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"उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत।"

"Arise! Awake! And stop not till the Goal is reached."

FORMULA OF ROUSING AND REFINING

BY THE EDITOR

"The mind is everything. If the mind loses its liberty you lose yours. If the mind is free, you are free too. The mind may be dipped in any colour, like a white cloth fresh from the wash. . . If the mind he kept in bad company, it will colour one's thought and conversation. Placed in the midst of devotees, it shall meditate upon God also. It changes its nature according to the things amongst which it lives and acts."

Sri Ramakrishna*

I

Ordinarily air is 'light' and 'non-resisting'. Small insects, almost invisible to the naked eye, can hop from one place to another and pass through it with ease, with the help of the tiny mnscles of their legs. But if the insect has wings, air stands 'rigid', as it were, receives their beatings and permits steady flight. This rigidity, however, can become most deadly to man and his properties when, instead of remaining still, air begins to move at eighty miles an hour, along a ten mile front! Those who had occasion to carry relief to cyclone-struck areas know the extent of damage this 'light' element that surrounds us can cause within a short time.

Thought exhibits some of these features. When we leave the mind to itself, without making any effort to direct it, thought forms emerge and combine in strange ways. They roll and curve like puffs of smoke from a dying fire. They look harmless and, sometimes, even interesting like butterflies flitting in the morning sunbeams. But the consequences can be terrible if their 'airy' waves develop into a passion which spreads from one individual to another, till opposing nations are caught in its violent eddies and whirlpools. Wars and bloodshed start as little breezes in ambitious minds. But when left unchecked, they slowly assume the proportions of a wide-spread storm

* *Teachings*, No. 514.

which spends itself in wrecking homes, killing and disabling millions, and destroying works of art and culture. The next generation or two would find themselves thrown into a sorry plight. They would be compelled to struggle hard to rebuild what was wantonly razed to the ground during hostilities. If still the general pattern of thoughts remains unchanged, the aggrieved party would surely plan some sort of revenge to 'retrieve',—as they would put it—the honour supposed to have been lost earlier! The vicious circle would thus be continued indefinitely. Uncontrolled thoughts have a way of percolating, and ultimately sweeping away, society's protecting bunds in the shape of mutual love and helpfulness, or the religious values of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Therefore, from the earliest times, sages who had at heart the welfare of all mankind have laid the greatest emphasis on the regulation and purification of the tremendous energies flowing through the mind. Every aspirant is expected to struggle hard in his own way to detach his mind from the external world and to turn it Godward. The reason for such a discipline is not that activities on the physical plane as such, or the presence of other people near by are objectionable, but that there is need to make special efforts to create, and hold aloft, an all-embracing and sublime Ideal to which all activities and contacts can be intelligently referred then and there, without fail. Like every other work of skill, the creation of such an Ideal is possible only if thought can be lifted above the craving for sense enjoyments, and trained to move freely, and feel quite at home, in a world of moral and spiritual values. When guided by such a pervasive Ideal, mind becomes our best friend, while without it the same mind becomes our deadly foe.

II

There is one aspect of the personality that is common to the man of uncontrolled habits and the perfect sage. It is the fact of being connected with bodily exertion and of actively participating in day to day affairs in their respective fields. But while the movements of the one are prompted by the motive of securing for himself whatever promises satisfaction to his senses or vanity at the time, those of the other carry the ennobling touch born of the clear recognition of the sacredness of all life and the unity of existence.

If two people can have the same set of ideas, arranged precisely in the same order, their inferences, convictions, and behaviour are bound to be identical. The trouble is that they are seldom so arranged. Hence people think and act in diametrically opposite ways although their environment contains all that is required to make everyone virtuous and holy. In many cases, a person takes his first step in self-control when he has carefully observed the sequence of changes within him and put them together in a causal chain, more or less as follows: The sense organs are so made as to be able to bring reports of any attractive object falling within their range. If there is no pressing work for the mind, it dwells on the special charms of any of those objects. When this is repeated, it gathers momentum and its influence automatically spreads to the next higher level of the personality. There it takes the form of a steadily rising desire to possess the object. From here on the turns of thought become extremely complicated. For, when many people desire to seize the same object a clash becomes inevitable. That means enmity, anger, and a state of mind in which the memory of better principles of conduct can hardly arise. Since, thus, all available and relevant facts and views fail to get into the picture, the decisions arrived at and the actions undertaken go wrong, and lead to varying degrees of pain, loss, or destruction. Man is man only so long as his internal organ, *antaḥkaraṇa,* is fit to discriminate between what is right and wrong, good or evil, useful or harmful. When it is unable to do so, the man is ruined or debarred from attaining human aspirations.[1]

[1] Cf. *Gītā,* ii.62-64, and Śaṅkara Bhāṣya thereon: Śāstrācāryopadeśāhita-saṁskāra-janitāyāḥ smṛteḥ syāt vibhramo, bhramśaḥ, smṛtyutpatti-nimitta-

According to this reasoning, it is unchecked 'brooding' on the beautiful side alone of sense objects that helps unwanted elements to come out of their 'shells' and enter the thought stream. If we are fully convinced of this, we shall always be vigilant. Instead of remaining passive, we shall travel all along the line and take note of the forms those elements assume at different levels. We shall then learn to tap the energy that gives them life, and convert it in ways that benefit ourselves and others. We do the same thing with wealth. All the products of a nation's creative efforts can be estimated in terms of money or purchasive power. Wicked rnlers may waste it in securing the services of agents whose business is to accentuate differences of language, race, or religion among masses of people in adjacent lands, till all of them drift into war and destroy themselves as well as the sources of production! Through wise policies, on the other hand, it is possible to utilize that very purchasive power to provide better facilities for the spread of knowledge, to promote arts and culture, and even to improve production as a whole. In actual practice the question resolves itself into one of increased spending for right purposes; when supplies are fully diverted into good channels, bad ones must sooner or later dry up of themselves. The principle that by continued stress on the desirable, disconnection from undesirables is brought about without striking a single blow at them, is at the back of most exercises in mental purification. This is hinted during the brief reference to the process whereby the senses can be pulled back from their objects and made to 'imitate, as it were' the nature of the mind. 'The senses,' it is stated, 'are restrained, like the mind, when the mind is restrained.' As this is too terse to be easily understood, the common example of the bees is cited immediately below. 'Just as bees fly as the queen flies up, and sit as she sits down, so the senses become restrained when the mind is restrained.' In other words, to the extent we create a lofty Ideal and implant it within ourselves, the various aspects of our personality, mental or physical, will 'settle' round it, get charged by it, and faithfully reflect its glory in the course of our daily work. Since it acts on all of them simultaneously and in equal measure, this method of control is the surest and best. Other controls involving a single sense, limb, or aspect have necessarily to be supplemented, while this control acting directly on the intellect, emotions, and higher receptivity does not 'stand in need of employing any other means.'[2]

III

For quick check-ups we require short formulas. Even when our car fails to start, we are forced to use a few of them. We try to find out what has gone wrong by conducting 'tests' along two or three 'lines', kept distinct in our minds for the sake of convenience. First, we surely examine the fuel side,—stock, supply pipe, and pump. We may next take up the ignition side,—battery, wiring, plugs, and cleanliness of the various 'points'. If still we are unable to detect the mistake, we may pass on to the carburettor, and so on. Similarly the physician of the traditional Indian school also has his own 'code' for classifying his patient's symptoms. One technical term covers the assimilative system,—excess or deficiency of digestive juices etc. The second means tissue formations, which include such opposites as swellings and tnmours, and atrophies. The third embraces all 'movements', related to joints, muscles, nervous impulses, or difficulty of emotional

prāptau anutpattiḥ...kāryākārya-viṣaya-vivekāyogyatā antaḥ-karaṇasya buddheḥ nāśa ucyate...Tāvat eva hi puruṣo yāvat antaḥ-karaṇaṁ tadīyaṁ kāryākārya-viṣaya-viveka-yogyam, tad-ayogyatve naṣṭa eva puruṣo bhavati,...puruṣārthāyogyo bhavati.

[2] Cf. citta-nirodhe, cittavat niruddhāni indriyāṇi, na itarendriyavat upāyāntaram apekṣante. Yathā madhukara-rājānam makṣikā utpatantam anūtpatanti, niviśamānam anu-niviśante, tathā indriyāṇi citta-nirodhe niruddhāni ityeṣa pratyāhāraḥ...Tac-ca paramā tu iyaṁ vaśyatā yaccitta-nirodhe niruddhāni indriyāṇi, na itarendriyavat prayatna-kṛtam upāyāntaram apekṣante yoginaḥ. Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtras, ii.54-55.

adjustments. He has naturally to arrange his drugs too in accordance with their power to restore the equilibrium of the three vital 'sections', as seen by him. Such divisions are made primarily for convenience. They are not without a certain reasoning behind them.

In the matter of mental control also a threefold division is possible. It has to be based on three easily identifiable kinds of ideas and emotions that every man is likely to experience at some time or other. Of these the lowest kind makes a man sluggish and ordinarily averse to hard work, especially mental. But when he chooses to exert, his tendency may be to cling doggedly and without reason to any single idea, as if it were all. Or he may rush headlong into action without understanding the need to pause and consider his own ability, or the loss and injury that may be inflicted on others. He may be fickle and stiff-necked by turns, and as a general rule, too indolent to shake off the habit of looking at things from the wrong end. When these symptoms are found, we must conclude that the mental mechanism is still in the lowest 'gear' in which Nature had left it at birth! Such moods, outlook and behaviour are called 'Tāmasic'.

The next higher kind is called 'Rājasic'. It makes egocentric ideas dominate the mind. The man who is goaded by them will always aim at personal gain. He would gladly undergo severe hardships, even carry on prolonged religious austerities, in order to secure wealth and sensual pleasures. Greedy and cruel, he does not hesitate to encroach on the rights of others. He runs into extremes,—of joy when his schemes succeed and of utter misery when they fail. It does not strike him that what he thinks to be enjoyment is in fact a veritable trap-door through which he loses his strength, intellectual vigour, and psychological stability. He must indeed be a most foolhardy driver who is unable to notice that his chance hits have put his machine in the 'reverse gear' in the evolutionary plane!

The third in the series is the 'Sāttvic' mood. As any text book on spiritual topics will show, Sattva endows the aspirant with mental firmness and vigour. It leads to the steady rise within him of qualities like fearlessness, uprightness, serenity, modesty, compassion, and devotion to study and worship. They gradually purify and enrich his personality. As they penetrate into deeper levels, they establish 'irreversible' patterns of reaction out of the very energies that previously produced only Tāmasic and Rājasic moods. When purity reaches its peak, the mind becomes fully receptive to the highest Truth, the One indestructible Reality in all beings. The intellect, thoughts, vitality, and sense organs henceforth lose their separate existence in a way; for they have now become equally faithful instruments to express that Oneness in their respective spheres of work. That this transformation has a reality far surpassing that of the physical body and the material objects surrounding it, is verifiable directly by the sage himself whenever he is inclined to look within, and indirectly by others who live so close to him as to be able to observe the turn of events within his 'range'.

IV

The object of bringing all mental movements under three heads is clear from the degrees of cultural advance inferable[3] at the back of the qualities included in each. The simplest principle of control is that wherever Tamas is seen to be operating, steps should be taken immediately to replace it by Rajas. Vigorous activity is the best antidote to sluggishness and stupor. Selfish activity has no doubt its own dangers, but it has one relieving feature while indolence has none. For selfishness always carries with it not only the desire to forge ahead, but also the determination to protect itself while engaged in running after pleasures. Sooner or later, Nature will lead the selfish man to a cross-road. He will then see that he can gain his further objectives by peaceful means, which may be a little slow in

[3] Cf. Tataḥ ca kāryeṇa lingena devādi-pūjaya sattvādi-niṣṭhā anumeyā ... Evam kāryato nirṇītāḥ sattvādi-niṣṭhāḥ ... Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, *Gītā*, xvii.3-4.

fructifying. Or he can resort to violence or intrigue in the name of speed, and risk everything, including previous gains and even his own life. Confronted by these alternatives, he will be compelled by his self-interest itself to pause and reflect. The difficulty is only in picking up sufficient courage to make the first right choice. After that he would see the advantage of adopting the path of love and gentleness to achieve his legitimate ends. Each subsequent adjustment within himself would mean a little more widening of the aperture to let in the light of Sattva. Before long he would begin to treat day to day problems as excellent opportunities for reacting quickly with virtuous 'drives'. When this attitude takes firm root in him, he would play the game of life with power and grace, distilled out of the very energy that used to work havoc inside him before.

That mental refinement is a kind of distillation from crude sources was well known to ancient teachers. What more dramatic example of it can be found than the way in which Kṛṣṇa dealt with Arjuna's sudden dejection before the starting of hostilities at Kurukṣetra? This impending slaughter acted as a powerful stimulus, and made Arjuna, although a hero of many battles, acutely conscious of the nnco-ordinated streams of valour and virtue all along flowing within him. That was evident from his prostration at Kṛṣṇa's feet and his earnest prayer for guidance, in spite of his feeling, at the time, that a mendicant's life would be better than a military victory stained with the blood of relatives and preceptors. Kṛṣṇa too saw the same facts and entertained the same love and respect for the fighting men on either side, as Arjuna did. Bnt he had the special ability to integrate every external event, however terrible, and plan of action, however painful, into a well ordered Cosmic Scheme, in which earthly values of gradual evolution mixed harmoniously with the eternal Perfection of the Supreme Lord. Words spoken and discussions carried on in an atmosphere charged with such a penetrative Vision could not fail to produce the final transforming movement in the fairly 'processed' materials present in Arjuna's noble heart. If we turn to the lives of the great Prophets and their immediate followers, we shall come across beantiful instances of conversions and transformations, some sudden, others slow, the variations in speed being due mainly to the different proportions in which Tamas, Rajas, and Sattva stood mixed up in their thought stream at the time.

Stndents of the popular drama, *Śākuntalam,* will remember how the celestial charioteer Mātali employed the sound psychological principle of whipping up Rajas in order to neutralize Tamas. He found that something sensational had to be done to remove the stupor into which King Duṣyanta had fallen and to make him fit to fight on behalf of the gods. With a touch of grim humour, Mātali who knew how to keep himself invisible. seized the innocent jester Mādhavya, pulled his neck backwards, almost 'snapping it into three parts like a sugar cane', and shouted in threatening tones: 'Here I am, thirsting for the blood gushing out of your throat. I shall kill you now, as a tiger kills its struggling prey. Let Duṣyanta who wields his bow to remove the fear of the afflicted rush to your rescue!' This ruse had the expected result. How could any hero look on idly when ruffians attacked members of his household and he was himself called by name and challenged? He decided quickly to send a missile that could locate an unseen enemy and slay him wherever he might hide. Having achieved his purpose, Mātali appeared before the king, bowed down to him and, after putting him in his normal mood, explained: 'I fonnd Your Royal Highness extremely dispirited. It was to rouse you into anger that I acted in such a strange way. To make the fire blaze forth, we have to stir it; and to make the snake spread out his hood, we have to poke him a little. Similar is the case with human beings. They can get into their highest spirits only when sufficiently provoked.'[4]

[4] Eṣa tvām abhinava-kaṇṭha-śonitārthī
Śārdūlaḥ paśum-iva hanmi ceṣṭamānam;

The general rule, thus, is that when internal balance is upset, we have to 'counteract Tamas by Rajas, then conquer Rajas by Sattva, the calm beautiful state that will grow and grow until all else is gone'.[5] But as long as Sattva is weak, and the mental scene presents nothing more than a prolonged tussle between Tamas and Rajas, the statement of the wise that 'the mind alone is Ignorance'[6] is literally true. When Rajas predominates and sense enjoyments are eagerly sucked in from all sides, the 'mental sheath' may very well be compared to the sacrificial fire of ancient ritualists. The five senses will then correspond to the five officiating priests, the innumerable desires imbedded in the mind to the fuel that keeps the fire burning, and objects of pleasure to an unbroken stream of oblations.[7] What can be expected to result from such a procedure except a tightening of existing bonds? It is to rouse men from their complacent attitude and make them aware of their danger that poets have conveyed their warnings through the use of striking images. One briefly-worded caution says: 'In the forest-track of sense pleasures, there prowls a huge tiger called the mind. Let good persous who love Freedom never go in that direction!'[8]

V

Every warning, howsoever expressed, is bound to throw the listener on his guard in an instant. It cannot but wake up his sleeping faculties and make them spring into position,—alert, poised, and ready to act, like a whole regiment with arms shouldered, waiting for the next word of command. When this is over, the problem changes into one of utilizing the energies whose downpour is heralded by the sudden flash of vigilance. Ancient teachers have wisely provided the necessary canals. They have followed up their warnings with positive directions, and assured success to those who adhere to them. Like skilful painters who balance each dark shade by a high light, these sage-poets have placed by the side of every prohibition its appropriate counterpart in the shape of some practical step for rearranging the pattern of thought. The very fact that they have spent their precious time to exhort us ought to be an eye-opener to us. In the first place it implies that we have the *freedom* to change whatever is undesirable. Secondly it shows that the most basic of all changes,—that from which others are derived later—is the *conscious introduction* of *any* convenient *virtuous thought* to neutralize an acknowledgedly *bad* one.

We know the important part played by the initial 'suction' of fuel-mixture in an internal combustion engine. What we call 'thought' performs a similar function in our personality. Take, for example, the familiar 'desire' to walk to the nearest door. What happens on the conscious 'dial' or 'screen' is the presentation, in advance, of mental pictures of our body executing the relevant movements. We also 'hear' a mental talk urging us to carry them out. If we do not 'act' immediately, it is because, for some reason or other, fresh pictures and talks have entered the field and cancelled previous ones. If our power of observation is sharp, we can watch the subsequent 'audio-visual' events. Or, cutting off the expected 'forward' movement, we can recall earlier 'bits' and combine them in any order we like. But whatever takes place in the 'surface' mind, under control or without it, 'seeing' and 'talking' do not leave us. What the teachers realized, and want us too to realize, is that something else, more vital and 'basic', happens at the same time, in the deeper recesses of the personality. That is the 'suction' of Life-energy in its

Ārtānām bhayam apanetum ātta-dhanvā
Duṣyantas-tava śaraṇam bhavatvidānīm!

... kiñcin-nimittād-api manaḥ-saṅtāpāt āyuṣmān mayā viklavo dṛṣṭaḥ. Paścāt kopayitum āyuṣmantaṁ tathā kṛtavān asmi. Kutaḥ:

Jvalati calitendhano'gnir-
Viprakṛtaḥ pannagaḥ phaṇam kurute,
Prāyaḥ svam mahimānaṁ
Kopāt pratipadyate jantuḥ.

Act vi. 27 and 31.

[5] *Inspired Talks* of Sw. Vivekananda.
[6] Mano hyavidyā. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi,* 169.
[7] *Ibid,* 168.
[8] *Ibid,* 176.

purest and most creative form. We may call it Cosmic Prāṇa. Under suitable conditions it is capable of moving the ethical, artistic, and spiritual wheels with which every mind is equipped from the start. If a person is 'willing' to undertake the prescribed disciplines, he can employ the resulting currents to overhaul the related environment.—his own mind and body to the maximum limit, and to a lesser extent, the external world abounding in people whose ability to respond to higher values may not be adequately developed. 'Thought' in its entirety is such a complicated process that while it undoubtedly uses and 'exhausts' this Prāṇa from one side, it also manages to draw it in freely from the other side[9] which is immersed in the Universal Fund of all Energy. The speciality of thought, as distinct from ordinary energy, is that what we mean by such terms as desire, meaning, or purpose has the unique gift of filtering out all other possibilities and 'picking up' just those elements of Power which correspond to the 'intentions', either allowed to continue unchecked, or deliberately kept up by us for attaining the Highest. Looked at from this standpoint, 'mind' cannot be permanently labelled 'the abode of Ignorance'. For with the change in intention, the character of the thoughts, and therefore of the mind, undergoes a total modification. If the mind caused bondage previously, it can, in an altered set-up, prepare the way for Freedom and Peace. There is nothing unusual in this, says the poet; threatening clouds are brought in by the wind, but again they are scattered and driven out of sight by the very same agency. So it is with the mind; when pure and divested of Tamas and Rajas, it conduces to Liberation and Insight.[10]

The path of any newly-risen intention, however, can never be quite smooth. For, its predecessors would have adapted the internal mechanisms to suit the acquisition of objects and satisfactions matching their own inferior moral and spiritual content. It is in the nature of old plans, fittings, and ways of handling available resources to continue to operate till they are approached from the right angle and readjusted into a new framework without serious inconvenience or damage. And this means hard work,—the patient transformation of the emotions and outlook connected with the earlier order, which has now to stand in the category of Rajas or Tamas. The Sāttvic elements employed to carry out this important task should have a preponderance of discrimination and dispassion. The former is needed to help in deciding what nobler levels lie higher up, and the latter to re-educate the mind and facilitate the easy shifting of emotions into them step by step. With these two qualities functioning as its powerful wings, the new intention can make its controlling and co-ordinating flights wherever it likes. Far from impeding its onward sweep, the 'rigidity' of old habits from within and of adverse situations outside will only serve to aid it by receiving the 'beatings' of its wings and giving them their forward thrust. For the hero who aims at the conquest of 'Self',—which means also a wise and creative attitude towards what was earlier classed as 'not-Self'—resistance from any side, internal or external, can only act as a welcome incentive for further efforts and greater harmonization.

It is not difficult to see that ancient sages looked at Liberation not as a 'retreat' in the crude sense we sometimes give the term, but as an advance, not as a mean shrinking but as an intelligent expansion. In some places it has been presented, most poetically, as 'a damsel' whom one might wish to meet and cherish as one's own, or as a delightful 'creeper that grows on the top of a tall edifice', like a temple. Since nobody would like to remain in dependence, it has been quite significantly described as 'the suzerainty of absolute Independence'. And to every thinking man

[9] Cf. Ātmanaḥ, parasmāt puruṣād-akṣarāt satyād-eṣa uktaḥ Prāṇo jāyate ... Chāyā iva dehe, manokṛtena, manah saṁkalpecchādi-niṣpanna-karmanimittena (āyāti). *Praśna Up.* iii. 3. Śaṅkara Bhāṣya.

[10] *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, 172.

who is troubled at heart by the mounting problems of the modern world,—generally left unsolved, and in many cases dangerously aggravated by current racial, economic, political, military, as well as religious programmes—a refreshingly safe and fruitful line of action will be opened up if he can be convinced that spiritual Freedom involves the positive and unshakable realization of 'everyone in oneself, oneself in others,' and all together in a supreme Protecting Principle which religions call God.

Nothing can 'obstruct' the mind functions of a sage who gets such a realization. He would *depend* no more on 'conditions of place, time, posture', moral disciplines or specific objects of meditation.[11] But, being guided hy his ever-blazing Illumination, he would never violate the principles or the values mastered through a faithful observance of such restrictions earlier. His thoughts, words, and deeds can henceforth move only in one single direction: To achieve the welfare of one and all without distinction. If the old world gained from such Insight, the modern world stands to gain much more from it now.

Vairāgya-Bodhau puruṣasya pakṣivat
Pakṣau vijānīhi vicakṣaṇa tvam,
Vimukti-saudhāgra-latādhirohaṇaṁ
Tābhyāṁ vinā nānyatareṇa siddhyati. 374.
Etad-dvāram ajasra-mukti-yuvateḥ ... Svā-
rājya-sāmrājya-dhuk ... 376.
Na deśa-kālāsana-dig-yamādi-
Lakṣyādyapekṣā'pratibaddhavṛtteḥ
Saṁsiddha-tattvasya mahātmano'sti;
Sva-vedane kā niyamādyavasthā ? 529.

[11] Cf. *Ibid,*

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

By Dr. S. N. L. Shrivastava

The word 'religion' is derived from the Latin words *re* (back) and *legāre* (bind or unite). Thus according to the etymological derivation of the word, religion means sending man back to his original Home or the reunion of man with God. Man comes of God and to Him he must return. How beautifully does Wordsworth remind man of his divine origin:

Trailing clouds of glory we come
From God who is our home.

Could anything be more legitimate and of greater importance for man than this returning to his Source, his God? Here is man's birthright, a right superior to all his other rights political and social, a heritage which no earthly fortune can equal. Yet religion, the most vital concern of man, has ever been questioned. If it was Science which questioned it yesterday, it is Psychology, the New Psychology, which is questioning it today with all the zeal of a new convert. While science today, realizing the limitations of its own knowledge and after all its successes being faced with an uncertainty concerning the choice of its basic theoretical concepts, comes forward with the admission that "There are regions of the human spirit nntramelled by the world of physics. In the mystic sense of the creation around us, in the expression of art, in a yearning towards God, the soul goes upward and finds the fulfilment of something implanted in its nature"[1]; the new psychology claims to have studied the problems of religion with such *scientific* thoroughness and exactitude as has enabled it to give God a decent burial with such formidable guards over His tomb that never in future shall it be possible for men to steal away His body and proclaim a resurrection.

The A-bomb or H-bomb for the bombardment of religion was manufactured in the

[1] Sir A. S. Eddington: *The Nature of the Physical World,* p. 327.

armoury of New Psychology when some years ago, von Hartmann, the German philosopher, declared that "God is a *projection* of the needs, hopes and fears of man on to the blank wall of the unknowable. It is as if the human race is looking at a mirror, as it were, when it thinks it sees God." "Who is God?", asks Jung and answers: "He is a thought which humanity has brought from itself. The deity is nothing but a projected complex. The idea of a world-creating principle is a projected perception of the living essence of man." For Freud "God is a great illusion. Demons do not exist any more than gods, being only 'the products of the psychic activity of man'." Freud traces religious experience to Oedipus Complex. According to him, incestuous sexual wishes which are taboo in normal social life are satisfied on a higher level. Thus God-idea is a projection from sexual needs, and therefore, like every other projection, an illusion. Shroeder gives the quintessence of the whole matter: "God is love; sex love disguised."

According to A. G. Tansley there is a kind of projection which he terms 'idealization' in which "the mind projects an ideal of personality" from the mind's own need of harmony and unification. God is such a projection. The projected ideal of God varies according to the changing needs of human society. "The projection of the most diverse human qualities upon God," writes Tansley, "is well illustrated by the different aspects God takes according to human preoccupations. He is the great Creator or the stern Lawgiver, the God of Justice or the God of Mercy, the God of Battles or the God of Love, as different human needs and passions wax and wane. In recent centuries. since Christianity became dominant, He is most universally the God of Love, because the oppressed majority must have consolation, and also because more and more, the tender instinct is felt to be the hope of humanity.

So far God is essentially a social God, a concentrated projection of all the qualities useful to the herd—the supreme herd leader of humanity, just as the old tribal gods were the tribal leaders. . . . . But with the increase of the individual's spiritual autonomy God has another function to perform. The individual demands the right of entering into personal relations with God, no longer through His servants the priests, but directly and intimately. God then becomes the centre of the individual's own struggles towards unification, the repository of the highest hopes, the confidant of his deepest troubles. The more intimate the communion, the more frankly and simply the individual 'casts his burden upon the Lord', the more useful God is to him and the more real his personal religion."[2]

This *idealization,* Tansley calls "a common frailty of the human mind" and adds: "It is fair to call it a frailty, because idealization confuses the ideal and the real, and such confusion can never form a sound basis for action or opinion."[3]

Let us now turn our attention to Leuba, another notable contemporary psychologist of religion. Prof. James H. Leuba, Professor Emeritus of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania, devoted his entire life to a strictly scientific study of the problems of religion. Leuba's approach to the study of religion was, in his own words, "to make of religious experience a field open to psychology, without reservation, *on exactly the same terms and with the same expectations* as any other part of human experience" and this "implied the setting aside of the claim of religion to a unique, superhuman nature."[4] Leuba firmly believes that the forces that work in the religious life and the conditions under which they work are "psycho-physical" and do not involve any intervention of a God or Divine Being. "It appears clearly," says Leuba, "that in the alleged actions of God in man, natural, known forces are present, and that these forces are adequate to produce the effects attributed to

[2] Tansley: *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life,* pp. 159-60.

[3] *Ibid,* p. 161.

[4] *Religion in Transition,* Edited by Vergilius Ferm, p. 184.

God. Thus, one is led to the conclusion that the present task of humanity is to learn to use these physiological and psychical forces in the best, the most effective way, without letting itself be retarded by the persistency of an obsolete method—the only thinkable one two thousand years ago."[5] Leuba tells us that the most important generalization and one which, in his opinion, is of far-reaching consequence, to which he is led by his investigations, is this that belief in supernatural agencies and in continuation of life after death arise from two different sources, "the irrepressible habit to explain by assigning causes, and the equally irrepressible habit of seeking help in the struggle of life." Belief in continuation after death also arises from certain pseudo-perceptions such as the perception of apparitions and other visions of persons who have died.

Leuba regards the mystic's claim to a direct awareness of the Divine Presence as baseless. According to him, it is *not a direct awareness* but an *inference* from certain unusual sensations, feelings and emotions, as much as the primitive's inference of a thunder-god from the phenomenon of thunder.

Such are the contentions of the new psychologists concerning the most vital problems of religion. We do not doubt their sincerity and earnestness of purpose, their devotion to the scientific spirit and their desire to emancipate humanity from dogmas and false beliefs. But we would also point out to them that their own generalizations and inferences are by no means free from fallacies which they have simply overlooked. Against the contentions of the new psychologists mentioned above, we would submit the following observations and criticisms:—

(1) In the first place, it is important to remember that a *psychology of religion* is not *religion* nor can a psychology of religion *in itself* invalidate the reality of religion. All that a psychology of religion is legitimately entitled to say is this that in the contemplation of God the mind obeys the same psychological laws which it does in the thinking of other objects and in other experiences; and if the psychological laws innate to the structure of the human mind do not prove the unreality of the *objects* thought of and experienced in other spheres, they can no more prove the unreality of the *object* of religious experience viz. God. To show how the idea of God arises in the mind is *not* necessarily to *prove* that there is no reality corresponding to the idea. The psychological account or explanation of the God-idea in the human mind, and the development and the evolution of this idea through the ages, is by no means a demonstration of the unreality of God. It is certainly true that the idea of God is and has been relative to the intellectual capacities of peoples at different stages of intellectual growth; but can we *logically* argue from the relativity and evolution of the God-idea to the unreality of God? The God-ideas and the modes of worship etc. have been varied and changing, but what has persisted throughout the ages, universally, ineradicably and irrepressibly, is the Godward impulse in man, the pan-human aspiration after the Divine, which belongs to the structural equipment of the human mind and is a fact to reckon with by any psychology or psychologist. This fundamental spiritual dynamic needs explanation and cannot be explained away.

(2) "Projection" is the magic-wand in the hands of the new psychologists. They think that by the waving of this magic-wand they can spirit away God into nothingness. But little do they realize that projection covers the entire field of life, that there are projected ideals in all spheres of human knowledge and experience. Science projects the ideal of the unity and uniformity of nature—the ideal that the world is a cosmos, that in the whole range of existence, everything is connected with everything else in an orderly and intelligible manner, and this *for all time*. This is a *projection*, because no one can peruse the whole range of time and space, while Nature, obviously, is a congeries of varied and particular things. The principle of uniformity of nature is not only the basis and presupposition

[5] *Ibid*, p. 195.

of science, but of all knowledge and experience. Deny it, and all knowledge is invalidated. Yet, strictly speaking, it can never be demonstrated for it pertains not only to the past and the present but also to all time to come. Shall I say 'There is no uniformity in the real world. The principle of uniformity is an ideal of my own mind, my own mind's demand, projected on the real world'? Can the ideal of the real world itself be unreal?

Projection, then, can no more invalidate religious knowledge than it can scientific or other knowledge. Or, rather, I should think that the way in which we are wont to conceive the relation of the ideal to the real is itself faulty. We usually think that the ideal of knowledge or the ideal of morality or the ideal of aesthetic experience or the ideal of religion is *projected by the mind* on reality; rather we should think that *reality itself* is reflected in these ideals in our minds or *the ideal is the real become self-conscious in us.*

(3) Much is made of the presence of human instincts and emotions in religious life and experience, as if man could or should *dehumanize* himself if his religious life is to have any value or validity. It is too much to expect of man that he should, at the very initial stages of his spiritual life, rid himself completely of his human instincts and emotions; the significant fact is this that as man advances in his "practice of the Presence of God", his human instincts and emotions are gradually refined, sublimated, and eventually transmuted and transcended. Prof. W. B. Selbie is perfectly right in observing that "there is nothing derogatory to religion in the fact that it has had a lowly origin. Like all other human traits it has been subject to development and is to be judged not by its initial but by its final stages and at its highest. . . . Strong instincts like those of fear and sex undoubtedly serve to determine the direction of religious emotions and impulses, and it is one of the differentiæ of humanity that these instincts should be so used. They are themselves, as it were, only the raw material, and it is the use of them that counts. The fact that religion is capable of sublimating primitive instincts like those of fear and sex shows clearly enough that it is not all compacted of them, but is something *sui generis,* and therefore able to use them for its own ends."[6]

(4) Lastly, it may be said that the religious experience is a specific and autonomous experience, an experience *sui generis,* and as such, cannot be invalidated by psychology studying it *from without,* that is without the *psychologist himself living through that experience.* The usual method employed by the new psychologists of religion is one of inductive generalization from pathological cases and averages and from data gathered by statistical reports and questionnaires. It is obvious that such a method can hardly do justice to religious experience. The true data for a true psychology of religion are rather to be found in the utterances and affirmations of the mystics of all ages, countries and climes. The remarkable similarity in the utterances and affirmations of the mystics all the world over argues for the objectivity and universal validity of those affirmations.

In fact, the question of proving or disproving religion and its affirmations does never arise at all. In raising the question we assume that the reasoning or the logical faculty is the only faculty of the human mind at whose bar everything has to be decided, forgetting that there is also a faculty of divine knowledge which equally belongs to the structural constitution of the human mind, just as the moral sense and the aesthetic sense also belong to it. It has been rightly observed by Knudson that "religion does not derive its right to exist from the intellect. It stands in its own right; and this right is not a freak of nature. It is as valid as the *á priori* principles of thought. . . . There is a religious *á priori* as well as a theoretical *á priori,* that is, the human need or

[6] W. B. Selbie: *The Psychology of Religion,* p. 13.

capacity, expressed in religion, is not an accident of human development but is structural in the human reason or spirit as such, and consequently carries its validity in itself. Religious experience, in other words, is as ultimate as any form of experience; and since it is such, it can neither be created nor destroyed by Logic."[7] "As with other forms of experience so religious experience," writes Hopwood, "can stand on its own feet and look the universe in the face. It is no hybrid growth on the emotions, no beggar asking alms of the intellect, and no fungus on the healthy progress of the life urge. Religious faith attests itself on the side of feeling, on the side of mind, and on the side of action. It gathers up these aspects of man's personality and unifies them into one harmonious spiritual development. Material proof can yield no objectivity to experience that is spiritually conditioned."[8]

The call of religion is ever—to close this article with the attestation of one of the most spiritually enlightened poets of the world—to

'That blessed mood
In which the burthen of the mystery,
In which the heavy weary-weight
Of all this unintelligible world
Is lighted.

That serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on,—
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul!
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.'[9]

[7] A. C. Knudson: *Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 251.

[8] P. G. S. Hopwood: *A Testament of Faith*, p. 214.

[9] Wordsworth.

JAINA AND BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

By Prof. Radhakrishna Choudhary

India, the land of philosophers, has always given light through the ages. The perennial light of our cultural candle has never ceased to function here. Through the eternal messages of the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Jain and Buddhist scriptures, has come down to us the everlasting bliss of a happy and peaceful society, untarnished by the many waves that dashed against it from within and without. These factors have been responsible for our cultural continuity. The eternal messages of the past are enshrined within the hearts of millions even today and have acted as our beacon light in realizing our concept of a composite culture, based on love, mutual tolerance, and non-violence. A short comparative study of the Jaina and Buddhist philosophy will reveal to us the essential unity of our cultural life and thought.

The *Brahmajala Sutta* gives us a glimpse into the bold speculations aud the varieties of religious experience people had in the sixth century B. C. Different streams of thought, belief and practice tended to unite into a higher monastic idealism then. Vedic hymns supported prayer and worship. The inadequacy of the sacrificial system had already been admitted in the Upaniṣads which stressed Vidyā or knowledge by control of desire. Asceticism was popular with certain sects as

early as the Ṛgveda (X.136. 190). It will not be out of place to point out here that Indian thought always laid stress on the ultimate purposes of life. It affirmed life to the full but refused to become a victim and a slave of life. The insistence on detachment of life and action did not necessarily mean 'abstention' from it in the modern sense. It only meant that without detachment it was not possible to discover for oneself what lay behind the external life.

The age was one of tremendous mental ferment and philosophic enquiry. Jainism and Buddhism were integral parts of Indian life, culture and philosophy. They based their logic on close reasoning and argument and inveighed against all forms of magic and superstition. They were breakaways from the accepted Vedic path. They were silent about the existence of a first cause. They laid emphasis on non-violence and built up an organization of monks. Jacobi points out that the Brahmanic ascetic was the model from which they borrowed many important practices and institutions of ascetic life.[1] Kern, with slight modifications, practically holds the same view.[2] As predominant streams of thought in eastern India, Jainism and Buddhism reflected the desire to overcome the hopelessness of fatalistic outlooks. The primary interest was directed to an overall picture of the universe, tending to a monistic outlook. With the doctrine of effectiveness of individual action, Jainism advocated a way to liberation which is very similar to the Buddhist way. There is a certain amount of similarity between the legends of the lives of the Jinas and the Buddhas, e.g., Yaśoda in the Jaina legend and Yaśodhara in the Buddhist. The non-violent doctrines of the two contemporary sects sought to restrain the kings and convert them to the ideal of universal compassion. We find both Jainism and Buddhism claiming royal converts.

Viewed as a whole, Jainism is so exact a reproduction of Buddhism that we have considerable difficulty in accounting for their long continued existence by each other's side. This is the opinion of Barth.[3] It has been rightly controverted by Hopkins, who holds, "Nevertheless, their differences are as great as the resemblance between them and what Jainism at first appeared to have got of Buddhism seems now to be rather the common loan made by each sect from Brahmanism."[4] Colebrooke, however, holds that Jainism is older than Buddhism, since it adopts the animistic beliefs that nearly everything is possessed of a soul.[5] What is relevant for our purpose is that there can be no doubt that Jainism is a system quite different from Buddhism.

According to these systems, particularly Jainism, when man has *actually* become what he is now *potentially*, he will no longer be a man but a released soul or *Siddha*. He will be omniscient. He will have unlimited undifferentiated knowledge, will be blissful, and will have permanent right conviction and conduct and infinite capacity for activity. Such persons are above the reach of desire or want, and their perfections are immeasurably greater than language can praise. Their virtues transcend all that can be described by words. They are models of perfections for us to copy and imitate.[6]

Jainism propounded many-sided views of a thing and emphasized the relativity of truth. Despite the basic difference, as a typical representative śramaṇic cnltnre, the monastic tenets of Jainism and Buddhism have a close resemblance. Another remarkable feature, despite their philosophic difference, is their emphatic stress on the cult of non-violence. Both Jainism and Buddhism subordinated the emotional and emphasized the rational elements in man. They have, thereby, given posterity some of the acutest systems of logic, and the noblest branch of ethics and philanthropy.

[1] Vide *Translation of the Jaina Sūtras.*
[2] *Manual of Buddhism.*
[3] *The Religions of India,* p. 142.
[4] *Religions of India,* p. 283.
[5] *Miscellaneous Essays* II, 276.
[6] C. R. Jain, *Confluence of Opposites,* p. 361-62.

The Jaina Philosophy

The Six Systems of Philosophy agree with Jainism in one important fact, that the ultimate reality of Cosmos was always permanently existing, uncreated and indestructible. The remarkable contribution of Jainism is the doctrine of *Syādvāda* and *Anekāntavāda.* Since things have many characters, they are the objects of all-sided knowledge. Mahavira has been called a Sarvajñavādi. Reality, according to the Jainas, is a complex structure. The Jaina principle of Anekānta shows how to realize truth in its varied aspects and thereby understand the viewpoints of others. The true nature of the Jaina Philosophy is that it is catholic in outlook and is ever ready to understand other systems of thought. According to Mahavira, the best method of discussion was to consider a problem in its three aspects: (a) to establish one's own viewpoint, (b) to establish the opposite viewpoint, (c) to synthesize and establish the viewpoints of both.

Syādvāda holds all knowledge to be only probable. It insists on the correlativity of affirmation and negation. It is a logical corollary of Anekāntavāda. The sevenfold Syādvāda logic of the Jainas is as follows: (a) somehow a substance exists, (b) somehow a substance does not exist, (c) somehow a substance exists and does not exist, (d) somehow a substance is indescribable, (e) somehow a substance exists but is indescribable, (f) somehow a substance does not exist and is indescribable, and (g) somehow a substance exists and does not exist and is indescribable.

The concept of reality is the foundation of Jaina Philosophy known as Anekāntavāda or multi-sided reality. One-sided is the Buddhist emphasis of change alone as real. According to its Kṣaṇikavāda, a permanent underlying reality is denied altogether. Hence the Buddhist is known as Anātmavāda, a doctrine that does not recognize the existence of a permanent Ātman. This has been condemned by the Jainas as Ekāntavādi of an opposite type. The Jainas recognize 'Self' as a permanent reality. Anekāntavāda implies a complete comprehension of reality *in toto.* The object of knowledge is of infinite character. While the Upaniṣads say "Brahman is *Sat*", the Buddhists say, "All are transitory". The Jainas, on the other hand proclaim, "Something is transitory, something is not transitory". This is the famous Syādvāda in the form of 'may be or may not be'. While the Brahmanical doctrine believed in "the absolute and permanent being", the Jainas believed that being is joined to production, continuation and so on.

According to the Jainas, Reality or *Sat* is eternal and uncreated. It is characterized by origination or appearance (*Utpāda*), destruction or disappearance (*Vyaya*) and permanence (*Dhrauvya*). It has its modes (*Paryāya*) and qualities (*Guṇa*) through which persists all along the essential substratum. The basic substance with its qualities is something that is permanent, while the modes or accidental characters appear and disappear. Thus Jainism accepts both change and permanence as facts of experience. The substances are reals, characterized by existence and they are as follows: (a) *Jīva* (Living), (b) *Ajīva* (Non-living). Souls are either bound in *Samsāra* (*Baddha*) or liberated from it (*Mukta*). *Jīva* also means soul or spirit or the unit of consciousness. Non-living substances are made up of matter (*Pudgala*), principles of motion and rest (*Dharma and Adharma*), space and time (*Ākāśa* and *Kāla*). The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities and modifications.

God, in Jainism, is not a creator. He is a liberated soul, a spiritually perfected ideal. Every soul can aspire to achieve a Godhood by annihilating Karmaic forces. God is a detached ideal in the Jaina scheme of philosophy. The Jaina philosophy aims at *Mokṣa,* i.e., the soul is to be completely liberated from the shackles of *Karma.* For the attainment of these ends, Jainism lays down five basic vows or *Vratas*: *Satya, Asteya* (Abstention from thefts), *Brahmacarya, Aparigraha* (Abstention from

greed) and *Ahimsā*. These five principles are just like the *Pancaśīla* of the Buddhist system.

As the Buddhists put emphasis on *Āryasatya,* the Jainas did on *Samvara.* It should be borne in mind that the Jaina system also accepted the doctrine of the law of *Karma,* a subtle matter or energy, as axiomatic truth, and believed in the transmigration of the soul. The Jaina *Nirvāṇa* is merely existence of the soul in the highest non-material heaven. They lay emphasis on the permanence of the elements or substances (*Dravyas*). Buddhism introduces the doctrine of their impermanence. The main difference between these two systems is that the Jainas practised severe austerities for expending bad *Karma,* whereas the Buddhists advocated the golden mean between austerity and indulgence.

Some Pali Buddhist terms appear in *Ardhamagadhi* forms with similar meanings as the Jaina terms. The Jainas conceived such terms as *Āsava* in the material, physical sense, whereas the Buddhists tended to make them all mental and moral tendencies. Even the four elements they conceived in a more abstract manner as properties of matter,—Earth (Extension), Water (Cohesion), Fire (Heat) and Air (Motion). From the same outlook, it follows that the Jainas sought to wear out bad *Karma* by physical means of strenuous asceticism whereas the Buddhists believed that the mind trained by purely mental culture had the power to annihilate bad *Karma* by the mental act of understanding. One result of the Buddhist conception was that the groups of terms such as *Āsavagantha-Yoga-Ogha-Nivāraṇa-Kleśa-Samyojana-Parāmarśa-Upādāna* tended to fall together and lose all distinction.

In the sphere of Metaphysics, Jainism is opposed to all theories which do not emphasize ethical responsibility. Being is not unalterable in its nature. Reality to them is unity in difference and nothing beyond. It is a dynamic reality. According to Haribhadra, there is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality. The universe is traced to the two everlasting uncreated co-existing but independent categories of *Jīva* and *Ajīva.* According to the Jainas everything in the world except soul and space is produced from matter. They believe in the atomic structure of the universe. The physical objects apprehended by senses consist of atoms. An atom has no points. It is eternal and formless and can be perceived by the Omniscient. *Pudgala* (Matter) exists in two forms of *Aṇu* (Atom) and *Skandha* (Aggregate). Every perceivable object is a *Skandha.* The Jainas think that the homogeneous atoms produce different elements by varying combinations. The qualitative differences of primary atoms are denied and in this respect they agree with Democritus. *Karma* is of material nature.

The Jaina theory of soul and knowledge is so distinctive of Jainism and dissimilar to those of Buddhism that one cannot be a borrowed product of the other.[7] Undoubtedly there are similarities in doctrine between the two systems on the point of Karma and rebirth, but these two are the common features of all Indian systems. The Jainas believe in the perpetuity of the world. They did not consider God to be responsible for the sorrows of life. The Jaina conception of *Nirvāṇa* is that it is an entry of soul into a blessedness that has no end. It is a state of perfection and ineffable peace. The *Jīva* and the *Ajīva* are not the empirical abstractions of *Ātman* or consciousness and matter or non-consciousness, but the product of an interaction between the two. We are obliged to transcend the conception of an empirical centre and rise to logical subject in the Jaina theory of knowledge. The Jainas take their stand on the innate nature of the soul. The *Sāṅkhya* and the Jainas do not admit God but affirm the reality of spiritual consciousness.

Buddhist Philosophy

The teachings of Gautama Buddha are the basis of his philosophy. Existence is painful

[7] Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* II, 292.

and this is one of the fundamental truths only to be fully realized with the attaining of complete enlightenment. That pain has a cause, is the second truth. That pain can be brought to an end is the third truth. These two truths have been expanded into the chain of causation, the *Pratītya-Samutpāda* or origin by way of cause. In simple words, we can say, by the happening of some events others are also produced. This is called dependent origination. An assemblage of concomitant conditions makes up the appearance of a whole. It can be better explained in the following way.

From ignorance as canse arise the aggregates (*Sankharas*), from the aggregates as cause arise consciousness, from consciousness as cause arises 'name and form' (mind and body), from 'name and form' as cause arises the sphere of six (senses), from the sphere of the six as cause arises sensation, from sensation craving, from craving grasping, from grasping becoming, from becoming birth, from birth old age, death, grief, lamentation, pain, dejection and despair. Even so is the origination of all this mass of pain.

The fullest canonical treatment is found in the *Digghanikaya* where it occurs once with ten and once with nine links. At places it begins with the root cause of craving.[8] Pischel believed that the Buddhist philosophy was borrowed from the *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*. We have to bear in mind that the *Sāṅkhya* conception of *Prakṛti* (Primordial matter) is not found in Bnddhism. Buddhaghosha frankly denies that ignorance is to be understood as an uncaused root cause like *Prakṛti*.[9] He is of opinion that in one sense both ignorance and craving for existence may be called root causes, but not uncaused, for ignorance originates from the *Āsavas*. He further states that the special mark of ignorance is not knowing, its essence is delusion, it appears as covering and its immediate cause is the *Āsavas*.

According to Buddhaghosha, three *Vedanas* are the cause of craving and thirst (*Tanha*), craving for sensuous pleasure (*Kāma*), for existence and non-existence. From craving arises grasping (*Upādāna*). Grasping keeps the craving active and feeds it like fuel. From grasping arises becoming (*Bhava*), which is both the result of the previous link and the cause of the next.

The Buddhist texts present some philosophical problems of the highest magnitude:[10]

(a) Whether the Universe is eternal or not,
(b) Whether the Universe is finite or not,
(c) Whether the vital principle (*Jīva*) is the same as or other than the body,
(d) Whether after death a *Tathāgata* exists or not, whether he is neither existent nor non-existent.

These are some of the undetermined questions. It is not maintained that the questions are unknowable, but only that they have not been determined by the Buddha. To this extent, Buddhism may be called agnostic, not in teaching the fundamental unknowability of the nature of things but in excluding from the investigation certain definite problems which were useless to the practical aim of the seeker after truth and freedom from pain. These problems are the only ground for the charge of agnosticism.[11]

Some scholars believe that the Buddha was a genuine agnostic. He had studied the various systems of ideas prevalent in his days without deriving any great satisfaction from them. They hold that he had no reasoned or other conviction on the matter.[12] It may be pointed out in this connection that from the first it was never such a simple agnostic system of quietism. It inherited and took for granted many of the current Hindu dogmas, the belief in rebirth, Karma, and cosmological theories. It had to defend itself against the rival systems that taught their own methods of salvation and it had to justify itself against

[8] Mrs. Rhys David, *Dialogues* II, 42; *Samyutta* II; *Lalitāvistāra*.

[9] *Visuddhimagga*, 525.

[10] *Diggha* I, 187; *Majjhima* I, 431.

[11] Vide 'GOD-Buddhist' in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

[12] A. B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 45 & 63.

the sacrificial system of the current Hinduism. T. H. Huxley finds hope in the fact that a system which knows no God in the western sense, which denies soul to a man, which counts the belief in immortality a blunder, the hope of it a sin and never sought the aid of secular arms, yet spread over a considerable motley of the old world with marvellous rapidity and is still a dominant creed of a large fraction of mankind.[13] Radhakrishnan holds that Buddha was not really an agnostic.

The Buddhist doctrine is formulated in the analysis of the individual into five parts or the *Khaṇḍas*—the body, the feeling, perception, aggregates and consciousness. All things are analysed into the elements that may be perceived in them. The formulae of the five *Khaṇḍas* is said to have been set forth in the sermon. It now forms with the chain of causation the chief theoretical basis of Buddhism. In the *Abhidhamma,* the *Sankharas* are explained or expanded into a list of fifty-two constituents, the various psychic states that arise and pass away. The intermediate degrees of reality were recognized and further enquiry proceeded on those lines on a psychological basis.

With the decline of early Buddhism, the Mahāyāna form developed. The Mahāyāna spread out in every direction, tolerating almost everything and adapting itself to each country's distinctive outlook. It has been asserted by a competent authority that Mahāyāna Buddhism drafted practically the whole of Hiudu pantheon headed by Indra or Śakra (Pali *Sakka*) to serve as attendants upon the Buddha.[14] Hīnayāna was limited to Ceylon, Burma and Siam. Nagarjuna, the famous Mahāyāna philosopher, stands out as oue of the greatest minds India has ever produced. He formulated the Mahāyāna doctrine. His *Śūnyatā* has been characterized by Schterbatsky as Relativity. Everything, being relative and interdependent, has no absoluteness by itself. Hence it is *Śūnya* or Void. Mahāyāna Buddhism contributed a good deal towards the development of philosophy and thought. Gradually metaphysics developed in the Buddhist philosophy though its method was based on a psychological approach. It began as a dualistic metaphysics looking upon knowledge as a direct awareness of objects. In the next stage, ideas were made the media through which reality was apprehended. These two stages represented the Hīnayāna School. The Mahāyāna school went further and abolished things behind the images and reduced all experience to a series of ideas in the mind. The ideas of relativity and sub-conscious self came in. In the last stage mind itself was dissolved into mere ideas. This was Nagarjuna's Mādhyamika philosophy or the middle way. According to Nagarjuna, when the notion of self disappears one becomes free from the idea of 'I' and 'Me'.

It is held that the Buddha, like Kant, set a limit to knowledge and the ten *Avyaktas* formed part of the earliest doctrine. This stimulated endless speculations concerning *Nirvāṇa,* consciousness and the Universe. The *Avyaktas* generated the dialectical process of Buddhist philosophy and Nagarjuna attempted to bring the ultimate reality within the range of conceptual thought. Schterbatsky compared the *Apoha* dialectical method of Dignaga with Hegel's negation. Wader believes that Hegel might have been inspired by his Indian predecessors.

The philosophy of idealistic absolutism, started by Maitreya and Asaṅga and elaborated by Vasubandhu, denies the existence of the external objective world and ends in the affirmation of the *oneness* of all things. Vasubandhu anticipated and laid the foundation of a scheme of philosophy which was later on expanded by Śaṅkara as the Vedānta philosophy of the Upaniṣads. The cultivation of the love of humanity was one of the dominant characteristics of Buddhism.

The word *Nirvāṇa* probably arose as an

[13] *Romanes Lectures,* 1893.

[14] Belvelkar & Ranade, *Indian Philosophy,* 472-73.

expression for the blessed state of the individual soul in which it has lost the consciousness of itself.[15] *Nirvāṇa* has been described by Sariputta in the following words: "Just that, my friend, is bliss, that there is no feeling there." The Buddha said: "Do not deceive each other, do not despise anybody anywhere, never in anger wish anyone to suffer through your body, words or thoughts . . . keep thy immeasurable loving thought for all creatures . . . loving thought without obstruction. . . . To be dwelling in such conception or contemplation is called living in Brahma". *Nirvāṇa* is the highest goal of Buddhism. In the words of Tagore, it must mean the sublimation of self in a truth which is love itself.[16] In the *Kalama Sutta,* the Buddha propounded the freedom of thought and secured equality of opportunity by recognizing *Karma.* He detached morality from duty and thus eliminated God from the conception of a virtuous life. (Śaṅkara extolled Him as the lord of the Yogis). From the *Udana,* we learn that he was familiar with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* which evolved the doctrine of *Neti Neti.*

[15] A. Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and Its Development,* p. 99.

[16] *The Religion of Man,* p. 70.

Conclusion

Both Jainism and Buddhism attacked the problem of deliverance from rebirth in its practical bearing. They were the forerunners of monastic order. Jainism conceded that matter was real and assumed a plurality of immaterial individual souls existing from all eternity. Jainism sought to give ethical significance to world and life negation. The Buddha carried further what was begun there. Ecstasy and exercises in self-submergence played no less a part in the system of the Buddha and the Jainas. The sole task was to understand the why and the how of the cycle of rebirth and expound how it could be brought to an end. The authentic teaching of *Karma* is maintained by both the systems.

THE LOGIC OF RELATIONS IN VEDĀNTA

By Dr. P. S. Sastri

(*Continued from previous issue*)

5. Does the very form of an entity, say a table, constitute its difference or otherness? Or does its difference lie in the table excluding and excluded by the non-table? Or is difference a specific property of the thing? If the very form of the entity is identical with difference, then we cannot say that the table differs since difference is almost synonymous with the table.[48] But if difference is other than the object, and if it itself does not have any shape or form, then we cannot say that the form or nature of one entity excludes another.[49] To overcome this difficulty one may say that difference lies in mutual exclusion. This leads to a vicious circle and to the assumption of the thing to be proved. To begin with x must have the character of excluding or negating y. That is, a positive entity must have a negative character constituting its basic nature. This involves self-contradiction [50] Since this difference of x needs a prior existence of y, we can conceive a state when x and y are not differ-

[48] BS 47.15-19.

[49] BS 47.22-24.

[50] BS 47.24-25.

ent. Moreover, a difference that is posterior to the emergence of x and y, cannot be the character of any.[51] We cannot argue that difference emerges with the object as its property, since this leads to an infinite regress. As a property it must be perceivable, which it never is.[52] Further, difference as a property must differ from that which it qualifies. Then we need another difference to relate the property difference.

Difference is not an object for a perceptual cognition. It has no specific form. As formless it cannot have any character, and as such it cannot exist. It can only be through mental construction that we feel that we cognize difference.[53] In such a cognition we are led by the so-called dependence of difference on objects that are said to differ.[54] If difference were the same as the different object x, the other will be merely an other; it cannot differ from the object, nor can it distinguish one object from another.[55] Every object would be identical with difference. If difference were not identical with the object, since there is no separate entity called difference, there can be no difference anywhere;[56] and then no object would differ from any other.[57] Any difference as a mental construction is that which does not exist in the external universe. When it has no existence, objects cannot differ from one another, since a constructed character cannot create a product called difference of x from y.[58]

If difference is said to involve the vicious circle and the assumption of the fact to be proved. it does not falsify our awareness of difference. Difference does not negate itself merely because we are not able to find out its true nature.[59] But if we do not find out difference perceptually, how can we be aware of it? Our awareness can be based only on our experience, and our experience of difference requires the factual existence of difference. When two things are said to differ from one another, we mean that they have mutually exclusive characteristics. Those characteristics constitute the form of the object and nothing more. And difference cannot be equated with the mere form as such. If difference is the same as the form of the thing, it can as well be an aspect of the thing, though not the same as the thing.[60] In other words, every entity should have not only its own specific characteristics but also a quality of being different from something else.[61] But difference can be apprehended only through an apprehension of the contradictory of difference.[62] To know that x is other than y, I must know x as identical with itself, and y as identical with itself. And because I cannot equate these two identities, I treat them as different identities. But to know that x is identical with itself, I need not know that it has certain characteristics which do not belong to a non-x. That is, I need not know that it differs from something else. Thus a knowledge of x's difference requires a knowledge of x's identity, and not vice versa. I am aware that x differs from y because I am aware of the identity of x and of the identity of y; and it is this knowledge of y which is the non-x that is essential. But the knowledge of an identity does not require such a transitive reference. Consequently the apprehension of difference has its ground in the apprehension of identity.[63] Difference always refers to identity. It involves at least two objects, and this implies that difference always pre-supposes a limit. The knowledge of this limit is in essence the knowledge of the identity of the object which has this limit.[64]

Difference is a fact of normal unreflective experience. It is already known to us. It

[51] BS 49.10-12; Pramāṇamālā 4-5.
[52] BBV Sambandha 979.
[53] BS 48.10-12.
[54] PVV 254.2.
[55] PVV 255.3-4.
[56] MMK 14.6.
[57] PVV 256.1-3.
[58] B 48.12-13.
[59] cf. ATV 251
[60] cf. ATV 253-4.
[61] cf. Kh 47.
[62] BBV Sambandha 959.
[63] BS 70.5-17; B 465.3-467.2.
[64] TP 166.13-14.

cannot be something given to us by any valid means of cognition, since it is the nature of any such means of cognition to give us that knowledge or truth which is not known to us previously. Consequently, if difference is a fact of unthinking experience or knowledge, the valid means of cognition must tell us that this difference is not ultimately real.[65] It has a place within the empirical existence.[66] We cannot find any satisfactory and consistent explanation of difference. It is a self-contradictory or inexplicable fact of experience,[67] precisely because it must be real and yet it is never real. A difference which is cognized after the cognition of x and y, a difference which emerges after the emergence of x and y, must be an entity other than these two; and yet it cannot fall outside these two.[68]

As far as ordinary experience goes, it may be said that the truth about an object depends on its identity with itself, on its similarity with similar objects, and on its difference from everything other than itself; and it is a truth that is not subject to contradiction or negation.[69] At the same time reality is such that its character does not depend upon any man's will. The single moon may appear as two moons for one having a cataract in the eye; but the moon in reality cannot be double.[70] The real then is that which does not admit any change of character, inspite of the changes that may be taking place in it.[71] We can thus say that everything is real in so far as it claims to be itself and not something else.[72] That which appears to be real is that which has a form; and to this form we attach a name. There are no categories of substance, quality and the like. We have only names and forms which appear as objects to a subject.[73] Whatever is thus apprehended by a subject is finite.[74]

6. We may approach the problem of the reality of the world of experience from other avenues. A mere causal explanation of the external universe can be of no avail in enabling us to understand its nature. The universe reveals the characteristics describable as finitude, imperfection and change. We cannot derive it from any primal stuff called matter, motion, or energy, or space-time. In our ordinary experience we do not find any inorganic entity, unsupervised by a sentient being, giving rise, of its own accord, to modifications calculated to serve the specific ends of the individual.[75] A power of construction that has a human end, cannot be ascribed to logs of woods or to stones. Moreover, the world as we have it presents a diversity of entities. Some are felt inwardly by us, and some have an objective existence. Sound and other physical qualities may remain the same; still we experience different varieties of pleasure under different emotional attitudes. Further we have different discrete and finite existences like the root and the sprout which are preceded by the cohesion of the seed, soil, water, light and air. Is there a similar cohesion of entities with regard to the internal entities also?[76] Any such cohesion presupposes relations and ties of the most diverse forms conceivable. If we have to insist on the reality of relations, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the world is an inter-related coherent system. The being of everything would then depend on the being of everything else.[77] Whatever may be the character of the coherent system, for purposes of understanding the external universe we have to take it to be physical in nature.

Such a coherent system may be called the primal stuff. It can be resolved into a collection of certain basic entities or elements. If these are in a state of equilibrium, there can

[65] B 622.11-12.
[66] KKK 129.5-9.
[67] KKK 634.11-12.
[68] BS 49.22-23.
[69] EVTT 306.2-3.
[70] VSB 476.31-177.1.
[71] B 498.3-5.
[72] BBV 1.4-303.
[73] MMV 180.
[74] B 84.1-2.
[75] VSB 489.1-3; B 489.3-6.
[76] VSB 491.3-492.3

be no modifications or evolutes; and if the equipoise of the system were to be upset for the evolutionary process, how does this upsetting come about? If it is the very nature of these fundamentals to be restlessly active, we can never arrive at any point in time when this process began, nor can we speculate its cessation. Since these elements are regarded to have self-determined characters and since they cannot forgo their specific character, they cannot, with reference to one another possibly enter into a relation of subservience and dominance.[78] On such a view no point-instant has a duration. The duration of an entity beyond the moment of a sensation cannot be established by sensation. When we speak of its duration, we are said to be extending the sensation; and this is a construction of the imagination.

The bare point-instant, to which the physical universe is reduced, possesses infinitesimal sphericity. Out of this arises a binary or an entity made up of at least two such point-instants; and this is minute and short. There can also arise a gross and long tertiary and other compounds. Here is no reproduction of the properties of the original-point-instant.[79] While the binary arises from a pair of atoms why should the tertiary emerge from the binary and not from the primary? When the size of the cause is not bequeathed to the effect, what is its purpose?[80] If these point-instants are originally in a state of disjunction, we have to assume that their conjunction is due to some movement, because we observe that the disjoined threads give rise to a cloth only when they are moved to a conjunction. This movement is an effect and it needs a cause. If the need for a cause is rejected, how can there be the initial motion? If we assume a cause, we are only pushing backwards the question of the initial movement. We cannot predicate the character of effort to this cause, since effort invariably refers to volition. Impact, force and such other concepts have a validity only after the process has commenced. We cannot bring in any unseen principle to account for the initial movement, since that would land us in the problem of finding out how it is related to the point-instants. And if the initial movement is an impossibility, there can never arise the conjunction of the point-instants, since this conjunction depends on that movement.[81] The point-instant by itself cannot have any activity since all activity can be predicated only of an entity that has parts.[82]

We can predicate four possible characteristics to the point-instants: i) that they have a tendency to activity, ii) that they have a tendency to non-activity, iii) that they have both, and iv) that they have neither. The first alternative would prevent any destruction, thereby making the point-instant an eternal but finite entity. The second alternative would prohibit the emergence of any object. The third is self-contradictory; or it attributes some sort of a conscious deliberation to the point-instant. The last alternative implies the reality of a force other than the point-instants to enable them to be active at times and to be also inactive at other times. And if there is a force it should give room for continuous activity or for continuous non-activity.[83]

The Buddhist, however, holds to the conception of entities which are absolutely dissimilar. These are the discrete point-instants. Each such entity provides the limit of all continuity.[84] This view rejects Leibnitz's identity of indiscernibles. Leibnitz would tell us that the indiscernibles are resolved in a continuity of a qualitative change; and such a change is impossible on the Buddhist view.

Wherever we find an object possessing colour and other qualities, we find it to be gross

[77] cf. Lotze: Metaphysics 1.38.
[78] VSB 498.11-13.
[79] VSB 506.2-4.
[80] SS 11.72-74.
[81] VSB 509.12-17.
[82] CS 9.16.
[83] VSB 513.2-7.
[84] See Johnson; Logic, 1.18.

and non-permanent. The cloth is non-permanent in relation to the threads, and the threads as compared with their constituent fibres and so on. Likewise if the point-instant has some characteristics, it must have something else as its cause; and in itself it cannot endure.[85] That which endures inspite of the various modifications is the common character which is easily recognizable.[86] And what we call the effects would then be merely the various states or aspects of the same abiding essence. As finite and as an effect, the point-instant cannot endure.[87]

If these point-instants have identical or similar characteristics, it is difficult to imagine that they give rise to entities having mutually exclusive qualities.[88] If they have different characteristics, does each point-instant have many qualities or only one? In the former alternative some may have more and others less. Those that have more will be greater in size or volume than the rest; and then they are no longer point-instants. In the latter case, how can we account for colour and touch in the case of light, and only touch in the case of air? The point-instants making up light must have the two properties; or they interpenetrate wholly with those of air, and then our earlier difficulty about interpenetration remains irrefutable.[89] To admit that an extended body exists in an unextended atom is a contradiction, and to admit that the same extended body is present in many atoms is an impossibility.[90]

We may accept the other alternative and argue that the point-instants are already in conjunction and that it is their nature to be so. Here we have to note that the conjunction of one point-instant with another can take place either as a total interpenetration or as a partial contact. In the case of the total interpenetration there is no increase in the size, magnitude, or volume; and then we can never arrive at things. If the conjunction is only a partial contact, that would make the point-instant divisible into parts; and then it is no longer a point-instant.[91] We cannot speak of any conjunction between two point-instants because they are dimensionless; nor can we deny conjunction when we admit them.[92] In other words the conception of a point-instant as basic to the universe is a self-contradictory notion.[93]

Let us call the conjunction of two point-instants s and t, a binary compound st. This compound is distinct from s and from t, and is yet related to them by the relation of inherence. The relation of inherence too is distinct from the two objects between which it is said to subsist; and as such it has to be brought into relation with the objects wherein it is said to inhere by means of another distinct relation which must have the nature of inherence. Thus we need newer and newer relations of inherence for each of the relations of inherence successively postulated. [94] It may be contended that inherence is a relation which is clearly cognized as here and now, as being a permanent relation with the objects wherein it inheres; and that it is never perceived as something unrelated and standing in need of a distinct act of relation.[95] If this is a valid argument, why should we not treat conjunction also in a similar way? When the conjoined threads form into a cloth, can we say that colour is related to the threads in the same manner in which the threads are related to the cloth? Conjunction being a relation should be in permanent relation with the conjoint objects, without needing any other distinct relation. If conjunction needs a distinct relation of inherence, in the case of the colour of the cloth, because it is different from the conjoint objects,[96] then inherence

[85] VSB 14.5-8.
[86] B 513.14-15.
[87] B 521.7-8; 522.3-4.
[88] Cf. Kir II.187.12 ff.
[89] VSB 516.5.11; B 516.14-18; 477.6.
[90] NVTT 610-611; B 549.1-5.
[91] CS 9.13-15; VSB 510.5-11; SP 2; PKM 505.
[92] B 510.8-9.
[93] cf. LS 2.185 and Page 53.
[94] VSB 468.2-4; SP 4; PKH 505-6.
[95] See Johnson, I.211-2.
[96] cf. Alexander; Space, Time and Deity; 1-38.

also must needs require a distinct relation because it too is a distinct object. One cannot take shelter under the plea that conjunction being a quality needs a relation, and that inherence is not a quality; for, the circumstances that necessitate the distinct relation are present in both the cases. And as a result, we cannot have the binary compound.[97] That is, an independently existing relation called inherence which is different from the terms can never relate them by itself.[98] Since a relation is that which relates the terms, it is dependent on the terms; and when the terms are destroyed, the relation of inherence too gets destroyed. That which is liable to destruction is a finite entity.[99] A relation therefore cannot be treated as a universal,[100] nor can it be devoid of existence.[101]

[97] VSB 511.7-512.5; 488.4-5; IS 96.16-19.
[98] B 511.3-4.
[99] B 512.6-513.1.
[100] cf. SSP Section 9.
[101] cf. Space, Time, and Deity, 1.238.

The external world does not become real even if we change our terminology of relations into one of ties. We cannot even consider a tie or a relation to be a universal. The conjunction between the entities of a given set in a consecutive series is not identical with that between those of another. If it is identical we can never get the cloth. An identical conjunction cannot admit of any difference even in the spatial location of the entities. Further, with the destruction of the two, their conjunction too disappears. In such a case we have only to admit that inherence is similar to conjunction; and then *inherence* cannot be an unalterable universal. These relations emerge from certain causal conditions, and it is we that construct them mentally. But if we apprehend identity, we do not go in for the construction.[102]

(To be concluded)

[102] B. 468.8-12.

STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF HINDUISM

By Sri K. S. Ramaswami Sastri

Hinduism is not connected with any particular founder or prophet or incarnation. It claims to be eternal and the sages are stated to have merely visualized the Vedic mantras by intuition and given them to the world (mantra-draṣṭāraḥ). That Hinduism is not a historic religion is undoubtedly a source of strength to it as its fortunes will not depend on loyalty to a particular individual. But it is also a source of weakness as loyalty to a founder is likely to generate a passionate and invincible faith which loyalty to a principle may not evoke in an equal measure. But in the case of loyalty to an individual, there is a danger of faith vaulting and overleaping and leading to bigotry and fanaticism in regard to one's religion, and contempt and hatred in regard to the faiths of others. In the history of India there were occasions when political disunity and theological bigotry became sources of her ruin. But now India has regained social, economic, and political unity and re-attained her political independence and is resolved to put down all theological bigotry and obscurantism and rivalry and take her stand on spiritual strength and unity.

Another element in the strength of Hinduism is its tolerance. Hinduism does not claim as some other religions do, that it is the sole door to salvation. In the *Gītā,* Śrī Kṛṣṇa says that He responds to the call of the soul whatever form the call may take and that all souls seek and attain Him:

Howsoever men approach Me, even so do

I reward them; My path do men follow in all things, O son of Prithā. (IV. 11)

Whatever devotee seeks to worship with faith what form soever, that same faith of his I make unflinching. (VII. 21)

Kālidāsa says in his *Raghuvaṁśa*:

Many are the paths indicated in the scriptures; they all lead to the Goal. They reach Thee alone, as the branches of the Gangā fall into the sea.[1]

Puṣpadanta says in *Śiva-Mahimna-Stotra*:

Different are the paths laid down in the Veda, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Śaiva, and Vaiṣṇava scriptures. Of these, some people take to one and some to another as the best. Devotees follow these diverse paths, straight or crooked, according to their different tendencies. Yet, O Lord, Thou alone art the Ultimate Goal of all men, as is the ocean of all rivers.[2]

Everyday the performer of *Sandhyā Vandana* says:

Prostrations to every deity reach the Supreme Lord alone just as rain water, wherever fallen, ultimately finds its way to the sea.[3]

This liberal and tolerant mentality which sees unity in variety and good in everything may not contribute to passionate faith but generates a catholic frame of mind and a mood of goodwill and appreciation. It also appeals to the highest element in us and is a source of the eternal and invincible vitality of Hinduism.

A third trait of Hinduism is that it is not wedded exclusively to the formlessness or formfulness of God. Further, it stresses equally the immanence and transcendence of God. It calls God by thousand names. Its concept of Trimūrti leads to its emphasis on the functions of cosmic creation, preservation and destruction while affirming the oneness and indivisibility of God. It is not wedded to the concept of the Fatherhood of God alone but affirms also the Motherhood of God.

I am the father of this world, the mother, the dispenser, and grandsire. (*Gītā*, IX.17)

It has no objection to worshipping God in an image and even says that such an act is productive of great spiritual merit. It even exalts God's name to equality with God. And yet it knows that God is in the image or the name but is not exhausted by it. It stresses equally the various *sādhanas* of God-realization (Karma Yoga, Dhyāna Yoga, Bhakti Yoga, and Jñāna Yoga), though different teachers placed an extra stress on one or another of them. It affirmed different types of supreme spiritual bliss (Sālokya, Sāmīpya, Sārūpya, Sāyujya, and Kaivalya), leaving a person to choose what appealed to him most.

All this may appear to some minds as savouring of dilettantism, as making undue concessions to human urges and tastes and preferences, as making a fetish of the spirit of compromise and as likely to lead to a deflation of faith. But that is not the proper and correct way of looking at things which are unseen and are not verifiable by the senses. Verifiable things and things within the reach of reason could and should be verified and tested by reason; but the truth about unverifiable things and things beyond the reach of reason should be sought with the aid of scripture and intuition. Even in regard to verifiable things we have to steer clear of extremes and accept the golden mean. This attitude is all the more necessary in regard to unverifiable things, because bigoted and fanatic guessers at truth are sure to mislead

1. Bahudhāpyāgamairbhinnāḥ panthānaḥ siddhihetavaḥ;
Tvayyeva nipatantyoghāḥ jāhnavīyā yathārṇave.

2. Trayī sāṅkhyam yogaḥ paśupatimataṁ vaiṣṇavamiti
prabhinne prasthāne paramidamadaḥ pathyamiti ca;
Rucīnām vaicitryāt ṛjukutila nānāpathajuṣām
Nṛṇāmeko gamyastvamasi payasām-arṇava iva.

3. Ākāśāt patitaṁ toyam yathā gacchati sāgaram;
Sarvadeva-namaskāraḥ keśavam pratigacchati.

themselves and others by rushing to extreme views.

Thus a spirit of synthesis, unity in diversity, divinity in humanity, and humanity in divinity, may savour of weakness and compromise but is in reality a source of strength. Take for instance the concepts of Śaṅkara-nārāyaṇa, and Ardhanārīśwara (two Gods in one and one in two), and Dattātreya (three gods in one and one in three), and Durgā-Laxmī-Saraswatī (three goddesses in one and one in three), which are telling proofs of the Ṛgvedic declaration: *'Ekam Sat; Viprā Bahudhā Vadanti*—God is One; sages call Him variously.' The Ṛgveda exalts each God as the highest. Max Muller was puzzled by this mentality and called it Henotheism or Kathenotheism, and differentiated it from monotheism. But he was wrong. The above-said mental religious attitude was pure monotheism, the one and only God having many names and forms, and being Goddess and the Mother of the universe as well as God and the Father of the universe. Nay, between Monism and Monotheism there is only a very thin and shadowy line. He is static Ânanda (Bliss) and yet dynamically overflows as Śakti and takes a Name and Form.

The same spirit of strength through wise compromise and synthesized vision is, as shown above, seen in the view that all the four yogas (Karma, Dhyāna, Bhakti, and Jñāna) lead alike to God. Śrī Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā*:

> By meditation some behold the Self in the self by the self, others by Sāṅkhya Yoga, and others by Karma Yoga.
> Yet others, not knowing thus, worship, having heard from others; they, too, cross beyond death, adhering to what they heard. (XIII.24, 25)

It is equally noteworthy that Vyāsa, in Chapter IV, Part IV of the *Brahma Sūtras*, after propounding the question whether bliss in paradise is enjoyed with a body or in a bodiless state, answers that it can be enjoyed in both ways (*ubhayam vidham*—Sūtras 10 to 12). In the same way in Sūtras 5 to 7, he shows the synthesis and oneness of God's divine nature of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence with the soul's nature as pure *Caitanya*.

The same truth, viz., unity, harmony, and synthesis, is seen in the description of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya as establisher of Advaita (Advaita Sthāpanācārya), and establisher of six faiths (Ṣaṇmata-sthāpanācārya). Śrī Ramakrishna extended this unification to all the world religions.

The most beautiful presentation of such synthesis of strength and strength of synthesis is seen in Chapters X, XI, and XIII of the *Gītā* in which the vision of the special glories of particular Vibhūtis of God, the Divine Cosmic Vision, the Divine beauty of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, and the effulgence of Nirguṇa Brahman (jyotiṣāmapi tajjyotiḥ tamasaḥ paramucyate—XIII.17), are perfectly harmonized.

Thus the doctrine of *Adhikāribheda* (diversity of aspirants), Iṣṭa Devata (Beloved Deity), and Iṣṭa Sādhana (preferred spiritual technique) give Hinduism its essential and unparalleled universality and supreme strength. They form the secret of the undying vitality of Hinduism. Let us never forget the uniquely divine and divinely unique gospel of Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā*:

> From all directions and through all paths men come unto Me! (IV.11)

ARMIES AND COMMANDERS

(KURU WAR)

By Prof. V. B. Athavale

To find out what events occurred at Hastinapur during 8 days of the dark half of Āśvin;* we must turn to Ch. 151-159 and 165-172. For, they are called 'Sainya-niryāṇa' and 'ratha atirathī saṅkhyāna' and they are 56th and 57th in the 100 Parvas of Vyāsa. In the Udyoga-parva of Sauti, they are 7th and 9th Upa-parvas. The 8th Upa-parva is Ulūka Dūta āgamana. In the order of the Parvas of Vyāsa 'Ulūka Dūta āgamana' is 58th. It is easy to show that the sequence of the Parvas of Vyāsa is correct and the error is due to Sauti. For, Ulūka, the son of Śakuni, was sent by Duryodhana to Yudhiṣṭhira when he was in the camp on Hiraṇvati. But 'ratha atiratha saṅkhyāna' is a talk between Duryodhana and Bhīṣma at Hastinapur. just after Bhīṣma was appointed Generalissimo by Duryodhana. We shall see later that Karṇa and Bhīṣma quarrelled on this occasion and Karṇa decided not to take part in the actual war as long as Bhīṣma was in the field. Udyo. 141.16 refers to this quarrel in the talk between Karṇa and Kṛṣṇa. It will be also clear later that Kuntī had disclosed to Kṛṣṇa that Karṇa was her son prior to her marriage with Pāṇḍu. Ādi. 136.26-28 tell that Kuntī recognized Karṇa when he displayed his archery at Hastinapur and she fainted but Vidura sprinkled water and brought her to a normal condition. Even Kṛṣṇa did not disclose the fact to the Pāṇḍavas after his arrival at Upaplāvya. It was Kuntī who disclosed it to her sons at the time of 'Jalapradāna' (offering of water to the dead) at Hastinapur.

Ch. 153.8, tells that when Kṛṣṇa left the assembly under the protection of his soldiers, Duryodhana asked his officers to announce by beating the drums immediately, that the army is to march to Kurukṣetra to fix the camp sites on the next day, without any delay. Ch. 156.13-35 tell that Duryodhana inspected his eleven divisions in the morning on the next day. Then the king and Karṇa went to Bhīṣma to request him to be their Commander-in-chief like Uśanā Kavi in the past. Then Bhīṣma told the king that he would not accept any one except the king as a superior and he would not accept Karṇa as his equal. If Karṇa was to be the general he would refrain from the battle. 'Karṇa always vies with me in the battle-field'. Karṇa got angry§ and said 'I shall not fight as long as Bhīṣma is alive. I shall fight with Arjuna after the death of Bhīṣma.'

Ch. 156.26-32 tell that Duryodhana performed the ceremony of appointing Bhīṣma as the general. Ch. 150.3 tells that the moon was in Puṣya on this day. But we know that the moon is in Puṣya on Āśvin Vadya 7th. Verse 28 says that while the trumpets were announcing the event, red mud came down from a cloudless sky. It is verified by Karṇa in Ch. 143.22. Ch. 156.35 tells that the King and Karṇa went to Kurukṣetra to fix the camp sites.

The departure of the Pāṇḍava army could take place only after Kṛṣṇa returned to Upaplāvya after his meeting with Karṇa and Sañjaya in the chariot at Hastinapur, which we know to have taken place on Āśvin Vadya 8th. Bhīṣma became the Senāpati on Āśvin Vadya 7th. Hence the failure of negotiations

* Referred to in the previous issue.

§ Ch. 168.3-29 tell that Karṇa got angry because Bhīṣma derided him as *Ardharatha* and of low birth. Bhīṣma told that Droṇa also called him *Ardharatha*.

must have taken place on Āśvin Vadya 6th. We know that Kṛṣṇa required three days to reach Hastinapur. The return journey also required three days and hence Kṛṣṇa must have reached Upaplāvya on Āśvin Vadya 11th. Ch. 151-152 and 157-158 tell what happened on the day of the departure of the Pāṇḍava army. These facts are corroborated in Śalya.35.5-10 and here we get the Nakṣatra on which the Pāṇḍava army started. It says that after Kṛṣṇa returned to Upaplāvya, he told the Pāṇḍavas that the Kauravas did not accept his proposals and hence they must start with him for war, on Puṣya Nakṣatra. As the moon returns to the same Nakṣatra after 27 days, it is clear that this Puṣya must be on Kārtika Vadya 5th, i.e. the 5th day after the Kārtika full moon.

Before trying to ascertain the sequence of events at Upaplāvya on Kārtika Vadya 5th, it would be useful to collate the astronomical phenomena observed during this interval. Bhīṣ 3.33 tells that on dark 14th day of the same month, there was again a sharp shower of red mud like that on Vadya 7th. (a) Bhīṣ. 3.13, 16, 30 refer to a big Dhūmaketu (comet) revolving reversely (apasavyam pravartate). (b) Bhīṣ. 3.17, tells. that the ecliptic node (Rāhu) is between Swāti and Chitrā and thus both the sun and the moon may be eclipsed. (c) Bhīṣ. 3.11 tells that Rāhu is approaching the sun. (d) Bhīṣ. 2.23 tells about the lunar eclipse on Kārtika full moon. (e) Bhīs. 3.32 tells that the solar and lnnar eclipses occurred in the same month on the 13th day only. (f) Bhīṣ. 3.28 tells that as the lunar eclipse occurred on the 13th day after the solar eclipse, Amāvāsyā, 13th day and Panrṇa-māsī have come on the same day. (g) Bhīs. 3.31 tells, 'We have seen a Pakṣa (fortnight) of 14 days, 15 days and in rare cases of 16 days also. But we have never come across a Pakṣa of 13 days like this. (h) These bad omens had occurred just after the ceremonial march of the Kaurava army. The Pāṇḍava army moved 5 days after the lunar eclipse.

Ch. 157-158 tell that Kṛṣṇa asked Yudhiṣṭhira to appoint seven Senāpatis for his seven divisions on this Puṣya Nakṣatra in order to avoid a quarrel, which had taken place in the case of the Kaurava army at Hastinapur. Ch. 157.11 tells that (1) Drupada, (2) Virāṭa, (3) Sātyaki, (4) Dhṛṣṭadyumna, (5) Dhṛṣṭaketu, (6) Śikhaṇḍi, (7) Sahadeva Magadha were the seven generals adopted by Yudhiṣṭhira. While this ceremony was going on at Upaplāvya, Balarāma arrived there with Akrūra, Gada, Sāmba, Uddhava, Chārudeṣṇa and others. He, again, pleaded that the Vṛṣṇi family ought to give some help to the Duryodhana side. But as Kṛṣṇa sternly opposed the idea, Balarāma had no alternative but to remain neutral and thus he decided to go for the Sārasvata pilgrimage.[1]

Ch. 158 tells that just after Balarāma and others left Upaplāvya, Rukmi Bhoja, brother of Rukmiṇī, arrived there to offer his help. But Arjuna found that his behaviour was rather rude, so his help was refused. Rukmi then went to Dnryodhana bnt he also refused the offer. Verse 38 tells that Balarāma and Rukmi were thus the only persons who did not take part in the Kuru war. Ch. 152.6, 9 tell that Kṛṣṇa went to Kurukṣetra to fix the sites for the Pāṇḍava camps on the Hiraṇvati river and Sātyaki as well as Dhṛṣṭadyumna accompanied for helping him. Śalya. 35.15 confirms this by saying that after Balarāma left for pilgrimage on Puṣya Nakṣatra, Kṛṣṇa also left for Kurukṣetra with Yuyudhāna Sātyaki on the same Nakṣatra.

Udyog. 195.11, 15 gives the exact location and extent of the camps and the battle zone. It says that the battle zone was Yojanas ($5 = 22\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length and breadth) five in extent and it was the back half of the Kuru-

[1] This pilgrimage (Sārasvata) of Balarāma is corroborated by Bhāg. X.78.17-20. This neutrality was forced on Balarāma. In his 2nd attempt to give some help to Duryodhana, he argues that both Arjuna and Duryodhana are the relatives of the Vṛṣṇis and hence they deserve equal share. Bhima and Duryodhana were taught the mace fight by him with equal zeal. Kṛṣṇa had decided to join the righteous side of the Pāṇḍavas. Hence Balarāma was asked to help none.

kṣetra district. Vana. 83.4, tells that Dṛṣadvati (Ghaggar) was the northern boundary of the district and Saraswati was the southern boundary. Śalya. 62.39 tells that the camps of Duryodhana were on the Dṛṣadvati (Ghaggar) river. Ch. 160 tells that the camps of the Pāṇḍavas were on the Hiraṇvati river and Ulūka, the son of Śakuni, was sent as an emissary to the Pāṇḍava camps on 'lohabhisara' (Mārgaśīrṣa Śukla 6th=Champaṣaṣṭhi) day. In my tour of East Punjab, with letters from the Governor's Secretary, in 1950 A.D., I could discover that the river Mārkaṇḍeyī was known in the past as Hiraṇvati.

It will be clear from this that the actual war zone must be between the Pāṇḍava camps on the Hiraṇvati river in the south and the Kaurava camps on the Dṛṣadvati (Ghaggar) in the north. Hiraṇvati river rises in the Sivalik hills and flowing south-west, meets Ghaggar some miles south of Ambala. Ghaggar rises near the Morni forest lake (Dwaitavana saras) and after flowing past the Ambala town, meets the Saraswatī river at Kaithal. After the confluence, the river is at present called Ghaggar and it gets lost in the Rajaputana desert. The map shows the dry bed of the river extending many miles. The Saraswatī river rises in the Sivalik hills at a place called Adhabadri and it is 50 miles from the source of the Dṛṣadvati river. It flows past the twin town Kurukṣetra-Thaneśvar, Prithūdaka (Pehoha) etc. and meets Dṛṣadvati at Kaithal. It is easy to show that no war took place near the Saraswatī river, *either at Kurukṣetra town or at Prithūdaka as it is commonly believed,* or stated in the provincial Gazetteers. For, Śalya-parva tells that during the last ten days of the war, Balarāma was at Sarasvatī-vināśana, Prithūdaka, Kurukṣetra, Plakṣaprasravaṇa, etc. on the Sarasvatī river. Cunningham writes on page 386 of 'The Ancient Geography of India' that 'Amina' is a village 5 miles SW of Thaneśvar and it was here that Droṇa had arranged his famous Chakravyūha on the 13th day of the war and Abhimanyu was killed there. But this tradition cannot be true because we shall see later that Balarāma was here on this day. Further Mbh. says that war took place not in the front half of Kurukṣetra but in the back half. The territory north of Hiraṇvati can be rightly called the back half if Thaneśvar and Saraswatī can be shown to be the frontal portion of the district. Ādi. and Śalya tell in four places that Thaneśvar=Kurukṣetra=Samant-pañcaka are the 'tīrthas' which form the front door of all other places in the district.

In the 100 Parvas of Vyāsa, 57th is 'Ratha saṅkhyāna', 58th is Ulūka-dūtāgamana', 59th is 'Ambopākhyāna' and 60th is Bhīṣmābhiṣecana. Udyoga-parva of Sauti ends here. We know that Ulūka came to the Pāṇḍavas on Mārgaśirṣa Śukla 6th when they were in their camps. Now we can turn to find out where Sauti has inserted it in his scheme. Ch. 172 is a talk between Duryodhana and Bhīṣma. Verse 16 tells, "I (Bhīsma) shall never fight with Śikhaṇḍi Pāñcālya. You know that I am Devavrata and hence I cannot fight with women or with men who are reported to be women first but became males later. I think you have heard the report that Śikhaṇḍi was born as a girl first, but he became a boy later." Then Duryodhana asked him to tell the story. Ch. 173-192 is the Ambopākhyāna of Sauti. Ch. 193.1 tells that on the next day, in the morning, Duryodhana asked Bhīṣma in the presence of all the armies assembled in the camp, as to the number of days he would require to destroy the Pāṇḍava army. Bhīṣma said that if a thousand Rathis be chosen as one unit of destruction per day, he would take one month to finish the job. When Droṇa was asked the same question, he told that, like Bhīsma, he would finish the job in one month. Kṛpa told that he would require two months for the same job. Drauṇi said he could finish the job in ten nights only. But Karṇa promised that he was competent to finish the job in five days only. It was at this moment that Bhīṣma said that Karṇa was only bragging. It is possible that it was at this time Bhīṣma derided Karṇa as Ardharatha.

Ch. 194.2, 7, 12-15, tell that Yudhiṣṭhira got the news of this talk of the Kauravas through his spies, and he asked Arjuna what he thought about his own powers. Arjuna said that he had secured immense power of destruction by his Tapas in the Himālayas. By that power he was confident that he would destroy the three worlds and the plant and animal kingdom also in a single moment. 'But it is not proper to use these powers for individuals, hence it is proper to use the normal weapons and obtain victory through our valour.'

Ch. 195 and 196 are called Kaurava Sainya Niryāṇa and Pāṇḍava Sainya Niryāṇa respectively. As the Ch. 195.11, 15 directly mentions the Pāṇḍava and Kaurava camps, it means the movement of the armies from their respective camps to the battle zone, on the first day of the war. This is clearly distinct from the Senā-niryāṇa mentioned earlier in the 56th Parva of Vyāsa, which was from Hastinapur and Upaplāvya on two different days but on the same Puṣya Nakṣatra, for the sake of fixing camp sites.

Here ends the Udyoga-parva of Sauti and the next is the Bhīṣma-parva.

LIFE AND WORKS OF ŚRI ŚAṄKARA

By Sri A. V. Sankaranarayana Rao

Introduction

Śrī Śaṅkara played a very prominent part in the cultural history of India as a mystic, philosopher, and teacher. Swami Vivekananda, who was the best exponent of Śaṅkara in modern times, has admired his keen intellect and philosophic geuius. Some of the Western savants like Prof. Max Müller and Paul Deussen have paid glowing tributes to his works. Śrī Śaṅkara lived barely for 32 years, but that short span of life was full of tremendous activity and dynamic thought. The forces he released through his life and work brought about a new epoch and shaped the course of history. The momentum of those forces—forces for the rejuvenation of religion and society—continues unabated even to this day and the work of regeneration of man initiated by him is still progressing.

We shall confine ourselves here to the life and literary works of Śrī Śaṅkara, making a brief reference to the great aspects of his life such as: how he fought big debates in the cause of the Vedic religion, how he purified society of corruption, how he brought about harmony among the different religious sects under the aegis of the Vedic religion (thus earning the epithet 'Ṣaṇmata-sthāpanācārya), and how he established the four Mutts at the four cardinal points of India to stand as sentinels for the protection of Vaidika Dharma, the Religion Eternal (Sanātana Dharma).

As is the case with several religious reformers, the need for a very reliable and clear historic account of Śaṅkara is being felt increasingly. His Advaita philosophy enjoys a wide and steady popularity not only in India but also in Europe and America. Scholars of the East as well as the West are making a critical study of his philosophy and works. This kind of intellectual study of Śaṅkara's works has naturally aroused a great deal of interest in the details of his life. Yet, there are very few reliable works written in the true historical spirit.

Śaṅkara Vijaya of Mādhava, the well-known Vidyāraṇya of the Vijayanagara kingdom and later the chief of Śṛṅgeri Mutt, is one of the original sources for the life of Śaṅkara. The *Śaṅkara Vijaya* written by Ānandagiri also furnishes information to a certain extent. We can also collect some details from *Madhva*

Vijaya and *Maṇimañjarī* both by Paṇḍit Nārāyaṇācārya, a Madhva writer.

The Time of Śaṅkara

If we are to realize the greatness of Śaṅkara, it is very necessary that we should have a glimpse into the times in which he lived and the context in which he worked, for every great man works in the *milieu* of his surroundings and tries to solve the problems then facing society.

The date of Śaṅkara has not been definitely arrived at and is still a matter of controversy. It is the consensus of opinion that he lived after Bhagavān Buddha. The dates assigned to him vary from 6th century B.C. to 8th century A.D. The traditional date is Kaliyuga 2593 or 509 B.C. It has been generally accepted by many modern historians that he lived between 788 and 820 A.D. This has been more or less supported by the investigations made by Prof. Max Müller and Prof. Macdonell as well as by Prof. Keith and Dr. Bhandarkar. Prof. Telang, on the basis of a reference to Pūrṇa Varman, the Buddhist king of Magadha, in the *Sūtra Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, pleads that he must have lived in the sixth century A.D.

Whatever may have been the exact date, it is clear that he lived at a time when Hindu religion faced a critical situation brought about by quarrelling sects and fanatics with unholy zeal and degrading practices. Buddhism had enmeshed itself in its subtle philosophies on the thought plane and was fast gliding down to degeneracy on the moral plane. The development of Buddhist 'Tāntricism' with its various 'Yānas' such as Vajrayāna and its offshoots, Sahajayāna, Mantrayāna and Kālacakrayāna, and the secret concourses based on the Guhyasamāja Tantra and other texts are witness to this state of affairs. The Vedic religion, too, was at its lowest ebb. Its noble principles were forgotten and there was a welter of views in society. Various systems of philosophy had sprung up, advocating their own views of life and Reality, which were mostly partial and based upon mere intellectual cogitations, not on revealed truth. On the orthodox side, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika propounded their own systems of thought entirely based upon reasoning, paying only lip homage to the Śrutis. The Mīmāṁsā confined itself to the Karma-kāṇḍa of the Vedas and interpreted the Śruti wholly in terms of ritualistic Karma and turned the gaze of man towards enjoyment, mundane and heavenly.

Besides these philosophical schools, there were religious schools with various notions and practices, such as the Tāntrikas and Kaulas, the Kāpālikas, Kālāmukhas, Pāśupatas, Pāñcarātras, Gāṇapatyas, and the Sauras. There were also the heterodox atheistic Jains, besides the Baudhas and the materialistic Bārhaspatyas, better known as Lokāyatikas or Cārvākas because of their hedonistic attitude. All these, pulling in different directions had split the Hindu society into an incoherent congeries of conflicting groups without being coordinated by a master ideal.

The truth that will liberate man from his little, limited personality and integrate him to the Infinite, that will make man realize his oneness with all creation, nay with existence itself, the truth that is a blessing to the individual and society in every way was lost sight of by those philosophies and sects. While the Mīmāṁsā tended to increase the desire of man for enjoyment, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga led man to an exclusive existence away from society, and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika bound man in the net of logical subtleties. We have already referred to the condition brought about by the self-stultifving, ultra-subtle Buddhist system of thought, in spite of the grand moral precepts preached by Bhagavān Buddha. While the Lokāyatikas were hedonistic in attitude, seeking pleasure by any means and catering to the comforts of the body, the Jainas went to the other extreme and advocated the mortification of the body. National well-being needed a genius who could counter the effects of all these mutually conflicting, partial views of

life and Reality and reinstate the healthy, integral view of life of the Vedas, as was done by Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā* before. There was an imperative necessity to establish unity in the midst of conflicting diversity if society was to be cohesive and all its members were to progress towards the goal in a systematic manner.

It was at this time that Śrī Śaṅkara appeared like a saviour to accomplish this great task by his work on the social and spiritual plane.

A Short Life-Sketch

Śrī Śaṅkara was born, according to popular tradition, on Vaiśākha Śuddha Pañcamī in the village Kaladi in North Travancore. His father was Śivaguru and his mother Āryāmbā, both of whom were great devotees of Śiva. They belonged to the highly orthodox Namboodiri Brāhmin sect of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda, Taittirīya Śākhā. Ānandagiri states a different story about the birth of Śaṅkara while *Maṇimañjarī's* version is altogether different. The narration here will be in accordance with the *Śaṅkara Vijaya* of Mādhava.

Śaṅkara had his early Sanskrit education in the village in the usual way. He displayed uncommon precocity. It is said that at a very tender age, he had studied Kāvyas and Purāṇas and blossomed into a full-fledged scholar. When he was seven, his father passed away. Later, his mother had his Upanayana ceremony conducted and sent him for initiation in the Vedas and Vedānta. It is said that he had an insight into their import by his intuition very soon. A very fascinating story is told of Śaṅkara as a Brahmacārin. While once going out, he stood outside a house calling for alms (Bhikṣā). The householder's wife, an extremely poor woman, felt deeply her inability to give anything. Finally, she could find only an old dried 'Āmalaka' fruit and she came out in full tears and placed it with all sincerity and devotion in Śaṅkara's Bhikṣā-pātra. Realizing the situation, Śaṅkara prayed to Śrī Mahālakṣmī and as a result the poor woman was endowed with wealth.

Proposals of marriage were being entertained for Śaṅkara by his mother. But Śaṅkara was developing an intense desire to renounce the world and become a Sannyāsin. His mother would not allow him to do so. To secure the mother's consent for Sannyāsa, it is said that the clever boy resorted to an extraordinary ruse. One day, the mother and son went to the river for a bath. As Śaṅkara was having his bath in the water, a crocodile caught hold of his leg and he called out immediately to his mother, who was near by, that the crocodile would leave him only if she permitted him to take Sannyāsa. The mother in this crisis would not, of course, hesitate and at once gave her consent with the hope that she might see him alive even as a Sannyāsin. Śaṅkara emerged from the water as a declared Sannyāsin. Later on, he became a disciple of Govinda Bhagavatpāda whose Āśrama was on the banks of the Narmadā and got himself formally initiated into the holy order of Hindu Sannyāsa. It is believed that it was Guru Govinda who taught Śaṅkara the philosophy of Advaita and directed him to write a commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, then interpreted in diverse and incorrect ways.

Later on, Śaṅkara travelled from place to place and arrived at Vārāṇasī which was the centre of learning and philosophy. Very soon, he began to attract pupils and disciples from various quarters. Among them was a Brāhmin youth by name Sunanda, who came from the Chola kingdom and later on became one of his specially endeared disciples under the name of Padmapāda. There were two other youths by name Prabhākara and Giri, who later joined the fold of Śaṅkara's disciples and came to be known as Hastāmalaka and Troṭaka respectively. Here, Śaṅkara started writing his works. It is not clear in what order he wrote them, but, according to tradition, his first commentary was on *Viṣṇusahasranāma*. Many small works of various kinds must have been written by him before he proceeded to write the commentaries of the important Upaniṣads, the *Gītā*, and the

Brahma Sūtras. The story goes that Śrī Vyāsa himself, the reputed author of the *Vedānta Sūtras,* came to Śaṅkara disguised as an old man, and challenged him on several interpretations made in his commentary. Although Śaṅkara triumphantly answered Vyāsa, the old man proved to be a terrible opponent and finally Vyāsa revealed himself and blessed Śaṅkara.

Another important anecdote relates to his meeting a Caṇḍāla with his dogs. Śaṅkara asked him to clear off the road for him to pass, as it was the practice of orthodox Brāhmins. The Caṇḍāla, however, smiled and asked Śaṅkara how he could consistently teach Advaita if he practised such differentiating observances. The Guru's eyes were opened and the five beautiful verses of ***Manīṣāpañcaka*** were the outcome of this experience. It is believed that the Caṇḍāla was none other than Viśveśvara Himself of Vārāṇasī in disguise. There is another story of Śaṅkara meeting a student who was engaged in learning the most difficult Sūtras of the Sanskrit grammar. With the object of teaching him the futility of such a study in the matter of realization of one's Self, Śaṅkara is said to have spontaneously burst out in song. This is the most popular and enchanting *'Bhaja-Govinda-stotra'*.

Later, Śaṅkara came to Prayāga and met Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and at his instance came to Maṇḍana Miśra, the famous Mīmāṁsaka of Māhiṣmatīpura. Here a long debate was held between the two. Maṇḍana Miśra's wife, Ubhaya Sarasvatī, by herself a very learned lady, presided over the debate. The discussion went on for several days and finally, Maṇḍana, overpowered by the intellect of Śaṅkara, took Sannyāsa as one of his chief disciples under the name of Sureśvarācārya.

Even in those days with very few travelling facilities, Śaṅkara travelled widely in India for the propagation of Advaita philosophy. He covered practically all the important places of the country. He sent his chief disciples wherever he himself could not go. He travelled South till he reached the banks of the Tuṅgabhadrā and established a monastery at Śṛṅgeri, which is now the most richly endowed and widely honoured of the South Indian religious institutions. He also built a temple here for Śrī Śāradā, the goddess of learning. The other three important Mutts established by him were at Purī in Orissa, at Dvārakā in Gujarat, and at Badrināth in the Himālayas. According to tradition, it is said that these three Mutts were respectively in charge of Hastāmalaka, Padmapāda, and Troṭaka. The Śṛṅgeri Mutt has eight branches —at Virūpākṣa, Puṣpagiri, Kumbhakonam, Kūḍli, Śaṅkeśvara, Śrī Śailam, Āvaṇi, and Śivagaṅgā.

After making all the arrangements to carry on his missionary work in the Mutts and firmly establishing them with proper staff, Śaṅkara visited even Kashmir to win the famous seat of learning there. He visited certain parts of Assam also. At Kāmarūpa (Gauhati), Śaṅkara triumphed over a Śākta commentator by name Abhinavagupta. It is said that this defeated pundit resorted to Abhisārakarma (black magic) to take revenge on Śaṅkara. This act ultimately told upon the health of Śaṅkara and he could never recover his normal vigour. Lastly, he came to Kedāreśvara in the Himālayas and at the age of thirty-two, this illustrious philosopher entered final Samādhi in one of the caves there.

(To be concluded)

ŚRĪ-BHĀṢYA

By Swami Vireswarananda

(*Continued from previous issue*)

Topic 6:

THE PERSON OF THE SIZE OF A THUMB IS BRAHMAN

In Sūtra 20 it was shown that the smallness of Brahman referred to in Daharavidyā is for the sake of meditation. But we find that in scriptural texts the individual self alone is referred to as of limited size. So why should it not be the individual self? To remove this doubt this topic is begun. An alternative connection is this: In the previous topic the smallness of Brahman was established for the sake of meditation. To establish again its size as the size of a thumb this topic is begun.

शब्दादेव प्रमितः ॥ १।३।२३ ॥

23. From the very word ('Lord' mentioned in the text) (the being) measured (by the size of a thumb is Brahman).

'The being of the size of a thumb resides in the middle of the self, as the Lord of the past and future; (knowing Him) one fears no more. This is That' (*Kaṭh* 2.4.12). Vide 2.4.13 and 2.6.17 also. Who is this being of the size of a thumb? Is it Brahman or the individual self? The opponent holds that it is the latter, for it is referred to as of the size of a thumb in *Śvet* 5.8. where it is clear that the reference is to the individual self as it is said to have desires and egoity. Again nowhere else is Brahman said to be of the size of a thumb even for the sake of Upāsanā (devout meditation). The individual soul can also be said to be the 'Lord' as the text says, for it is the ruler of the body, the sense-organs etc.

This the Sūtra refutes and says that the 'being of the size of a thumb' is the supreme Brahman, for it is apparent from the words, 'The Lord of the past and future.' This rulership over everything of the past and future cannot belong to the individual self which is subject to Karma.

हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ॥ १।३।२४ ॥

24. But with reference to (the space in) the heart (is this declaration of size), as man alone is qualified (for meditation on Brahman).

As the Lord abides in the heart of men who meditate on Him, and the heart is of the size of a thumb, He is said to be of the size of a thumb. As man alone is capable of meditation on Brahman, scriptural teachings are meant for him. Therefore it is with reference to him that the thumb is used as the standard of measurement.

Topic 7:

THE RIGHT OF THE GODS TO BRAHMA-VIDYĀ

In the previous topic it was said that men alone are capable of meditation on Brahman. So a doubt might arise that the gods are not entitled to such meditations. To remove such a doubt this topic is begun. In Sūtras 25-37 there is therefore a digression from the main topic of the Section.

तदुपर्यपि बादरायणः सम्भवात् ॥ १।३।२५ ॥

25. Bādarāyaṇa thinks (that) beings above men (i.e. the gods) also (are capable of meditation on the Supreme Brahman), because (it is) possible (for them also).

The gods also are entitled to meditation on Brahman according to Bādarāyaṇa, for they are also corporeal beings like men and so capa-

ble of such meditations and it is possible for them also to have a desire for final illumination. That they are corporeal beings we know from the hymns addressed to them as having a body. We also find in the Upaniṣads gods like Indra and others going to teachers for the attainment of the knowledge of the Brahman. So, as the gods are corporeal beings they are also entitled to meditation on Brahman.

विरोधः कर्मणीति चेत्, न, अनेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात्

॥ २।३।२६ ॥

26. If it be said (that the corporeality of gods would involve) a contradiction to sacrifices; (we say) no, because we find (in the scriptures) (that gods) assume many forms (at one and the same time).

An objection is raised that if the gods are corporeal beings then it would not be possible for one and the same god to be present when invoked at sacrifices performed simultaneously at different places. This the latter part of the Sūtra refutes, for it is seen from scriptural texts that gods are capable of assuming several forms simultaneously.

शब्द इति चेत्, न, अतः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्

॥ १।३।२७ ॥

27. If it be said (that the corporeality of the gods would involve a contradiction) with regard to (Vedic) words, (we say) no, since beings originate from them (as is known) from perception (Śruti) and inference (Smṛti).

All the words in the Vedas are eternal. Every word has as its counterpart a form, an object which it denotes. The word, the object, and the relation between the word and the object are eternal verities. This is accepted by all orthodox Hindu philosophers. Now we have in the Vedas words like 'Indra,' 'Varuṇa' etc., and so the relation between these words and the gods they refer to should be eternal; but if the gods are corporeal beings they cannot be eternal. So the word 'Indra' etc. will be meaningless before the creation of Indra and after his demise, and consequently the eternity of the Vedas and their authoritativeness on that ground would be a myth.

The Sūtra refutes this objection thus. The Creator creates god Indra uttering the Vedic word 'Indra.' The words 'Indra' etc. do not mean particular individuals but a type. So each Vedic word has a counterpart, an object which is a type, class or species, that have the same form and as such is eternal and does not depend on the birth and death of individuals belonging to that type, as e.g. the word 'cow'. So when one Indra dies the Creator remembers the particular form of Indra and creates another Indra of the same form etc., even as a potter creates a new pot when an earlier one is destroyed. Hence there is no contradiction with Vedic words if the gods are corporeal beings. How is this known? Both from Śruti and Smṛti or direct perception and inference. In the Vedas it is said that the Creator uttered different words before creating different types of beings. 'He said Bhūḥ and then created the earth' (*Taitt. Br.* 2.2.4). 'The several names, actions and conditions of all things He shaped in the beginning from the words of the Vedas' (*Manu* 1.21).

अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ॥ १।३।२८ ॥

28. From this very reason also (results) the eternity (of the Vedas).

The Creator recollects the meaning of the words in the Vedas and then creates the world of beings. He remembers the shape of different things in the world by uttering the Vedic words and creates those things. Though many of the Mantras in the Vedas are attributed to certain Ṛṣis yet they are not the authors but only discoverers or revealers. At the time of creation after a partial dissolution, Brahmā remembers with the help of the words of the Vedas the former Ṛṣis, Viśwāmitra and others, and He creates these Ṛṣis again having the same name and ability, who could therefore recite the same Mantras assigned to them, correctly and without any difficulty, thus revealing the very Mantras. So the eternity

of the Vedas is established though these Ṛṣis are their revealers.

समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात् स्मृतेश्च ॥ १।३।२९॥

29. And because of the sameness of names and forms (in every fresh cycle) there is no contradiction (to the eternity of these Vedic words) even in the revolving of world cycles, as is seen from the Śruti and the Smṛti.

An objection is raised. Since at the end of a cycle when there is complete dissolution including the Creator Brahmā and the Vedas, and creation begins afresh at the beginning of the next cycle, there is a break in the continuity of existence. So how could the eternity of the Vedas be established? This Sūtra refutes it. At the beginning of a new cycle the world will have the same name and form as it had in the previous cycles and so there is no contradiction to the eternity of the Vedas. The Śruti and the Smṛti declare the creation of a new world of the same name and form. 'He who first creates Brahmā and delivers the Vedas to him' (*Śvet* 6.18). 'As in the rotation of the seasons, the very same signs of the different seasons are seen repeated, so also at the beginning of a cycle the various things are created as in the previous cycle' (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 1.5.65).

Topic 8:

THE RIGHT OF THE GODS TO PRACTISE CERTAIN UPĀSANĀS

मध्वादिष्वसम्भवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः ॥ १।३।३०॥

30. Jaimini (is of the opinion) that the gods (Vasu and others) are not entitled for Madhu Vidyā etc. on account of the impossibility.

It has been shown that the gods are qualified for the meditation on Brahman. Now the question is raised whether they are qualified for certain other Upāsanās. In many of the meditations (Upāsanās) one has to meditate on the self of some god or other. For example, in Madhu Vidyā one has to meditate on the sun-god. Such a meditation would be impossible for the sun-god. So the gods cannot practise these meditations for the same person cannot be both the object of meditation and the meditator. Moreover the result of such meditations is the attainment of the position of such gods which they are already and there is no question of their attaining it. So Jaimini thinks the gods are not qualified for Madhu Vidyā etc.

ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ॥ १।३।३१॥

31. And on account of (the meditation of the gods) being on the Light (of lights i.e. Brahman).

'The gods meditate on that Light of lights as life and immortality' (*Bṛh*.4.4.16). Though this meditation is common to both men and the gods, yet the special mention of the gods shows that they have a right only for this meditation and not for other meditations like Madhu Vidyā etc.

भावं तु बादरायणः, अस्ति हि ॥१।३।३२॥

32. But Bādarāyaṇa (maintains) the existence (of these qualifications) for it is possible.

Bādarāyaṇa maintains that the gods have necessary qualifications for Madhu Vidyā etc., for it is possible for them to meditate upon Brahman in their own form and attain also its results, viz. the position of Vasu (the sun-god) etc. in the next cycle also.

(To be continued)

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TO OUR READERS

'Religion, the most vital concern of man,' as Dr. S. N. L. Shrivastava, M.A., D.Litt, says, 'has ever been questioned. If it was Science which questioned it yesterday, it is Psychology, the New Psychology, which is questioning it today with all the zeal of a new convert.' In the course of his detailed reply to the critics. the learned Professor points out, with apt quotations, that the 'generalizations and inferences' of the Psychologists 'are by no means free from fallacies, which they have simply overlooked.' 'A psychology of religion is not religion,' nor can it 'in itself invalidate the reality of religion.' 'Religion does not derive its right to exist from the intellect. It stands in its own right.' 'The human need or capacity expressed in religion' is 'structural in the human reason or spirit as such, and consequently carries its validity in itself.' 'Religious experience is as ultimate as any form of experience.' Surely, 'it cannot be invalidated by psychology studying it from outside, that is, without the psychologist himself living through that experience' . . .

From the times of the Vedas down to the present age, a number of spiritual luminaries have appeared on the Indian scene and left the impress of their personality and message behind them. Each of them has come and added his own flower to the bouquet of the spiritual life of India, and enhanced its beauty. Behind the apparent differences and divergent views of these systems, there is a unity and continuity of spiritual thought. Prof. Radhakrishna Choudhary, M.A., Purāṇshāstri, F.R.A.S. (London), (whose valuable article on "Vidyāpati's Faith" appeared in Prabuddha Bharata, November 1955) has this time given us a detailed study of the contribution of Buddhism and Jainism to Indian Culture. As he rightly says, 'Through the eternal messages' contained in them 'has come down to us the everlasting bliss of a happy and peaceful society, untarnished by many waves that dashed against it from within and without.' As he rightly says, 'The eternal messages of the past... enshrined within the hearts of millions...have acted as our beacon light in realizing our concept of a composite culture, based on love, mutual tolerance and non-violence.' We are thankful to the Professor for revealing to us 'this essential unity of our cultural life and thought.' . . .

Sri K. S. Ramaswami Sastri, B.A., B.L., who is a frequent contributor to our journals, is well known for his deep scholarship and keen interest in all aspects of culture. In the article on "Strength and Weakness of Hinduism" he shows how what is usually considered as the weakness of Hinduism is verily its strength. "A spirit of synthesis, unity in diversity, divinity in humanity, and humanity in divinity, may savour of weakness and compromise but is in reality a source of strength." In his simple and lucid style he explains how 'this liberal and tolerant mentality' has been a source of 'the eternal and invincible vitality of Hinduism.' With appropriate quotations from various Sanskrit texts he reveals the 'secret' of this undying vitality of Hinduism. . . .

Prof. V. B. Athavale, M.Sc., F.R.G.S., continues in this number his attempt at reconstructing the events of the Kuru War. It is inevitable that there should be a certain amount of screening and filtering when a purely 'historical' study is made of a book which was not written to serve such a purpose. 'History' in the sense of an exact narration of all the ugly, vicious, and murderous 'incidents' which can take place in relations between two countries, or two sections within the same country, can only lead to a perpetuation of hatred, intrigues, and reprisals,—as world 'history' has

amply demonstrated. It cannot create the passion for moral and spiritual progress which the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* have instilled into the minds of millions, century after century. Looked at from the field of human culture, this successful moulding of character of vast masses of people,—beginning from days when teaching facilities were considerably less than at present—is an astounding historical fact. Taking the *Mahābhārata*, as an example, we find that it was not Vyāsa's original composition or Sauti's version of it that helped the inhabitants of remote villages to cherish in their minds such glorious pictures of the heroes and heroines of old as could give them courage to face their troubles, large-heartedness to set apart a portion of their meagre earnings to support wandering religious men in particular and the cause of religion in general, or the yearning to feel the throbbing of Divine grace within their simple hearts. What reached their ears was most often the 'versions' given by the 'local' or 'itinerant' story-tellers who combined their knowledge of Sanskrit with appealing songs and interesting anecdotes which acted in their totality like *'hṛt-karṇa-rasāyanāni'*, nectar giving new life to the heart and the ear and indeed all other aspects of the personality. . . . Since the 'historical' sense has come to stay, we have to take steps to see that while satisfying it, we do not knock out or lose the 'inspirational' element which was rightly uppermost in the minds of the sage-composers who wrote, spoke, and used their talents *only* to rouse, and to render abiding, the higher values of life in those whom they found caught in the midst of egoistic pulls and fights. Curses and blessings, penances and boons, demons and gods, free mixing of celestials and human beings, physical harassment and mental supremacy, reincarnation and liberation,—these were introduced as delicate 'movers' in the environment which made not only kings and queens, but also the dutiful wife and the diligent merchant, get the 'vision' that made them manifest the noblest virtues in their day to day activities. With this wider frame-work kept fixed in our minds, we shall be able to appreciate the way in which the learned Professor has analyzed the various chapters of the *Mahābhārata,* and picked up facts and events which we shall miss in the course of a hasty reading. . . . Many scholars who have made a critical study of the *Mahābhārata* have often ignored the fact that, wherever important events are described as having taken place, the positions of the various heavenly bodies at the time have been carefully indicated by the composer. Some 'modern' thinkers may take a special delight in scoffiing at those who 'look at the stars' and try to associate them with earthly events. But there are others who believe that the 'heavenly map', when carefully analyzed, can give us valuable clues as to the precise dates of the events narrated. We are thankful to Prof. Athavale for having taken great pains and given us details about the eclipses, and the planetary movements connected with the main incidents of the War. We take this opportunity of pointing out how Dr. P. S. Sastri, M.A., M. Litt., Ph.D., of Sangor University, has recently used these very astronomical data to arrive at the actual date of the Mahābhārata War. In the *Astrological Magazine* of June 1957, he mentions the 'two eclipses' and writes as follows: 'Thus far we can state definitely that the Mahābhārata War took place before Kali Yuga commenced, that the trumpets for war blew on the New Moon day of Kārtika, and that there were two eclipses during this Kshayamāsa. These facts fit in admirably with 3137 B. C.' After referring to the planetary positions next, Dr. Sastri writes: 'Thus seven astral bodies were together on the day of the battle. This planetary position fits in with the year 3137 B. C.' From other references we know that 'Kali began exactly on the day when Kṛṣṇa ceased to live and that was the 36th year after the war. Since Kali began in 3102 B. C., the great Bhārata War must have taken place in 3137 B. C.' Dr. Sastri adds: 'In 3101 B. C. on the 20th of February at 2 hours, 27

minutes, 30 seconds, we find Jupiter and Mercury in the same degree, while Mars was eight degrees away from these and Saturn only seven degrees away; and this agrees with the traditional astronomical account of the positions at the beginning of Kali.' Scholarship and pains-taking habits, backed by an initial faith in the wisdom of ancient sages and by a sincere desire to discover what they really saw, thought, and did for the benefit of posterity, can never fail to produce excellent results in the long run. . .

With the increasing interest evinced in Indian philosophy, both here and abroad, the 'need for very reliable and clear historic accounts' of the founders of our philosophical systems is being keenly felt. But our teachers themselves have left us very few details about their own lives. They felt it their duty to focus all their energy on teaching people how to lift themselves above their little selves and lead a higher and nobler life. Did not the Upaniṣad declare: 'Tamevaikaṁ jānatha ātmānam anyā vāco vimuñcatha'—Realize and meditate only on that Ātman and give up all other talk? So they were 'satisfied with giving us the thoughts', leaving us 'to find out their antecedents as best we can'. In the absence of any historical record, we have to rely mainly on the traditional accounts left by others for the details of Śaṅkara's life. Mr. Sankaranarayana Rao gives a brief account of the Ācārya's life based on *Śaṅkara Vijaya*. . . Those were the times when 'various systems of philosophy . . . advocating their own views of life and Reality . . . mostly partial and based upon intellectual cogitations' had sprung up. Śaṅkara came as the genius to 'reinstate the healthy, integral view of life of the Vedas'. The writer refers to 'the prominent part that Śaṅkara played in the cultural history of India as a mystic, philosopher, and teacher.'

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

STUDIES IN HINDU POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ITS METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION. By Dr. Vishwanath Prasad Varma, M.A. (Pat.), M.A. (Columbia), Ph.D. (Chicago). *Published by Motilal Banarsidas, Post Box 75, Banaras. Pp. 218. Price Rs. 15.*

This book covers a very vast field beginning from the Vedas and ending with the Smṛtis. The references in the footnotes are both profuse and instructive. To take just one example: Page 187 has a total of eight, including Śatapatha, Taittirīya, Rgveda as well as 'Vedic India' by Ragozin who summarizes the views of Abel Bergaine. There are important quotations from Buddhist sources and from such books as Arthaśāstra and Mahābhārata.

Prof. Varma comes into clash with many writers in the field,—Dhawan, Radhakrishnan, Bandyopadhyaya and Bottazi, to mention a few. Sinha, he says, 'has ended in a great confusion and even contradicts himself.' 'Radhakrishnan and C. A. F. Rhys Davids are mistaken and unfaithful to the great body of Buddhist Pali literature in trying to supplement Buddhism by an absolutist metaphysics.' 'The Vedic view of the divine creation of the cosmos and of social organization made any materialistic political thought impossible.' Hindu books like Arthaśāstra 'never' 'propose to give a faithful picture of a concrete polity.' 'The immense number of details does not make the book non-theoretical.' The name of the book is Śāstram, which means a philosophical and not a historical presentation.' If extant books are dismissed as 'didactic', it becomes difficult to appreciate a challenge like this: 'Talking in historical terms, we have no evidence of any concrete state or kingdom in ancient India where Dharma or its decrees were considered as sovereign.' 'It is up to those who hold this view to come forward with concrete proof and not to rely on the statements of theoretical and normative books and to interpret some of their statements as referring to an actual historical situation.' The reader will doubtless pause and think well in such contexts.

Barring these, this book contains an excellent study of Dharma in its manifold aspects. There has

been a tendency among Indian scholars to show from our ancient texts that they contain all notions of sovereignty, of the rights of the people against the powers of the ruler, and so on which we now associate with the West. Some have gone to extremes in this kind of interpretation. Prof. Varma's main attempt in this volume has been to make a detailed analysis of our available literature and discuss kingship and administration, as they developed in India from very ancient times. He rightly shows again and again that 'We do not find in Manu, or for that matter in any Hindu theorist, the concept of civil and political rights of the people. This does not imply that historically speaking, people were always tyrannized and oppressed by kings. What we are asserting is only that there was no conceptual formulation of the notion of rights against somebody, or of rights versus duty.' The notion of Dharma comprehended the basic ideas involved in the concepts of rights and duties and freedom, but the Hindu conceptualization is totally different from the modern way.' 'In later periods of Indian history the Brahmins enjoyed judicial power and there are references in the Mahābhārata to this effect.' But 'The Brahmins as a class never enjoyed supreme political power.' 'Ancient India presents no spectacle like those of the Hebrew Theocracy, Islamic Caliphate, or Calvin's rule in Geneva.' 'The notion of Karma is highly democratic to the extent that it rejects any Hebraic or Calvinistic idea of special election or selection. One is entrusted only with the performance of only those tasks for which one's previous Karma has fitted him.' 'Concurrently the law of Karma made impossible any idea of non-resistance or passive obedience being divinely ordained, because every person has his scheme of particular Dharma. God did not prescribe passive obedience or absolute non-resistance to the political authority of the king. The people have their Dharmas.' 'In a specific situation the people would decide what to do.' 'Asoka for the first time condemns political violence as being opposed to Dharma. But in spite of the reference to love and transcendental good resulting from a conquest of Dharma no metaphysical discussion of the problem of political violence is found in the inscriptions of Asoka.' 'The problems of Kautilya, Bhīshma and Bharadwāja were different from the modern juxtaposition of politics and ethics.' 'The notion of social versus ethical or political versus ethical' is not met with in Hindu writers. 'There is no conflict between the pursuance of political life and the contemplation of Brahman.' In fact, every page of this book abounds in brilliant statements and expositions of this kind. This is a book which deserves careful and detailed study.

GANDHIAN TECHNIQUE AND TRADITION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. By R. N. Bose, M.A., I.A.S. *Published by Research Division, All India Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management, Calcutta-7. Pp. 228+iii. Price Rs. 5.*

Gandhiji, as is too well known by now, 'sought to apply the principlees of truth and non-violence' and 'set a new standard of values', whatever was the problem he attempted to solve. With the gaining of independence and the launching of large scale programmes of industrial expansion, a tendency has been growing in India to put aside Gandhiji's approach as too idealisitic and his methods as 'Quixotic or impossible'. And we are paying the price for such an attitude in the form of bitterness and strife that is seen all over the country. 'Time has come,' says the author, 'when the nation should not only re-discover him, but re-assess and re-understand him who was one of the most vital thinkers of the age and who ceaselessly evolved in incessant ways towards the ultimate values.' For 'sooner or later it will be realised that this dreamer had his feet firmly planted on the ground, and that the idealist was the most practical of men.' It will be seen that 'Gandhiji not only kept abreast but went far ahead of his times' (P. 33) and that his 'social and economic ideas are based upon a realistic appraisal of man's nature and the nature of his position in the universe.' (P. 10)

Mr. R. N. Bose is the Professor of Industrial Law, All-India Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management. With his intimate knowledge of the Industrial relations and problems and also his thorough grasp of the Gandhian approach, he presents to us, in clear and simple language, the different aspects of Gandhiji's technique and tradition in solving the various conflicts of modern industrial society. The article on 'Gandhiji and the Ancient Tradition' first appeared in the Prabuddha Bharata, June 1938.

S. K.

KULACŪDĀMAṆI NIGAMA: *Published by Ganesh & Co. (Madras) Ltd., Madras. Pp. x + 31 + 60. Price Rs. 3.*

This reprint contains a brief Preface by Śrī Karra Ramamurthy, B.A., B.L. It explains the significance of "Kula" and makes apt references to Ānandalaharī etc. In his valuable Introduction, Śrī Akṣaya Kumāra Maitra, C.I.E., has summed up the general features of Kaula knowledge,—"Kulam-mātṛ-māna meyam", Mātā, Mānam, and Meyam being respectively the Jīva, Jñāna, and Viśva or the universe. "The esoteric character of its doctrine and practice is such that it was never meant for the ordinary man of the world." "It is easier to walk on a drawn sword than to be a Kaula", "the Adhikārī must be a Kulīna", one "capable of

realizing that every person, thing and act is a manifestation of the Mother or Śaktī.'' The seven Paṭalas or chapters are printed in Sanskrit; their summary in English makes brief mention of items like 'Jñānaśuddhi, purification of knowledge', worship of the Yantra, or hymns to be recited. The sixth chapter deals with Śava-sādhana and the seventh with Mahiṣa-mardinī. There is a detailed index of the first line of all the verses. For this as well as other books, students of the Tantras, and Sādhakas in general will be profoundly grateful to the publishers.

SAUNDARYALAHARĪ: *Published by Ganesh & Co. Madras, Ltd., Madras Pp. xxiii; 117; 66; 48; and 356. Price Rs. 25.*

This very valuable book bas been brought out by the Publishers ''to synchronize with the Golden Jubilee of His Holiness Śrī Śaṁkarācārya Swāmigal'' of Śrī Kāñci-Kāmakoti Pīṭham. The English translation of the first section, Ānandalaharī, is by the late Pandit Anantakrishna Śāstri, while that of the second section, is hy Śrī Karra Rāmamūrthy Gāru. The special feature of this edition is the bringing together of Kaivalyāśrama's ''saubhāgyavardhanī'' and the two Ṭīkas, ''Lakṣmīdharā'' and ''Aruṇāmodinī'', all printed in Sanskrit. In the beginning are printed Prātaḥ-smaraṇa-stotram and appropriate messages from the heads of Śṛngeri and Kāñci Piṭhams. There is a brief Foreword by Dr. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, and this is followed by a Note on 'Advaita in Saundaryalaharī' by Prof. P. Sankaranarayanan of Vivekananda College, and a Sanskrit Bhūmikā by Śrī Anantakrishna Śāstri. The Index section is very elaborate. The get-up is excellent, and the coloured pictures of their Holinesses the Jagadgurus as well as of Śrī Ādi Śaṁkara and of Śrī Rājarājeśvarī add to the attractiveness of the volume which, as said in one of the ''Messages'' ''is bound to be helpful to all those devoted to Śrī Vidyā.''

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION CHINGLEPUT BRANCH

Report for 1956

Inspired by the teachings of the great Swami Vivekananda a small Vidyalaya was founded during the Centenary Year of Sri Ramakrishna on 22.6.1936. The institution was affiliated to the Ramakrishna Mission in December 1940. The work has expanded remarkably since then, and today the centre runs (1) a Boys' High School, (2) a Girls' High School, (3) an Elementary School for Boys, (4) an Elementary School for Girls, (5) a Boys' Residential Home (Hostel), and a small Printing Press.

The two High Schools prepare students for the S. S. L. C. Public Examination of Madras leading to the University. Apart from the usual curricular studies, religious and moral instruction forms a regular part of the course in all classes. An efficient A. C. C. Group, Spinning and Weaving, a Scout Group, Painting and Fretwork, Hand-composing and Printing, the Literary and Debating Society, are some of the extracurricular activities of the Boys' High School, and Home-craft, Music and Needle-work and Dress-making, of the Girls' School. The present strength of the two schools is 350 boys and 226 girls, with 17 and 11 teachers on the staff, respectively.

The Elementary Schools command a strength of 477 pupils, 269 boys and 208 girls.

The daily routine and activities of the Boys' Residential Home have been so framed as to inculcate in the boys a sense of discipline, and instill in them the value of manual labour, self-help, and character built upon spiritual ideals.

A three-storeyed building for the Boys' Residential Home, an Ashrama on a plot of land in a suburb in order to provide facilities for a life of pure meditation to the monks of the Ramakrishna Order and the development of the Printing Press are the schemes under the Programme of Expansion.

The immediate needs of the institution are:

1.	Hostel Buildings	Rs.	15,000/-
2.	Buildings for the Elementary and High Schools	Rs.	1,50,000/-
3.	To erect Laboratory and Library Halls	,,	50,000/-
4.	Sadhu Seva Fund	,,	25,000/-
5.	To develop the Printing Press	,,	25,000/-
		Rs.	2,65,000/-