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उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत।

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

AT THE FEET OF THE HOLY MOTHER

RECORDED BY SWAMI ARUPANANDA

TRANSLATED BY SRIMATI LEELA MAZUMDAR

14th March 1913, Jayrambati

Dr. Lalit Babu of Shyambazar and Prabodh Babu had arrived. They came at about four in the afternoon to pay their respects to the Mother, and talked with her. ... Speaking of the rules about taking food, the Mother said: '... Whatever you eat, you must first dedicate to God; you should not take any other kind of food. The quality of your blood depends on the quality of the food you take. If you take consecrated food, your blood and your mind will be purified; you will find strength. If your mind is pure, your faith and love will be pure.' ...

Prabodh Babu asked, 'Mother, the Master loved renunciation, but where is our spirit of renunciation?"

The Mother replied: 'It will grow by degrees. A little in this life, more in the next. The shell alone changes, the soul remains the same. .... He (the Master) used to say, "If I wished, I could cover with gold the whole of Kamarpukur, only by asking Shejobabu (Mathuranath Biswas) to do so. But what is the use? Such things are ephemeral".

'Of some people, he would say that this was their final incarnation. He used to say, "See now, he has no desire for anything. This is his last life".'

They bowed at her feet and took their leave.

At dusk, we sat on the verandah of the Mother's house, talking. ...

I said: 'Some people once said to Swami Vivekananda, "What right has a Śūdra (a non-Brahmin) to take the *sannyāsin's* vows?" ... Swamiji replied, "A Kāyastha is a Kṣatriya by caste, and has the right to take the vows".'

Later, the Mother said: 'I do not under-

stand anything, but this I know. Naren came down from among the seven *ṛṣis* (seers), and the Master's disciples are *sannyāsins* who have gained knowledge. A man of knowledge can become a *sannyāsin*. Take Gourdasi for instance; women may not become *sannyāsinīs*. But is she a woman? She is like a man. How many men are there like her? See how she has arranged for the school, the carriage, the horses. The Master used to say, "If a woman becomes a *sannyāsinī*, she no longer remains a woman". She becomes a man. To Gourdasi, he would say, "I shall pour the water, you knead the clay".'

28th March 1913, Jayrambati

... We were at the midday meal. The Mother's crazy sister-in-law had set a place for a child on her own verandah. Every time she filled a glass of water for him, a cat came and drank from it. She became furious, and cried out that she would kill the wretched cat! The Mother was nearby, and she said, 'No, no, do not hinder a thirsty creature. Besides, he has already touched the water'.

The crazy aunt shouted: 'Do not waste your pity over a cat. How much pity have you for human beings? Why don't you have pity on men?'

The Mother became serious and said: 'The person I do not pity is miserable indeed! I do not know on whom I have no pity, even to the meanest creature.'

We were having our evening meal. The Mother had prepared a dish of potatoes and some watery vegetables. She brought it to us saying, 'See what this tastes like'. I tasted a little and said, 'Just like a patient's diet, cool and bland. Who cooked it?'

The Mother replied, 'I did'.

'With your own hands?'

'Yes.'

I said: 'Well, it is nothing special. People from our parts would not care for it.'

The Mother said, 'Try just the juice'.

Nalini commented: 'Aunt, you never use chillies. How can he eat it?'

The Mother said to her: 'Now, don't listen to him. When you taste it yourself, you will like it.'

I continued: 'For some days, I have been making enquiries about which dishes you have cooked, and trying them out. But they all taste the same.'

The Mother said: 'Very well, one day I shall cook as they do in your parts. ... One has to put more chillies, isn't it that?'

I said: 'But not too much. Anyway, the taste need not be bad even if there are not enough chillies!'

Whereupon the Mother said to Nalini: 'Get some peas tomorrow. I shall cook. I used to be quite a good cook; now I am getting out of practice. Lakshmi's mother and I would cook at Kamarpukur. One day, the Master and Hriday were eating together. Lakshmi's mother was an excellent cook. The Master tasted something she had prepared and cried, "Oh, Hridu, the person who cooked this is a specialist!" Then he ate something that I had cooked and said, "And this one is a quack". ... To which Hriday replied: "True, but your quack will be at hand all the time. ... You have only to call her; the specialist's fees are very high, and she is not always available. People always call in the quack first; the quack is always one's friend." The Master said, "Quite right, she is always there".

'One day, at Dakshineswar, the Master asked me to cook something nice for Naren. I made *mug-dāl* and *capātis*. After the meal, he asked Naren, "Well, how did you like it?" Naren replied, "Quite nice, just like a patient's diet". Then the Master asked me, "What was it that you cooked for him? Make *chāna-dāl* and thicker *capātis*". In the end I did so. Naren ate it, and was highly pleased.'

8th May 1913, Jayrambati

Radhu had been unwell, and her crazy mother was scolding away. Addressing the Mother, she said, 'You have been giving my daughter medicines to kill her'. Beginning with this, she went on to say whatever came to her lips, till at last uncle Barada was summoned, and he berated her. The Mother had reached the limit of her patience, and she too rebuked her: 'I shall put an end to you today. If I do so, no one on earth can save you. And I shall not be committing a sin, but a good deed.'

Later, she said to us: 'I fell into the hands of a husband who never so much as spoke to me slightingly. Once at Dakshineswar, I carried some food to his room. As I was coming away, thinking it was Lakshmi and not I, he said, "Close the door as you go", using the familiar second person singular, as is the custom when addressing juniors or inferiors. I answered, "Yes, I am doing so". He was embarrassed when he recognized my voice, and said, "Oh, it is you! I thought it was Lakshmi. Please do not mind my addressing you that way". Even the next day, he came before my room and said, "Look, my dear, I could not sleep last night, wondering how I could speak so rudely to you". And now see how this creature abuses me day and night!' ...

8th June 1913, Jayrambati

Sri Surendranath Bhowmik and Dr. Durgaprasad Ghosh have arrived. They will be leaving this afternoon. After their morning bath, they came to pay their respects to the Mother. The Mother placed her hand on their heads and blessed them and asked them to be seated. After a few words, Suren Babu asked the Mother: 'Mother, whenever I worship the Master, I am faced with a problem. Supposing someone believes that his chosen deity and the Master are one and the same, then after worshipping his chosen goddess in the form of the Master, it sounds rather awkward to conclude the *pūjā* by addressing the deity in the feminine.'

The Mother smiled and replied: 'Well, my son, (he is the Godhead and one's chosen deity; he is all the gods and all their sacred word-symbols; in him one worships all the gods and goddesses. It does not matter how you address him.')

Suren Babu said, 'Mother, I cannot meditate properly'.

The Mother said: 'What does it matter? It is enough if you look at the Master's picture. When the Master was ill at Cossipore, the boys took turns in watching him. Gopal was with him, and he left the Master in order to sit for meditation. So he remained for a long time. Girish Babu arrived and, hearing about this, said, "What! he on whom he is meditating lies here suffering, and he goes off to meditate!" He immediately sent for Gopal, and the Master asked him to massage his feet, saying, "Not that I ask you to do so because my feet are aching, but because you have many good deeds to your credit". So, just look at the Master, and that will be enough.' ...

Durga Babu asked, 'Mother, I cannot always decide what rules to follow about taking food'.

The Mother answered: 'There was only one rule to which the Master paid particular attention; he never ate at funeral feasts. ... Otherwise, dedicate your food to him in your mind and eat everything.'

Durga Babu continued: 'Mother, frequently, when I am working at the hospital, I feel thirsty, and am obliged to drink water from the hands of all sorts of people. Does that matter?'

The Mother said: 'What else can you do? One has to do these things when at work. Remember the Master as you drink. There is no harm. Those who have to work cannot afford to be so particular.'

Suren Babu said: 'Then, again, Mother, one has to live with the various members of a family. Some people take their food as soon as it is ready, even before it is dedicated. I feel constrained about offering such food to God.'

The Mother said: 'These things happen in life, even with us. Somebody may be a little sickly, and has to have his food set aside early. When the food arrives, say to yourself that he (the Master) has given it to you and then take it. There is no harm in that.' ...

Suren Babu asked, 'Mother, I live so far out; is there any truth in dreams?'

The Mother said: 'Oh, yes, dreams about him are true. He used to forbid people to repeat dreams about him, even to him.'

Suren Babu continued: 'Mother, we do not know what the Master was like; we have never seen him. You are everything to us.'

The Mother replied: 'Do not fear, my son, the Master will take care of you here and hereafter.'

They left after their meal, accompanied by uncle Barada, who was going to Calcutta. In time, they reached the open fields to the north. The Mother accompanied them for a short distance and then stood watching, as long as she could see them.

When Suren Babu was the head master of a school at Ballaratanganj, he was pained to learn that the butchers of that locality were in the habit of skinning live cows. One day, they actually did so in front of the school. The Hindu and Muslim students, the teachers of the school, and Suren Babu himself protested strongly against this. The butchers were given a beating, and all this led to trouble. The butchers threatened to ill-treat Suren Babu. At this time, two or three boys from that school came to Jayrambati for the Mother's blessings. Suren Babu sent a letter with them, and they themselves related the whole story. The Mother shuddered when she heard it and, referring to Suren Babu, cried, 'Who will protest against such a deed if not you?' At the Mother's request, an encouraging letter was written to Suren Babu, and he was urged to do his utmost to put an end to the cruel practice. To Suren Babu's second letter, the Mother asked us to write, 'If there is any truth in God, then there will be a remedy for this'. A lawsuit ensued from the incident and, although the results were not as encouraging as one could hope them to be, gradually the cruel practice was stopped; at least, it was no longer done openly.

11th June 1913, Jayrambati

I and another were at our midday meal on the verandah of the Mother's house. ... In the course of our conversation, the Mother said: ('*Satya-yuga* (golden age) commenced with the advent of the Master. Some special people came with him.) Our Naren was the greatest *ṛṣi* of the Sapta Ṛṣis (seven seers). He could have said that Naren was one among a hundred *ṛṣis*, but he said, one among the seven. Arjuna came as Jogin (Swami Yogananda). How many outstanding people came with him? Do you think a great many? One may get loads of sour mangoes, but not so many of the *fajli* species. (Numerous ordinary people are born, and die. The greatest souls accompany God in order to do His work.')

I said, 'Swami Vivekananda, too, said that the *satya-yuga* commenced with the advent of the Master'.

The Mother replied, 'It is so indeed'.

12th June 1913, Jayrambati

We were at our midday meal on the verandah of the Mother's house; the Mother had seated Radhu, too, in a corner, and was feeding her. The Mother said to Radhu: 'Come on, eat this dish of herbs, the Master used to have

it. He loved it—herbs, figs, and green bananas. He had a weak stomach. Come, drink your milk.'

Radhu said, 'No please, no more'.

The Mother pressed her: 'Come now, have a little more. When the Master was ill, Gangaprasad Sen of Kumartuli was called in. The Kaviraj forbade him to drink any water when he was taking his medicine. The Master kept asking everybody, "Well, my dear, do you think I shall be able to do without water?" They answered, "Certainly you will". He asked me, "Can I manage?" I replied, "Of course, you can". He went on, "Even from the pomegranates you give me, you must wipe away all the water. Can you do it?" I said, "We shall try our best to do whatever Mother Kālī ordains". At last, he strengthened his mind and took the medicine without any water.

'Every day, I would give him six to eight pounds of milk, sometimes as much as ten pounds. The man who brought his cow and milked it here for us would give me more than my share. He used to say: "Those fellows take home the milk intended for Kālī and give it to God knows whom. If I leave some here, at least the Master will have it." Indeed, he was very devout. I used to give him *sandeś*, *rasagolla*, and any other sweetmeats that I had —people used to send large quantities of them in those days. I would boil the milk and reduce it to two or three pounds. He used to ask, "How much!" I would answer, "Why, about a little more than two pounds". "Then why did Golap say it was more?" "She does not know. How can she know our measures? How can she possibly guess the capacity of our jugs?"

'But he asked her again, and Golap said, "One bowl from here and one from the temple". He was shocked: "What! All that milk! Go, call her. Ask her." As soon as I arrived, he asked me, "How much does that bowl hold? How many *chatāks*? How many *powās*?" I answered: "How can I say how many *chatāks* or *powās*? You must have your milk; what does it matter how many *chatāks* or *powās*? Who is going to keep track of weights and measures?" He said, "But can I digest all that amount? I am sure to be ill!" And sure enough, he fell ill the same day. ... He ate nothing that evening. His rice remained untouched. I made him a little sago. Golap said, "You had only to tell me, Mother. How could I know? Now, he goes without food!" I said, "There is no harm in telling these little fibs to make him eat. This is how I coax him to eat".' ...

I said, 'Well, it appears that the mind is everything'.

The Mother replied: 'So it is. Otherwise, if he had not been told, he would have continued to enjoy his food.'

Who has understood the Holy Mother? There is not a trace of grandeur. The Master had at least his power of *vidyā* (knowledge) manifested, but the Mother?—her perfection of knowledge is hidden. What a mighty power is this! Glory to the Mother! Glory to the Mother!

—SWAMI PREMANANDA

THE AIMS OF OUR EDUCATION

By the Editor

Vidyayā vindate'mṛtam—Through knowledge (of the Self) is attained immortality.

—*Kena Upaniṣad*, II.4.

I

Comenius, the great educational philosopher, said that education is the development of the whole man. This means that education should touch, chasten, and culture all the aspects of the human personality, his body, mind, and spirit. True education ought to give a corrective to the entire outlook of man, removing all the angularities in his personality and turning him out to be a man of robust mind and sound character, whose conduct and behaviour under varying situations become edifying and worthy of emulation. Such a character cannot be fashioned by merely imparting to man what is called the formal and liberal education of the arts and the sciences. Some other discipline is necessary for the mind and the spirit of man. That training of the mind and the spirit can be effectively brought into being only by introducing the elements of moral and religious education into the general scheme of educational curriculum. Plato, the worthy successor of Socrates, held that 'education consists in giving to the body and soul all perfection of which they are susceptible'. Here, in India, voicing the spirit and wisdom of our great sages, and fully embodying them in a most powerful form, says Swami Vivekananda that 'education is the manifestation of the perfection already in man'. Hence it is that all our plans of education and paradigms of training should have this goal clearly before them, namely, 'giving to the body and soul all perfection of which they are susceptible' or 'manifestation of the perfection already in man'. These, then, ought to be our educational ideals.

Against this background, it was heartening for us to learn from the newspapers a couple of months back that the Government of India are seriously thinking of appointing a high-power commission of educationists of standing to go into the question of imparting moral and religious education in schools and colleges and to advise them as to how best such a measure could be implemented in keeping with our age-old traditions as well as our modern aspirations. The decision of the government, we must add, has not come a day sooner; our wonder is why even so much delay became necessary. Nevertheless, we heartily welcome the step taken by them and congratulate them on their wise decision.

This measure, we apprehend, may give rise to some mixed feelings in many minds. It may be asked, How will religious education fit in in a country which has declared itself to be a secular state? We may remind those whose thinking works on these lines that secularism in our concept, and as it has been clearly defined by our leaders, has no conflict with the religious spirit or religious education.

We may recall in this connection the words of Prime Minister Nehru who defined secularism in India thus: 'This did not mean that they (Indians) were to be irreligious or a nation of atheists. A secular state only meant that every individual in it was free to profess any faith he chose.' Nearly a decade ago, when the constitution of the country was still on the anvil, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan had said: 'India has always, even as early as 3000 B.C., accepted the fulfilment of the divine possibilities in man's nature as the true aim of human existence, and our religion has never asked us to accept any-

thing in blind, unthinking faith. ... Secularism means the adoption of the scientific spirit. It means the absence of religious arrogance or dogmatism, an attitude of impartiality so far as different religions are concerned, equality of opportunity for all religions, and no dogmatizing for any one religion. ... It does not mean that we would be non-religious or dogmatically religious.'

In the light of these avowals, there should be no misapprehension in any mind with regard to the introduction of religious education in the country. On the contrary, the consequences of an educational system that does not possess the character-building influence, supplied by moral and religious training, are too dreadful to contemplate. Rightly approached, with a proper perspective of the aims and objectives to be achieved, the measure that the government are contemplating to introduce is bound to elicit wide appreciation and willing co-operation from all sections of our people. Truly speaking, in this measure is reflected the deep anxiety that is welling up in the minds of a great majority of our thinking people, who are earnestly interested in the preservation of our national cultural heritage, its values and ideals, and who are worried at the spectacle of the new trends that are developing in the field of education.

II

Anyone who seriously ponders over what is taking place at present in the realm of education all over the country is sure to notice that a soul-killing morbidity has seized our sacred temples of learning, and the disease is eating into their very vitals. And the tonic to restore them to normal health and vigour can come only by infusing into their body the beneficent influence accruing from moral training and religious education—a revival in part at least of the elevating and sanctifying atmosphere that prevailed in our ancient system of education, oriented according to the needs and moods of the present age. Only thus can we hope to tone up the educational institutions, enabling them to effectively play the role assigned to them in the context of our national, social, and individual lives.

Educational institutions are the anvils on which the nation's citizens are forged and fashioned. It is therefore of vital importance that such healthy and helpful conditions be created in the educational field as conduce to the all-round growth of the personality of the student, who, after all, constitutes the citizen of tomorrow. By merely imparting secular education, viz. the formal and liberal education—the teaching of the arts and the sciences—the all-round development of the students is not ensured. No doubt, such an education develops their intellect and widens the horizon of their knowledge of things; but there it stops. It does not give them a sense of the moral values and the ideas of morality. At best, it prepares them for a profession in life, to eke out the means of their physical existence, but nothing more. Certainly, it does not hold out any promise to produce men of great character. The goodness of character results from quite a different kind of training and education; it depends on moral training and religious education. It was an eminent British educationist who said, 'Educate men without religion and you make them that clever devils'. Of the responsibility that the school owes to society, John Dewey, the famous American philosopher, says: 'The school is fundamentally an institution erected by society to do a certain specific work, to exercise a certain specific function in maintaining the life and advancing the welfare of society' (*Moral Principles in Education,* p. 7). He further says: 'The relations of education to the public are different from those of any other professional work. Education is a public business with us, in a sense that the protection and restoration of personal health or legal rights are not. To an extent characteristic of no other institution, save that of the state itself, the school has the power to modify the social order' (*ibid.,* Introduction, p. v). That being the

case, a powerful instrument such as the school should be judiciously used for disseminating moral and religious education side by side with the imparting of formal education.

III

But what is actually happening in the educational field is entirely different. In a world that is becoming increasingly swayed by political and economic forces, educational aims and objectives themselves have undergone transformation in such a way as to meet the needs of those forces. We shall deal with some of these new ideals and motives that are responsible for the recent trends in pedagogy.

The modern era is all out for industrialization. In the countries of the West, this craze has grown out of all proportions. The Eastern countries are not yet fully in its grip, but the day is not far off when they too will be completely overtaken and overwhelmed by it. Because of this craze, in the West, for the last half a century or so, educational methods and ideals were all geared up to the *tempo* of rapid industrialization. So much so, every branch of learning was oriented in such a way as to produce men who would fit in well in a world that was out for industrialization. The motto was to produce more scientists and more technicians, more engineers and more craftsmen, who would produce more, and ever more, and contribute to the material prosperity of man. The result was that man became machine-minded, goaded by the motive force of material prosperity and happiness.

In the struggle to adjust educational values and ideals to the demands of the new age, the higher values of education that were implicit in the philosophical teachings of a succession of teachers and thinkers have been pushed to the background, if not completely overshadowed —ideals of self-knowledge and self-discipline, the stress on the perfection of the individual, the integration of the personality, and such others. These ideals are no longer to be found in the forefront in any scheme of life, at least not in the educational system that obtains today. Educational institutions are busy in planning for the preparation of man in a manner that would fit him into a world fast moving on the twin wheels of science and technology.

In an age such as ours, to the extent that one becomes interested in the material things of life, one has necessarily to go in for a system of education that will make one most competent to attain that goal. Since man has become machine-minded, his educational needs are reoriented to meet the demands of the new situation. In such a scheme of education, which we may term as 'education for the mechanization of man', where the only driving force is material progress and prosperity, there is hardly any scope for training in morality and religion.

Next, look at the picture of a state that swears by methods which are totalitarian in form and content. In a totalitarian state, the state takes the position of an all-powerful god. All individuals living in it are, or ought to be, its votaries. The handful of men that hold authority are its high priests, and they dictate and direct the activities of the individuals in every sphere of life. The individual is of little concern in such a set-up; the mighty god of state is all in all, and everyone must bow low before it and its high priests. There is no talk of personal freedom; all individual interests and personal preferences have to be sacrificed at the altar of the god of state. Everyone is a soldier to guard the liberty of the state. In such a set-up too, there is training, there is discipline, but it is all done in the military fashion.

Right from birth, in the home, in the school, in the working sphere, everywhere discipline is enforced in a manner that the individual is made conscious of the role that he is expected to play in a totalitarian regime. If ever one resists or falters, down comes upon him the heavy hand of persecution, which is carried to the very extreme with meticulous precision and perfection. In such a state, the educationists have the special task of producing educational

patterns to suit the requirements of the political system and the dictates of the few that wield authority. Every phase of life is geared up to the one supreme purpose of the state. Indoctrination in all spheres, at all levels, is resorted to in a thorough manner, and each individual is most vigilently watched to see that he or she grows according to the mould that is set for him or her. No protest or unwillingness is ever countenanced, and recalcitrant elements, if any, are coolly done away with to pave the way for the smooth running of the chariot of state. In such a situation, there can certainly be no liberal education, which is what confers on man his freedom of thought, expression, and function. And sure enough, religious education has little to do in such an educational system, which we may term as 'education for the militarization of man'.

IV

We shall now turn to a consideration of what we may call 'education for the humanization of man'. In this scheme, the human and humane faculties of man are provided free scope for their full expression. By supplying knowledge to the mind of man, he is enabled to think and act for himself in a way that will be beneficial not only to himself, but to the community as well. There is discipline in it too, but that discipline does not thwart the individual's initiative, and lends only a helping hand in the regulation and ordering of his life and conduct and in the development of a refined character. By a gradual process of the training of the mind, one is enabled to realize one's own rights and responsibilities in the context of the socio-political environment in which one lives. It is precisely in this system of education that moral principles have to play a great role in training up the minds of the citizens of a country. What is needed in this type of education, to quote John Dewey once again, 'is a genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application'. And he says further: 'These moral principles need to be brought down to the ground through their statement in social and psychological terms. We need to see that the moral principles are not arbitrary, that they are not "transcendental"; that the term "moral" does not designate a special region or portion of life. We need to translate the moral into the conditions and forces of our community life, and into the impulses and habits of the individual. . . . The one thing needful is that we recognize that moral principles are real in the same sense in which other forces are real; that they are inherent in community life, and in the working structure of the individual. If we can secure a genuine faith in this fact, we shall have secured the condition which alone is necessary to get from educational system all the effectiveness there is in it' (*op. cit.*, pp. 57-58).

In such an education, the emphasis is not so much on *what* function a man is trained to perform, as on *how* he is trained to discharge it. The stress is not on the verb, but on the adverb. Here we have to make a clear distinction between education for the *function* of man and education of the *being* of man. Let us explain. If education keeps before it the ideal of turning out men of character who will perform their functions, whatever they may be, in a disinterested and conscientious manner, that is education of the being of man. Training of men's talents and faculties to make them fit for the diverse functions in life is education for the function of man—such as an engineer, a doctor, a lawyer, an administrator, a scientist, a craftsman, who are all equally members of the body social performing their own specific functions. But education of the being of man is devoted to the development of man as a human being first, and then to create facilities for the full expression of the perfection that is inherent in him. Man ought to be human first, and then he can choose to become a poet or a philosopher, a scientist or an artist, an engineer or a doctor, a lawyer or a professor. The common denominator of all these professions is the humanity of the human being. The training of that humanity of the human being is what we would

term as the humanization of man, as against the mechanization and militarization of man that we discussed in the last section.

An expert doctor or a thoroughgoing scientist need not necessarily be a moral person, if, as we have said, the stress is not laid on the development of the being of man. If a good man is also an efficient doctor, then the benefit that flows from such a person is immense. Otherwise, a wicked person who has all the functional qualification of an expert doctor can do incalculable mischief. In the hands of wicked men, the mighty force of scientific knowledge can become a dreadful instrument causing sorrow and suffering to numberless people. That is what is happening to science. which is being abused by unworthy men.

The type of education that we are presently speaking of ought to undertake the responsibility of shaping individuals into fine examples of human personalities, in whom human considerations will reign supreme, and all other interests will occupy only a secondary place. Alongside of formal and functional education, which, of course, is essential for everyone who wishes to be a useful member of society, there ought to be that indispensable aspect of education, namely, the education of the moral being of man. Both formal and moral education should be given side by side, in order to prepare man to accept and occupy a responsible and respectable position in society and to discharge the duties that devolve upon him truly, honestly, and conscientiously. It is this kind of character-building education that Swami Vivekananda wanted when he said: 'The end of all education, all training, should be man-making. The end and aim of all training is to make the man grow.' 'It is man-making education all round that we want.'

V

Finally, we come to the loftiest aim of education, which we may term as 'education for the divinization of man'. In this sphere, it is religion that plays the most vital part. It was Swami Vivekananda, again, who said that 'religion is the manifestation of the divinity already in man' and 'religion is realization'. Indian scriptures declare that true knowledge—the knowledge of the Self—leads one to immortality. It leads to the liberation of man from the thraldom of matter, to his spiritual emancipation. All our secular knowledge, profundity of scholarship, and intellectual abilities are meant merely for the pleasure and glory of our worldly life, and never for the freedom of the spirit. By this, it is not to be understood that secular knowledge or intellectual training is decried, but the Indian ideal of education, in its highest form, is spiritual realization, to enable man to realize his own inherent divine essence. *Vidyādāna* or imparting of secular knowledge is no doubt a great ideal; but greater than that is *jñānadāna* or the gift of spiritual knowledge, the knowledge that liberates. Actually, our scriptures classify knowledge into two kinds, lower and higher, i.e. the knowledge of the various sciences and arts, and the knowledge which leads to the realization of the indestructible, absolute Truth, which is the fundamental spiritual essence of the whole universe. Until that goal is reached, man's education must continue uninterruptedly. The divinity that is latent in man must gradually unfold until he perceives his own identity with that fundamental spiritual essence which is the basis of all phenomenal existence. That is the acme of perfection, the *summum bonum* of life.

According to the Indian scheme, the goal of life is twofold, *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*, which takes into consideration both the social betterment of man—meaning all happiness and prosperity, which has *dharma* as the basis of life and conduct—and his spiritual perfection or *mokṣa*. In the preservation of this great national ideal, every Indian has a moral obligation. As such, any scheme of education that is sought to be introduced in the country must be such that it should be ready for a healthy assimilation of the new social and economic programmes, which are meant for developing our

material life, at the same time that it makes an earnest endeavour to prepare man for the spiritual perfection of his being. Education, in short, should become a dynamic force both in the social and spiritual aspects of our life.

This aspect of education which is concerned with the spiritual unfoldment of man may well form an independent subject, the consideration of which we may reserve for a suitable occasion in the future.

MĀYĀ AND AVIDYĀ IN THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

By Professor Surendranath Bhattacharya

It is said that the Buddha, on attaining enlightenment, evolved two formulas. These formulas are believed to represent his fundamental teachings. The second of these formulas is known as the twelvefold *pratītyasamutpāda*—the concatenation of causes and effects. 'On ignorance depends *karma*; on *karma* depends consciousness; on consciousness depend name and form; on name and form depend the six organs of senses; on the six organs of senses depends contact; on contact depends sensation. ... Thus does this entire aggregation of misery arise' (Warren).[1]

The doctrine of the *pratītyasamutpāda* seems to regard *avidyā* as the ultimate cause of all miseries. In fact, the series would seem to indicate that the Buddha accepted *avidyā* as the primal cause, from which evolves the world of mind and matter.[2] But when we take into account the implication of the doctrine, as pointed out by the *Visuddhimagga* (XVII), we must say that, although *avidyā* is put at the beginning of the series, yet it is not to be taken, like the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya, as the causeless primary cause of the world. For each one of the series is equally dependent upon the rest, and if one fails, the entire series fails. They are like so many points on the circumference of a circle existing from eternity, and as no point can be called the first, so none of the series could be called the first. Ignorance (*avidyā*) is put first only to make the starting-point of a discourse. This, however, does not take away the importance of *avidyā* as a link in the chain of the causal series.

In the canonical texts, *avidyā* is taken in the sense of mere 'want of knowledge', and no attempt seems to have been made to examine the concept philosophically. Thus, according to the *Sutta Piṭaka* and the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka, avidyā* is 'want of knowledge' concerning misery, anteriority, etc. *Majjhima Nikāya* (Vol. I. p. 54) speaks about fourfold *avidyā*: (i) *avidyā* about sorrow, (ii) *avidyā* as to how sorrow originates, (iii) *avidyā* about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and (iv) *avidyā* as to how sorrow is destroyed.

The Sabbātthivādins, however, do not regard *avidyā* as a link in the chain of the *pratītyasamutpāda*. *Avidyā*, with them, is delusion, representing the ultimate state of immaterial *dharmas* (existence units?).[3]

The *Śatasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā* says that

[1] *Saṁyutta Nikāya,* XXII. 90.

[2] *Ibid.*, XI. 7-8.

[3] *Vide* Sogen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought.*

all phenomena are but illusory. The five *skandhas* of *rūpa, vedanā, saṁjñā, saṁskāra,* and *vijñāna* are all but *māyā.* The doctrine is elaborately set forth in the sixth *parivarta* of the book. The main theme of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā* is to preach *śūnyata* (nothingness) of all phenomena, including Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Even perfection of wisdom is said to have no reality.[4]

Aśvaghoṣa (A.D. 80), however, admits an absolute, permanent Reality. But his *bhūtatathātā* is really indefinable. All terms are relative, and one cannot be conceived without its opposite (*pratiyogī*). So the only way of expressing the *bhūtatathātā* is 'It is not so'.[5] This suchness (*bhūtatathātā*) is, however, distinguished into two aspects—conditional and absolute, phenomenal and transcendental.[6] When the Absolute assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation, it is called the all-conserving mind (*ālayavijñāna*).[7] Aśvaghoṣa takes *avidyā* as the source of all phenomena. The Absolute is said to assume phenomenal forms of existence through *avidyā.* All things and conditions in the phenomenal world owe their appearance to *avidyā* and *smṛti* (memory), and are no more real than the reflections in a mirror. Even all modes of consciousness and mentation are products of *avidyā.*

The *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra* (earlier than A.D. 443) entertains similar views. All phenomena, internal and external, evolve out of *avidyā.*[8] The objective world is an error; it is *māyā*; it is *śūnya.* But this must not be understood to mean that it is a total negation. The world appears both to the wise and the ignorant. The wise see it as it really is, that is, as an illusion; whereas the ignorant fail to cognize the truth about the world.[9] To understand the world as it really is (*yathābhūta*) is the fundamental teaching of the Buddhist philosophy. The world as it is seen through the ordinary human eye is nothing but *māyā. Māyā* is therefore, more or less, a subjective quality, having no objective and cosmological implication.

The world is always a becoming, a series of continuous changes. When it is perceived with the eye of wisdom (*prajñācakṣu*), its emptiness is revealed. The 'thatness' (*yathābhūtatva*) of the world is beyond all relativism. Hence the world can be designated neither as existent nor as non-existent.[10] In fact, any term that admits of an antethesis cannot be applied to it. The world of experience can therefore be likened to *māyā,* phantom creations, of a magician. Although the spectators take these creations as real and substantial, yet the magician knows them to be false, and from his point of view, they are neither existent nor non-existent.[11]

Candrakīrti (seventh century A.D.), commenting on the *Mādhyamika-kārikās* of Nāgārjuna,[12] makes the position of the Mādhyamika school sufficiently clear with regard to its doctrine of *avidyā.* The entire phenomenal world is ascribed to *ajñāna,* and it is said to be unreal.[13] *Paramārtha-satya* is the complete cessation of the world. *Avidyā* is a synonym of ignorance.[14] It proceeds from hazy mentation due to infatuation. So if any origin of *avidyā* is to be sought

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[4] *Vide* Chapter II.

[5] Cf. *'Neti neti'*, etc. *Bṛ.U.*, II.3.6; III.9.26; IV.2.4,5,22; *Ka.U.*, I.3.15; etc.

[6] Cf. The conception of Brahman as Nirguṇa and Saguṇa.

[7] Cf. The Vedāntic conception of Hiraṇyagarbha or *samaṣṭi-buddhi.*

[8] *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra,* p.19 (Edited by Das and Vidyabhusana).

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*, p.56.

[11] *Ibid.*, p.25f.

[12] The position of Nāgārjuna is similar to that of Śaṅkara. Just as Śaṅkara is the greatest exponent of the *anirvacanīyavāda,* so is Nāgārjuna the greatest exponent of *śūnyavāda,* although neither can rightly claim to be the originator of the respective doctrine. Each elaborated and developed with his powerful dialectic what was already accepted as an established doctrine.

[13] *Mādhyamika-Vṛtti,* B.B.IV. p.495.

[14] *Ibid.*, p.328.

after, it may be found in imagination.[15] *Avidyā* is ignorance, darkness, that which conceals truth, and inertness;[16] and man transmigrates being enveloped by this *avidyā*.

The concepts of the unity of the six materials (earth, water, fire, air, sky, and consciousness), aggregate, permanency, externality, pleasure, soul, man, I, mine, etc. are all wrong, inasmuch as they are, in reality, without essence. *Avidyā* is defined to be these wrong concepts.[17] It is repeatedly said that people take as real things which are, in fact, characterless (*niḥsvabhāva*), being overtaken by the darkness of *avidyā*.[18]

From the above, it is clear that the Buddhists took *avidyā* practically in the sense of *atasmin tadbuddhiḥ* (to take a thing for what it is not); for, further on in the *Vṛtti*, *avidyā* is defined as either ignorance about the truth or its mistaken view.[19]

In the Buddhist philosophy, Reality is said to be of two kinds—as it is understood by the common people, and as it is realized by the truly enlightened. 'Buddhist philosophical discussions are made on the assumption of two kinds of reality or truth: (i) common-sense reality or conditional truth, and (ii) Reality-in-itself or transcendental Truth.'[20] Candrakīrti explains the term '*saṁvṛti*' as *ajñāna* (ignorance), for it is ignorance that completely conceals the truth about all phenomena. Conditional reality is conceded to the world of intellect, and Reality-in-itself is said to be beyond the pale of understanding.[21] Transcendental Truth is, indeed, beyond all denominations. It cannot be spoken of as either *śūnya* or *aśūnya*, *bhāva* or *abhāva*, real or unreal. This distinction of reality is also one of the fundamental doctrines of the Advaita Vedānta. The Advaitins also speak of *pāramārthika-satyatva* and *vyāvahārika-satyatva*. This doctrine is, certainly, a development of the Upaniṣadic conception of the highest Reality expressed so frequently in such texts as '*Tadviditādatho aviditādadhi*' (*Ke.U.*, II.3), '*Aśabdam-asparśam-arūpam-avyayam*, (*Ka.U.*, I.3.15), etc.

Anirvacanīyavāda is simply a confession of the inability to give any rational explanation of phenomena. The Śūnyavādins, similarly, tried to prove the indefinableness of all phenomena. Just as the Śūnyavādins hold that as phenomena are inexplicable, so they are, in reality, without any essence (*niḥsvarūpa*); exactly in the same manner do the Advaitins declare the nothingness (*sutucchakatva*) of all phenomena as being explicable neither this way nor that. Regarding the nature of phenomena, the Śūnyavādins and the Advaitins have substantial agreement. Both attribute phenomena to *avidyā*. The difference lies in the latter's acceptance of a noumenon and the former's formal rejection of it. Whatever might have been the conception of the early Buddhists, we notice, beginning with Aśvaghoṣa, a marked tendency to admit a noumenon, however colourless its nature might be proclaimed to be. Candrakīrti strongly repudiates the charge that the Mādhyamikas are nihilists.[22]

In the Upaniṣads as well as in Buddhism, individual existence is preached to be the product of *avidyā* and at the root of all sufferings. Both hold alike that the destruction of *avidyā* brings the highest bliss. The highest truth of the Upaniṣads is the permanent Self (Brahman). Reality with the Upaniṣads is static. With the Buddhists, it is dynamic and impermanent. So *avidyā*, in the Upaniṣads, is ignorance about the permanent Self; in the Buddhist philosophy, it is ignorance about impermanence. At any rate, *avidyā* with both is ignorance about the Reality, although the con-

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[15] *Ibid.*, p.452.

[16] *Ibid.*, p.542.

[17] *Ibid.*, p.563. Also see *Śikṣā*, 221; *Bodhicaryā*, IX.15.

[18] *Mādhyamika-Vṛtti*, pp.237, 261, 265, 370.

[19] *Ibid.*, p.564.

[20] *Ibid.*, p.492.

[21] Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryā*, IX.2.

[22] *Mādhyamika-Vṛtti*, p.368.

ception of the Reality is different. But in Buddhism, there is hardly any attempt[23] at a critical examination of *avidyā*. In fact, no explanation of *avidyā* is found, and we are to remain satisfied with the vague idea of it as mere ignorance. The theory of *avidyā* is simply laid down categorically and dogmatically. As to how and why *avidyā* came to assert itself in the nature of 'thatness', Buddhism is silent. Nevertheless, the resemblance of the Buddhist thought with the Advaita school (at least so far as its attitude towards the objective world is concerned) is so striking and complete that it would not be too much to say that the Advaitin came to fulfil and not to destroy. Exactly the same ideas as are set forth by Gauḍapāda in his *Kārikās* regarding the real truth are found in the early Mahāyāna literature.[24] It is also interesting to note that the terms such as *khapuṣpasannibha, māyopama, svapnopama, gandharvanagaropama*, etc.,[25] used by the Buddhist writers to describe the world (*loka*), are as freely used by the Advaitins for the same purpose. And this is quite natural, for both Buddhism and Advaitism drew on the same source, namely, the Upaniṣads.[26] The doctrine of *avidyā* was in its germinal stage in the Upaniṣads; it sprouted at the hands of the Buddhists; and it grew into a mighty tree at the hands of the Advaitins.

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[23] See *Patisambhidamagga*, Vol.I. p.50; *Majjhima Nikāya*, I.67.

[24] See *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā*, pp.21, 177; Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryā*, IX.150-51; Gauḍapāda, *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, II.32.

[25] See *Śatasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā*, Chapter VI; *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra*, Chapter II.

[26] See Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.I. pp.360ff.; Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, pp.83-84.

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES IMPLICIT THEREIN—2

By Professor P. S. Naidu

In the first part of this article, we surveyed the European scene from a novel standpoint, and highlighted the basic concepts and values of educational significance that emerged from a critical examination of the leaders of thought neglected so far in the well-known histories of education. We concluded with a brief discussion of Kantian philosophy.

Now, coming to Hegel, we may make a startling statement that in him European philosophy committed suicide. What after all is the abiding contribution that Hegel had made to philosophy, and through philosophy to education? Little or nothing, from our standpoint. True, he did speak of the integrated and unified whole, without internal contradictions, as the highest reality. Spirituality was seen by him as the highest truth and as the final goal of evolution. The vision that he had was the result of German mysticism that he inherited from his intellectual progenitor. But he polluted the pure stream by letting into it muddy and disturbing currents of rationalism and dialectic logic. The dialectic principle is the outcome of his effort to introduce, forcibly and wrongly, into the higher realm of experience a law which is valid only at the lower levels. Serious students of philosophy have, for a long time, been

aware that Hegelian dialectic was the offspring of Kantian antinomies; but they did not see—and we have a shrewd suspicion that they did not *want* to see—that Kant himself was firmly of the opinion that the antinomies could flourish only at the lower phenomenal level, and would die if lifted to the higher spiritual level. Anyway, the dialectic proved to be the fatal noose round the neck of European philosophy; and we should ignore it completely, as well as all the foul ideas and principles that sprang from its unholy loins.

The scene now shifts to France. One of the rarest and sweetest flowers of European thought, namely, Bergsonianism, blossomed in the early decades of the present century. It is wrong to brand Bergson's philosophy as irrational; it is supra-rational. It is equally wrong to classify it as a philosophy of feeling; it is that and much more; it is a philosophy of the total personality of man, and of the destiny of *Homo sapiens*. Emphasis is usually laid on the wrong aspects of Bergson's system, namely, on the theory of creative evolution, and of time or duration as the essence of the universe, and on his unique view of the relationship between brain and memory. But what is of value to us is his philosophic method. Reason reigned supreme in European philosophy from the time of Aristotle, who defined man as a rational animal, down to Hegel, who said that the real is rational and the rational is real. Discursive reason enshrined in the deductive logic of Aristotle, the inductive logic of Mill, and the dialectical logic of Hegel was believed to be the only means by which man could unravel the mysteries of the universe. Bergson expressed the hollowness of this claim of the intellect. Our intellect is so constructed as to present us with a superficial view of the material universe, and even this superficial view is a false one. Discursive reason analyses reality into a series of static snapshots similar to the frames in a movie film, and this it does in the interest of practical action. Our intellect cuts across the living flow of reality, and carves out of it solid objects in the outer world and separate states of consciousness in the inner world. Otherwise, it will be impossible for us to get what we want for living our life at the biological level. Intellect is thus a special faculty evolved by nature for purposes of successful action; and for such action, what is real has first to be halted and arrested, then killed and dissected. It is only then that we can tease out and pick the juicy particles needed for keeping the *sthūla-śarīra* and *sūkṣma-śarīra* going. But he who would penetrate into the heart of reality and unravel its mysteries must needs make use of another faculty, and that is *intuition*. The method by which we reach metaphysical truth is not intellectual, but intuitive. Long, long ago, Pythagoras, Plotinus, and even Plato had a glimpse of this method, and the medieval mystics made full use of it.

Bergson came out with a bold declaration that the efforts of our puny intellect are pathetic in the extreme, and that without the aid of intuition, we can never attain ultimate truth. In this stand that he took, Bergson received powerful and authoritative support from McDougall. Basing his conclusions on impeccable experimental evidence, McDougall succeeded in establishing that intelligence is merely the handmaid of instinct, and that it has no independent role to play in human activity. Its function is to shine round instinct like a suffused halo, giving just a little aid to the latter in its efforts to reach its natural goal. And when instinct, which is usually blind, becomes self-conscious, it gives birth to intuition, which is the tool *par excellence* for attaining the ultimately real.

The supreme lesson that we have to learn from the basic teachings of Bergson is this: Let us by all means cultivate the intellect, but let us not be hypnotized into the belief that this intellect will solve for us the basic problems of life. The ripening of intellect should yield the fruit of intuition. And intuition alone can give us that *darśana* of reality which is the final fulfilment of human life. Bergson's great contribution is in the field of method, the method which Indian teachers taught and prac-

tised even in the remote past, and which the West is slowly and painfully discovering just now.

From France let us step across to Britain. Many of us are familiar with the educational thought of Whitehead and Russell, Joad and Ross, Rusk and Percy Nunn. But, in this discussion, we are going to ignore them completely. Our concern will be with Bradley, Bosanquet, and Thomas Hill Green—names which may sound strange and unfamiliar. These three were the leaders of the neo-idealistic movement in Britain. It is noteworthy that all of them came under the influence of Hegel, early in their career, but as their own thought matured, they reacted unfavourably to Hegelianism and developed a characteristic type of British idealism. Bradley sets the tone of the entire movement by his penetrating analysis of the Absolute, and the place of *individuality* in the Absolute. One can sense, as one reads his great work, *Appearance and Reality*, the metaphysical passion with which Bradley struggles to get a glimpse of the Absolute in order to see how individuality fares therein. Bradley is fully convinced that all the wealth and manifoldness of the individual and the particular enter into, and are preserved within, the Absolute. 'Every flame of passion would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss.' This view of individuality is further emphasized in Bradley's conception of the moral life, and of religion as the supra-moral sphere towards which moral life presses.

What is hesitant and undefined in Bradley becomes clear, distinct, and certain in Bosanquet, whose 'ideas again centre in the problem of individuality. ... The individual is something entirely peculiar and unique, not in the biological or psychological or social sense, but in the metaphysical sense'. In his two Gifford lectures on 'The Principle of Individuality and Value' and 'The Value and Destiny of the Individual', Bosanquet elaborates his conception of individuality. His great contribution is the distinction he draws between metaphysical individuality and psycho-bio-sociological personality. He will not have it that personality is an ingredient of individuality, and insists repeatedly that what maximal individuality in its true sense demands is not reached in the human individual, but has to be sought beyond the level of the personal and the finite. The human individual is a mere fragment of a larger whole, is nothing apart from this, and needs to be completed in it. Man is not truly an individual, so long as he is a person. He must strive after the higher form of existence, and in this advance, his finite individuality must be set aside; all that he has hitherto been must disappear in a radical transformation. His self passes transfigured and transmuted into the eternal peace of the Absolute. This is true immortality, an immortality in which we carry into the future not our present self, but the self transfigured into divinity.

There can be no grander conception, no more impressive lesson for educationists and educators than this teaching of a British idealistic philosopher of this century. And what is of special significance to us is that this teaching is only a modernized version of what Śaṅkara taught twelve centuries ago, and what the Upaniṣads taught a thousand years before Christ.

One more thinker of the trio remains to be discussed, namely, Thomas Hill Green. One gets a philosophic thrill as one reads the opening sections of his monumental work *Prolegomena to Ethics*. Rising to the pure level of Vedāntic mysticism and transcendentalism, at times touching the fringes of pantheism, Green carries to its conclusion the line of thought initiated by Bradley and Bosanquet. To a student of Indian philosophy, the Greenian landscape is familiar and exhilarating. Here one comes across concepts and values saturated with the spirit of Vedānta.

One step more, and we reach the end of the Western scene; and that step is a fairly long one, taking us from England right across the Atlantic to America. We are considering the

American scene, because there are certain values which have inspired American thinkers—values that we cannot ignore from the standpoint that we have taken. Here, again, we shall bypass familiar names like John Dewey, Charles Sanders Pierce, and William James, and concentrate on Josiah Royce. America is the land that gave birth to pragmatism, and also to a liberal form of democracy. The two therefore are associated as cause and effect. This is absolutely wrong. All the ills that democracy is heir to are the fruit of pragmatism. Everything of value in democracy will perish if individuality is suppressed. The only school of thought which interprets individuality aright as a value of life and consequently of education is idealism. That is the reason why we are concentrating on Royce, one of the leaders of American idealism. As in the case of Bosanquet, Royce expounds his ideas in his Gifford lectures on 'The World and the Individual'. From our viewpoint, the concept of prime importance is that of the absolute Person or the absolute Individual. This concept was Royce's characteristic means for avoiding subjectivism without involving himself in theological controversies. In the mind of this absolute Person, the whole universe is a system of ideas, in which finite minds share. The absolute Person has the absolute will, the one will which is not intolerant of diversity. The one will is a higher unity in diversity of all particular aims and wills. It desires to include all purposes and all passions within itself to the end that all possible life may be realized. 'Its demand for submission is never tyranny, its sense of the excellence of its own Unity is never arrogance.'

In the further development of this excellent ideal of moral life, Royce introduced irrelevent concepts of lower value, as did Creighton, another American idealist, and ruined the effect of his philosophy. Perhaps, it was difficult for these thinkers to shake off the dead weight of pragmatism. Idealism has to be eternally vigilant, if it is not to be polluted and ultimately poisoned by concepts of inferior value.

Europe was blessed in its great leaders who saw steadily and distinctly the goal of life, and enunciated the goal of education. A few of them had the courage to prescribe the means by which the goal could be reached. Self-realization in the highest sense, through self-knowledge of the right kind, is the goal of life. The teacher should strive to instil this value in the minds of his pupils by fostering their individuality. And the unerring means by which these values can be realized is intuition. Intellect is not to be despised, but it is to serve only as the usher to the inner chamber of intuition. Thus the goal of life, the aim of education, and the method have all emerged clearly. Yet, Europe is in the doldrums crying for help from outside. Christ said long ago that much will be expected of him to whom much has been given. If he fails to come up to expectations, the severest retribution will overtake him. When nature confers her boon on talented individuals, she expects the fullest development of the powers she has bestowed. Failure on the part of individuals and nations to discharge faithfully the duty entrusted to them is visited with appalling chastisement frightening to behold. Europe received great gifts, but chose to treat them in a light-hearted manner. Retribution has come much sooner than expected.

Let us see how Europe went astray. The great Socratic dictum 'Know Thyself' was shining steadily before the eyes of educators in Europe. They said to themselves that the best way of knowing ourselves is to know what is round about us. Self-knowledge will come as an easy and natural consequence of the knowledge of that which is not self, namely, of the material, biological, and social environment in which we have to live. So, let us launch on an intellectual conquest of the vast realm around us. After all, consciousness is of the very essence of self. Let us enlarge this consciousness. This is the extrospective attitude, and it comes naturally to the West. But it is a wrong attitude. There is a world of difference between enlargement of consciousness and enrichment of consciousness. Enlargement is

the result of the outward flow of mental energy, whereas enrichment is the direct consequence of the inward growth vertically up to divinity. The former will give understanding without wisdom, wealth without happiness, power without self-satisfaction, and, finally, an illusion of truth which is worse than ignorance. And Europe chose this in preference to inner illumination.

In this endeavour to expand consciousness, under the false hope that the mysteries of human life will be solved thereby, Europe allowed its mental energy to flow outward. Consciousness was projected into the vast expanses of space in the heavens, and there arose the magnificent science of astronomy. Great was the self-confidence developed by this discipline. Laplace is reported to have presented a copy of his work *Celestial Dynamics* to Napoleon, and the emperor, after reading the treatise, asked its author why he made no mention of God in his writings which claim to deal with celestial regions. Laplace cooly replied: 'Your Imperial Majesty, there is no need for such a hypothesis in my science. I can explain all the celestial phenomena without assuming the existence of God.'

From the celestial regions, man came down to the earth and projected his consciousness on to its surface and to its enveloping atmosphere. There arose the science of geography with all its applied and practical branches. Explorations, excavations, and mountain-climbing expeditions are yielding up more and more secrets jealously guarded by nature so far. What need has man for God or for spiritual values, when he can explain everything and control everything on land, under water, and up in the heavens by means of his scientific knowledge?

From the vast expanses of the earth's surface, and the atmosphere surrounding it, the scientist comes down to the objects of our sense-manifold. His consciousness now penetrates inorganic matter, and there come into existence the physical sciences which have transformed our life. It is not merely the conquest of the material environment at the purely scientific level, but the application of scientific knowledge to technology, resulting in the development of marvellous machinery, which take away our breath and redound to the credit of the scientist. Not satisfied with the results achieved by the expansion of consciousness in the material realm, man penetrated the biological and social realms and brought into existence the biological and social sciences, with their own fields of practical application. Man can now swim like a fish and fly like a bird. Why, then, should education not be guided by concepts and values which science has evolved? Why should not the curricula for our children be science-centred? With the full conviction that science will finally solve the mysteries of life, and will also bring about the salvation of man, the West launched on a scheme of science-centred education and went full-blast ahead with it. Today, there are proposals for spreading scientific education on a nation-wide scale. Yet, the greatest scientists have borne evidence to the failure of science. It has developed the head of man all right, but it has left his heart unrepentant, with the result that human personality has suffered lop-sided development. Science has conferred on man the skill to fly like a bird and swim like a fish, but it has failed to teach him to walk on this earth like a man. In a beautiful way, science itself is teaching man just now, in the contemporary period, that he will not know himself, even if he knew all about everything outside of himself. Knowledge of the sun, the moon, and the stars, of matter, life, and society, and even of the mind is not self-knowledge. Nature herself is trying to teach the scientist this supreme lesson in the very midst of his sorry failures.

We saw how man embarked on the great expedition of exploring the external world, in the hope that the expansion of his cognitive powers will somehow result in the full and integrated growth of his total personality, and will ultimately lead to self-knowledge. So he went ahead, with courage and faith, to penetrate the heavens and the earth, and on earth, matter,

life, and society. Not satisfied with his achievements at the theoretical and practical level, he began to probe the nucleus of matter. His consciousness penetrated into the sub-microscopic structures in the physical and biological realms. First the atom, then the electrons and the protons, and then energy, all these yielded up their secrets one after the other. And now he is up against a dead wall. In fact, it is no wall at all, but empty space. Everything seems to have dissolved into nothing. If I may express a profound scientific truth in ordinary language, then I am inclined to put it thus: The scientist's search for reality has led him to the conclusion that the ultimate constituent of this world is empty space, nothing or *śūnya*. Not only has this breath-taking revelation come to him at the end of his long search, but he also sees that all his cherished dogmas, known as scientific laws, are utterly inapplicable in the sub-microscopic or nuclear realm. He is disillusioned, but also sobered: 'Is it for this that I undertook this painful search; have I been pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp?' He is moved by self-pity, and accuses a merciless fate that has played a cruel joke on him. But nature, gentle mother she is, whispers gently: 'Child, your efforts have not been in vain. The path that you have followed has shown you that out there is nothing, only empty space. It is now for you to guess what other path you should follow, at the end of which you will find fullness and not emptiness. You have tried to uncover nature in the hope of finding something alluring inside. You have undraped garment after garment. And lo! there is nothing inside. Do not be dispirited. Start again, but the search must be for finding something else and by entirely different means.' These are mother nature's words. And a very small number of nuclear scientists have heard the still small voice and have responded with faith. They have to take off from a new vantage point to a new goal, pursuing a new path.

At the dawn of science, great hopes were held out for the salvation of man. We were then slaves of superstition and ignorance. The scientist appeared on the scene as our saviour, and called upon us to renounce our allegiance to religion and spirituality. He started by drawing a distinction between fact and value. Facts are objective and absolute; values are subjective and relative. So, let us pour contempt on values and hold fast to facts. Matter and energy are the only two ultimate facts, and the mechanistic and deterministic law of causation is the one and the only true principle in the universe. 'Believe me and believe in my articles of faith, I shall lead you to the very heights of truth and happiness', said the scientist. We believed and entrusted our souls to his safe keeping. But what has the scientist done? He asked us to worship matter and accept materialism as our guide. We accepted materialism and swore by it. Now, he coolly tells us that matter does not exist. It is empty space, *ākāśa*; in fact, it is *śūnya*.

All solid matter is in essence empty space. Only in appearance it is solid, and it can be compressed into a pin point; and even this pin point of matter may not be material at all, but just a form of energy or wave motion. The much boasted of laws of conservation of matter and energy have quietly disappeared. Matter can be spirited away into energy, and immaterial energy can be concretized into matter. Matter can be created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing. Then, there is that last stronghold of the physical sciences, the law of universal causation. How fares it with this law? We know of the fate that has overtaken this law during the last half-a-century. In the place of mechanistic and deterministic concepts, the scientist speaks of statistical averages. The electrons behave like erratic individuals with free will. General principles governing their behaviour in the mass can only be formulated, as in the social sciences, in terms of means and standard deviations. Determinism has given place to indeterminism, certainty to uncertainty, and absolute exactitude to relativity. Finally, what about purpose? The classical scientist condemns all teleological concepts as smacking of anthropomorphism, but

the contemporary nuclear scientist admits, rather unwillingly of course, the existence of purpose, of a world beyond this world which controls the electrons and protons, and of Divine will which is the origin and support of the material world. So, matter has become immaterial, the laws of conservation have gone out of the picture, and the law of causation has been dethroned. In what sense is such a discipline competent to formulate the basic values in education?

To sum up: The landscape in European education is not so bleak and disappointing as one may imagine as the result of our scathing condemnation of science. The basic life values of self-knowledge and self-discipline, and the leading educational values of individuality that have emerged at various points in our survey, are sound at the core. And so is the method which a few European thinkers have prescribed for realizing these values. But this method is exceedingly difficult; so the softer method of scientific rationalism is pursued, and the goals are distorted to suit this method. It is this lower method and a set of lower values which can fit into this method that dominate the scene in education today. Can we rescue the original and pure goals, and can we somehow bring back the spiritual method?

THE VEDĀNTA AND THE SĀṄKHYA THEORY OF MANY PURUṢAS

By Swami Nirgunananda

In the Sāṅkhya philosophy, Puruṣa and Prakṛti are the two ultimate and real entities. Puruṣas are many in number, and each one of them is of the nature of consciousness, indivisible, infinite, and all-pervading. Again, Puruṣa is neither a doer nor an enjoyer and is eternally unchanging. But Prakṛti, which is made up of the three qualities of *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas,* is by nature inert, divisibly one, and changefully eternal. When in contact with Puruṣa, Prakṛti undergoes modifications giving rise to microcosmic and macrocosmic evolutes. In our brief discussion here, we are chiefly concerned with the theory of pluralism as propounded by the Sāṅkhya; and our purpose will be to prove in the light of the Vedānta that such a theory of the many, all-pervading Puruṣas or selves cannot be reasonably established.

We may at first present the Sāṅkhya point of view in support of this theory. The *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (18) of Īśvarakṛṣṇa says that the plurality of Puruṣas is established from the fact that birth, death, motor and sense organs, etc. are all well distributed in each Puruṣa; that the inclination (of all Puruṣas) towards work is not simultaneous; and that there is a proportionate difference of the three qualities in each Puruṣa. The *Sāṅkhyapravacana-Sūtra* (VI.45) says that Puruṣas are many, because we find in this world a regular distribution of misery and happiness.

In elucidation of these texts, the Sāṅkhya points out that if only one Puruṣa is accepted, then the following difficulties will crop up: When one Puruṣa is born or dead, all the other Puruṣas will be born or dead simultaneously, and when one Puruṣa becomes blind, the rest will follow suit. Moreover, the particular inclination of a single Puruṣa towards doing a certain work will prompt the rest to do the same work at the same time; and *devas,* human beings, and other lower creatures will consti-

tute a single species, and cease to be different groups. Thus there will follow a general disorder. But, in fact, we do not notice such irregularities and confusion in the order of creation. The diversity and discreteness that exist among the different species justify inferentially the existence of many Puruṣas.

While defining the nature of release from this transmigratory existence (*saṁsāra*), the Sāṅkhya maintains that each one is by nature all-pervading, infinite, and intelligent. Owing to ignorance, he is under the sway of Prakṛti, which in consequence brings untold miseries. When the false knowledge of the non-self, arising out of this ignorance, is completely discarded by proper discrimination (*viveka*), the individual attains his own natural state, i.e. he is established in his own true Self, and, consequently, the chain that binds him to Prakṛti is cut asunder. There is no positive feeling of bliss or joy in that state, but there follows immediately a complete cessation of all miseries—bodily and mental, cosmic and extra-cosmic.

Though each Puruṣa is infinite and all-pervading, still from the standpoint of intelligence or *jña*, there cannot be any objection to the existence of many such Puruṣas. Objects that are limited by time and space cannot be infinite, but as the Puruṣas are beyond time and space, there can be no bar to the acceptance of the plurality of Puruṣas. To clarify this view, the following illustration is cited: As the various rays of light emanating from different coloured lights can exist together in one place without being limited and excluded by one another, the Puruṣas also can be many from the standpoint of intelligence or *jña*.

Further, multiplicity cannot be a product of unity. In the making of a pot, for example, we need the clay, the potter, and the knowledge of the pot. Similarly, the diversity of this world is explainable only if we accept for its cause more than one real entity. Even the Vedāntins accept two entities, namely, Brahman and *māyā*, to explain the world of diversity.

In an attempt to reconcile the statement of the Śruti that the Ātman or Self is One without a second, the Sāṅkhya contends that the Puruṣas or selves belong to a single class (*jāti*) and that they do not differ in any respect from one another. There is no dualism whatsoever in the intrinsic qualities of the Puruṣas. Hence, in spite of their being many, they are said to be of only one class without a second.

Having thus stated the Sāṅkhya position, let us examine it from the standpoint of the Advaita Vedānta. The conditions of birth, death, blindness, deafness, bondage, liberation, etc. can apply only in the case of the *jīvas* or individual souls. If the Puruṣa of the Sāṅkhya, who is subject to these conditions, is termed *jīva*, then there is some logic in their theory of pluralism. Diversity and multiplicity in creation are caused by ignorance or *māyā*, which through its projecting power (*vikṣepa-śakti*) makes the One Brahman appear as many. While commenting on the text 'He desired, "Let me be many"' (*Tai.U.*, II.7), Śrī Śaṅkarācārya remarks that the One Brahman has become many through the manifestations of name and form that are latent in Itself. Otherwise, it is not possible for the formless Brahman to be many. Diversity and multiplicity in creation are due to the false superimposition of these two limiting adjuncts, name and form, and 'as conditioned by these two, Brahman enters as a factor into all empirical dealings involving such words as knowledge, knower, and knowable, as also their implications etc.'.

Brahman or Puruṣa, who is beyond bondage, liberation, time, and space, can never be made to relate to the individual souls. How can such an unrelated and indifferent Puruṣa serve the purpose of Prakṛti or aid in the process of creation? Birth, death, etc. do not touch such Brahman. If, from the standpoint of the world, we admit that such conditions exist in It, then Brahman becomes divided apparently into many causally related *jīvas*. But in reality *jīva* is Brahman. In the *Gītā*, it is said, 'As the all-pervading ether is not tainted, by reason

of its subtlety, even so the Self that is present in every body does not suffer any taint' (XIII.32).

If the *jīva* in reality is not Brahman, it can never hope to become that which is not already in it. *Jīva's* separation from Brahman is only apparent, and is caused by ignorance. When this ignorance is completely dispelled by right knowledge, arising from true discrimination, the *jīva* experiences such direct awareness as 'I am Brahman'. Then there follow a complete cessation of manifoldness and a positive experience of the Existence-Knowledge-Bliss Absolute. The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. 'There is no diversity whatsoever. He who sees as though there is multiplicity in this world goes from death to death' (*Ka.U.*, II.1.11). Similarly, there are Śruti passages which eulogize the knowledge of unity and condemn the knowledge of multiplicity.

By reason also, we cannot prove the existence of many, all-pervading Puruṣas. There is no proper illustration to support this assumption. Refuting the Sāṅkhya position, Swami Vivekananda says: 'Can there be more than one Puruṣa? .... The Omnipresent and Infinite (Puruṣa) cannot be two. If there are two Infinites A and B, the Infinite A would limit the Infinite B. .... Difference in identity means exclusion, and exclusion means limitation.' As such, there is no scope for even two infinites; and how can we assume many such infinite Puruṣas? Moreover, one infinite and all-pervading Puruṣa is quite capable of bringing about all the modifications in conjunction with Prakṛti.

The Sāṅkhya illustration of various coloured lights also does not afford a reasonable proof to assume the plurality of selves. The Sāṅkhya does not admit any variety or speciality in the selves or Puruṣas. It holds that all Puruṣas are equally of the same nature and quality. Hence the illustration of various lights is not in conformity with the Sāṅkhya theory. And, if the illuminations of the lights are of the same, differenceless variety, there is no reason to assume manifoldness. In the complete absence of even the slightest difference, there cannot be any distinguishing factor that can produce a knowledge of variety. Because, when there is a knowledge of manifoldness, there necessarily is a simultaneous knowledge of difference.

If we admit, even from the standpoint of knowledge or *jña*, many, differenceless Puruṣas, what is the differentiating factor in them that gives us an idea of multiple number? 'Multiplicity without distinction is impossible' (Radhakrishnan). Personalism or 'ownness' (*pratyaktva*) cannot be said to be the differentiator, because it exists in all Puruṣas as the common feature of consciousness, all-pervadingness, etc. If we accept that there is some slight difference somewhere between two entities, which are otherwise equal in all respects, then that entity possessing the difference will be separate from the other. And, as a result of this separation, it will be limited by the other. It cannot be called unlimited or infinite, and to call it unlimited limited is a contradiction in terms.

In his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, II.3.50, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya refutes pluralism from yet a different point of view. He says: 'According to the Sāṅkhya, the selves or Puruṣas are many, and all of them are of the nature of intelligence and all-pervading. Pradhāna or Prakṛti engages herself in various activities for the enjoyment and liberation of these Puruṣas. There is also no difference among the selves in point of proximity to Prakṛti. So it follows that, when one self is afflicted with sorrow, all the other selves will be equally afflicted.' In reality, however, we do not come across such experiences. Further, the objections raised by the Sāṅkhya against the acceptance of one Puruṣa (Brahman) hold good even in the case of its own theory of many Puruṣas. As such, pluralism cannot stand its ground.

The doctrine that multiplicity is best explained by the theory of dualism or pluralism cannot stand the light of reason supplied by the Advaita Vedānta. We have already dealt with that point. Also, we find in this world that

only one subject is able to produce various kinds of false knowledge. For instance, in the dark, a thief sees the stump of a tree and thinks it to be a policeman; a baby is stricken with fear thinking it to be a ghost; and a man who has lost his beloved on the way imagines it to be his sweetheart. Thus through ignorance and superimposition, one object can give rise to diverse false ideas. And such a phenomenon is in the experience of everybody. Still we must not think that ignorance or *māyā*, which cannot be logically formulated, is a real entity. Brahman is the only reality, and this manifold manifestation of the world is caused by the veiling and projecting powers of *māyā*. This *māyā* is also transcended ultimately when the knowledge of Brahman dawns.

Māyā is there in the nature of creation as a fact to produce this world of phenomena. This has been beautifully expressed by Swami Vivekananda: '*Māyā* is a statement of fact of this universe, of how it is going on. ... Everything that has form, everything that calls up an idea in your mind, is within *māyā*. For everything that is bound by the laws of time, space, and causation is within *māyā*.'

Śruti texts also emphatically declare that the ultimate Truth is one and not many. '(The Self) being one, the controller, and the inner Self of all—makes a single form multifarious' (*Ka.U.*, II.2.12). 'Truth is one, sages call It variously.' Further, while instructing about the path to *mokṣa* or liberation, the Śruti asserts that 'only through the knowledge of One Brahman does a man transcend death; there is no other way to cross this *saṁsāra*' (*Śve.U.*, III.8). And there are numerous similar passages both in the Śruti and Smṛti which indicate that the knowledge of the unity of the Self is the *sine qua non* for *mokṣa*.

While commenting on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (11), Śrī Gauḍapāda says that there is only one Self. The Sāṅkhya explanation of the Śruti passage that the Self is 'One without a second' does not lead us to assume a plurality of selves. It was already shown that there cannot be two objects which are equal in all respects, infinite, and all-pervading. Further, there is no valid illustration in support of this contention. And it is more logical to assume that an infinite and eternal entity, which is completely devoid of all differences either intrinsic or extrinsic, can be only one. Therefore the Śruti passage 'One without a second' definitely refers to One Brahman without a second. The number 'one' indicates that there is no other entity apart from Brahman.

Summing up the arguments, we may say that Brahman which in Its own reality is beyond one, two, etc., and in human dealings is described as 'not this', 'not this', can be viewed as the one, all-pervading Puruṣa of the Sāṅkhya. And by false superimposition, this Brahman appears to be manifested in various *jīvas* or individual selves, who, according to the Sāṅkhya, are subject to birth, death, misery, happiness, etc. But in reality *jīva* is Brahman. Thus there could be a reconciliation between the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta. Otherwise, as Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has said: 'The philosophical view of the Sāṅkhya, with its dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and a plurality of infinite Puruṣas, each unlimited and yet not interfering with the unlimitedness of the other, though existing out of and independent of them, cannot be regarded as a satisfactory solution of the main problem of philosophy. The dualistic realism is the result of false metaphysics.'

SCIENCE AND HUMAN WISDOM

By Professor Sidney Hook

The key words of modern times are 'revolution' and 'crisis'. 'Revolution' signifies transformation; 'crisis', an acute situation requiring choice and resolution. Revolutions are usually the preludes to crisis. Whether we deplore it or welcome it, we are living in the greatest era of revolutionary transformation in human history. This revolutionary transformation is the effect of a convergent series of related revolutions—political, national. economic, and technological.

The political and national revolutions are the most dramatic, but not the most fundamental The political revolution expresses the principle that all adults, who are affected by the decisions of government, should have some voice in influencing those decisions. The national revolution is expressed in the principle of national self-determination. It repudiates the view that any nation has the moral or political authority to be the arbiter of the destinies of another.

The economic revolution of modern times is based upon the conception that the welfare of the entire community is a charge upon the government. It must be planned along certain strategic lines with reference to the available and potential resources. Such planning would be inadequate, and sometimes impossible, without the technological revolution. The technological revolution confronts us at every turn. Yesterday's miracle is today's commonplace. Benjamin Franklin and Karl Marx defined man as a tool-making animal, but the difference between the technology of the primitive man and the modern man is that modern technology is based on science, and therefore invention is accelerative and cumulative. Invention itself, as Whitehead puts it, becomes institutionalized. Napoleon the Great, in all his pomp and glory, could not travel from Rome to Paris faster than Julius Caesar did almost two thousand years before him. Since Napoleon's day the time has been reduced to an hour.

GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

At the basis of all these revolutionary changes is the scientific revolution, by which I mean the reliance upon the pattern of experimental inquiry to discover truths about the nature of Nature, the nature of society, and the nature of the human body and mind. By saying that the scientific revolution is at the basis of all these changes either directly or indirectly, I do not mean to deny reciprocal influences among them. However, an analytical and statistical study of the complex of changes will, I am convinced, establish the fact that the scientific revolution, whose beginnings are found in the seventeenth century, is by far the strongest component in the complicated pattern of modern life.

This scientific revolution has changed man's picture of himself and the conception of his role in the universe. He no longer sees himself as a creature who necessarily must suffer in a world of divine decree. He is no longer a passive, contemplative spirit, whose vocation is to make a survey of all time and all existence. The conception of man, which emerges from modern science, is one of a creator, a maker, and a doer. No longer a pawn of fate, he is a focus of genuine novelty in the world. By virtue of the fact that scientific knowledge is experimental, the universe, in the most literal sense, is changed whenever the frontiers of knowledge are widened. Scientific knowledge is therefore transformative. The increase of knowledge entails increase of power, and therefore of objective responsibility. Man acquires the role of a kind of minor deity, capable of changing parts of the physical and social world, by commanding and transforming the natural elements at will. The late Dr. John von Neumann predicted that, in the near future,

man, like the Homeric deities on Mt. Olympus, would be able to control even the weather—a power which, in the long run, may turn out to be of greater fearfulness than any nuclear weapon. A 'cold war' would take on a new meaning if one could design a local 'ice age' in which to cool off a restless enemy.

But for all their power, will men be any wiser than the Homeric gods who acted like Greek children? It is obvious that, since the seventeenth century, growth in human power and scientific knowledge has not been commensurate with growth in human wisdom. Will it be any different in the future? Indeed, there are voices like those of Aldous Huxley, who prophesy that it will be worse. They assert that all that knowledge does is to add to human power, and that scientific knowledge of man's body and mind, combined with our knowledge of the physical world, will merely extend the power of man over man. They predict that the scientific revolution will result in a most terrible tyranny over man because it puts into unwise hands the power to condition, recondition, and 'brain-wash' the human mind. By the use of chemicals, of subconscious and subliminal persuaders, as well as by overt propaganda, mankind can be manipulated like sheep. It is argued by some critics of science, whose eloquence borders on hysteria, that a civilization based upon science, and which views scientific knowledge as the most reliable kind of knowledge, must be one of ruthless exploitation, in which all humane values are doomed to disappear.

This raises the crucial question, Can the logic and ethics of scientific method itself develop an attitude of reasonableness, which will enable men to solve the human and social problems created by the impact of scientific knowledge on the world? Can the same generic *pattern* of solving problems, that has proved so successful in the solution of technical scientific questions, be applied to human affairs? I propose to answer these questions affirmatively. In passing, however, I wish to point out that until now we have not made a unified effort to approach these problems scientifically, and that the methods which have been used—revelation, intuition, authority, metaphysical speculation—have not been conspicuously successful. Indeed, we face the problem because all of these alternative methods have failed.

Let us begin by examining the claim that science can give only knowledge of fact, and that some other discipline—custom, religion, and metaphysics—is the source of wisdom.

THE NATURE OF HUMAN WISDOM

There is a difference between knowledge and wisdom, which we all recognize. We know that a man can be a learned fool, and sometimes meet a sage who is by no means a scholar. It is not so easy to state the precise difference between knowledge and wisdom, however. Wisdom, we are tempted to say, is found in the *use* of knowledge. Yes, but there is a wise use of knowledge and an unwise use. We must be knowledgeable about *something* in order to tell when use is wise or not. I conclude, therefore, that wisdom is a kind of knowledge, after all. It is knowledge about the nature of human values. A man is wise who knows what is of most worth in human experience, who knows the ways of the human heart—what gives it enduring satisfactions, the costs and consequences of its choice in happiness for himself and others. A man is wise who knows what we are likely to regret, what is better overlooked, and what should never be overlooked. A man is wise who knows when to fight, when to avoid fighting, and, above all, how to remove the conditions which provoke conflict and to create those which give human beings a vested interest in preserving peace.

If this is what we understand by wisdom, then the basic questions are whether value is an affair of knowledge, and if it is, whether that knowledge can be achieved by methods comparable with the methods pursued so successfully in other fields. The technological developments of recent times make these ques-

tions more momentous. They do not raise new questions of principle.

For obvious reasons, we cannot hand the gift of technology back to anyone or stem its further advance. Yet its further advance is Janus-faced—one face encourages hope of greater survival, quantitatively and qualitatively; the other face threatens human survival absolutely. No matter how ingenious the mechanism of any invention, it will never have a built-in governor or regulator guaranteeing its use rather than abuse. Indeed, both 'use' and 'abuse' in this context are, strictly speaking, not terms applicable to technology at all. They are moral terms.

No intelligent moral judgement about the use or abuse of technology today can be made without the relevant knowledge, which only the technologist or natural scientist can supply. However, it would be a gross mistake to believe that this necessary condition is a sufficient one. To be knowledgeable about the ways of matter —about the ways of things—is not the same thing as being wise about the ways of men, their emotions and fears, their behaviour in crowds and as creatures with historial memories.

HOW SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE MAY INFLUENCE HUMAN JUDGEMENT

There are some who go from the true proposition that wise statesmanship in the modern world is impossible without informed awareness of the discoveries of modern science, to the false proposition that scientists must be considered the chief 'advisers to humanity', invested with authority and responsibility in judging the human affairs affected by their discoveries. This is a dangerous error and based on a false conception of scientific method. The *pattern* of scientific thinking is the same in every field, but we know that there is no automatic transfer of training or power from one field to another, that not only are subject-matters and techniques different in different fields, but specific criteria of evidence. Scientists, who have no preparation in politics and history, are hardly more qualified to discuss what Churchill once called the secret of Soviet policy (or the secret of Middle Eastern or Far Eastern policy) than historians and lawyers as such to discuss the secrets of the atom.

There is sometimes a hidden premise behind this assumption that the thinking of the natural scientist gives us the paradigm of rationality in human affairs. This is made explicit in an article by the gentle Max Born, a Nobel Prize-winning physicist. Natural scientists, he claims, should be used in politics and administration, because they are 'less dogmatic and more open to argument than people trained in law or classics'. The evidence he offers, as well as the evidence he ignores, betrays the unscientific character of his generalizations. Not only is it true that, as a rule, scientists in the past have rarely been in more agreement with each other about questions of foreign policy than others; the record shows that with respect to *some* questions on which they were pretty much agreed—for example, their expectation of Soviet behaviour after the war—they have been demonstrably wrong. With respect to the nature of Communism and developments in foreign affairs involving Communism, the record shows that the leaders of American labour have been far wiser, by and large, than the leaders of American science, of whom (with some notable exceptions) Einstein was representative. The leaders of labour had a double advantage. They knew something about the subject, and they also had some first-hand experience in dealing with Communist duplicity. Workers' freedom is freedom to strike—workers realize that they are subjected to forced labour or slavery under Communism.

Again, with some exceptions, scientists tend to exhibit the defects of their virtues when they go from the field of scientific research to the field of politics, which requires decisions and rarely permits the luxury of suspended judgement, until the decisive evidence is at hand. The initial assumption which the scientist makes

of integrity and good faith in accepting a report in order to check it, he cannot always make in politics. It is true that lawyers professionally are not interested in establishing the truth, but in winning a case, and they care little which side of the case it is. However, as judges and jurists, lawyers have shown great wisdom in reconciling the inescapable conflict of legitimate claims. The nature of the juridical concern—its sensitiveness to history, to intent and motive, to individualization whether of judgement or punishment, to the dual values of justice in the individual case and certainly in the community—brings law closer to politics than physical science. Law as a system of thought and decision is open to argument and change, as its history shows, but for obvious reasons it cannot abandon a principle as readily as a scientist can discard a theory. Whether scholars trained in the classics or humanities are less open to argument and less tolerant of intellectual difference than scientists would be hard to establish, unless we specified more carefully in what fields and on what questions.

In the quest of wisdom, it seems to me absurd to fall victim to vocational or professional imperialism and to make invidious distinctions between the different disciplines. In every field of knowledge, we can distinguish between good and bad thinking, between scientific and unscientific thinking. Wisdom is found in the recognition and solution of life's problems. It is the bearing it has on these problems which determines whether the knowledge of a field is relevant to its solution or not. Our best hope of gaining wisdom is to bring the clearest thinking from every relevant field of knowledge to bear on the problem at hand. If this is true, it is just as mistaken to believe that statesmen by themselves can solve the great questions of war, peace, and human welfare in this age of explosive technology, without consulting technologists, scientists, jurists, and psychologists, as it is to believe that scientists can go off by themselves in a special huddle and return with Jove-like pronouncements about what mankind must believe or practise in order to be saved.

SYSTEMATIC INQUIRY IN THE SOLUTION OF HUMAN PROBLEMS

It is a commonplace of formal logic that we cannot deduce what should be from premises which describe only what is. However, it is a fact of experience that our value commitments are embedded in the problems which we are called upon to solve; part of the solution consists in discovering what those commitments really are, whether we can induce others to share them, and whether they are worth sustaining in particular situations. Wisdom consists not in being wise only about means, or only about ends, but about ends-and-means in their togetherness, whenever we are asked or ask ourselves, 'What should we do?' When we ask such a question in a concrete historical context, then the only way we can answer it is by inquiry into the probable consequences of alternative modes of action. Facts alone do not determine policy, because value commitments are involved in every policy. Once this is recognized, what else can or should 'determine' policy if not the facts in the case? Can a reasonable man uphold a policy including the consequences of holding the policy, no matter what the facts are? ('Determine' here, of course, does not mean 'logically entail'.)

The basic challenge to this view comes from those who deny that we can be wise or intelligent or even rational about our ends. 'There is no such thing', says Bertrand Russell, 'as an irrational end except in the sense of one that is impossible of realization.' Surely, not all ends that are possible of realization are therefore rational! Is there no wise or foolish choice among ends, all of which are possible of realization? Why is it necessarily irrational to pursue an end that is impossible of realization? This assumes that in normal circumstances, once we understand that we cannot get what we want, it is not worth pursuing. This is not a strictly logical proposition. It is not self-contradictory to pursue an impossible end, but we may discover that the pursuit of an unrealizable end is not worth while, because it is too time-con-

suming and frustrating. We then abandon our aim. Let us suppose our end *is* possible of achievement and we discover that the effort necessary to achieve it costs us too much, hurts us too much, bores us too much, in short, gets in the way of our other ends whose desirability we had taken for granted. Would it not then become as irrational to pursue as the end which is impossible of realization? Is it not a perfectly natural way of speaking to assert sometimes that a man's ideal is an illusion, his goal mistaken, his desire undesirable? Russell mistakes a purely logical point for one of ethics. However, where there is no *summum bonum,* where there is no *one* all-sanctifying and final end, the logic does not apply. If we recognize that we are committed to plural ends, that we take our problems one at a time, that the situations in which we make decisions are located within a historical process, we can be rational or intelligent about ends as well as about means.

If we cannot be intelligent about our ends, there is neither wisdom nor foolishness. If we are unwise about our ends, then more often than not we will regret our choices and make those we love regret them, too.

One thing seems to be unquestionable. There are no total solutions. A great piece of foolishness may end life in this world once and for all, but there can be no corresponding great piece of wisdom which will save us the trouble of further thinking. So long as vision outstrips reach, ambition capacity, desires resources, so long as men find greater satisfactions in commanding and controlling men than in co-operating to create and discover new occasions for shared joys, men will have troubles and problems. They will need to be solved daily not so much by inherited or revealed wisdom as by earned wisdom, which is won only by scientific inquiry.

What does it mean to be scientific or rational about the subject-matter of wisdom? It means that we must first locate our moral problems in relation to specific and concrete situations of moral choice. It means that we must relate our ends to the consequences of the means used. We must, in turn, test these consequences by their relevance to human interests. We must approach the problems which call for wisdom one at a time. There is no guarantee that universal agreement will be reached in every case. However, a solution may be objective and relative even if it is not universal. Because human beings are alike, or want to be alike, or have compatible differences within a common human nature, shared experiences may lead to commonly accepted conclusions. Whether such conclusions are universal or not, they are justifiably considered scientific, if they are won by following the underlying pattern of inquiry described above.

Science is nothing but the finding of unity. As soon as science would reach perfect unity, it would stop from further progress, because it would reach the goal. Thus Chemistry could not progress farther when it would discover one element out of which all others could be made. Physics would stop when it would be able to fulfil its services in discovering one energy of which all the others are but manifestations, and the science of religion become perfect when it would discover Him who is the one life in a universe of death, Him who is the constant basis of an ever-changing world, One who is the only Soul of which all souls are but delusive manifestations. Thus is it, through multiplicity and duality, that the ultimate unity is reached. Religion can go no further. This is the goal of all Science.

—SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

ŚRĪ-BHĀṢYA

By Swami Vireswarananda

(Continued from previous issue)

Topic 3

THE SOUL IS NOT PRODUCED, BUT IS ETERNAL.

नात्मा श्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः ॥२।३।१८॥

18. The individual self is not (produced), (for it is so) mentioned in the scriptures, also (on account of its) being eternal, (for so it is known) from them (the Śruti texts).

The question is raised whether the individual self also is produced from Brahman, like the elements. The opponent holds that it is produced, for there are texts which say so: 'He from whom this world is produced; He who has created these beings on this earth.' Reasoning also shows that the individual self is produced from Brahman, as otherwise the promissory statement that from the knowldege of one thing everything is known would be contradicted. Moreover, texts like 'From whence these beings are produced' (*Tai.U.*, III.1.1) declare in a general way the origination of the world, and no distinction is made between the sentient and insentient beings.

The *sūtra* refutes this and says that the individual self is not produced, for the Śruti texts deny it: 'The intelligent self is neither born, nor does it die' (*Ka.U.*, I.2.18). *Vide* also *Śvetāśvatara*, I.9 and *Kaṭha*, II.2.13. In that case, how does the knowledge of one thing lead to the knowledge of everything? Yes, it is possible, for the individual self also is an effect of Brahman. By effect is meant that the substance has attained a new condition, and from this point of view, it is an effect as is clearly seen from the soul's taking a gross body at the time of creation. There is, however, a difference between the sentient self and the insentient beings in this attainment of a new condition. In the case of the self, it is a mere contraction and expansion of intelligence, while in the case of the insentient beings, the elements etc., it is a change in their essential nature. It is this latter kind of change that is denied for the self by the Śruti texts. They do not deny even the attainment of a new condition by the self. Brahman has for Its body the sentient and insentient beings both in the causal and effected states. In the causal state, they are so subtle that they cannot be designated otherwise than as Brahman Itself, and hence texts like '*Sat* alone was this at the beginning' etc. (*Chā.U.*, VI.2.8). But when these sentient and insentient beings attain a gross state with names and forms, Brahman is said to be in the effected state. At the time of this change, the insentient beings undergo change in their essential nature and produce objects of enjoyment, while the souls attain expansion of intelligence as a result of their taking to a gross body, which makes them fit for the enjoyment of these objects as a result of the fruit of their *karma*. So the soul also is an effect of Brahman. The texts which declare the origination of the soul only refer to its taking a gross body and thereby having expanded intelligence, while those that deny origination declare that there is no change in its essential nature. Brahman is in Its causal or effected state according as It has for Its body matter and souls either in their subtle or gross state. The effect being thus non-different from the cause, the initial promissory statement holds good.

Topic 4

THE NATURE OF THE SOUL AND ITS SIZE

ज्ञोऽत एव ॥२।३।१९॥

19. For this very reason (viz. scriptural statements), (the individual soul) is a knower.

Now the question of the nature and the size

of the soul is taken up for discussion. First, as regards the nature of the soul. Is it purely consciousness, or is it an inert substance having intelligence occasionally under certain circumstances as an adventitious quality, or is it a knower? Some, like the Advaitins, hold that it is mere knowledge, for the Śruti texts declare like that: 'Knowledge performs sacrifie' etc. (*Tai.U.*, II.5.1); 'He who abides in intelligence' (*Bṛ.U.*, III.7.22), where 'intelligence' stands for the 'self' mentioned in the Kāṇva recension.

The Vaiśeṣikas refute this view and say that the self is neither mere knowledge nor is it a knower having knowledge for its quality. The self, according to them, is an inert thing, and its knowledge is an adventitious or occasional quality, as it results when the sense-organs come in contact with external objects. If it were mere knowledge or a knower, there would have been no use of the sense-organs to cognize objects. Moreover, in deep sleep, there is no knowledge, which shows that it is neither mere knowledge nor a knower, for if either were its nature, it could not have been destroyed in deep sleep. Destruction of one's nature would mean destruction of the thing itself. The Śruti texts declare that in the state of freedom also there is no knowledge: 'When he has departed, there is no consciousness' (*Bṛ.U.*, II.4.12). So it has to be said that the self is an inert thing like the pot, and that its knowledge is an adventitious quality.

These two views the *sūtra* refutes and says that the soul is essentially a knower, and is neither mere knowledge nor inert, for the scriptures declare it to be a knower both in the state of bondage and freedom: 'And he who knows "I smell this" is the self. ... Through the mind, he verily sees these desired objects and rejoices' (*Chā.U.*, VIII.12.4-5); 'He who sees this does not see death nor illness nor any sorrow. He who sees this sees all things and obtains all things in all ways' (*Chā.U.*, VII.26.2); 'And this one is the seer, feeler,' etc. (*Pra.U.*, IV.9). Texts which declare it to be mere knowledge only show that knowledge is its chief characteristic, by which its nature is known or defined. In deep sleep and swoon, knowledge exists, though in a dormant condition, and on waking, it expands and manifests itself. 'When he has departed, there is no consciousness' (*Bṛ.U.*, II.4.12) does not mean that there is no consciousness in the state of release, but that the self does not remember the body it had in the state of bondage.

उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् ॥२।३।२०॥

20. (As the Śruti texts declare the soul's) passing out, going (to other spheres), and returning (thence) the soul is atomic in size.

It was shown that the soul is a knower. The opponent says that, if it is a knower, it being infinite and all-pervading, there will be cognition at all places and at all times. Refuting this view, this *sūtra* and the following establish that the soul is atomic in size. There are Śruti texts mentioning the soul's passing out of the body, going to heaven etc., and returning from there. *Vide Bṛ.U.*, IV.4.2 and 6. This is possible only if the soul is atomic and not infinite or all-pervading, for to an infinite soul, there can be no going and coming.

स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोः ॥२।३।२१॥

21. And the latter two (the going and coming) (being effected) directly by the self (it is of atomic size).

Even if the soul is infinite, still it can be spoken of as passing out of the body, if it be taken to mean separation from the body. But for the going and coming, they cannot be explained away like that, and must be understood as being accomplished by the self itself; and that is not possible for an entity that is all-pervading. So the soul is atomic in size.

नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात् ॥२।३।२२॥

22. If it be said (that the soul is) not atomic, as the scriptures state it to be otherwise (i.e. all-pervading) (we say) not so, for (the One) other than the individual soul (i.e. su-

preme Brahman) is the subject-matter (in those texts).

A fresh objection is raised that the soul is not atomic, as the scriptures declare it to be otherwise. 'Which is the self? This entity consisting of knowledge within the heart surrounded by the organs' etc. (*Bṛ.U.*, III.4.7)—in this text, the individual self is introduced as the subject-matter, and later on, the Śruti declares, 'That infinite, birthless self' etc. (*Bṛ.U.*, IV.4.22), where the self is said to be infinite. Therefore the soul is not atomic. This *sūtra* refutes it and says that the soul is atomic, as the self referred to in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* IV.4.22 is not the soul, but the supreme Self or Brahman, which was introduced in the discussion 'He who has known the Self of intelligence' (*Bṛ.U.*, IV.4.13). It is this latter Self that is called infinite by the Śruti text.

स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्यां च ॥२।३।२३॥

23. And on account of the very word (atomic) (used by the Śruti texts to denote its size) and infinitesimal measure (the soul is atomic).

'This atomic self' etc. (*Mu.U.*, III.1.9)—this text directly states that the soul is atomic. Again, we have 'That self is to be known as a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair divided a hundred times' (*Śve.U.*, V.9), which shows that the soul is of infinitesimal measure.

(To be continued)

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TO OUR READERS

Professor Surendranath Bhattacharya, M.A., formerly of Bihar National College, Patna, who has been contributing a series of scholarly articles on *avidyā* and *māyā*, in the third article that is given in this issue, makes a careful examination of the concepts of '*Māyā* and *Avidyā* in the Buddhist Philosophy', and shows that there is close correspondence between Buddhist thought and Advaita Vedānta, for both of them 'drew on the same source, namely, the Upaniṣads'. ...

In the second and concluding part of his article on 'Western Philosophy and Educational Values Implicit Therein', Professor P. S. Naidu, M.A., Head of the Research Department, Vidya Bhawan, Udaipur, after showing that 'the softer method of scientific rationalism' that is being pursued in the educational field has proved to be a failure, urges for the restoration of 'the basic life values of self-knowledge and self-discipline and the leading educational values of individuality' that are implicit in the thought of some of the great philosophers of the West. ...

The Sāṅkhya theory of many Puruṣas is discussed in the light of the Advaita Vedānta, and shown to be untenable, by Swami Nirgunananda, of the Ramakrishna Order, in his brief article entitled 'The Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya Theory of Many Puruṣas'. ...

Professor Sidney Hook is a leading American philosopher of range and an able interpreter of experimental empiricism developed by John Dewey. He is an active campaigner on behalf of international democratic movements. 'Science and Human Wisdom' by Professor Sidney Hook, presented in this issue, is reproduced from the *Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture* for January 1959.

REVIVAL OF SANSKRIT LEARNING IN INDIA

What makes a nation? There is a notion in certain circles that a nation, worth the name, should consist of people speaking the same

language and belonging to the same race. The histories of America, England, and many other nations, where people of various climes and clans have worked together to build up the countries of their adoption, however, tell a different story. They do not lend support to such a theory. A better and more plausible definition of a nation would be that it is a community of people, not necessarily of the same race or speaking the same language, but who have agreed amongst themselves to live together for the achievement of a common purpose. The members of such a community are bound to each other by certain common objectives and ideals of life, and they brave all obstacles and temptations which try to undo their unity of existence. This determination to hold on as one body, come what may, is what knits them fast to one another, leading to the formation of a nation. It is this voluntary and whole-hearted acceptance of a common ideal and the willingness to strive unitedly for it that is the prime requisite in the formation of a nation, and not the similarity of language or race.

None the less, the fact remains that people speaking the same language are drawn to each other more closely than people speaking different languages. To overcome this short-coming, every nation has felt the need of a common language of communication in order to maintain the continuity of its independent existence and, consequently, by mutual consent, has chosen for the purpose one, and when found necessary two or three, of the many languages spoken by the people forming the nation. Naturally, the question arises, What were the considerations which threw the weight heavily in favour of the particular language or languages chosen. As it appears to the superficial observer, it was obviously the numerical strength of the people who spoke that language that decided the issue. Apparently it was so. A little deeper reflection should, however, reveal to the unbiased mind that number alone could not have been the sole reason in preferring one language to another as a common means of exchange of thought. It would be more reasonable to assume that it was because the language chosen was best suited to give expression to the wishes and aspirations which induced the people to join together to form the nation.

Thus we find that in the building up of a nation, two factors are of supreme importance. Firstly, a universally acceptable ideal for the sake of which the nation as a whole can pool all its resources; and secondly, a language which stands as the symbol of that ideal and which constantly places before the minds of the people a vivid picture of that ideal.

The restlessness and ferment that are visible all over India at the present moment are only an outward manifestation of the inner struggle to win back the lost nationhood. India, long subject to foreign domination, has just regained her political freedom, but has not yet fully discovered the two requisites which can fully restore to her the nationhood that she had lost. It is not that she has to find these requisites anew. Even when there was no political integration of the various units of the country, the idea of Bharat as one entity, extending from the Himalayas to Kanyakumari and from Dwarka to Puri, was always there in the minds of the people. That is because the nation as a whole held on to the ideal of Brahmavidyā or the realization of divinity within and without. But 'owing to political conditions, narrow and local patriotism, and owing to our present-day educational system, which aims at worldly success but not spiritual upliftment, we have,' as Sri Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar, Governor of Mysore, remarks, 'in general, forgotten all about the rich and invaluable heritage which Vedāntic thought has given us; instead, we have been immersed in the mire of materialism, *svecchārājya*' (quoted from his address delivered on the occasion of the Thirteenth Foundation Day of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras, and published in the *Journal of Oriental Research,* of the Institute, Vol. XXVI, Parts I-IV, 1958, under the caption 'Sanskrit, the Repository of Universal Culture

and Brahmavidyā'). We have to unearth that 'rich and invaluable heritage' and revive it if we want to live and progress as a nation. The Governor's address is a good pointer as to how best we can do it.

'Sanskrit language', he says, 'is a treasure-house that can never be exhausted. It has not been exhausted and perhaps never will be; because in its ultimate being Saṁskṛta is the symbol of culture, a storehouse of "Brahmavidyā" or knowledge of the highest.' Again: 'We speak of Saṁskṛti or culture, and Saṁskṛta is the language of this culture. Culture envisages the adoption of a sense of values, among which reason, truth, duty, and peace hold a high place. Judged by these standards, the Sanskrit culture of the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Purāṇas, and the Itihāsas abounds in mental and spiritual riches of unique value. ... Above all, the greatest gift of Sanskrit is "Brahmavidyā", knowledge of the supreme Spirit. This is the discipline by which men attain the highest state of being.'

Let us in this connection remind ourselves of what Swami Vivekananda said nearly sixty years ago. For, of late, there is a big linguistic controversy going on in the country, and much passion has been aroused in the name of a common language and the dignity and self-respect of independent India. The Swami, with his penetrating insight, says:

'Therefore the ideas must be taught in the language of the people; at the same time, Sanskrit education must go on along with it, because the very sound of Sanskrit gives a prestige and a power and a strength to the race. ... Even the great Buddha made one false step when he stopped the Sanskrit language from being studied by the masses. He wanted rapid and immediate results, and translated and preached in the language of the day, Pali. That was grand, he spoke in the language of the people, and the people understood him, ... but along with it Sanskrit ought to have spread. Knowledge came, but the prestige was not there, culture was not there. ... Teach the masses in the vernaculars, give them ideas; they will get information, but something more is necessary; give them culture.'

And that culture can be given only through Sanskrit. Forgetting this fundamental fact has been the cause of much bitterness, strife, hatred, and animosity let loose in the country recently by this controversy. The sooner we realize this and reinstate Sanskrit to its pristine glorious position, the better it is for the country. For it is in Sanskrit and Sanskrit alone that we can discover the universal ideal necessary for the cultural progress and prosperity of the country.

The revival of Sanskrit has become the most urgent need of the country, now that we have attained the political unification also. It is a *must* if the country is not to lose its individuality. As we have pointed out earlier, it was through the ideal of Brahmavidyā and Sanskrit, the language through which that ideal was transmitted from generation to generation, that the country retained its nationhood, and now it has to do the same to regain its nationality, and maintain its unity. The address of the Governor of Mysore, which we have quoted above, emphasizes this point:

'We have now been enjoying political freedom. This freedom implies intellectual freedom also. But any kind of freedom is founded on unity. Therefore our first and foremost duty, in this environment, is to realize this unity, the unity of our culture, which helps us to overcome all differences in our country.'

Sri K. M. Munshi also stresses this point in his article 'Sanskrit in Modern Life' published in *The Hindustan Times* (Magazine Section, Sunday, March 22, 1959). He writes:

'People with limited historical knowledge identify Sanskrit exclusively with ritualism, and ritualism with communalism. We must, however, remember that Sanskrit has, for the last three thousand years, provided us with basic unity, the unity of our languages, the uniform development of their literature, and social solidarity. Moral and spiritual values have also been given to us through Sanskrit. And if Sanskrit were neglected, *we will imperil this basic unity*' (italics ours).

India without Sanskrit will be like a body without the soul. She would be culturally bankrupt, which would be disastrous for her as a nation. It is Sanskrit that provides the roots and background to Indian culture. It is the lingua franca of religion and learning, the language of philosophy, and the language of religious revelation and tradition. As long as we take pride in our own cultural traditions, we cannot afford to give up Sanskrit. India

will live as long as her Sanskrit culture and tradition course through her veins.

There is yet a greater reason for the immediate resuscitation of Sanskrit in the country. So far, the plea for this resuscitation was made keeping in view mainly the good of India. Has it got any significance for the world at large, beyond India? Yes, it has. In his final summing up, Sri Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar states most forcefully the universal usefulness of Sanskrit learning. He says:

'We think today that advance in science is commensurate with progress. Such a notion, as one realizes, is wrong, and yet, there has not been a revolution in our way of thinking. We have accepted so many second-rate things as of supreme value that we have relegated into the background, and put into cold storage, some of the most precious thoughts given to us. There is a crying need for new approaches, new angles, and new thoughts; and could there be any source so large and so untapped as that which the Sanskrit language offers? Every advantage should be taken of this great cultural heritage, this cultural gift that our ancestors have handed to us, and it should be exploited to the full not only for the benefit of ourselves in India, but also of the human race. I believe that these works were meant to be of use for one and all and that they were written by sages and savants, rulers and priests, all of them men of the highest integrity, with their experience of life, their profound observation, their deep knowledge, their subtle wisdom to render them useful for all at all times.'

The *Journal* from which we have taken the above extract contains interesting articles on Sanskrit studies in Japan, Indian literature in China, and a report of an American symposium on oriental studies in a university curriculum. Will India, the home of Sanskrit, lag behind when other countries are taking so much interest in the language which has preserved her culture and made her great in the eyes of the world throughout the centuries, and when the whole world is in need of her spiritual message?

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

THE INDIAN BUDDHIST ICONOGRAPHY. By Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, M.A., PH.D. Second revised and enlarged edition, with 357 illustrations. *Published by Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta-12. 1958. Pages xxxiii+478. Price Rs. 40.*

This very useful monograph on Buddhist iconography, dealing mostly with the late medieval Buddhist icons of India and Nepal, has been long out of print. Students and scholars of this branch of Indian iconography in particular, and scholars and Indologists interested in Indian culture and religion in general, have been utilizing the first edition of the book with profit for a long time. It was first published in 1924 mainly on the basis of a large mass of *Sādhanamālā* texts brought from Nepal by the late Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad Sastri, one of the foremost Sanskritists and Indologists.

The study of Buddhist iconography was at first mostly confined to a few European scholars like Grünwedel, Foucher, and others, before it was taken up in right earnest by Dr. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, a young promising scholar of the time, a little less than forty years ago. He had some special facilities in this respect, for he could not only get a sound guidance in the field of his research from his father, Mm. Haraprasad Sastri, but also could utilize the mass of literary materials in the shape of the numerous *Sādhanamālā* texts, written in hybrid Sanskrit, collected by his father in Nepal. It was the French savant, M. Foucher, who showed in his work (*Etude sur l' Iconographie Bouddhique de l' Inde*, partie 1, Paris, 1900; partie 2, Paris, 1905) how these texts were indispensable for the study and proper interpretation of the countless varieties of medieval Buddhist images and pictorial representations. But the literary material which he could utilize for this purpose was comparatively scanty, and it could throw only a little light on many of the sculptural and pictorial forms connected with the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna aspects

of Buddhism. Grünwedel, in his earlier work in German, *Buddhistische Kunst un Indien* (an English translation of this work by Miss Gibson was first published with additions from the pen of James Burgess in 1901), could not use any such text, as the material was not available to him at that time. But as he was primarily concerned with the earlier phases of Buddhist art, and not much with the iconography of the developed forms associated with the later and highly transformed aspects of Buddhism, the non-availability of this sort of textual material was not much of a handicap to him. When Foucher practically opened this line of research, it was necessary that some other scholars should take it up in right earnest, and Dr. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya was well-qualified for this task. The results of years of study and research in this field were published in 1924, and the publication was hailed by Indologists as a standard work indispensable for the correct interpretation of the numerous Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna icons.

The want of a thoroughly revised edition of the book was being keenly felt for a long time. The author himself had since 1924 much advanced the knowledge of the subject by several other publications, the most important and authoritative of which were his two volumes of the *Sādhanamālā* (Vols. XXVI and XLI in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series) and the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* (Vol. CIX in the same series, of which he was the General Editor). Such works on this subject as A. K. Coomaraswamy's *Elements of Buddhist Iconography,* the second edition of Alice Getty's *Gods of Northern Buddhism,* N. K Bhattasali's *Inconography of Buddhist and Brahmanical Sculptures in the Dacca Museum,* A. K. Gordon's *Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism,* etc., which were published after 1924, also necessitated a thorough revision of the book. The comparatively recent publication of the *Two Lamaistic Pantheons* (Vols. I and II) by Walter Eugene Clarke in the Harvard Yenchung Institute Monograph Series also made the author hasten his decision about bringing out a revised edition of his book. Clarke's work, though mainly dealing with the iconography of the numerous Buddhist images in the Royal Temple at Peiping in Manchuria, had special bearing on this matter, for these late medieval Chinese statuettes were mostly based on the text of *Niṣpannayogāvalī* written by Mahāpaṇḍita Abhayākaragupta of the Vikramaśīla monastery of India. Thus the author's previous study of this subject had to be reorientated in the light of all these important contributions and discoveries in the field of Buddhist iconography in India and the adjoining countries.

The first edition, though a scholarly one and bearing marks of youthful talent, lacked in places the maturity of an experienced writer, which one finds in the present one. The author has spared no pains in making the revision very thorough. There has been a great deal of rearrangement throughout the book, much fresh matter has been incorporated, and old one either rewritten or left out The introduction alone proves the truth of this remark; the major portion of it is new, and contains dissertations on such topics as Vajrayāna mysticism, the psychic process of the Sādhana, godhead in Buddhism, etc.

One, however, may not accept all the suggestions offered by the author in them. Thus he accepts without criticism the opinion of much later writers like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla that 'though the Buddha was antagonistic to all sorts of sacrifices, sorcery, necromancy, and magic,... he gave instructions on Mudrās, Maṇḍalas, Yoga, and Tantra'. He further observes that 'a clever organizer as the Buddha was, he did not fail to notice the importance of incorporating magical practices in his religion to make it popular from all points of view' (p. 9). It is difficult to accept this in the light of whatever is known about the Buddha and his teachings from the much earlier and more authoritative sources. Reference may also be made in this connection to his suggestion about one of the homelands of Buddhist Tāntrism.

It is also very difficult to endorse the author's statement that 'the village Vajrayoginī. (in Pargana Vikrampur of the Dacca District) was originally known as Uḍḍiyāna, but as the deity Vajrayoginī became more popular later, the original name gradually disappeared giving place to the name of the deity' (p. 17). It is true that there is a good deal of controversy about the exact location of Uḍḍiyāna, which is traditionally associated with the rise of Tāntrism in the creed. But one of the previous suggestions that it has to be located in a tract situated in the extreme northwest of India, to the north of ancient Gandhāra, known from a fairly early period as Udyāna, is far more acceptable. There is not only the similarity in names, but there is also the explicit statement of Hiuen Tsang about the magical nature of the particular kind of Buddhism practised by the people of the locality. But still it must be said that, though one may differ from the author in these and several other matters, one does not fail to notice the earnestness and sincerity with which he has sponsored his views.

It will not be possible to highlight the various merits of the present edition in the short space of this review. A comparison of the contents of the principal chapters of this edition with those of the chapters of the previous one shows how great an improvement has been made. The text of the

Niṣpannayogāvalī and the Peiping images studied in Clarke's work have been fully utilized in presenting the iconographic matter, in addition to the various authoritative texts from the *Sādhanamālā* and the selective illustrations of sculptures and paintings mostly belonging to eastern India. The richness of the descriptive material incorporated in the work has made the task of identifying the Vajrayāna images a great deal easier.

The printing as well as the get-up of the book is generally good, though typographical errors are not absent. It is profusely illustrated, but as art paper is not used, most of the illustrations are indifferent. The price of the book from this consideration alone may be regarded as a little too high. But considering the nature of the work and the excessive cost of printing and publication in these days, the high price may be condoned. The book contains a very useful glossary, an index of words, as well as an index of illustrations.

DR. JITENDRA NATH BANERJEA

IDEALISM: A NEW DEFENCE AND A NEW APPLICATION. By G. C. Dev. *Published by the University of Dacca, Dacca, East Pakistan. 1958. Pp. 196. Price Rs. 5.*

Idealism always had attractions, and will continue to have. It is so very fascinating to live in hope. It is definitely a healthy attitude of mind, and would be fundamentally helpful for a truly social existence in the context of a world that seems to be unwilling to make it thrive. Therefore idealism is a will to believe in the best and the good. That we can recommend idealism to the human mind is but natural, since the human mind is always prone to live in the practical and contemplate on the evanescent with a fear that is altogether practical. So all idealism has been believed in by everyone, including the philosophical realist and pessimist.

The idealism of the philosophers, however, is of a different kind. It is not that of the ordinary common-sense man. It claims, above all, that it can present a consistent philosophy of the world or reality. It tries to show that idealism can be reconciled with science, and that the truest reality can be attained by means of the reason inherent in man.

Dr. Dev, who had presented a good volume on idealism and progress, in this volume tries to answer the various critics of idealism. In the process, he had to modify his idealism itself, in the metaphysical dualism between sense and reason, and grant a place to intuition. Rightly does the author observe, 'To be a sound, cogent, and comprehensive view of reality, idealism must traverse the whole path from sense to supralogical intuition through the intermediary of reason' (p. 58). Here precisely is the rub. A reason trained to feed on sense and sensate deliverances, and which has almost come to feel that it is its legitimate food, is less likely to accept an alternative diet, even if the latter diet is wholesome. It has been tried in ancient India, when *anumāna* was asked to do double duty: to construct a reality out of the stuff of sense (called *iha-jñāna*) and a reality out of the stuff of intuition (called *para-jñāna*), and the result was a twofold reality which was somehow held to be in some sort of relation; however, later on, the one was made to be a phenomenal representation of the other. Theories of illusion naturally followed. Synthesis is a watchword of philosophy, but what are to be the conditions of synthesis? Neither sense nor intellect can grant us the reality that can satisfy us in our higher moments of being To be able to arrive at the logic of the infinite is the first condition of a real idealism that can do justice and bring satisfaction to the spiritual self of man.

Dr. Dev reveals a close study of the Western works on idealism and realism, and has shrewdly criticized their limitations. Dr. Dev's special pleading on behalf of the theories of error or illusion of the Advaita or Māyāvāda Vedānta misses the fundamental truth that there can be no illusion in reality as such, but only in the interpretations that men make of them. To say that illusions are creative imaginations that make no difference to reality poses several problems as to whose creative imaginations they indeed are. To these, no answer is furnished by combining two mistakes or errors in order to produce a right solution (pp. 90 ff.). The limitations of the different *pramāṇas* must be first recognized, and error or truth must be judged within the field of one *pramāṇa* alone. This will entail different tests of truth within each domain. The cross-criticism of *pramāṇas* may be helpful only when there is clash of interests of the two fields of being or knowing. Coherence theories are true within autonomous fields; and correspondence will work when the fields are heteronomous. The human being is a denizen of many worlds or levels of being. The complexity of truth or error lies precisely in the complexity of the human personality. This will not yield more than a relativistic vision of reality. Idealism hopes to arrive at a stage of awareness when a synoptic vision will be available to the seeker after reality as a whole. This is *darśana, samyag-darśana.* At that state, it is likely that all the other *pramāṇas* would wither away.

In the last section of the book, idealism is revealed as an operating practical principle. Undoubtedly, the modern tendency is to make idealism a practical gospel of work and reveal that it grants the philo-

sophic bases for action in community, in service. Dr. Dev writes with sincerity about the goal of man. That he does recognize a heaven is clear, but when even heaven is expected to come to earth as a park and not a factory, it seems to be a hope that has no foundation. Man must exceed the earth-consciousness, if not the earth itself. This is the decree of his death and his deathlessness. This mortal heaven is not, at least, the final heaven of man.

DR. K. C. VARADACHARI

WISDOM BEYOND REASON. By S. R SHARMA. *Published by Lakshmi Narayan Agarwal, Educational Publishers, Hospital Road, Agra. Pp. 142. Price Rs. 2.50.*

Introduced by Dilip Kumar Roy in a fascinating way, this autobiography reveals that even historians are human, in so far as they give up the scientific objectivity and note events with the self. The author, being a fine and sensitive spirit, in this work of inward searching, has presented how the ultimate truth of oneself comes from a deep and earnest study and meditation on the greatest literature of the spiritual world— the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavad-Gītā.* There is a wisdom beyond the knowledge that the sciences can give. Sciences give the neutral or ambivalent good and evil, leaving it to wisdom to use it fairly and wisely. Such a use is not to be learnt from academic philosophers or pundits, but by those who have entered the inner life. This surely is open only to those who, through devotion to the transcendent Reality, 'know, perceive, and enter into' the divine Self, who is verily the Self of all. Professor Sharma writes in a simple and direct manner about his own home-coming. It is a book that can inspire others to see that there is truer reality beyond reason than in reason and the external world. It is that vision that makes reality worthwhile rather than illusion. But it is only those who have known and perceived and entered into that Reality that can say with truth that all that is bereft of It, or that which is seen without this Self, is verily illusion.

DR. K. C. VARADACHARI

MAHATMA BUDDHA, AN ARYA REFORMER: WAS HE AN ATHEIST? By PT. DHARMA DEVA. *Published by the author, Ananda Kutir, Jwalapur, U.P. 1957. Pages 132. Rs. 1.50.*

This book needs to be widely read, inasmuch as the learned author has taken great pains to collect a vast array of evidence from various sources in order to refute the common misconception that Buddha preached atheism and nihilism and that his conception of *nirvāṇa* was nothing but a denial of God and the Ātman. Whatever may be said about the later forms Buddhism, it cannot be asserted with any degree of force that Buddha ever denied the existence of the Ātman or God, although it is a fact that he did not specifically speak of the Ātman or God, perhaps on the sound principle that all our talks about them can only be in the nature of speculations. If one's mind becomes calm ('void' as Buddha says), one has attained what one wanted. And if one follows the Vedāntic conception of Brahman intelligently, one would find that the ultimate significance of the Ātman and Brahman is just this 'void'. This 'void' is not a mere negative idea, but something very positive. It is from the 'void' that everything comes. Whatever emanates from it is phenomenon. The Vedāntin says that all phenomena are unreal. If we subtract all phenomena either from the Ātman or from the Brahman, nothing remains but the 'void'. And the 'void' is silence, the silence of the Ātman as the Vedāntin would call it. And so Buddha rightly did not care to talk about it. But he did talk to show the way to the 'void'. This procedure is quite logical; and this is what the learned author of this book has tried to prove by convincing arguments and evidence.

Buddha was a great reformer, and fearlessly exposed the tactics of a degenerated and corrupt priestcraft which was responsible for maintaining all sorts of social injustices and evil customs practised in the name of religion. But, even here, Buddha rightly took the middle course (*madhyamārga*), avoiding all the extremes, so that there might be no complete breaking with the past and that a healthy change might be brought about consistent with the living tradition.

The writer has done a great service by successfully attempting to heal a breach in our cultural history and claiming Buddha as a great Arya and a product of our ancient Vedic thought; and for this, he deserves to be congratulated

D. D. PUNETHA

EXISTENTIALISM AND EDUCATION. By GEORGE F. KNELLER. *Published by Philosophical Library, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16. 1958. Pages 170. Price $3.75.*

Of late, collectivism has gained currency in politics, economy, religion, and education. The individual is no longer viewed as he should be. Our schools and colleges are growing in strength. When more students are admitted to each class, it becomes impossible to pay attention individually. The result is that we educate the students as though by tape-recording of lectures or with the aid of microphone, audio-visual aids, and the like. Our political and economic insti-

tutions have brought us to this abject neglect of the individual. Dr. Kneller is concerned with this serious problem, and the remedy he prescribes is one of promoting and developing a healthy individualism. As he observes, history is made by individuals, not by groups. This is, of course, an over-simplification. There can be, and have been, groups of individualists. But Dr. Kneller's interests in existentialism make him attach no value to the group.

Dr. Kneller wants the educationist to concentrate on the individual as a unique personality. This is outlined in the fifth chapter of the book, which has given the title to the whole work. The emphasis on the authentic personality, on the dignity of the individual, is derived from the existentialist thought of Heidegger, Marcel, and Sartre; for it is the existentialist who, in recent years, has argued that man must be personally concerned with his moral development. This rejection of the sovereignty of the social matrix is a healthy symptom, but it has to be regulated properly if we do not intend developing eccentrics. Yet Dr. Kneller observes that nothing should be excluded from the mind of a person, provided he is capable of understanding it.

Dr. Kneller's work is timely, in spite of its moorings in the solipsistic existentialism. It brings forward the main problem of education; and the freshness of the problem does not make us forget that the ancient *gurukulas* in India did have an individualist bias, though the ancients were no existentialists.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

THE NATURE OF THINGS. BY DON HAWLEY. *Published by Philosophical Library, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16. 1959. Pages 186. Price $ 3.75.*

The advances in pure and applied sciences have been responsible for a growing faith in materialism and for a rejection of the spiritual and humanistic values. The time has come for a critical appraisal of the scientific thought in evaluating the spiritual continuum of man. Don Hawley's endeavour in this direction is timely and valuable, in spite of its preoccupation with a vindication of Christianity.

The sciences hold that anything experienced with the aid of the senses is real And yet the electrons and protons, which are said to be the basic stuff of the entire universe, are unsensed. This suprasensuous basis of the universe is accepted on faith, though a similar suprasensuous reality accepted by the religions is rejected as being irrational. This contradiction backed by inconsistency is evident even in the theory of evolution. The coelacanth was supposed to be extinct for some sixty million years. It has appeared in our modern world; and no two specimens captured off Africa are identical in form. Even the concept of the missing link is a hypothesis which has hypnotized the scientists to take it as a fact, though it is not proved.

Don Hawley's refutation of time dilation in the Relativity Theory, his explanation of receding galaxies, and his logical refutation of materialism are stimulating. He pleads for man's reliance on his noumenally oriented senses and faculties; and in this plea, he is much encouraged by the investigations of Dr. Rhine and others. The book is worth careful study, and it sets one thinking.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

JUSTICE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC. BY PETER FIREMAN. *Published by Philosophical Library, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16. Pages 52. Price $ 2.00.*

In this essay, the author tries to evaluate the status of Plato's views on justice in the history of human thought and culture, treating the subject without metaphysics, philosophy, or religion, but with mere sound common sense, basing on the *Republic* which he quotes extensively.

The concept of justice in Plato corresponds to the concept of *dharma* in Hindu thought. Justice is the bond of society and the basis of all other virtues. It is not merely the interest of the strong, for that would lead to the confounding of justice with injustice. On the other hand, if the essence of justice lies in each person contributing to the common stock the best in himself, the thing to which his nature is best adapted, it follows that the Platonic idea of justice is the essential part of culture and that it is in sharp contrast with the idea of class conflict. If our aim is a socialistic society, which will assure peace with progress and eliminate all conflict with one's neighbours, it would be more profitable to look for light in Plato's idea of the good life, even though the pattern of life has changed from the isolated city-states of ancient days into the modern world community.

Is it not true now, as ever before, that justice is doing one's own business in a certain way, and not in being a busy body; and may we not say with Plato that justice is at once the virtue of an individual as well as of the state? If we agree with Greene that war is due to the non-fulfilment of the moral foundations of the states, we would see how the concept of justice assumes special importance. Let us then vary a formula by Manu and say, 'Justice protects those who protect it'.

PROF. V. A. THIAGARAJAN

MAN AND HIS TRAGIC LIFE. By Laszlo Vatai. Translated from the original Hungarian by Laszlo Kecskemethy. *Published by Philosophical Library, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16. Pages 210. Price $3.75.*

This is a philosophical treatise on Christian existentialism as propounded by Dostoevsky through the characters of his novels, particularly *The Brothers Karamazov*. Dostoevsky's central problem is man himself. He tries to understand life by examining man in his minutest detail, in his relationship to God and Nature. On the one hand, man tries to assert his own autonomy against the limitations imposed by the Transcendent; and on the other, he tries to compromise with it through faith. But both are tragic, because they offer no solution to the suffering of man Another attempt to overcome this dilemma is through the narcosis of passion or idea. But whenever the veil of narcosis is lifted, the tragic shows itself all the more vividly, landing man in utter dismay. Free will and freedom are mere dreams. The author substitutes Descartes' dictum, 'I think, therefore I am' by 'I suffer, therefore I am'. The only way out is through transcendental revelation, which brings repentence and silent acceptance of the tragic.

The communal life of man is the result of culture, which the author defines as 'the cultivation of nature according to the symbols of the Transcendent' (p. 204) When culture becomes bankrupt and disintegrated, the result is civilization. Reason, science, and communism are the products of civilization. which is the cause of anarchy. Christianity was the 'culture creating factor' of Western civilization. But the Church pushed religion to the background by giving a materialistic interpretation of Christian religion. As if to illustrate this point, Dostoevsky makes the Grand Inquisitor say to Christ, 'You gave everything to the pope, they say, consequently now everything depends on the pope, and now there is no need for you' (p. 185).

Any effort to accelerate the gradual turning back of modern man to spiritual values of life is to be welcomed. This work must be lauded from that standpoint But we feel that a little knowledge of Indian philosophy and psychology would not have allowed the author to erroneously equate insanity and epilepsy with saintliness. His assumption that St. Paul's superconscious states are the result of epilepsy is quite strange to us. *Samādhi* or superconscious ecstasy and epilepsy are far-removed from each other, and the results produced by them are vastly different. We cannot also appreciate the tendency to harp too much on suffering, what the author calls the unavoidable tragic. Man is what he makes of himself. Pursuit of the pleasures of the world produces suffering, and the pursuit of the divine within brings peace and bliss.

The book is written with clarity of thought and purpose, and repays a careful study by all those who are concerned with the problems of human life.

S. C.

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION ASHRAMA PATNA

Report for 1958

The Ramakrishna Ashrama was founded at Patna in 1922, and it was recognized as a branch centre of the Ramakrishna Mission in 1926. The normal activities of the Ashrama during the year were as follows:

Religious Activities: Besides the daily evening classes in the temple prayer hall, weekly scriptural classes on the *Gītā*, the *Bhāgavata*, etc. were conducted in and outside the Ashrama premises. The birthday anniversaries of Sri Ramakrishna, the Holy Mother Sri Sarada Devi, and Swami Vivekananda, and Durga Puja, Kali Puja, Saraswati Puja, Sivaratri, and other festivals were celebrated in a befitting manner.

Educational and Cultural Activities: (a) *The Adbhutananda Upper Primary School*: This school was started more than two decades ago in memory of Swami Adbhutananda, a direct disciple of Sri Ramakrishna, who was born in the Chapra (Saran) District of this State. In the year under review, there were 169 boys on the roll.

(b) *The Students' Home*: This section was started in 1957. There were 14 students at the end of the year. They were given free board, lodging, textbooks, and some other amenities. The permanent building for the Home is nearing completion.

(c) *The Turiyananda Lecture Hall, Library, and Reading Room*: The spacious lecture hall serves as a forum for popular lectures and discourses. Distinguished scholars were invited during the year to give lectures on diverse topics.

Total number of books in the library: 5,125. Books added during the year: 1,299. Number of dailies and periodicals in the reading room: 6 and 56. Total number of readers: 11,876. Number of books issued: 5,762.

Medical Activities: (a) *Bhuvaneshwar Charitable Homoeopathic Dispensary*: Total number of patients treated: 70,362; new cases: 8,438.

(b) *Allopathic Department*: Total number of patients treated: 49,491; new cases: 7,249.

Urgent Needs of the Ashrama:

(a) For the acquisition of land and construction of the building for the Charitable Dispensary	..	Rs. 1 lakh
(b) Endowment for Reserve Fund	..	Rs. 1 lakh

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION ASHRAMA KANPUR

REPORT FOR 1957 AND 1958

Started in 1920, this centre has now developed into one of the premier philanthropic institutions of the city. The activities of the centre fall under three heads: Religious and Cultural, Educational, and Medical.

Religious and Cultural: Daily worship at the Ashrama shrine, weekly classes on Sunday evenings in the Ashrama premises and on suitable week days outside, and observance of the birthdays of Sri Ramakrishna, Sri Sarada Devi, Swami Vivekananda, Buddha, Sri Rama, Sri Krishna, Sri Sankara, and Jesus Christ.

Educational Activities. The Higher Secondary School: Apart from imparting a thorough general education, this institution looks after the physical, moral, social, and religious development of the students. Extra-curricular activities and social functions are occasionally organized to make the school life of the boys wholesome and complete. In December 1958, there were 515 boys on the roll.

The library attached to the school contains 5,149 books. A small children's section was added to it in 1957 with a grant of Rs. 3,000 from the Central Social Welfare Board The total number of books issued during 1957 and 1958 were 2,829 and 3,331 respectively. The reading room receives 20 magazines and newspapers. The average daily attendance was 105.

The Student's Diary System, the Teachers' Study Circle, and the Old Boys' Association are some of the other features of the institution.

Due to lack of suitable playgrounds and the crowded and noisy nature of the locality in which the school is presently situated, it is being felt that the school should be shifted to a place with more congenial surroundings. The scheme is estimated to cost Rs. 5,00,000, and the management appeals to the public for the necessary financial help.

Medical Activities: *The Charitable Hospital*: Started in 1939, it has now two departments—general and eye. To cope with the increasing work, some additions were made to the hospital building at a cost of Rs. 21,000. In 1958, the Health Ministry of the Government of India granted a sum of Rs. 15,000 for equipments. The total number of patients treated in the hospital: 1957: 1,11,736; 1958: 97,405

Physical Culture Institute: The Vivekananda Vyayamasalas, one in the city for Harijans and the other in the Mission premises, organized two public feats and two *dangals*. More than 50 persons attended the Vyayamasala in the Mission premises daily. The Harijan Akhara organized an inter-caste *melā* and distributed 37 sets of uniforms to poor Harijan students.

Milk Distribution: During the year 1958, 36,000 lb. of milk, supplied by the U.P. Branch of the Indian Red Cross Society, were distributed among poor patients and under-nourished children. The average number of daily recipients was three hundred.

Immediate Needs of the Centre:

1. Building for the Library and Reading Room	.. ..	Rs.	25,000
2. Equipments to the Hospital	..	Rs.	10,000
3. For the Reserve Fund of the Hospital	.. ..	Rs.	10,000