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उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

SPIRITUAL TALKS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

February 18, 1930

In the course of a talk about a few men of genius in Europe, Mahapurushji said: "Their writings will create a stir in the West; for howsoever they may talk, they will have an inner appreciation (of things Indian) in future, and even now they are having it. Ours being a subject nation, they do not easily acknowledge her contribution. In religion, they are very conservative; and so they cannot easily express themselves frankly. But I tell you, "You can know from the smell in one's mouth what food one has been taking". It is the same in the case of intellectual food as well. Whatever may be the mental make-up of a man, it will express itself through his writings. It is something like what you call "knowledge through presumption" (*arthāpatti*) in Indian logic: if somebody is found to have a robust body, though he is not noticed to eat anything, the presumption is that he gets good food.'

Swami Vivekananda used to like the song beginning with the words, 'Now, O Śiva, take my boat to the other shore' etc. In the course of a talk, Mahapurushji gave the history of the

song: 'A man named Devīśahāya, who was born blind and who was devoted to Śiva, started on foot one day for Varanasi to see Viśvanātha. During the journey, he had no other thought in his mind but that of Śiva. When he had travelled half the way, he got his sight restored by the grace of Śiva, Lord of Gaurī, residing in Mount Kailāsa. This amazed and delighted him so much that he began to shed tears of joy profusely. From that day onward, the name of Śiva, songs of Śiva, and devotion to Śiva welled up in his heart spontaneously, and they filled him fully. From that day, he became eager to bring out a book full of the glory of Śiva and containing songs in praise of Him. He brought out an excellent book entitled *Śaivamanorañjanī*.' (The song referred to above is contained in this book.)

February 19, 1930

A monk asked Mahapurush Maharaj as to where Swami Brahmananda stayed before the Belur Math came into existence. He replied: 'I cannot give you dates, but we lived at Baranagore for six years and at Alambazar for five years. Maharaj (Swami Brahmananda) joined

the monastery at Baranagore; at Alambazar, his stay was not long (he having gone out for his spiritual practices). (When Swamiji came back from America) he did not like the latter house, because its rooms were like pigeon-holes. Then we moved to Nilambar Mukherji's house on this side (west) of the Gaṅgā, where we stayed for some days; finally we came to this place (Belur Math).

'Swamiji wrote to me to send them (Swami Turiyananda and Swami Brahmananda) to the monastery. I was then on my way to Tehri, Mussoorie, and other places. I met them at Lucknow in summer. As this meeting came about after a long period, there was no end to our talking. The talks continued till the small hours of the morning. One night, it went on till three o'clock; morning was about to break! When, according to Swamiji's letter, I asked them to proceed to the monastery, they said, "No, not now". Then I said, "How strangely you speak! Swamiji has written, and still you won't go!" Then they said, "But you are going to the hills now; we shall see what can be done when you start back for the monastery". I returned when the rains set in. On reaching Lucknow, I came to learn, on enquiry, that they had left the place. So I went to Ayodhya and bathed in the sacred Sarayū. After further inquiry, I came to know that they were staying in the house of a lawyer in Faizabad. I went there. The lawyer had a good collection of religious books. We had talks again as before and, according to the promise made earlier at Lucknow, they accompanied me. Swami Turiyananda and Swami Subodhananda were with Maharaj during the days of his spiritual practice. Swami Subodhananda knows many things about that period. Maharaj had been to Dwaraka. I do not know the details of that pilgrimage. Before Swamiji's departure for America, he met Maharaj and Swami Turiyananda at Bombay, and not at Abu Road station. At Abu lived a Bengali gentleman who worked in the Traffic Superintendent's office. He loved Swamiji very much.'

February 21, 1930

When asked whether renunciation resulted from practice, Mahapurushji replied: 'No, it is the result of past tendencies; it comes when one is free from all desires. Renunciation comes as a result of experience reinforced by discrimination. Granted you have all this, conscious effort also is necessary, as a matter of course. But the *sine qua non* is God's grace. That is why the Master would pray, "Compassion, compassion. Mother, be gracious. Mother, I know neither practice nor prayer. Be kind, O Mother". Unless She is gracious, no practice or prayer is possible. What does it matter even if one poses to be a *guru* leading his disciples? For nobody is quite free in his activities; everything moves according to Mother's will. She is the mechanic, and all others are Her machines. It is difficult to keep these facts in mind. If one can fully realize these, one will transcend both good and evil. Everything can be had if She is propitious. Through the grace of Mahāmāyā (the great cosmic Energy) can come practice, prayer, renunciation, and everything. She has both the powers of enlightenment and ignorance. All the opportunities come to one when She removes ignorance and helps one with Her power of enlightenment. Ours is simply to go on praying, "Mother, be compassionate!" Nothing will avail unless She is kind.' With this, he folded his hands and sat in meditation, with eyes closed.

After a while, he continued: 'Swami Subodhananda is younger than myself. Among my brother-disciples, I am the oldest. The Mother has granted refuge to me; nay, not only to me, but also to all my brother-disciples, and to many more besides. She will grant it to many more yet. This illusion of the world will have an end; Māyā has an end, though its presence cannot be denied. Life is after all a momentary phenomenon. Existence-Knowledge-Bliss alone is true.

'People are crowding here for initiation from me, because I have grown old (and may depart soon). But has his work stopped even though

the Master, Swamiji, Holy Mother, and Maharaj left one by one? It will all go on.'

February 26, 1930

While discussing about an article in the *Modern Review*, Mahapurushji said: "This much is only a manifestation of His glory; the infinite Being is greater even than this. The whole universe is only a foot (quarter) of His; His three other immortal feet (quarters) continue in their own effulgence" (*Puruṣa-sūkta*). This universe is only one foot. It was well said by Swami Yogananda, "The scriptures, Vedas, Vedāntas, holy men, and saints are all there to be sure; but unless God incarnates, all these remain useless. Does the heart become satisfied unless He comes down out of His unquestioning mercy and explains everything?" He is God, full of all perfection; what need can He have? He is infinite perfection itself. "O Arjuna, I have no duty to perform in any of the three worlds" (*Gītā*, III.22). There can be no other way out unless He is merciful. There are any number of sects; but unless He is gracious, no man of true renunciation emerges from them.'

On the question of taking orders, he said: 'These are all outward forms. The main thing is for the mind to merge itself at the feet of the Master, at the lotus feet of God, and to remain absorbed there. Nobody pays any attention that side; they think it is quite enough to wear an ochre robe after touching the Master's feet. The real consummation lies in having firm devotion and knowledge.'

'Leave it all alone. Today is Śivarātri. Om, salutation to Śiva, salutation to Śiva, salutation to Śiva! "The sacrificial laddle is Brahman; the oblation also is Brahman, which is poured into the fire of Brahman by the sacrificer, who is Brahman. By this performance of the rite which is Brahman, he reaches Brahman Itself" (*Gītā*, IV.24).'

When the worship of Śiva had ended at the close of the night, he said: 'Everything is full of Śiva, salutation to Śiva who is Existence-Knowledge-Bliss. Everything is permeated by

Śiva! All are hungry. Give them the consecrated food. "He (Bṛgu) realized food to be Brahman; for it is from food that all these beings emerge; when born, they live on it; and (at the end) they proceed towards food and enter into it" (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, III.2). So you can understand why the Vedas enjoin, "One should multiply food. That is the vow for one who knows food to be Brahman" (*ibid.*, III.9).'

February 28, 1930

'If you believe in me,' said Mahapurushji, then light up this fire of knowledge that Rama-krishna is, and mentally pour as oblation your minds and hearts to the Master. Nothing will avail unless you practise *japa* and meditation. This is my inmost conviction; now you are free to act as you like. Do not forget the main ideal in the midst of your busy life. The main object of life is to realize God; it will not do to while away your lives in a little comfort by following others like a herd of sheep, following each other blindly. I tell you of my inmost conviction: *japa*, meditation, love for God, and faith in Him are absolutely necessary. And what else can man do, the mind being a cheat and time being inexorable?'

March 2, 1930

In connection with Śivarātri, Mahapurushji said: 'The Master liked to adorn Swamiji with *kuṇḍala* (large ear-rings like the ones worn by Śiva). That is why he had them brought from Dacca once, and put them on Swamiji's ears.'

March 7, 1930

We were talking about Śrī Caitanya Mahā-prabhu. In that connection, Mahapurushji said: 'It was he who discovered (the places of Śrī Kṛṣṇa's disports at) Vṛndāvana and Mathurā. Else, people had hardly any knowledge of them. Jagannātha (Puri), too, came to be better known through him.' Just then B— Maharaj came and saluted him. Mahapurushji asked him, 'Would you tell me what kind of knowledge is that which is devoid

of devotion?" 'Maharaj, that is no knowledge at all', came the reply. 'I have heard that Swamiji once told the Holy Mother, "Mother, I am ruthlessly lopping off all past tendencies with the help of knowledge". The Holy Mother laughed at this and said, "I hope you are not lopping me off as well!" "Is that knowledge", replied Swamiji with folded hands, "which would make one forget one's *guru's* lotus feet?" That made the Mother laugh.' Hearing this, Mahapurushji said again: 'That's it. Without devotion nothing avails, my son; no realization comes. Reasoning and discrimination are valuable to be sure, for they are helpful to a certain extent. But devotion is the main thing; and knowledge is implied in devotion. Is devotion just a common thing? If one has devotion, one has attained everything. Unless one has that, the mind does not become malleable. Mahāprabhu, our Swamiji, and others—all had devotion as their main stay. As for the Upaniṣads, they are full of devotion. Mahāprabhu has told us what devotion is:

"O Lord of the universe, I do not crave for wealth, or friends and relatives, or beautiful poesy;

Let me have in every birth an unquestioning love for you, O God."

"The mind can reach up to the God with form and attributes, or the God with attributes,

but without form. Beyond that, He transcends both speech and thought. The Master used to say, "God is realizable only by the pure mind".'

March 11, 1930

The conversation revolved round Mahatma Gandhi. In the course of the talk, Mahapurushji remarked: 'The Mahatma is doing excellent work. What you should remember, however, is that Mother's grace is the most powerful thing. Nothing avails unless Mother becomes gracious; and when She is gracious, everything becomes helpful.'

March 17, 1930

Mahapurushji said: 'Mere book-learning is of little worth. In Śaṅkarācārya's *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, there is a verse which says: "Loud speech consisting of a shower of words, the skill in expounding scriptures, and likewise erudition—these merely bring on a little personal enjoyment to the scholar, but are no good for liberation" (58).' To a monk who was about to leave for Bhuvaneshwar, he remarked: 'It is an excellent place, where we have a monastery set up by Swami Brahmananda. You will be happy there. It is a good place for spiritual practices. If you wish to roam about, it is a different matter. But if you want to be a true monk, devoted to spiritual life, then by all means go to Bhuvaneshwar.'

THE VOICE OF THE UPANIṢADS

I know this mighty Person (Puruṣa) of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness. Only by knowing Him does one pass over death. There is no other path to reach the goal.

—*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, III.8.

I

The Upaniṣads form the pinnacle of the religio-philosophic thought of India. They have occupied this exalted position for centuries, informing and inspiring the spiritual life of the Indian people. Their soul-elevating message

has uplifted and transformed hundreds of spiritually awakened souls, and transported them to a realm of supreme bliss and beatitude, beyond all human understanding. The Upaniṣads are the outpourings of realized souls who had a vision of Truth face to face. The voice

of the Upaniṣads, uttered by the sages of India hundreds of years ago, has come down to us in full force and potency. The teachings of the Upaniṣads are there for anyone to take up and live up to them. For Indians, the Upaniṣads have always provided 'the solace of life and the solace of death'. They urge men and women to scale the heights of spiritual Truth, to know the true nature of Reality, and to give up the vanity of this world. The Upaniṣads are the very essence of the Vedas, and contain the loftiest truths pertaining to man, nature, and Reality. They not only state spiritual facts about the universe and the Reality behind it, but also provide the philosophic basis as well as the religious urge to understand and realize those truths.

The Upaniṣads are called *Brahmavidyā* or the science of Reality. They deal not only with the science of the Reality behind man and nature, but also with the art of attaining that Reality, which is the spiritual basis of all beings. The chief aim of the Upaniṣads is to lead man from the darkness of the material world to the light of the spiritual world. Lured by the apparent glamour of this world, man is running after it like one pursuing the *ignis fatuus*, which ever eludes his grasp. In this pursuit, he has forgotten the divine treasure lying hidden in his own self. The Upaniṣads point this out to man and exhort him to dive deep within and discover the spiritual gems that shine in his own being.

II

Man is neither the body, nor the mind, nor the intellect, nor even the conglomeration of all these, but he is the Spirit unconditioned by any of these. The Spirit is not only immanent in the universe, but also transcends it. It is the Spirit that infuses life into matter. It is because of its presence that all beings become active and animated, and perform their respective functions. 'He shining, all these shine; through His lustre, all these are variously illumined' (*Muṇḍaka*, II.2.11). There is neither life nor light in the absence of the Spirit. The

Spirit is self-luminous, self-creative, all-pervading, and ever-present. There was no time when it was not, and there will be no time when it will cease to be. Neither is it non-existent at the present moment. 'He is the ruler of the past and the future. He exists today, and He will exist tomorrow' (*Kaṭha*, II.1.13).

The Spirit is one and infinite; it is without a second. There is no place where it is not. Yet it is beyond all space. 'It is unmoving, one, and faster than the mind. Remaining stationery, it outruns all other runners' (*Īśā*, 4). 'While sitting, it travels far away; while sleeping, it goes everywhere' (*Kaṭha*, I.2.21). 'As the moving (sun) He dwells in heaven; as air He pervades all and dwells in inter-space; as fire He resides on the earth; He lives among men; He lives among gods; He dwells in space' (*ibid.*, II.2.2). The Spirit is ever present behind all the thought and activity of man, whether in the waking state or in the dream state. It is the abiding witness even during the dreamless deep sleep. 'Through its help, man perceives the objects in both the sleep and the waking states' (*ibid.*, II.1.4). The Spirit is uncaused; yet it is the ground of all this world-show, which is conjured up in the cosmic Mind.

Mistaking the appearance of this world-show to be real and enduring, and running after it to enjoy the little pleasures derived from the senses, man has lost track of the main purpose of life, and is wallowing in the quagmire of this worldly existence. The Upaniṣads warn him in kind and compassionate words, with loving care and solicitude like that of his earthly mother, about the incalculable loss he has to suffer, if he does not turn his attention towards the realization of the Ātman or Brahman in this very life. 'If one has realized here, then there is truth; if one has not realized here, then there is great destruction. The wise ones, having realized (Brahman) in all beings, and having turned away from this world, become immortal' (*Kena*, II.5). The Upaniṣads call on man to shake off the cloak of ignorance under which he is labouring, to stand before the

self-effulgent Reality in all purity and perfection, and to attain peace eternal and life immortal.

III

Ācārya Śaṅkara, who re-established the pure religion of the Upaniṣads in this country, and who revived and systematically formulated the philosophy of the Vedānta, defines the word 'upaniṣad', in the introduction to his commentary on the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, thus: 'By the word "upaniṣad" is denoted the knowledge of the knowable reality. . . . This knowledge splits up, injures, or destroys the seeds of worldly existence, such as ignorance etc., in the case of those seekers of emancipation who, after becoming detached from the desire for the seen and unseen objects, approach (*upa sad*) the knowledge that is called *upaniṣad*. Or the knowledge of Brahman is called *upaniṣad* because of its conformity to the idea of leading to Brahman.' Again, in the introduction to his commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara says: '*Upaniṣad* leads to the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman. Knowledge (of Brahman) is referred to by the word "upaniṣad", for, in the case of those who are devoted to it, it either loosens or ends such things as being born in a womb and old age, or because it takes one near Brahman, or because the highest good is proximately embedded in it.'

Thus all the principal Upaniṣads, which contain this sacred and secret knowledge, have three objects in view. (1) They describe the nature of the universal Being or Brahman, which is also the indwelling Self of every being. (2) They speak of the special qualities, moral and spiritual, with which the seeker has to equip himself in order to fully realize the meaning of their words and get a direct, immediate, and intuitive knowledge of Brahman. (3) They describe the blissful state of *Brahmajñāna* and the experience of one who attains it. Spiritual emancipation confers freedom from the trammels of worldly existence, *saṁsāra*.

The Upaniṣads are not concerned with teach-

ing any secular knowledge, which can be had by studying the several branches of arts and science. *Brahmavidyā* is the subject-matter of the Upaniṣads. In fact, the Upaniṣads themselves declare that all kinds of knowledge, including the Vedas, fall within the domain of lower knowledge, *aparāvidyā*. The higher knowledge, *parāvidyā*, is that by which is realized the imperishable Brahman (*Muṇḍaka*, I.1.5). That knowledge only is spiritual knowledge which gives us the knowledge of the ultimate Reality behind the universe. As a matter of fact, it is recognized on all hands that, in matters suprasensual, the authority of the Upaniṣads is final and unquestionable. This position of the Upaniṣads has been accepted by all the schools of Vedānta, though the interpretations put on their texts vary from commentator to commentator. It is not unoften that one commentator reads into a text a meaning diametrically opposite to that given by another. All the same, all the commentators are unanimous in upholding the authority of these sacred texts, though holding fast to their own respective interpretations. Particularly with regard to the questions relating to the soul's survival after death, future life, transmigration, reincarnation, the final goal of life, the nature of the world and the Self, the nature of Reality or Brahman, and other similar transempirical matters, the authority of the Upaniṣads is held as valid and final, and is looked upon as the voice of God. The divergences in interpretations, however, have led to the establishment of the diverse schools of Vedānta, each of which commands a huge following in this vast country of ours.

The Upaniṣads occupy a unique position in the philosophic thought of India. As the chief constituent of the *prasthānatraya*, the three basic texts of the Vedānta schools, the Upaniṣads proclaim the fundamental truths regarding the Reality underlying the universe. The *Brahma-Sūtra*, the second constituent of the *prasthānatraya*, is the exposition of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, while the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the third constituent, unfolds methods

for the practice in actual life of the truths enunciated in the Upaniṣads. Whereas the 'Gītā is the milk' flowing out of the 'Upaniṣad cows', the *Brahma-Sūtra* is a systematization of the various philosophical strands of the Upaniṣads by a master mind. The *Gītā* actually contains several *ślokas* bodily taken from the Upaniṣads, and the main Upaniṣadic teachings run right through the eighteen chapters of this divine song.

IV

The Upaniṣads aim at unity. They teach that there is only unity behind all this apparent multiplicity. When this unity is discovered, perfection in the spiritual science is reached. Truth is One. It appears as many. The external nature, with all its variety, as well as the individual man, with his body, mind, and intellect, are its expressions. Both the macrocosm and the microcosm are its manifestations. In essence, there is no difference between them. Brahman, which is omnipresent and all-comprehensive, and which is the basic spiritual reality behind every object in nature, is identical with Ātman, the Self, the indwelling Being in man. It can be approached by two ways, either by externalizing or by internalizing our search.

Indian seers and mystics have always preferred to seek it through the internal search. If man knows himself in essence, he can know the universe, for, in reality, the latter is not different from him. Both man and the world are the effects of one and the same cause, or, to put it in the Vedāntic language, they are both appearances of the same Reality. By knowing the one, the other also can be known. 'By knowing one lump of clay, all that is made of clay is known; for the modification is an effort of speech, a name, and the only reality in it is clay' (*Chāndogya*, VI.1.4). Brahman or God is spoken of as the origin, ground, and goal of the universe. 'From whom indeed these things are born, through whom they live, and unto whom they return and merge in. That is Brahman' (*Taittirīya*, III.1). The

question is asked: 'What is that by knowing which everything in this universe is known' (*Muṇḍaka*, I.1.3); and the answer provided is: 'By the realization of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection, and meditation, all this is known' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II.4.5).

Brahman, the Being, is the spiritual basis of the becoming, the world. Brahman is the Noumenon. It is the substratum on which the phenomenon appears. Brahman is the very life and essence of all phenomena. Man, ignorant as he is of his divine essence, is caught up in the phenomenal flow of life, and so he is unable to touch the rock bottom of Reality. The purpose of the Upaniṣads is to teach him about the true nature of things and urge him to focus his attention on the realization of the Self, Ātman, which is Brahman. This the Upaniṣads do through interesting stories and anecdotes, and in a language which is not only simple and charming, but also soul-stirring and soul-uplifting. The Upaniṣadic seers are men of God-realization. Their words come out from profound conviction and bear the stamp of authority that can be had only from a direct vision of God or Truth.

Man must realize the Self. That is the aim of the Upaniṣads. That is the goal of all spiritual practice and the end of all religious pursuit. Of all beings, man is most competent to receive the knowledge of Truth and to realize it. He has in him that requisite instrument to apprehend as well as to comprehend the truth of things. No other being, save man, has a claim to this prerogative. So it is that the Upaniṣads exhort man, again and again, to make full use of this rare privilege afforded to him to understand Truth and thereby attain eternal freedom, peace, and blessedness.

V

The Upaniṣads contain several cryptic statements which may be adopted for purposes of meditation. These statements impress upon the mind of the seeker the abiding nature of Brahman as well as the fundamental spiritual oneness of all existence. The most sacred

among these *mantras*, known as *mahāvākyas*, state great spiritual truths in very simple words. Some of the well-known *mahāvākyas* are: *Aham Brahmasmi*—I am Brahman (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, I.4.10); *Tattvamasi*—Thou art That (*Chāndogya*, VI.8.7); and *Ayamātmā Brahma*—This Self is Brahman (*Māṇḍūkya*, 2).

Man must pierce through the veil of names and forms, which is the world, and arrive at the core, which is Brahman. For doing this, he must needs undertake strenuous spiritual *sādhanā*. By continuous discrimination and practice, the notion that the world is real, to which man clings in ignorance, will gradually wear out, yielding place to a truer understanding of the essential nature of the world. The Upaniṣads prescribe several methods or *upāsānās* which are all aimed towards this end.

Man is groping in darkness. The senses drag him out, and he is lost in the joys and sorrows of the world. Like a piece of wood that is helplessly tossed about in a swirling stream, now moving with even flow unobstructed, now sucked in by a whirlpool and going down to the bottom, and the next moment being thrown up to the surface for a brief spell of smooth journey, man is buffeted by this world and its myriads of attractions and repulsions. From this stream, man must strive to come out and stand on the firm bank of Reality to see objectively the flow of the stream called life. The Upaniṣads provide the raft to cross the turbulent stream of this life and reach the calm shore of eternal life, which is untouched by the troubles and tribulations of earthly existence. The voice of the Upaniṣads is directed towards one and all. They are ever eager to help anyone that comes to them seeking their cooling waters to quench the fire of *samsāra*. The Upaniṣads receive one and all with outstretched hands and transport them to the realm of immortality. They lift man out of the darkness of ignorance and show him the light of Truth, which enlightens every being.

The goal of spiritual struggle, according to the Upaniṣads, is the cessation of *samsāra*. To one who realizes Truth, there is no more return

to this world (*Kaṭha*, I.3.8). Such a one becomes free from the round of birth and death, and attains that which is 'birthless, eternal, undecaying, and ancient' (*ibid.*, I.2.18). The finite ego of man must blow out and shine in the light of Brahman. Man's true being is in the being of Brahman, which is his real home and in which he must finally rest. In this world, he is like a wayfarer who has lost his track. The Upaniṣads lend him a helping hand and guide him on the right path to Self-knowledge.

When Truth is perceived, all doubts vanish. Temptations cease. Man then no longer runs after the luring but elusive objects of the world. He recognizes their trivial nature and recoils from them. Regarding the knower of Truth, it has been said: 'When that Self, which is both high and low, is realized, the knot of the heart gets untied, all doubts become solved, and all one's actions become dissipated' (*Muṇḍaka*, II.2.8).

VI

Man should become physically free, mentally free, and spiritually free. The Upaniṣads show him the way to freedom. The spiritual evolution of man must be gradual. Man must needs fulfil his physical needs to begin with. Then he should outgrow them by the cultivation of mental powers and moral virtues. By further sublimation, he should develop spiritual aptitude and aspiration. It is only in that heart which is spiritually pure and refined that the light of Truth shines. The method of sublimation is the true spiritual path, which is most efficacious. The Upaniṣads point to this method as the most fruitful of all avenues to reach the spiritual goal. Man should be physically fit, mentally alert, and spiritually earnest to undertake the life of the Spirit.

There are several passages in the Upaniṣads praying for health and happiness, as well as for the development of the body, mind, and intellect. These are necessary for a purposeful life. The body, mind, and intellect should be strengthened and trained to work for a great

purpose—the greatest purpose of life, namely, Self-realization. Man should grow harmoniously and develop a well integrated personality. Addressing such a competent aspirant, the Upaniṣads say: ‘Taking hold of the bow, that is the great weapon familiar in the Upaniṣads, one should fix on it an arrow, sharpened with meditation. Drawing the string with a mind absorbed in Its thought, hit, O good-looking one, that very target that is the Immutable’ (*Muṇḍaka*, II.2.3).

Faith, fearlessness, and freedom are the

watchwords of the Upaniṣads. In the words of Swami Vivekananda, who revived the message of the Upaniṣads in recent times: ‘They (the Upaniṣads) will call with trumpet voice upon the weak, the miserable, and the downtrodden of all races, all creeds, and all sects, to stand on their feet and be free. Freedom, physical freedom, mental freedom, and spiritual freedom are the watchwords of the Upaniṣads.’ Man must get out of this stifling life of matter and breathe the sweet, fresh air of the Spirit. That is the chief aim of the Upaniṣads.

ĪSVARA AND HIS MĀYĀ—1

FROM THE NON-DUALISTIC VIEWPOINT

BY SWAMI SATPRAKASHANANDA

1. *The jīva, jagat, and Īśvara constitute the triple relative order*

The individual experiencer (*jīva*),¹ the world of experience (*jagat*), and their supreme Ruler (Īśvara) are the three main categories of the relative existence. These are acknowledged by most religious and philosophical systems. The central fact, however, is the individual, the embodied soul. It is from his position that all enquiries begin. He is the investigator. He judges reality and unreality. He never doubts his own existence, which is self-evident. Every other existence has, as a matter of course, a reference, direct or indirect, to the individual. In the Vedāntic view of the relative order, the individual is in no case out of the picture. It

is his experience of the universe that ascertains its reality. The existence of the individual (*jīva*) and the universe (*jagat*) presupposes the existence of the supreme Lord (Īśvara), because neither of them is self-existent or self-sufficient. Their origination and sustenance must be due to an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent Being. Indeed, the existence of Īśvara is the necessary condition for the existence of the *jīva* and *jagat*. There cannot be the *jīva* and *jagat* without Īśvara.

Again, it is man’s ignorance regarding the true nature of himself and the universe that sets him in quest of the ultimate Reality, and it is his self-realization as the undivided, limitless Consciousness beyond all diversity and relativity, including the duality of the subject and the object, which proves the illusoriness of all that is finite and the absolute reality of Brahman, the One only without a second. Nothing can convey to him the truth about Brahman more directly than Its reference to his own self in such terse expressions as ‘This

¹ The word ‘*jīva*’ literally means a living being. Every living creature, be it a plant, a worm, an insect, a bird, a beast, a man, or a deity, is, according to Hindu view, an embodied soul. The *jīvas* have varying degrees of consciousness. Even the plants are sentient. Of all the *jīvas*, man alone is capable of self-knowledge. The *jīva*, *jagat*, and Īśvara are also termed respectively *bhoktr* (experiencer), *bhogya* (the experienced), and *preritr* (the Mover), who interrelates the two (*vide Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, I.12).

Ātman is Brahman',² 'That thou art',³ 'I am Brahman',⁴ 'Consciousness is Brahman'.⁵ Essentially, man is Brahman; but as an individual being, he is bound to be in the triple existence of the *jīva*, *jagat*, and *Īśvara*. With the *jīva*, there must be *jagat* and *Īśvara*.

One may assume that in non-dualistic Vedānta, *Īśvara* is a projection of the *jīva's* *ajñāna* (anti-knowledge). Such a view, though upheld by some of its later interpreters, is not its true intent. On the contrary, the trend of the Vedāntic texts, if we can see aright, is to maintain that the *jīva's* *ajñāna* (anti-knowledge), the limiting adjunct of the finite self, is a product of the cosmic *māyā* of *Īśvara*. As long as the *jīva* is subject to *ajñāna*, he sees Reality as it appears to him through *māyā*. Meditation on *Īśvara* makes him free from *ajñāna* and removes the veil of *māyā* completely.⁶ The vast difference between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* is recognized throughout the Vedāntic texts.⁷ At the same time, their essential identity with non-dual Brahman is maintained. The cardinal Upaniṣadic dictum (*mahāvākya*) 'That thou art', which is the keynote of Vedānta, is based on this distinction. *Īśvara* is all-free, all-powerful, all-knowing, while the *jīva's* freedom, power, and knowledge are ever limited. The released soul that attains *Brahmaloka* gains all lordly powers, except the powers of creation, etc. which belong to *Īśvara* alone.⁸ While *Īśvara* is one, the *jīvas* are many. *Īśvara* is the controller of the *jīvas* and the dispenser of the fruits of their actions.⁹ He manifests the *jīvas* and *jagat*. He is ever associated with them as their eternal Ruler.¹⁰ The three are coexistent, but not on the same grade,

² *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 2; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II.5.19; IV.4.5.

³ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI.14.3.

⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I.4.10.

⁵ *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, III.1.3.

⁶ *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, I.11.

⁷ *Vide Brahma-Sūtra*, II.1.22: 'But on account of the statement (in the Śrutis) of difference (between the individual soul and Brahman as Creator), (He is) something more (than the individual soul).'

⁸ *Ibid.*, IV.4.17.

⁹ *Vākyavṛtti*, 36.

¹⁰ cf. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, VI.17; 'Who rules over this universe eternally.'

in respect of manifestation of freedom, knowledge, power, and joy.

2. No beginning of the three.

In fact, the *jīva*, *jagat*, and *Īśvara* are inter-related. We cannot account for any of the three without reference to two others. All the attributes of *Īśvara* imply His relation to the *jīva* and *jagat*. Any expression with regard to Him, such as 'God the Father', 'the almighty Creator', 'the adorable Lord', 'the supreme Ruler', 'the benign Providence', 'the omnipresent Being', 'the divine Master', has a reference to either of them. Like *Īśvara*, the *jīva* as well as *jagat* has no beginning in time. All the three are said to be unborn (*aja*).¹¹ As pointed out by Śaṅkara, their beginning is untenable.¹² The universe with the living and the non-living must have existed in the causal state before its manifestation, because nothing cannot turn into something, just as something cannot turn into nothing. Moreover, had the living being arisen accidentally without their previous existence in potential forms, then their weal and woe would have been unmerited and the difference in their sufferings and enjoyments unaccounted for. Nor would it have been proper to hold God responsible for such a situation. How could He be regarded as all-wise and impartial, in case He allowed some to suffer and others to enjoy without cause? The same problems would have to be faced even if the living creatures originated from undiversified, homogeneous Nature. Therefore, prior to their manifestation, the living and the non-living, constituting the universe, must have existed in causal state in primordial Nature. The world ever *is*, whether manifest or unmanifest, and its sole ruler is *Īśvara*. 'There is no one else able to rule it.'¹³

The Sanskrit word corresponding to 'creation' is '*ṣṛṣṭi*', which literally means 'throwing', that is to say, 'projection from the latent to

¹¹ *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, I.9.

¹² *Brahma-Sūtra*, II.1.36, see commentary.

¹³ *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, VI.17.

the manifest form'. In the Vedāntic view, the creation of the *jīva* and *jagat* does not imply their absolute beginning, but their development from the potential to the actual state. Just as every individual thing in this world has three distinct states of existence—origination, continuation, and destruction (which is but reversion to the cause)—so has the universe as a whole. The projection, the preservation, and the dissolution of the universe comprising the living and the non-living form a complete cycle (*kalpa*) rotating continuously under the rulership of Īśvara. It is an eternal process. Rare individuals who attain liberation by realizing the supreme Brahman go beyond it, while countless others continue to be in the cosmic order controlled by Īśvara. The beginning of the universe actually means the beginning of a cycle. The dissolution of the universe with the animate and the inanimate does not mean its annihilation, but its reabsorption in the causal state, from which it emerges again in the beginning of a new cycle. It is said in the *R̥g-Veda*: 'The Lord planned the sun and the moon as before.'¹⁴ As Creator, Protector, and Destroyer of the universe, Īśvara is designated respectively as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. The one and the same Lord has three different aspects or forms (*trimūrti*).

3. How are the *jīva* and *jagat* related to Īśvara?

How does Īśvara hold and control the *jīva* and *jagat*? The relation between God and the world has been a baffling problem in rational theology. We cannot explain the world without God, nor can we harmonize the two. The crucial point is: How can this indubitable, imperfect world be reconciled with the existence of the perfect Being. To conceive the *jīva* and *jagat* as different from or outside Īśvara implies limitation on His infinitude. In the Vedāntic view, they have no existence apart from, or independent of, Īśvara. He is the Reality that supports and controls both. They depend on Him, and not He on them. He is the sole independent entity. He is the central principle

that pervades everything. He is external to none. In the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the Lord calls the *jīva* and *jagat* His higher and lower natures.¹⁵ They are the manifestations of His being. There is no 'other' in His consciousness. He is not an individual. He is the cosmic whole, including the *jīva* and *jagat*. The three form a unity in difference. Truly speaking, Īśvara is the supreme Self (Paramātmān) that manifests and sustains all finite existences, conscious and unconscious. As stated by Śaṅkara: 'To the contemplative, nothing other than the supreme Lord exists. He is manifest in the eightfold form of the unmoving and the moving, such as earth, water, fire, air, ether, the sun, the moon, and the individual soul.'¹⁶

According to all schools of Vedānta, monotheistic¹⁷ as well as monistic (non-dualistic), Īśvara is the sole self-existent Reality, inclusive of the *jīva* and *jagat*. The unity of existence is the keynote of Vedānta. Absolute pluralism or dualism has no place in it. Says Śrī Kṛṣṇa: 'Beyond Me there is naught else. All this is strung on Me as a row of gems on a string.'¹⁸ Īśvara in Vedānta is called 'the internal Controller' (*antaryāmin*), who directs and guides the cosmic process from within. 'He who inhabits all beings, and is within all beings, whom none of the beings knows, whose body is all beings, and who controls all beings from within, that immortal, internal Controller is your self.'¹⁹ It is He who shines as the conscious self in every living creature. The one undivided luminous Self appears as myriad souls. 'All faces are His faces; all heads His heads; all necks His necks; He dwells in the hearts of all beings. He is the divine Lord pervading everything. Therefore He is all-embracing and benign. The Self, indeed, is the mighty Lord who directs the intellect to the attainment of complete clarity of

¹⁵ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VII.4,5.

¹⁶ *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* (Hymn to the benign Lord in the form of the *guru*).

¹⁷ The five monotheistic schools of Vedānta are: (1) Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja, (2) Dvaitādvaita of Nimbārka, (3) Śuddhādvaita of Vallabha, (4) Dvaita of Madhva, (5) Acintyābheda of Baladeva.

¹⁸ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VII.7.

¹⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III.7.15.

¹⁴ *R̥g-Veda*, X.190.3.

vision. He is the imperishable Light that controls everything.²⁰

One may pertinently ask, How does the Imperishable include the perishable, the All-pure the impure, the All-good the evil? How does the Self-intelligent consist of the unintelligent? The explanation that the individual souls and Nature (*prakṛti*) form the outer aspect of Īśvara, as given by some monotheistic philosophers, does not prove to be a convincing answer. According to Rāmānuja, the *jīva* and *prakṛti* are accessory to Īśvara, being related to Him as attributes to substance or as body to the soul. Even so, it is difficult to conceive Īśvara as an immutable, all-free, or perfect Being. As long as the *jīva* and *prakṛti* are inseparably associated with the being of Īśvara, and form an integral part of Him, His nature cannot be altogether free from their imperfections and impurities.

4. *The solution of the problem is the non-dualistic conception of māyā.*

Let us see how non-dualistic Vedānta solves the problem. Both non-dualistic and monotheistic schools of Vedānta hold that the universe is the manifestation of Īśvara's power (*śakti*) called *māyā*. There are, however, marked differences in their conceptions of *māyā*, despite several points of agreement. All agree that *māyā* is the causal potency of primordial Nature or *prakṛti*, the origin of the universe, which is not a discrete entity as the Sāṅkhya system maintains, but is subordinate to Īśvara, and belongs to Him as His power (*śakti*). So the Upaniṣad says: 'Know that *prakṛti* is *māyā* and that the supreme Lord is the wielder of *māyā*. The whole universe is filled with what are but the parts of His being.'²¹ '*Prakṛti* is Īśvara's power of *māyā*', says Śaṅkara.²² It is through His power of *māyā* that Īśvara is the all-knowing and all-powerful Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer of the cosmic manifold. According to most monotheistic schools, the creative energy of God is inherent in Him. In the view

of Śākta Tantra, which is closest to non-dualism, the power of God is not different from the being of God, the power-holder. Śakti in her potential state is identical with Śiva. Now, if *māyā*, the creative energy, inheres in God, if it be inseparably connected with His being, then any change in it means change in God Himself, and the seed of imperfection must be within Him. So the problem remains unsolved.

According to the non-dualistic school, the creative energy or *prakṛti*, recognized as Īśvara's power of *māyā*, is not an ultimate principle inherent in Him. It does not pertain to His essential nature as Nirguṇa Brahman. It adheres to Him as an adjunct (*upādhi*), so to speak, but in no way affects Him. *Māyā* is true so far as the world-appearance is concerned. It serves as the power of Īśvara in the realm of appearance, beyond which it has no existence. *Māyā* is something positive, but unique. It is not non-being, because it is instrumental to the appearance of multiplicity on the unity of Reality. Nor is it being, since it has no existence apart from non-dual Brahman. Īśvara, who knows *māyā* as such, holds and controls it. As the master of *māyā*, He is the Projector, Preserver, and Destroyer of the manifold universe, of which He is the sole support. Nirguṇa is Saguṇa without undergoing any change. Being under the spell of *māyā*, the *jīvas* regard the phenomenal world of plurality as real in itself and become bound to the wheel of mortal life. *Māyā* and its manifestations have no influence over Īśvara. To Him, the unity of Reality is fully manifest, despite the apparent multiplicity. *Māyā* is related to Him in the same way as an illusory object is related to its ground. Conjoined with *māyā* by apparent superimposition, Brahman is Īśvara. The term '*māyā*' is applicable to Īśvara's creation as well as to His creative power. It signifies both the causal and the manifest state of the universe.

Brahman, as controlling *māyā*, is Īśvara; as controlled by *māyā*, is *jīva*. From the position of the *jīva*, this mysterious principle, *māyā*, is designated as *ajñāna* or *avidyā*, which is usually

²⁰ *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, III.11,12.

²¹ *Ibid.*, IV.10.

²² *Brahma-Sūtra*, II.1.14, see commentary.

translated as ignorance or nescience. But *ajñāna* or *avidyā* does not mean the absence or the negation, but the reverse, of knowledge. It is anti-knowledge, which terminates with the knowledge of Reality.²³ It has two distinct functions—it veils the supreme Being and projects the manifold. It is because of this that the *jīva* fails to perceive non-dual Brahman as his self and experiences multiple things and beings as real in themselves. Thus *avidyā* is the cause of both inapprehension and misapprehension. There can be inapprehension of the Real without its misapprehension, as in deep sleep, but there cannot be misapprehension without inapprehension. Any perception of duality is due to *avidyā*. Any relative knowledge as well as ignorance is in its domain.

5. *The appearance of the world of phenomena is due to māyā or ajñāna (anti-knowledge) that hides Reality.*

There are reasons for recognizing primal energy, of the nature of *ajñāna* or *avidyā*, as the creative power of Īśvara. In the first place, without power the creativity of the immutable and immovable Brahman is not possible. Then again, *prakṛti*, the primordial Nature, must not be apart from, or independent of, non-dual Being. There can be only one absolute Being. This phenomenal world of change and interdependence cannot be a self-sustaining entity. Yet, it appears to be self-existent and covers that on whom its existence depends. Indeed, everything that we perceive seems to be real in itself, while, in fact, it is a mere form covering the real. Try as we may, we cannot know the real nature of anything. The forms, changing constantly, appear to be real because of Reality underlying them. We only deal with the forms and mistake them to be real in themselves, while the underlying Reality never comes into view. What but *avidyā* can create such a situation?

²³ *Ajñāna* is eradicated by direct experience of Brahman (*aparokṣānubhūti*). This is intuitive knowledge. So *ajñāna* is said to be anti-knowledge, that which is *contradictory* to knowledge. Brahman is the locus of *ajñāna* from the viewpoint of the world-appearance. In this sense, *ajñāna* is contrary to pure consciousness.

As the cause is, so is the effect. The effect points to a corresponding cause.

Moreover, had the world of duality and dependence been absolutely real, had there been no ideal existence transcending it, then liberation from its bondage would not have been possible. But since it is rooted in *avidyā*, liberation is attainable by its eradication through the knowledge of Reality beyond all limitation. It is said by Śaṅkara: 'Truly, the seed force (potential energy), which has to be designated as *avyakta* (the indefinable), is of the nature of *avidyā* and is dependent on Īśvara. It is a monstrous sleep made up of *māyā*, in which lie the migratory souls lacking in self-knowledge.'²⁴

6. *Māyā has different names. It is indefinable either as real or as unreal. Nor is it both real and unreal.*

The same primal energy, supported and directed by Īśvara, has different names. As undiversified in its potential aspect, it is called *avyākṛta*. As the origin of the universe, it is called *prakṛti*. As it veils Reality, and is contradicted by its direct experience or immediate knowledge, it is called *ajñāna* or *avidyā*. As instrumental to the projection of the world-appearance, it is called *māyā*. Since its nature cannot be determined either as being (*sat*) or as non-being (*asat*), it is called *avyakta* (the indefinable).²⁵ Indeed, it is inexplicable in itself. Just as the world is not self-explanatory, so is its origin. The terms '*prakṛti*', '*avidyā*', '*ajñāna*', '*māyā*', and '*avyakta*' are often synonymously used.

The word '*māyā*' literally means 'that which measures (the Immeasurable)'. It is this inscrutable measuring or limiting principle that makes the Unlimited apparently limited, the Undifferentiated apparently differentiated, the Unrelated apparently related, the Unconditioned apparently conditioned by time, space, and causation. So *māyā* has been called *aghaṭita-*

²⁴ *Brahma-Sūtra*, I.4.3, see commentary.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

ghaṭanā-paṭiyasī,²⁶ she who is expert in making the non-existent appear as existent. It is *māyā* that makes Reality appear as different from what It is. Manifesting itself as the manifold of names and forms grounded on non-dual Reality, *māyā* is neither real nor unreal. The manifold is not real (*sat*), because it has no existence apart from Brahman, and is eradicated by true knowledge. That alone is real (*sat*), according to Vedānta, which is self-existent, which is not conditioned by time, space, and causation.

Nor is the phenomenal world of multiplicity unreal (*asat*), because it is a fact of universal experience, and persists until the knowledge of Reality is attained. That is unreal (*asat*) which has no existence at all. The world of phenomena is not non-existence, as is a barren woman's son or a hare's horn. Though it has no self-identity, yet it is undeniable. It is also different from dream-experience, or illusion, or hallucination, which is a projection of imagination, and is more or less private, which admits of no practical use and endures for the time being.

Māyā cannot be regarded even as participant of both existence and non-existence, which are contradictory. Since the world of becoming is indescribable (*anirvacanīya*) either as real (*sat*) or as unreal (*asat*), it is characterized in Vedāntic terminology as '*mithyā*', which does not mean, as is often misconceived, 'unreal', but 'other than real and unreal' (*sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*). The manifold has an apparent existence grounded on the supreme Being, like the illusory perception of a serpent on a rope.

Māyā is thus defined by Śaṅkara: '*Māyā* or *avidyā*, also called *avyakta*, is the power (*śakti*) of the supreme Lord. She is composed of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*), has no beginning, and is imperceptible (in her potential aspect). It is from the effects she produces that her existence can be inferred only by the wise. It is she who begets the entire universe. She is neither real nor unreal, nor both. She

is neither different nor non-different (from Reality), nor both. She is neither a compound nor an integral whole, nor both. She is most peculiar. Her nature is inexpressible.²⁷

7. *Māyā* is evident as contraries that mark the universe.

We cannot see *māyā* in its potential aspect. We see only the effects it produces; and it is from the effects that we can know the nature of the cause. Truly speaking, *māyā* is not a theory, but a fact of experience. The entire relative existence is the domain of *māyā*. Anything relative is neither real nor unreal. It has a conditional existence, but no absolute reality. It is and it is not. The whole realm of cause and effect is such. The entire world of phenomena, physical and psychical, is conditioned by time, space, and causation. It exists because of the Absolute. It is not real in itself. It has only an apparent existence. It is based on the Absolute, yet not identical with It. The world as it appears to us is neither real nor unreal. It is *mithyā*. As an appearance, it is neither different nor non-different from Brahman. But, essentially, it is non-different from Brahman, its basis and being.²⁸ In fact, the world of experience is an appearance screening Reality, which exists in and through it. It is said by Gauḍapāda: 'This manifold does not exist as identical with the Self, nor does it stand by itself independent of the Self. They are neither different nor identical; this is what the seers see.'²⁹

The following remarks of Swami Vivekananda are illuminating: '*Māyā* is not illusion, as it is popularly interpreted. *Māyā* is real, yet it is not real. It is real in that the Real is behind it, and gives it its appearance of reality. That which is real in *māyā* is the Reality in and through *māyā*. Yet the Reality is not seen, and hence that which is seen is unreal, and it has no real independent existence of itself, but is dependent upon the Real for its

²⁷ *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, 108-9.

²⁸ *Vide Brahma-Sūtra*, II.1.14.

²⁹ *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, II.34.

²⁶ *Vide Śaṅkara's Māyāpañcaka* (Five stanzas on *māyā*).

existence. *Māyā*, then, is a paradox—real, yet not real; an illusion, yet not an illusion. He who knows the Real sees in *māyā* not illusion, but Reality. He who knows not the Real sees in *māyā* illusion and thinks it real.³⁰

This coupling of the Real and the unreal is the act of *māyā*. It is the mysterious principle that associates the dissociated. It prevails everywhere as the meeting of the contraries. It is *māyā* that brings about the relativity of the subject and the object, the knower and the known. The two are dissimilar, yet inseparable. One does not exist without the other. The universe is a conglomeration of pairs of opposites, such as light and darkness, joy and sorrow, knowledge and ignorance, prosperity and poverty, beauty and ugliness, good and evil, in which the antitheses are correlated; yet either factor appears to be an independent existence, and we try in vain all our life to exclude one from the other. This is the effect of *māyā*. There is no elevation without depression, no construction without destruction, no addition without subtraction. In each case, the contraries form a single process. They are inseparable; yet they appear to be disparate. This is the effect of *māyā*. Each organism lives by constant building and break-up. The seed disintegrates as it sprouts. The birth of the plant is the death of the seed-form. They go together. This is how *māyā* operates.

8. *By associating the dissociated, māyā causes individualization.*

But the glaring instance of *māyā* is man's ego idea. His very individuality is based on ignorance (*ajñāna*). He is not essentially a psycho-physical being. He can know by self-introspection that he is the unchanging witness of physical and mental events and, therefore, ever distinct from the body-mind complex. Yet he fails to recognize the true nature of the Self and mistakes the not-self for the Self. The knower of the body and the mind gets identified with the known. This is absurd. Yet it is the

commonest fact of life. All confusions and sufferings of man arise from this wrong identification, the outcome of ignorance. Here is the origin of the ego idea that expresses itself as 'I-ness' and 'my-ness'.

The subject and the object are as contrary in character as light and darkness. The subject is self-luminous, for consciousness is its very nature. The object is stark blind, absolutely devoid of consciousness. The one is pure spirit; the other is dark matter. There is no reason why one should be confused with the other. Yet they become identified with each other, and the attributes of one are ascribed to the other. But neither of them changes its nature in this process of superimposition, just as a stump of tree suffers no change when mistaken for a policeman, or a thief, or a ghost.

This mistaking of one thing for another or the ascription of the attribute of one thing to another is called, in Vedāntic terminology, *adhyāsa*. It is apparent association of the dissociated. What accomplishes this strange feat is the *aghaṭita-ghaṭanā-paṭiyasī māyā*. It is evident in all human behaviour and experience marked with 'I-consciousness', such as 'I am here', 'I am writing', 'I think', 'I see', 'I am hungry', 'I am growing old', 'I dreamt', 'I am deaf', 'I am virtuous', 'I am wealthy', 'I am happy', 'I am a father', 'My body feels tired', 'My hands can grasp', 'My mind can visualize', 'I shall die', and so forth. Thus, unaware of the true nature of the Self, which is ever pure and free, man identifies himself not only with the body, the senses, and the mind, but also with external things and beings, and grieves helplessly in delusion.

That *ajñāna* is ever attendant on the individualized self is evident from such abiding feeling of man as 'I do not know myself'. It is very strange that the knower, whose essence is consciousness, should have ignorance with regard to his real nature. Yet it is a fact. Not only that. Each individual feels as if he is surrounded by a wall of ignorance, which he struggles to break down throughout life. *Ajñāna* underlies the ego idea and all its varied expressions.

³⁰ *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, VI. p.58.

All volitional actions of an individual, all his thoughts, feelings, memories, and imaginations proceed from the ego idea. Even in dream, it endures in different forms. In dreamless sleep, all modes of the mind, including the ego idea, merge in unspecified unawareness. While asleep, a teacher does not know that he is a teacher; a mother does not know that she is a

mother; a robber does not know that he is a robber. From this state of *ajñāna*, unspecified unawareness, arise again the ego idea and the consequent mental movements, as one wakes up. The individual *ajñāna*, the limiting adjunct of the finite self, is a phase of the primary *ajñāna* or *avidyā*.

(To be continued)

AKHANDĀRTHA OR THE THEORY OF JUDGEMENT

BY DR. P. S. SASTRI

1. An object can be characterized in many ways. We can speak of it as an existent, as a substance, as an effect or a cause, as a universal, or as a determinate or specific one. These are the various qualifications which make the object determinate and intelligible. The qualifications by themselves are abstract universals, and they acquire a meaning by becoming the qualifications of an object, that is, by ceasing to be abstract. The nature or character of the object is that denoted by its predicate, which is its qualification. In the absence of a predicate, it will have no character. And that which is apprehended as our cognition or knowledge is this very character or predicate.¹

Can we say that the constructive or conceptual activity is only the attribution of a predicate or character to an existent? If the predicate, which is a class predicate, is not one with the existent, we can predicate it; and then it will be a separate existent. This is an impossibility.² But if it is not other than the existent, the so-called predicate only renders the entity explicit to consciousness.

If the object is both a universal and a particular, one must qualify the other; and since both these aspects are the objects of a single cognition, they cannot stand in the relation of an adjective to a substantive. Even if they are the objects of two different cognitions, this is

not possible.³ The cognition of a quality cannot make the substance determinate; and the cognition of a substance cannot make the quality determinate. I may cognize a patch of blue without knowing that which is blue. I may cognize a tree without knowing what tree it is.⁴ Moreover, the relation of one cognition to another is not achieved by the cognitions, but by the self.⁵ It is the self functioning as thought that unifies ideas in one consciousness; and such a unification is only the unity that characterizes consciousness. The expression of this unity is the judgement. The way in which this unity can be expressed gives us different forms of judgement.⁶

A simple judgement is one which expresses a single idea. From this, we can derive the conjunctive and composite judgements applying various types of relations. All such judgements remain within the relational context. But their very reality is to be sought in the character of the perceptual judgement which expresses a necessity of thought and existence. The concept of a *śimśapā*, for example, necessarily, implies its character of being a tree. The idea of man necessarily involves the nature of mortality. The predicate in all these cases is necessary from the very nature of the subject. If the

³ See Bradley, *Logic*, pp. 96, 254, 484.

⁴ NVTT., 142.15-19.

⁵ See SV., 1.1.4.121-22.

⁶ See Kant, *Prolegomena*, section 22; Bosanquet, *Logic*, I.31.

¹ See NVTT., 142.2-15.

² VVM., 186.

subject exists, then its predicate cannot be denied.⁷ Actually, a perceptual apprehension presents only the coexistence of the subject and the predicate. Any relation between the two is a mental construction, since no relation is perceivable. The predicate is interpreted as being the necessary character of the existent. Thus, when we say that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, this crossing the Rubicon is not something external to the being of Caesar. When $7+5$ is said to be equal to 12, we are not adding any known or unknown quantity to $7+5$ to get 12.⁸ On the other hand, we are recognizing the necessity revealed by the embodied universal called the fact and exhibited by the judgement. Every judgement refers, and is relative, to a determinate whole or embodied universal, which is a unity. This unity is characterized by certain necessary connections which the judgement seeks to define or reveal.⁹ When the subject of the judgement is real, and when it is seen to refer to a real fact, this real must be self-subsistent if it is to be real. But the this of the perceptual apprehension is always the dependent existent. It has no complete existence. It claims to be real only when it embodies reality as such. The judgement proper affirms the necessity based on a reality that is self-subsistent.¹⁰ A judgement is, then, completely true only when the subject in its entirety is identical with reality. This cannot, however, mean that the constituents of a true proposition are the constituents of facts, or of the world.¹¹ The constituents of the proposition 'Brutus killed Caesar' are not identical, nor do they correspond with the action of Brutus and the wounds of Caesar. A theory like that of correspondence fails to account the facts that correspond to a false proposition or to a supposal. On the other hand, the judgement renders a fact determinate; and reality is that which is made determinate to consciousness in an act of judgement.

⁷ See Sigwart, I.202-3.

⁸ cf. Lotze, *Logic*, I.82-86.

⁹ See Bosanquet, *Logic*, I.135.

¹⁰ cf. Bosanquet, *Logic*, II.237.

¹¹ But see Stebbing, *Mind*, Vol. XLII. p. 346, and her *Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 161.

2. The perceptual cognition determines the object, not its perceptibility. We judge that this is blue, not that this is perceptible. Perception as such can only determine the object, and as such our knowledge thereof.¹² The first moment of the cognition of the object may be a sensation, and the second moment may provide a reference of this sensation to the second moment of the object. In the third moment, there may arise the mnemonic elements. But it is at this stage that the sensations are replaced by the intellect, which constructs an image or idea. The second moment, says the Buddhist, presents a transition from pure sensation to the intelligible image or idea.¹³ The intellect, however, tries to determine the same object grasped by the senses.¹⁴

What is the perceptibility of the object? Is it the nature of an object of perception? Or is it the nature of an object of knowledge derived from perception? In the former case, it is the sense-organ that first comes into contact with the object, whose character is not arrived at perceptually. As Kumārila said, audibility is not known through perception, since it is at least beyond the hearing of the deaf.¹⁵ The sensation is followed by an image; and then the constructive intellect identifies the two. Such an identification takes the determinate form, which can be expressed as 'this is a blue patch'. The senses alone cannot arrive at such a judgement.¹⁶

We cannot admit the second alternative also, since, during the moment of our apprehension of the object, we do not have the object of knowledge derived from perception. We do not have even the knowledge of the object, as distinct from the perception of the object, during the experience. We do not say that this is the knowledge and that that is the object. Kumārila and his followers were therefore led to believe that, in a perceptual cognition, there arises in the object a certain character called

¹² See PVA., 338.21-22.

¹³ cf. NVT., 488.

¹⁴ VVN., 122.

¹⁵ SV. *Anumāna*, 60.

¹⁶ NBT., 19.4-7.

knowability; and that through this knowability we infer the existence and nature of the object. This doctrine appears in modern Neo-realism and Behaviourism. They all deny images and introspection;¹⁷ and this denial cannot explain the unitary character of the perceptual cognition. Nor can such a doctrine establish a direct relation between the judgement and the fact judged. This defect arises primarily, because these thinkers divorce the perceptual apprehension from the determination of the object. These two are not two distinct or different activities.

Apprehension means the immediate awareness of the form or appearance under which the object is found to appear. This itself is the determination of the object.¹⁸ This is a judgement, which is an act of the mind. This activity is directed to make the object intelligible, for which purpose the sensation is united with conception. The original immediate apprehension gets mediated by becoming determinate. That is, immediacy as such is not the nature or character of the object; for, if it were so, the object must be apprehended by every one. Immediacy, however, is the character of the cognition, and it presents an awareness of the object.¹⁹ Every judgement is, then, a synthesis of a sensation and a conception. The former makes it an affirmation, since it implies a reference to reality. The latter brings about the necessity and the logical character of the judgement. As affirmative, the judgement claims truth.²⁰ This claim is made good only by the acceptance of the reality of the world,²¹ which reality is denied in Vijñānavāda.

3. The determinate judgement of perception represents an act of the will. It expresses a decision, an affirmation regarding the identity of two different entities. The differences in time, place, and condition between the actual experience and the object are synthesized in a judgement.²² The same conceptual activity

which is at work in the process of judging brings forth the linguistic expression.²³ There is no conception which does not involve a generic character and therefore a name. As Dinnāga said, names have their source in concepts and concepts in names.²⁴ Consequently, the predicate in a perceptual judgement is a name expressing a basic character; it gives utterance to the subject which is the unutterable fact of immediacy. The utterable is united with the unutterable.²⁵ The subject in every judgement, then, is the reality which cannot be expressed. The indivisible real is analysed as being such and such;²⁶ and this reality is the ground which makes the judgement necessary, affirmative, and non-contradictory.²⁷

Every judgement refers to a single real entity, and it is therefore both affirmative and singular. It is a categorical judgement with a singular verb and with a predicate which is not a bare particular.²⁸ As Vācaspati observed, judgement, conception, and apodictic necessity are not different entities to the Buddhist.²⁹ A perceptual apprehension, however, does not become a mediated apprehension merely because of the presence of the concept. The mediacy and immediacy refer to our awareness of the objects. If we apprehend an object directly, it is an immediate apprehension; and if we apprehend it through some external mark or object, it is mediate.³⁰ The basic perceptual judgement expresses an immediacy; and this feature is central to every other judgement, since all cognition is perceptual cognition.³¹ From this, we get the perceptual judgement as the basis of every other kind of judgement; and knowledge is of the essence of a judgement regarding its object.

The simplest possible judgement involves the

¹⁷ See Russell, *Analysis of Mind*, p. 112.

¹⁸ PVA., 341.10-11.

¹⁹ PVA., 343.1-6.

²⁰ cf. Bosanquet, *Logic*, I.67; Joseph, *Logic*, p. 160.

²¹ See Bosanquet, *Essentials*, p. 70.

²² NVTT., 483-85.

²³ NB., I.3-4.

²⁴ PS., V.1.

²⁵ TSP., 368-1-3.

²⁶ NVTT., 135.12-14, 483.21-24. cf. Bosanquet, *Essentials*, pp. 70-71.

²⁷ cf. Paton, *In Defence of Reason*, p. 34; Bosanquet, *Logic*, I. 70.

²⁸ cf. Sigwart, I.236.

²⁹ NVTT., 133.10-11.

³⁰ MMV., 20.

³¹ cf. McTaggart, *Nature of Existence*, II.8.

naming of an immediate sensation. This is the fundamental act³² leading to the fivefold classification of Dinnāga.³³ We have as many kinds of judgement as we have of names. Thus we have judgements of proper names like 'This is Mr. X'. Next we have substantival judgements, which predicate something of an object that can be denominated. Then we have collective judgements involving classes or groups. These three types further imply judgements of quality and judgements of motion. These five forms take us from the simplest to the most complex judgement; and all these forms exhibit the basic character of a judgement in various fields.

Apart from these, we have judgements that differ from one another in their quality. There are others depending upon quantity. The quantitative perceptual judgement is singular. It refers to one and only one real entity. When it has to refer to many, the many, in so far as they constitute a single reference, will be a collective unity only when the predicate referred to this unity has a necessary relation. Then it becomes categorical. This categorical proposition is always preceded by the impersonal judgement of perception, which treats the matter of perception as a predicate of some subject.³⁴ As qualitative, it is always an affirmation.³⁵ It affirms some aspect or element of reality. It claims a relation of conformity or agreement with reality. In laying this claim, it is apodictic. It claims validity only in so far as the concepts expressed by the subject and the predicate are constant. These concepts must be determined in such a way that they are identical to every one. But in a sentence, we do not have a relation between concepts or ideas; we have only an explication of the ideal content represented by the subject.³⁶

4. The subject and the predicate may appear in a statement as two terms. But the fact to which they refer is one and one only. We say

that X is mortal. Here we do not have X and mortality existing in the world as two different entities. There is no X who is not mortal. The distinction between the subject and the predicate is, accordingly, a distinction of the analysing thought; and it does not correspond to actual apprehension. This distinction can be said to depend either upon the order of thought or upon the emphasis placed.³⁷ In reality, the subject and the predicate together constitute a single datum.

The class theory of predication makes out that X is a member of the class of mortal beings.³⁸ If there is in existence such a class, we do not need the judgement, because it expresses nothing new. The predicative view takes mortality to be an attribute of X. But the mortality of a human being is not the same mortality characterizing an animal. The two differ, because of a difference between the existents. The attributive view, however, considers the mortality of X as a qualification of reality. 'This is red' is not, on this view, a subject-predicate proposition, but is of the form 'redness is here'.³⁹ These are only predicates.⁴⁰ If the sentence predicates something of a subject, this subject must be outside the sentence, and such a subject is reality. The so-called subject in the statement is actually the predicate, while the alleged predicate is only that which specifies it; but the so-called subject is only the starting point, which represents the point of contact with reality.⁴¹

The subject of a statement is that about which we think before making the statement. The predicate is that which conveys an information about this subject.⁴² The subject being an essential element in reality, the content of the judgement expresses not only some thing specific about the given, but some character of reality as a whole.⁴³ When we say that the

³² See Sigwart, I.65; Bosanquet, *Logic*, I.32 ff.

³³ PS., I.2. ff., I.12. cf. *Hetutattvopadeśa*, 20.

³⁴ cf. Lotze, *Logic*, I.74.

³⁵ See *Statement and Inference*, p. 243.

³⁶ See Bosanquet, *Logic*, I.77.

³⁷ cf. *Statement and Inference*, pp. 139-41.

³⁸ See Ayer, *Philosophical Essays*, p. 12.

³⁹ See Russell, *Meaning and Truth*, p. 97.

⁴⁰ See Ayer, *Philosophical Essays*, p. 17.

⁴¹ cf. Bradley, *Logic*, 1.2.1., 9 ff.; Bosanquet, *Logic*, I.76.

⁴² See *Statement and Inference*, pp. 118-19; Joseph, *Logic*, p. 161.

⁴³ See Bradley, *Logic*, 1.1.10.

glass is elastic, the grammatical predicate is only 'elastic'; but the logical predicate is the elasticity of the glass, when we are emphasizing the concept of elasticity. But when we say that it is *the* glass which is elastic, the logical subject is elasticity.⁴⁴ Such a logical subject has no existence apart from reality which it defines. That is, the judgment acquires only the predicated content, not the subject.⁴⁵ The ultimate subject will then be the reality that is present in self-consciousness. The function of the logical predicate is to specify or render determinate the form or mode of being appropriate to this subject. It makes explicit the specific being that characterizes the subject. As the specific form, such a predicate cannot stand for a class or universal.

A judgement, then, is not a subject-predicate synthesis. It is an expression of an experience, and it seeks to define reality in determinate language. In other words, the subject-predicate relation is as self-contradictory as the subject-object relation. The relation can be neither external nor internal. And the only possible way of speaking is that the subject has an identity (*svarūpa*) with the predicate. The predicate is the concrete expression of the subject. If there is identity, there is no relation; and if there is a relation, there must be difference which prevents unity. Moreover, the subject of a proposition is a subject only in relation to its predicate; and the predicate likewise is relative to its subject. This mutual interdependence can admit the subject-predicate relation only by admitting the vicious circle.⁴⁶ We can avoid this vicious circle only by insisting the fact that a judgement is complete only when it expresses an identity of the subject with the so-called predicate.

5. Our apprehension of the world is an act of affirmation. This affirmation issues itself in the form of a judgement. It expresses what we are compelled to think. If we apprehend an object table, we cannot think of it as any object other than a table, if we do not want to

contradict our own experiences. There is a certain necessity operating in consciousness, because of which we are forced to believe that it is a table. It is in this sense that the table belongs to the objective world; and the judgement expressing this therefore reveals a necessity of thought.⁴⁷ If my judgement is necessary, it is then a judgement which any individual can and does have under the same or similar conditions. It is universal. Further, when I apprehend the object, I have an experience, which I interpret in terms of the idea of a table. My judgement is constructive. It affirms an interpretation (*kalpana*) of my perceptual apprehension, and at the same time refers my perception to the objective world. In so doing, my judgement, starting from a momentary sensation and from an entity that is here and now, extends my perception by an interpretation. This extension confers on my judgement the character of defining reality. In other words, in having the judgement, I am transforming my private world into the objective world.

The judgement does not involve the reference of an ideal content to reality. If the judgement as a fact is within reality, it cannot refer to reality; and if it is outside reality, there is no consistent principle which can relate it to reality. The judgement expressed linguistically is an expression of an ideal content in terms of a relational structure. This expression articulates through construction that which is immediately apprehended. As an articulation, it offers a definition of reality, even though such a definition may be only partial. In other words, in every judgement, we have a partial self-determination of reality.

6. Every judgement involves a single idea in terms of which we seek to define reality. The European idealist logic regards it as made up of two concepts,⁴⁸ thereby converting the objective reference also to the status of an idea. The instrument of cognizing, says Dharmakīrti, consists in the co-ordination between the

⁴⁴ cf. Joseph, *Logic*, p. 163.

⁴⁵ See Bosanquet, *Essentials*, p. 101.

⁴⁶ TP., 168; *Pañcadaśi*, 1.52.

⁴⁷ See VSB., 2.2.26-28; cf. Bosanquet, *Essentials*, pp. 23-26.

⁴⁸ See Sigwart, I.66; Lotze, *Logic*, I.59 ff., 86.

image and its real object.⁴⁹ The image is different from all dissimilar ones, and it is connected with all similar ones because of the sameness. This sameness brings the object and the image together.⁵⁰ But when this image enters the judgement as a concept, it must have constancy, completeness, determinateness, and universality.⁵¹

The judgement is an act of affirmation, which acquires an objective existence when it assumes a linguistic form. This form is the sentence or statement containing words. The words are signs indicative of ideas. Each such idea enters the statement only as an idea immediately present to the consciousness of the subject that makes the statement. Ideas, then, must exist prior to the linguistic expression. A simple judgement presents a single idea. When something is predicated of the subject, we have apparently two ideas representing the subject and the predicate. The predication being affirmative, the judgement expresses that the idea denoted by the predicate agrees with that expressed by the subject. This agreement really means that the predicate in its entirety is one with the subject.⁵² Normally, the predicate has a wider application than the one expressed by the judgement. In entering the judgement, it loses that much of its meaning which is not relevant to the particular subject of the judgement.⁵³ That idea denoted by the predicate which coincides with the idea signified by the subject is the most essential one as far as the judgement is concerned.⁵⁴ The ideal content of the judgement is represented therefore by the specific subject; and this is one with the fact. This specific subject or idea does not qualify reality,⁵⁵ but is one with reality. The given in perceptual experience differs only in degree from the sensation that I have. In referring the content of the apprehension, I am only externalizing and extending my cognition

by equating it with the given. When the judgement always involves the predication of a significant idea to a subject in reality, it does so only by means of an identity of content between the two.⁵⁶

7. Every perceptual judgement contains a this, which is experienced, and an idea, which is constructed. The idea is identified with the external entity. This does not mean that we grasp an external object by its idea; it is not even converting an idea into an external object. It is not a real uniting of the two. It is not an imputation.⁵⁷ It is an error, but we are obliged by the necessity operating in thought to project the idea into the external world. Hence Dharmottara had to admit that the idea we refer to the object is our idea, that it is never external.⁵⁸ This process of externalization is manifested in the judgement by the verb 'to be', which distinguishes the object from our idea. This verb has a reference to the real object only.⁵⁹ It provides an existential import to the judgement by transferring the epistemological idea to the ontological existent. It connects the idea with fact by relating the object as idea to the object as sensed or intuited.⁶⁰ And the judgement as synthesis of an idea and sensation then acquires an objective validity. This relation can be one of identity only when the predicate in its entirety agrees with the essential character of the subject. When the two are not identical, it becomes impossible to relate them satisfactorily.⁶¹

8. Thus far we have been arguing that the meaning conveyed by the substantive constitutes the central or basic import of a judgement.⁶² The various terms in such a statement have a relation of apposition.⁶³ That is, the real determinant of a statement is not its relational form, but its underlying meaning.

⁴⁹ NB., I.14-15. cf. Bradley, *Logic*, 5; Bosanquet, *Logic*, I.13,76.

⁵⁰ NBT., 19.16-18.

⁵¹ cf. Sigwart, I.245.

⁵² *Ibid.*, I. 55.

⁵³ cf. Herbart, *Introduction to Philosophy*, I.92.

⁵⁴ See Sigwart, I.57.

⁵⁵ cf. Bosanquet, *Logic*, I.71.

⁵⁶ cf. Bosanquet, *Essentials*, p. 79.

⁵⁷ NVT., 485.13-15.

⁵⁸ NVT., 486.6.

⁵⁹ TSP., 287.17.

⁶⁰ cf. Sigwart, I.76; Bosanquet, *Essentials*, pp. 99-100; *Statement and Inference*, pp. 181, 217 ff.; Joseph, *Logic*, p. 162.

⁶¹ cf. Lotze, *Logic*, I.81.

⁶² VSB., 185.24.

⁶³ PPV., 223.8-9.

Even the statement 'this is that X' is non-relational as regards the resultant meaning. Even the attributive judgement of perception extends the original datum of knowledge by consolidating and harmonizing the various factors in terms of an identity. The judgement is thus non-relational, not because it is infra-relational, but because it synthesizes and transcends those very relations.

Vācaspati, accepting the substantival theory of judgement, argues that this universe of names and forms is, in an ultimate sense, the absolute Reality, though that Reality is not the same as this universe.⁶⁴ The universe, as a predicate, is a form or manifestation or appearance of the Real; and the Real can never be a predicate of any other.⁶⁵ The various terms or entities that seek to qualify reality constitute only a qualification *per accidens*. They are just indicative of reality. Take an instance: 'That house where I find the crow is the house of X.' Such a judgement enables the seeker to identify the house; and the significance of such a judgement is an identification. The relation of the crow provides only a qualification *per accidens*.

Consider a sentence like, 'this is that man'. It offers a relational cognition through the mediation of the words this and that. But in spite of the divergent spatial and temporal features denoted by these words, the sentence expresses a non-relational identity⁶⁶ in terms of apposition. This appositional character points out that a judgement is not an expression of an identity-in-difference, though the structure of the sentence seems to be relational.

9. (i) Does this non-relational import of a judgement refer to a non-relational reality? (ii) Or does it refer to a reality which does not admit of differences? (iii) Or is it a group of words which are not synonymous with one another, and which affirm the character of the substantives only? (iv) Or do these words in the sentence make explicit one substantive which is in it? (v) Or does it give rise to a valid knowledge which is not found to be re-

lational? The first interpretation is not valid, since the words in a sentence give rise to an import only when their meanings are related to one another. Nor can the judgement refer to a reality that is not capable of being internally differentiated, since such a reality is not definable. We cannot have a determinate conception of reality as that which denies or negates difference. Such a denial actually affirms the relational character of reality. Nor can reality be indicated as that in which difference is absent because of the same relational implication. The third interpretation is futile when we have to interpret a conjunctive statement like 'fire and water are respectively hot and cold'. The words here are not synonymous, and they refer to two substantives which therefore do not express a single idea. The fourth interpretation would make only one substantive the important word in a sentence, thereby making the other words superfluous.⁶⁷

These objections do not recognize the true nature of the import of a judgement expressed linguistically. When the words give rise to a complete understanding which is non-relational, or when they express the character or nature of the substantive, we have the final import. The words should not be synonymous, since a true judgement is not a mere tautology. Consider the statement: 'The moon is the pre-eminent luminary.' Here the words actually express a single unitary idea of the luminous body, without being synonymous. The knowledge that arises from these words is not relational, since the luminosity is not something other than the moon. It is a necessary character of the moon.⁶⁸ The most important term here is the moon, and it is with reference to the moon that the statement acquires a significance. When we assert the substantival character of a judgement, we are not pleading for the import of a pure tautologous judgement. The idea of the moon does exclude the idea of the luminosity of the moon. The words other than the moon do serve the function of excluding the

⁶⁴ B., 273.1; NMA., 264.

⁶⁵ B., 135.3-7.

⁶⁶ SS., I.149-50; PPV., 237.8-9. See VPS., 230.

⁶⁷ TP., 105.17-107.4.

⁶⁸ TP., 109.2-5. See BS., 99; B., 138.3-8; PP., 84.7-14; PPV., 239.15-20; VPS., 232.

non-luminous character of the moon.⁶⁹ The apprehension of this substantive is immediate.⁷⁰ The identity of the other words with this substantive is apprehended through implication.⁷¹ The word 'luminary' expresses luminosity in general. By secondary implication, it applies to a specific luminary. The word 'pre-eminent' expresses the quality of pre-eminence, and by secondary implication, it applies to the particular luminary. That is, the word 'moon' does not denote a quality nor a generality, and as such these meanings are excluded. Only the specific luminary in which these features are inherent is accepted as the significance of the word 'moon'. It is in this manner that the words 'moon', 'pre-eminent', and 'luminary' have a single import. The words other than the moon are necessary, since they exclude non-luminous and non-pre-eminent objects.⁷²

10. Judgement expresses an ideal content about a subject in reality. The subject is an existent, whose character is expressed in the statement. The two aspects of existence and content, the that and the what, are felt as a harmonious unity; but this harmony as present in the finitude of feeling is imperfect. Each aspect has a tendency to assert itself as the only one; and thought separates them completely in order to synthesize them more concretely. This separated 'that' is the logical subject, whose predicate is the 'what'. Since the 'that' is a specific subject in reality, we can take reality to be the ultimate subject of every judgement. But if the 'that' is the subject, we cannot forget that the 'that' does not exist apart from its 'what'. There is no bare subject nor a bare predicate.⁷³ The statement can then only be a verbal expression of an identity. Such an expression of an identity is the ideal element. If the real is non-relational, the judgement cannot offer a valid relational import.

11. The words, then, are not directed merely

⁶⁹ See *Taittirīya Vārtika*, 2.66-67, 78-79; NMA., 260-62; *Pramāṇamālā*, 19; VPS., 229; TP., 111.3-7.

⁷⁰ See PVA., 248.15.

⁷¹ PPV., 238.10-13, 239.9-10.

⁷² VSP., 232.

⁷³ cf. Sigwart, I.90-91; Lotze, *Logic*, I.140; Bradley, *Essays*, pp. 316, 333.

towards the manifestation of their meanings; for they achieve their purpose when they together reveal a single import, which is the import of the sentence as a whole.⁷⁴ But the various words as adjectival to a single reality would make the import of a judgement depend on an identity-in-difference, and this we have seen to be an illogical position.⁷⁵

The various words in a judgement, says the author of *Vivaraṇa*, express the various universals, and they are in apposition to one another. As appositional, they refer to a reality which is the true universal.⁷⁶ But if all the words are purely synonymous, all words save one would be redundant, and every judgement should have only a single word.⁷⁷

12. The statement as relational refers an ideal content to a subject within reality. Such a judgement cannot claim absolute truth, since the predication is not of reality, but of something within reality. But if the judgement were to agree with reality, it must affect an identity of the ideal with the real. This identification would then be the predication; and since the identification is necessary, the relational form implicit in any predication will be only formal. The predicate cannot be other than the real, nor can it exist apart from the real. It expresses a partial aspect of the real; and as partial, the judgement containing it cannot claim absolute truth. When we have reality as the subject of the judgement, and a predicate which can be identified⁷⁸ with this reality with the least possible construction or adjustment, then we have a valid judgement. And the function of a valid judgement is to affirm this identification, not to predicate an attribute.

⁷⁴ B., 219.8-10.

⁷⁵ NMA., 259-60.

⁷⁶ PPV., 223; VPS., 214-15.

⁷⁷ NMA., 258-59.

⁷⁸ cf. Sigwart, I.57.

Abbreviations used in the footnotes: B.—*Bhāmātī*; BS.—*Brahmasiddhi*; MMV.—*Mādhyamaka Kārika Vṛtti*; NB.—*Nyāya Bindu*; NBT.—*Nyāya Bindu Tikā*; NMA.—*Nyāya Makaranda*; NVTT.—*Tātparya Tikā*; PP.—*Pañcapādikā*; PPV.—*Vivaraṇam*; PS.—*Pramāṇa Samuccaya*; PVA.—*Pramāṇa Vārtikā-lāṅkāra*; SS.—*Saṁkṣepa Śārirakam*; SV.—*Śloka Vārtika*; TP.—*Tattvaprādīpikā* of Citsukha; TSP.—*Tattva Saṅgraha Pañjikā*; VPS.—*Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha*; VSB.—*Vedānta-Sūtra Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara; VVM.—*Vidhi Viveka*; VVN.—*Nyāya Kaṅikā*.

THE POETRY OF ŚRĪ ŚAṆKARA—3

BY SRI P. SAMA RAO

(Continued from previous issue)

V

‘For those who are afflicted, in the way of the world, by the burning pain due to the sunshine of the threefold misery (*ādhyātmika*, *ādidaiivika*, and *ādibhautika*), and who through delusion wander about in a desert in search of water—for them, here is the triumphant message of Śrī Śaṅkara pointing out, within easy reach, the comforting ocean of nectar, the Brahman, the One without a second, to lead them on to liberation’ (*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, 580).

The true aim and function of philosophy is to help one to realize oneself and thereby attain one’s union with the Absolute. The Godhead is the fount of all beauty and sweetness. He is Form in form. ‘He is concealed in all beings, the all-pervading Self, abiding in all beings, the Controller of all activities, the indwelling Self of all, the Witness, the Enlightener, the Absolute beyond all attributes’ (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, VI.11).

No reminiscence of beauty or sweetness in high art can be without a reference, directly or indirectly, to the devotional kinship of the soul with the higher Soul. ‘He hath eyes on all sides, mouths on all sides, arms and feet on all sides. He is the sole God producing earth and heaven. He weldeth them together with His arms as wings’ (*Rg-Veda*, X.17.3). Every philosophical system therefore logically arrives at this end.

Thus any consideration of Śrī Śaṅkara’s poetry, which is deeply religious, cannot dispense with his philosophical pieces, or the manner in which the Abstract immanent in them is aesthetically approached and interpreted so as to aid in the contemplation of the Divine. The hymns are more expressive, however, of the deep truths of the Godhead with

all the idealism, fineness, and sublimity of Nature’s beauty.

In the journeying of the self to the Beyond (of the Ātman to the Paramātman), ethics marks the first stage; for it is only those who have acquired the necessary strength by purity that can proceed further on. Besides, ethics, pure and simple, is directly concerned with the pious consecration of the Ātman unto the Paramātman; and indirectly, with the realization of equality or *samatva* with other souls, which also trace the same descent from the Paramātman. In Platonic sense, and as Robert Browning beautifully puts it, we are but ‘broken arcs of a perfect round’ in our finiteness and limitations. Perfect realization or liberation consists only in adhering to the truth of common descent and achieving the complete round in ourselves with our pious endeavour.

Next to his prose commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, Śrī Śaṅkara’s chief works on Vedāntic monism are *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* and *Upadeśasāhasrī*. They are in verse and exhaustive enough as means for the understanding of the one Reality, i.e. Brahman, behind all the phenomenal existence.

The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, ‘Crest-jewel of Discrimination’, is more poetic and more melodious in expression than the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, ‘A Thousand Teachings’, which is predominantly intellectual. The aim of both is one and the same, that is, to sublimate grossness into subtlest ethereality, so that the Real, which is the most subtle, may easily be grasped, and the ultimate truth about the Brahman duly realized: ‘There is neither death nor birth, neither a bound nor a struggling soul, neither a seeker after liberation nor a liberated one’ (*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, 574). This echoes the supreme message of the *Avadhūta-Gītā*. *Dvaita* (duality) is unreal,

advaita (non-duality) alone is real, and everything is *Brahmamaya*.

It is intriguing to know how Śrī Śaṅkara, a protagonist of Nirguṇa Brahman, could describe Him in terms of finite and transient qualities and yet convince us of His qualitylessness and infinity, through such a wealth of luscious phrases and images borrowed of Nature and from his own experience on the empiric level.

While Śrī Śaṅkara's monistic meditations like *Nirvāṇaṣṭaka*, *Vijñānanauka*, *Kaivalya*, etc. are for the evolved, other hymns like *Haristuti*, *Annapūrṇāṣṭaka*, *Śivaprātaḥsmaraṇa*, *Vedasāraśivastotra*, etc. and the disquisitional texts like *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, *Ātmabodha*, *Aparokṣānubhūti*, etc. are for the laity and the less evolved. *Śataślokī* is at the top of them all, where the melody of the universe has been joined to the melody of the heavens with syllables quite magical and serene. Our experience on going through this text can best be described only in the words of Keats (*Ode on a Grecian Urn*):

Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter: therefore ye soft pipes play on,
Not to the sensuous ear, but more endear'd
Pipe to the Spirit ditties of no tone.

The various philosophical pieces mentioned above are only different editions of the same message, that is, of Vedāntic monism, though stress on its different aspects varies from one to the other. But the most comprehensive of these are *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, and *Śataślokī*. The diction in all but *Śataślokī* is uniformly simple, direct, and transparent, like the Vedic utterances. The poetic character of Śrī Śaṅkara is present throughout all of them, though in different measures. His poetic expression—sensuous phrase and image and the melody of sense and colour—attains its fullest height only in *Śataślokī*, which may therefore be fittingly called the most poetic gem of them all (see *Śataślokī*, 12, 40, 47, 49, 55, 59, 63, 68, 92, 101).

The infinite diversity and multiplicity of the created are just the transformations which the

One Absolute seems to undergo in our ignorant apperception of It through our own distracted vision and purblindness occasioned by our ego. The non-duality and the oneness of all creation has been confirmed by science today. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* sets out how creation advanced from stage to stage, and into what we see and feel around us today. These had all been merged in their ionic forms in the One Supreme before creation (*Hiraṇyagarbha*), and got manifested differently during creation. In other words, the supreme Self gets transformed into many and appears as different and distinct as the superimpositions are made on It by the mind and its qualities (*Śataślokī*, 50, 55, and 59). Like the light enclosed by opaque walls, or like the fire buried in ashes, the self does not lose its essential nature (*Saccidānanda*) of illumination or eternality by such an enshrouding. Perfect realization identifies it with the supreme Self or Brahman. The mystic sense of *samatva* is none other than seeing oneself in the rest of creation (*Gītā*, VI.30).

While *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* and *Vijñānanauka* are discursive of the Ātman and the Paramātmān, and seek to establish their identity, *Ātmapañcaka*, *Nirvāṇaṣṭaka*, and *Kaivalya* sing sublimely of this identity. One can find parallels to these monistic strains only in *Avadhūta-Gītā* and Upaniṣads like the *Kaṭha*, *Īśāvāsya*, *Māṇḍūkya*, and *Śvetāsvatara*. The rational process through which this identity is established is both by negation and by affirmation.

Of the many hymns addressed to *iṣṭadevatās*, perhaps the most popular and spiritually sublime is the one in praise of *Dakṣiṇāmūrti*. The infinity of Vedāntic thought, if condensed in *Śataślokī*, has been further condensed here. It is both a hymn and an *upadeśa*. It is said that it emanated from Maheśvara Himself in His yogic incarnation as *Dakṣiṇāmūrti*. *Dakṣiṇāmūrti* is conceived of as having all the insignias of Maheśvara's infinity, potency, immanence, and compassion. For the world teacher must instruct how to fight not only the physical evils, but also the mental evils, in the course of spiritual preparation for liberation.

There is a singing quality in almost all of Śrī Śaṅkara's hymns. Modern renderings of many of them, especially *Dvādaśa-pañjarikā* and *Carpata-pañjarikā*, into songs have now become too popular to be missed. On hearing them, we experience a huge immeasurable pillar of soul-cleansing fire, symbolic of the quenchless thirst of the soul for the Over-Soul, sprouting up from the bottom of our minds and flooding, as it were, all space with beatific glow and wiping out all margins of time and personality. The poet who leads us into such a feeling is indeed a peerless one, who is all-compassionate, all-friendly, and grand of soul, meriting universal regard (*Avadhūta-Gītā*, VIII.3).

Śrī Śaṅkara's childlike faith in the Divine cannot be better illustrated than by his prayers to the Devī to do him only that which She deemed most fitting and proper (*Devyaparādha-kṣamāpaṇa-stotra*, 2, 3-4). He exonerates himself from all sin with the humblest apology: 'Whatever faults of omission I might have committed, forgive me; for a bad son may sometimes be born, but a bad mother never.'

VI

Art in life and life in art are the two sides of one and the same medal called spiritual endeavour. They have the same substratum, the same goal, and the same finale, namely, the extinction of the lower self in the higher Self and the attainment of peace and tranquillity. 'The moment the individual soul (*jīva*) comes into union with the Self (Brahman) during *susupti*, it ceases to be conscious of anything, internal or external, like a man fervently embraced by his beloved wife on his return home from a foreign land' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV.3.21). In that state, all worldly activity, which is the result of merit and demerit, disappears; and 'nothing is remembered of all these ups and downs—sorrow, confusion, or fear' (*Śataślokī*, 69). How could the oneness of the self with the higher Self be better described than in the lines: 'The one motionless Self moves with the wandering mind, remains in it, and is also both

before and behind it. But although it is thus present throughout, the eye and the other senses know it not. Water, for instance, moves about with the rolling waves, raised by the wind; it is in them and before them, by them and behind them; and when the waves are still, it is as it ever is' (*ibid.*, 30). Śrī Śaṅkara explains why the eye and the other senses know it not in no less lyrical effusion: 'The cloud that hides the huge sun has not existed before, nor will exist thereafter, but is visible only during that interval; for, if it were not so, how can the group of clouds be visible without the sun? In this manner does the universe (*viśva*, appearance or phenomenal existence) veil the understanding and not the Supreme (Self), which is its (of the universe) illuminator and inspirer' (*ibid.*, 32).

If, in religion, there is thus the identity of the self with the supreme Self, in art, there is the identity of the artist with his subject. For creation is not possible without such oneness. There is no liberation worth the name without the realization of this identity through *yoga* (*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, 6), which contemplates non-attachment to sense objects and action, and devotion to selfless action (*Gītā*, VI.4). *Niṣkāma-karma* (motiveless action) is for the purification of the mind (*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, 11). Nārada defines devotion as extreme love to some being, while Śāṅḍilya defines it as extreme attachment to Īśvara. From the Advaitic standpoint, both these amount, in fact, to 'seeking after one's real nature'.

According to our scriptures, no real knowledge can be gained without the grace of *guru*, for 'he is verily the Lord Himself'. The afflictions from which the disciple seeks deliverance are those of *Māyā* (illusion), which spring from his own ego and the natural phenomena around him. These are like the clouds that obscure the sun. *Mukti* is the attainment of that Brāhmic state, the equipoise of *triguṇas*, in which 'there is no manifested universe'. *Avidyā* (nescience) or *Māyā*, called also the 'undifferentiated', is the power of the Lord. 'She is to be inferred by one of clear intellect

only from the effects She produces. It is She who brings forth this whole universe.' 'She is neither existent nor non-existent, nor partaking of both characters; neither same nor different nor both; neither composed of parts nor an indivisible whole nor both; She is most wonderful, and cannot be described in words (*Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi*, 108, 109).

This Māyā hides one's vision and stands as a dense barrier against one's knowing oneself and the Truth. She is, in her very nature, phenomenal and transient, for both the experiencer and the experience are themselves phenomenal and fugitive. She is deceitful. She makes herself felt in various ways and in various forms. She becomes the serpent in the rope, silver in the nacre, and water in the mirage. Since the mind is the seat of illusion, there is no liberation till the mind is completely purged of its 'mindness', or the sense of ego, by an absolute surrender of it to the Lord. This means, essentially, the Advaitic oneness of the aspirant with the object of his aspiration, a transfiguration into Brahman.

The greatest of all illusions lies in taking the body and the universe as one's own self and regarding them as real. The sins of commission and omission are traceable only to this belief. The self and the body are not the same. 'The Self is without parts and without a second, but the body is comprised of many parts; the Self is the ruler and subjective, the body is the ruled and objective; the Self is of the nature of knowledge and pure, the body consists of flesh, and is impure; the body is inert; the Self is eternal and real by nature, the body is transient and unreal; and the resplendence of the Self consists in its making all things cognizable; its shining is not like that of fire etc., for there is darkness at night' (*Aparokṣānubhūti*, 17-22, 37). Besides, 'How can the "I" be the body, when there is such a thing as the perceiver "I" and the perceived "body"?' The Self is therefore distinct from both the *sthūla* (gross) and *liṅga* (subtle) *śarīras*, and can be said to be their informing spirit, the supreme Lord, the Soul of all, identical with all, beyond all, the 'I', the

immutable, for it is Brahman alone who 'assumes all names, all forms, and all activities, and whatever is born of Him is of His very nature' (*ibid.*, 50, 51, 52).

Then the question arises, How does the universe that is created by Him exist, and in what manner or form? Śrī Śaṅkara poetizes again and states that the universe exists in Brahman just like the blueness in the sky, like the mirage in a desert, like the illusive appearance of a person in a post, like the ghost in a vacant space, like two moons in the sky, and like a celestial city conjured out of an accidental formation of the clouds by the winds. Like the essential clay of the pot and the essential threads of cloth, Brahman can be said to appear 'under the name of the world' (*ibid.*, 61-63). Śrī Śaṅkara pictures to us, in no less charming manner, this illusive distortion or parallax of the vision through various phenomena, once again borrowed of Nature (*ibid.*, 75-79, 80-85; *Śataślokī*, 49). Like the dizziness that sees the white as yellow, or the world to be revolving when actually it is not so, or like the fire-brand appearing circular when revolved, or the trees appearing topsyturvy when reflected in water, ignorance perceives the Self as the body.

The *Śataślokī* describes rapturously: 'This goddess of illusion has four crests (eminent qualities). She is always fresh and therefore ever young. She is skilful, because she is an expert in accomplishing even the impossible. She is sweet-mouthed at the outset. Thus, too, she veils the knowledge derivable from the Upaniṣads. In her dwell, like two birds, the supreme Self and the individual soul, for they alone make all things manifest' (26). The individual soul, or *jīva*, though it is a ray of the omnipotent supreme Self, is destroyed like the *paṭaṅga* (dragon fly) at the moment of its transmigratory existence, when besmeared with illusion. But the supreme Self remains one and the same like the face that is variously reflected in different mirrors (*media*), or the sun that is multiplied into many in several waters (*Śataślokī*, 51-52). In fact, the sun and the moon and other objects are perceived by the

sense of sight, only because it is inspired by the inner consciousness that can be traced only to the Supreme (*ibid.*, 87).

Thus in a novel way, and by grades of perceptual process through the eye, the mind, and the intellect, Śrī Śaṅkara determines the transience of all cognitions, and traces their primary source to an inspiration from the Lord, who alone 'is the absolute seer, the witness, for He is never like the above objective' (eye, mind, etc.). So the seeker after liberation should regard everything, inclusive of the universe, as non-essential and unreal, and abandon it just like one who, having drunk the juice of a fruit, throws it away, although the remnant may be highly fragrant (*ibid.*, 89). This realization expressed by Śrī Śaṅkara in *Śataślokī*, 92, 101, is an epitome of his *Ātmapañcaka*, *Nirvāṇaśatka*, *Nirvāṇadaśaka*, etc.

In yet another sublime simile of *Śataślokī*, Śrī Śaṅkara compares *saṁsāra* (worldly life) to a 'huge tree, which bears the fruits of births and deaths before, betwixt, and after; whose roots are the result of past actions; whose countless leaves are delusions, vanities, joys, and sorrows; whose branches are desire, anger, etc.; and on which dwell the birds of sons and cattle, wives and daughters in huge numbers'. He exhorts people to sue for deliverance in arduous terms: 'Make me immortal for ever, O Soma (Hiraṇyagarbha), in that abode of concentrated bliss, and vouchsafe to my soul that is betwixt the brows an unceasing shower of immortality.' The seeker after liberation must therefore be dynamic in the pursuit of his ideal, and he must be like the bird 'which, by the motion of its wings, generates breeze and by

its aid reaches a great height, and there, having attained the vast expanse of the atmosphere, cures itself of its fatigue by spreading its wings and obtains its own blissful quiet' (*ibid.*, 68).

The supreme Bliss is of the nature of the Absolute; it is something internal and inexpressibly beyond the 'priya, moda, and pramoda' degrees of enjoyment. It is the culmination of realization, which is not conscious of itself, for it has been merged into Brahman. It becomes the 'self-effulgent Ātman itself, the Witness of the three states, the Real, the Changeless, the Untainted' (*Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, 211). It is not the Void of the Buddhists, nor the Nothing of the nihilists. Just as 'motion presupposes rest, so the ever changing Prakṛti has behind it the immutable Ātman'. It is like the self-luminous sun that is seen after laying aside 'the jar, the water, and the reflection of the sun in it'. For sheer melody of sound and sense, *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, 92, 93, 94, 145, 207, 237, 238, 355, and 378 are peerless.

Śrī Śaṅkara's picture of Brahman has the same sanctity as that of the Vedic or Upaniṣadic seers. 'It is Existence, Knowledge, the Absolute, pure, supreme, self-existent, eternal, and individual Bliss, not different, in reality, from the individual soul, and devoid of interior or exterior—there It reigns triumphant' (*ibid.*, 225). 'It transcends all contradictions created by Māyā or nescience; it is eternal beyond the reach of pain, indivisible, immeasurable, formless, undifferentiated (as knower, knowledge, and known), nameless, immutable, self-luminous, and an eternal embodiment of *rasa*' (*ibid.*, 237-39).

(To be continued)

Poetry is the language of the soul, while prose is the language of science. The former is the language of mystery, of devotion, of religion. Prose lays bare its whole meaning to the intelligence, while poetry plunges us in the *mysterium tremendum* of life and suggests the truths that cannot be stated. An atmosphere of the numinous envelops all poetry. In the last analysis, the essentially poetical character is derived from the creative intuition which holds sound, suggestion, and sense in organic solution.

GANDHIJI'S PATHWAY TO PEACE—1

PEACE INTERNAL

BY SRI M. S. DESHPANDE

Gandhiji has been rightly called a 'Prophet of Peace'. It is a fitting tribute to him, because all his activities had been actuated by, and directed towards, the achievement of universal peace. The peace he tried to establish had two aspects: one internal and the other external. He wanted to bring about internal peace in the lives of individuals and external peace in the affairs of societies and nations.

The lives of individuals are very often disturbed by internal conflicts, just as those of societies and nations are disturbed by external ones. In fact, these internal discords of individuals are projected outside in societies, and bring about external discords. Hence, if the internal ones are satisfactorily resolved, the external ones also can be easily lessened.

Each individual has his own internal conflicts—conflicts among his ideals and his thoughts, among his feelings and his tastes, among his thousand and one desires, as well as the numerous demands of his senses. He experiences clashes among them every day, nay, every hour, which undermine his peace of mind and throw him in the cauldron of eternal unrest. The smooth tenor of his life is violently disturbed, and it becomes a prey to terrible storms and whirlwinds.

How to resolve these conflicts and remove these discords is a very important problem. Eminent thinkers, both of the East and the West, after long and deep thinking, have hit upon only one remedy for their successful elimination, viz. the integration of personality. People nowadays, more than ever before, are suffering from divided personality. Their lives have lost old moorings and have not secured new ones. Old ideals and ways of life have disappeared without giving place to new ones. Hence they are drifting aimlessly—they know not where. They are assailed by doubts at

every step, which remain unanswered, as they have not developed any proper philosophy of life which is capable of resolving them. They thus become nervous wrecks, spend sleepless nights, and always allow themselves to be assailed by imaginary nightmares requiring mental treatment.

Integration of personality is, thus, the only remedy to bring peace to our disturbed lives. Such an integration requires the inculcation of a proper philosophy of life. A sound philosophy not only gives a correct view of life, enabling a person to formulate a proper goal for himself, but also shows him the correct way leading towards the goal. Thus it serves both as a science as well as an art of life, making a person well-versed both in the theory and practice of proper living. The spread of such a philosophy will soon bring about integration and automatically result in the descent of peace.

What was the philosophy of life that Gandhiji practised and preached for the achievement of integration and peace? His philosophy had given him a clear idea about the nature of individual life, as well as that of the universal life. He knew full well the nature of God, soul, and the world, as well their relation with one another. This had enabled him to formulate and fix the goal of his life, together with the pathway leading to it. With the help of this philosophy and his *sādhanā* to reach the goal, he had succeeded in creating a sound integration in his life, which enabled him to enjoy undisturbed peace throughout his eventful life—even during the most critical periods. Gandhiji could, thus, leave behind him his brilliant example of a well-formulated philosophy of life for the guidance of future generations. Let us now have a glimpse at his pathway to peace internal.

The ideal that Gandhiji had placed before

himself was God-realization. 'I want to see God face to face', he used to say very often. Though Gandhiji started his life with disbelief in God and prayer, and continued to maintain the same attitude for a long time, he did feel a void in his life at a later stage, which led him soon to read the real meaning of creation. Thereafter, he was surer of God's existence than even of the people sitting in his room. He felt very miserable to find that he was still far away from God, even though he was conscious that God governed every breath of his life. But the feeling that he was journeying Godward gave him some solace, for he occasionally felt the warmth of the sunshine of His presence.

What is Gandhiji's conception of God-realization? Says he: 'I hold that complete realization of God is impossible in this embodied life. Nor is it necessary. A living immovable faith is all that is required for reaching the full spiritual height attainable by human beings.' To him, God-realization is a supersensuous experience, consisting in the feeling of His constant presence in the heart. Still, he appears to have enjoyed other spiritual experiences as well. He speaks about the inner voice, which may be likened to the *anāhata* sound heard by the mystics. Though small in the beginning, this inner voice gradually appears to have assumed greater and greater sonorousness and power. 'The divine music', he tells us, 'is incessantly going on within ourselves. But our loud senses drown the delicate music, which is unlike and infinitely superior to anything we can hear with our senses.' Along with this 'still small voice', Gandhiji speaks about the 'pillar of fire' and the 'inner light'. 'When this light corresponds with the promptings of the inner voice,' he says, 'then that flash has the mark of inspiration.' He also speaks about the lustre of Truth which is 'million-times more brilliant than that of the sun' and the 'faint glimmer of the mighty effulgence of Truth'. Gandhiji appears to have also received messages and heard actual words emerging from the inner voice. He was thus not only able to hear the spiritual sound, but was also able to hear the

words from God, 'the supreme Counsellor'. These messages as well as the glimpses of God never failed him in the most critical periods of his life. Hence Gandhiji placed implicit faith in their guidance and acted according to their direction. He advised others also to do the same.

The *sādhanā* that Gandhiji chalked out for reaching this ideal is threefold. It is intellectual, moral, and spiritual. A clear conception regarding the nature of God, soul, and the world forms the intellectual aspect of the *sādhanā*. Gandhiji wants us all to implicitly believe in the existence of God and never to fall a prey to non-belief. He realized the futility and impossibility of reasoning out His existence. Says Gandhiji: 'God exists, because we exist. Really we are not; He alone is. If we will be, we must eternally sing His praise and do His will.' This is Gandhiji's first criterion to prove God's existence. The direct testimony of saints, who are the eyewitnesses, is the second criterion. He wants us to believe in them and make our faith in God firm and living.

Like all other saints, Gandhiji said that God is One without a second. He has innumerable names, but Gandhiji chose to call Him 'Truth'. Gandhiji's Truth—absolute Truth—has a very wide connotation. It not only connotes eternal Existence, both in time and space, but it also connotes eternal Knowledge, Power, and Bliss. Gandhiji's Truth is Light, Life, Goodness, and Law. It is a mysterious Power that holds all together, creates, dissolves and recreates. Infinite is its love and boundless its mercy. Such is the Truth he worshipped with all his heart and wanted us all to worship with perfect devotion.

'Our soul is immortal', says Gandhiji. It is the eternal spark of the divine fire. 'We may not be God,' says he, 'but we are of God, even as a little drop of water is the ocean. Imagine it torn away from the ocean and flung millions of miles away. It becomes helpless, and cannot feel the might and majesty of the ocean. But if some one could point out to it that it

is the ocean (and teach it to realize it), its faith would revive, and it would dance with joy, and the whole might and majesty of the ocean would be reflected in it.'

'But our earthly existence is', according to Gandhiji, 'so fickle that it can be wiped out in the twinkling of an eye.' 'What are hundred years in Eternity?' he asks, and advises all to shatter the chains of egotism and melt into the ocean of humanity and share its dignity. Gandhiji also tells us that death is as necessary for man's growth as life itself. Death is inevitable. It is a wise plan in the economy of nature. It is a welcome friend, a deliverer. Death is at any time blessed, but it is twice blessed for a warrior who dies for Truth. It is a mere change when we work for God. Therefore Gandhiji advises us all to introspect, realize our real nature and duty, fight with the inner foes, develop all our Godward faculties to perfection, and enjoy the bliss of God-realization.

The moral *sādhanā* which Gandhiji enjoins concerns the fight with the inner foes, viz. vices, and the acquisition of some cardinal virtues. In fact, our attempt at the cultivation of virtues will automatically bring about the elimination of vices. The main virtues, which Gandhiji wants us to develop, are truth, love, and self-restraint. These three, along with devotion to God which crowns them all, are the basic virtues. Gandhiji's truth, as a virtue, consists in the correspondence between thought, word, and deed. Prompting of the inner voice or conscience is the true thought. Its undiluted—clear—exact and accurate expression in speech and action will invest words and deeds with the sanctity of truth. Gandhiji wants us to realize such truth by single-minded devotion (*abhyāsa*) and indifference to every other interest in life (*vairāgya*). He advises the seeker of truth to observe silence occasionally, because it helps 'the soul to find the path in clearer light' and 'attain the full height'. 'A man of few words', says he, 'will rarely be thoughtless in his speech. He will measure every word.'

'True love is boundless like the ocean and, swelling within one, spreads itself out and envelops the whole world.' Such is the unselfish pure love which Gandhiji advocates. Says he: 'Love is life, hatred is death. The law of love, call it attraction, affinity, cohesion, if you like, governs the world. Love is the reverse of the coin of which the obverse is truth. Truth ever triumphs over untruth; love conquers hatred. Hatred always tries to kill, but love never dies.' Non-violence is another name which Gandhiji has given to such a pure love. His non-violence and love are one and the same. They depict the negative and positive aspects of the same attitude of mind. Pure unselfish love is perfectly non-violent, and perfect non-violence is full of pure love. Thus they are identical.

Self-restraint is the third cardinal virtue which Gandhiji desires us to cultivate. If truth supports and love unites, self-restraint gives the necessary strength to the *sādhanā* and enables him to walk with courage and confidence on the pathway to perfection and peace. Self-restraint is the source of all strength, the spring of all power. It is the mother of so many vows like non-stealing, celibacy, non-taste, etc. Voluntary restraint is the privilege of man. Control of the palate is the source of perfect health and strength. It will also enable him to control all other senses with ease. And he who can conquer the senses can conquer the whole world. Complete control over all the senses—control of thought, word, and deed alike—will bring a power of the highest potency and a purity of the highest type. Gandhiji was thus a powerful advocate of this virtue.

Along with these two kinds of *sādhanās*, the third, viz. spiritual *sādhanā*, also was practised and preached by Gandhiji. A living faith in God, heartfelt prayer, meditation on *Rāmanāma*, and selfless service of the creation are the four things that constitute this *sādhanā*. Gandhiji highly extols 'the living immovable faith'. 'Intellect', he says, 'takes us along in the battle of life to a certain extent, but at critical moments it fails us. Faith transcends

reason. It is when the horizon is the darkest, and human reason is beaten down to the ground, that faith shines the brightest and comes to our rescue.' 'Faith is not a delicate flower that withers under the slightest stormy weather. It moves mountains and jumps across the ocean. That faith is nothing but the wide awake consciousness of God within. He who has achieved that faith wants nothing. Bodily diseased, he is spiritually healthy; physically poor, he rolls in spiritual riches.'

Prayer is the next spiritual *sādhanā* advocated by Gandhiji. He himself was essentially a man of faith and prayer. 'Prayer really is complete meditation and melting into the higher Self—God.' 'He who hungers for the awakening of the Divine in him must fall back upon prayer.' Real prayer prefers heart without words to words without heart. It needs no speech. It must spring from the heart. Prayer is a call to humility—a call to self-purification, to inward search and peace. A man of prayer will be at peace with himself and with the whole world. 'I believe', declares Gandhiji, 'that prayer is the very soul and essence of religion, and therefore it must be the very core of the life of man.' Along with prayer, Gandhiji asked us to enthrone Rāma in our hearts and take God's name with every breath. 'I have no strength', writes Gandhiji, 'save what God has given me. I know that I can do nothing, God can do everything. My

greatest weapon is mute prayer.'

The last *sādhanā* advocated by Gandhiji is selfless service. Says he: 'The only way to find God is to see Him in His creation and be one with it. Service of His creatures is service of God.' Hence Gandhiji urges us to make service the staff of our lives. 'I am striving for the Kingdom of Heaven,' he tells us, 'which is spiritual deliverance. For me the road to salvation lies through incessant toil in the service of my country and of my humanity.' 'I recognize no God except the God that is to be found in the hearts of dumb millions. . . . And I worship the God that is Truth through the service of these millions.' Gandhiji tried to reduce himself to a cipher, identify himself with everything that lives, and live at peace with friend and foe alike. Thus did he hope to attain salvation through selfless service. He wants all to pour their whole soul in such service and enjoy its blessings. He strongly maintained that loving service, offered in a spirit of humility, will bring about proper self-purification, which, in the fullness of time, will lead to God-realization.

Such is the nature of Gandhiji's pathway to internal peace, which, if followed faithfully, is sure to bring about the integration of personality, elimination of conflicts, and consequent emergence of peace. Gandhiji walked the pathway, enjoyed the blessings of peace, and then preached it to all for adoption.

ŚRĪ-BHĀSYA

BY SWAMI VIRESWARANANDA

(Continued from previous issue)

TOPIC 2

THE SOUL IN DREAMLESS SLEEP

Now the state of deep sleep or *susupti* is taken up for discussion.

तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेः आत्मनि च ॥३१२॥

7. The absence of that (dreaming, i.e. dreamless sleep takes place) in the nerves and in the self, as it is known from the Śruti.

In different texts, *susupti* (deep sleep) is said to take place under different conditions. 'And when a man is asleep . . . so that he sees no

dreams, then he has entered into those nerves (*nāḍīs*)' (*Chā. U.*, VIII.6.3); 'Through them, he moves forth and rests in the pericardium, i.e. in the region of the heart' (*Br. U.*, II.1.19); 'When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the True' (*Chā. U.*, VI.8.1). The question is whether each of them alternatively or all of them together are the seat of deep sleep. The opponent holds that, as the various places mentioned are in the same case ending, the locative case, they are alternatives; and, moreover, the sleeping soul being atomic cannot be at all the places. The *sūtra* refutes this and says that there can be no alternative in such cases, for all the Vedic texts are equally authoritative, and to accept one alternative would mean the sublation of the authority of the other texts for the time being. The same case ending, moreover, is used where things serve different purposes and have to be combined, as, for example, when we say, 'He sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on a couch', where we have to combine the two into one as 'He sleeps on a couch in the palace'. Similarly, here also we have to combine all the texts, meaning that the soul goes through the nerves to the region of the heart and there rests in Brahman. Thus Brahman alone is the immediate resting place of the soul in deep sleep.

अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात् ॥३१२।८॥

8. Hence the awakening from this (i.e. Brahman).

Since Brahman is the immediate resting place of the soul, the Śruti declares that the souls awake from that, i.e. Brahman, 'All these creatures, when they have come back from the True, know not that they have come back from the True' (*Chā. U.*, VI.10.2).

TOPIC 3

THE SELFSAME SOUL RETURNS FROM SUSUPTI

स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः ॥३१२।९॥

9. But the selfsame soul (returns from Brahman after *susupti*) on account of work, memory, scriptural authority, and precept.

Does the same soul arise after *susupti* or a different one? The opponent holds that, since the soul in deep sleep rests in Brahman, freed from all its limitations, it is as good as a released soul, and can no more have any connection with *samsāra*; so the soul rising from deep sleep is a different one.

This view the *sūtra* refutes and says that the selfsame soul returns after deep sleep, for the following reasons: (1) The soul has to undergo retribution for the good and evil acts done by it before it attains knowledge. If a different soul arises, then the retribution would be experienced by one who has not done that *karma*. So one will be punished for the actions of another, while the latter goes scot-free. (2) There is the experience of identity of personality before and after deep sleep. (3) There is the scriptural authority in texts like, 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, ... that they become again' (*Chā. U.*, VI.9.3). From this, we find that the selfsame soul returns after deep sleep. (4) If the person who rises from sleep is a different one, then scriptural injunctions with respect to release would be useless. For, if a person attains release by merely going to sleep, the scriptural instruction would be unnecessary for attaining liberation. Nor can it be said that the soul in deep sleep is free from all limitations, and manifests itself in its true nature like the released soul, for the description of the two states in scriptural texts is quite different. Of the former state, the Śruti says, 'It seems as if he has gone to annihilation. I see no good in this' (*Chā. U.*, VIII.11.1). Of the released soul, it says, 'There he moves ... rejoicing' (*ibid.*, VIII.12.3); 'He becomes sovereign. He becomes free to act as he wishes' (*ibid.*, VII.25.2; see also *ibid.*, VII.26.2). While the sleeping soul is ignorant, the released soul is all-knowing etc. The sleeping soul is still within the sphere of *samsāra*, but having discarded temporarily the instruments of action and knowledge, and thus being incapable of knowledge and enjoyment, it rests completely

in Brahman and rises again refreshed for new enjoyment and action. So deep sleep is not liberation; hence the selfsame soul returns after deep sleep.

TOPIC 4

THE NATURE OF A SWOON

मुग्धेऽर्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात् ॥३१२।१०॥

10. In a swoon, there is partial death, as that is the only alternative left.

The question of swoon is taken up for discussion now. Is swoon included in the three

states already stated above and the fourth state, death, or is it a fifth state different from them? The *sūtra* states that it is partial death. It is not waking or dream state, as the soul has no consciousness in a swoon; nor can it be deep sleep, for that gives rest and happiness, which a swoon does not. On the other hand, it gives only pain and suffering. The causes that lead the soul to the two states also are different. Nor can it be death, because a person in a swoon returns to life. So the only alternative left is to regard it as partial death.

(To be continued)

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TO OUR READERS

A senior monk of the Ramakrishna Order, Swami Satprakashananda is the founder-head of the Vedanta Society of St. Louis (Missouri), U. S. A. His article, only a part of which is presented in this issue, gives a lucid exposition of 'Īśvara and His Māyā' from the non-dualistic viewpoint. The article, to be concluded in the next issue, forms a chapter of the Swami's prospective book now under preparation. . . .

'Akhaṇḍārtha or the Theory of Judgement' is a penetrating study of one of the fundamental problems of Indian logic by Dr. P. S. Sastri, M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., who has recently joined Nagpur University as Reader and Head of the Department of English. Dr. Sastri is a regular contributor to *Prabuddha Bharata*. . . .

The highest Advaitic truth, as propounded by Śrī Śaṅkara, is that all duality is unreal and Brahman alone is real. The self of man, Ātman, is, indeed, Brahman, which is Existence-Knowledge-Bliss Absolute. This essential teaching of Advaita Vedānta, as contained in two of the most notable works of Śaṅkarācārya, viz. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* and *Śataślokī*, forms the subject of the third part of Sri P. Sama Rao's article on 'The Poetry of Śrī Śaṅkara'. . . .

The philosophy of life that Gandhiji practised and preached aimed at bringing peace not only to the individual (peace internal), but also to humanity at large (peace external). In the first article on 'Gandhiji's Pathway to Peace', given in this issue, Sri M. S. Deshpande, M.A., formerly Principal of K. G. Vidyalaya, Ramatirth, Jamakhandi, describes the several *sādhanās* advocated by Gandhiji for acquiring 'peace internal'. The second article, dealing with Gandhiji's pathway to 'peace external' will be included in the next issue.

DOES SWAMI VIVEKANANDA CONTRADICT HIMSELF?

An interesting discussion on Swami Vivekananda's *Karma-yoga*, which took place between some members of an 'Introductory Group' belonging to Tetra Kalia School of Philosophy, Cape Town, South Africa, and their 'Master', is published in Volume III, Number 29 of *Philosophia*, the typescript journal of the above mentioned school of philosophy. The discussion centres round two statements made by Swami Vivekananda: 'Do good and be good. And this will take you to freedom and to whatever truth there is' and 'Any of the paths will

earn you the grace of God to such an extent that that will over-ride all other things.' The teacher, who is of the view that *jñāna-yoga* is superior to *karma-yoga*, remarks at the end of the discussion: 'The statement sounds very nice, but I don't think any thinking philosopher would accept it as stated there. Vivekananda has in some places condemned Buddhism as being of no account at all. He says somewhere that Buddhism died out in India, because it could not stand the light of thought. These are my words as I remember them. I find that *Vivekananda contradicts himself quite a lot*' (italics ours).

Everyone is within his rights to disagree with the views of Swami Vivekananda, and the Swami himself would have been the first to appreciate the person who disagreed with him. But does the Swami really contradict himself? To be sure, there *are* passages in the writings, speeches, and lectures of Swami Vivekananda that, on the surface at least, appear to be contradictory, and the students of the Swami's works, especially the beginners, do often find them perplexing. There is, however, little reason for getting perplexed, if only the students approach the works in the correct spirit and with the right attitude of mind. The contradictions we meet with in the Swami's works are not far removed in their nature from the ones we find in the scriptures of the various religions, nor are they all irreconcilable. As a matter of fact, the Swami's works are merely a simple and clear exposition of the truths embedded in the ancient scriptures of Hinduism, in their relation to modern life. Only the Swami has attempted therein to synthesize the conflicting elements in the ancient texts and to make the exposition as scientific and rational as possible. Though on many points he differed in his reading of the ancient scriptures from the great *ācāryas* who had preceded him, he was not a deviationist from the ancient tradition. He was, indeed, a true follower of the ancient Hindu seers. We have his own authority for saying this. He says: 'My plan is to follow the ideas of the great

ancient Masters. I have studied their work, and it has been given unto me to discover the line of action they took. They were the great originators of society. They were the great givers of strength, and of purity, and of life. They did most marvellous work. We have to do most marvellous work also. Circumstances have become a little different, and in consequence the lines of action have to be changed a little, and that is all' (*The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, Vol. III. p. 220).

A deeper, comprehensive study of the Swami's works would reveal to us that the various statements he makes, though apparently contradictory, are, in fact, complementary to each other. Every statement has to be understood in the light of the explanation given in the other statements dealing with the same topic, for they are not isolated and unconnected pieces. Each statement sets forth and emphasizes a particular idea, or elaborates it from a particular point of view, but they are not contradictory on that account. The Swami himself makes this clear in a conversation he had with a disciple. The disciple asks him: 'Sir, you sometimes say, "All are Nārāyaṇas, the poor and the needy are my Nārāyaṇas", and again you say, "Men should be counted as worms". What do you really mean?' The Swami replies: 'Well, there is not the least doubt that all are Nārāyaṇas. But all Nārāyaṇas do not criticize the furniture of the Math. I shall go on working for the good of men, without caring in the least for the criticisms of others—it is in this sense that the expression, "Men are to be counted as worms", has been used' (*ibid.*, Vol. VII. p. 248).

The Swami, it is true, has given different instructions and advice to different persons or to the same persons at different times. The reason is easy to see. The religious teacher *par excellence* that he was, he knew that all persons are not of the same temperament and that they are at different stages of development. Naturally, the instruction that is suited to one person would not be suitable for another. One coat, to use a familiar simile of the Swami,

cannot fit everybody, or the same person at different stages of his growth. 'The whole world of religions', as the Swami explains, 'is only a travelling, a coming up, of different men and women, through various conditions and circumstances, to the same goal. . . . The contradictions come from the same truth adapting itself to the varying circumstances of different natures' (*ibid.*, Vol. I. p. 15). 'Each man,' he says in another place, 'according to his nature, has a peculiar tendency, and takes to certain ideals and a certain path by which to reach them' (*ibid.*, Vol. VI. p. 103).

The discussion quoted above from the *Philosophia* refers to the contradiction involved in Swami Vivekananda's praise of Buddha and condemnation of Buddhism. This condemnation and praise of the same persons and things at different times is a type of contradiction, to understand which we must always remember that the Swami was, first and foremost, a prophet and a seer, and only secondarily a philosopher, a logician, and an intellectual. He was an inspirer of men, with a message to humanity, to which, as he said, he had 'no time to give a polish'. His one object in life, his one desire, he used to say, was 'to rouse the sleeping Leviathan that has lost all faith in his power and makes no response'. 'Realization of the Ātman, the attainment of freedom, is the essential thing', he declared many times. On another occasion, he said: 'If we read the history of nations between the lines, we shall always find that the rise of a nation comes with an increase in the number of such men (men who have realized the Truth), and the fall begins when this pursuit after the Infinite . . . has ceased. . . . The mainspring of the strength of every race lies in its spirituality, and the death of that race begins the day that spirituality wanes and materialism gains ground' (*ibid.*, Vol. II. p. 65). Wherever he went, particularly in the country of his birth, his energies were directed towards the one end of making people conscious of the tremendous power that resided within them. Whatever he did and spoke was for the purpose of instilling faith,

confidence, and strength into the hearts of the people. And, often, he used very strong language in condemning and criticizing certain aspects—only *certain aspects*—of the usages, institutions, systems of thought, and views of persons, which, he was convinced, had brought about degradation and retarded the progress of the nation and individuals. But there were the other aspects that certainly deserved praise and commendation, and the Swami did praise them and presented them to his audience as the ideal worth preserving and following. He was not in any way dogmatic in his assertions, and allowed his hearers the freedom to critically examine his words, reject what was irreconcilable, accept what was in conformity with reason, and follow in practice what suited best to each one. 'Take up what suits you and let others take up what they need' (*ibid.*, Vol. II. p. 348); 'I do not come to convert you to a new belief. I want you to keep your own belief. . . . I want to teach you to live the truth, to reveal the light within your own soul' (*ibid.*, Vol. VI. p. 124), are his words. Once a disciple asked him: 'Sir, you sometimes hold before us the householder's ideal and sometimes the ideal of the *sannyāsin*. Which one are we to adopt?' The Swami's reply was: 'Well, go on listening to all. Then stick to that one which appeals to you—grip it hard like a bulldog' (*ibid.*, Vol. VII. pp. 249-50). The Swami's main intention was to draw the attention of his hearers to both the bright and dark aspects of a question. Many times he used such language only to drive home and impress upon his hearers the truth of the statement he was making. Condemnation, on occasions, was with him only a way of eulogizing the opposite of what was condemned and stressing its value.

Another characteristic feature of the Swami's works, which may be misconstrued as a contradiction, is the use of hyperbolic language in presenting certain ideals to his audience. For example, while he was addressing the people of Madras, he always said: 'Young men of Madras, my hope is in you.' But when he was addressing the people of Calcutta, he said: 'In

other parts of India, there is intellect, there is money, but enthusiasm is only in my motherland. That must come out; therefore arise, young men of Calcutta, with enthusiasm in your blood.' And when he was addressing the people of Lahore, he appealed to them in a similar vein, as if everything depended on them and them alone. Or, when he would speak of *karma-yoga*, he would speak of it as if it were the best of all *yogas*; and when it was a question of *jñāna-yoga* or *bhakti-yoga*, he would speak of them as if they were the best. The explanations that have been offered in the foregoing paragraphs are applicable here also, and no further explanation is needed. Only one point may be mentioned. Such use of the hyperbolic language is frequently resorted to in the scriptures of Hinduism, in order to take people by the hand from where they stand and give them a lift to a higher plane. In the Vedas, for example, we find a peculiar phenomenon, named as Henotheism or Kathenotheism. The various gods, such as Indra, Varuṇa, and so on, are, one after another, raised to the highest status, and described to be omnipresent, omnipotent, and the God of gods. So also in the Purāṇas, we sometimes find Viṣṇu being

described as the greatest of all the gods, and at other times Śiva and Brahmā. The same scriptures also say that the various gods are the manifestations of the one supreme Lord. We do not, however, conclude therefrom that the scriptures are all contradictory, but reconcile contradictory statements on the principle of *iṣṭaniṣṭhā* or single-minded devotion to the chosen ideal.

Finally, there are the contradictions between some of the Swami's utterances expressed in the earlier part of his life, and those expressed in the later part of it. Strictly speaking, they are not contradictions at all. What appears as contradiction is merely the evolution of ideas in the thought-process of the Swami. The earlier period represents a stage in the Swami's life, when he was still groping in the dark and feeling his way through to find out solutions to the various problems that beset him at the time. The opinions he expressed then had not yet become crystallized into his settled convictions, and he was still questioning the authoritativeness of many of them. So there is nothing incongruous if the Swami changed some of his earlier opinions later on, when he arrived at mature conclusions.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

A WORLD WITHOUT JEWS. BY KARL MARX. EDITED AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DAGOBERT D. RUNES. *Published by Philosophical Library, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16. 1959. Pages 51. Price \$2.75.*

The recrudescence of anti-Semitism in the contemporary world is a source of deep concern to all decent citizens of the free world. Somehow, in our minds, Jew-baiting is linked only with Nazism. That communism is a close ally of Nazism in this respect is not known to many of us. This fact, which has been sedulously shielded from our view, is now exposed to full view of the free world by the brochure under review.

The diatribes and vitriolic outpourings of the founder of dialectical materialism against an ancient

culture are astounding. Here are a few examples: 'Let us look at the real Jew of our time. . . . What is the object of the Jew's worship in this world? Usury. What is his worldly God? Money' (p. 37). 'The Law of the Jew, lacking all solid foundation, is only a religious caricature of morality and of law in general' (p. 42.) And more of this anaemic, corrosive, and depressing stuff is to be found throughout the book.

Intense hatred of an old, well-established spiritual culture springs out of an inferiority complex in its presence. If you cannot reach up to the level of your superior, destroy him or, worse, paint him black!

As the publisher's note rightly mentions: 'Most of Marx's anti-Semitic diatribes were carefully elimi-

nated by the editors of his works.' Philosophical Library has earned the gratitude of the free world by publishing this rare, unexpurgated English edition, with a fearless, illuminating, and critical introduction by Dagobert D. Runes.

PROFESSOR P. S. NAIDU

THE SOUL OF INDIA SPEAKS. BY JAGADISH CHANDRA GHOSH. *Published by Presidency Library, 15 College Square, Calcutta-12. Pages 240. Price Rs. 5.*

In this instructive book, the author presents an illuminating account of India's spiritual heritage expressed through humanitarian service, universal love, and goodwill among men. The ancient scriptures of India proclaimed this message of love and goodwill to all mankind. Self-realization has always been reconciled here with social and humanitarian service. To realize Brahman is to see the supreme Reality in Its creation and to be one with It. The highest form of spiritual effort includes selfless work aimed at the good of the whole of creation.

The book has been aptly named *The Soul of India Speaks*: it speaks of the true excellence of Indian thought and culture—the culture which was demonstrated in the lives of a long succession of sages and seers, saints and other immortal sons of India, and which has nourished and sustained this country through the ages.

DR. ANIMA SEN GUPTA

MY MEMORABLE MOMENTS WITH BAPU. BY MANUBEHN GANDHI. *Published by Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad 14. 1960. Pages 48. Price 50 nP.*

This is an English version of a book originally written in Gujarati by Srimati Manubehn Gandhi, and contains twenty-six anecdotes garnered by her from her own experience in association with Gandhiji. The original Gujarati book was adjudged worthy of a prize by the Government of India under their scheme for encouraging social education literature in our various national languages. The translation into English has been done by Sri Arvind Sheth, and the English edition carries a Foreword by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Srimati Manubehn Gandhi is one of the few who had the privilege of serving Gandhiji personally for several years and learning life-moulding and character-building lessons from their intimate association with him. Having set for himself certain moral and spiritual standards in his day-to-day life and work, Gandhiji tried to inculcate the same ideals in others around him as well. Our author says: 'To

work for him was as difficult as handling the sharp edge of a razor.'

Some of the anecdotes given in the book are very touching, and portray the characteristic qualities of Gandhiji's refined heart, and how he bestowed meticulous care, almost bordering on devotion, upon every minute detail of whatever work he did in his busy life. It is a book that no one should fail to read.

S. A.

LANGUAGE OF THE SELF. BY FRITHJOF SCHUON. TRANSLATED BY MARCO PALLIS AND MACLEOD MATHESON. *Published by Ganesh & Co. (Madras) Private Ltd., Madras-17. 1959. Pages xxii+262. Price Rs. 15.*

Frithjof Schuon belongs to the illustrious company of Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and René Guénon. It was a select band of scholars deeply convinced of the truths embodied in Hinduism. They dedicated themselves to the supreme task of propagating and popularizing the various aspects of Hinduism among Western audiences.

Guénon's disciple Schuon comes from Switzerland; and this in itself helped him to realize a synthesis of different cults and systems. In the work under review, Schuon has collected eleven of his papers on topics that have a bearing on Hinduism.

Schuon is a traditionalist who upholds orthodoxy. This made him treat Swami Vivekananda rather harshly as a deviationist; and yet he admits elsewhere in the work that no religion or system can remain as it was under modern conditions. After outlining orthodoxy, he offers a general account of the Vedānta as developed by Śaṅkara and as enunciated by Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa and Sri Ramana Maharshi. Vedānta is contained in the question, 'Who am I?' It is a form of self-knowledge, which alone delivers man from bondage. How a Western seeker can have this self-knowledge is outlined in two chapters, one of these being an account of *yoga*. In this connection, the author takes great pains to show the orthodoxy and originality of Buddhism. Incidentally, it may be remarked that the author follows Guénon in accepting transmigration and in rejecting the rebirth of a human soul on the earth. This is difficult to establish. If rebirth is possible, it is possible anywhere.

Schuon's treatment of art is stimulating. His defence of the caste system is the best part of the work. Though scientists are opposed to the reality of races, Schuon has a very good chapter on the meaning of race, which deserves a careful study.

Gnosis or *jñāna* is the language of the self. It is a language where love and goodness are inseparable from *jñāna*. This is the undercurrent of the entire

work; and it is also the theme of the last chapter.

The book suffers from the lack of any unity. It has repetitions; and it is not tolerant of any changes in the stream of Hindu thought and religion.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

HINDI

KALYĀN (SAMKSIPTA DEVĪBHĀGAVATĀṆK)
VOLUME XXXIV. No. 1. Published by Gita Press,
Gorakhpur, U.P. Pages 704. Price Rs. 7.50.

Kalyān, the well-known Hindi religious monthly, begins with a special number every year. This year's special number, published in January 1960, gives a literal translation of the *Devībhāgavata* in an abridged form. Though the entire volume is practically occupied by the *Devībhāgavata* itself, there are a few scholarly articles, both at the beginning and at the end, dealing with the significance and efficacy of Śakti worship.

Hinduism accepts and extols the Motherhood of God. Śakti worship, offered to the Universal Mother in Her various aspects, is the dominant religion in some of the regions of India. Śakti is worshipped in such popular forms as Durgā, Kālī, Lakṣmī, Sarasvatī, and Bhavānī. Saints there have been many in this country who had had the vision of the Mother and attained the highest spiritual knowledge through Her grace.

Tradition has it that Maharṣi Veda-Vyāsa composed the Purāṇas with a view to imparting the knowledge of *dharma* to the common people. The *Devībhāgavata*, presented in this volume, discusses, through interesting stories and dialogues, the process of achieving the fourfold *puruṣārtha*, namely, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, and *mokṣa*. It has been said here that the fourfold human objective cannot be realized without the grace of Śakti, the Universal Mother. How to receive Her grace by worshipping Her in several ways forms the chief theme that runs

through the pages of this volume. The translation of the *Devībhāgavata* text is simple and faithful.

As usual, this special number also is profusely illustrated, and maintains the high standard of the Gita Press publications. The volume is a valuable gift to India's religious literature in Hindi.

SWAMI NIRGUNANANDA

PARAMĀRTHA (BHAGAVAT-PREMĀṆK).
VOLUME XI. Nos. 1-2. Published by Mumukshu
Ashram, Shahajahanpur, U.P. Pages 196.
Price Rs. 4.

This is *Paramārtha's* special number for 1960, and it is devoted to *Bhagavat-prema* or love divine. Among its contributors are some notable writers in Hindi, both lay and monastic.

Pure *bhakti* and pure *jñāna* are not different. They are one and the same. In the words of Swami Vivekananda: 'There is no difference between the supreme *bhakti* and the supreme *jñāna*. The supreme *bhakti* is to realize God as the form of *prema* (love) itself. . . . In the perfect realization of love, even the consciousness of one's own body does not exist. . . . Realization of love comes to none unless one becomes a perfect *jñāni*.' So even in the initial stages, *bhakti* should be tempered with *jñāna*, if it is not to lead to mere emotional effusion. Similarly, *jñāna* without *bhakti* will end up in dry intellectualism. There should be a happy combination of both for a healthy, balanced growth of the spiritual life of the aspirant. In the articles given in this volume, there should have been an emphasis on reconciliation between *jñāna* and *bhakti*.

The importance and efficacy of *prema* or love for the realization of God is the central theme of the articles. All the stages of *bhakti* or divine love up to *parā-bhakti* have been discussed against the background of Hindu scriptures. The volume opens with a lucid translation of the *Bhakti-Sūtra* of Nārada.

SWAMI NIRGUNANANDA

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION SEVA PRATISHTHAN

99 SARAT BOSE ROAD, CALCUTTA 26

REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1958 TO
MARCH 1959

This institution, started by the Ramakrishna Mission 27 years ago in a rented house as a small

maternity clinic, grew into a first class maternity hospital with ante-natal, natal, and post-natal departments, and received all-round public appreciation. It is now established in its own premises, covering nearly five *bighas* of land.

Owing to growing demands from the public, and the introduction of the auxiliary nursing-cum-midwifery training by the Government of India, the

Management converted the institution into a general hospital for men, women, and children during 1956 and 1957. For this purpose, a number of medical, surgical, and paediatric beds were added, and the previous name, Shishumangal Pratishtan, was changed into Seva Pratishtan since May 15, 1957.

The hospital has got a fairly well-equipped laboratory, a 500 m.a. X-ray plant, a surgical unit with modern instruments and appliances, and an all-electric laundry plant. Besides a number of experienced top-ranking honorary visiting medical officers, who work as departmental heads and first assistants, the hospital has got an adequate number of resident medical and nursing staff to look after its indoor and outdoor departments. It has been recognized by the West Bengal Nursing Council as a training school both for auxiliary and senior nursing-cum-midwifery courses. Eighty-seven trainees were on the rolls in March 1959, and thirty-two auxiliary students passed the final examination.

The present number of beds in the hospital is 210: obstetric and gynaecological beds: 150; medical and surgical beds for men and women: 50; and paediatric beds: 10. Out of these, 70 beds were free for deserving patients. The total number of admissions in the indoor department during the year under review was 5,857, of which over 48% were treated free. The outdoor clinics were free for all. Average daily attendance in the outdoor departments: 124.

The general section is temporarily accommodated in an asbestos shed and in a portion of the existing maternity block. A five storeyed R.C. structure is under construction, and will, when completed, comprise an outdoor department and indoor wards with 150 beds for the treatment of various general cases.

Statistical Report of the Various Departments :

(i) *Ante-natal Care* : Number of patients treated: outdoor: new cases registered: 6,982; old cases treated: 11,726; total: 18,708; indoor: new cases admitted: 561; daily average number of beds occupied: 9.7.

(ii) *Hospital Confinement* : Total number of confinements: 4,078; daily average number of beds occupied: 66.7.

(iii) *Gynaecological Department* : Number of cases treated: outdoor: new cases registered: 3,897; old cases: 7,777; total: 11,674; indoor: new cases admitted: 508; daily average number of beds occupied: 15.8. There are 20 beds in the indoor department.

(iv) *Medical and Surgical Departments* : Number of cases treated: outdoor: medical: new cases: 2,005; old cases: 2,576; surgical: new cases: 2,087; old cases: 3,806; total: 10,474; indoor: medical: new

cases: 266; old cases: 6,782; surgical: new cases: 255; old cases: 7,485; total: 14,788; daily average number of beds occupied: 33.13. There are 25 beds for men and 25 beds for women in the medical and surgical wards.

(v) *Child Care* : (a) *Neonatal Management* : Arrangements have been made for proper nursing and medical attention of the new born babies, from the time of birth, under the direction and supervision of visiting paediatricians.

(b) *Post-natal Clinic and Follow-up of Infants and Toddlers* : Regular examination and follow-up of infants and toddlers is done by experienced paediatricians in the bi-weekly clinics of the institution. Number of cases treated: 59.

(c) *Treatment of Children up to Seven Years of Age* : A paediatric section with ten beds for the treatment of children under seven years of age has been opened since 1957. Total number of children treated: 189.

Laboratory Report : Details of specimens examined: blood: 2,693; urine and stool: 14,570; sputum: 67; bacteriological examination: 226; bio-chemical examination: 385; other examinations: 30.

SRI RAMAKRISHNA MATH CHARITABLE DISPENSARY, MYLAPORE, MADRAS

REPORT FOR 1959

The dispensary treated 1,54,175 cases in 1959 in its various departments. The details of the treatment are as follows:

Eye Department : Refractions and extra-ocular operations are performed once a week. Number of patients treated: new: 3,959; old: 13,776; total: 17,735. Number of refractions done: 105. Number of extra-ocular operations performed: 95.

E.N.T. Department : Number of patients treated: old: 9,741; new: 3,967; total: 13,708. Tonsil and ear operations were started in 1959. Number of tonsillectomies done: 63.

Dental Section : Number of patients treated: extractions: 3,209; caries: 3,101; pyorrhoea: 1,883; total: 8,193.

X-Ray Department : 25% of the cases are X-rayed free of any charges. Number of patients X-rayed: 252; number of patients screened: 110.

Laboratory : Number of specimens examined: 819.

Homoeopathic Department : Total number of patients treated: 6,868.

Milk Distribution : Medicated milk was distributed to 8,283 sickly children, and powdered milk to 1,07,178 under-nourished women and children.

Present Need of the Dispensary : An endowment procuring a monthly income of at least Rs. 2,000 for the purchase of medicines, bandage materials, etc.