PRABUDDHA BHARATA

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"उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।"

"Arise, Awake! And stop not till the Goal is reached."

ALONG THE PATH

Upa tvāgne divedive doṣāvastar-dhiyā vayam, namo bharanta emasi;
Rājantam adhvarāṇām gopām ṛtasya dīdivim, vardhamānam sve dame.

To Thee, O leaping Flame, we come
Moving along the Path of growing Light;
We come with Intuition's intent gaze,
O Illuminer of nightfall's gloom!
With meek surrender here we come—

Since we know:
Bright thy sway over the Soul's arrow-tracks,
Of cosmic order the luminous Guardian Thou—
Full blooming in Thine own Abode.

—*Madhucchandā Vaiśvāmitra* (*Ṛg-Veda,* I.1.7-8)
(Translated by Anirvan)

LETTERS OF SWAMI BRAHMANANDA

I

To Mohandas Pandurang Moray

4th Nov. '97

Sir,

In reply to the queries made by you in your letter . . . I wish to draw your attention to the following facts:

The main object of our Institution is to impart such instruction to the young men of our country as will enable them to realize the highest ideal of freedom (*jīvan-mukti*) held up by the Vedanta, and as such we take greater care to help them to form their character, to cast their life into a better mould, than to make them superficial masters of our scriptures. In a word, ours is a religious institution, a *bona-fide* monastery, where men who have renounced for ever all family connections with a view to realize the truths inculcated in the Shastras, live and receive systematic training under our guidance, practise devotion, and subject themselves to a course of discipline which is calculated to elevate their moral nature.

As regards the condition on which we receive students, I wish to inform you that we do not admit such men in our Institution as have a chance to swerve from the path of renunciation or have heavy earthly responsibilities upon their shoulders. But we have a mind to start other institutions for the training of men who wish to keep their connection with the world and yet have a strong desire to make the best of the opportunities (both secular and spiritual) afforded to them by the various conditions of their birth, occupation, etc.

The letter you wrote to Swami Ramakrishnananda was forwarded to me for reply. Therefore I write this letter to you.

Yours etc.,
Swami Brahmananda

II

To Swami Akhandananda

The Math
Belur P. O.
7-7-'98

My Dear Swamin,

I am sorry I could not write to you earlier than this. I hope you will excuse me for this....I am very glad to learn that you are working hard for

the orphanage.[1] Don't be depressed for money. I am sure where there is an unselfish work God helps in various ways. But mind you, if there is any desire for name or fame the results are miserable.

Swamiji[2] and party are still in Kashmir. The Maharaja has promised to give him a plot of land at Srinagar....The masonry work of our new Math land has begun. It is expected that the work will be finished after two months. The net-fencing of the land was finished. When you will feel much and tremendous want for money, please at once write to your servant (Brahmananda) who will try his utmost to help in your noble cause. Even he is ready to sacrifice his life for your cause. More in my next....

With love,

Yours sincerely,
Brahmananda

III

The Math
P. O. Belur, Howrah
15th April, 1905

My Dear Kumud,

I am in receipt of your kind notes...and the telegram. It gives me greatest pleasure to learn that Sashi Maharaj's[3] lectures and works there were attended with great success and that it is about to bear fruit in the shape of a permanent centre there shortly for which you have received promises and hopes from the influential residents of the place.

...It is a good sign that you have been successful in influencing many of the well-known citizens of Bombay in our cause. The zeal, labour, and self-sacrifice of the little band of our...friends there have been fully repayed by the grace of Guru Maharaj. I hope you will not be slow in catching hold of this opportune tide and reap due benefit in the cause of our noble religion....

With love and best wishes,

Yours affectionately,
Brahmananda

[1] The work started in this connection at Sargachi (Murshidabad) by Swami Akhandananda, as early as in 1897, formed the nucleus of the oldest Ashrama of the Ramakrishna Mission.

[2] Swami Vivekananda.

[3] Swami Ramakrishnananda.

THE IDEAL OF STRIVING AFTER PERFECTION

By the Editor

Śalkairagnimindhāna(h) ubhau lokau sane maham

'Offering ourselves like sacrificial fuel, we shall attain the best perfection in both the worlds'.

—*Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, XIII, 12.

Notwithstanding repeated assurances by the spokesmen of the powers that be to the effect that there is no reason for despair at the present tragic plight of mankind, the prevailing gloom and confusion in men's minds show no signs of abatement. To the rubs and worries of daily life are added the misgiving and uneasiness arising from national crises and international tensions. Old values and established orders are crumbling down all round, burying not only erstwhile empires and civilizations but also ideas, ideals, and idols. In the scheme of things the average individual occupies the most unenviable position, being tossed about from one mode of life to another, with no set purpose except to make the best of a bad job. In spite of an advanced scientific civilization aimed at securing for man the maximum pleasure and comfort and making him a perfected social being in a perfected economic society, the world is becoming one vast prison-house, seething with discontent, mistrust, and violence. Suffering a good deal from want of a clear vision and a definite goal in life, men are aimlessly, and often helplessly, groping in the dark.

Is man, then, a tiny bark, as it were, voyaging uncharted and tempestuous seas, raised this moment on the crest of a billow and dashed down into a chasm the next, rolling to and fro at the mercy of good and bad forces beyond his control? Is he no better than a stray leaf tumbling crazily across a field unknown, under the impact of the wind—himself powerless in the face of an inexorable law of cause and effect? The heart sinks at the thought of such a dreadful prospect. What is the way out for struggling humanity? Is there no hope, no escape? To this piteous supplication that has gone forth from the bottom of the heart of despair, the great Upanishadic seer responded in tender words of hope and strength: 'Hear, ye children of immortal bliss! Even ye that reside in higher spheres! I have found the Ancient One, who is beyond all darkness, all delusion; knowing Him alone you shall attain to the state of deathlessness,—there is no other way to the ultimate goal of life'. Thus it is that the most ancient spiritual teachers of the world proclaim the great ideal of striving after perfection. They teach that the soul is eternal and immortal, perfect and infinite. Man is divine, though he feels through ignorance that he is held in bondage by material forces. Perfection is the end and aim of life and will be reached by man when this bondage is eliminated. This is the underlying purpose of man's struggle on earth, whether he knows it or not.

But the question, which to most people seems legitimate and pertinent, obviously arises: What is perfection other than the acme of worldly progress and physical comfort and why should one striving after perfection trouble oneself with such 'unfamiliar' things as soul, God, or spirituality? The awakening of a serious doubt or unbelief regarding anything concerning spiritual verities is not unnatural in our age when life is fashioned by and dependent on the hedonistic pleasure-principle. Pursuit of scientific knowledge and technological advance or attainment of proficiency in the arts is certainly most necessary and important for the progress of humanity. It would be the height of unwisdom if man failed to put forth his energies in order to avail himself of the advantages resulting from a thorough

knowledge of the arts and the sciences. But the vanity and glamour with which our material achievements are invariably associated have made us lose sight of the spiritual needs of life. As a result, spiritual values are ignored or are replaced by idolatry of comfort and pleasure. Thus when man remains ignorant of the knowledge of the Reality which sustains him and in virtue of which he lives, even the lofty ideals of science and art elude his grasp. The aims of life are superseded by its means, and the strivings of the individual lead him nowhere; he is reduced to impotence through sheer inanity of the soul and turns out a menace to himself as well as to his fellow men. So wrote Shakespeare,

> 'But man, proud man,
> Drest in a little brief authority,
> Most ignorant of what he's most assur'd,—
> His glassy essence,—like an angry ape,
> Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
> As make the angels weep'.

Man is a creature of circumstances. The ideal of perfection differs from man to man according to the individual's needs—physical, mental, and spiritual. India has, from time immemorial, placed before man the attainment of a complete and integral conception of life and Reality as the ideal of ultimate perfection. The eternal, imperishable Atman is the source and repository of all knowledge and all values, and the goal of life is absolute perfection through the awareness of this unitive knowledge. Man is called upon to strive for that supreme perfection attaining which every other mundane achievement is seen to be not apart from it but a limited and partial manifestation of it. Atman, which is the goal of all knowledge and by knowing which everything else is known, the pervader and sustainer of all, illumines all and also itself.

> 'He who, renouncing all activities, worships in the sacred and stainless shrine of Atman, which is independent of time, place, and distance; which is present everywhere; which is the destroyer of heat and cold, and other opposites; and which is the giver of eternal happiness, becomes all-knowing and all-pervading and attains hereafter Immortality'. (*Ātmabodha*, 68).

This is the ideal which, in some form or other, every great religion seeks to inspire man with. It is where ethical virtues and secular strivings lead man to.

The expansion of man's being and the inevitable process of the manifestation of the perfection inherent in him cannot brook any delay obstruction. The tendency to ignore the Spirit as unknown or unknowable and to worship mammon in place of God is the direct corollary of a philosophy of life which accommodates with equanimity an utterly famished soul and a grossly pampered body. That aspect of man's being, his earthly vesture, that is finite and perishable is tenaciously clung to, while his essential and eternal spiritual being is left uncared for at the present day. It is easily forgotten that the common heritage of the human race is spiritual and not material and that dull, dead matter can never serve to awaken and sustain the life values which lead to the transformation of man and his uplifting to the state of supreme perfection. Good life is equated with a life of mere sense-enjoyment; progress towards perfection is viewed not from the standpoint of things really and intimately human but in terms of technicalization and regimentation. 'In this age of spiritual turpitude,' says a leading thinker of our times, 'when not only the old religious beliefs but also the humanist creed of the nineteenth century have been shaken, modern civilized man's sole strong belief is a faith in the might of technical science and its capacity for infinite development. Technique is man's last love, for the sake of which he is prepared to change his very image. . . . There can be no *technical ends* of life, only technical means: the ends of life belong to another sphere, to that of the *Spirit*'.

The Indian view of life is essentially spiritual; it has a spiritual goal—liberation (*mokṣa*) or perfection in this very life (*jīvanmukti*). Of the four ideals which serve the ends of human pursuit (*puruṣārtha*), the realization of *mokṣa* (spiritual freedom) is the coping-stone of life, and the other three ideals (*dharma, artha,* and *kāma*), which belong to

the material world and which are necessary and legitimate at certain periods of life, support and are subordinated to it. Nothing short of the highest perfection can yield the highest good. Any relative perfection in things finite cannot but be ephemeral and illusory. It is neither deep nor abiding, nor does it satisfy the craving of the soul. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* describes how different types of people choose and set out to realize the two different ideals of life: the wise, endowed with discrimination and desiring the everlasting good, choose the ideal of striving after ultimate perfection; the ignorant and the deluded, fascinated by wealth and enjoyments, choose the path of momentary worldly pleasures. It is within the power of every man to choose either of the two ideals. Those who are short-sighted and devoid of prudence strive after sense-pleasures and material values and finally miss the true goal of human effort. The *Īśa Upaniṣad* says that man overcomes death and misery through the inferior knowledge (*avidyā*), but he attains immortality only through the superior knowledge (*vidyā*).

Striving after spiritual perfection, in other words, the realization of God—is an inevitable necessity for man. All his serious thoughts and actions proceed from the depths of the soul. Perfection or emancipation is not something foreign to the real nature of man. Though it is expressed in words that man 'attains' liberation or perfection, in actual fact the soul does not attain perfection afresh, for it is ever perfect, ever free. Perfection is the very nature of the Atman, the Absolute, which through *māyā* appears imperfect and finite. The immortal soul, which never actually becomes mortal but seems through *avidyā* to do so, knows its own immortality. This is the great ideal for man at all times and in all climes: self-discovery, self-knowledge, self-fulfilment; the integration of personality in the impersonal Spirit through a harmonious blending of all the factors—physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual—that constitute life.

The irresistible, universal urge towards perfect self-impression and self-expansion is easily understandable. It is an instance of the natural law of spiritual development which applies to every being. Man's innumerable strivings and struggles in life and his inordinate longing to march on interminably along the spiral path of progress, seeking to gain at every instant a higher step of achievement than the previous bear eloquent testimony to the fact that the divine Self within is wanting to manifest itself and that he is exerting consciously or unconsciously to reach the Infinite. Man wants to reach unto God. The divinity inherent in him cannot be suppressed or stopped from unfolding itself by degrees until the full and complete infinitude is reached. However much the agnostic may argue in favour of enjoying life through the mere senses, even as animals do, it can never be denied that the essence of life is going towards perfection. According to Carlyle, 'Man's hapiness comes of his greatness; it is because there is an Infinite in him which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the finite'. 'So, in this life', says Swami Vivekananda, 'with all its miseries and sorrows, its joys and smiles and tears, one thing is certain, that all things are rushing towards their goal and it is only a question of time when you and I, and plants, and animals, and every particle of life that exists must reach the infinite ocean of Perfection, must attain to Freedom, to God'.

It is most commonly seen that man seeks God, prays to Him, meditates on Him, and realizes Him,—and not *vice versa*. Man yearns for God because God lives right in the core of his heart, inspiring and guiding him. Sri Krishna tells Arjuna, towards the end of the *Gita* discourse,

> 'The Lord dwells in the hearts of all beings, O Arjuna, . . . Take refuge in Him alone with all your soul, O Bhārata, by His grace will you gain Supreme Peace and the Abode of Everlasting Perfection'.

The grace of God descends only upon him who has striven to his utmost, who has not spared himself in his persistent strnggle towards the Goal Supreme. To realize God one must devote oneself to the task heart and soul. Our entire life in the world is to be lived as an in-

cessant preparation for the life in God. The path to perfection is 'sharp like a razor and hard to tread' and only the best and sincerest aspirants can hope to succeed. The Lord says in the *Gita,*

'Among thousands of men, one, here and there, strives for perfection; and of those who strive and succeed, one perchance, knows Me in truth'.

Earnestness, yearning, and a resolute determination to 'go forward' at all costs are the *sine qua non* of God realization. Perfection cannot be attained without constant practice (*abhyāsa*) and renunciation (*vairāgya*). Belief in God can never be effectively brought home to the unbeliever unless and until he himself comes to feel the need for it. And in this nothing succeeds like success. As a man advances in his quest after the Infinite, undaunted and full of faith, gradually he draws closer and closer to the treasure-house of God-consciousness. So says Sri Ramakrishna: 'Devote yourself to spiritual practice and go forward. Through practice you will advance more and more in the path of God. At last you will come to know that God alone is real and all else is illusory, and that the goal of life is the attainment of God'. In order to emphasize the fact that the ideal of striving after perfection requires that the aspirant should 'arise, awake, and go forward', and not stop till the ultimate goal is reached, Sri Ramakrishna used to relate the following parable:

'Once upon a time a wood-cutter went into a forest to chop wood. There suddenly he met a Brahmachāri. The holy man said to him, "My good man, go forward". On returning home the wood-cutter asked himself, "Why did the Brahmachāri tell me to go forward?" Some time passed. One day he remembered the Brahmachāri's words. He said to himself, "Today I shall go deeper into the forest". Going deep into the forest, he discovered innumerable sandal-wood trees. He was very happy and returned with cart-loads of sandal-wood. He sold them in the market and became very rich.

'A few days later he again remembered the words of the holy man to go forward. He went deeper into the forest and discovered a silver-mine near a river. This was even beyond his dreams. He dug out silver from the mine and sold it in the market. He got so much money that he didn't even know how much he had.

'A few more days passed. One day he thought: "The Brahmachāri didn't ask me to stop at the silver-mine; he told me to go forward". This time he went to the other side of the river and found a gold-mine. Then he exclaimed: "Ah, just see! This is why he asked me to go forward".

'Again, a few days afterwards, he went still deeper into the forest and found heaps of diamonds and other precious gems. He took these also and became as rich as the god of wealth himself'.

To many God is still a far-away and obscure concept, and the spiritual ideal an outmoded if not impracticable thing. Religion and renunciation are held in derision and looked down upon with not a little suspicion. Sri Ramakrishna's own realizations and teachings completely dispel all such doubt and unbelief. He tells us *ex cathedra,* 'Through selfless work love of God grows in the heart. Then through His grace one realizes Him in course of time. God can be seen. One can talk to Him ās I am talking to you'. All the same, inability to subscribe to a belief in the existence of God is no problem to one who is endowed with the prerequisites for Self-knowledge such as discrimination (*viveka*), renunciation (*vairāgya*), control of the mind (*śama*), self-restraint (*dama*), perfect mastery of the senses (*uparati*), forbearance (*titikṣā*), faith (*śraddhā*), self-settledness (*sāmādhāna*), and yearning for spiritual freedom (*mumukṣutvam*). These virtues are indispensable and have to be acquired through relentless and diligent practice. A spontaneous belief in God and intimate communion with Him makes the task of the aspirant a hundredfold easier, for it affords an additional impulse and inspiration to look upon every act as the worship of the Divine. While the Impersonal Absolute—the eternal, all-pervading, and immanent as well as transcendent Reality—kindles the spark of divinity already present in every man, nay, in every being, thereby making every act of morality, love, or piety a form of unselfish service to God-in-man. Every such act, actuated by a sincere spirit of self-abnegation and an awareness of the divinity of man becomes a pro-

gressive step towards freedom and perfection *par excellence*.

For centuries past there has existed a large measure of unanimity about the ideal goal of human effort. But not so with regard to the avenues that profess to lead to that goal, and herein are to be met with various opinions, often contradictory, expressed dogmatically and crammed down everyone's throat with fanatic violence. If all the paths are true and effective in taking man to the goal and yet they appear to contradict one another, the conclusion is inevitable that every one of these could not have been meant to suit all the people of the world at once. Men are endowed with dissimilar innate tendencies and abilities. There are not only people at different levels of spiritual development, but they also differ in temperament. It is absurd to expect that one religion or one set of doctrines should be accepted by all mankind. Unity in variety and not a forced uniformity is the plan of creation. The various religious disciplines and ways of striving after perfection are necessary and should be suited to different temperaments. Different rules and formulae of worship are designed to help people at different levels and lead them forward from where they stand towards the common goal of the Highest Perfection.

The knowers of God and the seers of Truth assure us that perfection is man's birthright and that he must reach it sooner or later. History and evolution, looked at from their non-materialistic background, appear in their true light as processes of the manifestation of the perfection already in every being. When struggle is inevitable in life, it is best to strive for the highest ideal which includes and transcends all lower ones. In the terse and brief words of Swami Vivekananda:

'Each soul is potentially divine. The goal is to manifest this divine within, by controlling nature, external and internal. Do this either by work, or worship, or psychic control, or philosophy, by one, or more, or all of these—and be free. This is the whole of religion. Doctrines, or dogmas, or rituals, or books, or temples, or forms, are but secondary details'.

The four types of Yoga are recommended for aspirants of four principal types into which mankind may largely be divided—Karma Yoga for the active type, Bhakti Yoga for the emotional type, Jnana Yoga for the intellectual and philosophical type, and Raja Yoga for the psychic type. The Yogas are distinct but not disparate, and though one is practised to the exclusion of the others, most people find it suitable and often necessary to take recourse to various combinations of the methods of the different Yogas. Critics who say that these paths, leading to spiritual perfection, are not progressive, scientific, or rational are either misinformed or ignorant. To disregard the spiritual ideal of perfection, which is no other than man's real nature—Existence-Knowledge-Bliss (*saccidānanda*), and run after strange tin gods and airy nostrums is to add fuel to the fire which is even now threatening to consume the whole of humanity, with all the cultural and spiritual legacies that have come down from the dawn of history.

In practical daily life we are hurt by small things; we are enslaved by little beings. Misery comes because we think we are finite—we are little beings. And yet, how difficult it is to believe that we are infinite beings! In the midst of all this misery and trouble, when a little thing may throughi me off my balance, it must be my care to believe that I am infinite. And the fact is that we are, and that consciously or unconsciously we are all researching after that something which is infinite; we are always seeking for something that is free.

—*Swami Vivekananda*

NATURE AND MAN

By Prof. Haridas Bhattacharyya

From about the time of Kant an obvious but significant distinction has been drawn between the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of History. Nature has been assigned to the realm of Law while History has been regarded as belonging to the domain of Freedom. We are accustomed to think of law as a sign of rigidity and invariableness in behaviour—a world ruled by law is a world in strait jacket with its movements restricted in an absolute fashion. It is not permissible there to deviate from the customary channel of expression. The novel and the unforeseen have no place in a mechanistic universe and all higher integrations can be reduced without remainder to lower combinations. Uniformity of occurrence makes prediction a theoretical possibility even though, as a matter of fact, it may not be possible always to realize that possibility in actuality. Time, therefore, has no meaning in the true sense in such a world, as Bergson has pointed out. It is indeed true that in recent years some speculative minds have fancied that after all Nature might be possessed of some indeterminacy and also that the laws of Nature might be contingent. The existence of isotopes, allotropic modifications and isomers may have confirmed the belief that Nature too might have a way of evading dull uniformity in her elements and compounds, and of manifesting originality in her scheme of integration. The transformation of elements through radio-activity and artificial bombardment may also have raised doubts about the constancy of elementary forms. But the stark fact remains that these oddities of Nature are as much subject to definite laws as the constancies are, even though we may not succeed in all cases in understanding the origin of the different primary formations. Those who are strict scientists, therefore, resolutely set their faces against the importation of the concept of spontaneity and individuality in discussing the events and entities of Nature. The one-time cry that teleology would be the death of Science has been reinforced by the further cry that Freedom would kill all Science.

It is obvious that in such a world of unchanging laws the only units that fulfil the conditions of calculation are those which repeat the life-history of other units of the same kind. Individuality has no meaning in a world ruled rigidly by law, for the same law controls similar things. Units behave uniformly in similar situations and all units of the same kind react similarly in identical or similar situations. Any peculiarity of response would be set down to the importation of new factors into the life of the reacting unit and not to any distinctive constitution of the unit in question. The idea that laws are only statistical averages of behaviour of slightly differing units would be vehemently opposed by strict adherents of the mechanistic view of the universe. All natural laws are verifiable in the sense that reaction-patterns are uniform in the physico-chemical universe under identical conditions. Once we are able by rigid analysis to isolate the units, we are assured of being further able to discover their functioning for all times to come. In such a world we can live with confidence for things would not spring surprises on us or confound our calculations. We do not have to be on tenterhook in a world of expected happenings and we can prepare ourselves beforehand for meeting contingencies provided our knowledge of elements is full and our computation is accurate. We cease to be on our guard in a world that knows no novelty and we sink into a life of routine when dealing with such a universe. Attitudes and ideals have no real meaning in a world of brute facts, for here the possible and the actual coincide. Habitual reaction dispenses with the necessity

of conscious adjustment except in unusual situations arising out of the complexity of combination of physical forces. We tread unconsciously on the *terra firma* though we have to balance our body deliberately on a rocking earth during an earthquake. When plying tools or handling weapons we never suspect them of possible treachery at the critical moment nor do we count upon unexpected help from them in times of dire need.

We enter an entirely different world when the actors in the world-drama are not mute insensate things but living and thinking beings. We shall not tarry to discuss whether even in the realm of mere life there is scope for deviation from the rigid laws of mechanism, though the probabilities are that life transcends mechanism and is a category *sui generis*. Vital phenomena are so radically different from physical phenomena proper that without the assumption of a new principle their distinctive features cannot be properly understood. The neo-vitalists have not been slow to seize upon these differentiating qualities of living things and to point to facts in the world of life which the mechanistic hypothesis finds it hard to explain. The features that are significant in the present context are adaptation, variation, and evolution which life manifests but matter does not. Here we are face to face with a new type of entity that refuses to remain unchanging or stationary for all times. We have a peep, as it were, into spontaneity, into the yawning and stretching of limbs of a giant slowly awakening from slumber into a state of consciousness. There is much of torpor yet, but the charm of simply belonging to a class and not having any individuality is gone. Blind repetition of reactions is now giving place to individual response. Time is biting into the organization and function of a living nnit and modifying its activity in the light of its past history. Selective response has now a more definite meaning for the unit, even though the species has still a dominating role in determining the behaviour of each unit. Spontaneous variation leading to the origination of new species brings out the element of revolt that life nurses within its bosom against all routine, and rehearses on a lower level that intolerance with repetition which every conscious agent manifests in higher reaches of life. How any particular living unit would accept its physical environment has yet defied the predictions of the scientist even though we may believe that if our knowledge had been more perfect, we would have been able to foresee the life-history of a plant. Matters are further complicated when sentience makes its appearance in the world of life for then behaviour begins to be modified by experience and individual differences tend to widen still further. Even a micro-organism is less mechanical in its response than a plant; and even though it may degenerate into a sessile condition, an animal retains the capacity of sentience with all that it implies for variation in reaction. Where motility brings an animal into contact with new surroundings, the need of varying responses is paramount. Widely differing environmental conditions, due to changes in space and time, demand a degree of adaptation which uniform conditions do not. An animal that fails to withstand change or adapt itself to varying circumstances is on the way to extinction. An animal that has not to face change is assured of security at the cost of evolution: the difference in the degree of intelligence possessed by terrestrial and aquatic animals is an instance in point. Adventure has its risks but not without compensating gains, provided, of course, that it does not degenerate into foolhardiness and expose the animal to absolutely unfamiliar and hostile situations without preparing it gradually for new adaptations. As these laws of life have a bearing upon social adaptation and social evolution, they are worthy of being noted and observed. Discontinuity of wonted reaction produces a shock, the stupefying effect of which unnerves and unsettles the reacting individual. Heredity and variation are the two feet with which life makes progress. A total denial of the conservative factor is not possible—here as elsewhere Nature abhors leaps. Monstrosities of all kinds have little surviving value—we are too firmly tethered to the past in our life and

mind to be able to abjure it altogether even when we venture into the unknown through accident or design. At the same time stagnation and degeneration dog the footseps of those who refuse to leave the warm corner of the accustomed, forgetting that life subsists through struggle and reckoning with the new and that growth implies an acceptance of new materials and a rearrangement of the components of the organism as a whole. Life is not additive but reconstructive at every stage of its growth—a jettisoning of much past may be necessary to incorporate the living present and the incoming future.

Let us turn now to the Philosophy of History. Here we are in an entirely new realm of being. In place of interacting atoms we are in the presence of souls responding to facts and events of the physical world and to other souls. Natural history is an unlawful extension of the term 'History', for the happenings of Nature relate to no land in particular nor to any particular agent. These do not owe their origin to the initiation of any free cause nor do they form part of any individual biography or record the collective action of any social group. It is man's reaction to his surroundings that we record in history: here every stimulus becomes significant only in so far as it attains the status of a motive. A mere succession of events would not give a biography but a kaleidoscopic show. Substitution and transformation record a change but not a biography unless change is understood only as somebody's biography—of an imaginary subject, say God, in whose experience the change occurs. History, therefore, implies maintenance of identity through difference. The successive changes are all strung together to form the life-history of an individual. In the case of a definite personality the procession of states is attended by a sense of identity—the details may drop out of consciousness and yet the sense of continuity persists. In the case of group-mind such a sense of identity is obviously impossible, but it manages to retain its historic continuity by evolving ideas and arts, manners and institutions, language and literature, traditions and attitudes which are transmitted down the chain of generations. Social, tribal, and national histories are reflections in individual minds of these ideas and tendencies, and it is on these that individual reactions are reared. True, there are variations in the way in which the conserved past acts on individual minds; but the general lines of reaction are so similar that something like a racial unconscious seems to be in operation in all minds of the human race in certain matters while smaller groups seem to be swayed by inherited tendencies of their own forbears in a much larger number of things. In preserving the memory of past events the present generation does not necessarily establish its kinship with those in whom those events were matters of experience, for there may supervene a spirit of detachment which is fatal to identification of all kinds. It is the emotional acceptance of the past that makes history a living creed which is very difficult to disown. The degree of difficulty in dissociating the rational and irrational factors of any complex belief, attitude, and idea will determine the strength of the conviction in their infallibility. Early suggestion and imitation may fix a habit of thought firmly in the mind and render it immune to alteration. Lack of personal thinking and fear of social opprobrium and oppression may conspire to petrify social beliefs and stereotype social behaviour.

Fortunately, however, the human personality is not a representative but an individual. You cannot anticipate its behaviour in terms of class reaction as you can do in the case of inorganic things. You have got to deal with each individual as he is and not as belonging merely to a particular group. In calculating or understanding his reactions you have to deal with him in his individual capacity as a being with a separate biography of his own. You have to concede to him the right of choosing his reactions in terms of ideals and values. This individual being is not merely subjected to stimuli —it is also awayed by ends which it freely postulates as ideals worthy of realization. In other words, you have to deal with a free agent

who uses the past to meet the present and to prepare for the future. Time has vital significance for such a being, as with the accumulation of experience readjustment of its thought and action becomes inevitable. Every experience leaves a trail behind and serves to modify behaviour in individual lives. Personal history is unique and unsharable, and as all human reactions are joint products of organization and stimulation, the same stimulus-situation will not call forth the same reaction. Not only will individuals vary in their modes of prehension and appropriation but the same individual will return different reactions in different periods of his life owing to a change in the organization of thoughts during the intervening period.

It would follow from this that our handling of human materials cannot be on all fours with our dealing with the material world. For one thing, men have feelings and cannot be treated with callousness as material things can be. Much misery in the world would have been avoided by the recognition of this obvious fact, and yet we have to confess to our shame that humanity has often been treated not merely as chattels but also as a kind of conscious automata, creaking under pain like an ungreased wheel but not deserving of pity or sympathy on that account. The habit of dealing with insensate nature we have carried over to human relations by a kind of what has been felicitously termed 'apathetic fallacy' with the effect that violence, injury, murder, and rapine produce no remorse and are even gloated upon with supreme satisfaction. It is otherwise unthinkable that the conscience of the world should not be deeply stirred by the atom-bomb havoc at Nagasaki and Hiroshima and there should be a regular race for deadly discoveries among the so-called civilized nations of the world. The race for armaments is ultimately prompted by the lust for power and not by any genuine fear of attack by a hostile nation—nations have agreed that suspicion and jealousy, and not trust and amity, shall be the gniding principles of international relation. Pacifists have cried themselves hoarse over the iniquity of training young men for murder and turning them into cannon-fodder of enemy nations. They have deplored the squandering away of national wealth in promoting ill will and creating a spirit of aggression, in the production of mumition and in war propaganda, when it might have been used in promoting health, wealth, and happiness, in educating the rising generation in useful arts and industries, and in alleviating suffering and want not only in the country but also in any afflicted part of the world. With telling effect Bertrand Russell has drawn the distinction between the possessive impulse which has dictated the policy of the strong nations with imperialistic aims and the creative impulse which can thrive only when national thought and energy are directed towards peaceful ends and the production of artistic beauty. Whatever be the private religious belief of the people at large, the indifference with which the imperialistic States wage war reminds one strongly of the old philosophies of Pūraṇa Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccāyana of Buddha's time, namely, that it is all the same whether a person makes all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, or he gives alms, shows liberality, and practises generosity, self-mastery, and such other virtues, and that when one cleaves a head in twain with a sharp sword he simply lodges the sword in the interval between the elementary substances which by their combination make a thing living and that in reality there is neither a slayer nor one slain—a strange parody of the *Bhagavad-Gita* position that death overtakes the body and not the soul which is immortal.

But the State has not been the only engine of oppression though its ponderous weight has been most consciously felt. We all know what negation of human rights the State is capable of. State rules are not collective decisions of the subjects in the majority of cases and even majority decisions with the help of the votes of the ignorant and the unthinking are not always ethical. Where power is wielded by a single authority not amenable to popular control, the iniquity becomes more intolerable. Democracies have found it necessary, therefore, to pro-

vide for periodical appeal to the people when the removal of an oppressive authority is thought desirable—an irremovable executive is an intolerable nuisance. When we remember that the State claims the right of sending people to war and of putting restrictions of all kinds on its subjects ostensibly in the name of safety, we can understand how important it is that popular opinion should be reflected in the management of the State and that no party should be allowed to be so entrenched in power as to defy removal and act as a tyrannical oligarchy. And the wielding of power becomes facilitated when unscrupulous leaders keep their followers deliberately ignorant so that these may not develop independent powers of thinking and are swayed by superstition and fanaticism alike. A progressive State is therefore under a moral obligation to foster education and promote learning so that power can be entrusted to worthy hands by an intelligent electorate. Our attitude towards our ignorant supporters is the same as towards our enemies—we prefer to treat them like material things which are useful to the extent to which they can be used as pliant tools for carrying ont our designs withont any initiative of their own and without any grumbling for being so used. Against the Kantian injunction we want to treat them always as means and never as ends—in the Kingdom of Ends they have no place. Now what is true of State domination is equally true of social domination though here the control is less obvions, being exercised less consciously in most cases by the dominating authorities and less consciously felt by those on whom it oppressively works because of their being *born* with diverse social disabilities. Social conscience, which has the curious habit of going to sleep when enjoying privileges, is not disturbed so long as the unprivileged accept their lot in a spirit of resignation and accommodate themselves to the socio-economic system withont any murmer or protest. It not unoften happens that the first awakening to social disabilities comes not to the sufferers themselves but to one belonging to a privileged class and it is he who rouses the unprivileged classes to a sense of their social inferiority and the rights and privileges that should have been theirs. Through the painful process of education the masses have often to be roused to a sense of their own importance and the necessity of organizing themselves to resist oppression and relegation to the social background. Those enjoying traditional and prescriptive rights cannot be expected to admit the claims to justice and fair play of the newly awakened masses without a fight. Men and women, capital and labour, the higher castes and the untouchables, the Hindus and the Muslims, the Westerners and the Easterners, the white races and the coloured races are today in deadly grip with each other for the simple reason that the second party to the conflict is demanding its dnes in the social, political, economic, and religious fields. Repression has been followed by explosion in many of these relations with visible slackening of discipline in most fields of human activity which is due to a sudden release of inhibitions consequent on resentment and sense of frustration at the slow recognition of human rights. Diffusion of education, missionary propaganda, the zeal of social reformers and workers, and acquaintance with more liberal systems of social relation have conspired with the incompetence and degradation of the privileged to bring about a new sense of social values and the need of a social reorientation in keeping with the spirit of the times. Claims based on qualifications which have ceased to exist are sought to be defended on the principles of heredity, age-long custom, and social convenience, with the effect that when these are resisted by the submerged classes the danger of throwing the baby away with the bath makes its appearance and even those that deserve respect on the basis of their own merit are slighted and there is an all-round decline in faith and in respect for authority and social gradation of all kinds. The spirit of *nil admirari* in one field spreads to other fields also, and there develops a general attitude of irreverence which is inimical to social order. Claims and counter-claims

cloud the real social issue and bring about a class war of which watchful enemies of the social and religious order take the fullest advantage.

It is time to recognize, therefore, that for ensuring social balance the dynamic character of society has to be taken into due consideration. You cannot build up a social structure which will last for all times, for social relations are not sacrosanct and depend upon the fluctuating conditions of social existence and social security. Here form is dependent upon matter and organization cannot be dissociated from the components. The intrusion of foreign elements and the absorption of alien ideas equally affect the continuity of social tradition—even a radical change in social occupations will have an adverse effect on the maintenance of an old social order. This is why when a transition takes place from a pastoral to an agricultural, or from an agricultural to an industrial mode of life, there creeps in almost imperceptibly a desire for new social valuation in consonance with the new type of social relation that a changed social occupation has ushered in. Even religious beliefs are profoundly altered, and naturally, as a consequence, social classification reared on those beliefs. Human life is such an organized system that any change in a radical belief brings about a readjustment in thought and action and attitude. Human history does not record a single instance of social current being completely reversed and bringing back the old things that had once floated down the stream of time. All attempts to recapture the past in its old meaning prove futile because the world of thoughts inexorably moves away from its ancient moorings.

One is forcibly reminded in this context of the famous dictum of Sir Henry Sumner Maine that 'the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement *from Status to Contract*' and of the saying of Bertrand Russell that 'all institutions, if they are not to hamper individual growth, must be based as far as possible upon voluntary combination, rather than the force of law or the traditional authority of the holders of power' and of his other saying that 'what is necessary, if an organic society is to grow up, is that our institutions should be so fundamentally changed as to embody that new respect for the individual and his rights which modern feeling demands'. With constant change in occupation of included groups society is far more fluent today than it was even in the recent past. Castes and guilds no longer enforce or expect hereditary occupation with its attendant privileges and responsibilities. Hereditary aptitude is either not present in some cases or not worked upon in other cases, with the effect that, like the grinning without the cat which Alice saw in the Wonderland, vanity and false pride take the place of genuine worth and ancestral occupation. Honour must be deserved before being desired or claimed, and ancestral rights must be built on the solid foundation of personal achievement and not solely buttressed by the accident of birth. It is not expected that social gradation would be fixed with every change in social composition and social occupation nor do modern States and societies possess the necessary machinery for such periodic revaluation and rearrangement of social groups. History has such an eccentric way of progression that we cannot predict its exact route, much less to affirm that it would move dialectically at all times. One thing, however, is certain, namely, that with the virtual annihilation of space in modern times ideas spread over the whole world very quickly and success in social experiment in one place is likely to inspire other places to try the same experiment. But as social traditions differ widely from place to place, the degree of break with the past would be unequal in different places, and so smooth transition in one area may have as its counterpart violent upheaval in another area. A classless secular society is not embarrassed by the handicap of religion and social gradation and can plan for all without being obliged to recommend reservation for any privileged class. There is, of course, danger in establishing social entropy of the maximum

degree, for the existence of classes devoted to ideals and freed from the cares of livelihood is an asset of the highest value to any society provided some device can be found to maintain the purity of such classes. Levelling down is much easier than levelling up, and whosoever throws down an idol must undertake at the same time the responsibility of providing new objects of worship lest faith should disappear and the humility of spirit so necessary in any form of social gradation should depart. This means that even in a classless society there should be provision for spiritual leadership, and the gladiatorial struggle for self-preservation must be controlled by persons who are endowed with a high sense of justice and fair play. Unless there are seers of eternal verities and the laws of the land are based on those principles of humanity which the best minds have discovered and preached, life is likely to degenerate into jungle fight in which might is always right and the end always justifies the means. Subject to this reservation, however, every progressive society must provide for the due recognition and encouragement of merit wheresoever found so that none is denied the opportunity of attaining his proper intellectual, moral, and spiritual stature simply because he was not happily born in respect of wealth, parentage, and social status.

The discovery and fostering of individual genius being a social and national responsibility—much more so in a country which is independent, any system of human relationship pledged to progress must provide for smoothing down the inequalities of material endowment by instituting such methods of competitive examination and personnel selection as would ensure to all a fair chance of coming to a position in society commensurate with their personal worth. With the inheritance of wealth must not be linked up the inheritance of greater advantage in lucrative service and honourable position. On the other hand, it should be the duty of the State to stimulate personal resourcefulness by preventing absolutely leisured life with inevitable inclination towards corruption, impatience of criticism, and domineering habit. From the time of the Old Testament downwards the denunciation of the rich man's grabbing of the poor man's land has been repeated in many lands but practically to no effect. How to promote thrift and encourage industry and yet at the same time how to prevent the misuse of accumulated wealth have proved two irreconcilable problems. Almost every agrarian reform has been designed in advanced societies in the interest of a more equitable distribution of land and the legislatures have sought to expropriate the rich from a portion of their wealth by heavy taxation, imposition of death-duties, and such other methods for increasing the public revenue and equalizing wealth. The agency of the State in encouraging personal endeavour to re-earn the ancestral wealth is commendable in so far as it is designed to provide opportunities of advancement to those not advantageously born. It is unjust if industry is deprived of its fruit because the lazy poor are jealous of the thrifty rich and provoke the State to despoil the latter of their riches in the hope that they would get a share of the spoil.

Once it is admitted that the perfection of the individual is the supreme objective of all social endeavour, all measures inimical to that ideal cease to be moral. Thus wheu social laws press heavily on individuals and groups and are sought to be defended on the ground that society is more important than the individual and so burdens must be cheerfully borne, we are forgetting that society exists for the individual and not *vice versa*. A new entrant may be on probation for a short period and even discouraging disabilities may be imposed for a time to test his mettle or his sincerity. But once that test is over, the irritating restrictions should be withdrawn and he should be graded on his personal merit. Many alien races have been completely absorbed within the capacious fold of Hinduism with proper social status in course of its long history, but there are still a lot, many latterly absorbed, who have been

denied this right of organic relationship to the community at large. Recent social revolts have been mostly directed against this denial of the right of approximate equality with higher castes in religious and social matters. Social legislation had to be sponsored by liberal-minded politicians to ameliorate the social condition of the submerged classes and to bring about an approximation to the ideal of social equality. But in our enthusiasm to be just we may be tempted to be over-generous and there lies danger. The basic equipment for entering a higher class must be acquired and our first duty must be to provide suitable opportunities to the socially backward classes to enable them to make up the leeway in education. The philosophies of India may point a moral in this direction. Thus it was recognized that a man's religious life must be strictly regulated according to his intellectual and moral equipment. While the performance of daily duties and the five great sacrifices of reading the scriptures, offering oblations to the manes, sacrificing to the gods, spreading food for the animals to take, and entertaining guests would constitute the whole spiritual life of an ordinary householder, these would not suffice for those who have come to realize that what matters most is not placating the gods but attaining Self-knowledge and understanding the relation of the self to the ultimate principle of existence. Thus corresponding to the different *āśramas* or stages of life there are different spiritual obligations; and for one who has realized in his own life the identity of Self with Brahman, mundane duties lose all validity and moral distinctions in the ordinary sense of the term cease to exist. The call of the Infinite supersedes the claims of the finites and embracing the life of a mendicant, after deserting one's family, ceases to be immoral. Higher stations bring stricter obligations, and so what is expected of a Brahmin or a monk is not enjoined as duty on weaker mortals or those in a lower station. Caste prejudices have no *locus standi* in a mind that has realized that All are Brahman or that All Men are Vishnus and yet *varṇa* is the backbone of the Hindu socio-religious organization. The primary endeavour must, therefore, be to help each individual, irrespective of caste and sex and race, to realize the fullest potentialities of his or her nature, and to remove those restrictions that prevent the acquisition of those fundamental rights without which no proper exercise of native faculties is possible. In our anxiety to be chivalrous we may overlook the patent fact that men and women are not equally adapted for all types of work, and certain avocations may have to be forbidden to each. But this should not prevent us from admitting that where Nature does not put any obstacles in the way, there should be equal opportunities, equal rights equal responsibilities, and equal obligations, subject to any limitations that the condition of the country demands and the smooth working of an enlightened social existence requires.

The claims of the Spirit being higher than those of the body, though the latter must be met to the extent necessary for healthy and clean living, any programme of social progress must think in terms beyond merely increasing creature comforts. A pampered body and a famished soul should not be the social objective at any time. In our eagerness to advance the cause of the proletariate we are likely to overlook the supreme importance of the needs of the Spirit in any scheme of social regeneration. Patient suffering is not always a vice and rebellion against established order on the slightest provocation is not always a virtue. Meekness of the spirit is not always a morality of the slaves and haughty insolence is not a virtue even of the masters. Moderation in all things, sweet reasonableness in our dealings with other men, considerateness, contentment, and devotion to social solidarity are the qualities essential for any kind of social stability. Faith in the innate goodness of the human nature would hearten many endeavours and create much optimism where suspicion, distrust, and a low view of human inclinations would make men

Social evolution has meant at all times the advance of civilization and the spread of culture. Sages all over the world have laboured in the cause of purifying the soul, for from this fountain-head have flown all that make for happier relation, contented living, and mutual service. But contentment thus inculcated is not meant to be a passive acceptance of the existing. Man has been taught always to screw himself up to a higher pitch of perfection and to exercise his liberty in furtherance of nobler ideals. To use Whitehead's expressive formula, we must shift our aim from 'the tameness of outworn perfection to some other ideal with its freshness still upon it'. This involves a knowledge of the principles of social aesthetics, of ways of beautiful living in conformity with a higher level of spiritual excellence. Social concord is not to be purchased at the cost of spiritual atrophy, nor should social discord be created only to feed the beast in us the better.

We shall not enter into the vexed question of the connotation of culture. Roughly speaking it would mean the establishment of those habits of thinking, feeling, and willing which have reference to a harmonious social life together with the acceptance of those transcendental implications that guarantee the continuance and enrichment of that life. The Indian philosophers summed up the fundamental requirements of a spiritual life in the formula—non-injury in thought, word, and deed, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, and non-hankering after worldly luxuries, these to be supplemented by purity, contentment, religious exercise, scriptural study, and meditation on God and also by the cultivation of friendliness, pity, joy, and indifference towards relevant objects. Perhaps to the West this would sound too negative and quietistic, but then the East thought in terms of duties and not rights, of intellectual and moral training and not of aesthetic delight although that was included by implication in the definition of Reality as the True (*satyam*), the Good (*śivam*), and the Beautiful (*sundaram*). When the East undertook adventurous journeys across seas and mountains, it was not out of curiosity or lust for new lands but out of a desire to preach the message of salvation, as Indian religious missions to the Far East did, or to learn the message of peace, as the Chinese pilgrims to India did. The long history of thought in the East would show that the adventure of ideas was not unknown either in India or in China. It is only when this habit of speculation declined and experimentation with new ideas languished that decadence set in. The quickening influence of contact with other modes of thought, belief, action, and devotion has again set a problem for life and speculation and the spirit of acceptance of the world is challenging the spirit of negation and renunciation with which the spiritual East is familiar. At this juncture we shall be needing circumspection, social understanding, and willingness to submit to the irresistible logic of facts if our culture is to survive.

By culture we shall not mean the body of beliefs, attitudes, and manners that characterize any stage of civilization, whether high or low, or emergence of a civilized condition out of primitive barbarism or even external polish or intellectual and aesthetic refinement of an individual, but we shall mean by it that perfection which takes due note of the necessity of harmonious social life, of regulating instincts and impulses by the laws of reason, of opening the mind to the beauties of nature and the appeal of distress in any shape and form, the sensitiveness to the influences of numinous situations and mystic appeals, and the readiness to subordinate the interests of the self to the larger good of society at large. We shall have to add to this the peculiarity of Indian culture, namely, the spirit of renunciation and detachment that must accompany all endeavours—the absence of a spirit of grabbing, of mad haste and cut-throat competition for power and pelf, and also the pursuit of spiritual insight and universal peace, based on a recognition of the identity of ultimate interests of all spiritual beings. Subject to the above reservation we shall be willing to subscribe to the definition of complete *kultur* as given by

Michaelis and quoted by Sir Philip Hartog: 'In this idea is comprised all that lifts man above beast; the conquering of the fetters and limitations placed on us by natural laws, the utilization of natural forces for human purposes, no less than the self-deliverance of man from the fetters of superstition and ignorance, the refinement of his instincts, the will for peace and for good understanding with other men and other nations, and the right to choose one's own path in every field of life—in short, the realization of the *rights of individual existence*'. What we in the East do not wish to harp on is the element of right—friction lies that way as the study of Western civilization abundantly shows. If nations had thought in terms of duties—of debts to gods, saints, and ancestors, as India, China, and Japan did, and of sacrifices for the satisfaction of all types of beings, as India did, perhaps there would have been real peace in the world. The fashion of decrying everything that has come down from hoary antiquity through Brahminic agency must end and we must record with gratitude the inestimable legacy of spirituality that it has preserved for us to enjoy and to export to other countries. The denial of the fundamental verities on which spiritual life was enthroned in India has not brought us nearer the millennial perfection and happiness. The sordidness, the injustice, the unscrupulousness, the immorality, the corruption in all fields of social and political activity, and the violence, that have come in the wake of successive world wars, are a warning to men that the sheet-anchor of spiritual life has been weighed and the ship of personal and social life is drifting to dangerous shoals and heavy seas. When life becomes tempest-tossed and begins to lose its steadiness, it is time to make for a known haven under the control of a tried helmsman. Let there be no blind faith or acquiescence in the unjust and the tyrannical organization of social and communal life; let there be an all-round attempt to remove galling disabilities, unmerited humiliations, obvious injustice in the distribution of the blessings of material life, and the lack of proper opportunities to rise, from which individuals and groups still suffer; but let there be reverence for ideals, respect for the teachers of mankind, regard for inherited wisdom, and recognition of the fact that man does not live by bread alone. Too long have we been fed on the idea that steel can be met only by steel, hatred by hatred, war by counter-war, agitation by repression, and oppression by revolution. We have tried to improve the intellect of men without chastening their morals, taught them to fatten their bodies without feeding their souls, and attempted to encompass social solidarity without the solder of spiritual kinship. Like unskilled medical practitioners we have tried to allay the symptoms of disease without attacking the root-cause of the malady. Once the formula of making the right appeal to the hearts of men is discovered and acted upon, disturbing social, national, and international symptoms will disappear as if by magic; but that discovery and that appeal can be made only by those who have hitched their wagon to a star and fashioned their temporal life in the pattern of the eternal. It is they alone who have faith in the innate goodness of the human spirit and its potentiality for attaining divine stature, for they practise the art of overcoming anger by lovingkindness, evil by good, stinginess by liberality, and mendacity by truthfulness. Were this faith to depart from the world for ever, no prophet would preach the message of God, no ethical teacher would strive to reform human character and humanity would reel back to barbarism and beastdom. May Heaven save us from that doom!

Through the intellect is not the way to solve the problem of misery, but through the heart. . . . Always cnltivate the heart; though the heart the Lord speaks, and through the intellect you yourself speak.

—*Swami Vivekananda*

SHIVA-PANCHĀKSHARA-STOTRA

OF SHANKARACHARYA

By Prof. K. R. Pisharoti

The *Śiva-pañcākṣara-stotra* of Shankaracharya is perhaps the most widely popular of his devotional hymns in praise of Shiva. The hymn, as it is, does not appear to signify much. It even creates the feeling that it does not come up to the general standard of Shankara's Stotras, either in form or in content. Nevertheless, it occupies the place of honour amongst Shaivite hymns of prayer, and the reason is that it is an exposition of the *Pañcākṣara* Mantra—*'Namah Śivāya'* (the five letters being: *na, ma, śi, va, ya*) which means 'salutations to Shiva'. Naturally, therefore, devotional tradition and practice alike assign to it a unique position.

In spite of its shortness, the Stotra gives us a vivid picture of the essentials of the supreme Lord Shiva. Physically of the form of a Yaksha, the Lord is described as possessing matted locks, dark-blue neck, and three eyes representing the sun, moon, and fire. He is pictured as *digambara,* as adorned with the necklace of serpents, and besmeared with sandal-paste and ashes. The Lord's emblem of the Bull, and Nandi, the Gaṇas, and Gauri are also mentioned. The main achievement of the Lord described is the destruction of the sacrifice of Daksha ; even gods and Seers are described as worshipping Him and singing His glories. Amongst the characteristic attributes mentioned are the following: He is *maheśvara*—the great Lord ; *divya* and *deva*—resplendent and shining; *śuddha*—pure; *nitya*—unchanged and unchanging ; and *sanātana*—Eternal. Thus the hymn presents not many but a few select attributes, and this renders the contemplation of the Lord easy even for the novice.

As said above, the Stotra is an elaboration of the Mantric text *Namah Śivāya,* and the lucid exposition of the Mantra by Shankara forms its present significance. From this point of view the Mantra forms a cryptic exposition of the Lord's physical features and attributes, sufficiently simple to understand but profound enough to produce an awareness of the supreme Lord who is alike the light and the shade of the entire universe.

Words are sounds with the power of signification. If a person is told anything uncomplimentary and displeasing, he is apt to lose his temper and, if he has the power he will probably retaliate too. And if he is told anything complimentary and pleasing, he will naturally feel flattered and elated. In both cases, the feeling aroused in him has resulted from the use of certain words—words arranged in a particular order and enunciated in a particular form. Indeed, much of the conflict in the world has arisen through words, not so much through actions. For, while the scope of the latter is limited, that of the former is unlimited. Mantras have power for good or for evil. Even as our everyday speech begets results,—good, bad, or indifferent—according as the words are enunciated, so does a Mantra: its effect depends to a great extent upon how it is recited.

God is present everywhere and in all beings, animate and inanimate,—that is what the Seers and the scriptures declare. But we do not see Him with our eyes, even with all the aids that modern science has devised. Nevertheless, the blessed amongst us experience Him. We are, however, told that He sees us, hears us, listens to us, and helps us, provided we make ourselves deserving of His grace. Hence the gaining of the Lord's grace depends largely upon ourselves, upon our becoming worthy of it. If, therefore, any one feels that

God has failed him on any particular occasion, really God is not to blame but he himself. In such cases the path of wisdom tells us that it is up to us to rise to the required fitness by self-effort, and pray, at the same time, for His grace.

If God listens to the individual's prayer, why should one pray in terms of another? The individual may well think, 'My needs are my own and somebody else's words cannot give adequate expression to my devout longing. I would, therefore, prefer to pray in my own way'. Such, indeed, is the path of the strong and the brave, of those who have developed an independent personality. Such was the path followed by our ancient Seers who had realized the supreme Godhead. But those who feel helpless, weak, and timid—and they form the vast majority amongst those who are in quest of the supreme Lord—have to be led. For them such hymns as these form one of the convenient means of reaching the Godhead. Man can thrive only by obtaining God's grace, and to secure His grace He has to be invoked. One may do it in one's own way or follow the path already chalked out by the great Seers of old,—the path that is easy and simple for the average man. Hence the importance of hymns of prayer in the religious life of man.

When God has to be invoked, it has necessarily to be done in the particular way that is most fruitful. The form is, indeed, very important. We all know that even in our everyday social contacts we have to observe certain well defined forms and the same has to be done in our dealings with our nearest and dearest ones. There is a way of doing things and we have to do things in that particular way if our doing is to serve any useful purpose. Hence the great importance of form and method in invoking gods—forms and methods which the great Seers have found most suitably applicable to the various gods and goddesses. All know from experience that familiar words attract and compel attention more easily than unfamiliar words. This seems to be the secret of the importance attached to the constant recital of various kinds of popular hymns and Mantras. For, earnest repetition and prayer ensure familiarity and consequently the early attainment of our desired goal by winning the grace of the Lord.

One such hymn of prayer is the ***Śiva-pañcākṣara-stotra.*** It leads directly to the attainment of the Godhead. If tradition is to be believed, Lord Shiva has often listened to this hymn. Regarding the efficacy of this hymn, Shankaracharya says in the *phala-śruti* couplet appended to the hymn, 'He who recites this sacred *Pañcākṣara* hymn in the presence of Shiva attains Shivaloka and enjoys (himself) in the company of Shiva'.

शिवपञ्चाक्षरस्तोत्रम्

नागेन्द्रहाराय त्रिलोचनाय
भस्माङ्गरागाय महेश्वराय ।
नित्याय शुद्धाय दिगम्बराय
तस्मै नकाराय नमः शिवाय ॥ १ ॥

1. Unto Him who has the serpent necklace, who has three eyes, who has his body adorned with ashes,[1] who is *maheśvara*,[2] who is immutable,[3] who is pure, who is clad in quarters—obeisance unto Shiva,[4] of the nature of *Na-kāra.*

मन्दाकिनीसलिलचन्दनचर्चिताय
नन्दीश्वरप्रमथनाथमहेश्वराय ।
मन्दारपुष्पबहुपुष्पसुपूजिताय
तस्मै मकाराय नमः शिवाय ॥ २ ॥

2. Unto Him who is anointed with sandal-paste mixed with the waters of (the river) Gangā, who is worshipped with *mandāra* and various other flowers, who is the Lord of Nandi and the Gaṇas—obeisance unto Shiva, of the nature of *Ma-kāra.*

[1 *Angarāga* means cosmetics, such as sandal-paste. The Lord has his body smeared over with ashes.

2 This may be taken as the name of Lord Shiva or as meaning the 'Great Lord'.

3 The term emphasizes the absence of all kinds of change.

4 The last *pāda* may also be taken as meaning, 'the auspicious *Na-kāra*'.]

शिवाय गौरीवदनारविंद-
सूर्याय दक्षाध्वरनाशकाय।
श्रीनीलकण्ठाय वृषध्वजाय
तस्मै शिकाराय नमः शिवाय ॥ ३ ॥

3. Unto Him who is beneficent, who is the sun to the lotus of the face of Gauri,[5] who is the destroyer of the sacrifice of Daksha, who is blue-necked, who has the Bull for his banner—obeisance unto Shiva, of the nature of *Śi-kāra*.

वसिष्ठकुम्भोद्भवगौतमार्य-
मुनीन्द्रदेवार्चितशेखराय।
चन्द्रार्कवैश्वानरलोचनाय
तस्मै वकाराय नमः शिवाय ॥ ४ ॥

4. Unto Him who has His crest worshipped by Vasishṭha, Gautama, *kumbhodbhava* (Agastya), and other noble Seers and Devas, who has eyes of the sun, the moon, and Agni—obeisance unto Shiva, of the nature of *Va-kāra*.

यक्षस्वरूपाय जटाधराय
पिनाकहस्ताय सनातनाय।
दिव्याय देवाय दिगम्बराय
तस्मै यकाराय नमः शिवाय ॥ ५ ॥

5. Unto Him who has the form of a Yaksha,[6] who has matted locks, who wields the *pināka* bow, who is Eternal, who is shining, who is divine, who is clad in quarters,[7]—obeisance unto Shiva, of the nature of *Ya-kāra*.

[5 Two other readings current are: *vadanābja-bāla and vadanābjavṛnda.*]

[6 The form of the Lord is said to be that of a Yaksha.

7 The Lord is described as 'clad in quarters'. This, though popularly taken to mean 'undraped', indicates that He fills every quarter, i.e. He is omnipresent.]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WHITEHEAD

By Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao

The fundamental tenets of the philosophy of Whitehead are set forth by him in great detail in his Gifford Lectures, *Process and Reality*.[1] A succinct account of the same is found in the third part of his book, *Adventures of Ideas*.[2] For the first time anticipatory hints of his metaphysics break on us in his popular book, *Science and the Modern World*. There he gives a rapid and critical account of the development of the history of scientific and philosophic thought interspersed with the doctrines of his own philosophy. The most lucid and non-technical presentation of his thought is set forth in the two lectures[3] delivered at the University of Chicago in 1934. After the manner of Spinoza, Whitehead presents in the form of clear propositions the categories of his metaphysics in a brief compass, before elaborating them. His categorical scheme consists of four divisions—the Category of the Ultimate, the Category of Existence (comprising eight entities), the Category of Explanation (in twenty-seven propositions), and the Category of Obligation consisting of nine propositions. 'The whole of the discussion in the subsequent parts either leads up to these categories (of the four types) or is explanatory of them, or is considering our experience of the world in the light of these categories.'[4]

Whitehead conceives Reality after the model of an organism. It is essentially a process and

1 Part I, Ch. II.
2 Part III, pp. 225-309.
3 *Nature and Life.*

4 *Process and Reality,* p. 38.

not a static entity. Everything in the universe is changing. All things are entangled in the unrest of becoming. Everything is a living movement and restless development. Reality is an ever flowing stream of happenings and events. As Heraclitus puts it: 'We do not step into the same stream twice, because the second time we step into it, it is no longer the old stream!' Reality throws up new evolutes at every stage, because it is creative in its process. It is not the mere unfolding of the past that is potential in it. It is the creation of the new that was not in it prior to the process. We can never catch Reality taking a holiday from the laws of growth, process, and motion. It is a flow of events, a surging of life moving incessantly to new forms.

The universal process of Reality has nothing in it that persists with an unchanging identity. There is no possibility of the reappearance of the old. It is being affected in the process, and so it cannot persist with its identity unchanged. When the old makes room for the new, the new arises. There are two different sides to the process. The first indicates the passing away of the old, and in its place something new comes into being. This coming into being is the second aspect of the process. This is called Creativity.

Creativity is the chief and the most primary category in Whitehead's thought. It is given the place of primacy in his categorical scheme. It is called the Category of the Ultimate. It expresses the general principles in all the other three special categories. They all imply creativity. 'It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity.'[5] Further it is creativity that is responsible for the fact of novelty. The advance of Reality consists in the passage from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the given entities in disjunction. 'The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the "many" which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive "many" which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it synthesizes. The many become one, and are increased by one.'[6] Creative activity underlies the very nature of things. It is an urge towards differentiation and unification for the purpose of individuating itself into creatures. It is concerned 'with becoming, the being, and the relatedness of actual entities'.

For Whitehead, Reality is a complex and patterned process. Everything in Reality is suffused by every other thing. It is a huge organism with a definite and a pervasive scheme of internal relations.

'Creativity' is defined by Whitehead, as another rendering of the Aristotelian term 'matter', and of the 'neutral stuff' of modern science. But it is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form' or of external relations; it is the pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world—a world which is never the same twice, though always with the stable element of divine ordering. Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian 'matter' is without a character of its own. It is the ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters are more special than itself.[7] Thus Reality on Whitehead's account turns out to be an intelligible pattern and a process, accomplishing something new always. There is a purpose at the heart of the universe and a point in the different forms and functions of the

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43. Terms like Creativity, Many, and One are the ultimate notions involved in the meaning of the term Entity. These three terms complete the Category of the Ultimate. The terms Thing, Being, and Entity are synonymous. The term 'One' does not signify the 'integral number one'. It is a complex notion. It stands for the singularity of an Entity. The term 'Many' presupposes the term 'One', the term 'One' presupposes 'Many'. The term 'Many' conveys the notion of a 'disjunctive diversity' which is essential to the concept of 'being'. This is the *first* Category.

evolutes. He singles out four philosophical notions as being basic to his system of thought. Most of the four notions come under the eight categories enumerated under the categories of Existence.[8]

'Reflective experience', says Whitehead, 'resolves into (a) Actual Entities, (b) Prehensions, (c) Nexus, and (d) the Ontological Principle'. The chief point to be noted in Whitehead's thought is that the Real is the concrete. He refuses to think of Reality in terms of abstractions, and describes that way of thinking as committing 'the fallacy of the misplaced concreteness'.

Reality is an organic, live, interrelated complex and concrete entity. The ultimate facts of immediate actual experience are called Actual Entities. They are also called Actual Occasions. The Actual Entities are the growing together of the many things into a new entity. They are the ultimate constituents of the world. There is no going behind them. The concept of an Actual Entity in Whitehead's thought has had a steady development. It has taken a final shape in his book, *Process and Reality*. In his earlier works, *The Concept of Nature* and *Science and the Modern World,* he began with the concept of Events. The Event was defined as something that is here and now. It was originally understood by Whitehead to be temporal but not spatial. Later on he points out that it is neither spatial nor temporal, and that spatiality and temporality are interwoven in it. It is self-contained and marked against other entities. It is described as atomic. It is also described as 'throb of emotions' and 'vibration'. The atomic and separatist nature of Events is given prominence in the earlier works of Whitehead. The demands of the rigour of his metaphysics led him to water down the stress he laid on the atomic and separatist nature of an Event. The purpose of the concept of an Event is to displace the traditional notion of the unchanging thinghood of objects. There are no things that endure with a selfsame identity.The notion that objects exist as independent entities, located in space, is attributed by Whitehead to 'the fallacy of misplaced concreteness'. The abstract is not the real, only the concrete is. There is nothing in nature that exists by itself. 'Everything suffuses everything else, and the relations of things to other things, to their environment, for instance, to their past, to their future, and to the minds that know them, literally constitute part of the being or essence of the thing.'[9]

The dynamic, the concrete, and the organic nature of Events, when fully stressed, gives us the concept of the Actual Entity. The concept of an Actual Entity throws overboard the traditional philosophical category, substance. The dynamic nature of an Actual Entity is opposed to the concept of the block universe. The concept of the Actual Entity is the foundation of Whitehead's thought. 'Among these eight categories of Existence, Actual Entities and Eternal Objects stand out with certain extreme finality. The other types of Existence have a certain intermediary character.'[10]

The entire philosophy of organism is, in one sense, the history of Actual Entities and their development. The process is described in the third category, the Category of Explanation. Under this he enumerates as many as twenty-seven categories.[11] This list is valuable as a table of reference for the basic ideas of Whitehead.

The first six categories of Explanation deal about Actual Entities. 'The actual world is a process, and the process is the becoming of Actual Entities. Thus Actual Entities are creatures; they are also termed Actual Occasions.'[12] Every Actual Entity in the process of its becoming extends over other Events which are contained in it and is itself contained as a part in other Events which extend over it. Rudolf Metz's illustration makes the point

[8] The second Category contains the following divisions: Actual Entities, Prehensions, Nexns, Subjective-forms, Eternal Objects, Propositions, Multiplicities, Contrasts.

[9] C.E.M. Joad : *Guide to Philosophy,* p. 573.

[10] *Process and Reality,* p. 29.

[11] *The Categories of Explanation,* pp. 30-35.

[12] *Process and Reality,* p. 30. The first Category of Explanation.

clear. 'For example, the journey of a cart through a street is a part of the whole life of the street; the life of the street extends over the journey of the cart. Similarly, the revolution of a wheel of this cart is a part of the event which is constituted by the journey of the cart, which extends over the revolution of the wheel.'[13] 'An Actual Entity is a process, and is not describable in terms of the morphology of a stuff.'[14] It is a 'concrescence'. Several factors enter into the concrescence and thus constitute an Actual Entity. In the last analysis, it is a network of several entities in relation. In its becoming, the potential unity of many Entities, actual and non-actual, acquire the real unity. Thus it is the concrescence of many potentials.[15] The interrelated nature of Actual Entities is fundamental to the thought of Whitehead. He posits that there are no independent Entities in the universe. Every Entity is drawn towards other Entities. There is a reciprocal and binding affinity obtaining between the things of the world. The universe is a network of interrelated feelings. There is a sort of electrical affinity obtaining between the things of the world. This affinity is called 'feeling' as well as 'prehension'. Prehension exists not only between conscious objects, but also between inert objects. It is this reciprocal pull which obtains between objects that makes for the organic nature of Reality. But for such an interconnection Reality would merely consist of a plurality of Entities, discrete and unconnected. Such an atomism militates against the intelligibility of scientific concepts like causation, induction, etc. It is this scheme of prehensions that has enabled Whitehead to combine atomism with the organic nature of Reality. Apart from these prehensions there is no Actual Entity at all. The Actual Entity joins the different feelings. It is defined by the rest of the universe, and it has no being at all out of those relations. It is determined by its predecessors, and it also conditions its successors. It affects other Entities and is affected by them. The interrelatedness of things is derived from the fact of the existence of 'universal feeling'. The doctrine of universal feeling and the relatedness of things, together rule out atomism. There are no independent particular Entities located in empty space. This principle of the interrelated nature of Entities is called by Whitehead the principle of Relativity.[16]

The Actual Entity is the growing together of these prehensions. The scheme of prehensions and the idea that every object feels drawn towards others is taken over from Bacon by Whitehead. He quotes and elaborately comments on the passage where Bacon says,

> 'It is certain that all bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they have perception : for when one body is applied to another, there is a kind of election to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate; and whether the body be alternant or altered, ever more a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies would be alike one to another. And sometimes this perception, in some kind of bodies, is far more subtile than sense; so that sense is but a dull thing in comparison of it; we see a weather-glass will find the least difference of the weather in heat or cold, when we find it not. And this perception is sometimes at a distance, as well as upon the touch; as when the load-stone draweth iron; or flame naphtha of Babylon, a great distance off. It is therefore a subject of a very noble enquiry, to enquire of the more subtile perceptions, for it is another key to open nature, as well as the sense; and sometimes better.'[17]

It is from this passage that Whitehead derives his inspiration for the feeling element that exists between things. The extreme position that Whitehead takes, namely, that inanimate objects too have reciprocal pull between them, and that consciousness is not necessary for the existence of feeling, is derived

[13] Metz: *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, p. 602.

[14] *Process and Reality*, p. 55.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 30. The second Category of Explanation: 'In the becoming of an Actual Entity, the potential unity of many Entities—actual and non-actual—acquires the real unity of the one Actual Entity; so that the Actual Entity is the real concrescence of many potentials.'

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[17] Francis Bacon : *Natural History* (*Silva Silvarum*), Ch. IX. See *Science and the Modern World*, p. 52.

pessimistic and resentful. Enlightening the soul is a better paying proposition in social relations than electrifying the house of a poor man. We are ultimately driven, then, to admit that we must draw up a scale of social values before we can plan for social betterment. from Bacon's illustration of the weather-glass in the passage cited. In short Whitehead's philosophy is a 'critique of pure feeling'. Whitehead writes, 'the philosophy of organism aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling, in the philosophical position in which Kant put his *Critique of Pure Reason*. This should also supersede the remaining critiques required in the Kantian philosophy.'[18]

The Actual Entity is a concrescence of many potentials. It is the growing together and a becoming in one of novel Prehension, Nexus, Subjective-forms, Propositions, Multiplicities, and Contrasts.[19] This holding together is rendered possible because of the interrelatedness of things. The processes of the Actual Entity can be described in two ways: one which is analytical of its potentiality for 'objectification' in the becoming of other Actual Entities, and another which is analytical of the process which constitutes its own becoming.[20] 'The term "Objectification" refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of one Actual Entity is realized in another.'[21]

The Actual Entity being essentially a process of a self-formation organizes the data presented to it by the rest of the world for its appropriation. The appropriation is effected according to the principle of unity which Whitehead calls the 'subjective aim.' In the process of appropriation 'no two Actual Entities originate from an identical universe'. The differences between the universes of Actual Entities consist in some Actual Entities being included in one, and not in the other and in the subordinate Entities which each of the Actual Entities introduced in the world.[22]

[18] *Process and Reality*, p. 158.

[19] See the third Category of Explanation. The Entities mentioned in the concrescence, prehensions, nexus, etc. are instances of the Category of Existence.

[20] See the eighth Category of Explanation.

[21] *Process and Reality*, p. 31.

[22] See the fifth Category of Explanation.

In the process of concrescence, though there is the possibility for each given entity in so far as its own nature is concerned to get implicated in one or other of many modes, still it is only in one mode. That particular mode of interpretation is rendered determinate by concrescence. This concrescence, no doubt, is conditioned by the 'correlate Universe'.[23] In the process of the concrescence the data throw up the subject. Here it must not be forgotten that Whitehead takes a stand which is diametrically opposed to 'Idealist metaphysics'. He believes that consciousness is derivative and not primary. He says, 'According to the philosophy of organism these three components (consciousness, thought, and sense-perception) are unessential elements in experience, either physical or mental'.[24] Any instance of experience is dipolar, whether that instance be God or an Actual Occasion of the world. The origination of God is from the mental pole, the origination of an Actual Occasion is from the physical pole; in either case these elements, consciousness, thought, and sense-perception, belong to the derivative 'impure' phases of the concrescence.[25] The subject or consciousness is the result of the grouping together of the data. Whitehead calls it the 'Superject'. This is Whitehead's doctrine

[23] See the sixth Category of Explanation.

[24] *Process and Reality*, pp. 49-50. See Hogben: *Nature of Living Matter*, p. 25. 'In our generation, the work of the Pavlov school has successfully tackled, for the first time in history, the problem of what Dr. Haldane calls conscious behaviour in non-teleological terms. It has reduced it to the investigations of the conditions under which new reflex systems are brought into being.'

See also Hogben's Address to the British Association of Science, Cape Town: 'The modern mechanist does not say that love and heroism do not exist but he says, "Show me the behaviour to which you apply the adjective thoughtful, loving, or heroic, and we will one fine day endeavour to arrive at predictable conclusions with reference to them, following the only method of enquiry which we have learnt by experience to trust".'

See *Process and Reality*, pp. 226-227: 'Experience has been explained in a thoroughly topsyturvy fashion, the wrong eud first'.

[25] *Process and Reality*, pp. 49-50.

of the emergent unity of the superject. Consciousness is not the fundamental stuff to begin with, it is something that is manifest at a later stage. The feelings create the subject. The subject is always called the superject. 'It is fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy of organism, that the notion of an Actual Entity as the unchanging subject of change is completely abandoned. An actual Entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is subject-superject, and neither half of the description can for a moment be lost sight of.'[26] The term 'subject' is always to be construed as an abbreviation of 'subject-superject'. Whitehead refutes the position that consciousness is fundamental and presupposed in the functioning of prehensions. It is a later phase. The group of prehensions gives rise to it.

Whitehead in defining the doctrine of the emergent-subject contrasts his position with that of Kant. He says 'the philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant's philosophy. *The Critique of Pure Reason* describes the process by which the subjective data pass into the appearance of an objective world. The philosophy of organism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjective satisfaction. For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world—a "superject" rather than a "subject". The word "object" thus means an Entity which is a potentiality for being a component in feeling; and the word "subject" means the Entity constituted by the process of feeling, and including this process. The feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings.'[27]

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

(*To be continued*)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIVEKANANDA AND THE FUTURE OF MANKIND

By Dr. Gobinda Chandra Deb

(*Continued from the October issue*)

The Vedantic exposition of error as an experience of the inexplicable and through that of the false is of paramount importance for metaphysics, since it is futile to treat its content either as a memory-image or as a real entity in a different spatio-temporal locus. Without entering into details, it may be pointed out that the mysterious transformation of a memory-image into a presented content constitutes the nucleus of error and, as such, the question of its inexplicability legitimately crops up. The same seems to be the upshot of the oft-repeated efforts from the days of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers till Alexander and even afterwards to shift the content of error from its presented context to a different one, since the apprehension of the past as present and the distant as near brings in the question of inexplicability under a new garb. Perhaps because of such difficulties, Holt maintains that there are contrary features of the object i.e. there are features of the snake in the rope with reference to which the perception of the erroneous snake can be accounted for. But this ingenious device of Holt does not, it seems, simplify the problem since, obviously, the alleged snake in the rope cannot be as real as the rope and as such the content of error retains its inexplicability. In other words, this also implies the falsity of the content of error, since it is an empirical existent devoid of metaphysical reality. The

snake in the rope, though felt to be an existent, has no reality whatsoever besides that of the rope. Transferred from the private world of the individual experiencer to the public world of all individuals, the doctrine would imply that the world of plurality, though felt to be real, has no reality of its own besides that of its undifferenced substratum. So it comes to this that the undifferenced Absolute alone is real and the world of plurality is false.

Now, accepting this well-known account of error as correct, it has to be seen whether this lends its categorical support to a purely solipsistic account of the world of plurality or not. The traditional method of exposition of error, though it claims to be quite consistent with the unambiguous refutation of subjective idealism, *vijnānavāda* as it was called, in Shankara, the great champion of non-relational absolutism, leaves the impression that it must invariably have its sheet-anchor in an individualistic idealism which cannot willy-nilly fight shy of a treatment of the world of plurality as a conjecture of the finite individual. But on closer considerations this prevalent impression does not appear to be correct.

An undue epistemological twist of the problem of error, at the cost of its accompanying metaphysical implications on the one hand and an extension of the analogy between the empirical illusion of the individual and the universal appearances, between the multiverse and the universe, beyond a reasonable limit, on the other, is primarily, if not mainly, responsible for a solipsistic interpretation of the world of experience in Vedanta. It has been presumed by some interpreters of error in traditional Vedanta that the indispensable condition of the falsity of appearances is their actual cancellation in subsequent cognitions. But to my mind, actual cancellation should better be substituted by cancellability which of course includes cancellation in a distinct sense i.e. in the substratum of the content wrongly apprehended and not necessarily to its external percipient. While these interpreters would treat the subsequent cognition of the rope as the sole determinant of the falsity of the snake previously experienced in its supposed locus, the rope, I would feel tempted to look upon this subsequent cognition as simply an occasion for our cognition of falsity even without which the snake would have been equally false provided its nature were such as was experienced in the said mistaken perception. Let us, in this connection, manage to think of an alternative possibility, equally, if not more, significant for an analysis of error. Supposing the erroneous snake is not actually cancelled through the perception of any outside individual whatsoever, will it not be equally illusory and cease to be real if its intrinsic nature is cancellable? It may be presumed that cancellability has no meaning apart from actual cancellation and as such the supposed alternative is a mere fiction of the intellect. This presumption will not appear to be correct if, instead of looking at the question of error from the standpoint of an external observer, we, by what Bergson calls 'intellectual sympathy', condescend to consider the question from the standpoint of the content perceived. If the rope were a conscious agent and if it could actually appear as a snake with the full cognition that it is not at all a snake but a rope, I think, we should be justified in asserting that without being cancelled to an external observer the snake in this reference is quite false because of its cancellability which undoubtedly implies its subjective cancellation in its apparent locus. The mistake of a purely solipsistic exposition of error seems to lie in assuming that the cancellation of the content of error can have meaning only with reference to an external cognizer and not with reference to its apparent substratum. This is due to too much of importance being ascribed to the manner in which we come across erroneous contents and the manner in which we find that they are cancelled, though, rightly understood, erroneous contents are found to be erroneous

because of their intrinsic essence to which alone the experience of cancellation bears testimony. It is wrong to ascribe undue importance to the subsequent cognition also because what is taken to be an illusion on its strength might reassert its existence on a possible third experience which might vindicate the first. In the majority of cases this may not, as a matter of fact, take place, but this is not altogether impossible in very rare cases. Thus, the content of error will not cease to be erroneous even if no external percipient comes to testify to the same, in case they are existentially erroneous. In other words, in order to lay an undue emphasis upon the epistemological aspect of error which is after all a means to an end, there is no justification for ignoring its metaphysical implications which are undoubtedly much more important in the present context.

The aforesaid rather superfluous emphasis upon the epistemological factors in illusory experiences has led to an equally superfluous emphasis upon an analogy in details between the empirical illusion of the finite individual and the cosmic appearances, even when this is intrinsically impossible. The appearance of cosmic illusions to an external observer is hardly possible since there is no finite individual outside the cosmic appearances to see them from a distance as in the case of the snake-rope illusion. Naturally here the appearances must be present in relation to their substratum, the undifferenced Absolute. It has already been shown that the cosmic whole cannot be taken as a replica of the finite percipient since there is always an inexhaustible plurality of such percipients at the empirical level i.e. in bondage. As such the cosmic appearances will remain throughout eternity and must appear in relation to their apparent locus which leaves admittedly no scope for any plurality whatsoever.

On a closer analysis it appears that an insistence upon a perfect similarity between the illusion of the private world of an individual and the cosmic appearances is not only a demand intrinsically impossible to fulfil, as has been shown above, but is also illogical in character. An inference is based upon the applicability of its middle term in different contexts and if we demand that the two instances of the middle term must be exactly alike, no inference would be possible. Let us explain the point with the help of the stock example of inference in Indian Logic, viz. the transition from the perception of smoke in the yonder mountain to the mediate knowledge of fire in it. This inference will be valid on the supposition that wherever there is smoke there is fire. Now, if it is contended that the said inference will be acceptable only if the smoke previously perceived is similar in details with the smoke now perceived in the mountain, inference must fall through since obviously enough smoke perceived in different contexts cannot be exactly alike. An inference is therefore based upon the notion of substantial similarity and not numerical identity of the middle term in different contexts. Vāchaspati rightly observes that the demand for numerical identity of the different instances of the middle term will be suicidal to the postulation of inference as a source of valid knowledge. Judged in this light, the role played by the external percipient in the determination of falsity of private personal appearance should not be superimposed upon cosmic appearances which are Over-individual in character. If the essence of illusions is taken to be their cancellability, which implies either cancellation to an external observer or in the locus of the content wrongly apprehended, substantial similarity between empirical illusion and cosmic appearances cannot logically be disputed and the thesis outlined above with regard to the relation of appearance to reality stands.

It might be apprehended that such a reading of cancellation of cosmic appearances will make them a permanent adjunct of the alleged undifferenced Absolute which will as a consequence cease to be non-relational. My answer to this apprehension is that extra-subjective but false appearances are quite compatible with their nndifferenced substratum. It is

only the real that can qualify the real and thus add to or detract from its being. But the non-relational Absolute being real and the cosmic appearance being false, the latter can only apparently qualify the former without any detriment to its undifferenced essence. This, I think, is the true meaning of the doctrine of inexplicability of appearances in Vedanta. Rightly observes Madhusudana, the renowned Vedantist, that appearance (*dṛśyatva*) is the infallible mark of falsity; and consistently with this definition, I would like to assert that the cosmic appearances are false because they appear to their apparent background. Thus, the appearance of the undifferenced Absolute as the eternal spectator of the world-drama can neither add to its essence nor take away from the same. Non-relational absolutism thus stands ear-marked from the relational in which appearances, being the real contents of the Absolute in some sense or other, do really qualify it and contribute to its essence. In other words, the undifferenced Absolute can, consistently with its unalloyed identity, leave scope for the eternal appearance of a false cosmic whole in it, since in its essence, the said whole stands ever cancelled in the former.

Judged in this light it might be possible to measure the depth of significance of the following *Gita* utterance on the nature of Reality: 'I pervade all that exists with My invisible being, but though the universe exists in Me, I do not exist in it'. Yet, from the perspective of this analysis, perhaps the most significant formulation of undifferenced absolutism is to be met with in the following enigmatic expression which constitutes the preliminary couplet of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: 'Reality in its fullness is the invisible and the abstract, and it is also the visible and the concrete; from the fullest Reality, it itself comes out in the shape of the universe and yet, mysteriously enough, Reality in its fullness remains intact'. The striking resemblance of the doctrine given expression to in this couplet with the view of Plotinus—who appears in history definitely later—that Reality is 'present everywhere in its entirety' cannot possibly be overlooked. Its three implications of superlative importance for idealistic philosophies of all types, specially of the truest type, are: (i) recognition of the Absolute as the fundamental stuff of Reality; (ii) appearance of the Absolute as the world of experience; (iii) retention of the intrinsic nature of the Absolute, in spite of its appearance as the cosmic whole. In short, if the above analysis of error and inexplicability of its contents proves acceptable, as it should, on the basis of the texts of the Upanishads and the *Gita* and the pregnant suggestions of Vivekananda, the basic identity of Īśvara with the undifferenced Absolute, its apparent substratum, may be taken as the last word of Vedanta. It is not a philosophy of identity in difference but identity eternally appearing as differences without in any way ceasing to be what it intrinsically is. And if there is any mystery in it, it is a double mystery: the first, that false differences eternally appear in spite of their being ultimately unreal; and the second, that an undifferenced stuff apparently becomes the substratum of endless varieties that constitute the cosmic drama.

The relation of appearance to Reality, thus conceived, gives us a sort of new mathematics which implies that the addition of appearances to Reality does not augment it, nor does the subtraction of them from it in any way lessen its being. This is the type of mathematics which alone can determine precisely the relation of the world of appearances to the form of the good in Plato and of the phenomenon and noumenon in Kant, both very much enamoured of mathematics, the former finding in it a preparatory discipline for the knowledge of Reality and the latter, the unattained ideal of metaphysics. Bradley was clearly unaware of such mathematics, since his appearances, however discrepant *prima facie* they might be with Reality, contribute finally to its richness. Being impressed with the profound metaphysical implications of the findings of contemporary science, based on the calculations of higher mathe-

matics, Sir James Jeans feelingly observes that in the light of our present scientific knowledge we should be justified in thinking that the universe is after all a bundle of thoughts in the mind of a mathematician. This aptly reminds us of Spinoza. I would like to add, in consonance with the new mathematics of *māyāvāda* just elaborated at some length, that the thoughts in the mind of the alleged mathematician cannot possibly enter into his being or essence.

I have already pointed out the substantial identity of *élan vital* of Bergson with the concept of Maya and through that of Kāli in Vivekananda. From the philosophical specification of Maya and its relation to the undifferenced Absolute made thus far, it would be apparent that what is viewed on the surface as Maya or God or Kāli or the *élan vital* is, on its last analysis, identical with the Absolute characterized by pure identity. Speaking in terms of mythology, pregnant with the deepest possible metaphysical import, the universe may be looked upon as the free sport of ever dynamic Kāli, riddled with contradictions, on the breast of the ever static Śiva, above all contradictions. The reality of Kāli is Śiva and the apparent expression of Śiva is Kāli. Bergson finds ultimate truth in unrestricted dynamism and treats stability as a fiction of intellect constructed within Reality, but Vedanta, rightly understood, finds the truth of dynamism in stability and the apparent expression of stability in dynamism.

It seems that a failure to adjust properly the relation of appearances to the pure identity of their substratum has been responsible for some differences among the Vedantists of the Advaitic school. The usual method of accounting for them is to explain them away as trivial on the ground of uniform adherence of all Advaitins to the undifferenced Absolute, admittedly the pivot of Vedanta. It has also been given out that from the ethical standpoint, the undifferenced Absolute alone is of the utmost importance and as such minor differences should not disconcert the adherents of the doctrine. But, on a close analysis, it appears that, from a theoretic standpoint at least, such differences ought not to have been treated so lightly. It may also be added that a proper evaluation of the status of appearances in Reality would have considerably broadened the scope of Vedantic ethics. This will be clarified while we take up for consideration the ethics of Vivekananda.

In passing it may be mentioned that solipsistic interpreters of Advaita Vedanta do not seem to have done justice to Shankara whose system is replete with references that lend fair support to the recognition of some sort of extra-subjective status of the world of appearances. The illustrations of the magician and the dramatist throughout resorted to in explaining the role of world appearances and the recognition of a mysterious relation of the cosmic whole within its undifferenced background which can neither be characterized as a relation of difference nor also as one of identity, pure and simple, seem to be quite compatible with the metaphysical implications of Maya already brought out. I am therefore led to think that among the interpreters of Shankara it is Vāchaspati who has brought out best the implications of *māyāvāda*. In what has come to be known as *avacchedavāda*, Vāchaspati has clearly drawn, on the one hand, the distinction between Avidya as the material of private personal appearances like the rope-snake and of the cosmic appearances that constitute our commonly shared world, and on the other, between the individual self as related to the finite mind-stuff and God as related to the cosmic Maya. Such a clear-cut differentiation between the cosmic whole and the privately experienced worlds and between the individual self and the universal mind, seem to corroborate our view of the relation of appearances with reality.

A general survey of relational absolutism reveals that it has three consecutive phases. The first is a recognition of the 'Absolute as an identity of distincts' as Croce would like to call it. Spinoza, notwithstanding his leanings to Vedantic ethics, and Ramanuja

especially, may be taken as representatives of this tendency. A little analysis shows that the identity of distincts is but a hidden form of the identity of opposites, since identity and distinctness are not apparently compatible. Thus, the first phase of relational absolutism logically leads to the second. Hegel and Bhāskara, more specially the former, may be taken as its prominent representatives. Through his dialectic method, Hegel has attempted to build a pyramid of contradictions on the top of which is to be found the all-inclusive Absolute, the highest synthesis of all possible discrepancies which needs no further synthesis. The next phase of relational absolutism, which is perhaps its final phase, ascribes a halo of mystery round the notion of identity of opposites in its recognition that intellect fails to understand how exactly all contradictions are reconciled, an ideal which it can never altogether reach. The best representative of the tendency seems to be Bradley, who, as we have already seen, considerably tones down undue logism of Hegel in his epistemology as well as metaphysics. A kindred note is somewhat visible in Bengal Vaishnavism as represented by Baladeva and others, according to which the relation of the finite self with the cosmic whole is a sort of mysterious identity in difference (*acintya-bhedābheda*). A rather indefinite variety of non-relational absolutism, as represented by a considerably large number of its advocates, both in the East as well as the West, might, from the speculative standpoint, be subsumed under its three consecutive phases stated above. It seems that relational absolutism reaches its culmination in its third phase, in a confession of its inability which does not seem to result from the nature of things but from a confusion of the demands of reason and experience in the scale of Reality.

The full significance of this remark will be apparent if we proceed to consider the role of reason and experience in philosophy. While discussing the epistemology of Vivekananda I tried to indicate how intellect and intuition can meet. In this study of his metaphysics, I have been systematically trying to show how sense and intellect can possibly meet and contribute their respective quota to the scheme of Reality. There is an apparent conflict between the demands of sense and intellect and the history of philosophy, particularly of speculative philosophy, is but a record of this perpetual conflict. It has been pointed out previously how the demand of intellect for identity can be met by a supralogical awareness. But even after this union of intellect and intuition, the tussle between sense and intellect persists, since, as against the demand of intellect for a stable identity, sense finds all reality in a changing plurality, in a process which, as we have already seen, is self-discrepant through and through. It may be presumed that sense gives us a knowledge of the thinghood which is more or less stable in character and as such it cannot be said to reveal simply a process. But the supposition seems to be wrong, since, strictly speaking, sense is directly concerned with a cluster of sensations out of which the thing is constructed by intellect somewhat in the manner shown by Kant. And it is more than obvious that the internal sense reveals our inner life as a continuous but fleeting show. There is, at least, no immediate awareness of a durable self. Empirically, thoughts themselves are thinkers, as William James puts it. In short, as against intellect supplemented by supralogical intuition, sense is not concerned with stability and identity but with plurality and change which are for it convertible terms. Judged in this light, the preferences of some philosophers for plurality and change is in fact a preference for sense as distinguished from reason and through that from supralogical intuition of the highest type. To the contrary, the partiality of some other philosophers for stability and unity is, in fact, a partiality for reason and through that for the highest supralogical intuition as against sense. The history of philosophy of the past, consciously or unconsciously, exhibits a predilection for stability and identity and as such might be said to be characterized by a domi-

nating logical tendency. Platonism and Vedantism constitute its very breath and Buddhists and Heraclitus appear on the scene in order to shine for a moment by contrast. This alone accounts for the importance that Aristotle ascribes to an unmoved mover, in spite of his leanings, as against Plato, to change. Modern philosophy, more particularly contemporary philosophy, seems to be characterized by the reverse tendency, since for it Reality is unmitigated change. Plainly speaking, it is therefore through and through empirical in its attitude. Descartes and Spinoza find it difficult to accommodate change in a stable stuff till at last Leibniz finds in movement the infallible mark of Reality and treats God as pure activity (*actus purus*), just like Prakṛti of Sānkhya whose essence is perpetual change. As contrasted with the occasionally cautious preference of modern philosophers for change, contemporary philosophy, unhesitatingly and without any reservation, gives vent to its unqualified predilections for change as the fundamental stuff of Reality. Croce and Gentile conceive, under the pressure of time-spirit, the Absolute, whose stability in some shape or other was treated in the past as its infallible feature, as a process. And Alexander conceives of his deity, the philosophical substitute for God of popular theism, as an emergent character of a continuously changing process, and as such it never is but always to be. Even intuitionism of Bergson, which claims to transcend the limitations of intellect, is a specimen of empiricism of the widest possible dimensions. Metaphysically at least, intellect is in him a failure, since it is unable to unravel the mystery of change and duration, and intuition is a great success because unrestricted change happens to be its pulse-beat. In fine, contemporary philosophy, under an indefinite variety of confusing appellations—such as intuitionism, neo-idealism, neo-realism, pragmatism, dialectical materialism and conceptions of the same brood—primarily aims at a recognition of change either in the shape of space-time or events or point-instants or even as dynamics of history as the fundamental stuff of Reality.

Relational absolutism aims at effecting a cheap compromise between the demands of sense and reason in its attempt to make change and plurality in some way or other a fabric of the Absolute or the unitary background of the universe. Ramanuja does not feel so much the problem implied in a reconciliation of unity and plurality, since, for him, the Absolute is a unity of the type of the physical body, of which the whole universe is, as it were, a few limbs or it is a unity of the type of the tree, of which the whole world may be looked upon as branches and leaves. The organic unity of the psycho-physical organism that constitutes our empirical being seems to be Ramanuja's clue to the discovery of Reality. Here one cannot fail to take note of the discrepancy implied in such a juxtaposition of unity and diversity. Organic unity is not any the less contradictory because of its being a fact. It is difficult to accept the supposition that facts cannot be contradictory in nature. Judged in this light, any rejection of Bhaskara's concept of identity in difference seems to be unwarranted. Hegel realizes the problem implied in a simultaneous recognition of unity and plurality as a double feature of Reality. But he also seems to have offered a cheap solution of it by a clear-cut denunciation of the fundamental demand of intellect to which reference has already been made. His fidelity to sense and through that to change leads him to treat pure being as a synonym of pure nothing and his fidelity to logic, side by side, forced him to attempt a synthesis of opposites and thus to reach self-consistency in a new shape. But he does not seem to have been able to serve two masters with equal dexterity and skill and has therefore succeeded in not satisfying either. Spinoza and Bradley seem to have made a more serious attempt to tackle the problem by an elimination of the time-process from the Absolute, taken as a whole. Spinoza is for viewing things under the aspect of eternity (*sub specie eternitatis*) and accord-

ing to Bradley, though there are 'histories without number in the Absolute, the Absolute itself has no history'. But yet the attempt at the elimination of contradictions does not seem to have been quite successful, since in Spinoza there are eternal modes which enter into the very being of the Absolute much in the manner in which the three angles of a triangle enter into its being. This obviously brings in the question of identity in difference and thus invites the difficulties to which we have already referred. Much similar is the case with Bradley who is more a Spinozist than a Hegelian. He strains every nerve to resolve all the differences in the unity of the Absolute not in the drastic manner of Hegel but with the cautious method of a 'homœopath'. The Absolute resolves all contradictions 'homœopathically', as he puts it. Nevertheless the seeds of differences are there in the unity of the Absolute and, as such, the problem of making identity and difference logically compatible remains unsolved. In short, relational absolutism, in all its phases, has failed to do full justice to the demands of sense and reason and seems to swing like a pendulum between the two with an alternative preference for both.

It is to be noted that, sense and intellect being primordial faculties of our spiritual life, it would intrinsically be impossible to lay an exclusive emphasis upon one of them at the cost of the other. A satisfactory code of metaphysics must, therefore, be based on a synthesis of the ultimate demands of both of them. In other words, stability and change, unity and plurality must be posited as parallel features of Reality. Consistently with a logical temper, this metaphysical parallelism can be asserted only if the stable Absolute be recognized as the apparent substratum of the cosmic process, the totality of appearances whose reality is constituted by the former. The recognition, in conformity with the fundamental demands of reason and sense, of identity appearing as differences and the differences finding their reality in identity is the great insoluble mystery that constitutes Maya—probably the last word of metaphysics in so far as it lies within the comprehension of man as he is constituted. In other words, in a reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism, through which Kant attempts to banish metaphysics altogether, a synthetic code of Reality seems to lie hidden. It is thus comparable to the great monster of Hindu mythology which perpetually deceives its murderer by coming back into life out of its own blood shed by the latter. If the analysis carried thus far stands, as in my humble opinion it should, the above specification of Reality seems to be the last word of Vivekananda on Metaphysics and through that of Advaita Vedanta of which he is the staunchest among modern advocates, the 'paragon of Vedantic missionaries', as William James beautifully puts it.

From the above analysis, I think, it ought to be quite clear that the cancellation of the world of appearances in liberation, at times pronounced with great emphasis by Vivekananda, relates not to the universe but to the multiverse, the smaller world that the finite individual carves out for it within the framework of cosmic appearances. The philosophy of Kant seems to be based, like traditional Vedanta as it is ordinarily understood, on the recognition of the phenomenal reality of the first, side by side with a treatment of the cosmic whole as its necessary shadow which cannot claim even a phenomenal status,—a doctrine which can hardly claim acceptance as has already been shown.

From the above it also follows that the emphasis laid nowadays in philosophy upon a historical genesis of philosophical concepts, however otherwise important it may be, chooses to be, being purely based on the verdict of sense, a selective study of Reality and should be replaced by a complete view of it based on the verdicts of sense and intellect,—more appropriately, intellect finding its fulfilment in extra-logical awareness.

(To be continued)

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TO OUR READERS

Life,—dominated as it is by a continuous movement of incessant interaction of forces and counter-forces,—to be fruitful, must not only be a daring adventure but also an acted living philosophy. Man has to accept and adequately meet the challenge of Nature: Is the universe animated by a living and conscious Principle and is human life under the firm hold of inexorable inconsequence? Not all strict scientists take even the 'material' world to be a product of blind mechanism, subject to unchanging laws. Some of them afirm justifiably that the only real world is the spiritual world. The deplorable disposition to equate human personality with inert inorganic matter and handle the former as on all fours with the latter has to be checked if the world is to be spared the anguish of helplessly witnessing the increasing inhumanity of man. This need for a spiritual and essentially human outlook has been rightly and energetically emphasized by Prof. Haridas Bhattacharyya, M.A., B.L., P.R.S., in his masterly study of *Nature and Man*. His fervent call for a better recognition of the claims of the Spirit than those of the mere body—though the latter must be met to the extent necessary,—in order to make society an effective institution for the perfection of the individual, cannot be lost upon those who seek to pilot human affairs.

A close study of the fundamental tenets of *The Philosophy of* the well-known British philosopher A. N. *Whitehead* is made by Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao, M.A., D.Litt. It will be concluded in our next.

THE SCIENTIST AND THE SOUL

It is often seen that some scientists betray a very 'unscientific' attitude towards matters that lie beyond their own special sphere of investigation. The 'pitched battle' in the West between mechanistic materialism and dogmatic theology has only served to widen the gulf between religion and science. Moderners in general and many a scientifically inclined person in particular are sceptical about the existence of the soul as an immaterial reality, independent of the body and mind. While modern physics and psychical research have revolutionized scientific thought and belief, yet there are not wanting rank materialists who go so far as to assert that matter is something 'lying out there in space' which one could see and touch. Those who reject every experience—mystic or otherwise—that lies beyond the ken of the physical senses cannot be said to be true seekers of truth in its entirety. Examining the generally known two broad conceptions of the soul or Self of man according to physical science,—viz. that the nature and substance of man consist of (1) the body only, with its biological functions, and (2) the body, with the quality or function of consciousness,—in the course of a thought-provoking article in the *Visva-Bharati Quarterly* (for May-July 1951), Dr. Satish Chandra Chatterji, scholar, philosopher, and author, writes:

'The first scientific concept, as we have explained it before, is that the soul is the material body with its natural functions and without any consciousness. As against this crude notion of the soul we are to point out first that, while claiming to be scientific it really arises out of an unscientific attitude of the mind. A scientist should be faithful to, and must have due regard for, the facts of experience. That there are certain mental states in a man is as good and as certain a fact as that he has a body and its states. Even if we grant that sense-perception is the only reliable source of knowledge, it may be pertinently asked: Do we not have a kind of perception, called internal, which gives us an immediate knowledge of our mental states? And do we not perceive in these, consciousness which is nowhere to be perceived in the external material objects? To deny the existence of consciousness is, therefore, to reject the evidence of our immediate experience and ignore certain actual facts of experience. And this is the most unscientific act for a scientist to do. Secondly, we are to observe that, bnt for conscionsness there would be no ground for our asserting the existence

of the body. If there be no consciousness, how could we know that we have a body at all? For a material body, to *be* or simply to exist is not to become conscious of itself. If, then, we *know* that we have a body, that is because there is such a thing as consciousness in us. Hence the scientific idea of the soul as the unconscious material body also turns out to be dogmatic and irrational.

'Turning next to the other scientific idea of the soul we find that, although it means an advance on the first concept, yet it does not really help us to explain all the facts of man's life and experience. On this view, the soul of man is his living concious body. Consciousness is here said to be a quality of the body, because it is perceived to exist in the body and to arise out of the activity of the brain. But it is rather misleading to speak of consciousness as a perceptible quality of the physical body. None of us perceives consciousness in the body or the brain in the same way in which we perceive the colour red in a rose. The red colour is *in* a rose, but consciousness is *of* the body or the brain and not *in* the body or the brain. That is to say, the body or the brain is an *object of* consciousness and not *conscious objects* themselves. Further, to say with the scientist that consciousness is a by-product of the complex combination of the material elements composing the body, is only to make hypothesis which has not yet been verified. So far as human knowledge goes, we have not anywhere perceived consciousness to arise out of the combination of unconscious physical elements, however complex that might be. So the scientist's idea of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of brain activity has no more validity than that of an unproved assumption which must not have any place in a rational science. Then, assuming that consciousness is an epiphenomenon or shadow of brain activity, we do not see how it can act or exert any influence on the body as it is found to do in emotion and volition. Nor, again, do we see how it can be acted upon in what is called sensation. It is a matter of common experience that strong emotions and volitions of the mind move the body, and strong sensations break in upon the mind. But all this is inexplicable on the view that consciousness is a shadowy phenomenon. Interaction is possible only between two real and substantial entities and not between a substance and its shadow. To be true to the facts of experience, therefore, the scientist must admit either that consciousness is a reality or that it belongs to an immaterial reality called the soul'.

Dr. Chatterji has successfully sought to beard the lion in his den. The scientist is hoist with his own petard. Pressing home the clear idea about the nature and function of science itself, Dr. Chatterji says:

'By science we mean the systematic study and rational explanation of facts of experience. It is the primary function of science to observe, describe, and analyse all the facts of experience without omitting or neglecting any of them. It would be the most unscientific thing for a scientist to ignore actual facts or even to twist them to suit his preconceptions and presuppositions. Secondly, science aims at a rational explanation of the facts of experience by bringing them under certain laws and relating them to their proper causes and conditions. It may even be that for such reasoned and reasonable explanation of facts, the scientists have to admit the reality of entities which are not directly open to sense-experience, but without which sense-experience cannot be rationally explained. That is the justification for the theories of atoms, electrons, protons, etc., in the past and present history of science. These entities are as far beyond the reach of our senses as is the soul or spirit admitted by certain philosophers. If the scientista are justified in making these assumptions for the sake of a rational explanation of facts of experience, there is no reason why some philosophers should be unjustified in their admission of the soul as a spiritual entity when that is found necessary for the same purpose'.

Apart from refuting the untenable views of the scientists regarding the soul of man, the learned philosopher adduces luculent and independent evidence in favour of the existence of the soul. These are partly linguistic and partly logical and psychological. The function of language is to express our thoughts and thoughts are born of experience—internal and external.

'In ordinary life we use such expressions as "*my* body", "*my* mind", "*my* intellect" and so on. On the contrary, expressions like "*I* body", "*I* mind", "*I* intellect" are not only not used, but are laughed at when used by anyone. If human language is any index to the realities of life, we are to say that the body, mind, and intellect belong to and are somehow owned by the soul, but are not themselves the Soul of man. It is true that we sometimes use such an expression as "my soul". But here we should note that there is no absurdity in our taking the expression to mean "I, the soul". Rather, we feel that such a rendering of it brings out the real significance of the expression in question. When I say "my soul", what I mean is just "myself" and not that there is an "I" to which the soul belongs. As for ordinary judgments like "I am lame", "I am fat", etc., we are to say that they have their basis in the wrong sense of identity between soul and the body. The soul as embodied and identified with the body may be

spoken of as lame, fat, etc. But that such identification is wrong comes out clearly from the fact that the lame man considers himself to be the same person that he was before he became lame. If a man were really the body as a whole, then with the loss of a limb he would cease to be the same person. This, however, is not a matter of actual experience. Rather, a man considers himself and is considered by others to be the same person both before and after the loss of a particular limb. All this goes to show that the soul of a man is not his body, but an abiding reality which, although related to a body, is different and distinct from it'.

The two other factors of common experience to which Dr. Chatterji draws attention are the individual's sense of personal continuity and personal identity.

A normal person has no doubt that there is an unbroken continuity between the different states and stages of his life. The past states and stages in his life are continuous with his present life. Not only are they continuous, but they are felt or experienced as continuous. How are we to explain this indubitable *sense* of continuity in the life of an individual person? This can hardly be explained by the continuity of development of his body. There may be a sort of physical continuity in the development of the body like the one we find in the continuous flow of the water of a river. But mere physical continuity is not enough to explain psychical, i.e. experienced continuity. If it were so, a river could become conscious of the continuity of ita flow. Hence to explain the sense of personal continuity properly, we have to admit the existence of a conscious reality called the soul or self of man. . . . A mere succession of conscious states does not explain the consciousness of succession. What we require for this purpose is a constant, conscious reality or soul which binds together the successive stages as parts of its personal life'.

The sense of personal identity has been sought to be explained by some scientists in terms of continuity of the body, while others have sought to explain it away as false and illusory. Answering these unsuccessful and unscientific contentions, Dr. Chatterji writes:

'As we bave pointed out, the continuity of our body is no explanation for the *experienced* continuity of our personal life. Assuming that it is so, we do not see how it can be taken to explain our sense of personal *identity*. It is one thing to say that something is continuous, and quite a different thing to say that it is identical. In fact, however, the idea of continuity, instead of explaining identity, itself requires some sort of identity for its explanation. A thing is said to have a continued existence, if and only if there is something which remains identical in it and makes it continuous. . . . The other alternative . . . that man's sense of personal identity is illusory, there being really nothing identical in him to produce it . . . involves the fallacy of a vicious circle in the scientist's reasoning. This may be put as follows: "There is no soul because the sense of personal identity is illusory; and the sense of personal identity is illusory, because there is no identical soul". Apart from this logical flaw in the scientist's argument, we are to point out that the sense of personal identity is a matter of immediate knowledge for us, and that to reject it as illusory is to be blind to facts of experience in order to save one's favourite theory.'

There are many other positive phenomena which we come across in life and all of which can be satisfactorily explained and understood only on the basis of the existence of a distinct, conscious, imperishable *soul*. There is the notion of freedom inherent in us, whereas the body and mind are bound by law. We also have a direct understanding that the body and mind are as mere 'instruments' which we seek to control and direct for the best purposes we desire. The phenomenon of dream, where perception takes place without the agency of the senses, and many undisputed cases of telepathy, clairvoyance, and clairaudience prove the possibility of extrasensory experience. There are the cases of amazing child prodigies and of those—young and old—who have clearly and accurately remembered events of their past lives,—all of which can be satisfactorily explained on the basis of experiences in past lives, which means the existence of a soul which survives the destruction of the physical body. The Vedanta teaches that man's real nature is divine, that he *is* the *soul* and *has* a mind and body. This is the foundation of all ethics and progress in life. Or else, if man were a mere fortuitous combination somehow produced out of 'unconscious matter' and his existence ended once and for all with somatic death, all ethics and morality would lose their intrinsic significance and further the strivings of man in pursuit of higher aspirations and eternal values would become fatuous.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD (A SYMPOSIUM). EDITED BY C. H. DOBINSON. *Published by the Oxford University Press, Mercantile Buildings, Lal Bazar, Calcutta. Pages 153. Price 12sh. 6d.*

The whole world is on the move, including our country, after a long period of lethargic stillness. Every human institution is changing, and some of them are changing beyond recognition. The rising generation has to be trained to adopt itself to, and take its legitimate place in this challengingly new world. And naturally everyone looks up to our educational institutions to provide this training. But has our educational system kept pace with the changing times? Are our present-day educational aims, policies, and methods capable of meeting the challenge of the times? The book under review sets out to examine the position in contemporary British education, in the light of the act of 1944, with a view to determining its merits and limitations in respect of its ability to meet the above-mentioned challenge. And it is needless to say that those responsible for guiding Indian education can learn a great deal from such a carefully prepared balance-sheet of British education.

Education in a Changing World is a symposium and the participants in it, who are all leading educationists, have done an excellent job of it. They have dug down to the very roots of education, and have examined them objectively and unsparingly. Among the problems thus raised by the symposiats. I should like to give the place of prime importance to philosophical considerations discussed by Prof. L. A. Reid, who laments that 'English educational thought has been starved of its philosophical due'. 'A great present need of education is well-proportioned wisdom leavened by philosophy'. Without a firm foundation of calmly thought out philosophy, our educational policies and methods are bound to go awry. The severe frustration in contemporary Indian education is due solely to lack of proper philosophical orientation. Indian educators and educationists will do well to read, assimilate, and act on the observations made by Prof. Reid.

Next to the philosophical, certain sociological considerations count most in education. The role of the State in education, education in relation to the social order, and the orientation of education in terms of the newly emerging concept of Internationalism, are all problems of vital importance, and are discussed by Professors C. A. Morris, I. L. Kandel, and Sir John Maud. In regard to the first two problems, the discussion has, quite naturally, a distinctive English slant. The democratic ideal is implicit in the British way of life, but the tradition of English schools has created two types of educational institutions: one for the masses and the other for the select few. We see in the symposium under review some very determined and effective thinking to remove this 'class distinction' in education and to provide equal educational opportunities for all children, best suited to their aptitudes and abilities.

Luckily, in our country, we do not have to face the problem of a dual system of school education. But there is something much more sinister threatening our educational institutions and that is State infiltration and domination. Even the autonomy of our universities is being undermined today by the sinister penetration of State agencies. The well-known dictum that 'the State should make itself increasingly unnecessary, and should finally wither away' should be enforced first in the field of education.

While the interference of the national State is resented, and rightly resented, we welcome the international outlook in education. Sir John Maud's observations on the functioning of the U.N.E.S.C.O. are really illuminating, as they bring out the merits as well as the limitations of that body. 'There are no sanctions for U.N.E.S.C.O. to apply against a nation', and 'there would be difficulty even in discussing the question whether communists and non-communists enjoyed equal opportunities for education in Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary'. Even so, the U.N.E.S.C.O. has been peacefully mobilizing world opinion in favour of the view that national and cultural loyalties are as compatible with membership of a world society as is family loyalty with membership of a national society. Such a view is bound to prevail over and penetrate into every country, however undemocratic and reactionary.

After the philosophical and sociological considerations, psychological principles count most in education. Prof. Rex Knight presents a well-balanced account of the contributions of psychology to education. And we in India have many valuable lessons to learn from the chapter 'The scientific background of educational change'. Psychology does not claim to be a panacea for all the ills in education; yet, it is a valuable guide, indicating what may be done and may not be done when revolutionary changes in education are being contemplated. For instance, psychology condemns the myths that have grown round it, and exposes the fallacies underlying the strange excursion into mental typology which has generated the so-called multi-lateral schools in certain areas of our country. The warning of the psychologist may be ignored only at grave risk to the younger generation of India.

A symposium is, when all is said and done, a series of views with different perspectives. No doubt an attempt is made in the symposium under review to present to us a synthesis of the different aspects discussed separately by the symposiasts. But the basic causes of the ills that affect our educational system have not been explored. There is, of course, a feeling on the part of the symposiasts that the educational system needs radical changes. But they are not able to hit upon the principles on which such a thorough change should be made. They lack the spiritual vision for reorienting their educational systems. Such a vision may be had if the reformers will turn their attention to Swami Vivekananda's writings and utterances on education. Everything that is needed for an effective reform is there ready to hand. European thinkers will therefore do well to study carefully the great Swami's views on education which are, in fact, a translation, on the practical plane, of the Vedantic view of life.

P. S. NAIDU

HINDU HOLY BOOKS—*CHANDI* AND *GITA*. BY BHUVAN MOHAN BANERJI. *Published by Haripada Banerji, 63, Kailas Bose Street, Calcutta—6. Pages 112. Price Rs. 2-8.*

The book under review presents, in rhymed verse, English renderings of the gist of two of the most popular holy books of the Hindus. It also contains some of the original poems of the author under the titles 'Miscellany of Musings on War' and 'Echo of Milton's Paradise Lost, Book I'. Dr. Banerji is highly conscious of the responsibility that devolves upon a man, well versed in Eastern lore and Western literature, for, the main purpose of writing this book has been to acquaint those who know English but not Sanskrit with the instructive and inspiring thoughts contained in these holy books. The book goes a long way to serve this purpose. The medium is as pliant as the heroic couplet could be.

But one cannot quite admire the choice of this verse-form, because in reading through the book one comes to know more about its limitations. Yet, it must be said to his credit that Dr. Banerji has read his Dryden and Pope thoroughly and well. Nobility of purpose and sincerity of feeling have given it a peculiar distinction among the books of its kind, and, as such, it deserves to be read for that specific purpose as well as for occasional passages of poetic insight and beauty, and his faith in the assimilation of noble ideas and forms from foreign sources.

AMARESH DATTA

SATYAGRAHA. BY M. K. GANDHI. *Pages 422. Price Rs. 5-8.*

SATYAGRAHA IN SOUTH AFRICA. BY M. K. GANDHI. *Pages 366. Price Rs. 4.*

Both published by the Navajivan Publishing House, Kalupur, Ahmedabad.

The Navajivan Publishing House, as is well known, is doing a great national service by publishing, from time to time, collected writings of Mahatma Gandhi.

Satyagraha is a comprehensive collection of Gandhiji's writings on the unique subject of non-violent resistance. To quote Gandhiji: 'Indeed, the sum total of the experience of mankind is that men somehow or other live on. From which fact I infer that it is the law of love that rules mankind. Had violence, i.e. hate, ruled us, we should have become extinct long ago. And yet the tragedy of it is that the so-called civilized men and nations conduct themselves as if the basis of society was violence'. The world, in spite of advances in science and technology, is in the fatal grip of violence. This is the tragedy of civilization. Men seem to have no inclination to heed to the message of true religion and the result is an unending succession of inevitable sorrow and devastation. What Gandhiji stressed was non-violence of the strong and the brave. A mere superficial observance of non-violence, proceeding from fear and cowardice, is worse than violence. Satyagraha means the immense force of moral and spiritual strength that one develops through faith in one's own uprightness and through reliance on God.

Satyagraha in South Africa is the revised second edition of the well-known and authentic work by Gandhiji, published many years ago. It was originally written in Gujarati and was rendered into English by V. G. Desai. The lucidity and faithfulness to the original of the translation have been commended by Gandhiji himself in his foreword. As the title indicates, the book enshrines an authentic, consolidated, and comprehensive acconnt of the memorable non-violent struggle in South Africa, for the emancipation of Indians living there, which was effectively carried on and successfully concluded after eight years under Gandhiji's leadership. This work is important as a historical document as it refers to the very beginnings of the theory and practice of *Satyagraha*—a term invented and employed for the first time by Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa—which later on became a powerful force in his hands and under his guidance, as the history of India's struggle for freedom amply bears out. Today when Indians in South Africa are facing a most difficult situation, what Gandhiji has said in this book assumes a special significance alike to the oppressors and the oppressed.

B. S. MATHUR

BENGALI

TATTVA-JIJÑÂSÂ. BY SATISHCHANDRA CHATTOPADHYAYA. *Available from Das Gupta & Co. Ltd., 54/3, College Street, Calcutta. Pages 177. Price Rs. 2.*

This Bengali book by a renowned philosopher and well-known author is a collection of essays on philosophical subjects contributed to a number of Bengali magazines and written at different times. The essays thus lack any inner connection, and are loosely strung together to form a garland of variegated colour. The essays also differ very much in size and quality. The best essay in the collection is undoubtedly the last, which deals with the philosophy of the late Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya. The author has poured his whole soul into it. It is one of the best expositions of that eminent philosopher, written by one who is himself a philosopher and who had the privilege of intimate association with him extending over a large number of years. One reason for the dearth of books on Prof. Bhattacharya's philosophy is that he was a very difficult writer. Not only are his thoughts very difficult to grasp but his style also is very terse. Prof. Chatterjee must he congratulated upon the wonderfully able manner in which he has expounded the very difficult philosophy of the late Prof. Bhattacharya.

Unfortunately, all the essays in the collection are not up to the level of that on Prof. Bhattacharya's philosophy. The essay on 'Sri Aurobindo and the Eternal Problem of Man's Life' is rather disappointing, as it gives hardly any idea of the distinguishing features of Sri Aurobindo's message. The short essay on Sri Ramakrishna is full of great feeling and devotion.

Other essays in the book also differ widely in quality. But one thing must be said in justice to the author. Although many of the essays are somewhat scrappy, yet there is no trace of prejudice of any kind in any of them. The book ought to find a place on the shelves of every public library in Bengal.

S. K. MAITRA

MARATHI

SRIMAD-BHAGAVAD-GITECHA ABHANGATMAKA ANUVAD OR MANTRA-GITA. (OF SAINT TUKARAM). EDITED BY V. S. BENDREY. *Published by V. V. Patankar, 41 Budhwar, Poona—2. Pages 358. Price Rs. 5.*

Tukaram, the great poet-saint of Maharashtra, composed a large number of inspiring and instructive lyrical verses known as 'Abhangas', in Marathi which possess a vast religious fervour and are very popular among the Marathi-knowing public. There has also been current a Marathi rendering of the *Gita*, of which is attributed to Tukaram and of which about ten editions have been printed since 1840. But it could not be authenticated since no mention of this work has been made in any of the biographies of Tukaram. The learned editor of the book under review, who has been doing commendable work in connection with historical research and the publication of valuable books in Marathi, Sanskrit, and English, became deeply interested in this Abhanga-rendering of the *Gita* while he was engaged in writing a biography of Tukaram. This book is the outcome of Sri Bendrey's untiring efforts in trying to establish its correct authorship and publish a critical edition of it. He has sought to make it clear beyond all doubt, both from internal and external evidence, that the author of the work is none other than the great saint. In a learned and exhaustive Introduction to the book the editor has thoroughly discussed the question of the authorship and the nature of the contents of the book and other allied topics, throwing some light on the social and political conditions during the times when Tukaram wrote the *Gita* Anuvad and also on the lofty teachings of the saint.

Sri Bendrey has consulted as many as ten different manuscripts and has spared no pains in making the edition reliable and readable, and easily intelligible to Marathi readers who cannot but be impressed by his depth of scholarship and clarity of exposition. The text of the *Gita* is given in Sanskrit and each Shloka is followed by its Abhanga rendering. The Abhangātmaka-Anuvād is more a free than literal rendering, and it is but natural that Tukaram's interpretations of the *Gita* bear the impress of his ethical and philosophical thought. There are altogether 724 Abhangas—700 corresponding to the *Gita* Shlokas and 24 relating to the author's introduction, salutation, etc. contained in almost every chapter. Useful footnotes have been added wherever necessary and variations of textual readings have also been indicated. Two alphabetical indices, one for the Sanskrit Shlokas (with the number of the corresponding Abhanga) and the other for the Abhangas, are appended at the end.

NEWS AND REPORTS

RAMAKRISHNA MISSION

REPORT (IN BRIEF) FOR THE YEAR 1950

The following is a brief report of the work done by the Mission during the year 1950:

CENTRES

There were altogether 67 Mission centres and 8 sub-centres, which served all without distinction of creed, sex, or colour and preached non-sectarian religious principles.

ACTIVITIES

Relief Work: Winding up the Gratuitous Relief Work in the form of daily feeding at the Sealdah station thousands of refugees from East Pakistan for seven weeks, and ministering to the needs of many more through 19 centres in various Provinces for about six months till the end of August, the Mission took up Rehabilitation Work in West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, where 1,445 families were rehabilitated. Up to the end of the year the Mission spent Rs. 1,22,251/- for relief and rehabilitation. Moreover, 10,116 people in Assam, who were affected by earthquake, were helped with 30,183 yards of cloth besides cash and medicine, at a total cost of Rs. 7,036/-.

Medical Service: The Mission conducted 8 Hospitals with a total of 520 beds, which treated in all 13,764 cases. The 41 Outdoor Dispensaries, including the T.B. Clinic at Delhi, treated altogether 26,05,125 cases including repeated ones during the year.

Help to the Poor: Under this head 74 mds. of rice, 215 cloths and blankets, and Rs. 4,233/- were distributed among deserving people. In addition, 145 students and 202 families were helped with a total of Rs. 23,294/- as monthly grants. Regular stipends were also given to 34 refugee students from Sind, the total expenditure being Rs. 4,740/-.

Educational Work: Work under this head included 3 Colleges, of which 1 was for Teachers' Training, 22 High Schools including 4 Residential ones, 18 Tamil Schools, and 6 Orphanages with a total of 10,418 boys and 4,571 girls; 60 lower grade schools with 7,236 boys and 2,568 girls; 6 Industrial and Technical Schools with 305 boys; and 3 Teachers' Training Schools with 243 students. The Mission conducted 37 Students' Homes, accommodating 2,215 pupils. Besides, 4 Primary Schools, having 355 students, were helped with Rs. 227/-.

Work outside India: In Ceylon, Burma, Singapore, and Mauritius the Mission successfully carried on its educational and cultural activities. Only in Pakistan it somehow maintained its existence.

SWAMI MADHAVANANDA
General Secretary
Ramakrishna Mission

Belur Math
27-9-1951

RAMAKRISHNA MISSION SEVASHRAMA, RANGOON

REPORT FOR 1950

The Ramakrishna Mission Sevashrama (Charitable Hospital), Rangoon, Burma, which restarted working in 1947 after the war, has at present 115 beds and caters to about 700 outdoor patients daily. During the year under report the Sevashrama treated a total number of 3,368 in-patients and 1,91,373 out-patients.

The Physiotherapeutic Department was reorganized and shifted to a separate building of its own which was declared open by Sri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, during his visit to Rangoon in June 1950. Treatment is given with diathermy as well as ultra-violet and infra-red rays and radiant heat. 1,202 persons were treated in this department during the year.

Radium treatment for cancer and other malignant diseases was given to 75 patients. The clinical laboratory carried out, in all, 5,480 tests. Altogether 880 patients (340 indoor and 540 outdoor cases) were X-rayed in the hospital's own X-ray plant.

All the 4 candidates trained by the Sevashrama and sent up for the Compounders Examination passed. A fresh batch of 8 candidates are under training.

Finances: The total expenditure incurred on General Account was Rs. 2,42,580-3-0 while the receipts amounted to Rs. 2,32,180-10-0 leaving a deficit of Rs. 10,399-9-0. Besides contributions for maintaining the Hospital, the Sevashrama needs funds to equip and furnish a new ward with 30 beds, and to construct a maternity block and a children's ward.

RAMAKRISHNA MATH CHARITABLE DISPENSARY, MADRAS

REPORT FOR 1950

This Charitable Dispensary, conducted by the Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras, came into being in 1925 in order to render service to poor and helpless patients in and around the locality. Ever since, it has rapidly and extensively progressed.

During the year under report the Dispensary treated 85,000 cases in all—61,830 in the Allopathic and 23,170 in the Homeopathic sections, of which 25,414 were new. Also 2,973 injections were administered and 801 minor surgical operations were done during the period.