either sufficiently guarded, or altogether in accordance with the sentiments contained in the late Governor General's minute of the 19th December last.

98. Although it is incumbent on us to protect Rajah Chundoo Lall from any vindictive feelings on the part of the Nizam, and even to use our influence, in the event of his removal from office, to obtain for him a provision suited to his rank and station, we are not aware of our having incurred any obligation to continue our support to him as minister longer than his conduct deserves it; and if, as Lord Hastings seems to have been of opinion, all the advantages of direct interference might have been secured through the influence of the Resident with the Nizam's Minister, it seems essential to this influence that the minister should be in some degree dependent on the person exercising it, and that he should have to dread the discontinuance, as well as to hope for the continuance, of the Resident's support.

99. This, however, is altogether a forced and unnatural system of government; and we agree with Sir Charles Metcalfe that "a system of non-interference founded on regard for the rights of an independent sovereign, if practicable under the circumstances of our intimate connection with the Nizam's Government, would have great and decided advantages, and is that which we ought to endeavour to establish provided always that the irresistible strength which our protection affords to the Government be not converted to the oppression of the people." (letter from Sir Charles Metcalfe to Mr Swinton dated 29th November 1822). The concluding consideration is most important, and constitutes, in our mind, the strongest objection against our withdrawing from all interference in the concerns of a Government which we are bound by treaty to protect, however tyrannical and oppressive may be its proceedings, As long as we have an army stationed within the Nizam's country, the objection never can be altogether obviated. But it would be very much weakened were we relieved from the objection contracted under the 17th article of the treaty of 1800, whereby we have agreed to employ the subsidiary force in enforcing payment, from the Nizam's subjects and dependents, of his just claims upon them, and in reducing to obedience such as are refractory. And we think it not improbable, that the Nizam would be glad to purchase freedom of action by relieving us from this engagement.

100. We have thus put you in possession, generally of our sentiments on this very difficult and important subject. We abstain from issuing any positive instructions on this occasion, because we are unwilling to fetter your discretion on the judicious exercise of which we are disposed to place great reliance. We likewise entertain a high opinion of the probity and

talents of the present Resident at Hyderabad, both of which have been conspicuously evinced in the transactions under review of Sir Charles Metcalfe's experience and information, you will, no doubt, avail yourselves; and we feel confident that whatever measures may be resolved on for upholding the Nizam's government, the great object of our solicitude, will be executed by him with judgement, zeal and ability.

101. Since the foregoing paragraphs were prepared, we have received your Letters in the Political Department dated the 7<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> March, 8<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> May, 16<sup>th</sup> June, 1<sup>st</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup>, 31<sup>st</sup> July, and 9<sup>th</sup> August.

102. We shall reply to these communications on the subject of the Hyderabad transactions without any unnecessary delay.

East India House, the 10th January 1824.

India Board, 13th January 1824.

Approved with alterations by order of the Commissioners for the affairs of India

(signed) T.P. Courtenay.



## V. NAGPUR

### 1. WARREN HASTINGS, ALEXANDER ELLIOT CORRESPONDENCE AND RELATED PAPERS

Warren Hastings to Alexander Elliot: Fort William 12 Jan. 1777

My Dear Elliot

This letter will comprize one connected subject, and to render this intelligible I shall take it up from a very early period.

After the famous defeat of the Marattas at Ponnipett, Sudaba, the second officer in command, and the first cousin of Rogonaut Row the late Peshwa and competitor of the ministers of Poona, was missing, and supposed to have been slain. About three years after a man disfigured with wounds made his appearance under the name of Sudaba, with a small force, was attacked, defeated, made prisoner and exposed as an imposter by the ruling Peshwa. From that time he continued a prisoner till the month of April last, when he escaped from his confinement, collected a considerable army, and even made himself master of all the country called Cocan, which lies between the hills and the sea. On the 27th of October he ventured in an engagement with the forces of the actual Government, was totally routed, put to sea in a small vessel and sailed to the island of Bombay, where he demanded protection. Unfortunately for him the Governor and second in command were both absent at Salsett, and Mr Draper who had charge of the fort sending two persons of inferior rank to receive him, the devoted fugitive construed this into an insult, and in a fit of ill-timed pride instantly departed, threw himself into the hands of a Maratta chief named Ragoojee Angria (?), who delivered him up a prisoner to the ministers at Poona. Ragonaut Row more fortunate escaped to Bombay where he was received, and probably continues there. It is said that Mr. Hornby on the first news of Sudaba's confinement, sent a deputation to Ragoojee Angria to demand him with (p.2) a declaration of war in case of refusal. Such at least is the representation of this affair which we have received from Poona, where both this measure, and the asylum granted to Ragoba are treated as acts of hostility against the Maratta state and direct infringements of the treaty. We too have taken up the charges as such, and sent peremptory orders to the presidency of Bombay to dismiss Ragonaut Rao. In the meantime Col. Upton continues, notwithstanding our repeated orders for his recall, at Poona, whether by his free consent or by constraint is uncertain. The style both of his letters and those of the Peshwa, seems to confirm the common report of his being detained by force. This is not the only suspicious circumstance. All the letters from Poona both before and since the ratification of the treaty are filled with reproaches for the hostile acts which preceded it, and even strong indications that the authors of them did not regard the treaty as binding but on the persons only who signed it. Their last letters which were written immediately after the overthrow of Sudaba contain a demand in behalf of the king of Tanjour, whose name never before appeared in any papers of their correspondence or the negotiation with Colonel Upton. These are at best but doubtful symptoms, and added to the indisposition which the presidency of Bombay have all along shown to the late treaty, portend but (p.3) a short duration to the peace concluded by it.

By the overthrow of Sudaba, the intestine troubles which have so long disturbed the Maratta state appear to have been so far appeased as to leave them at full leisure to prosecute remote undertakings. The same letters that brought us the news of this event also informed us that the ministers had set on foot an expedition against Hyder Ally. By other

channels we learn that Nizam Ally Cawn and Moodajee Boosla the Raja of Berar have been invited and have agreed to join their forces on this occasion.

So sudden revival and reunion of the powers of this great empire, and so sudden an application of them immediately on the close of a long civil war, indicate a degree of vigor in its constitution, which cannot fail to alarm the friends of the Company, if the subsequent appearances shall warrant this conclusion. I think they will not, but persuade myself that the present conjuncture is no less favourable than any of the past (always excepting the ill-fated treaty with Ragoba) for advancing the interests of the Company, and extending their influence and connections. I will tell you why.

In the first place a confederacy formed between the Peshwa, the Subadar of Deccan, who has plundered the Marattas of a great part of the Poona state, and the chief of Berar its nominal vassal; all possessing (p.4) mutual claims on each other, and swayed by opposite interests, cannot hold long together. In the 2nd the Government of Poona is weak in itself by the want of a constitutional authority in those who possess the rule of it, and by want of unanimity among themselves. Maraba Furnees one of their principal members has openly separated himself from the rest. Their chief, Succaram Babboo is old and infirm, and both he and Nana Furnees, who are the only parties to the treaty lately concluded with us in the name of the Maratta state, lately demanded and received passports from the Government to retire to Benaris, with the avowed design of passing the remainder of their lives there in devotion. This design though probably suggested only by the personal dangers to which they were exposed by the rapid successes of Sudaba, must diminish the confidence and respect which are the natural attendants of a fixed and regular authority. And 3rdly the Government of Berar possesses in it the seeds of civil discord, which are at this time ready to spring up on the first occasion that can favour their growth. This is a subject which requires one to be more explicit than I have been on others, and this too I must take up ab

boo (?)

Ragoojee Boosla the Rajah of Berar, the same person who invaded Bengal, and subjected in to the chout tin the time of the Nabob Alliverdy Cawn, dying left 4 sons, Jannoojee, Shabajee, Moodajee and Bimbajee. Jannoojee succeeded him. He having no child adopted the son of Moodajee who was called by the name of his grandfather Ragoojee. On the death of Jannoojee, Shabajee the second brother succeeded to the Government, but held it in the name of his nephew, the legal heir. This was the cause of continual dissensions (p.5) between the two brothers. Shabajee holding the Government in right of primogeniture, Moodajee claiming it on the behalf of his own son, though the legal affinity between them was changed by his elder brother's adoption. In the late dissensions between Ragonaut Row, and the Ministers of Poona, Shabajee took part with the former, and Moodajee with the latter, but their own affairs calling them home before those were decided, they came to an open rupture. Shabajee was slain, and his brother assumed the rein of Government in his stead.

Here I must go back to relate another transaction more immediately connected with the purpose of this letter. Shabajee, a little time before his return to Berar, sent a vackeel named Beneram Pundit to Calcutta with a letter containing professions of friendship, and a desire to be on terms of alliance with this Government. I thought this an occasion not to be slighted, and returned such an answer as was most proper to encourage the wishes of Shabajee without expressing too interested a solicitude to meet them, and I sent the vackeel back big with the project of uniting the province of Berar to this Government on terms similar to those which had been formed with Sujah Dowla by the treaty concluded at

Benaris, and which I may venture to say were such as afforded the Company every advantage that could be derived from such an alliance, without derogating from the dignity or credit of our ally. (p.6)

While Beneram was on his return the revolution took place, which I have mentioned above, and as he was known to be the confidential servant of Shabajee, some time elapsed before he ventured to return to his new master. Being at length however invited to come, he went and was well received; Moodajee read the letters and answered them as addressed to himself, and after some time thought proper to send him back in his former character, with handsome professions but general, and with no declared object or instructions. A very friendly and in some sort confidential correspondence however has continued between us ever since. From Beneram Pundit I learn that the same feuds which formerly divided the two brothers, while Shabajee was living are now likely to break out between Moodajee and his son, who is now about 19 years of age, and begins to look upon his father as the usurper of his rights. In these sentiments he has been confirmed by a man, who has been the successive minister of the three brothers, named Dewaugur Pundit, who finds himself of too little consequence with his present master, and naturally concludes that he shall acquire a greater ascendant on the mind of his young pupil, if he should succeed in obtaining his advancement to the possession of the Government. By the intrigues of this man, Nizam Ally has been induced to invite Moodajee Boosla to his court, for the purpose of concerting measure (p.7) for their common interest, or to send his Dewan if he should be prevented from attending himself. To the last proposition Moodajee has consented, as he mentions in a letter which I have lately received from him, and I understand that it is proposed that Ragoojee shall accompany him, with the secret design of gaining the support of Nizam Ally in the prosecution of the projects against Moodajee. Whatever may be the issue of these measures, a peoper attention to the circumstance as they arise, might put it early in the power of this Government, were it duly authorized to concert them to the advantage of the Company it duly authorized to concert them to the advantage of the Company without any sacrifice of their faith, or hazard of their interests.

We have a battalion of sepoys already stationed in the districts bordering on Berar, and another added to it would be sufficient to answer any purposes for which they might be wanted...

It is impossible to foresee the circumstances on which our interposition may be demanded, or on which it could be honorably given, and therefore impossible to anticipate the mode of it.

You are already well acquainted however with the general system which I wish to be empowered to establish in India, namely to extend the influence of the British nation to every part of India not too remote from their possessions, without enlarging the circle of their defences, or involving them (p.8) in hazardous war or indefinite engagements, and to accept of the allegiance of such of our neighbour as shall sue to be enlisted among the friends and allies of the king of Great Britain. The late Nabob Shujah Dowla, who wanted neither pride nor understanding, would have thought it an honour to be called the Vizier of the king of England, and offered at one time to coin Siccas in his Majesty's name. Nor was this a mere visionary project. The credit of such a connection with the sovereign of power which has for a long time past made so considerable a figure in Hindostan, would of itself be a great advantage. But I am afraid that his chief inducement arose from a great defect in our political constitution of which he had severely felt the bad effects, I mean the rapid succession of persons entrusted (under whatever name or character) with the rule and

administration of the British affairs in this part of our Indian possessions; the consequent want of consistency in their measures, and even in their attachments and engagements; and the caprices to which he was often exposed on the same account. Had he possessed the spirit of foresight, he would have had severe cause for these reflections in the miserable state of penury and servitude to which his son has been since reduced, ineffectually to our interests, as every excess of power beyond its proper (p.9) bounds will never defeat its own purposes; nor indeed has the son much cause to complain of an injury which he has scarce sense or sensibility to discover; although it must be redressed whenever that state has a more worthy ruler and the sovereignty restored with all its rights unimpeded to the lawful proprietor. But I wander from subject. My intention in this digression is to shew the advantages which would be derived both by Government and its allies from a direct engagement with them, made with the sanction of the king's name, which would secure it from wanton and licentious violation, and render the objects of it more certain and durable.

On this footing I would replace the Soubaship of Oude. On this footing I would establish an alliance with Berar. These countries are of more importance to us than any other from their continuity to ours, and therefore it is of consequence to settle their connection with us before that of any other. But the same system might be rendered more extensive by time, and the observance of a steady principle of conduct, and an inviolable attachment to formal engagements.

I will not here enumerate all the advantages which may be derived from this plan, to you especially to whom I have long ago explained personally my views and sentiments upon this subject. Indeed, except a short and rather (p.10) obscure intimation of it in one of my letters to Lord North, I have communicated it to no person but Colonel Maclean and yourself; and that is my principal reason among others for having written to you rather than to any one else, upon the various points contained in this letter. To enable me to carry it into execution, I must be released from the restrictions which I at present lye under; I must have discretionary powers, and a fixed channel of correspondence.

I shall follow the subject no further, but leave it here for your discretion to make such use of it as you shall judge most likely to prove effectual to its execution.--or to suppress it. I am aware that I tread on dangerous ground, exposed to the ill will of the Company if they look to the renewal of their charter, and to all the popular and rooted prejudices which are entertained against the expensive projects of military enterprize, and the injustice of disturbing the peace of our quiet neighbours; for this construction will be given to it. To answer these and the other objections to this plan would require much time and argument; but though this might be necessary to the support of a proposition calculated for the public eye, it will not be wanted on this occasion, as I hope (p.11) it will be only seen by those who are to adopt it, and to whom its obvious consequences will need little explanation. I trust it to you in confidence, and desire that your will impart it with the same caution, that I may not suffer by the attempt to raise the power of my country, and to extend the influence of the King's name, among nations to which it is yet unknown, if the means which I have recommended should be judged inadequate to such laudable ends, or impolitic with respect to other circumstances. Of their justice and moral propriety I have no doubt.

I am ever, my dear Elliot,  
Your most affectionate friend,  
Warren Hastings.

Note: Plan by Warren Hastings ("it is yet incomplete, as I could only venture to propose what I saw a moral certainty of accomplishing") Feb 1777.

The superiority which the English possess over the other powers of India is derived from two causes, the authority of their government, and their military discipline. It is by these advantages only that they can improve or maintain it.

Every political measure ought to be carefully avoided that may have a tendency to weaken either. An extension of territory beyond certain bounds is dangerous, and must in the course of time prove fatal to both.

Remote military expeditions are liable to the same effects; but these may be obviated to a certain extent by proper regulations, and by an undeviating adherence to them.

The province of Bengal, (in which I include Behar) though nearly equal in dimensions to Great Britain itself, is capable of being defended against any power which may invade it; so long as it can be supplied with recruits sufficient to preserve the superiority of its European soldiery to the number of native troops which must be necessarily joined to them for its protection. That proportion seems to be well ascertained in its present military establishment, which, it such a conclusion may be drawn from part experience, is equal to any occasion which is again likely to call it forth to action. Nature herself has furnished the best defences of this country, in the unmilitary genius of the people the absolute security of its north and eastern frontiers, the difficulty of access on the other borders, and the multitude of rivers, (p.2) which intersect the most valuable parts of it. These altogether form a powerful protection against foreign invasion and a complete security against internal danger.

But I presume that a mere provision made for the common vicissitudes of political affairs will not be deemed sufficient to ensure permanency to the British dominion, which we have thrice seen near the edge of ruin; although its had no European enemy opposed to it. Let the case be put that the French joined with a numerous Indian army, and strengthened by other alliances were to enter Bengal. Such a case is not unlikely for it is scarce to be conceived that they will ever make the attempt without such a support. Will three brigades be sufficient to encounter such an armament, to repel other invaders, and to maintain the dominions of our ally the Nabob of Owde. I believe that with good conduct, and that fortune, which has hitherto supported us in all our greatest emergencies, it may. Yet it will be impolitic to trust our whole stake to an equal hazard, if a more ample security can be obtained. To effect this purpose on the principles already laid down, the following plan is suggested.

1st. Let one complete brigade (including the garrison of Chunar) be appropriated to the defence of the province of Owde, the districts of Corah and Illahabad, and the division of Rohilcund belonging to the Government of Oude. Let the British officers be recalled from the Nabob's service whenever it can be done with safety.

2nd. While Nedjiff Cawn lives let his pension be confirmed to him, on the condition of (p.3) his furnishing with a body of 5000 Horse whenever demanded.

3rd. Let a treaty of defensive alliance be formed with the Rajah of Berar. Let such a number of our battalions of sepoy, but for his protection, be stationed with him, and annually relieved. Let him pay a fixed monthly subsidy for these of Rupees for each battalion.

4th. Let the alliance with the Nabob of Arcot be confirmed by treaty, and on the conditions recommended in my letter to Lord North of the 1st September. And let the Nabob be put in

full possession of the zemindarry of Tanjour. Let him pay a monthly subsidy for the British troops and sepoys on that establishment.

5th. The political connections of the presidency of Bombay cannot be prescribed under the present uncertain state of their affairs. The treaty lately ratified with the Poonah Government, is not formed for long duration, and the breach of it, whenever it happens, will either produce a state of lasting hostility, or lead the Government of Bombay to new and surer engagements.

6th. Let every treaty be executed in the name of the king of Great Britain, expressing the reciprocal condition of protection and fidelity, and with his express sanction.

7th. Let it be lawful for the Governor General and Council of Bengal, and for the Presidents of Councils of Fort St. George and Bombay, with the consent of the Governor General and council of Bengal, to enter into temporary agreements, with any other princes or states for a term of two or three years only, and renewable after the expiration of that term. (p.4)

8th. If amongst these any should desire to be bound by perpetual ties with the king of Great Britain, and their situation and consequence shall be such as will admit of it, such may be received into his alliance and protection, on terms similar to those of the treaties already prescribed, varying only as their wants and means may proportionably require it.

9th. Let three complete brigade on the present establishment be kept up for the defence of the provinces of Bengal, and the dependencies of the province of Owd, as above described, two of which shall always remain in the former, and relieve that stationed in the latter once in two years.

10th. Let an additional number of battalions be added to the brigades for the purpose of furnishing the aids required in the other stations beyond our own provinces.

This system will be attended with the following advantages

1. It will provide an increase of our military and political strength without an addition of expence, which may be employed to cooperate in all its parts to the defence of our own possessions, and whenever the occasion shall be so urgent as to demand it, may reunited for the same end.

2. It will prove an immediate security to our borders.

3. It will be the means of securing the friendship and support of those powers, who might otherwise be won to the French interest, if that nation should ever attempt the invasion of Bengal, or of the other presidencies, and be a check upon others whose territories lie contiguous to them.

4. It will afford the controuling (p.5) Government of Bengal a complete knowledge of the strength connections and designs of all the powers of Hindostan, and may enable it to prevent connections against any of the British possessions, or those of its allies.

5. It may eventually draw a portion of the wealth of India into Bengal, not only by the means of subsidies paid by the state in alliance with it, but by opening new channels of commerce.

6. It will afford employment and support to the middle class of the subjects of great Britain, whose services are less required at home than those of the lower rank of life.

7. To these may be added, though but as negative advantages, that it will require no addition of recruits from England, and that the external influence of the British power in India will be extended without any diminution of its internal strength, or the dangers usually attendant on distant military operations.

I foresee many objections which may be urged against this system, but one which may not be obviated by the establishment of an active, and permanent form of government here, and a fixed channel of correspondence at home. The present constitution is in its nature incapable of vigor or unanimity. It is loaded with business in details, and it wants both confidence, authority and consistency, because the primary orders under which it acts, are dictated by a variable body of men, who have neither power to reward or punish; who possess no interest and can derive no credit from the success of the affairs which they superintend, who are charged with no responsibility, and are subject to a continual fluctuation of measures both from the want of progressive knowledge, and the change (p.6) of opinions inseparable from a change of persons.

These defects obviously point out their own remedies. It would lead me into too wide a field, nor is it within the sphere of my province, to prescribe them.

I shall conclude with one observation which I think necessary to obviate the charge either of levity or artifice, which may be imputed to me, for the multitude of plans, which I have at different times recommended (should this ever go beyond the hands to which it is immediately directed) for the various departments and operations of this Government. In this attempt I have only trod the path, which it was equally the duty of my predecessors to trace; but which they left unnoticed. On my arrival in Bengal I found this Government in possession of a great and rich dominion, and a wide political system, which has been since greatly extended, without one Rule of Government, but what descended to it from its ancient commercial institutions, or any principle of policy but such as accident or the desultory judgement of those in actual power recommended. It was necessary to restore the authority of government, to the source from which its powers originated, to assume the direct control instead of allowing it to act by a concealed and weakened influence; to constitute an uniform and effectual mode for the management and collection of the public revenue; to establish regular courts for the administration of civil and criminal justice; to give strength and utility to its political connections, and to transfer a share of its wealth to Great Britain; without exhausting its circulation. This, aided by the abilities and superior knowledge of my associates in the (p.7) Government, I attempted, because it was essentially necessary in itself; because it was my particular province, and because I was expressly enjoined to do it; and, if I may judge by the present state of Bengal, notwithstanding the distractions which have prevailed in it for more than two years past, the measures which were adopted for those ends, were as effectual as the means with which we were supplied could enable us to make them. To render them more so, to render the changes which were introduced by the late act of Parliament, more subservient to the purposes for which they were ordained, and to supply the radical defects which it either created or left unremedied I have recommended an additional plan for the administration of justice, I have proposed rules for arranging the powers of Government, and both particular and general system, for our external policy. The same duty which promoted and compelled me to point out the means of reformation in one instance, equally enjoined it in all where it was wanting. And whether I have erred in my endeavours, or they shall be judged deserving of the public

attention, still they were such as appertained to my trust and station, and such as I could not have withheld without a crime. And whatever part I may leave deficient, my successors must supply, or they will prove themselves unfaithful ministers, and the state which they serve will suffer through neglect.

I am far from supposing that any general measure of Government however formed, will completely answer all the ends for which it was projected, much less do I presume to aim at that degree of perfection in those which I have ventured to recommend. The dominion exercised by(p.8) the British Empire in India is fraught with many radical and incurable defects, besides those too which all human institutions are liable, arising from the distance to its scene of operations, the impossibility of furnishing it at all times with those aids which it requires from home, and the difficulty of reconciling its primary exigencies with those which in all states ought to take place of every other concern. The interests of the people who are subjected to its authority. All that the wisest institutions can effect in such a system can only be to improve the advantages of a temporary possession, and to protract that decay, which sooner or later must end it.



**Warren Hastings to Alexander Elliot : Fort William 10th February 1777.**

My dear Elliot

The accompanying letter was written and intended for the last dispatch. It contains the particular application of a system with which you are already well acquainted. Whatever my own conviction may be of its expediency, I am tied down from acting directly, nor can I employ even influence with the rod of authority hanging over my head.

Nor is this my only difficulty. I cannot communicate a subject of this nature through any official channel. If I write to the Secret Committee, they are too many to be trusted with it. They may not be disposed to receive a proposition from me with candor; and bodies of men, however small, are always indifferent to the business which is brought regularly before them. I cannot write to the chairman, because in the first place I know not who he is, and in the second because both the gentlemen who hold the first stations in the Direction at this time, are as I understand my professed enemies, and would therefore be more likely to draw conclusions from what I wrote to my disadvantage than to adopt my recommendations. Neither can I approach the king's minister in such an occasion without some preparatory caution, in which his (p.2) leisure, his inclinations, and the ability of the times should be consulted.

It is impossible for me to foresee what may be the dispositions in England when this letter shall arrive. It is equally impossible to reconcile the different orders which the court of directors last year gave us for our conduct towards the powers of India. They desire us upon no account to enter into any wars however advantageous to the Company, and they at the same time direct us to cooperate with the presidency of Bombay in keeping possession of the lands which Ragoba ceded to them by treaty. The first is an absolute prohibition to interfere in the politics of India. The last is a positive order to interfere, and to engage in a war with the first power in India.

Being thus at a loss to judge of the views of the court of directors, I am still more so to judge of the king, to the knowledge of which I have no access. I must therefore leave it to you to consider well the dispositions of the times and of the ministers. If you (p.3) have reason to believe that such a system as I have recommended will be approved, I trust to you to make use of such means as you shall judge most likely to promote it. If on the contrary men's minds are adverse to the extension of our influence, you had best say nothing about it, as it can serve no good purpose, and may be turned to my disadvantage.

These dispatches I shall entrust to Captain Toone. You know his worth, and my affection for him. I have earnestly recommended his return, if he can recover his constitution, and if you can promote his views you will oblige me by serving him.

I am ever my dear Elliot, your most affectionate friend.

Warren Hastings.

PS: Sudaba who is mentioned in the accompanying letter has been put to death, having been beaten with clubs till he expired. This you know is not murder but simple manslaughter by the doctrine of Abbi Haneefa; but seems too have been done by those Hindoos to avoid the shedding of sacred blood; an argument in favour of Sudaba's cause.

For a fuller explanation of the design which is contained (p.4) in my letter of the 12th ultimat I have drawn it up with as much accuracy as my time would allow in a methodical form in the enclosed sheets, which I trust to your discretion to make such use of it as you think proper. It is yet incomplete, as I could only venture to propose what I saw a moral certainty of accomplishing. In the natural operation of such an influence once established many important objects will start up which it is impossible to foresee, and many which though within the reach of conjecture would appear visionary if formally detailed. I have no fear of its failing to produce the good effects which I have described, nor even much greater. The only danger which I should apprehend would be from the attempt to make the most of it that could be made. The rapacity of individuals, and the emulation of these in actual power to surpass their predecessor, will ever prove the greatest evils of our political system. Our alliance with the Nabob of Old is a striking illustration of this. It was in the beginning a mutually profitable charge to the Company. It was placed on a footing of mutual advantage of both. It is now become an oppressive burthen on that province, which must so on fall with increased weight (p.5) on the Company. The late Vizier paid to the Company a tribute of 25,20,000 Rs and cheerfully paid it. It was optional because he was at liberty to dismiss the brigade when the exigency of his affairs no longer required it; and he could safely dispense with it. The present Nabob has yielded up a revenue of 23 lacks in the cession of Benaris; he pays or rather ought to pay, 31,20,000 Rs. a year for the subsidy; and we have added to his expences an extravagant military establishment which at its estimated about is an annual charge of above 40 lacks, so that we are in fact the distributors of a crore of rupees drawn from his treasury, which is already exhausted, and that part of his army which still remains under his own direction is rendered as useless and even a dangerous incumbrance, because he cannot pay it. Our brigade therefore must continue a fixture (?) to that province, which would be a prey to the meanest invader the instant that it was deprived of its support. This state of the province of Owd, bad as it is, must necessarily (p.6) continue so which the present Nabob lives. Perhaps it would be a wiser policy to go even further, and to place able minister in the charge of his affairs which he chuses to entrust only to the most detestable wretches of his dominion, and to restore the administration to his successor precisely on the footing on which it was left by the Nabob Shuja Dowla. The last proposition I most heartily wish to see executed for the credit of our faith, and (as it might easily be proved) for the advancement of our real interest.

Many of the propositions in this scheme require explanation. This you can give, but I have not time, and I have already made it too long. Nudjif Cawn's pension is due in justice to him, as he quitted us unwillingly, and followed the king at the express solicitation of the commander in chief of our army. He has ever proved faithful to us, and possesses such resources in his military talents, and in the credit of them, that while he lives he will be our best shield against the only enemy which we have to dread in that quarter, the Marattas. He has no money, and can therefore pay no subsidy, and whenever he dies, we must look to other (p.7) means of defence on that frontier of our possessions and those of our ally.

If peace is to be our object, I cannot devise a more likely way to ensure it than to command all the means of war, and this is the only use I would wish ever to make of the plan which I have proposed, if it is adopted while I remain here. This I suppose will not be long. I wish it not unless I possess power and confidence, and a doubtful authority till the short time is passed which has been allotted to me by parliament, and then go out of course. I would not accept of an empire on such terms. If I must give place to General Clavering he will revenge the injustice done with by it, if I could seek such a revenge; and if a new member is added in the room of fColl. Monson, I shall except the renewal of the same violence which I have already experienced, for (p.8P I cannot hope that the choice will fall

on a friend of mine. Besides it is not in nature for five men to share the same power, and not to divide into factions. When one man can always make a majority.

**Alexander Elliot to Sir Gilbert Elliot, Calcutta 26.11.1771:**

He (Middleton) has been in this country now 19 years and is about 38 years of age.. Brought up at Westminster and from there went to Oxford....In the year 63 he was worth about 120 thousand pounds.. foolishly wanted to strike a great stroke by entering in to a forbidden trade. If it had succeeded must have sent him home richer than Lord Clive.(P) It proved other wise and I believe his whole stock at the end of a few months turned out to be about 10,000 pounds..is now third in council. (EFP9A. A Elliot was younger brother to Gilbert Elliot, first Lord Minto, and first arrived in India in 1771. He later acted as an emmissary of W. Hastings in England, returned to Calcutta in October 1777 carrying a special political message which subsequently led him on an embassy to Cuttack and Nagpore. He however died of illness on August 1778 , on way to Nagpore. He was 23 then.)

**A. Elliot, Calcutta 1.4.1773:**

Every thing is quiet in (P) Bengal. We have a brigade, the third of our whole army within 150 miles of Dilly.Their presence has however so far overawed the Morattoes and other powers that it is not imagined they will have any thing to do.

**From Journal of A. Elliot: July 1775**

(p 12) .. In some former years the Company had sent out so great a number of cadets to Bengal, that, with those who were appointed in the country, the channel of promotion was quite choked up, and hardly any prospect of promotion remained for such as happened to be at the bottom of the list. Compassion to these young gentlemen was, I believe, the principal motive which suggested the division of each of a the regiments into two battalions, which by doubling the number of commissioned officers to each regiment, made room for a larger promotion; but at the same time (p. 13) it must be apparent how greatly this measure increased the expense to the Company .. In the course of Mr. Hastings late Government the commanding officer of the brigade which happened to be stationed at the Presidency, remarked to him, that, what with the number wanting to compleat and those absent from sickness in the hospital, the officers of the European battalions were ashamed to appear at the head of their companies, some of which did not consist of ten men; upon enquiry the case was found to be nearly the same in the other regiments (14) .. These considerations .. determined Mr Hastings to propose the forming both battalions of each regiment,

## VI. RAJPUTANA

### 1. J.ADAM. SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO CAPT J.TOD: 3.2.1818

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IOR: BOARD'S COLLECTIONS : vol 1104: NO 29702 : pp 141-70 : Para 26 pertain to enclosing a letter to the Rana about Tod's appointment.

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9. The object of attention next, in order to the rennexation of such of the alienated possessions of the state of Oodeypoor as are recoverable from foreign powers on the principles above stated, is the re-establishment of the authority of the Rana's paramount government over the feudal lords who have taken advantage of the times to throw off its control and the resumption of the government lands which have been illicitly appropriated by them. The (p 151) information to be collected by you must be the foundation of any instructions on this subject, are of great importance to the due success of the system of which the alliance with Oodeypoor forms a branch. The degree in which this object is to be accomplished or attempted must vary with the situation and circumstances of the several chiefs whose interests are to be effected: considerations of equity or expediency may suggest the adoption of many intermediate modes of settlement between the entire re-establishment of the Rana's ...authority (p 152) and the confirmation of the acquired independence of the former feudatory. The latter will probably be found equally just and politic with relation to Banaswara, Doongerpoor, Serowy (if it be really connected with Meywar and not with Marwar as is asserted) and possibly other principalities of which the Governor General does not at present possess adequate information; some of those above mentioned, Banaswara especially, maintains that it is independent, and tributary to no one; and (p 153) whatever was its ancient feudal connection with Oodeypoor, it would perhaps be on all accounts desirable, under present circumstances to secure to it the real independence with relation to that state which it has no doubt enjoyed for a course of years. Such a procedure in cases of this description can in no wise be deemed a compromise of the Rana's interests or a failure in our performance of the treaty, neither can it on the other hand furnish grounds of expectations of a similar indulgence to inferior feudatories of Oodeypoor whose situation and circumstances are altogether different.

21. You will be pleased to correspond with the Residents (p 166) at Delhi and with Scindia on the several matters to which this dispatch relates as well as with Sir David Ochterlony, Sir John Malcolm and the different political and military authorities with whom it may become requisite for you to act in concert, or maintain official communication. You will especially keep the Resident at Delhi and Sir D. Ochterlony apprised of the progress of your arrangements with the Rana of Oodeypoor. ...

22. You will assume the official designation of Political Agent in Meywar and Karowlee, and will for the present act under the direct instructions of the Governor General or the Resident at Delhi. Hereafter it will become expedient for the function of the office, (p 168) especially in matters connected with the interests and relations of the chiefs besides those to whom you are directly accredited to be exercised under the general superintendance of the officer who will be vested with the chiefs political and military authority in Rajpootana.

23. You are authorised to draw a personal salary of Rs 1500 per mensem (including your salary as first assistant to the Residency with Scindia which office you will for the present retain) and to charge your actual (p 169) expences to the public in the same manner as at present, maintaining the utmost economy in your disbursements under this head consistent with the necessary appearance of your public situation.

**2. J. TOD TO J. ADAM, SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL : 27.2.1818  
(Extract)**

20. The express poverty of the Rana is a great bar to a commencement of the work of renovation. There is no wealth in any shape at Oudepoor, I am credibly informed the prince often disburses his own dinner expences. There are no bankers of any credit and the ministers having still less, this little they fear to lend. The consequence is that the inferior officers of government are detached with (p 208) bodies of troops to manage forts and pergunnahs without any provision for their expences, and the industry, tranquility and hopes of the ryots are crushed in the very end (?) by the necessity thus imposed of levying sums on them.

**3. J. ADAM, SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO J. TOD : 26.3.1818  
(Extract)**

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IOR: Board's Collections: Vol 1104: No 29702: pp191-210 and pp 230-40  
Cons (No 22..) 15.5.1818.

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5. The Governor General laments to perceive the many and serious obstacles to the early attainment of these most important objects. With a view to remove those, arising out of the poverty of the Rana, the Governor General will not object to your affording him moderate pecuniary aid to the (p 234) extent of a lac or two lacs of rupees on your satisfying yourself that it will be faithfully and judiciously applied to the purposes of the grant. The object of the Rana's personal character can only be corrected by his being induced to place his confidence in a minister of capacity and integrity, having at heart the welfare of his prince and his country and disposed to act in concert with the British Government in its views for the public benefit. You are aware of the strong objections that exist to any thing (p 235) like systematic interference in the affairs of the Rana's government which is equally by the treaty and by general considerations of policy. In this actual state of the court of Oudeypoor some more active interposition on your part than would be justifiable in a more wholesome condition of affairs, may not only be excusable, but actually indispensable for the success of the measures in view. All such interventions must be exercised with the utmost moderation, caution and discretion, and in the form of private advice not of authority. It (p 236) will be your endeavour to conciliate the confidence of the Rajah and his ministers and lead them to seek your counsel and assistance rather than make it necessary for you to offer it uninvited; and this will be best effected by your making your expositions to them display their own fundamental interest instead of any concern of ours to be advanced by enforcement of engagement. The Governor General reposes great reliance on your judgement, address and conciliatory spirit for accomplishing this desirable object, and for a just enlightened (p 237) discretion of the influence you may acquire.

11. The employment of the name and authority of the Rana to their utmost extent in promoting the suppression of the predatory habits among those who recognize his superiority is an object of great importance. The whole of this question is one to which the attention of the Governor General is sedulously directed and it will form the subject of early instructions.

Camp Purser, March 26, 1818

I have &c  
J.Adam, Secretary to Government.

**4. J. TOD, POL AGENT, AT OUDEYPOOR TO J. ADAM. SECRETARY TO GOVT:  
22.4.1818 (Extract)**

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IOR : Board's Collections:Vol 1104:No 29702:pp 260-3 : Sent to Ochterlony on (pp 241-60) 9.5.1818 by  
Government.

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23. ...There are four grand officers of state.(p 292):

First: The Purdhan or premier,

Second: The Bukshee- details of the troops,

Third: The Poorutnama- keeper of records,

Fourth: The Sukhoie- conducts foreign affairs and puts the seal to documents.

These have each four secretaries, but they, as well as many of the officers are now nominal, and the appointment to the Purdhan (Seolall) alone is filled up, and that temporarily, and by a man of very slender abilities and of no influence whatever.

24. There is another man (p 295) Sheerjee Mehta, who holds no official situation except to the younger prince whose estate he manages, and with whom I have but once entered on business. I judge better of him than of any of the others ...

46. This district (Koomulmair ?) consists of narrow contiguous parallel villages, with streams flowing through them, the cultivated spots being so many strips (steps?) supported in many places by ramparts loosely constructed and requiring constant labor to keep in repair. The base of these valleys seldom exceed 100 yards in breadth, but the soil is fertile and (p 324) water at hand throughout, hamlets are thickly scattered, peopled by Rajpoots now become perfect Bhoomeas, and as unwarlike as the common cultivating classes who mix with them. The cultivation of the present Fusil is understood likely to produce in all about 30,000 Rs to the Rana, and from all the information I have been able to collect Jesswant Rao's collection amounted to one lack of rupees. In the statement of my memoir, I believe I assumed 3 lacks as the amount, but (p 325) in my letter from Rowtah of the 27th January, 4 1/2 I said had been received. This included the duties in former times as merchandize which passed between Marwar and Meywar, which were collected at Koomulmair, chiefly on the salt of the western lakes of Marwar, which was carried to all parts, and sold under the universal name of Sambhur. Opium of Malwa and Kotah which supplied Mahwa(?), and cloths of Khandesh and Malwah, and other produce exported to Pally. The aggregate amount was consequently great, the present (p 326) value therefore to the Rana of Koomulmair cannot be estimated higher than 80 (thousand ?) Rs, and what may be ultimately expected, from 3 to 4 lacs, with increasing industry and population, and revived commerce.

**5. C.T. METCALFE, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT TO J.TOD : 12.6.1819  
(Extract)**

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IOR:Board's Collections: Vol 1105: No 29074: pp

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7. It seems from your despatch that you recommend an alteration of the existing agreement regarding tribute by the substitution of 5/16 on the whole revenue, in lieu of the 4/16 at present stipulated on different parts of it.

8. The Governor General in Council, however, would not wish to agitate the question of an alteration, unless embarrassments which are not anticipated should actually arise in the execution of the existing arrangement.

**6. J. TOD, RESIDENT AT OODEYPOOR TO OCHTERLONEY: 11.8.1818 (Extract)**

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IOR : Board collections : No. 29703 (Vol 1105) : 140-260

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The lavish and unwise prodigality with which the chiefs of these states diminished their revenues, in gifts of their best lands and other resources to the different religious orders, and in which we have the most obvious exposition of their decline has trenched (?) deeply on this particular branch, either by gifts of portions of the collections (p 208) of particular stations to chiefs, or reduction of the rates to the great carriers of the Rajpoot states, the Charans and Bhats. At some stations they pay only half, at others a third of what is levied from other carriers; indeed it may be said that they pay only what they please, for whenever opposition is made to their will they are sure to overcome by having recourse to the dagger on themselves. The wounds they inflict on themselves are in proportion to the provocation (p 209) or object to be gained, from a common gash on the fleshy part of the arm to a death blow. In Rana Umur Sing's time, on this very account, the Bhats made a grand sacrifice at the palace, but being rather a stern character and free from prejudices he banished the whole fraternity his dominions, and thus recovered 84 villages they held free. Descendents of these Bhats came back on the proclamations, and soon proceeded to obtain their ancient immunities, by their old method, and fairly put (p 210) the Rana in restraint and alarm, and he was actually compelled to beg I would release him, by telling them I would not admit of his submitting to their demands. This I effected by inviting them to come to me to try their arts, and if they committed any extravagances, I should have recourse to Umur Sing's punishment. They obtained two of their old villages and exemption of duties for 500 bullocks. It was necessary to do something to please them, as they had 40,000 ready to pass from Malwa and Boondelkhund (P 211) through Meywar and Marwar with grain, and to return with salt.

30. The grand and indeed only drawback to the restoration of Meywar, is in the weakness of the Rana's personal character. ...

Its effects were most disagreeable to me, in seeing them able to appropriate to themselves, many of the best Khalsa lands and to an amount far beyond what it had ever been customary to bestow on the individuals of this branch of the household. They were also the medium of others receiving lands and villages, and I used to receive daily private reports of every village thus disposed of. Here I could interfere, and it became my duty to do so, (p 216) as well for His Highness's benefit as that our own interests might not suffer, tho these I never mentioned, but placed my anxiety on the score of his alone. ...

...(p 218)... I also endeavoured to awaken his pride and ambition, by telling him he thus deprived himself of the means of restoring those outward emblems of rank and state, of which his enemies had deprived him, and that it was proper he should think of restoring that splendour of appearance so befitting his house as the first in dignity Rajiwara (?). I also said it was from this system alone that this dignity had impaired, that (p 219) this was the real cause of foreign enemies having been able to subvert its authority, as well as of the resistance made to it by the omrahs at home, and in short, that he had to attribute every evil that had befallen his House, and all his personal deprivations, to this principle of his ancestors, who had thus so weakened their authority, that they could neither resist foreign invasion or domestic rebellion, and knowing this, he should take every just and favourable occasion (p 220) to reunite all lands (especially those to which direct heirs failed) to his authority. I told him I could not personally be happy till I saw all these comforts and appearances restored, as well as his real dignity and strength, and now it depended chiefly on himself. Much of this was delivered through Kishen Doss, much personally. His Highness invariably receives all I have to say with attention and kindness, is profoundly sensible of its justice, and assured me that (p 221) not a village should be given away henceforth without acquainting me, and I really believe he has been pretty steady in this last determination.

#### **7. J. TOD, POLITICAL AGENT, AT OUDEYPOOR TO C.T. METCALFE, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT: 24.4.1819 (Extract)**

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Source: IOR: Board's Collections: Vol1105: No: 29074: pp 135 - 334

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63. Before he (Davee Chund) would accept of the office he drew out a paper of articles which he shewed me, and said he would only attempt the affairs of government on the Rana's acceptance of them; they were all much to the purpose, and I anticipated much good from the wariness of such a character (p 190) with the little anxiety he showed for the honor. The principles were:

1. The Rana's limiting and settling his expenditure,
2. That no sunnuds, grants or purwannahs should be issued without his knowledge,
3. That as Purdhan no transactions should be carried on without his knowledge,
4. That his highness should not permit inferior servants to interfere in the administration.

64. These, and several minor ones, were so proper and just that I could (P 191) not but approve of them - and the Rana having given his hearty assent, begged I would be present at conferring the office on Davee Chund. I attended accordingly.

75. In the meeting with Rawut Jowan Sing, Sherjee Mehta in the Rana's confidence, I explicitly said, that without the Rana recalling all the Khalsa, from whatever quarter, and introducing one government instead of the hundred which now existed, all I could do was of no avail. That if his highness saw those things as I did, I would labour night and day for his benefit, as I (p 201) had hitherto done, though to little purpose; but that in the present system, nothing but disgraceful disorder prevailed.



82. I accordingly went, and previous to the installation addressed his highness as follows: "Rawutjee and Sherjee Mehta, will have told your highness all I had to say, there are some points, though your highness treats me as one of the family, on which I cannot bring myself to speak, but of which they will have (p 205) informed you. The two chief points of which I wish to be assured from your own mouth, are a necessary regard to expenditure, and having but one authority in the country."

The Rana kindly replied, "... I agree to all, and tomorrow (p 206) I shall draw out papers which will show how eager I am to see things set fairly a going." ...

**8. J. TOD, RESIDENT AT OODEYPOOR, TO GOVERNMENT (METCALFE): 24.4.1819  
(Extract)**

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IOR : Boards Collections : No 29074 (vol 1105) : pp 135-334 : Con 12.6.1819

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90. The paper which His Highness had drawn out for his personal expenditure amounted to 800 rupees per day, but which has since arisen to 1,000 rupees. In this is included every branch of his personal expenditure, one half of which goes to the kitchen, for there has always been a royal hospitality in this House, and which the Rana is most solicitous to maintain. He likes above all things to have all his chiefs and officers and inferior dependents (p 213) supplied with their daily food from his kitchen, and there are many of descendents of old and faithful who have no other means of support. This also includes the food for his horses and other cattle. The rest is distributed for the wardrobe, charity, sacrificial rites, allowance to decayed chiefs, Charuns, Bhauts, repairs of public buildings, tombs erecting &c &c &c and 1,000 rupees per month exclusive of what he derives from his estate to the young prince.

91. Matters were thus approaching that state preparatory to complete reformation. (p 214)

92. Independent of the reasons already assigned for wishing a general system of renting, I was convinced from what I had witnessed it was the only plan of combining the interests of the Rana, and the welfare of the ryots with the just claims of the British Government.

93. Nine tenths of the lands have been waste from 5 to 30 or more years so that it may be reckoned as land which never know the plough.

100. From day to day I proceeded in this to the completion, when I framed from the whole the Schedule No 1 (No 2 and a copy of the records, I shall soon submit a copy of the jageerdars estates) from which, however, several deductions will I since find, take place, from the causes I mentioned of jageerdar as well as charity lands having crept in, and of many of the villages inserted in the records not (223) a trace is to be found.

112. It was shown in one instance, which was (p 233) likely to be attended with the frustration of all my endeavours to extirpate that extensive system of plunder which disgraced the country and kept the inhabitants and merchants in continual alarm for their persons and property. My early endeavours to this end had been very successful, and by the capture of a whole band of the most determined miscreants, who had committed the most atrocious murders and robberies, a dread was instilled into the minds of the most daring.

113. This party in open day had attacked, wounded (p 234) and plundered a party within a mile of the rising town of Bhilara which created great alarm. By rewards, and unceasing intelligence, a month afterwards I discovered their retreat with the chief of Umurgurh.

I obtained a letter to him from the Rana, and with one of my own sent a messenger to read it in his presence and demand their immediate surrender, which was with difficulty complied with from their pernicious ideas of the right of sanctuary, and six of the gang were conveyed to Oodeypoor and tried by the (p 235) Rana himself, and convicted on the evidence of the people robbed. They would have been capitally punished, but as I saw some aversion to it being during this illness, I recommended 7 years labor in the streets of the capital in irons.

114. It was astonishing the surprise it excited in all ranks the capture and trial of these thieves; and its good effects were great indeed. But what was my surprise when about two months after, I heard from a Mootsuddee stationed in Mandelgurh, that the old spirit of rapine was again appearing from the (p 236) release of the prisoners who were again in their old haunts.

115. On hearing of it I went to the Rana and expressed my astonishment. He laid the blame on his sister, and said he was actually ashamed of what had taken place, but that it was done from a religious motive during his extreme illness.

I had every reason to believe a sum of money to this influence had been the cause of their enlargements, and if something was not done to do away this evil impression I clearly observed the country (p 237) would soon again be over-run. I therefore got the Umurgurh estate instantly attached, and a party sent off, and on the eighth day, I had four of the six sweeping the streets of the capital in irons; at the same time three of another party were captured carrying off the cattle from the very town of Mandlegurh, who were a few days after their capture, executed by orders sent by the Rana.

116. These examples have had the desired effect, and I may safely say no part of India has been more free (p 238) of all depredations than Meywar.

Even to the south west, where the population is entirely Bheel, it is by a similar system of measures to that pursued in Mairwarra (?) greatly got under, and will in time I trust be entirely so.

121. We advanced, however, a most important step in this meeting.

122. They brought a schedule (p 244) containing a list of pecuniary allowances to the females of the family, in lieu of lands, which were once more to be brought under the Rana's authority.

123. In the most flourishing period of the state, and during the reign of the wisest of the Rana's ancestors, the Ranees never had a greater allowance than 5000 Rs annually each, and it was not customary to let them hold lands; but at present the country was actually parcelled out amongst them with the exceptions already specified.

124. In my calculations (p 245) I made out, that for the ensuing year 1876, if the country was farmed out in the most favorable manner the total Khalsa land revenue might realize six lacs of rupees, a small sum, but in comparison with what it was a year ago, a large one, and ample, with other resources, for all the expences and dignity of the Government. Lands, and

the best held by these branches of the family, were equal if cultivated to nearly two thirds of this, though producing to them not 1/5th of their value. They only tended to foster that spirit (p 246) of speculation in a numerous train of kackoons and establishments without providing for the support of the holders, besides the other train of evils already mentioned.

125. The schedule was on the same lavish scale as might have been expected amounting in all to 15,000 Rs monthly or 1,80,000 Rs annually!! An aggregate not realized by the Rana throughout his country during the last 5 years.

126. I saw the difficulties he labored under, I was myself placed in a most delicate situation; but it was necessary to recover (p 247) these lands or drop all idea of restoring order. As this must be a monthly expenditure it was necessary to provide accordingly.

127. The transit and town duties have been accordingly set aside for this purpose, and I am sorry to say it swallows up the whole, I have been assiduous in watching this growing branch of the revenues of Meywar, and by moderate duties, and abolishing those which were vexatious, with perfect safety to the merchant, they are monthly rising in value.

#### **9. J.TOD, POLITICAL AGENT, AT OODEYPOOR TO GOVERNMENT: 24.4.1819**

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IOR: Board's Collections : Vol 1105 : No. 29074 : pp 135-334; Enclosures 335-8, 339-60.

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144.(p268) One of the evils and the cause of many others existing here is in the total want of all privacy in discussing the measures of government. Every man in the city from the pettiest cloth seller to the Rana, discusses them as if he had a share in them, and from the Rana having been so long a stranger to all its dignities, and but wretchedly attended on, every person from the purdhan to the Passwan who drives the flies from him, assumes the privilege of giving advice.

Note: Francis Buchanan makes similar observations in his "A journey through Mysore, Canara and Malabar." (undertaken 23.4.1800-5.7.1801) and published in 1807. On pp 342-3 of volume I he says :

"I took an opportunity, in company with this aumildar, of examining into the management of the lac insect; and for this purpose we collected all the people who follow that employment. I have always found, that the more of any class of people were assembled, the more likely I was to get just information: not that all of them spoke; some one or two men generally answered my questions; but they did it without fear of reflexions from those who might otherwise have been absent; as every one, if he chose, had an opportunity of speaking. The Hindus of all descriptions, so far as I have observed, are indeed very desirous of having every kind of business discussed in public assemblies."

**10. MAJOR GENERAL SIR DAVID OCHTERLONY, BART, RESIDENT IN MALWA AND RAJPOOTANA TO MR SECRETARY SWINTON, ON OODEYPOOR : 6.4.1823**

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Source: IOR: Board's Collections; Vol. 1007; No. 29707; Con 2.5.1823

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14. The honourable the Governor General in Council is aware of the present state of Oudeypoor from the letters I have recently transmitted. There appears less violence and bluster, but the (no ?) material change seems to have (p 2) taken place in the wishes or determination of the Rana, if those can be called his, when he is known to be the mere tool of a faction, and without any determination, and if he has wishes they are only to be at liberty to indulge his weak, foolish and prodigal expences.

15. Of Oudeypoor I could wish to say little for the present, in addition to what I had the honour to represent to Government in my Dispatch No 130 (dated 4th Sept 1822).

16. It is however satisfactory to be able to say that time and experience have convinced me, that my picture (p 3) of Meywar and of the prince, is the first and only faithful representation<sup>16</sup> which has been afforded to the view of Government; but when I say faithful, I do not mean to say correct, for my statement of the imbecility of the Maharana, is short of the reality, and if the late accounts at Oudeypoor may be ascribed to him, I can no add to the catalogue of imperfections, a vice I did not suspect, nor merely unjust, but wanton cruelty.

17. I have great hope of a favourable change on the arrival of Captain Cobbe, and the (p 4) introduction of something like a steady and impartial system, for I ascribe something of what has occurred there, to a seeming disinclination on the part of the late Political Agent to speak disagreeable truths and to make appeals to that intellect which he so highly praises. He began and ended his political career by universally and improvidently indulging, rather than kindly checking, his propensities to a wasteful profusion and occasionally humbled him by injudicious intermeddling, which he should not have commenced, and from which he did not find it always easy to retreat with dignity. (p 5)

18. To give my sentiments unreservedly and in a few words, I consider the late Political Agent as too much of a Rajpoot himself to deal with Rajpoots: fair exposition, probity and candour are the best weapons to oppose to obstinacy, cunning and deceit. Circumstances may prevent your gaining a single point, but your rise from every discussion with the consciousness that you have not, and need not yield a single principle.

19. I would wish to believe that our late proceedings at Jeypoor will have a most favourable effect on the Rajpoot (p 6) community. The rise, progress and termination of these disputes cannot I think fail to shew to this perverse, obstinate and suspicious race, that we condemn all paltry jealousies of what may or may not be the motives of our conduct, and proceed with the proper dignity of conscious integrity to subvert corruption and reform misrule, and leave time and experience to produce that respect and admiration which the disinterestedness of the measures can not fail to impress on a race, of all other the most alive to, and the most influenced by, a sordid selfishness. (p 7)

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<sup>16</sup> Emphasis in pencil

20. It would be less difficult to adjust the pending differences at Oudeypoor, would I feel the necessary conviction that the Purdhan is turned out merely because he will not gratify the extravagance of the prince by the sacrifice of the revenues which have been appropriated to the liquidation of his debts to the British Government by his own agreement. But he came into office so fenced on all sides by a number of articles subscribed by the Rana, and has so openly and avowedly enjoyed the support of the late Local Agent and (p 8) his locum tenens that knowing the native character, I cannot feel confident he has not presumed on it, to render his refusals more unpalatable than decorum required, and that there may not also be just grounds for the defalcations and exactions of which they accuse him.

21. Captain Cobbe has been represented to assure the Rana he came without any predilections or prejudices, and that if the Purdhan has abused his trust, he shall not interfere to prevent his punishment; but if his dismissal is not demanded by misconduct, (p 9) and is only sought by the Rana to indulge a personal dislike, we shall think it an improper exercise of authority and in direct violation of promises given of his nomination to office. But still our reluctance to interfere in internal details will induce us to waive all discussion of that nature and all we shall require is that, whatever minister is appointed shall give us a security of the most satisfactory nature, that the heavy debt due by the Rana is liquidated by regular instalments, and that (p 10) the current tribute is regularly paid as it becomes due.

22. I have suffered much lately from ill health but if it improves and I do not find it both improvident and improper to carry it into effect, my intention is to proceed to Neemuch about the end of this or the beginning of the next month, and from thence, if necessary I can make a night's run by dauk to Oudeypoor should Captain Cobbe think my presence would answer any good or useful purpose.

## 11. CAPTAIN COBBE TO OCHTERLONEY : 17. 9.1823 (Extract)

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IOR : Board's Collections : Vol 1007 : No 29707

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Sir

The Rana has expressed (p 55) to me his earnest wish that after the Dussaira the Koonwar should make a tour of inspection through Meywar accompanied by me. I feel desirous of obtaining the knowledge with which it would furnish me, and I am of opinion that thrown into such immediate and constant contact with this ill-disposed youngman, I might be enabled to acquire some personal influence and ascendancy over him, which may hereafter be useful. As the consolidated allowance granted me is stated expressly to cover all expences of establishment, (p 56) camp, equipage &c I cannot of course solicit the consideration of Government towards the extra expence to which a tour of three or four months will put me, but as my allowance is by no means calculated to enable me at all times to keep a supply of cattle for this purpose in a country where grain and servants are exorbitantly dear, and as no kind of carriage is procurable for hire, I hope I shall not be thought asking too much in requesting to be allowed to indent on the Commissariat at Neemuch or Nuseerabad (p 57) for the carriage I may require, ...(also additional sowars)... (ends p 59).

Government to Ochterloney : 24.10.1823

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 23rd ultimo, submitting a copy of a letter from the Political Agent at Oudeypoor, dated the 17th of that month, and to acquaint you in reply, that the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council entirely concurs with you in the expediency of Captain Cobbe accompanying the Koonwar on his intended tour of inspection through Meywar.

2. You are accordingly authorized to supply Captain Cobbe with the camp equipage and carriage cattle required by him, if they can be spared from the public service, and with (p 61) an additional party of 20 or 24 sowars, to be returned to their corps on completion of the tour. I have &c G. Swinton, secretary to Government.

Fort William, 24th October 1823.

**12. CAPT COBBE, POLITICAL AGENT AT OUDEYPOOR TO OCHTERLONEY :  
20.2.1825**

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IOR : Board's Collections : Vol 1107 : No 29707 : pp 236-318, Encl pp 318-33; private letter 333-50; Govt reply pp 351-65.

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5. I considered this a fair opportunity for taking on myself a more active share in the management of the pergunnahs, nominally set aside for our security and after endless efforts to reduce their superfluous expenditure and meeting with every ...of underhand opposition from the minister and his adherents I succeeded in farming the whole of them on good security for three years at an increasing rent (the particulars of each lease with the arrangement of the kists (p 246) will be found in statement No 1). I insisted on a rising rent instead of an average one, as the maximum of the present lease will of course form the basis of any future one. I could have obtained more favourable terms had I foregone my right of interference in all cases of dispute with ryots, or had I not stipulated that no remission should be made (as has been usual) for failure of crops, bad seasons &c. I thought it however better to secure a fair sum without chance of failure in preference (p 247) to a large nominal amount of which I might have been disappointed.

11. ... The mode of collection remains for the most part as I found it. The usages of Meywar allotted one third of the produce in kind to the sovereign, and an annual fine under the name of Berar was levied on each village in proportion to its supposed capabilities. Such a system in the hands of the Rana's Kamdars, without proper checks, would only tend to encourage partiality and oppression towards the ryots, and spoliation of the revenue, with little chance of detection. This appears to have attracted Captain Tod's (P 273) attention at an early period and induced him to alter the whole system of collection, receiving on the part of the Rana one half of the produce in kind, abolishing the Berar entirely. This certainly simplified the collection, prevented in some degree the former oppressions, and enabled the Agent to ascertain with sufficient exactness the actual amount of revenue realized. But in some material points this arrangement was at least as objectionable as the former inasmuch as the burthen which by the abolition of the Berar was removed from (p 274) the trading, handicrafts, and manufacturing parts of the community

was by the additional assessment in kind, nearly doubled on the cultivators, the very class it was most desirable to encourage and spare. As might have been foreseen the husbandmen in some of the pergunnahs have betaken themselves to other occupations.

12. Amongst a people strongly prejudiced in favour of their ancient usages it will in most cases be found advisable, rather to improve the customs, and bend them to your purpose, than attempt (p 275) to substitute others, even if superior. This would have induced me to revert to the former mode of collection, had I not felt too diffident of my own acquaintance with the subject to venture on a change in the system established by Captain Tod, doubtless on good grounds. I have nevertheless yielded to the reiterated petitions of the inhabitants of the pergunnah of Hoorlah and consented for this year to revert to the former usage. I propose fixing the Berar by a committee formed from the heads of each village, a deputy from myself and the (p 276) local Kamdar of the Rana. As this has been done merely on the ground of relieving the agriculturists, during the present dreadful scarcity, it binds me to nothing beyond the present season. The result will be submitted in my next report when the plan can either be abandoned or renewed.

15. In order to avoid occupying the time of Government by a second dispatch, I shall endeavour to submit (p 288) all my little experience furnishes, respecting the chiefs and feudatories of the Rana, as briefly as possible. Should I be guilty of repetition it will arise from my ignorance of how far the Government is informed of their relative situation to the Rana. The chiefs are into three classes, the first consisting of the sixteen most powerful heads of families, the second of thirty two Thakoors and the third of the descendents of the other classes who have settled themselves in the small villages set aside for their maintenance. (P 289) All these classes are bound to provide for the service of the state a certain amount of horse and foot, in proportion to the value of their Jageers. The right of the sovereign to resume these lands has always been distinctly recognised and on the decease of a chief his Jageer is formally taken possession of by the Rana until the heir has paid the usual Nuzzurana and received his investiture. In short it much resembles the renewal of a bishop's lease in Ireland. This form of government nearly assimilates with that (p 290) called the feudal and has all the vices of that system in addition to those arising from the natural disposition of Rajpoots; the prince who has no regular force is on the moment of invasion, deserted by his feudatories who have each their own possessions to defend. Nor is he ever able to punish a disobedience to which every one is a party, and as each chief has from two to ten wives, they are so intermarried and connected with each other, that no dependence could be placed on their (p 291) exertions against their relations. Such a machine could not work well or long, and under a head and hand so weak as the present Rana's the ruin of the country was inevitable. Even in better times the feelings of the chiefs and their line of conduct during the time of the disturbances of the last fifty years I cannot better explain than in the words of Rawat Hameer Sing of Budaiser, a man of some notoriety, when speaking to me of his being abused as a plunderer, "Meywar was then divided into two classes : the plunderers, and the plundered. (p 292) I should have been content to abstain from robbing if I could have secured my own exemption from being robbed. To defend myself I was obliged to keep more men than I could maintain; to feed them I was compelled to plunder my weaker or less courageous neighbours, and the Khalsa of the Rana being the least protected was my most frequent prey. Besides he is our father and should feed us, but now I am ensured in the enjoyment of my own property I have no wish to interfere with that of others." As habits are not however so (p 293) rapidly changed the latter part of this declaration may be cautiously received. On Captain Tod's arrival the whole of the chiefs were summoned to the Durbar and a mutual agreement contracted between them and the Rana, a copy of which is appended marked No 2.

### 13. PRIVATE LETTER FROM CAPT COBBE TO THE RESIDENT IN MALWA AND RAJPOOTANA (OCHTERLONEY) : DATED 20TH FEBRUARY 1825 (Extract)

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Source: IOR: Boards Collections: 101:1107: No:29707, pp333 - 350

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The accompanying has already become so bulky that I feel unwilling to lengthen it; (p 334) still as it does not appear a fair or very clear exposition I trouble you with a few lines in a less formal shape. The entire failure of rain destroyed the Kharif (?) crop in toto, the frost has since killed all the grain, and the blight filled ears of wheat and barley, give me a lamentable prospect for the Rabbee. The cattle are dying in numbers for want of fodder and the wells even in the valley are already failing. Reports of failures have during former seasons been so often made to Government, that real and extreme as the distress (P 335) is I feel ashamed to report it, lest I be suspected of attributing to the season the fruits of my own mismanagement. The tribute of Government and instalment, being secured, will be collected with exception to the amount of the renter's of duties defalcation, and the sum so unjustifiably usurped at Jawund (?), as reported on the 7th November. But the sufferings of the ryots will be very severe indeed, and already are their children exposed for sale. Never did the improvidence of former years appear so strikingly as at present when a moderate sum of ready money (p 336) applied to the repairs of tanks, wells &c would save thousands from starvation by giving them employment, besides ensuring a considerable increase of revenue hereafter. It is right you should know it was not in consequence of any leniency or remission to the ryots that the payment of the tribute was withheld; the revenue was collected to the last anna, nor was a single bund, road, well, or other public work either constructed or repaired by the Rana's Government during these years.

With respect to the employment of a treasurer, I should state (p 337) that the banker is apparently confirming a favour on me by collecting the tribute and the keeping the accounts of it, whilst from it he derives not only a heavy pecuniary profit, but a degree of influence very inconvenient at times...

### 14. GOVERNMENT TO OCHTERLONEY : 29.4.1825 (Extract)

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IOR : Board's Collections: Vol 1107 : No 29707 : pp 351-65.

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6. The Governor General in Council concurs in opinion with the Political Agent that, adverting to the expectations held out at the period of the negotiations of the Oudeypore treaty, and still more to the extreme misery and depopulation which that country had experienced, the frequent partial failures of the crops subsequent to 1818, and the peculiarly heavy defalcations of the present year, considerations of humanity and sound policy equally suggest the adoption of the most lenient and liberal course in adjusting our demands (357) of tribute from Meywar. The Governor General in Council therefore authorizes you to continue until further orders, the demand for tribute at the existing rate of 4 annas, which is understood to yield about three lacs in an average season. It is not considered necessary to fix the precise period to which this indulgence shall extend, nor, on the other hand, it is proposed, that at any rate it shall exceed the term of the reigning prince's life. Government observes further that in consideration of the late scarcity and failure of crops, every practicable degree (p 358) of indulgence must be extended to the ryots, both in the reserved pergunnahs, and in the Khalsa generally, in the way of remissions and suspensions, and his



lordship in council will be prepared to make a large sacrifice of the tribute of the current year provided you can so arrange as that the benefit of that relinquishment shall reach to the cultivators. It appears very necessary also that to provide in some degree against future calamity, pecuniary assistance should be afforded to the government and the cultivators (P 359) for the repairing of tanks and wells, and Government would propose instead of relinquishing absolutely any part of the debt due by the state of Oudeypore to the British Government, as suggested by Captain Cobbe, to appropriate a portion of the instalments realized on that account, to the above beneficial purposes. Any distinct suggestion which Captain Cobbe may found on this intimation, accompanied with estimates of expence, will receive due attention from Government. Independent moreover of the above extraordinary aid, it is desirable, that the repair (p 360) or construction of public works calculated to extend and improve cultivation in Meywar, should be, at all times, properly looked after; the expences of course to be charged on the public revenues both of the reserved Pergunnahs and the Rana's Khalsa lands.

**15. CAPT COBBE, POLITICAL AGENT, OODEYPOOR TO RESIDENT AT DEHLEE:  
11.3.1828. (Extract)**

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IOR : Board's Collections : Vol 1111 : No 29715 : pp 394-401

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4. Jehauzpoor is one of the pergunnahs, the proceeds of which were assigned to cover the tribute. It was by far (p 397) the most flourishing and productive in Meywar. It was made over to the uncontrolled management of the Rana's officers in January 1827. I beg to refer to Capt Sutherland's minute report of it two months previous to the transfer, it is impossible to imagine a greater contrast than it presented by is present condition.

5. I informed the minister that nothing but an extreme emergency ever induced the Government to employ its troops in the territories of its allies, and that I considered the present case as the very last which could authorize such a step. On the Rana's assurances of (P 398) his ability and inclination to manage his country without help, and fulfil his engagements, all securities had been given up to him. In twelve months an extensive pergunnah had been reduced from a state of almost unequalled prosperity to utter ruin, whilst the other districts were rapidly following the same course; I stated my conviction that Government would receive with much disappointment, if not displeasure such manifest proofs of his highness's Government, and the incapacity of his servants, and whose errors were evidently not those of judgement alone. I advised his immediately making a candid statement (p 399) of affairs to the Koonwur, in order to concert measures for the immediate suppression of disorder so rapidly increasing, and endeavour to reconcile the Rana to such retrenchments from his personal expences as would without encroaching on the tribute, cover the deficiency of revenue and the extra sebundies required.

6. In my letter of the 20th June 1827 I reported some instances of the oppressions, then exercised and my apprehensions of the result; they have been more than verified, for the roads in every direction are now so infested, as to be impassable to unarmed travellers. The country was in a wretched (p 400) state when the present minister came into office; he is quiet, not deficient in sense, and I believe tolerably honest in his own person; but he wants both energy and talent to control the parties which fill this Durbar. I gave all the help and support I possibly could, hoping the Koonwur would through vanity do the rest. He however, has evidently considered Sheer Sing as a tool, bound to obey all his orders, without any claim to being shielded from the consequence. The Prince's Khandar (?) who

formerly managed his affairs, and kept him within bounds, has been long dying. This (p 401) check removed, the Koonwur has in a few short months continued to do away every favorable impression formerly entertained and render himself and protege objects of any thing but respect or regard. I shall shortly have to resume this subject as I do not conceive it possible Sheer Sing can maintain his post two months longer.

I have &c ,

F. A. (?) Cobbe, Political Agent.

Oodeypoor, 11th March 1828.

**16. CAPT SUTHERLAND, ACTING POLITICAL AGENT, OUDEYPOOR TO SIR C. METCALFE, RESIDENT AT DEHLEE, AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL FOR THE AFFAIRS OF RAJPOOTANA (Revenue Report on Jehazpoor): dated 1.12.1826**

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IOR : BENGAL Pol Cons : P/125/12 : Proceedings 20.1.1827 : No 47 : also in Board's Collection : Vol 1107 : No 29708 : pp 222-49

Note : Metcalfe in his letter of 8.12.1826 concurs with the views of the Acting Political Agent.

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Sir,

In pursuance of the intention expressed in my letter of the 12th ultimo I proceeded to Jehazpoor and I have now the honour to submit a return of the various heads under which collections were made in that district last year and would (p ) have added to this the amount of each year's collections since the district has been under our charge, but the records containing the information are in Oudeypoor.

2. It is necessary that in addition to the return I should afford some information of the revenue system which altho in most respects similar to that of other parts of India is in some different, and in all the most essential parts simple and perfect. It appears to me to have in it a good deal of the original Hindoo system, vitiated by (p ) later Governments, and I intrude on this subject the more unreservedly, because it is necessarily one of the first importance, and because I believe that such information from whatever quarter is received with interest.

3. The two principal heads of collection in each harvest are the Mupte and Koote. The former is a tax on produce without any further reference to soil than that a particular description of produce requires a certain quality of soil. The latter is the share of grain to which the Government is entitled. (p )

4. The Beega is seventy five cubits square, and the Beega of tobacco or any description of garden stuff is taxed at Rs 3-4 $\frac{1}{2}$ as. The Beega of wheat, gram or barley at Rs 2- 12. The Beega of cotton, Indian corn, Kupooam (?) (a die) at Rs 2-4  $\frac{3}{4}$ . Cheaper, and inferior articles of produce, requiring inferior soils, or grown at a great distance from the village are taxed at a lower rate or from Rs 1-8 down to eight annas. The rupee is worth only from 11 to 12 annas in comparison with the Sonat. The Mupte (p ) or measurement seems to take place in each harvest and the tax is the same whether the crops are good or bad, but if they have failed altogether the tax is altogether remitted.

5. The Koote is the division of crop: from each maund or forty seers of produce, fifteen seers are set aside. Of these government takes five seers and the remaining ten go to pay the village officers (Bara Buloota). The remaining twenty five seers are divided whatever the description of produce, one third to the government and two third as to the cultivator. (p ) Thus Government gets one third of the whole.

6. I conclude that the Mupte and the Koote are very nearly equal as to the government's and the cultivator's share, as the cultivator seems to take either indifferently and my calculations have been made on this supposition.

7. Bunnia and Bramin cultivators give only one fourth because they do not labour with their own hands. The quantity of ground which they cultivate is very limited, but the system is naturally offensive to the more industrious ryot.

8. So far the system is beautiful and would in the original form be very favourable to the people but there follows as will be seen by the return, a string of taxes imposed at different times by different governments which are answered according to their extent by an additional tax of forty six, or eight annas on each rupee of the Mupte and Koote. But as these rates whether at the original or extra scale of assessment are apparently defined altho perhaps varying in every district. The revenue affairs of this (p ) country are placed in a very manageable form.

9. The Mupte and Koote being last year thirty three  $\frac{3}{10}$  per cent, it required an addition of 30-  $\frac{6}{20}$  per cent to answer the demand of Government, and in an ordinary year an additional 17-  $\frac{4}{10}$  is required or in all 50-  $\frac{7}{10}$ th per cent.

10. The two taxes which last year fell most heavily on the people were Trisala and Nuzerana. The former is a tax levied every third year, and has no limit. In an ordinary case it necessarily trenches on the capital accumulated in the (p ) two former years, and in an extraordinary one might be made to sweep away all the agricultural capital of a district. The latter is a tax levied on occasions of marriage or rejoicing in the Rana's family and like the other is without limit. Jahazpoor was alone of all the Rana's country subjected to this tax last year. It was injudiciously levied in the same year with the Trisala, and I believe without the Agent's sanction, both these taxes are however made to fall as much as possible on Potails and Enamdars.

11. I did not in one single instance get hold (p ) of the village accounts of daily receipts and disbursements, and I feared to take any measure to force their production. Our manager and the government officers pretend that they have never been produced. The potails have usurped the office of putwaree, and there are no district zemindars.

12. I had however many tests by which to satisfy myself that the amount shown is that which was collected by the officers of Government.

13. I must notice that a great deal of the information contained in the (p ) return is Capt Black's. The interest which that gentleman evinces in whatever concerns the prosperity and comfort of the people leads most of them to his tent instead of mine, a preference honourable to himself and which I shall not venture to disturb.

14. The only alteration which I have made in the management of Jahazpoor is discontinuing the agency of money lenders. Hitherto the officers of government have received the amount

fixed on each village in half yearly payments from this class, who have been allowed to make their collections either in money or in kind (p) from the people charging two per cent on the transaction if the money were paid when due, and consequently receiving this per centage on the whole amount collected, and two per cent per mensem on all arrears. The collections will now be made without any increase of charge by the government officers directly from the cultivators, and in payments corresponding with their returns on the sale of produce.

15. In other respects I consider the management of our Agent, Chand Khan very creditable to him. His mild system in the last year (p) is the more appreciated by the people from following that of a person in whose hands the district had unhappily been for eighteen months before, and whose infamous conduct more deserves punishment from the Rana's Government than any public delinquent of whom I have lately heard.

16. The expence of establishment and sebandee in this district is from sixteen to eighteen thousand rupees a year, exclusive of Rs 3000 paid to the manager by us, or from 13 to 15 per cent on the collections. In addition (p) to the Rs 55,224 were last year spent in the district in maintaining a body of troops. Some part of the district are hilly, inhabited by Meenas, and of some strength, and being on the Boondie frontier the permanent service of one hundred disposable men will be necessary to maintain tranquility to both countries. There will be besides these, 160 sebandies and about the same number of Jageerdar troops and the remainder I intend to hold available for service in the (p) Bheel hills.

17. I shall not feel myself at liberty to enter on so minute an enquiry in the other reserved districts, al tho farmed to a dependent of our own, for I am not sure that I have a right to enquire into the management of a farmer unless there are complaints that he deprives the people of their just rights.

18. I do not immediately see the utility of holding those districts in reserve. The whole of the Maharana's country and of his revenue is really answerable for our (p) tribute and equally entitled to whatever protection we may see fit to extend to it. If acting on my own judgement I would place all on the same footing. We do now in fact exercise the same authority and controul throughout, and the less our native agents have to say to the collection of revenue the more to our honour.

19. It had been customary also to reserve the customs for the payment either of arrears or of current tribute. The lease had expired when Captain Cobbe left, and he had not renewed it. I have begged (p) the minister to make his own settlement, and he has I understand rented it for the same sum to some retainer of his own, as we formerly did to the priest of Natdwara, taking security for its payment by monthly instalments. I conceive that the whole revenue of the country should go into the Rana's treasury without going through any intermediate agent of ours; if his minister be corrupt it rests with his highness to correct him. At all events, it will be more easy and satisfactory for the Agent to inform the Ranah of the amount to which (p) he is entitled than to check the minister and himself insure its payment, and the regular payment of our tribute may be easily regulated. The Government is in its finances more prosperous than most other governments of India. A month hence it will owe no debt except to our Government for which it pays no interest. That debt is only five or six lacs and to meet it there is a surplus revenue of three.

20. There is a large class of persons in the country who left it in disturbed times and who returned with the return of (p) quiet which the termination of last Maratta war gave to

India. They were invited to do so by us and consider themselves and their property under our guarantee. If so, that guarantee must have a limit. They still confidently appeal to it, but I cannot imagine that they are more entitled to protection than others or that they are to enjoy a monopoly of protection.

21. It appears to me at this short period of my experience that there is a very vitiated tone in the officers of the Ranah's Government from the minister downwards. The people have no hope of (p ) gaining redress or justice at their hands, and the Agent, instead of being a superintending, is an executive authority, in all the minute of interference. If the Agent interfere at all, it is necessary that he should be able to fix responsibility on the agents employed by the Ranah's Government. That they should be made to suffer for their misdeeds and that they should be raised to responsibility rather than depressed by the influence of such as our badged servants, who until committed themselves, as they immediately are by receiving bribes, actually controul the (p ) others.

22. To establish this system it will however be necessary that the Agent be constantly in motion through the districts, and whilst I may be here I intend to exercise myself the duties on which they hither to been employed.

23. A very great evil is the employment by the minister of his own relations in all places of power and profit. There seem to be hardly any officers that can be considered those of the state. Others rise and fall with the minister of the day, and (P ) his frequent removal occasions constant change and confusion. It is so the more necessary that their conduct should be constantly watched, whilst it is of course more difficult to controul them.

24. The undefined amount of the Trisala or three yearly tax, and that indiscriminate Goonagares or fine for all offences real or imaginary, criminal or civil, which goes to the benefit of those for whom they are levied, seem to me the great evils under which the people labour.

25. These prominent evils are so well known as common to all vitiated native governments that it is unnecessary at this period of our experience to (p ) enlarge on them. It is impossible that any country in which they prevail can prosper and fear that they are yet to be checked in the Oudeypoor territory. If they are to be checked by the Agent he must necessarily have the support and countenance of his Government in doing so,

Camp  
1 December 1826

I have &c  
J.Sutherland  
Acting Political Agent.

| <b>STATEMENT</b>                                                        | <b>RS.</b>    | <b>PERCENT</b> |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| Mapte & Koote : or one third of the whole produce given (to) Government | 48,937        | 33-33-0        |
| Extra Charges including Nuzerana & Trisala                              | 31,884        | 21-69-0        |
| One half of the sum levied indifferently on agriculturists and others   | 12,266        | 8-96-0         |
| <b>TOTAL Rs. and % from cultivators in S. 1882</b>                      | <b>93,087</b> | <b>63-98-0</b> |

| <b>DEDUCT</b>                                                                         |              | <b>RS.</b> | <b>PERCENT</b> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------|----------------|
| Nuzurana                                                                              | 14,254 - 971 | 22,054     | 15-02-0        |
| Trisala                                                                               | 7,800 - 531  |            |                |
|                                                                                       |              | <hr/>      |                |
|                                                                                       |              | 71,033     | 48-96-0        |
| ADD : One third of the Trisala or three yearly tax                                    |              | 2,600      | 1-77-0         |
| <b>TOTAL Government Share in money and % in an ordinary year from the cultivators</b> |              | <hr/>      |                |
|                                                                                       |              | 73,633     | 50-73-0        |

(J. Sutherland, Pol Agent)

( p: two pages after foregoing and following detailed statement )

- a. 48,937 the third of the produce is 33-33 percent
- b. 31,884 Do indifferently on agriculturists and others 21-69 "
- c. 12,266 Half of what is indifferently on cultivators and others 8-96 " 63-98
- d. 12,266 Half of Ditto 8-96  
(Total % taken from the cultivators.)
- e. 8,625 On Persons not cultivators 5-87  
(Total % from those not out agriculturists) 14-83

(J. Sutherland, Pol Agent)

**17. CAPT STEWART, POLITICAL AGENT AT JEYPOOR TO GOVERNMENT 26.11.1821  
(Extract)**

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IOR: Board's Collections: Vol 1091: No. 29676: pp16 - 60 ; Encl 61 - 75.

NOTE: the letter ends at para 30 on page 60 and is followed by the statements etc. referred in the first para, on pages 61-75. The Government's reply approbating the report etc. is on pp 76-8. The report was forwarded to Government by Ochterlony with his letter dated 4.12.1821 and precedes the report in this collection.

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Sir,

In consequence of the delay of the Durbar in furnishing me with a satisfactory account of the lands held in Tunkha, Jageer &c I have not been able until now to transmit a statement of the settlement of the revenue which has been made. The following documents which I have now the honour to submit will, I trust, convey to his excellency the Governor General in council a tolerably (p 17) correct notion of the revenues of this state.

First Settlement of the Khalsa lands &c for three years as it has now been made.

Second Statement of the lands held in Tunkha, or for the payment of the salaries of the officers of Government &c.

Third Statement of the lands held in Jageer by the different Thakoors of the state for the maintenance of horse for the service of the Government.

Forth Statement of the lands granted for religious and charitable purposes.

Fifth Abstract of the above statements. (p 18)

On each of these documents it is necessary to make a few observations.

2. With regard to the first statement his lordship in council is already aware, of the unfavorable circumstances under which the settlement was made. I did all in my power to inspire such of the farmers as made a reference to me with confidence, that the terms of the engagement would not be violated. But it is not to be supposed that men who have for a series of years been accustomed to a system of violence, oppression and corruption (p 19) should believe it possible that an end could be put at once to such a system. Besides, though the farmers often suffered injustice, yet it more frequently happened that a corrupt bargain was made between them and the ministers and Mootsuddies of the Durbar to defraud the Government, first by obtaining the lands at an under valuation, and, secondly, by obtaining remissions of the rent on pretence of a failure of the crops and c.

The greater part of the farmers who have rented the lands for three years, have, I am convinced, taken them under the supposition (p 20) that the same practices would continue to prevail. Hence many of the pegunnahs are rented much under the full value. If the farmers alone benefit by this, the present loss of revenue to the Government will be of little importance compared to the advantages which it may expect to derive at the next settlement, from the confidence of security with which the circumstance will inspire the farmers. But that the ministers and Mootsuddies of the Durbar will participate in these profits, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of any British Agent stationed here, I have no

doubt. Still, (p 21) however, the knowledge that an appeal now lies to British authority against any undue demands will, I trust, operate as a salutary check on the ministers, and by degrees inspire the farmers with confidence sufficient to induce them to resist such demands altogether.

3. ... I have discovered one of the unjust sources of emoluments to the Mootsuddies. This is a sum of money under the name of "Warisee" paid by each farmer (p 22) to the person through whose interest he is supposed to have obtained the lease. ... The amount of the whole of the Khalsa lands cannot be less than half a lac of rupees. Other similar and more corrupt sources of (p 23) emolument will I doubt not by degrees come to light.

10. I have only further to observe, with regard to the Khalsa lands that the rent of them, as given in the statement, is the net amount paid into the treasury at the capital (p 32) in the best Jyepoor rupees, which are somewhat better than Sonauts, and altogether independent of the expences of collection, pay of sebundies, and all the other ordinary expences of the pergunnahs. The amount of these expences is, on the average, about 15 or 16 percent on the collections.

11. With regard to statement No 2, of the lands held in Tunkha, it will be observed, in the first place, that the amount for which these lands are granted, greatly exceeds the jumma which they actually yield. (p 33) This arises from the mode of making grants, either in Tunkha, Jageer &c, which prevails here, and is I believe peculiar to this Government. Almost all grants of this kind are over-valued, and, according to the proportion by which the valuation exceeds the real jumma, the grants receive their name. Thus a grant, in which the estimated value is double the real jumma is called a six months grant. One in which the estimated amount is one third greater than the real jumma is called an eight months grant. (P 34) One in which the estimated amount is one fourth greater than the real jumma, is called a nine months grant, and so forth. If the estimated amount is equal to the real jumma, it is called a "Wusoole" grant. The deduction, therefore, which is made in the statement on account of the excess of the Tunkha valuation above the real jumma, is calculated from the nature of the different grants, whether of six months, eight months, or nine months &c. But the great proportion of them is of six months, that is, of that description (p 35) in which the valuation is double the real jumma.

12. It is to be remembered, however, that this statement of the Tunkha lands is taken entirely from the records of government and not from any actual survey or examination at present, and I have reason to believe that, in this department, considerable abuses prevail. Grants have been obtained of villages in Tunkha nominally called six months, but in which the actual jumma equals, and in some cases exceeds, the estimated amount. Again, when a village is granted in Tunkha for a certain (P 36) sum, and is brought by care and cultivation to exceed that amount, the overplus should be paid to Government. But no such payments are I believe made, though there is no doubt that many of the Tunkha grants now much exceed the amount for which they were originally given.

13. I have urgently recommended to this Government to make a regular investigation into the whole of the Tunkha grants; to resume such as are not by any proper tenure; and where the jumma exceeds the amount for which the Tunkha (p 37) is granted, either to resume a portion of it, or cause the overplus to be paid into the treasury.

14. It would probably be the most advantageous plan for this Government to resume all the Tunkha grants entirely, and to make the payments in money from the treasury. It is obvious



that in that case the revenue of the Tunkha lands, like the Khalsa, would gradually improve in each succeeding year; whereas now they can only be estimated for the second and third years the same as for the present. But (P 38) altho as a portion of the revenues of this state, in which the British Government will eventually have a share, and consequently a right to see that they are properly managed, yet I should doubt the policy of insisting, at present, on the entire resumption of the Tunkha lands, as too great an innovation on the ancient institutions of the country. There can, however, be no good reason for not making the strictest investigation into these tenures, and correcting the abuses that exist.

15. I have considered (P 39) it is sufficient for the information of Government to give in the statement the amount of the Tunkha grants in each pergunnah, instead of giving a detailed list of the Tunkhadars, who amount to five or six hundred, many holding single villages, and some half, some one third, and some even smaller portions of a village.

16. The amount of the lands held in Jageer will no doubt appear very great in proportion to the extent of the state. But, in a kind of feudal government like this, the object is not so much to form an army of the best (p 40) and cheapest description as to give employment and subsistence to all the military retainers of the tribe.

17. The Jageer tenures in the same manner as the Tunkha are nominally for a much larger amount than the real jumma, and, in the same manner, are denominated six months grants, eight months grants &c. The highest sum granted in Jagheer for the maintenance of one horse-man is 500 Rs per anum. In a six months grant consequently the sum actually realized is 250 Rs. In a nine months grant (P 41) it is 375 Rs, and so forth. Almost the whole of the Jagheers are of the description called six months, or in which the nominal amount is double the real jumma. But, some of the chiefs who are more nearly connected to the reigning family or whose forefathers have performed some signal service to the state, hold jageers at the higher description of eight, at nine, and of ten months.

18. The number of Jageerdar Horse at this Government is 4276. If the total amount of the Jagaers be divided by the number of Horse, it would (p 42) appear that, on the average, about 400 Rs per anum is allowed to each horse-man. But it is to be taken that there is a personal allowance to many of the Jageerdars of a considerable amount for keeping up an elephant, Palkee &c. There are also some chiefs, such as the Thakoor of Jheelaeah (?), whose Jageers are entirely personal, and on account of which they not obliged to muster any Horse. ... (P 43) ..

19. The same abuses prevail in regard to the Jageer as in the Tunkha grants. ...

21. The lands granted for religious and charitable purposes are over-valued in the same manner as those held in Jageer and in Tunkha are, and a similar deduction from them is made to find the real jumma. With regard however, to the lands held by this tenure my information is more defective than with respect to any other description of lands belonging to this state.

22. It will be observed that I have, in the statement, given an estimated sum for the number of villages, the (p 47) accounts of which have not been received. I have further added a sum on account of detached portions of land held by this tenure, independently of the number of villages in the statement. This, in 25 of the Muhals amounts to no less than 4,10,431 Beeghas and 14 Beeswas, which I have estimated at the low rent of one rupee per Beegah. Much more land, however, is held by this tenure, the accounts of which have not been received by me,

nor, indeed, by the Durbar: the Potalis, Canongoes &c of the villages doing all in their power (p 48) to conceal them.

23. Without wishing to interfere with the charitable or religious motives of the Government, yet I conceive it would be at least advisable to ascertain the real amount which is held by this tenure; and where lands have lapsed to the Government, but have been usurped by persons who have no right to them, (which I believe in many instances to be the case) that they should revert to the state.

26. As I have stated in a former dispatch, I calculated a great advantage to this state, and to the British Government in any further settlement of the revenues from a strict adherence to the one which has now been made. (p 52) It is supposed that the amount levied from the ryots on the Khalsa lands is generally one half more than the net rent paid to Government. I have stated that the expences of collection &c may amount to about 16 per cent, or say one sixth of the net revenue. There will remain, therefore, an amount nearly equal to one third of the net revenue as a profit to the farmer and their securities, or rather to be divided between these and the ministers and Mootsuddies of the Durbar. Now I conceive that, if, during the ensuing three (p 53) years, the farmers are secured in the possession of their leases, and protected as much as possible from all unjust exactions, they will naturally, in the ensuing settlement, offer nearly the full amount of the lands securing a moderate profit for themselves.

**18. CAPTAIN STEWART, POLITICAL AGENT AT JEYPOOR TO OCHTERLONY:  
14.11.1823 (Extract)**

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IOR : Board's Collections : Vol 1092 : No 29678 : pp 48-81.

NOTE : The Tunkha amount was added to the revenue realized for calculating the additional tribute above the revenue realization of forty lacs. Hence the tussle indicated in para 7 above.

The Government approbated Capt Stewart for this report and asked Ochterlony his views on the raising of the tribute as suggested by Stewart. Government's letter to Ochterlony is on pp 82-5 of this collection.

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2. First with regard to the revenues of the country. You are aware that the three settlements of the revenue which was made soon after my arrival here totally failed. In the second year, about one third of the farmers failed in bringing forward securities for that year and the pergunnahs they held were consequently rented to others, at a reduced rate. By this operation the amount of the revenue of the Khalsa lands for Sumbut 1879, amounted (p 50) only to Rs 25,90,813-9 instead of Rs 28,58,289-15, the a second year of the triennial settlement. And even of the farmer a sum of Rs 1,11,498-9-3 remained as yet unrecovered. For the present year 1880, it appears by the statement which has only been sent to me very (p 51) lately, that the total amount of the Khalsa lands amount only to Rs 26,30,974-9 whereas by the triennial settlement the amount this year ought to have been Rs 30,21,098-1.

3. From these facts it it may be inferred, first that in as far as regarded the revenues of the state no very baneful influence could have been exercised by the (p 52) Zenana faction since the settlement of the present year is only about forty thousand/better/Rs than that of the last year, which was made under the influence of Jhotah Ram. In the second place it may I think be inferred that under the present system, no very rapid improvement of the revenues of the state can be expected, under any administration. There are a regular set of renters who

have it in their power by combining, in a great measure to defeat an attempt (p 53) on the part of Government to raise the rent of the land to its real value. When in consequence of the failure of a renter or any other cause, a pergunnah is kept in the hands of Government itself and an aumil is sent thither, he invariably cheats the Government and it is sometimes several years even before the rent can be realized from him. This was exemplified in regard to Sambhur Lake, which you will perhaps recollect was two years ago retained in the hands of Government, on the plea that more would thus be made of it, than (p 53A) any renter would give. It was placed under the management of the Dewans Umwaur Chand and Nonid Ram, and the consequence was, that by the accounts of those persons, much less was realized than the renters had offered for it, and even that amount has not been all recovered from the Dewans.

4. Another cause of the little progress that is made in the improvement of the revenues of the state is, the total ignorance of every one concerned with the Durbar, or the administration in regard to the real resources of the (p 53B) country. There is not one at the present moment who can tell the quantity of land under cultivation in any particular pergunnah, the nature of the crops, or the mode in which the produce is divided between the contractor (? Cultivator) and the government. Hence the ryots are left in a great measure to the mercy of the renters or the aumils excepting in such parts as Jaurawattee (?) where the strength of the country enables the ryots to resist the Government, and where consequently they pay what may be called a tribute rather than a rent. (p 54)

5. To remedy these evils I know of no plan (that) can be adopted which would not involve a degree of interference on the part of the British Government in the internal administration of the country, quite incompatible with the appearance even of any authority on the part of this Government. As I cannot suppose it to be the wish of Government to resort to a measure of this kind, therefore, I have been led to consider how the British Government may derive the benefit which we have (p 55) a right to expect from an alliance with this state, without bending on its authority over its own subjects. For this purpose I know of no better plan than the one which has already occurred to you, and indeed been hinted to this Government, that is to give up the claim to five annas in the rupee on the excess of revenue above forty lacs, and to obtain in lieu of that an increase to the present tribute, and to make it permanent, although the five anna share may ultimately much exceed any amount that this Government (P 56) would at present agree to pay, above the stipulated tribute. Yet I conceive that the former plan whenever it comes to have effect must occasion such constant disputes with this Government, as would probably terminate in our being obliged to take the management of the revenues into our own hands.

6. But although on the most mature consideration I think it would be advisable to abandon the claim of the five annas in the rupee for an additional permanent tribute, (p 57) yet I would by no means on that account think it right that the Political Agent here should relax in the least his endeavours to effect an improvement of the revenues of the state, more especially during the minority of the Rajah. We are I conceive bound to protect his interest, and indeed unless we do so, I fear that instead of an increase to the tribute, this state would soon from mismanagement become incapable of paying even the stipulated tribute to the British Government.

7. Two years ago along with the revenue settlement I transmitted (p 58) a statement of the Tunkha lands of this Government, made out from the documents which your Mootsuddies had obtained from the records of the Government before my arrival. By that settlement it appearing that what is called, Tunkha amount, was about twenty lacs of rupees. Making

what I thought an ample allowance for the excess of Tunkha above the real jumma, I estimated the actual amount at Rs 11,93,889-4-10. As this Durbar alleged that this (p 159) far exceeded the real amount of Tunkha grants, I urged them to give me a correct statement of the amount as it stands at the present time. A statement of this kind has now been sent to me, which makes the amount little more than three lacs of rupees. I have not yet had time to examine this statement particularly, but I am partly unaware of the causes of the extraordinary difference. In the first place the amount of Tunkha grants has been taken from the statements of the Tunkhadars themselves, and in the second (p 60) place every grant, which can be construed into a Jagheer instead of a Tunkharee grant, has been carefully excluded from the present statement. Among others the whole of the grants for the support of the Zenana which alone amounts to several lacs of rupees, and which the Durbar insists are Jageers. Should the plan I have proposed for a permanent increase of the tribute be adopted it will render the discussions which must arise on this subject also unnecessary, as it will then be a matter of indifference whether the grants are Tunkharee or Jageer.

8. The Jageers granted (p 61) since the year Sumbut 1860 and which still remained unresumed have at last been sequestered, and an investigation into the right of each individual will take place, when it will be decided which shall be continued and which permanently assumed. ...

## 19. JAMES TOD ON RAJASTHAN 1829 - 32

Vol. I

(p. 141) It appears doubtful whether the Khalsa lands amounted to one fourth of those distributed in grants to the chiefs. The value of the crown demesne as the nerve and sinew of sovereignty, was well known by the former heads of this House. .... But the lavish folly of the present prince, out of this tract, twenty five miles in circumference, has not preserved a single village in his Khalsa.

(p. 142) Revenue and Rights of the Crown: .... The land tax in the Khalisa demesne is, of course, the chief source of supply; the transit duties on commerce and trade, and those of the larger towns and commercial marts rank next. In former times more attention was paid to this important branch of income, and the produce was greater because less shackled. The liberality on the side of the crown was only equalled by the integrity of the merchant, ...

(p. 143) the mines were very productive in former times, and yielded several lacks to the princes of Mewar. (reference to tin mines, silver, copper, iron, lead, marble quarries follows briefly)

Burrar: is an indefinite term for taxation and is connected with the thing taxed : as ganeem-burrar 'war tax' , ....(ganeem : enemy)

(p. 161) In Amber the most extensive benevolence, or burrar, is on the marriage of the Raj-cumar, or heir apparent. ...

(p. 439) Rana Bheem Sing (the reigning Prince) who succeeded his brother in Sumbut 1834 (AD 1778), was the fourth minor in the space of forty years ..... (Bheem Sing died in Mar-April 1828)

(p. 478) Such was the chaos from which order was to be evoked. .. To call them forth demanded only the exertion of moral (p. 479) interference, and every other was rejected. The lawless free-booter, and even the savage Bhil, felt awed at the agency of a power never seen... Accordingly at the mere name of the British power, rapine ceased, ... a single individual of no rank the negotiator. ....

(p. 505) The feudal lands, which were then double the fiscal, did not exhibit the like improvement....

(p. 507) Religious Establishments : ....There is scarcely a state in Rajpootana in which one fifth of the soil is not assigned for the support of the temples, their ministers, the secular Brahmins, bards, and (p. 508) genealogists. But the evil was not always so extensive; the abuse is of modern growth. ...In Mewar, the land in Sahsun, or religious grants, amounts in value to one-fifth of the revenue of the state, and the greater proportion of these has arisen out of the prodigal mismanagement of the last century.

(p. 511) The Brahmin threatened to spill his own blood if he did not obey the command, and gave himself a gash in a limb; but the Jat was inflexible ....

(p 531) Nathdwara : ... the personal grant (App XI) to the high priest ought alone to have sufficed for his household expenditure, being twenty thousand rupees per anum, equal to 10,000 in Europe. But the ten thousand towns of Mewar, from each of which he levied a crown, now exist only in the old rent-roll, and the heralds of Apollo would in vain attempt to collect their tribute from two thousand villages.

## 20. WITHDRAWAL OF RAJPOOTANA DRAFTS 1829-1830

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The collections to these (withdrawn) drafts on Rajpootana are from Nos 29672-29715 (vols 1089-1111) . The period covered is October 1817 to early 1829. The Drafts were withdrawn in Aug 1831. IOR :L/PS/2/45 : ,pp 1 / 1-2 , and 1/5 The intervening pages contain an internal memo in the Board on the court's request. This volume probably contains all the correspondence between the Board and the court on these Drafts, in addition to the paragraphs pertaining to Jyepore (20-73) and Kotah (74-117, 96-135) and the various alterations, additions etc and the notes and memoranda pertaining to them. The second volume (L/PS/2/46) is namely on Oodeypoor (paras 136-83, 184-215)., and contains similar notes, memos etc.

Though some references may have occurred to Rajpootana in earlier Political Dispatches etc these Drafts contained the first comprehensive survey of Rajpootana affairs. Hence the collections pertaining to them stretch from 1817-29 and probably include, if not all, most of the correspondence relating to their affairs during this period. The collections are in 23 volumes and may add to over 15,000 pages in manuscript ( perhaps some 3000-4000 in type)

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East India House  
4th August 1831.

Sir,

I am commanded by the court of directors to state, in reply to your letter of the 21st May last, respecting the drafts Nos 145 c 149 on the affairs of Rajpootana, that the great length of time, which has elapsed since that first preparation of these drafts, together with the great difference of opinion, which has arisen during their progress, respecting the policy of non-interference in the internal administration of protected states, render it, in the court's opinion, desirable, that the entire subject should be reconsidered, and that whatever instructions it may be deemed expedient to send to India, respecting the states of Rajpootana, should be founded on the results of more recent proceedings. I have therefore to request the Board's permission, that the Drafts Nos 145 to 149 may be withdrawn.

I have to honour to be Sir,  
Your most obedient humble servant  
P. Auber (secretary)

Thomas Hyde Villiers Esq.

**(Draft : To Mr Auber 9th August 1831)**

Sir,

I am directed by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, in which the court request the Board's consent that Drafts Nos 145 to 149 on the affairs on Rajpootana may be withdrawn, in view to a reconsideration of the subject and the preparation of an instruction to the local government founded on " the results of more recent proceedings".

The Board accordingly direct me (p 1/2) to signify their consent to the course recommended by the court.

I am &c  
T. Hyde Villiers.

## 21. BOARD OF CONTROL'S PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO RAJPOOTANA DRAFTS 1829-30 (Extract)

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IOR: L/PS/2/46 : Rajpootana : Drafts and Pre-Coms: 1829-30 : Pol & Foreign : (withdrawn) : The above is all in red ink.

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141/m. We can find no excuse for the extravagant expenditure which Captain Tod allowed to take place in the personal establishment of the Rana, an expenditure which is represented to have increased (p 79) from 1000 rupees a month, at which it stood which the Rana subsisted upon the bounty of Zalim Sing, to 1000 rupees a day, when its means must have been partly furnished by loans made under our guarantee, and by sums which should have been appropriated under the treaty, to the payment of our tribute. Had the amount of the arrears of our tribute been remitted to the ryot, we would have understood the reasons of such indulgence; but we cannot understand on what ground the Rana was permitted to consume in extravagance what really belonged to us.

141/n In the course of four years, the revenue of the Rana seems to have stood as follows:

|         |               |
|---------|---------------|
| 1818-19 | Rs. 4,51,281  |
| 1819-20 | Rs. 6,59,100  |
| 1820-21 | Rs. 10,18,478 |
| 1821-22 | Rs. 9,36,640  |

(p.80)

Yet not a rupee of our tribute amounting to 7,90,747 was realized and two debts from the Rana to us, the first amounting to 87,042 for money advanced in 1818 and the other to 32,085 for arrears of pay advanced to the garrison of Komulmain (?), equally remained unpaid, so that by the departure of Captain Tod the total debt of the Rana to the British Government was Rs 9,09,875.

141/o. It is a matter of much surprise to us that the non-payment of the sums due to us by treaty did not excite your attention, and lead to enquiry on your part as to the cause of such a circumstance, which must have seemed the more remarkable as Captain Tod's accounts stated the great improvement of the territory under his advice and management. (pp 81)

152/a. We entirely approve of your having declined taking any fixed tribute, in lieu of the tribute varying according to the amount of revenue by the terms of the treaty.

152/b. It is desirable that the protected Government and ourselves should have a common interest in the increase of the revenue, for that increase can only be permanent when it arises from the increased prosperity of the country.

152/c. That the condition of the country was improved and that Captain Tod acquired (p 82) the love and gratitude of the people of Meywar we have the unsuspected testimony of Bishop Heber who passed through Rajpootana in 1825 and Captain Cobbe frankly admits the same fact in his letter of the 15th September 1823 in these terms: "It will be satisfactory to Government as it is honourable to Captain Tod, that our connection with Meywar is regarded by all the middling and lower classes of inhabitants as the greatest blessing heaven could have bestowed."

152/d. We shall now advert to your proceedings in respect to the hill districts.(end of additions on p 82)

## **22. COURT'S PROPOSED PARAS IN RAJPOOTANA DRAFTS (withdrawn) 1829-30 (Extract)**

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IOR: L/PS/2/46:Note: Paras 154 and 155 are after initially omitting them later restored by the Board in the final shape of the draft. A marginal not says "Restored see para 123 c 5.". These are on pages 134-5.

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152. In the above proceedings there are some points which demand more detailed observations.

153. First with regard to the revenue and tribute.

154. Captain Tod concluded a quinquennial settlement for the Khalsa lands of Meywar on a jumma increasing progressively from Rs. 6,42,500 the first year to Rs 12,27,602 in the fifth and stated the annual aggregate of the Sayer (p 82) duties at Rs. 2,22,800.

155. He at the same time sent up a detailed statement of the produce of all the pergunnahs in Meywar in the Sumbut year 1820 or AD 1764 , amounting to Rs 70,64,497 viz 61,46,214 Jageer and Khalsa, and 7,14,175 Sasanie or charity land with an abstract of all lands antecedently or subsequently alienated, viz.

|                         |    |           |
|-------------------------|----|-----------|
| Under Scindiah          | Rs | 6,84,050  |
| Under Holkar            |    | 19,43,485 |
| Under Marwar            |    | 4,01,120  |
| Under a chief in Ajmore |    | 56,100    |
|                         |    | -----     |
|                         |    | 30,84,755 |

The total of lands now (p. 83) remaining under the Rana's Government beings:

|                            |            |
|----------------------------|------------|
| Sasanie or charitable land | 6,25,000   |
| Khalsa                     | 12,00,000  |
| Jageer                     | 21,54,752  |
|                            | -----      |
|                            | 39,79,742  |
|                            | 70,64,497. |

156. To have made this statement of any avail for the purposes of comparison he should have stated the Jaghire and Khalsa separately throughtout especially in the statement of 1764. We cannot imagine any reason for his not having done so but his knowledge that such a comparison would have shewn that his successor has so strongly asserted that (p 84) he had sacrificed the Rana's interests to those of the Thakoors.

Memo (at Board) on para 156 (between pp. 82-3)

The inference with the court draw at the conclusion of this paragraph is not a necessary consequence of the premises because Captain Tod might not have been in possession of the materials by which to distinguish the Jageer and Khalsa separately at so remote a period at



1764, while he could have no difficulty in making such distinction as to the time at which he was writing, and because the insinuation against Captain Tod of having unduly favored the native chiefs does not appear to be well founded (see paragraph 106 of the introductory memo and the proposed alteration of para 141 in which the subject is adverted to).

It is suggested that the latter part of paragraph 156 be omitted, and the former part of the paragraph be altered as pencilled.

### 23. AFFAIRS OF UDAIPUR

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Differences in approach between Court and Board in 1830. (as indicated Rajpootana Withdrawn Political Draft papers, Drafts 145 to 149 of 1829-30, Precom No 507, in Drafts and Precoms 1829-30 vol 2 & 3. The final letters ending in the withdrawal are from Boards: 21.5.1831, to Board : 4.8.1831, agreement of Board to withdraw: 9.8.1831.)

The treaty with Meywar was signed by Metcalfe at Delhi on 13.1.1818. The terms stipulated a tribute of 1/4 of the state revenue during the first five years and 3/8 of revenue afterwards to be paid by the state annually to the British Government. The state also undertook to provide troops according to its means.

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#### Proposed para by Court

146. The condition of the people does not appear to have been in any respect better than that of the Rana. They appear on the contrary to have suffered, in an aggravated degree, every evil which the most frightful mis-government can inflict.

#### Note on above by W. Cabbell, in the Board's Secret & Pol Dept.

The statement in para 146 that the condition of the people in Meywar is not improved, is opposed to the testimony of Bishop Heber and of Captain Cobbe, (see the quotations in paras 87 and 108 of the introductory memo) and does not appear to be supported by any of the documents contained in the proceedings under review.<sup>17</sup>

Secret and Political Department  
10 August 1829.

W.C.

#### Para 176 as proposed by Court.

176. Captain Cobbe says (15 September 1823), that on comparing the state of Meywar on his arrival with Captain Tod's reports he was reduced to the painful alternatives of either supposing that officer either very much misled by his sanguine disposition and his partiality for the work of his own hands, or of giving his successor the officiating agent (Captain

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<sup>17</sup> Note: Since this was written, the passage, to which the Court probably refer, has been discovered, and it will be found at the end of the quotation from Captain Cobb in para 176; It is to be observed however in reference to this passage that Captain Cobb is depicting the oppression to the officers, which compared with what they formerly endured from Mahrattas and other plunderers, he describes as a comparative blessing. (see the quotation in para 146 ought not to be allowed to stand as it is liable to be misunderstood that a para should be inserted to the effected suggested after para 176.

Waugh) credit for more mismanagement than is easily credible. "In one respect" he adds "Captain Todd was undoubtedly in error, I allude to his supposition that the influx of settlers would annually keep pace with or exceed, that of the first year, whereas, those who entered Meywar in that years were the natives of the country, who during the troubles which agitated the province, had sought refuge in Jodhpoor, Ajmere, and the neighbouring states; they gladly returned to their native spots when assured of the protection which a connection with the British government always ensures. The influx was consequently very great the first year, but has gradually diminished and is now reduced to a mere trifle. The soil of Meywar is of proverbial fecundity, and inhabitants alone are wanting to make it probably the most productive in India; but it is vain to hope for settlers in any considerable number until there be some security for life and property. The government is a tissue of cheating and oppression, and its influence and example are evident in the demoralisation of all classes. From the prince to the peasant all are thieves and robbers; there is not even an appearance of law or justice.

Note by W. Cabbell (accepted by Board in final Draft)

It is proposed to insert the following after para 176.

We observe however that in his private letter of the 18th September 1823 Captain Cobbe has remarked as follows: "It will be satisfactory to government, as it is honourable to Captain Todd, that our connection with Meywar is regarded by all the middling and lower classes of inhabitants as the greatest blessing heaven could have bestowed." We are somewhat at a loss to reconcile these two apparently contradictory statements made as they were about the same time, but we infer from the two that notwithstanding the oppression to which the people are still exposed to Marhatta and other plunderers.

Further quotations in Court's Draft

Captain Cobb in para 178 ....It would be to deceive Government most grossly were I to talk of non-interference. I have been obliged to interfere in everything or more properly speaking to carry on every part of the government myself, and without it the country would be a desert. (20.2.1825)

Captain Sutherland, acting agent; 12.11.1826. ...The duties here seem to extend to a minute supervision and control over every part of the Rana's administration.

**24. FROM LT COL. J. SUTHERLAND, AGENT GOVERNOR GENERAL FOR  
RAJPOOTANA TO LT. COL T. ROBINSON, POLITICAL AGENT MEYWAR, DATED  
1.10.1846 IN REPLY TO ROBINSON'S LETTER OF 26.9.1846.**

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No. 116536 (vol 2277) 1848-9 ?pertaining to Board's Collections ?? 21.2.1849.

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6. There is no doubt, I fear, that the examples of Oude and Hyderabad to which you refer in the 10th para of your letter, where our interference has been most extensively exercised are the worst governed states in India, but then they are Mahomedan principalities

having of course very different institutions from Rajpoot and other Hindoo principalities; to these you might perhaps have added Bhopaul and Tonk, the other two Mahomedan states. Yet at Hyderabad when Lord Metcalfe was resident there, and when our interference was extended to a degree before unknown and which latterly unfortunately has ceased, vast improvements were effected through the simple process of establishing British Superintendents throughout the provinces, and entrusting to them the duty of forming and superintending village revenue settlements which lasted for ten years. In Rajpootana in the same manner we were too long in taking a direct share in the administration of Jeypoor, since that was done in 1839 and our political agent has been head of the council of Regency, the state has been relieved from a debt of 70 lakhs of rupees, and on the anniversary of the Maharaja's 14th birthday in last month, only owed one lakh, whilst it had a surplus of income over expenditure of 3 lakh per anum. In the same manner there can be no doubt I suppose we have conferred immense benefit on Marwar by taking a share in the administration of the principality in 1840.

## 25. AFFAIRS OF ODEYPORE

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Political Despatch to India; dated Feb 21, 1849, paras 27-30. In all 91 paras from page 539-616

Note: This material is not compared with the original.

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27. Lt Col Bobinson in his letter of 26.9.1846 to Lt Col Sutherland .... thinks that the native rulers, of whom he has given so unfavourable a representation, "must be better qualified than strangers to judge the best mode of administering their own affairs", and he points to Oude and Hyderabad as the states "in which our interference has been greatest, and the observance of our advice most pertinaciously insisted upon" and in which the effects were "an increase of the ends which we sought to remedy."

28. It shows a very slender acquaintance with Indian history to represent Oude and Hyderabad as cases in which evils have been produced by giving advice on the general administration of the government and insisting on attention to that advice. On the contrary the short periods during which in those states any degree of attention to advice of that nature has been insisted on, have been almost the only interval during which the evils has been mitigated.

## VII. MAHRATTAS

### 1. WARREN HASTINGS CORRESPONDENCE ON THE MAHRATTAS

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Warren Hastings Original correspondence (British Lib. ADD MS 29132 -)

ADD MS 29132 (1758-1771) (ff 486)

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*Scrafton to W. Hastings 21.4.1759:*

(ff90) In consequence of your letter mentioning the Nabob acknowledging that the Marattas were coming in at his request the Col. has wrote a most severe letter to the Nabob wherein among other pretty expressions he tells him he will bring on his head the wrath of God and curses of his subjects. There is too much reason to suspect that he intended them as a check to us, for they could never have arrived so as to have been of any service against the Shahzada. If so I know not which to admire most, his folly or his treachery. If he cannot prevent their coming on, I fear he will be involved in irrecoverable distress.

*Warren Hastings to John Purling, 22.3.1772, ff 5-10*

I shall not fail for my own sake to pay an unlimited submission to the company's orders (ff 6r) where it is in my power and where their interests and possessions shall not be immediately endangered by the execution of them... **I may promise that no move will be made while he is in the hands of the Marhattas, nor if I can prevent it, ever more. Strange!, that while the revenue of the province is insufficient for its expenses and for the claim of the company and our mother country, the wealth of the province (which is its blood) should be drained to supply the pagentry of a mock king, an idol of our own creation ! But how much more astonishing that we should still pay him (9v) the same dangerous homage while he is a tool of the only enemies whom we have in India, and who wants but such aids to prosecute their designs even to our ruin.**

*ADD MS 29143 (12), Feb-July 1779, ff 512:*

*Goddard to Gov. Genl. and Council, 28.5.1779, ff 288-91:*

"With these principles of disunion subsisting among the Mahrattas, a more promising occasion than the present cannot offer itself for interfering in their affairs, and though a plan of conquest so extensive as the settling their government, or disposing of the chief authority in it, might not, after the opportunity lately lost, be considered as political or consistent to the company's interests, I am assured that the appearance of hostilities on our side, will obtain a compliance from them of any demands you may think it necessary to make, either of territory or money to reimburse the expenses of your armies, upon the claim established by the treaty of the Bombay government with Ragonat Row, or upon any other you may choose to count, (ff 289v) on their former breach of faith, and the hostile conduct of their subjects on my march.

"It is necessary that I now say something of the province of Gujarat, point it out as a most valuable and tempting acquisition to the company in this side of India. It is unnecessary to trouble (ff 290r) you with an account of its revenues and riches, as these must be well known to you. What I mean to explain is the ease with which a conquest might be made out of it, and the obvious advantages will strike you themselves.

"From these circumstances just mentioned and other observations I have been able to make, I am persuaded that the appearance of arms, without any actual exertion of their force, could be sufficient to bring this province into the subjection of the company; (ff 290v) but should it

be found otherwise, it is so situated for the convenience of supplies and communication by water that it might with ease be wrested the present possession and maintained against him, [even if] the whole force of the Mahratta empire was joined to his support".

*Sir Eyre Coote to Warren Hastings, Ghyretty, 27.6.1779, ff 414-15:*

"I am pleased with Goddard's letter to the Board, though I think I had detected him in a small slip which is the only one, that I could perceive in any of his public letters; I do not approve his saying anything of seizing the Gujarat country. These matters should be kept out of public letters. I join entirely with him in opinion that the situation of affairs in the Mahratta government requires their making peace with us, upon the terms that we shall dictate to them."

*ADD MS 29144 (13) Aug 1779 - Mar 1780, ff 473:*

*Warren Hastings to L. Sullivan, 22.8.1779, ff 35-40:*

"You will know that Ragunaut Row made his escape from the people who had the charge of his person, and taken refuge in our camp which I consider a fortunate circumstance, if a proper advantage be made of it. I have honestly and fairly joined in the cry for peace, and in framing the orders which tend to it, but in my heart I dread its accomplishment, knowing that nothing but war can retrieve the fatal effects of the late miscarriage (ff 38r) and that peace can only be a delusion."

"It would (ff 38v) not be difficult to excite a combination of all the ancient and independent Hindu states against the Mahrattas, and to engage the immediate junction with Cap. Popham; but in the present state of this government and especially of my own prospects, I dare not venture on such a measure."

**"The world is ever misled by names. Be assured, my friend, that the Mahrattas are a contemptible enemy as any that we have yet ever had opposed to us. Our danger awaits us only from within. Let the powers which the British Nation possesses in India be properly combined, and placed in steady hands; they are capable of subjecting all India, and with ease, to the British yoke. Do not misunderstand me. I do not wish to attempt it. The conquest would be easy, but I believe it would but ? accelerate our ruin from causes (ff39r) it is not necessary to detail. I speak only of what we are capable.** Two members of our board labour incessantly to confine the army under Gen. Goddard to inaction. I have been as jealous in the opposite extreme, and have used every persuasion which I have thought likely to prevail upon Mr. Hornby ? and Gen. Goddard to act in concert for their mutual credit, and the public service. The plan of operation which was projected by Mr. Hornby in March last is practicable without any alliance, and I am sorry that it was not then carried into execution."

*W.Palmer, Lucknow, 17-19.2.1780, ff 362-365:*

Meeting with Gen. Coote: "He admitted the necessity of creating a diversion on this side to facilitate the operation of Gen. Goddard on the other, but seemed to doubt the practicability of uniting the several chiefs in such a confederacy as would be necessary for that purpose. His idea on the subject is to move the company's troops across the Jamuna and if that could be done with safety to these provinces, it would be probably more effectual than any other measure to bring the Hindu princes into your plan."

*Goddard to Warren Hastings, ff 382-3:*

"My success in the reduction of Ahmedabad".

*Warren Hastings to Goddard, 24.3.1780, ff 458- :  
(Mahrattas-Rajasthan)*

Cypher over draft: "I omit Ragoba totally for I consider him as no longer in question, plainly seeing that we cannot receive him into a participation with us without drawing upon ourselves the enmity of all the other chiefs and states in India. Allow him protection for the present, a provision and an asylum in future. These are his rights! Four choices in relation to Mahrattas ... ff (461v) Palmer is also with him and has been directed by me to write and explain all his views fully to you. **I expect no great advantages immediately from the present treaty except that it may produce overtures from the Rajahs of Jayanagar, Oodeypour, and Joudpour. These countries form a continued chain from the Jamuna to Gujarat. The Rajahs are anxious to throw off their present subjection and become our tributaries. Our (462r) armies in future may not be commanded with so much ability or may fail in an attempt to force their march over India. If my plan succeeds we obtain a safe communication, and distract the attention of the Mahratta chiefs, we raise up enemies amongst them and their own neighbourhood, and carry the war to a distance from our own territories. Let me have your sentiments fully on every part of this letter.**"

*Warren Hastings to Gen. Goddard, Calcutta, 24.3.1780, ff 458-467:  
Mostly in cypher. All underlined cypher.*

"I have received your letters in their order duplicates excepted, to the 29th January. Hitherto I am perfectly satisfied.

2212 71 41.22 11515 25.41.80.71.25.89.40ed

but what is to be done hereafter.

4762 4.48 6756 617981109

And what our ultimate object? this will require our consideration in the interval between this and the next season, and upon this I must now request you your advice for I am not yet competent to give instructions.

I conclude that you will retain possession of your acquisitions without an attempt of the enemy to recover them during the remainder of the fair season. The rains will exclude all possibility of disturbance. I regard therefore the possession of what you have and what you may add to it as certain till the next (ff 458v) Dusserah. This will afford time to concert our future plans and these must be the result of your information and advice in answer to this. The following are the different plans which present themselves to me. First peace on the following terms: a confirmation of your acquisition, Fateh Singh's independency, and the Rana of Gohid's guaranteed, a provision and asylum for Ragoba but not in our territories, an exclusion of the French, and an indemnification for the charges of the war, by a sum in hand or an equivalent at our certain command. Second, peace with a surrender of a part of our acquisition (ff 459r) for an equivalent, and the other terms as in the preceding. Thirdly, you admit Moodajee into the plan offered to him. Fourthly, to prosecute the war as principals as we have begun.

Nothing else occurs to me practicable. I omit Ragoba... the two first of these plans (ff 459v) Moodajee and his dewan are very solicitors to be guarantees. If no better issue can be accomplished, and either of these can, I shall be glad of it. It is a matter of little moment in your present situation, whether the Mahrattas sue for peace or you at the head of a victorious army, offer it.

If peace cannot be obtained, upon the terms I have mentioned, and the third design can be effected, let us choose that. I would myself adopt it in preference to the other two, could I

conquer the prejudices (ff 406r) I should have to encounter at home, and was I to act entirely for myself.

The fourth remains as the last resort. We have no other choice, if the Mahrattas or Moodajee will not treat with us, and in the prosecution of this I have many reliances, could I command with certainty the vast resources of this government. The Board has concluded a treaty with the Rana of Gohid. Cap. Popham with his detachment has joined the Rana. (ff 461v) Palmer is also ... (463 v) this letter. There will be time enough for me to receive and return and answer to your letter before the season for action, when the present campaign is closed. I will take care to send you the opinion, with the fullest and final instructions of the board.

I have received pressing letters from Moodajee and his dewan. They are in substance that they are pressed (ff464r) by Nana and Nizam Ali to join them against us and threatened if they do not. And they are bound to the minister by treaty which they cannot break first. They have entertained 20,000 new horse and will employ them the ensuing four months in reducing Mudila (?) and other refractory zamindars. The next season they will be ready for whatever service may be required for them (ff 465v). In the meantime they prefer peace or to know the alternative I have to offer them with mysterious allusions to our original project which Beiram Pundit assures me they will be glad even now to engage him provided that they are certain of the exclusion of Ragoba.

I can say no more yet. Let me again entreat you to give me your sentiments fully on them you shall have full and (ff 466 r) decided instructions. In the meantime go on with the war. Unite if you can all the sea coast from the Mahe to Bombay. Again let me entreat you for God's sake to attend to your expenses, and to the means of defraying them, for we are no longer able to supply you (ff 467v) letter to Gen. Goddard, dated Calcutta.

*William Palmer, Gohid, to Warren Hastings, 20.3.1780, ff 431-32:  
(Mahratta-Gohid)*

My dear sir,

I arrived here three days ago...(the Rana) marched instantly towards Gwalior, Umbajee decamped with the greatest precipitation leaving his family and effects in the fort. The Rana has driven them entirely out of his country and across the river Saind, on the banks of which (on this side) he is now watching their motions...(ff 431v) ... His implacable hatred of the Mahrattas and desire of revenge makes him at present overlook every other object but the gratification of those passions and he is impatient to attack them in any situation. You may safely rely on his cooperating heartily with our troops in every measure to distress the enemy as far as his ability will admit, but he has large army in proportion to his income and his troops are very clamourous for pay. **Besides this untoward circumstance, his family confidants and subjects are totally averse to any connection with the English and would rather be destroyed by the Mahrattas than preserved by us. Nothing less than the invincible permanence of the mind which the Rana possesses could withstand such universal prejudice and importunity and I hope that his fortitude and the good conduct of our officers and soldiers will soon remove them. There is not a chief in Hindustan so well qualified by personal abilities to promote your views of circumscribing the power of the Mahrattas and aggrandising the company and the nation. His (ff 432 r), courage, his ardent and enterprising and full of strategies, his humanity and justice universally acknowledged, and his generosity unbounded at this time, he supports the families of Meer Cassim, Gahzodeen Cawn, Murtza Cawn, brother to the late Nabob of Furukabad and several others of note which have fallen into distress. Although his finances but very ill admit of it.**

**Tenfrizul Hussain Cawn and Meer Muzzer Aly are come to me from camp. The former has been indefatigable in the business which you desired him to prepare against my arrival and successful beyond expectation. He has received answers from almost every independent rajah whose territories are on, in the neighbourhood of the great road from Kalpy, Gohid &c. to Gujarat and all express strong desire to promote your views by every assistance they can afford.** I have not the smallest doubt that an interrupted chain of communication and an obstructed passage for troops will be immediately formed from Bengal to the Mahratta dominions on all sides. I am preparing the particular account of all these rajahs, the situation, extent and revenues of their country for your information. **Those of Oodeypour and Joudpoor have not yet sent answers, which is indeed both the distance and obstructions in the way would hardly admit of being received, but there is little doubt of their being favourable. In a word, if your plans are well executed by those persons to whom they are entrusted, the Mahrattas are at your feet.**

*Palmer to Warren Hastings, camp, 27.3.1780, ff 442-3:  
(Mahratta-Gohid)*

"He (the Rana) has desired me ... to assure you that at all times he be ready to sacrifice, his country and his life to your views and the service of the company. His country by the observation of all our gentlemen, is a very fine one and capable of producing a very considerable revenue, if it enjoys tranquility and security."

*Palmer to Warren Hastings, Gampat Giley(?), 20 miles east of Gohid, 31.3.1780, ff 470-71:  
(Mahratta-Gohid)*

We can obtain possession of any of the Mahratta districts here without battery cannon, the country being covered with force, many of which will require regular approaches, and **if you do not make some permanent conquest or obtain some decisive advantage, you will lose the assistance which is now offered you by every Rajah between this and the Narmada.**

*W. Palmer to Warren Hastings, 16.4.1780, ff 29-30:  
(Mahrattas-Gohid)*

Last night, Cap. Pophon determined to attempt surprising them... great numbers were killed, atleast 500 of the horses were taken and a great quantity of their arms. **I am exceedingly out of humour with the Rana, who came up with his horse in time to have destroyed this body of Marhattas entirely, and yet could not be prevailed on to charge them, broken and dispirited as they were. On this occasion, I cannot avoid making one reflection that whatever alliances we make with the country powers we must fight our own battles. Thus it has been from Mohammad Aly Cawn to the Rana of Gohid as far as has come within my observation.**

*William Popham to Gov. Gen in Council, Fort Lahour, 16.4.1780, ff 31-34:  
(Mahrattas-Gohid)*

"He (Rana) looks to trifling present advantages, without adverting to the consequences of obtaining them, at the risk of quitting grandeur, through most distant objects. I cannot find that (32r) he has any fixed system or plan of conduct; he therefore frequently wishes to know what line you would have in pursuit.

"There are two points... first, how am I to act should the Ranah not be able to pay me regularly every month, as stipulated by the treaty? Secondly, what am I to do respecting the conquered countries.



*William Palmer to Warren Hastings, Lahiar, 20.4.1780, ff 41-45:  
(Mahrattas-Gohid)*

**It is not easy to discover the true cause of a conduct so prejudiced to his interest and derogatory to his character, though many may be assigned it is probably systematically intended to answer the double purpose of rendering both the enemy and us less formidable to him. Perhaps his inability to pay his troops makes them disobedient and refractory, or he may not have any confidence in their courage or attachment. Whatever may be the real motive, if he would but fairly avow it some expedient might be devised, to obviate the ill consequences which must ensue from a continuance in the state of inactivity. But he is so far from mentioning impediments to any proposition at the time it is made, that he acquiesces in it until the time of execution arises when he constantly finds some pretext to evade it... in a word not the smallest dependency can be placed on assistance from him in any military operation, and I see no better prospect of any pecuniary aid. For I am persuaded he is wholly unable to pay the subsidy since he is now borrowing money of Cap. Popham and has applied to me for a loan of few thousand rupees, which I have not to lend him, but if I was certain it would be applied towards advancing our operations, I would venture to give a draft on you for 20 or 30 thousand rupees.**

A difficulty has arisen concerning the adjustment of the subsidy. By the treaty the Rana is to pay at the rate of 20,000 rupees per month for every battallion of sepoy with his proportion of artillery on our present (ff 43 r) establishment. A detachment now in his service, though forming four battallions upwards of 1,000 men short of the strength of our fixed corps. whilst the expense of it including staff, artillery men and a squadron of horse exceeds the amount of subsidy for four battallions by some thousand rupees monthly. The Rana thinks it cannot be required of him to pay for troops which he neither demanded nor has occasion for ... (ff 44r)

I have not been able to advance a step beyond what I informed you of in the negotiations which you charged me with. **I have not yet heard from Oodeypour or Joudpoor.** I have advised the inferior rajahs and zemindars who are desirous of acting against the common enemy, to remain quiet until we are in a condition to act in concert with them, or at least to protect them from the vengeance of the Mahrattas if their inclination should be prematurely discovered.

A Vakeel is arrived at Gohid from Jayanagar with a letter for me, but as you have not yet sent me your instructions respecting that rajah, I (ff 44 v) cannot give any satisfactory answer to their demands whatever they may be... (ff 45r) I am sorry that the account I had given of the Rana's conduct does not correspond with that I gave you of his character, but such is the difference between what I have heard and what I have seen, yet both may be true and his behaviour (arises) from an imbecility - which he is afraid to confess.

*William Palmer to Warren Hastings, 28.4.1780, ff 57-8:  
(Mahrattas-Gohid)*

"Storming of fort of Lahiar"

*William Palmer, Lahiar, 11.5.1780, ff 87-88:  
(Mahrattas-Rajpootana)*

"Gen. Goddard (in letter of 12.4) expressing great hopes of very beneficial effects of his operation, if my negotiations with the Rajpoot chiefs should prove successful.

I have yet received no letter from Oodeypour. Jaipur is in danger of being overrun by Pratap Sing the Rau of Mutchary, who has routed the Rajah's forces under the command of Shaik Efaun and taken their artillery and baggage. Shaik Efaun was killed in the action.

*W. Palmer, Lahiar to Warren Hastings, 14.5.1780, ff 93-94:*

*(Rajpootana)*

"I have not yet received any letter from Oodeypour. I learn that the Rajah of Joudpoor has threatened the Row of Mutchary with his resentment if he does not desist from all further hostilities against the Rajah of Jaipur. I do not know what effect the menace will produce, but it might promote your views with the former to afford some kind of protection to the latter.

*W. Palmer to Warren Hastings, Gohid, 24.5.1780, ff 120-127:*

*(Mahrattas-Rajpootana)*

Plans of action, replies to criticism: "I am at a loss to account for the total silence of the rajah of Oodeypour and the slow and cautious advances of the rajah of Joudpoor. Their conduct will I suppose considerably influence that of the petty rajahs of their tribes and indeed then alliances would be but little useful without the power and authority of the great chiefs. I doubt not however that these will engage whenever they shall see you determined to persecute the war against the Mahrattas with vigour and effect. I hope that Gen. Goddard's successes and the correspondences which I have requested him to open with the rajah of Joudpoor (by a letter which I sent for him to the rajah) will expedite this event." Separate correspondence by Gen. Coote with Joudpoor, etc. detrimental.

*W. Palmer, Gohid, to Warren Hastings, 10.6.1780, ff 165-170:*

*(Mahrattas-Rajpootana)*

"I am a loss to account for the conduct of Rajah of Jaipur, or rather that of his servants. No vakeel has yet come from him nor propositions of any kind, since I first wrote you of his request, although his affairs seem to be in a deplorable situation... (ff 167v) ... I suspect that the rajah is betrayed by his servants to Nadjuff Cawn, it is not otherwise easy to account for their neglect towards you at such critical circumstances and after the advances they had made, unless it may be imputed their secret influences which there is too much reason to believe is employed to counteract your designs in favour of the Rajpoot princes.

I apprehend that it is now too late to afford the Rajah of Jaipur any support...(ff168 v) ...**Cap. Popham did forbid the killing of cows, but as it was difficult to procure other meat, the order has been sometimes infringed by the troops not by the officers. The Rana told me that he did not expect a rigid observance of the prohibition and his motive for requiring it appeared to me, rather as intended to give him credit with his tribe, than to obey religious injunction. I have however always (ff 169 r) taken care to prevent offence in this or any other custom, religious or local, amongst my own people** ... I have little reason to hope for success (ff 169v) in your commission whilst he (Gen. Coote) remained up the country. I know that he has written to the rajah of Joudpoor and not through the official channel of his Persian interpreter. He has a news writer in our camp some of whose intelligence has been communicated to me."

*Goddard to Palmer, Surat, 1.7.1780, ff 280-281:*

Pleads for diversion in the North.

*W. Palmer, Futturgurh to Warren Hastings, 1.8.1780, ff 330-333:*

*(Mahrattas-Gohid)*

About overtures from and against India: "a body of them (troops of the Rana) at Gohid have lately extorted from him by force an advance of 12 annas per man towards their arrears of pay. I understand that they seized the person or Lt. J. Scott who was at Gohid and obliged him to become security against the interference (ff 333v) of our detachment to quell or to punish the mutiny. This single transaction will give you a clear insight of the Rana's situation."

*W. Palmer, Futtygurh, to Warren Hastings, 8.8.1780, ff 357:*  
News of capture of Gwalior.

*John Holland, Hyderabad, to Warren Hastings, 12.8.1780, ff 365-370:*  
Nizam's reason for supporting Poona.

*Warren Hastings to W. Palmer, 24.5.1780, ff 107v-117:*  
*(Mahrattas- Rajpootana)*

On Goddard and Popham achievements, etc.: "I will give you my sentiments concerning the rajah of Jayapore when I receive your report of your proposition which he was to send you. The vakeel has delivered none nor appears to have had any commission but that of intelligence and he is unfit for any thing but ... Banyanish intrigues. If you have any assurances of the steady and fixed system of government in Jaypore and that our engagements with the Rajah will not entangle us in quarrels with Nadjif Cawn, encourage the expectation of such an alliance. It is as we observe a necessary link in our chain."

"But my greatest reliance is on the rajah of Joudpoor. Labour to accomplish this point and go to him if he desires it. In any event the visit will be useful. It will add to our political knowledge and extend our future resources if it produces no immediate or substantial advantages.

"I lay before the Board your private instructions, and require the sanction for your prosecuting them, if the actual members (ff 110r) make no objection.

**"One of his request is that no cows may be killed in his country. I am sorry that this delicacy was not observed before it was suggested.**

*Warren Hastings to Major Carnac, 13.7.1780, ff 113v -120 r:*  
To proceed against Mahrattas westward of Gohid.

*Warren Hastings to Sir Eyre Coote, 21.1.1779, ff 73-82:*

"The sovereignty of the Mahratta state is by its constitution vested in a rajah, but for many (ff 78r) years past, that is since the accession of the late rajah, the powers of it have been usurped by the minister of the rajah who is tied with the Peshwah, the rajah possessing only the name. The last rajah was called rajah RamRajah. He died about latter end of Dec. 1777. He had no children, nor I have yet heard certainly that any successor has been named. Moodajee Boosla has a fairest pretension, being in the direct lineal descent from the ancient stock, and the adopted son of Sahoo Rajah, the predecessor of Ram Rajah, though deprived of his rights by the artificers of Balajee who was the peshwah when Sahoo Rajah died, and by an accommodation with Ragojee Boosla, the father of Moodajee, which was confined to a bare sufferance of Ram Rajah's elevation, without any acknowledgement of it, he and his sons, as Moodajee does to this day, styling themselves (ff 78v) in all public acts of Rajah Sahoo.

I had an early knowledge of Moodajee's pretensions, and judge him therefore a fit instrument to supply the place of Ragonaut Row, in the plan offered to us by the Presidency of Bombay. he had wealth, power, a territory extending from the borders of Bengal almost to Poona; Ragonaut Row neither wealth, power, nor territory, nor an influence remaining which could supply the wants of these requisites except what might eventually arise from an active part taken by the presidency of Bombay in his favour, and they had plainly shown that they would take none. The only point wanting was to fix Moodajee in a party in the design. I expected him to make advances having sent back his vakeel to him for that purpose, a man of understanding and well instructed. But it soon became necessary to take a more determined and active part. On the seventh of July, advices were received from (ff 79r) Cairo and deemed to be of certain credit that war had been declared between Great Britain and France. It was almost immediately proposed and resolved to enter into negotiations with Moodajee Boosla on the grounds which I have mentioned above. Mr. Elliott was deputed on this service and set out on the ...July. Mr. Rumbold has a copy of his instructions, and I have desired him to give you the perusal of that. The whole service could not have furnished an agent equally qualified for such a commission, and my hopes of its success were proportionately raised; but these were suddenly blasted, and the whole project annihilated by the death of that excellant young man.

I must now return to Col. Leslie. The distance from Calpy to the River Narmada is about 140 coss... (ff 79v) his death which happened on the 3rd October ... in time (after) of exactly 4 months from the day from which he began his march from that place.

*Gen. Goddard to Warren Hastings, 1.1.1780, ff 234-5, ff 236-37, ff 238-39 (in cypher):*

Seeks instructions how to operate whether the future is friendship or enmity with Futtey Sing, dividing of Gujarat, etc.

*Gen. Goddard, Pitlad, to Warren Hastings, 4.3.1780, ff 406-407:*

**"Permit me to declare to you that the prices of labour and of all kinds of provisions on this side of India, bear so little proportion to what has ever been known on the other, that it has been my principal study and employment to remove the almost inseparable difficulties which this difference occasions ... the proposed allowance of ten rupess for feeding each bullock is exceedingly moderate."**

*Bengal to Gen. Goddard, 29.11.1779:*

Disapprove of "so large an allowance as 50,000 rupees a month to Ragoba or indeed any allowance ... If Ragoba's influence is so far sunk that he cannot procure for himself the necessaries, we cannot consent to supply him with the superfluities of life, nor can we see how the company's affairs will be benefitted by an intimate connection with a man from whose influence no advantages can be derived."

*Sir. G. Farmer to Mr. Th. Holmes, Bombay, Poonah, 22.10.1777, ff 238-243:*

"Now it seems to me improbable that this Marhatta ... should all at once [turn] Quixote in the cause of his beloved master at the hazard of that security he has so long enjoyed and at the expense of a Brahmins heart's blood, I mean his treasures, which must be partly expended in the cause of Ragoba if he means to take it up in an active manner ... If therefore Morabah is the wise man they report him to be he will do as he has always done, eat his kitcheree, sit still, save his money, and continue on terms with both parties, till he sees the fit hour (that their dissensions may bring forth), to fall into the charge of affairs without danger, expense or exertion."

"I believe both the Nizam and Hyder see the Marhattas in the true light ... They are nests of hornets whose hive leaves no honey. The wisest course to be taken with them is to leave them in disturbance at home and by no means tempt them to a junction which may carry their stings abroad."

*T. Holmes to W.G. Palmer, 9.11.1777, ff 274-75:*

"I have always considered the parting with money as a certain token of the earnestness of a Jentoo, and therefore endeavoured at all times to discover if any of Rajoo's (?) partizans had given such a proof of being in earnest. I never could (ff 274v) discover in any this certain signal and have always doubted the sincereity of his good friends... Accidents to leading men are too (ff 275r) likely to happen in such a government as that of the Mahrattas".

*Warren Hastings to Col. Leslie, Fort William, 7.3.1778, ff 164-175:*

"My dear Col, this letter is confidential. I desired that no eye may see it but your own."  
**Then on Mahratta affairs.** "These are the causes which have urged me to propose an expedition from this side of India to strengthen and support our friends in the opposite quarter. The distracted state of the Mahratta government has contributed to this resolution. The two ministers are divided. Their collections embezzled by the most powerful of their own dependents. Thier treasury insufficient for the pay of their standing forces. Their army employed in a war with Hyder, who has lately gained a considerable advantage over them and the seeds of a revolution sown, though yet far from maturing.

"It would be too tedious a detail (ff 166v) to relate the grounds of belief of the last part. I shall mention no more than it is necessary for you to know.

In the beginning of last December, a proposal was made by Mooraba Furneesh, a man of high rank and estimation at Poona to the government of Bombay to join with him, Succa Ram Bobboo, Tuckoojee Hoolkar, and Buckba Poorunder, in a plan for restoring Ragoba to his former influence in the administration. ...

"Now my dear Col, I have a question to put to you, which you (168r) must answer with the confidence and plainness of a friend, not the caution of a man apprehensive only for his own reputation. Is your opinion of the undertaking such as to afford you a strong probability of success or do you think it too desperate to hazard the prosecution of it.

"On your answer to this question, I shall form my subsequent measures, but read what follows before you give it. ...

"I have had the precaution to intimate to Lord North the possibility that the detachment might not proceed so that it will not be unexpected, nor appear the consequence of an ill digested plan, if that should be the event of it."

*Lt. Col. Muir to Warren Hastings, 16.3.1778, ff 191-196:*

Meets Leslie and learns about Mahratta expedition.

*Col. Matthew Leslie, Lucknow, to Warren Hastings, 19.3.1778, ff 214-218:*

Reply on Mahratta expedition. "I have again and again perused you letter confidential. And the more I have done so I am convinced of the necessity of the measure from the greatness of the object and the more I look into the execution of the plan difficulties lessen to my view.

Persist then My dear Sir, to press it forward (ff 218r) and nothing shall be wanting on my part to secure it success."

Goddard to WH, 9.2.1779, ff 41-43:

Supporting Madagee appears at present the most eligible plan for obtaining an influence in the Mahratta states, especially since the assisting Ragunaut Row, will no longer furnish a pretence, I shall continue to press him in my letters to assert that claim to empire, which is offered him by the English ... I am now only about 100 kos distance (from Surat). **On the Gool Nuddy**

*Note on Mahratta Affairs: reflections, 28.4.1779, ff 207-10:*

"Nanah is, it is confidently said one of the most opulent men in the world. 20 crores of rupees he is imagined to be worth. He has one of the strongest places in India to protect it which is called Poonah Durr within 30 miles of Poonah to the eastward. It is a fortified mountain, on which, report says, they grow as much grain as would maintain a garrison of 10,000 men."

*Sam Pechell, to WH, 13.5.1779, ff 234-37:*

Talks with North.: "P.S.: I am surpris'd that your adversaries in the direction have hit but upon the strongest objection that seems to me against the alliance with Berar: that is, if the Raja should ascend the throne of Sattara the whole of Mahratta force will be united in such a manner has to give claw to India. It must be more for the interest of other powers that the Mahratta powers should be divided and the present power in a Peshwah be continued which will be ever subject to the same disputes as now distract that empire. But I doubt not you are providing sufficiently against such an event."

## VIII - AVADH

### Warren Hastings Correspondence on Avadh

*Henry Van Sittart to Warren Hastings, FW 21.4.1762.*

(ff 155-6) The Lucknow Padre advises that Sujah Dowla's army have recrossed the Jamuna, and that they have a design of entering the Patna province. He adds that it is reported there is an agreement between Sujah Dowla and the Nabob (Cossim Aly Cawn) who has invited the other to join him in order to attack the Europeans.

*H. Van Sittart to W. Hastings, 12.5.1762*

(ff 181-82) An information has been laid before the Court of Directors of Col. Caillaud having entered into a design with the Chuta Nabob having the Shahzada assassinated. They are extremely angry and have directed if it be true, that he be dismissed their service. They say they have been informed he signed a paper to that purpose and that such a paper is now in the hands of a Seyd in Bengal. You will have orders from the Board to enquire into this affair and inform them of all that you know or can learn.

*Translation of letter from Nabob (Cossim Aly Cawn) to President (Governor) Received 26.6.1763*

(ff 251-254) Nevertheless you no doubt will know this; that all this destruction and ruin brought upon my affairs are owing to Mr. Hastings, both in what is past and what is to come.

*R. Marriott - Benares, 15-16.8.1765*

(ff 264-275) What think you of my having the Nabob Suja Ul Dowla, Lord Clive, a General, a Col., a Lt. Col. and two Majors all in my house at once, besides Mr. and Mrs. Bolts, my brothers and the suite of my Lord and the General. Suja did not live with us, but in a house of a Rajah closeby.

*W.H. to Major J. Morrison, 12.12.1772, ff 184-85:*

I received your letter in which you informed me that his majesty Shaw Allum, emperor of Indostan has been pleased to honour you with the appointment of his Ambassador to the Court of Great Britain, that he has also given a letter of credence to me, acquainting me with your appointment &c: [Warren Hastings] refuses to meet or allow on any ship.

*Warren Hastings to Mr. N. Middleton, 28.1.1774, ff 258-63:*

Instructions for Oudh

*Warren Hastings to N. Middleton, 1.4.1774, ff 280-81:*

Sends additional instructions with respect to the army engaged on the service of the Vizier.

*Warren Hastings to S. Middleton, 19.8.1774, ff 346-47:*

Reorganisation of Bengal and Bihar: "Jaggernaut Deo has thrown of his allegations to government and established an independency in the hilly countries. The (346v) managers (?), or petty chiefs, by the example had become as troublesome as himself, the poor reiatts at the foot of the hills [go] for plunder, travellers robbed, and our dawks more than once carried and murdered. Brooke was sent to reduce Jaggernaut, ... this he has to all appearances [been] effective, he has destroyed the fortress of *Tooi* which Jaggernaut had made his principal place of strength ... **I shall be obliged to you if you write to me such a letter ... as you will be willing that I should enter on our proceedings.** (Jungle Tarai)

*Warren Hastings to Marriott, 6.4.1770, ff 33v-34r*

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Bengal has been threatened with a formidable junction of all the northern powers with Meer Cossim, the king and Shuja Dowla are said to be parties in it; but when these advices came the scheme was yet in projection and Meer Cossim waiting for his allies on the other side of Agra. This was on Feb. 7 and they had much work to do before June. In short, I look upon the alliance and attempt as a chimera. If it was ever thought on, the lateness of the season would (ff 34 r) prevent its execution this year and so many discorded interests will never hold together till the next. We have most deplorable accounts of the reduced state of the Bengal revenues, the want of specie and the security of provisions in that province.

*Warren Hastings to G. Van Sittart, 1.11.1783, ff 29v-2:*

Assof O'Dowla wants the abilities of Meer Cossim but he possesses a large share of personal bravery, which ought to be respected, though he has no army to sustain an open and declared state of hostility with us.

*From J. Fowke, Bunaras, No. 4, 20.3.1772, ff 80-81:*

The temporary home I now inhabit, Duke Ferdinand would not grudge to make his headquarters so that Gen. Sir Robert Barker need not in my opinion ever find himself put to a shift... I will not pretend to say by what means, for so it is, that Colley Chand (an insolent tyrannical Banian) has arrived to an amazing height of power and keeps the Rajah under the most servile subjection.

*From J. F., Benares, 20.4.1772, ff 125-8: (Largely in cypher)*

**"Suja Dowla: it is true his army is well disciplined, well trained, well provided but it wants the soul of an army, subordination. It will be not worth a cowry when apposed to European or even British seapoys".**

*Warren Hastings's Instructions to N. Middleton, Agent with Vizier, 28.1.1774, ff 276-283:*

"I wish you to study his temper and endeavour to acquire his confidence, by showing every appearance of mystery and intrigue, and by a cautious observance of the forms of civility"... "the vizier having sent me a turband...I desire you will take charge of a hat which I have requested him to accept in return".

*From Nat Middleton, 1.8.1774, ff 69-70:*

"I have, however yet hopes that this idea will vanish as the old ladys resentment cools and to discourage it as much as possible I endeavoured to conciliate the most dreadful notion of sea expeditions and have given such accounts (ff 70r) of the difficulties and inconvenience, which, even men in the vigour of youth, are always exposed to in such undertakings as will I persuade myself work upon her fears." Quarrels between Vizier and his mother for previous five years.

*Nat Middleton, 8.8.1774, ff 96-97:*

On Sannyasis near Baggah intending to cross the Gandack after the rains. "there is not the least dependence to be had on the company's (ff 97r) ryots hearabout; for many of them are of the very same sect; with only this difference that they have left off rowing. But what the sannyasis to enter this district and no military force was to make head against them, the resident sannyasis would join and assist in plundering the country."

*N. Middleton to Warren Hastings, 3.9.1774, ff 161-164:*

On disaffection with British army with Vizier - replied to Warren Hastings query. "A more general and alarming spirit of disaffection vizibly succeed the publication of the honourable board's sentiments upon the appeal (162r) made to them. It has been confidently affirmed



that the judgement of the council in this instance, is erroneous; that no authority whatever can withhold from the troops privileges and prerogatives which the customs and usage of war have established, and which are invariably observed in H.M.'s service and that the laws of England would decree to the troops a proportion of the advantages, whatever they may be which the company may derive from their services in the present expedition."

*L. Maclean, Bareilly to Warren Hastings, 7.10.1774, ff 270:*

(sent to investigate disaffection in British army with Vizier) "by the dint of rupees I procured a sufficient number of bearers to carry me to Sauly (?)... I have never seen a finer country than I have lately passed through, the whole indeed from Benares here, except some abominable jungles, all which might easily be cleared and cultivated, is capable of being formed into a continued garden. If the Nabob can retain his present dominions, few sovereigns, very few indeed, can boast of such a country. But anarchy reigns throughout; much more in his own, than in the conquered provinces; for the ryots, finding the Nabob at 500 miles distance refused to pay their rents even in the neighbourhood of Faizabad. The Foujedars are perpetually marching out with their matchlocks and gone to force payment, but they are as often beaten by the country people as successful. That Lucknow itself has been very lately attacked and the part of it plundered by band of robbers; sixty or seventy of the inhabitants killed in the fray. While this continues, to be the system of policy, how groundless the fears of those who say that there is a danger in rendering the Nabob so powerful".

*Nat Middleton, 16.10.1774, ff 283-84:*

"His Excellency (the Vizier) informed me that he had been required to subscribe to two letters, the drafts whereof had been sent to him by Col. Champion - one was to contain a full declaration that the disputation of Mr. Murray to treat with Fayzula Cawn had been the result of his own voluntary inclination and choice, and the other expressing an entire approbation of Colley Churu in every transaction with him, and acknowledging that it was with his consent and at his own desire that this man has all along been employed between them.

"This is so contrary to the real state of facts, and to the Nabob's declared sentiments, (ff 283v) that he seemed very embarrassed as to the part he was to act. On the one side he probably dreaded the consequences of a refusal, and on the other he finds it difficult to reconcile to himself the idea of subscribing to a falsehood or the disgrace which would result from so palpable and direct a contradiction of his former assertions to myself and others."

*L. Maclean, 26.10.1774, ff 293-5:*

Bareilly Vizier receives camp "may I further take the liberty ... to hint that no power of oratory or argument will ever persuade a soldier that he has not, when victorious, a right to contribution and plunder". "Expects to take two snakes from Benares."

*Warren Hastings to W. Palmer, 2.7.1782, ff 112 -113:*

"You will only hurt yourself and me by staying in a place where you lie at the mercy of men who in the acts of deception are too much for us both. One thing you may tell the Nabob viz that if he will pay off all that he owes to the Company both the regiments stationed at Lucknow, and the residency itself shall if he desires it, and the board to whom I must communicate it must give their concurrence, be withdrawn, and every other of his proposition agreed to. **Do not misunderstand me. I do not say that this shall be done; but that I will propose it, and urge the board to agree to it. I am weary of the reproach of being the instrument of a nation's ruin.**"

*Warren Hastings to Sir Eyre Coote, November 1779, ff 50-56:  
(Avadh-Benares)*

"I am happy that you approve of the plan proposed for the Gohid treaty. In this point at least our political ideas do not differ, for the same objection which you have made to the mode of ascertaining the value of the conquered lands, stuck me as forcibly, and it was the first alteration which I made in it as you would have seen by the copy of the finished treaty.

"At present I know no remedy, as the incapacity of the Nabob of Oud, and the turpitude of which character precludes me from proposing the only one which I could approve, which would be to restore the zamindary (Benares) to the government of Oud. It ought either to be ours wholly, or wholly appertain to its ancient and constitutional sovereign. On its present footing it carries in its bosom the seeds of enmity to both, and if the rajah can find the means of transporting his (ff 53v) influence to England, he will do yet more mischief by exciting the spirit of discord.

*Chas Purling, Lucknow to Warren Hastings, 19.1.1780, ff 256-259:*

"The Nabob complains, and with some reason, that he will not have sufficient for his household expenses if he grants one crore 36 lakhs rupees the amount of our (ff 256v) demands for the present year. I have therefore proposed, that he shall make me up one crore 13 lakhs about equal to last years tuncaws. ... Pay of three brigades to answer".

*N. Middleton to Warren Hastings, ff 338-341:*

"Dispute with Vizier over his insisting on the discontinuation of Zaidad of Aumil of Rohilkhund."

*N. Middleton to Warren Hastings, 18.11.1777, ff 305-316:*

Bristow and Pipon transaction with Vizier: "A very large sum of money was raised by Mr. Pipon and paid either directly to the Nabob or the late Minister Mochtar ul dowlah for his Excellency's views. Bonds for the amount were also executed to Mr. Pipon, I understand exclusively, **bearing an interest (ff 305v) of 3 or 4 percent per mensem**. Some time after the bonds have been executed, how long I cannot clearly learn, Mr. Bristow purchased a share in them, binding himself by a written instrument, to recover the whole and in just and equal proportion with his own". ...Explanation of his own innocence.

*Nat Middleton to Warren Hastings, 7.2.1778, ff 71-82, 83-97, 99-101, 103-105, 106-109:*

Nabob's anti British designs and his position. "My friend" to Vizier by N. Middleton.

*Nat Middleton, Lucknow, to Warren Hastings, 29.4.1778, ff 329-32:*

"I have been much embarrassed by you pressing injunctions to me respecting, the recovery of the claims of Gen. Stibbert and Col. Goddard on the Nabob.

"The letter having been presented to me long after my estimates for the year had been delivered in, and assignments obtained for them, I found it impossible to make certain provisions for it, and I got the Col. a bond as the best, and indeed the only security I could think of. I see no possibility of getting payment at present either in money or by assignment upon any part of, the Nabob's revenue, for believe me, Sir, there is not a corner of H.E's dominions that is not tuncawed for much more than the amount of its actual revenue. It is not in my power to prevent the Nabob's giving assignments; he is indeed obliged to do it, as an easy mode of procuring a temporary relief (ff 329v) from the clamours of his creditors, but I take care none of them shall be paid in prejudice to the company's claims and I must

indeed do His Excellency the justice to say he neither expects or desires them to be attended to further then it may be perfectly convenient. The only funds therefore from which it appears to me Col. Goddard's demand could at present be answered, would be out of the collections made upon the unappropriated tuncawks, which I own I should be sorry to break in upon as I always look to them as a resource to supply the loss of Batta, and deficiencies, which may unavoidably arise in realising the demands of the company."

*Nat Middleton to Warren Hastings, 13.5.1778, ff 379-82:*

"I was asked by the Minister that whether this was a measure **absolutely to be insisted upon**; and I answered in the negative; observing that it was strongly recommended by the Board, and separately by you, but that I conceived that it was not the intention of government to force it upon the Nabob in violence to his own inclinations." (appointment of Mr. John Oxborne)

## IX. BENARAS

### Warren Hastings Correspondence on Benaras

*W.H. to T. Lane, 11.7.1772, ff 103-5:*

Call for a list of all his (Rajah's) pensioners and strike of all whom you shall not judge proper objects of his bounty.

*Warren Hastings to Joseph Fowke, 15.7.1773, ff 223:*

A particular reply to your letter is as unnecessary, as it would (be) disagreeable to me to enter upon the subjects which they contain. : Declines offer of staying in Fowke's house because of large family.

*Warren Hastings to Fowke, Benares, 24.3.1772, ff 137*

Every act of friendship which he may show you as an obligation on myself.

*From J.F, Benares, 24.4.1772, No. 10, ff 131:*

Rajah visits here "he is a very agreeable manly youth of about 16".

*ADD MS 29141 (vol. 10, June-Oct. 1778) ff 540: (ff 154-55, 161-64) Thom Graham, Benares, 23rd July 1778 on Cheyt Singh:*

"Having this morning got information that the Rajah's letter, forwarded to you in my address of the 20th, is in no shape a direct answer to your letter to him respecting the board's resolution for his raising and maintaining three battallions of sepoys to be disciplined and commanded by English Officers and to serve wherever necessity may require during the present war between England and France, I should be deficient in the duty I owe my country, my employers and yourself, were I not to express the doubts I entertain of Rajah Cheyt Singh's attachment to the Company and to the English Government. His backwardness in complying, or more properly speaking, his not complying at all with a requisition for his assistance in proportion to his circumstances for the protection of the company's territories against their declared (161 v) enemies is in my opinion too strong a proof of his disaffection to render it necessary to bring any further instances for illustration ... he has oftener than once or twice proposed to his quondam minister Ossam Sing, to restore him to his confidence and office of Dewan provided he would by solemn oath and return engagements break of all intercourse, friendship and connection with the English. There is hardly a man about him who does not encourage him in that counsel, and I am convinced that unless some such person as Ossen Sing is introduced into the management of

his affairs, should we be unsuccessful in the present war, he will be the first to espouse the cause of our enemies ... (ff 162 r)... a dependent of his by name Byaram, a native of the Deccan, whose advice he pays the strictest attention has been heard to say, **that were it not for the present commotion in the Deccan he would bring an army from thence and do what Suja Ud Dowla could not do, level Calcutta with the ground.**

I learn from the place where that person now resides that he holds correspondence with several of the Mahratta chiefs and has frequent visits from their attendants to whom he shows every civility and attention. He has also, it is said, of late being employed himself to bring about an alliance offensive and defensive between Rajah Cheyt Sing, Adjeet Sing, the Rajah of Riwa, and the Rajah of a place called Singu, ... it is positively affirmed however that professions of friendship has passed between the parties by letter. To check and counteract the progress of such transactions the greatest circumspection is required as well (162 v) as a familiar intercourse with the people of the country which I make it my particular study to keep up".

*ff 443-44, Thomas Graham to Warren Hastings, 22.9.1778:*

"After repeated remonstrances both verbally and by letter I have at last prevailed upon the Rajah to commence the payment of the subsidy of 5 lakhs which he did last night by sending 50,000 rupees. He has promised to pay me as much more tomorrow or next day; and now that he has begun I shall not give him a day's quiet until the whole is discharged."

*Thomas Graham, Benares to Warren Hastings, 28.9.1778, ff 451-4:*

"Whether he pays the money here or at the Presidency, yet as his motives for wishing the latter are no secret here, and in a course of little time will be known at all the courts from Delhi downwards, if he is indulged, it will tend rather to prejudice than enhance that respectable opinion which our government (453 v) has gained in every quarter of Hindustan, for uniformity, and the exaction of a strict obedience to their orders. The least show of independence in a subject of government, possessing a degree of power and authority, especially one situated so centrally as Rajah Cheyt Sing is, must have influence on the minds of the people and if passed over unnoticed, may be productive of the most baneful consequences to the tranquility of our possessions."

*Thomas Graham to Warren Hastings, 7.10.1778, ff 477-78:*

P.S. I further send for your information a Ram Nagar newspaper from whence you will learn that the Rajah has laid a tax on all his public officers and farmers to make good the 5 lakhs.

*Thomas Grant, Benares to Alex Elliott, 7.2.1778, ff 58-70:*

Complaints of Rajah's not paying "any superior degree of attention to what the government may either advice or recommend" suggests that government should "join me to the Rajah in the administration of justice" as "we ought resume a part or establish such checks as would effectually put a stop to" his present independence. "His misbehaviour to Mr. G.L. (H?) has been such that some measure or other ought certainly be adopted to convince (ff 70r) him that he is not without the reach of the power of administration otherwise it is to be feared that in any time of trouble he would be found a very useless and perhaps faithless subject to the English."

*J. Macpherson to WH, 17.5.1779, ff 269-76:*

"The Benares scheme I give you more credit for than for all your other great measures. It is the plan to rule and control India, whoever is the administrator. You have in a word made one system of Hindostan, from the Caucasus to Cape Comorin - from Poonah to Tibet.

There you have laid a foundation for relief and glory of your country, which no soldier or politician had ever so much effected before you."

## X. ASSAM

### Warren Hastings Correspondence on Assam

*Warren Hastings to R. Barwell, 19.2.1774, ff 270- :*

I have written to Col. Cummins, and have directed him to order a detachment without loss of time to Silhet, and to obey such instructions as you can give them. These I desire may be strictly included within the letter of the orders which you will receive from the board, namely to punish the Rajah of Gentia for his insolence, but neither to attempt an establishment in the country nor to let the forces remain there longer than may be necessary to bring him to a due submission. This service will be best performed by burning the villages, distressing this country and if possible getting possession of his person. Recollect the Kutch Bihar expedition was first planned to be executed with two companys. We can hope for no profit though we are sure of a loss by (270v) persecuting that new Begam. I hope Mr. Thackeray was not the aggressor.

About two months ago, I received a letter from the Rajah imploring my authority to enjoin the collector to keep upon peaceable terms with him, and I sent him a kellat in consequence having received no advice of his having behaved improperly towards our government.

I shall be obliged if you will inform me in what the trade to Bengal consists, and whether the free navigation of the river Soornah will be advantageous to us if in our possession.

*Warren Hastings to Barwell, 23.9.1774, ff 358-9:*

At this time, I should be sorry to furnish any occasion for a quarrel with the Assammers, principally because it would interfere with the design of Bogles' present commission, from the excessive jealousy of the Booteas; and because if we ever do quarrel with them (the Assammers) we ought to do it effectually on a pre-concerted plan, with the means of prosecuting (359 r) it, and not till we had made a trial of obtaining the only advantage which could be expected from success, by conciliatory means.

I particularly wish for a free communication with that country.

## XI. BENGAL

### Warren Hastings Correspondence on Bengal

*Warren Hastings to Thos Lane, 25.4.1774, ff 295-6*

The Nabob has represented to me that the books ... are kept in the Hurmundal, or place of religious worship, in the house of Bhelloo Podar. You will be pleased to take the legal precaution which will be necessary to take possession of that .... I understand that a Brahman may be lawfully employed on such an occasion.

*Warren Hastings, Madras, to Sykes 2.2.1771, ff 54*

Although I am not sure that my condition will be much improved by the exchange, yet I heartily wish it could take place. **Bengal is now a scene of ruin and confusion, and whoever has ruled there must have great authority and must give great attention to the country, to retrieve its losses by the last year's famine, and by the incessant drain of**

money which it had suffered for some years past. **Indeed the Company's possessions everywhere seem much on the decline ...** when I left Bengal, I made an estimate of my fortune which exclusive of bad debts and deducting the loss of Moorshedabad 2-3 lakhs of rupees. I have met with no losses since but that of interest.

*Warren Hastings to L. Sullivan, 11.7.1771, ff 66r*

The Company has not been fortunate in their connections with Asiatick princes. Their first friend in Bengal was weak, cruel, and treacherous. The next of a character which the last act of his government makes it dangerous to acknowledge. Their successors have no character and are incapable of supporting anything.

*Warren Hastings to My Lord Shelbourne, 16.7.1771, Fort St. George, ff 73-783 (introduce to Mr. Macpherson):*

"The company servants in Bengal possessed of a divided, but absolute powers yet accountable to their superiors at home for the exercise of it, have by delegating them nominally to others contrived to enjoy all the emoluments of it with (out) responsibility. **Immense fortunes have been thus acquired by individuals which, they too ostentatiously display before the eyes of their countrymen at home. And it is not peculiar to the people of England alone to hate those who get money by means just, or unjust, which fortune has (75r) placed beyond their own reach...** I am afraid it is not in the Court of Directors to apply the proper remedy to this distemper in their stay. Men entrusted not from choice but accident with uncontrolled power will abuse it for their own private benefits whether they be English or aliens, whether servants of the Crown or of the Company. **It is a lot of humanity to do ill to self love when the patience have the counter checks to restrain that principle within proper bounds are directed to proper ends. The fault (75 v) therefore is radically in the constitution is not in the men. I dare not propose the remedy. It seems to me to depend more on the powers which can constitutionally be given from home than on the means of applying them with the effect when granted... (ff 77r) ... whether the government here be in the hands of the king or of the Company it must be entire and undivided. It cannot be responsible if it is under immediate control** (addressed to E, 16th July)

*Warren Hastings to Palk (Caillaud ?) 5.10.1771, ff 82-83:*

If facts are proofs it may be affirmed that all our great victories were gained by small numbers and every miscarriage has fallen on our great armies, which have scarce been in a single instance successful.

*From Warren Hastings, (to perhaps L. Sullivan, London) 12.11.1772, (extract), ff 124:*

**I have deposited all the powers of the Nabob in the hands of a lady, who has more understanding than any man in the family and has no temptation to abuse them and placed a man with her as her minister who is a dependent creature of our own government... Munny Begam, the mother of the last Nabob is a lady above alluded to Rajah Goordass is her minister, the son of Nundcomar.**

*From Robert Palk, London, 8.2.1773, ff 377-78:*

"The affairs of Bengal continue to be enquired into with much agitation, such immense sums have been found to be extorted, and so many large fortunes brought home, that uncommon envy and resentment has been raised, and I may venture to add half the House of Commons atleast would be glad to see like examples made to those that happened formerly in the year 20".