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Prabuddha Bharata

OR

AWAKENED INDIA

By Karma, Jnana, Bhakti, and Yoga, by one or more or all of these the vision of the Paramatman is obtained.

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PRABUDDHA BHARATA

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PRABUDDHA BHARATA

Vol. LXXIII APRIL 1968 No. 4

उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

—:o:—

LETTERS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

(140)

Sri Hatiramji Math
Ootacamund, Madras
2 August 1926

Dear Sriman —,

I received your letter after a long time and came to learn all about you. The Master is looking after you in all the circumstances. Whether in prosperity or in adversity, in disease or danger or difficulties, He is your constant companion. '*Satyameva jayate, nānṛtam*—Truth alone wins, and not untruth.' Go on doing the Master's work as before. What you have written about work is well and good. This is what the Master willed and Swamiji desired from his heart. Move on with it. You need not worry about your self-liberation etc. By Master's will, we will look into that. Go on doing work of service to all beings with a selfless-heart devoted to the path of truth. I earnestly pray so that your health may remain fit and your faith be firm and strong like the Himalayas.

That something impossible has come to be possible in your life, is only due to the grace of the Master. There is no doubt about it. The grace of the Holy Mother and our love have all been possible by His will. He has incarnated Himself along with his own *Śakti* or divine power and with his divine companions. So many devotees are coming out from so many places ! In so many ways is His work being done !

I do not feel bad with regard to my health. I will start from here

right at the beginning of September or may start even earlier. I cannot tell where I will go actually. May be, I will be going to Bombay via Mysore or to Mysore via Bangalore. I will do according as the Master wills. My heart-felt love and blessings to you. Have no fear. Do much work. May you grow steadfast day by day in your faith and devotion by the strength of which you will remain firm, will remain unmoved before anything.

Your well-wisher,
Shivananda

(141)

Godavari House
Ootacamund, Madras
3 October, 1926

Dear Sriman —,

I am very glad to receive your letter after a pretty long time. To sit regularly for spiritual practices is very good, even though the mind does not feel like taking the name of the Lord. Through prayer, one attains to His grace. Prayer is very much essential. He gives love to the heart, if one prays to Him sincerely for faith, devotion and compassion. And as, by His grace, one develops love in the heart, the mind gets absorbed in Him. Love is like the adhesive paste. I am sure that you will attain to it. Never yield to despondency. The Master is the living and glowing incarnation of God. Again, He, who is verily the indwelling Self of all, is also the very breath of your life, the self-effulgent Deity seated in your heart. I am only His child or a direct servant, and with all my heart I have placed you at His holy lotus feet. Surely He has accepted you. Pray to Him and take His name to your might and on the merit of that very bit He will bestow His grace on you. The divine grace is always there; only you will be able to feel that. I pray from my heart so that you may become more and more steadfast in your faith and devotion and make progress towards Him.

I shall not be able to go to the Math during the *Pūjā*. Perhaps, it will be next December when I may reach the Math. Meanwhile, I will visit the centres at Mysore, Bangalore and Nagpur.

I get the news of—occasionally or rather in every month. Through His grace, I am well. This place is very health-giving. The surrounding environment, too, is very beautiful, and stimulating for the remembrance of God.

My heart-felt love and blessings to you. Here too, a number of devotees have built up a small Math through their united effort. It came to be consecrated on the 24th September last. The Master is now seated here.

Yours well-wisher,
Shivananda

BLESSED ASSOCIATION OF THE SAINTS

[EDITORIAL]

Difference between a Saint and a Worldly person : The worldly man, it has been said, is in a state of constant intoxication—the intoxication of lust and gold, privileges and preferences, pleasures and enjoyments. His intoxication is chronic. He is constantly agitated by his sense desires, which never reach the satiety. From one false hope he is betrayed into another. Now animated by the rhapsodic applause of the passions and then heated by the unreasoned propping of the sentiments, he is sometimes stubborn, pugnacious, touchy and sometimes vindictive to push his way over others. He buys the merry madness of a moment by the long penitence of after years, and he spends much of his life in making the rest miserable. Elated by his own fury and logic, he considers himself clever and intelligent and says, 'I am the doer, I am the giver.' He denies the indwelling Self and despises the abiding virtues. He neither longs for liberation nor makes any exertion for it. His intoxication makes him a complex personality where platitudes are accepted as wisdom, bigoted narrowness as holy zeal and unctuous egoism as God-given piety. His ethics and morality, religion and rituals, charity and hospitality are all motivated by worldly gain. His head is full of schemes and heart full of anxieties. For everything, he formulates a plan and he puts that plan to the cold and impersonal appraisal of a pawnbroker conning a seed pearl through his jeweller's glass. Even when on the verge of death, he thinks that he will not die. He may assent to the saying 'All men are mortal' but he is far from bringing it home himself. At last comes a day when his sanguine florid strength and vigour 'turn to withered, weak and grey'. He has to unloose his grasp breaking asunder the ties of the world and he quits his stand leaving many cherished desires unfulfilled, many a promise of happiness rescinded. All anglings for pleasure end in nothing. All hopes turn into shadows of despair. The pathetic exhortations as 'Grieve not for me, my wife and children dear' and the like on the tombstones of the worldly-minded bear testimony to their typical and chronic worldliness. The *Upaniṣad* describes such worldly persons as *ātmahano janāḥ* or persons who kill their self (*Īśā*), and those that ignore their self are but fools who verily commit suicide.

Surrounded by such worldly persons, there stands another person—the saint who, though breathing the same air and living under the same sky with them, possesses a different frame of mind with which he towers high above us all. The saint is an extraordinary soul and he is a wonder to the world. What makes him extraordinary is not his material wealth or earthly possessions but his extraordinary vision and realization. He has known the mysteries of life and death and so he is released from the fetters of all desires. He possesses nothing but he is the master of his own conduct. He adheres to a supreme ideal of life to which Kālidāsa, the great Indian poet, signifies in *Mālavikāgnimitra* as 'owning the whole world while disowning himself'. His element is holiness and his mark is purity. He is pure like fire, free like the air, and guileless like a child. The prudence of the worldly wisdom, which is the mother of pride and avarice, is unknown to this holy simplicity. His is a true wisdom, which can only be found in a heart freed from the clouds of passions, perfect wisdom which is the fruit of

the assemblage of all virtues. Epictetus beautifully distinguishes this wisdom of the wise from the prudence of the worldly persons and says, 'Time alone relieves the foolish from sorrow, but reason the wise.' The saint is truly this wise person. His truth is his God-realization and he is firmly established on that truth; truth which he feels to be true. His whole soul directs him towards that truth. So he is under the noble necessity of being true. He sees God everywhere and remains intoxicated with the joy of God. The saint with his God-intoxication thus presents a striking contrast to the world of ordinary men who remain addicted to the intoxicating enjoyments of the world. By way of illustration in this context, we will recall one incident from the life of Sri Ramakrishna:

One day Sri Ramakrishna was going to Calcutta from Dakshineswar temple garden. He was seated in a carriage. Beyond Baranagar bazar when the carriage came to pass by the side of a grogshop, he saw some drunkards drinking wine, and singing joyfully and noisily making merry. As soon as he saw the drunkards, the memory of the bliss of God overwhelmed his mind and he became filled with divine inebriation. In that feat of divine inebriation he stood up, placed his foot on the footboard of the carriage and like one drunk began expressing joy and making gesticulations of his body and cried out loudly at those drunkards saying 'Very nice, fine enjoyment, bravo, bravo!' Here the drunkards stood intoxicated with the joy of drinking wine and the saint, as he saw them, instantly became intoxicated with the joy of God, the fountain-head of all joy and bliss. How similar were the manifestations of the two states of intoxication and yet how different they were in their meaning and significance! One represented the lowest of the pleasures of the world and the other represented a joy that was highest of the high. One intoxication blinds men and shuts their eyes to the light of the truth and the other endows one with the vision of a truth that remains true for ever—the truth which cannot be gotten for gold, neither silver be weighed for the price thereof. This vision of truth, not any temple or tower, rank or power, is the glory of the saint. With this truth-vision, he unconsciously leads the light of conscience before the world and demonstrates a burning spirituality. Before his towering realization, all evanescent enjoyments pale into insignificance. In the divine inebriation of the saint, the worldly people find another intoxication of rare and superior joy, which no earthly intoxicant can give. Does not the saint then make himself a rare person of extraordinary vision and uncommon realization in the world of ordinary men? Truly does the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (VII. 19) describe a saint as extraordinary person and say: 'Very rare is that great soul.' In *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (3), Śaṅkara describes the holy company of such a soul as a rare thing which is available only through the grace of God. He comments:

'There are three things which are rare indeed and are due to the grace of God —namely, a human birth, the longing for liberation and the protecting care of a perfected sage.'

The Saint as the Sculptor of Souls: The greatest of the miracles of a saint is his holiness. He radiates holiness and by that he compels a transfiguration around him. If he possesses anything which can be termed as supernatural power, it is his holiness with which he becomes the tamer of the souls. Being himself awakened to the call of truth, he makes others awakened too. Living contact with him brings in unconscious conversion in other souls. For this, he neither makes gratuitous asser-

tions nor invents illustrative experiences. There is neither any rhetorical affluence, nor smattering of learning. He lives the life and by this he adds a spark of Promethean fire into the souls of others.

The difference between a saint and a worldly person, according to Vedānta, is one of degree and not of kind. The same divinity shines in both. In a saint, it shines in full splendour and glory, whereas in the worldly person, it remains covered. All bondage, all miseries and all intoxication of the worldly man are his own creations. He makes himself hypnotized and, therefore, he suffers. By being forgetful of his real nature, he remains intoxicated with the inferior pleasures of life. But to understand all these one must have the glimpse of truth. One must taste the superior joy even for a moment before one can reject the inferior enjoyments and pleasures. Living contact of a saint gives him the real taste of that superior joy of life before which all earthly pleasures taste stale. Gradually he begins to be disenchanted, and the more he gets disenchanted, the more he becomes illumined. He attains a rebirth in one life and is made new. The worldly man's self-forgetfulness has been vividly described through a story as recorded in *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna* (pp. 359-60):

'Once a tigress attacked a herd of goats. A hunter saw her from a distance and killed her. The tigress was pregnant and gave birth to a cub as she expired. The cub began to grow in the company of the goats. At first it was nursed by the she-goats, and later on, as it grew bigger, it began to eat grass and bleat like the goats. Gradually the cub became a big tiger; but still it ate grass and bleated. When attacked by other animals, it would run away, like the goats. One day a fierce-looking tiger attacked the herd. It was amazed to see a tiger in the herd eating grass and running away with the goats at its approach. It left the goats and caught hold of the grass-eating tiger, which began to bleat and tried to run away. But the fierce tiger dragged it to the water and said: "Now look at your face in the water. You see, you have the pot-face of a tiger; it is exactly like mine." Next it pressed a piece of meat into its mouth. At first the grass-eating tiger refused to eat the meat. Then it got the taste of the meat and relished it. At last the fierce tiger said to the grass-eater: "What a disgrace! You lived with the goats and ate grass like them!" And the other was really ashamed of itself.'

'Eating grass is like enjoying "woman and gold". To bleat and run away like a goat is to behave like an ordinary man. Going away with the new tiger is like taking shelter with the *guru,* who awakens one's spiritual consciousness, and recognizing him alone as one's relative. To see one's face rightly is to know one's real Self.'

In the person of the saint, the worldly man finds that rare spiritual teacher who, by his glowing life, makes others glow in purity and holiness. This life of glowing holiness is a power and it is this power that prophesies in Revelation, 'Behold, I make all things new.' What a great wonder is wrought in this making things new! It is a transformation, which no metaphysics can define. It is a communication, which is inexpressible, because it is subtle and intense. The saint's animism impells us to place a living soul, a throbbing spirit behind our own corporeality. The soul gradually stretches and expands until it covers the entire universe, and conversely, the Absolute permeates the soul. Just as the ocean possesses only the savour of salt, so also the life of a saint possesses only the savour of God. This is the real power which a saint wields at ease to become the

forger of our morphology, architect of our emotions, captain of our personality and alchemist of our being.

Redemptive Power of Holy association : The sage Nārada has described the efficacy of the company of a saint as unerring and unfailing. Intoxication and illusion, dross and dirt, however deep and ingrained, melt away from a wicked heart when it comes in the contact of a truly saintly personality. Sri Ramakrishna compares holy company of saints to a soap solution which imperceptibly cleanses and purifies all. Instances of such unconscious purification and unintentional transfiguration of a soul through the holy association of saints are often amazing, mysterious, and wonderful. So the Lord in His last message to Uddhava reminds the latter *in the Bhāgavata* about the redemptive power of holy association and says :

'It was through the association of saints, O sinless one, that many who were of a *Rājasika* or *Tāmasika* nature—such as Vṛtra, Prahlāda, and others—attained Me in different ages : Daityas and Rākṣasas, beasts and birds, Gandharvas, Apsarās, Nāgas, Siddhas, Chāraṇas, Guhyakas, and Vidyādharas, and among mankind—Vaiśyas and Śūdras, women and outcasts.'

'Vṛṣaparvā, Bali, Bāṇa, Maya, Vibhīṣaṇa, Sugrīva, Hanumān, the bear Jāmbhavān, the elephant Gajendra, the vulture Jaṭāyu, the merchant Tulādhāra, the fowler Dharmavyādha, the hunchbacked (perfume-vendor) Kubjā, the Gopīs as well as wives of the Brāhmaṇas engaged in sacrifices, in Vrindavana, and others.'

'They had not studied the Vedas, nor served the great saints, nor observed any vows, nor performed any austerities, yet through their association with Me [as represented by the saints] they attained Me.' The holiness of a saint supplies its own fuel, lights its own fire, and is self-feeding like the sun. It cleanses as well as creates. The holiness of Christ not only purified the soul of Mary Magdalene, but also transformed her into a saint. Aṅgulimāla, the fierce robber turns into a holyman when he meets Buddha face to face. Before Aṅgulimāla, who was restless with his wickedness and vices, Buddha stood in awe of God and of his own soul. Unconscious influence is the specimen of a holy power that touches straight into our hearts, gives flash of sublime light over our past and into our future. It leaves marks of deep significance and symbolizm and pours forth a lofty strain of hope and inspiration. Its growing intensity dispenses with bodily presence and makes it strike with electric speed through time and space till it changes our whole being. This unconscious holy influence of Sri Ramakrishna, the God-intoxicated man of Dakshineswar once rescued Girish Chandra Ghosh from the bottomless pit of vice and transfigured the latter into the image of a saint. It is the story of a mavellous transformation that could ever be recorded in the history of the saints :

Girish was a great dramatist, a song writer and an actor. Inspired by western ideas, he had grown sceptical about the existence of God and so contemtuous about the saints. He was addicted to wine, had indulged in various kinds of moral debauchery and his sensuality was deep and ingrained. Reckless, arrogant and proud, Girish was a complicated person, always fluctuating between enjoyment and excitement. But his contact with Sri Ramakrishna proved to be a turning point in his chequered life. Though sceptical about the saints and holy men in general, Girish was surprized to see the radiant purity and holiness of the saint when he met him first in the house of a neighbour. Never he had seen such a God-intoxicated man before. So he could not forget the saint's face even when he returned home,

And how can one forget it? That mark of holiness is no mere abstract entity but a perceptible power that never leaves a miracle half-done. The artist's nimbus of glory around a saintly countenance may fade away; but the dear features that leave their impress upon our mind hold their fast colour.

Girish would come to Sri Ramakrishna even when he was drunk. The drunkenness of Girish would at once remind Sri Ramakrishna of the taste of the joy of God and fill his mind with great spiritual fervour. He would receive Girish with all cordiality and love. Though often under the influence of the liquor Girish would abuse Sri Ramakrishna publicly in most indecent terms, the latter would show only his all embracing love and compassion upon the former in return. One night, Girish drank himself to the extreme in the house of an actress and when the morning came he became full of remorse for it. With a repentant mind, he immediately started for Dakshineswar to visit Sri Ramakrishna not however without a bottle of wine. On arriving at the temple garden, he wept repentantly embracing Sri Ramakrishna's feet and then suddenly felt the urge for drinking. He became disturbed to see that the carriage in which he had left the bottle had in the meanwhile driven off. But Sri Ramakrishna knew the mind of Girish more than what Girish knew about it himself. He produced the bottle before Girish. He had privately asked a devotee to bring Girish's belongings from the carriage before it could leave. Not being able to get rid of his past habits, Girish now drank shamelessly at the very presence of Sri Ramakrishna and, having done so, he felt very much repentant again. To this, Sri Ramakrishna told him, 'drink to your heart's content, it won't be for much longer.' For, Sri Ramakrishna was never dogmatic to impose his own indoctrination upon Girish for whom he had allowed every freedom of thought and action. Never he could look upon anybody as a sinner who was to be answered according to his sins and follies. Rather, it was an outflow of a soul filled with love and compassion that made everything holy and divine by their touch. The more this divine love of the saint started gaining its hold upon Girish, the more Girish became conscious about his misdeeds and wickedness. One day while sitting before Sri Ramakrishna, Girish was repentantly brooding over his follies and foibles. Sri Ramakrishna in a mood of great spiritual fervour and compassion spoke out, 'Girish Ghosh, don't worry about it; people will be astonished at the marvellous change that will come upon you.' Seeking this change of life, Girish once asked Sri Ramakrishna, 'I don't want advice. I have written cartloads of advice to others. It doesn't help me. Do something to transform my life.' Girish therefore heaved a sigh of relief as he heard these words of solemn assurance about his future. The effect of the holy association of a saint could not but be infallible. True to the prophecy of Sri Ramakrishna, Girish started changing gradually. There came upon him a marvellous transfiguration which soon made him glow with a living faith in God and an ardent love for man. From out of the bottomless pit of his past vices, Girish emerged holy and purified to play the role of a heroic devotee of God, a changed person who in later life could boldly dwell on his past misdeeds to emphasize the glory of his wonderful transformation as well as the grace of Sri Ramakrishna.

The saint with his life of glowing saintliness thus stands as a veritable power-house of spirituality that sustains and feeds the tenets of religions and shapes and reshapes the souls of men. His body is the temple

of a living God and his mind, the great seat of a holy pilgrimage, for he carries within him only the thoughts of God and nothing else. The Sufi saint Rabia was once questioned, 'Do you love God?'. The unhesitating reply came, 'Yes.' Again she was asked, 'Do you hate Satan?.' And again the reply was unequivocal, 'No, my love for God leaves no room for hating Satan.' There may be differences of creeds and sects about the idea of God but the holiness of a saint stands above all differences of creeds and sects. Whether a saint is a Hindu or a Mohammedan, a Buddhist or a Christian, his holiness remains the same everywhere. This holiness is the goal of all spirituality, all religion, all penance, all austerity. It is the highest manifestation of the divine spirit assimilable and communicable across the barriers of race and religion. For all these, therefore, the Lord in the *Bhāgavata* says:

'Yoga, discrimination, piety, study of the Vedas, austerities, renunciation, rites such as *Agnihotra,* and works of public utility, charity, vows, sacrifices, secret *mantras,* places of pilgrimage, and moral rules particulars as well as universal—none of these, I say, binds Me so much as the association of saints that roots out all attachment.'

CONSCIOUSNESS: PHENOMENAL AND NOUMENAL

DR. P. S. SASTRI

The soul has been viewed by different thinkers in different ways. The Absolutist holds to the identity of the individual soul with the Absolute, and accordingly takes the soul to be all-pervasive or infinite. When all the attributive features appear to be contradictory, we are forced by the either-or argument to accept the infinite nature of the soul. (*Vedānta-Sūtra-Bhāṣya,* p. 286)

The soul cannot have merely as much extension as the body of the organizm. This limited extension would make it finite and non-eternal, because every finite entity has a beginning and an end. (ibid., p. 254) If it is held to be finite, we will have to determine or ascertain its size or magnitude. These are awkward questions which defeat themselves. Let us start with view that the soul is a point-instant.

The soul cannot be taken to be a point-instant. A point-instant cannot know the experiences spread all over the body. But does not a paste of sandalwood at one part keep the whole body fresh with the odour? Likewise, can the soul through its contact with the body, not know the various experiences? (*Vedānta-Sūtra,* IV. iv. 6) As the lighted candle placed in a corner dispels the darkness from the room, can the soul located in a part of the body not experience through consciousness all the varied experiences? Here consciousness is viewed as a quality. (ibid., II. iii. 25)

But a quality cannot exist apart from what it qualifies. (*Vedānta-Sūtra-Bhāṣya,* p. 284) Do we not have the flower at a corner and its fragrance smelt at a distance? (*Vedānta-Sūtra,* II. iii. 26) Likewise, cannot consciousness as the quality of the soul pervade the whole body?

But when a thorn gets into the leg, the whole body does not feel the pain, even though the skin pervades the entire body.

The medium of the skin cannot be of help in relating the point-instant called the soul to the body. (*Vedānta-Sūtra-Bhaṣya*, p. 285) Still the prick does bring about a change in the whole body. And the analogy here aims at making consciousness an appendage or a quality.

Consciousness cannot be treated as a quality on the faulty analogy of light. A quality coexists with what it qualifies. Smell, too, does not show that the fragrance and the flower exist at different places. The pervasion of odour is rendered possible either by the medium of air or by that of water. (ibid., p. 286).

Is the nature of the self to be conceived as having the features of the entities in which it manifests itself? Then the changes in the features would imply a corresponding change in the nature of the self. Thus the self would be in a continuous flux. If the abiding self has a nature distinct from and unaffected by the phenomena, then it would be difficult to relate this self to the phenomena. Moreover, to establish a relationship, we have to assume that the phenomena can and do exist independently. In such a situation, knowledge, feeling and will also will have to exist apart from the self. Then the noumenal self would be a superfluous entity.

If the individual selves are noumenal realities, how are they related to one another? A plurality of discreet selves would mean a plurality of finite entities. As finite, they cannot be the abiding realities. A self, which is a point-instant, does still occupy some space, and to that extent it has extension. As occupying a space, it is capable of becoming an object to a sense-perception. If to overcome these difficulties we are told that the self is a spiritual point-instant, what may be the nature of the experiencing individual? We cannot ascertain it, unless the concept of the point-instant is spatial. If it is not a physical or material entity, it should not be defined in spatial terms.

If the relation of the self to the psycho-physical organizm is real, the identification of the self with the mind or with the body cannot be attributed to ignorance. Moreover, there cannot be a relation between two entities that are exclusive of one another. How can we establish a relation between a physical entity and a non-physical one? There cannot be a relation of conjunction, because this relation operates between substances having spatial properties. It cannot be a relation of inherence, because this relation is not liable to be destroyed. It cannot be a relation of identity, because the point-instant cannot be the same as the body.

Knowledge, will, pleasure, pain and the like are experienced by all. These are attributes. They cannot belong to the body, because matter does not appear to have these properties. The body as an object of knowledge cannot be the subject having knowledge. It is regulated by the will, and it gives rise to the experience of pleasure or pain. These attributes cannot belong to the sense organs, which are only instruments of knowledge and action. Knowledge and will do not disappear with the loss of an eye or an ear. These attributes cannot belong to the mind, because the mind is the instrument through which one knows and wills. Since the mind is associated with the senses, if the mind were to the self, all cognitions and volitions would have to arise simultaneously. These arguments compel some to postulate a self as distinct from the body, the sense organs and the mind. This self is unchanging and its attributes are said to be knowledge, feeling, will and action. These attributes are related to the self and they are exhibited when the self comes into contact with the mind and the senses. The self does not have these attributes

when there is no such contact. It is argued that facts of experience point out that there must be many such selves, though they are not spatially and temporally limited, because they are non-material entities. The self is, accordingly, unchangeable, unmodifiable, infinite and all-pervading.

But how are the attributes related to the self? If there is an inherent relation, are they eternally inherent in the self, or are they first produced from some causes and then related to the self? If they are eternally inherent, then they pertain to the real nature of the self. The attributes cannot then exist apart from the self at any time. And we have a serious difficulty in explaining logically the relation of inherence. It is a relation involving a regress. If it is only a temporary relation, there are no rational grounds to assume such a relation.

If every self is infinite and all-pervading and if it has those attributes, all the objects must be simultaneously apprehended. Since the self is free from spatial and temporal limitations, there can be no limits to its knowledge, feeling and willing. It may be replied that this possibility does not exist, because each self is related to a certain mind. But a self that is infinite, if it can enter into a relation, can and ought to enter into a relation with all minds. It cannot be all pervading, if it is limited to and by one mind. It becomes a finite entity.

It may be argued that the self really transcends space and time, and that it is related to the external world through the medium of the mind. But if the mind is a material entity, there cannot be a direct relation between a non-material self and a material mind. If the mind is non-material, this non-material entity cannot have a direct contact with the senses. If the senses are non-material, how can they come into contact with the physical objects? Two non-material or supra-spatial entities cannot have any conjunction; for, otherwise there will have to be a relation of conjunction among the selves.

If the attributes are produced, they have a beginning in time. Then prior to the production of the attributes, the self must be without any attributes. Granting that the attributes are produced, there must be adequate causes to relate them to the self. Since the self is not the effect of any cause, how are the attributes produced and related to the self? If the contact of the self with the mind produces the attributes, there must be some attributes inherent in the self and in the mind. No such attributes are found in these. Even if the attributes are produced, they will be attached to a third entity, not to the self or to the mind. A self devoid of attributes cannot come into contact with a mind and then produce the attributes.

Normal experience establishes the distinction between the experiencing subject and the experienced object. This is untenable even in normal life. Foam, wave and ripple are the modifications of the ocean. They are not distinct from the ocean whose essence is water. Still there can be a distinction between them all and also a mutual relation like conjunction among them. There is no transformation of these into one another, even though they have the same essence. Likewise, the subject and the object can be modifications of the same essence, and they can yet appear distinct. The distinctions can be valid within a certain framework. (ibid., II. i. 13)

Can we assume that consciousness in its essence is universal or eternal, and that it can have particular states or aspects? If the particular aspects are identical with the universal, we cannot speak of the different aspects of consciousness. If the particular aspect is identical with the universal, then consciousness would have to undergo changes.

If a particular form or aspect of consciousness is different from the universal consciousness, there will be many consciousnesses but not one with different aspects. We cannot say that consciousness reveals an abiding aspect and also a changing one; for, then consciousness will have to be other than these two aspects. If these aspects differ from one another, consciousness as such will have to be different from both. If however consiousness is said to be non-different from them, it will be a collection of these two. If the universal and the particular aspects are forms of consciousness, are we to find out its real nature with or without these forms? If its nature includes these, then any change in these will involve a corresponding change in its nature. Then the unity of consciousness is lost. But if its nature does not involve these forms, these must be different from it, and therefore related to it. Then the modifications belong to the aspects that are other than consciousness. Even then the problem of relating them to consciousness is difficult of solution. Consciousness cannot be related to its changing aspects if it itself does not undergo any changes. Then in the place of consciousness we will have only the changing states and not an unchanging entity. Even then a relation between consciousness and its aspects is untenable. It is therefore evident that consciousness can have no forms or aspects other than itself, that it undergoes no modifications, and that it is one and eternal. It is self-contradictory to speak of an absolutely unchanging ground for real changes.

It is eternal, infinite, self-luminous pure consciousness, and it has no attributes. But because of its presence, even though it does not actively interfere, the ego, the intelligence, the senses, and the body are capable of their respective activities. The luminosity of the individual self illumines and reveals all these factors. The organization of all these factors is what we mean by the individuality of a living being.

In the state of deep sleep we do not have the experience of the 'I'. When I wake up and say, 'I have slept well', I accept the continuance of my being during this state; and this can refer only to the ground, my individuality, which is no other than the self. But the consciousness of I comes back to us when we wake up. This 'I' or the ego is then distinct from the self. And when I say that I do this or that, I am attributing activity to myself. This activity can be attributed only to the ego, not to the self.

The ego is both conscious and non-conscious (*Vedānta-Tattva-Viveka,* 18), because it reveals both knowledge and action which refer respectively to the self and the not-self. The not-self is only an appearance and the ego accordingly is no better. The ego is a case of the superimposition on the reflection of consciousness in *antaḥkaraṇa.* (*Tattva-Dīpana,* 185-9)

The physical body is constituted of the five physical elements organized by a principle of life, which is equally physical. Since these gross elements are evolved out of the five subtle physical elements, the body is possessed of the five senses of knowing and the five senses of acting, and these are related to the five kinds of objective entities. In its restricted sense, the mind is regarded as the internal instrument or sense, which has cognitive, emotional, and volitional functions, and which controls and organizes the functions of the senses. The subject-object relation between the mind and the senses on the one hand and the elementary objective entities on the other leads us to conclude that all these are evolved out of the same source. This source is the ego, and the ego itself is evolved out of the principle of *mahat* (intelligence)'. This intelligence is indi-

viduated as the ego. Yet this intelligence is not self-luminous, nor is it absolutely non-material. It is phenomenal. Every phenomenal entity is made up of a factor, which obstructs the fuller manifestation, another which tends towards fuller manifestation, and a third one which represents the manifested state. Anything that can pass into the completely unmanifested state, cannot have self-illumination or self-existence. The phenomenal consciousness, therefore, is not self-luminous or self-existent. It acquires illumining power, because of its ground, which is the Absolute Consciousness. The true self is this ground. It is the presence of this Absolute that reveals the phenomenal. Thus the ego has a reflected light, as it were.

The noumenal self-luminous consciousness and the phenomenal consciousness are not related in any way. The only relation is that the former is the ground of the latter, there is proximity, which is not spatial or temporal. The phenomenal consciousness has a temporal flow but it is beyond space. This proximity makes the two appear as if they are one and the same. The association which is inexplicable brings about an indiscrimination. Because of the association, the phenomenal consciousness becomes the self-modifying and self-evolving material cause of the universe. But it does not mean that it is really endowed with consciousness. This principle has the merit of modifying itself into a coherent system of subjective and objective phenomena.

There is no objective knowledge in the state of deep sleep, because the ego in this state exists in the causal form of *avidyā*. (*Māndūkya-Kārikā*, I. 11) The principle of *avidyā* is central to any enquiry into the nature of consciousness. We can dispense with it only if we accept the illogical position that consciousness is finite and yet real.

Absolute Consciousness and *avidyā* appear to be associated, but they are not identical. One is not the property of the other. The two are not the correlative aspects of some other entity. We cannot reduce one into the other or derive one from the other. The two do not mean the same. Since they cannot be further analysed and reduced to a simpler entity, they are not the aspects of the same entity. The very fact that *avidyā* is an inexplicable entity, shows that the association of *avidyā* with the Absolute is equally inexplicable.

The indiscrimination between the phenomenal and the noumenal is brought about by the inexplicable nature of each. The former is inexplicable, because it is self-contradictory and yet experienced; and the latter is inexplicable, because it is transcendental. This indiscrimination appears at the level of finite human experience, and is due to *avidyā*.

The experiencing subject experiences itself as affected by its experiences. Each experience is a modification. The subject as a modifiable entity can have only a phenomenal character. Since every object of experience too is liable to modification, it too has a phenomenal nature.

The objects of valid knowledge are the same for all subjects. In pursuance of the ideas formed about these objects, we make use of these objects. As such, these objects differ from the objects cognized in dreams, hallucinations, and erroneous perceptions. Then our ideas of the objects have an objective existence, though it is a phenomenal one. These objects have the nature of effects. Since the objective world exhibits a uniform pattern, the ultimate cause of these must be the same. The real substance or essential nature of the effect must be present in the cause also. Such a cause must account for every effect.

The living bodies, the senses, and the

minds are phenomenal entities. They act and react on the phenomenal objects. They are modified by the objects to which they are related, and they exert a modifying influence on these objects. Their very existence is felt in relation to the objects. Then they are equally phenomenal, and as such they have the nature of effects. The entire mental and physical universe has thus a single ultimate cause from which it is non-different.

Our knowledge or experience is not possible in the absence of a ground, which is unchanging, unmodified and self-luminous. If such a ground is not present, our experiences would be a series of unconnected subjective states. Systematic knowledge needs an integration, unification, and interpretation of the series of mental acts. A unifying principle is thus needed to witness these successive mental modifications and to unify them. Such a principle is absolutely necessary to make recollection and inferential cognition possible. Thus the phenomenal experiences are possible only if there is a noumenal consciousness. This consciousness can witness and unify the changing subjective stages, and it can illumine and reveal the phenomenal consciousness. This unchanging consciousness cannot be modified into a series of subjective states. It cannot be both self-modifying and self-identical. Such a noumenal self must be the ground of the phenomenal self.

The facts of the phenomenal consciousness are inexplicable in the absence of the noumenal. The noumenal can be said to express itself only in and through the phenomenal. Then they must be in relation. It cannot be a relation of conjunction, because the two have different orders or levels of existence. They cannot have any spatial or temporal relation, because the noumenal is non-spatial and nontemporal and the phenomenal is not conditioned by space. There cannot be a real causal relation between the two, because the noumenal is not modifiable. They cannot be related as a substantive and its attribute, because the phenomenal does not modify the noumenal. Then the relation between the two is inexplicable. It is just something, which only appears as a relation. We can only conceive of the phenomenal consciousness as having the reflection of the noumenal, and this does not involve any change or modification of the noumenal. The noumenal consciousness appears to be reflected in the changing phenomenal consciousness; and it illumines and endows the latter thereby with a power of illumination, witnesses its modifications, and seems to function as the principle of unity among these modifications. Thus it makes recollection, knowledge and the like possible. Thus also arises the idea of a knowing and acting ego which is then capable of maintaining its identity. Hence, the true self is the noumenal, the reflected self is the self appearing in phenomenal experience, and the faculty of experience is the mind. This mind varies from individual to individual. Hence, it is the phenomenal consciousness that determines personality, because all distinctions and differences pertain only to this level. The so-called reflected self is the subject or the agent operating through the mind.

The subjective and the objective phenomena are inter-related and they presuppose a common source, which must be simple and unanalysable. The correlated phenomena appear to have a common source. The effects appear to be the modifications of their material causes, and these causes therefore are modifiable entities. The effects are essentially non-different from their material causes, the differences appearing only as forms and names. Such an original cause is *avidyā*, whose modifi-

cations appear as the ego, the mind, the senses, the objects and the like.

This phenomenal principle, which is modifiable, can exist only as having its ground in an unmodifiable Reality. The unity in and through its modifications can be explained only when the ground appears as a catalyst. This catalyst witnesses it, reveals it, and sustains it. Since it is only a catalyst, it cannot be affected by the modifications of this phenomenal principle.

This phenomenal principle cannot be regarded as a second reality, because it does not have an existence independent of its ground, which is Absolute Consciousness. It cannot be treated as totally unreal or nonexistent, because it offers a causal explanation of the plurality of phenomenal appearances. As such, it is a positive entity, which is not absolutely real, not absolutely unreal, not both together, not even the negation of the two together. It is, therefore, said to be inexplicable. As such, the Absolute Consciousness is ultimately the only one real entity, which has no other to limit it. It is non-dual, a self-existent Reality. Though it is not the modifiable cause of the phenomena, the phenomenalist principle called *avidyā* depends on it. Then the world must be recognized as an appearance, which is as inexplicable as the cosmic ignorance. This cosmic ignorance is the power, which is creative of multiplicity, and creation means the world of forms and names. The Absolute Reality is made to appear as diverse forms and names by the activity of this cosmic ignorance. Thus this ignorance presents a distortion, which conceals the nature of Reality and which makes it appear as many. These two activities are then the aspects of the same activity.

We have spoken of the selves as being like the reflections. A normal reflection implies that only an entity having a form or a spatial extension can be reflection. Since the Absolute has no such spatial qualification, we speak of the self not as a reflection, but as being *like* a reflection. When the sky appears to be reflected in a sheet of water, we have the formless sky having a reflection. Even if it is argued that the blue vault of the sky is reflected, the blue vault is not a scientific fact; and the apparent vault is itself a product of the atmosphere. Something similar to this can take place with reference to *avidyā*, which is like the blue sky. That is, we employ the concept of reflection figuratively.

The real existence and the true nature of the one non-dual Absolute is logically determined as necessary for an explanation of the phenomena, which includes phenomenal consciousnesses and objective entities. It is also determined that the one appears as the many because of *avidyā* and that the Absolute remains unchanged. We have also seen that the phenomenal consciousnesses are manifested, illumined, regulated and unified by one and the same noumenal self. And we have also seen that the relation between the noumenal and the phenomenal can be expressed only figuratively.

The impressions based on experience are capable of being retained and reproduced by the phenomenal consciousness, because of the presence of the catalyst called the noumenal self. By itself the phenomenal is without any such activity, and the noumenal has no change. But the catalyst brings about the changes, and the catalyst accounts for the experienced unity of the phenomenal consciousness in the midst of its modifications. Then the impressions are not conserved in and reproduced by the noumenal self. Since the phenomenal consciousness is not a reflection but appears as if it were a reflection, the question whether it is phenomenal or noumenal does not arise. It does not have

an independent being and it is not purely phenomenal, because it always has the presence of the noumenal self. The true experiencing subject is not the mind, which undergoes modifications and which cannot be expected to know its own modifications. The experiencing subject cannot be the mere noumenal self, because the latter is unchanging. Then the subject is the phenomenal self as revealed by and grounded in the noumenal.

The phenomenal consciousness is that entity which, because of the presence of the catalyst called the noumenal consciousness, functions as consciousness. The two are related to one another phenomenally. The phenomenal is the conditioned consciousness. As conditioned, it is not a series of reflections on the series of phenomenal consciousness experienced as an individual mind. The reflection is similar to the emerging product in the presence of the catalyst. This product is not a series but a unity, and it enables the mind to function. The ever-changing mental modifications are illumined by the noumenal self whose presence is always there. Because of this presence, recollection and reproduction and reasoning are possible. The mind cannot be said to account for all these, because it does not retain its identity while undergoing modifications.

The noumenal self, as reflected in and conditioned by the phenomenal consciousness, appears as a determinate entity. This is the individual ego, which retains its comparative identity throughout all the modifications of the mind to which it is related. The conditioning does not mean that the noumenal is really conditioned. It appears only as if it were conditioned. As such, the question of parts in the noumenal does not arise. The reflected self is not identical with the noumenal, for it is only non-different from it. The particularized self differs from another, because of its specific ego and mind. This self is not a product of the mind but of *avidyā*, which also begets the mind.

CAUSALITY: AN ANALYSIS

Dr. Devaprasad Bhattacharya

In the early stages of human thinking, natural occurrences were thought of on the pattern of human experiences in the forms of acting and being acted on. Primitive men were under the anthropomorphic tendencies to view nature. But men at the later stage of thinking and civilization were not thoroughly convinced of the explanation in terms of anthropomorphism. They endeavoured in their right earnest to seek out cogent grounds and convincing causal explanations. From a study of the Greek philosophy we come to know that Leucippas in the fifth century expressly recognized the dire necessity of causation. 'Naught happens for nothing, but every thing from a ground and of necessity.' From that time on everybody of scientific thinking tacitly assumes that there is causation in some form or other in the world of phenomenal appearances suited to our pragmatic uses. Even the believers in magic do not discard causation. Sympathetic magic in its unadulterated form is quite akin to modern science. Both believe in the orders, uniformity and necessity

of causes and effects. 'In both of them the succession of events is assumed to be perfectly regular and certain, being determined by immutable laws, the operation of which can be foreseen and calculated precisely; the elements of caprice, of chance and of accident are banished from the course of nature. Both of them open up to a seemingly boundless vista of possibilities to whom who knows the causes of things and can touch the secret springs that set in motion the vast and intricate mechanism of the world.' (James G. Frazer: *The Golden Bough,* 1959, p. 48) It is not at all a fact that magic is to be condemned, because it denies causation. The fatal flaw of magic lies, on the other hand, in the fact that it distorts and misconstrues either the association of ideas by similarity or the law of association of ideas by contiguity in space or time. Any attempt to discard causation reduces the world to a sequence of phenomena without any connexion. So even the sceptic in some way admits causation. There has been a lot of discussion as to the nature of causation since the early ages to demonstrate the rational character of the world. But in course of our present discussion we shall see that though causation was demanded to avoid anthropomorphism and freaks of nature, yet causation can not avoid anthropomorphism. Causation cannot be denied as it presses on our consciousness and yet it cannot be admitted in any genuine sense. Explanations of causation are found either faulty or incomplete. One deliberate account of causation flatly contradicts another. This comes to pass only when the object is uncertain and inexplicable (as is the nature of Māyā). Two persons who know the nature of blazing fire in the hearth cannot have difference of opinion amongst themselves, because the object is certain. Causation can be traced in Descartes, the father of modern Western Philosophy. According to him, mechanical laws and efficient causality apply to the material world whereas freedom and teleology belong to the spiritual world. The whole material world can be treated as a mechanical system, and there is no need for introducing or considering any but efficient causes. 'Final causality is a theological conception, and however true it may be, it has no place in physics. Explanation by means of final causes of souls, of occult vital principles and of substantial forms does nothing to promote the advance of physical science.' (Cople Stone: *A History of Philosophy* Vol. IV, p. 138) For Descartes, the precedent and the subsequent do not hold any relation of the producer and the produced, every event being quite new. This view defeats itself outright, since it invokes godly interference for every disconnected series. The animistic interpretation of cause which ascribes the responsibility for the changes in the world to God has almost disappeared from the scientific writings. The mechanistic conception of causation includes the meaning of production or generation. On this view, nature's ways are mechanical and are to be explained in mechanistic terms. Mechanical theory holds that transmission of an impersonal physical force is a necessary condition for a cause-and-effect relation between two events. Now a days mechanical causation has been discardcd in favour of the concept of continuity and organization. Relatedness and organization are now believed to be inherent in experience. Events are not so static as they were supposed to be in yore. The organic philosophy of Whitehead holds that the events cannot be completely separated from each other. In case of their separateness, causal connexion, which is quite intimate by nature, cannot apply to them. But the main drawback in this view

is : if all relations are organic and internal, then we cannot distinguish between an ordinary external relation which does not affect the thing in the least and an internal relation which is something more than a regular sequence and makes a difference to its terms and signifies that neither the cause is without the effect nor the effect is without the cause.

Rejecting the concept of cause, many scientists have now substituted the terms 'dependent' and 'determined' which mean 'predictable and calculable'. [Existentialists condemn the terms like dependent, determined, predictable and calculable. Man is free, a self-creating and self-transcending subject.] Some, however, make a distinction between predictability and causality. Predictability is an epistemological concept and causal necessity is an ontological concept. From the one does not follow the other. From the absence of predictability does not follow the absence of causal necessity. The terms 'dependent' and 'determined' do not mean a rejection of causation, because the terms themselves imply causation. Prof. Reichenbach expounds causality as an exceptionless repetition meaning an if-then-always relation. Statistical method adds irreversibility to it. All arrangements, ordered or unordered, are only probable. Theoretical consequences of the statistical interpretation of the law of irreversibility are great. Statistical laws do not discard causality but only prefer probability and confesses our incapacity to observe and calculate the individual motion of every molecule. On the second view, causality, as Reichenbach points out, is strictly an 'idealization of the regularities of the microscopic environment in which we live, as a simplification into which we are led because the great number of elementary processes involved makes us regard as a strict law what actually is a statistical law'. (Hans Reichenbach : *The Rise of Scientific Thought,* pp. 157-165) Modern quantum mechanics also holds that individual atomic occurrences are controlled by probability laws. This is Heisenberg principle of 'if—then in a certain percentage relation'. Indeterminacy also favours this conclusion. The probability law is not an exceptionless generality. Wundt distinguishes at least three senses in which the term cause may be used. Cause is either a thing or a force or the cause and the effect are regularly followed changes. But with none of them we can be satisfied. Acceptance of probability laws is a negation of causal laws. Prof. J. L. Stocks summarizes modern scientific trends of thoughts on causation. He observes : 'If Eddington is right, it is no longer true in the world of physicist that every event has a cause, we have lost cause where we have lost substance in the atom. We have chased (he writes) the solid substance from the continuous liquid to the atom, from the atom to the electron, and there we have lost it.' (J. L. Stocks : *Time cause and Eternity,* pp. 42-45) In his Gifford Lectures in 1896 James Ward quoting Mach said, 'I hope the science of the future will discard the idea of cause and effect, as being formally obscure ; and in my feeling, that these ideas contain a strong tincture of fetishism I am certainly not alone.' The nature of causation is all right so long as we do not enquire into it ; but the appearance of causation is dissipated the moment we investigate. We set it down as indescribable appearance.

Modern philosophic thinkers do not subscribe to the view that cause and effect are entirely separate from each other nor that what is cause is a cause for all times and what is effect is the effect for all times. The cause and the effect flow into each other. The world of phenomena is interconnected. We are not in a position to press

back to the end of the process and find out a genuine cause, because as Hegel thinks, 'either the chain of causes extends back in an infinite series, or there is somewhere a first cause which is not the effect of any prior cause. If the series is infinite then no final and ultimate explanation is to be found. If there is a first cause, then this first cause is itself an unexplained fact. If by explaining a thing we mean assigning a cause for it then a first cause is by hypothesis unexplained and inexplicable since we cannot assign any prior cause to it. To explain the universe by something which is itself an ultimate mystery is surely no explanation.' (W. T. Stace: *The Philosophy of Hegel*) According to Hegel, the element of logical necessity which all explanation involves cannot be traced in the simple notion of causation. Causation can go to the extent of pointing out that cold causes solidification. But if we ask 'why', causation has no answer. Again, the first cause does not explain how the world arises out of it of necessity, nor does it explain itself far from explaining the world. Engels argues nature cannot be strictly divided into individual parts, definite classes and manifold forms. This way of looking objects in isolation overlooks the complete picture of things. Objects are essentially variables and cannot be kept in rigid isolation from the vast whole. What we call a cause is simply an effect of some other precedent event. To view a thing as isolated is to view it as constant and to invent rigid antithesis between the cause and the effect. So Engels argues, 'We find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis, positive and negative, e.g. are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases in their general connexion with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded. When we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then.' (Engels: *Anti-Duhring*, p. 36) Here we can find easily that the irreversibility which is of foundational importance for causality, has been rejected and through such rejection causality itself has been rejected. Prof. Karl Pearson argues (*Grammar of Science*, p. 131) likewise to refute causality. Past experiences of the ways of nature only provide great probabilities and not certainties. Logic, necessity and certainty are all conspicuous by their absence in the sequence of sense-impressions. The conceptual certainty and necessity are only transposed to the perceptual level. A particular cause can by no means be discerned for a particular effect. The cause always recedes into the background. 'The causes of any individual thing widen out into the unmanageable history of the universe. The ash tree is like Tennyson's "flower in the crannied wall", to know all its causes would be to know the universe. To trace causes in this sense is like tracing back all the lines of ancestry which converge in one individual; we soon reach a point where we can go no further owing to the bulk of the material.' The determination of the causal connexion is, strictly speaking, a device of ours to know and discriminate objects. There has been a lot of discussion whether succession in time is necessarily involved in any valid inference from the existing object to some other existing object or if the existent reason or the ground is quite enough or whether the causality is immanent or Transcendent or if there is any qualitative equality obtaining between the cause and the effect. But so

far no unanimity of views is attained. The logician and the psychologist take upon themselves the task of discussing the existence and nature of necessary connexion in the causal sequence. Only the standpoints of the psychologist and the logician differ amongst themselves. Logician is satisfied with the regular recurrence of the same process on the repetition of similar antecedent conditions, the psychologist, on the other hand, inquires how our belief in uniform recurrences is generated and through what stages it develops. The logician makes an inquiry into 'what the essentials of the conception are as a structural principle either of knowledge in general, or of this or that special department of science. The psychologist has to determine the elements which have actually entered into the conception or perception of causal connexion in the various stages and phases of mental development'. (Baldwin: *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,* Vol. I, p. 163) However, the main question remains the same with the logician as well as the psychologist. The question is, what is the ultimate ground of co-relation between the cause and the effect? Why the effect comes out of the cause at all? The final why as to causality can be answered by neither the psychologist nor the logician. Necessity cannot be the relation between the cause and the effect to a strict analysis. Bertrand Russell observes, 'cause in the only sense in which it can be practically applied, means "nearly invariable antecedent". We cannot in practice obtain an antecedent, which is quite invariable, for this would require us to take account of the whole universe, since something not taken account of may prevent the expected effect. We cannot distinguish, among nearly invariable antecedents, one as the cause, and the others as merely its concomitants: The attempt to do this depends upon a notion of cause which is derived from will and will is not at all the sort of thing that it is generally supposed to be, nor is there any reason to think that in physical world there is anything even remotely analogous to what will is supposed to be. If we could find one antecedent and only one that was quite invariable, we could call that one the cause without introducing any notion derived from mistaken ideas about will. But in fact we cannot find any antecedent that we know to be quite invariable, and we can find many that are nearly so'. (*Analysis of Mind,* p. 96 ff) There is no event which has only one invariable antecedent, on the contrary, every event has a number of nearly invariable antecedents. Each one of those antecedents will have the right to be called the cause. This means an utter rejection of the cause we know in our unreflected every day life.

Prof. R. G. Collingwood (*An Essay on Metaphysics,* pp. 285-332) makes a summary of the views of metaphysicians on causation. He finds at least three senses in which the word cause may be used. In sense I of the word cause, conscious and responsible agent has a motive and brings about effects freely and deliberately. It refers only to human activities and thus constitutes the subject-matter of history. The efficient and the final cause are implied in this sense. They are always present in the production of any event or effect. Sense I is the earliest and full of anthropomorphic elements. In sense II, the effect which is an event in nature can be produced or arrested by producing or arresting the cause which is an event in nature or state of things. This sense considers natural events which are either directly or indirectly controlled by human beings from the human point of view. This sense applies to practical sciences of nature. Many-one or one-many relation holds between the cause and the effect. To

know the cause is to he able to produce or prevent the effect by human agency. The cause is conditioned and dependent and a something in the world of nature and from this follows the relativity of cause. For a passive observer, there is no causation which is always connected with action. The sense II rests on anthropocentric and anthropomorphic ideas on nature. In sense II, the cause and the effect stand in a one-one relation of causal priority meaning that (i) the effect appears on the presence of the cause and subject to no further qualification; (ii) unless there is the cause; there is no effect; (iii) the cause is an antecedent to the effect. This applies to physics, chemistry and theoretical sciences of nature, which consider natural events theoretically. Dependence of one event upon another is causation. On this sense, necessity of a cause means that its existence does not depend on the sweet will of any individual. There is the one–one relation between the cause and the effect. Cause and the effect are simultaneous and coincident. The cause has its effect unconditionally: But both the rationalist and empiricist cannot explain necessitation. As a matter of fact, neither necessitation nor causation can explain each other, because both run parallel in the history of human thought. Necessitation and compulsion inherent in sense III are all anthopomorphic terms embedded in animistic theory of nature. Prof. Collingwood touches on two main points in Kantian views on causation: (*i*) every event is caused and (ii) the cause is prior to the effect. The first Kantian point is an example of sense III which requires that the cause must be simultaneous with the effect, for there is a one-one relation between the two. The second Kantian point illustrates the second sense of cause on which there is a difference of time between the cause and the effect. In view of this, it is quite impossible for Kant to unite these two points. Prof. Collingwood points that these three senses of cause are not accidental but are the product of a historical process. So we find that the cause in any form cannot shake off anthropomorphic and anthropocentric ideas from it and as such is always found deficient though we accept it and appreciate it in our pragmatic unthinking life. This is the Māyā that we accept causality in our everyday life but cannot accept it on critical analysis.

In India, as in the West, there has been a good deal of discussion as to the character of causation. The problem of causality in India centres round the questions, in the main: Is there any genuine relation between the cause and the effect? Does this relation convey the sense of identity or of difference? The effect is produced but is it produced from something positive and real or from a mere negative blank? Is the effect prefigured in the cause even prior to the causal operation or the effect is utterly different from the cause? Causal connexion in any sense of production has short-comings with it and it is the lot of causation that it cannot discard the sense of production. The Advaitic view represents that cause can neither be identical with nor different from the effect. Identity-difference cannot also be the relation. Elements of necessity, certainty, mutual separation and so on that make up the notion of causation vanish to a searching analysis of reason. The Advaitin takes up the world as it is, makes a sifting enquiry into it and finally sets down that the chain of causation is a product of basal ignorance. The nature of causation can be determined by neither 'is' nor 'is not'. It is distinct from both 'is' and 'is not'—*sadbhinnatve sati asadbhinnatvam* (*Advaita Brahmasiddhi*) It is magic, since its nature is not independent but depend-

ent upon the enquirer. To an ordinary unreflective man, causation is all right; to an astute metaphysician, it is inexplicable; and to a mystic, there is no causation at all. Into the nature of causation, we have to read ourselves and causation is full of anthropomorphic and anthropocentric ideas. Causation is Māyā, since it seems to explain though it can not explain, because it is unexplained itself. The exposition of causation that we come across in the Vedas is full of anthropomorphic ideas and anthropocentric notions. The Vedic seer personifies all nature as a giant man called Puruṣa. This Puruṣa embodies Vedic monotheistic pantheism. The Vedic seers were at the same time monistic and monotheistic in their causal considerations. 'One of the main circumstances of the higher religious thought of the time just preceding the Upaniṣads was a strong monotheistic tendency which seemed to develop simultaneously and peacefully along with the monistic ideas, such as the "That" the "only" the "Being".' (Bloomfield: *The Religion of Veda,* p. 270) The kernel of truth is that the Vedic seers did not find out the exact relation between the cause and the effect. How one is many or many is in essence one is a Māyā to the Vedic seers. In the Upaniṣads, we mark definitely two trends of thought. The cause in itself remains unchanged, the diversity of effects is only an unsubstantial appearance. There is another view which regards the effect as a real effect of a real cause. Both these views lead us straight to Māyā. If the cause remains unchanged even when the effect appears, we shall have no right to assert that the unchanged cause is the cause of the effect. Again, what can we mean by the reality of the cause and the reality of the effect? Does it mean that the law of causality is held out by perception? The Advaitin finds faults with perception and perceptual evidence. If the perception is real then the objects of perception are real; again, if and when objects of perception are real, the perception is real. This is a case of mutual dependence. The perceptual truth that we know is for the time being and cannot claim any right to be truth for an indefinite period in future. The perceptual reality of today may be sublated in future. We cannot sum up all perceptual truths, examine them and arrive at the conclusion that they are uncontradicted. Reality of cause and effect may be the reality of objects. But objects appear and disappear and suffer changes and, as such, they cannot claim any ultimate reality. They have only conventional and pragmatic reality. Causation, attaching to objects, may have, objective reality, i.e. conventional and pragmatic reality.

Śaṅkara effects a happy compromise of the Upaniṣadic texts which run counter to each other. There is no running away from the fact that in the phenomenal world with which we are ordinarily concerned, there is a real cause and a real effect. But this reality of the cause and the effect thins into air as we are reflective, analytic and critical. We find the ground, which is pure 'isness' or Being alone is real. Manifestations hold some amount of reality. But the manifestations cannot be as real as the ground itself. The Advaitin launches into attack on the theory of causality. According to him, objects are essentially variable and, as such, are illusory and indescribable. So there cannot be logically speaking any law of causality applicable to objects for any ultimate purpose. If there were any genuine law of causality having application to objects, objects would not have been essentially variable and indescribable. In case of invariable nature of objects, the world of objects would have been closed and fixed. But

this we do not find in nature, but rather the opposite of this is in view.

It may be noted in passing that the Advaitic views on causation are quite in line with the recent philosophical developments and neo-scientific findings. Modern science reverses the old views on matter which is solid and spread out in time and space. Particle physics reduces substratum of phenomena to an inexplicable energy, which cannot be designated as 'substance' or 'not-substance'. Atomic physics dematerializes matter and renders it non-material. 'Science, unable to hold the basic principle that composes all phenomena as existent or non-existent, cannot in consequence, logically characterize the universe in terms of real or unreal, but posits an objective world that is only pragmatically and conventionally existent and admits to its probable non-existence from a cosmic point apart from the present physical system of the universe. Thus the vision of the world rests in science as in Māyāvāda, upon the position of the observer. The world is existent and has a sort of reality as long as the individual conceives it as such from his particular physical observation point. However, outside the co-ordinate system of our universe, where none of our physical definitions are seen to hold, the world cannot be viewed as an existent unity in any of our known physical terms.' (Ruth Reyna : *The Concept of Māyā*, pp. 89-90) Views on causation are thoroughly regulated by the views we take of the world, because causation is of the world. If the world is neither real nor unreal and as such inexplicable, causation is also neither real nor unreal and as such inexplicable. This, in short, is Māyā. We cannot deny though we cannot accept it. Causation is an appearance and is contradicted.

VIVEKANANDA THE WIT—3

Dr. S. P. Sen Gupta

In his life as well as in talks, Swami Vivekananda never dropped the veil of playfulness. He was never tired of telling people that we are children of bliss, and therefore, we should never look morose and sombre. On the 9th December, 1900, the Swami returned to Belur Math from West unannounced. The monks were then having their meals at night. The gardener came hurriedly and said, 'An Englishman has come'. Speculations were rife as to his identity. To their great astonishment, they found the Englishman coming to them. 'How could he come?' they wondered, for the main gate was under lock and key. Now they had no difficulty in recognizing. He was none other than Swami Vivekananda himself. 'Our Swamiji has come' was on everybody's lips. It was an occasion for rejoicing. Swami Vivekananda, the eternal boy, jumped over the wall. And then laughing he said, 'I heard the bell inviting you all to your dinner. I thought I should not miss it. And that is why I scaled the wall.'

While at Mayavati, one day Swami Vivekananda was a little irritated, because the food could not be served to him in time. Swami Virajananda, the Swami's disciple was cooking. When the food was at last served, Swami Vivekananda said angrily, 'Take away the food. I won't have it.'

Virajananda kept mum. Then minutes passed, and neither spoke a word. And Swami Vivekananda relented. He began to eat like a boy. 'Do you know?' the Swami asked, 'Why I was so angry, I was frightfully hungry.'

It was snowing heavily. Swami Vivekananda's delicate health could not stand that climate. He must be removed to a warmer place. But how to get the porters? 'What do you propose to do?' the Swami asked. 'We shall carry you', replied Virajananda. 'Well, in that case', Swami Vivekananda said playfully, 'You want to throw me in the ditch.'

Swami Vivekananda had been to Dacca. People of all shades of opinion visited him from time to time. A youngman brought a photograph of a religious man and asked, 'Well, Swamiji, don't you believe that he is an incarnation of God?' 'I don't know', replied the Swami. And yet the youngman repeated the question with pertinacity. 'My dear boy', the Swami said, 'I fear you are underfed. You should eat more. Your brain, I fear, has dried up.'

'Do you really love me?' Swami Vivekananda asked, 'Yes, I love you' was the unequivocal reply from Swami Ramakrishnananda. Swami Vivekananda wanted to test him. Ramakrishnananda was a little orthodox. So Swami Vivekananda said, 'Then bring a loaf from the shop.' Ramakrishnananda was the son of a Brahmin, and Swami Vivekananda thought, he might hesitate to bring the loaf. For in those days loaf was socially tabooed among the orthodox. But Ramakrishnananda brought the loaf without the least hesitation.

Even after the conquest of the west, Swami Vivekananda could not assume pontifical solemnity. He never ceased to be playful with his brothers-in-faith. Sometimes he used to drag several persons into heated arguments and enjoy the situation. Swami Shivananda did not exaggerate when he said that wherever Swami Vivekananda chose to be, he would throw open the floodgates of unalloyed joy. We have it on the authority of Swami Saradananda that Swami Vivekananda would often say, 'One who cannot make funs is incapable of intellectual feats.' Haripada Mittra became Swami Vivekananda's disciple when the latter had already leaped into fame. His impression was this that the Swami was 'a stout, young monk with a cheerful countenance'. That cheerful countenance remained unchanged for the rest of his life. He often quoted from Dickens' *Pickwick Papers*, one of the most humorous books in English literature. 'Swamiji', recalls a disciple, 'sometimes imparted very valuable lessons through humour or derision... He would be merry, full of gaiety, fun and laughter, just like a boy, even when imparting the highest instruction. He laughed and made others laugh with him... Some came to enjoy his humorous talks.'

In reply to the remark that monks and holy men cannot be stout, the Swami replied, 'This is my famine insurance fund! Even if I do not get food for days on end, my fat will keep me alive.'

Josephine MacLeod recalls how once Swami Vivekananda was travelling with his American disciples in a boat. There were some orthodox Hindus also. Miss MacLeod and others had taken with them some chickens, which were clucking. Swami Vivekananda who knew, they were hidden, had a twinkle in his eye, but he would never betray them. On that occasion, the Hindu Pundits asked the Swami, 'Why do you have to do with these ladies? They are *mlechchas*. They are untouchables.' This is but one side of the picture. The Westerners, on the other hand, would come to Miss MacLeod and others and say, 'Swamiji is not treating you with respect. He meets you without his turban.' Swami Vivekananda heard the allegations against him from either side, and yet could have great

fun laughing at the idiosyncrasies of the civilizations of the East and the West.

Swami Vivekananda gave a call to his disciples to have the food, cooked by him. 'Now I am going to cook for you and serve the brithrin (*sic*). The food is delicious and for "yours truly" too hot with spices.' What is food for one is poison to another. What is 'delicious' to the Orientals may not be relished by the Westerners. Swami Vivekananda belonged to a family that was frightfully fond of hot dishes. Viswanath Dutta and his illustrious son were both excellent cooks. And hence when the Swami invited his Western disciples, they had mixed feelings. Swami Vivekananda's call is irresistible. But the preparation with chillies galore was not a happy prospect either. But take they must. Their tummies ached after they had taken the hot dishes. 'If Swamiji could cook for me', wrote one disciple, 'I can take the food and jolly well die for it.'

Swami Vivekananda was fond of ice-cream. Miss MacLeod recalls in her memoirs that the Swami was passionately fond of chocolate ice-cream, and would jestingly say that he himself was like chocolate, and hence this fascination. 'How do you like strawberry?' asked a Western disciple. 'I have never tasted it' was the Swami's reply. 'Goodness gracious!', persisted the disciple, 'You are taking strawberry everyday with ice-cream.' 'Even if you keep a pebble', replied the Swami, 'inside ice-cream, I shall take it without knowing what is inside.' Only four months before his passing away, Miss MacLeod gave Swami Vivekananda two hundred dollars and promised to pay him fifty dollars a month. 'Are you sure', the Swami asked, 'this will suffice for me?' 'Yes', replied Miss MacLeod, 'only you can't have ice-cream.'

After a lecture, the disciples took Swami Vivekananda to a restaurant. It was an awfully cold night, and as Ida Ansell recalls, it was hellish cold. Yet the Swami chose cold ice-cream. The hostess asked the Swami to wait for her, as she had an engagement elsewhere. She said that she would come back quickly. 'Well', said the Swami, 'Don't be long or when you come back you will find only lump of chocolate ice-cream.'

On another occasion, Swami Vivekananda was in a restaurant. He asked for chocolate ice-cream, and the waitress mistakenly brought ice-cream soda—a thing the Swami did not relish. The manager was annoyed and scolded the waitress. At this, the Swami called out, 'Don't you scold that poor girl. I'll take all the ice-cream soda if you are going to scold her.'

Mrs. Steele prepared a good dinner for Swami Vivekananda. The dessert consisted of fine dates. After that the Swami went to deliver a lecture, which was highly appreciated by all. Swami Vivekananda accounted for his success and told Mrs. Steele, 'It was your dates, madam.' Amidst all the serious discussions of philosophy, Swami Vivekananda could be playful. Ida Ansell writes: 'The jokes continued to be interspersed among the serious subjects!'

Swami Vivekananda was neither a gourmand nor a gourmet. And yet he never liked to tighten the belt. That explains why he was never tired of jokes, related to food. Once in the course of a lecture, he said that he had read Dante's *Inferno* three times. The hell described by Dante, did not appear horrible to him. The Hindu conception of hell was far more horrible. And then the Swami presented a lurid picture of the hell. A glutton was taken to hell. All the delicacies were served before him. He naturally felt tempted to have them all. But alas! his tummy was several thousand miles long, while the mouth was as small as the point of a needle. A greater punishment than tantalization can hardly be imagined.

Shanti, a disciple, served Swami Vivekananda. One morning he found her cooking when she was supposed to have been in the morning class. 'Are you not coming to meditate?' asked the Swami. 'Yes', she replied, 'but I have to get the broth simmering first. Then I shall come in.' The Swami replied playfully, but with a solemn face, 'Well, never mind. Our Master said, you could leave meditation for service.'

A boy once watched Swami Vivekananda taking coffee. He said, ' Black man like (*sic*) coffee; white man like coffee; red man like coffee.' Swami Vivekananda was amused and offered some coffee to the boy. Throughout the afternoon, the Swami, even when left to himself, kept repeating the boy's remark and laughing.

While Swami Vivekananda was at Alameda, Edith would cook for him. Once some pickles were brought for him. He took some of them, and the juice of the fruits ran out on his hand. Without any ado he put his fingers to his mouth to lick the juice off. Edith was shocked at this. Swami Vivekananda said, 'This little outside. That's the trouble with you; you always want the outside to be so nice.'

In an article, Christopher Isherwood quotes an interesting story, narrated by Swami Vivekananda about Madame Sarah Bernhardt, the famous French actress. We are reproducing it without any alteration. 'Madame Bernhardt has a special regard for India; she tells me again and again that our country is *trés ancien, trés civilisé*—very ancient and very civilized. She had told me that for about a month . . . she had visited every museum and made herself acquainted with the men and women, and their dress, the streets and bathing ghats and everything relating to India. Madame Bernhardt has a very strong desire to visit India. —"*C'est mon rave*!—It is the dream of my life," she says. The prince of Wales has promised to take her over to a tiger and elephant hunting excursion. But then she said, she must spend some two lacs of rupees if she went to India! "*La Divine Sarah*"—the divine Sarah—is her name—how can she want money!—She who never travels but by a special train! That pomp and luxury many a prince of Europe cannot afford to indulge in. One can only secure a seat in her performance by paying double the fees, and that a month in advance! Well, she is not going to suffer want of money! But Sarah Bernhardt is given to spending lavishly. Her travel to India is therefore put off for the present.'

In this account, Swami Vivekananda is playful and ironical at the same time. Again, when he said, 'When the American girls fail to procure husbands, they become old maids and naturally get attached to the church', he is distinctly ironical. But that is not his usual role. 'He had', writes E. T. Sturdy, 'a great sense of humour and as a natural correlative, much pathos and pity for affliction.' That is the correct appraisal of Swami Vivekananda's humour. Sister Christine recalls an anecdote, which may also be quoted.

'Swamiji', some body said, 'You said just the opposite yesterday.' 'Yes', replied Swami Vivekananda, 'that was *yesterday.*'

Cornelia Conger recalled how Swami Vivekananda told her grandmother Mrs. Lyon, 'Look here, Mrs. Lyon, I had had the greatest temptation of my life in America." Mrs. Lyon felt amused and asked, 'Who is she?' 'Not a lady', replied Swami Vivekananda, 'it is the organization in America.'

Sister Christine, about whom we said before, recalls that it was not all Vedānta and deep serious thought that engaged the Swami. Sometimes after the classes, it was pure fun and such gaiety as were never seen before. For all the disciples thought that religious men were grave. But Swami Vivekananda gave the lie to the popular

belief, because he was in a state of child-like joy, which is a sign of detachment that comes only to those who have seen the great Reality. Sister Christine also narrates how on one occasion a woman asked, 'Swamiji, are you a Buddhist (pronounced like *bud*)? 'No, madam', came the reply, 'I am a florist.'

Swami Vivekananda did not very much like the congregational singing in the church, which he humorously described as 'bottle-breaking business'. He also made all sorts of fun of 'Beulah Land' and sang:

I have reached the land of corn
and wine,
And all its riches freely mine.

India was Swami Vivekananda's subject for discourse. He asked Tom before his lecture, 'Look here, I never know when to stop when I speak on India. Please, therefore, draw my attention at 10 O'clock.' At 10 O'clock, Tom swung his watch like a pendulum just to give Swamiji the hint that it was 10 O'clock. The Swami reacted, 'He is swinging the watch, for it must be 10 O'clock, but I have not yet started.' The episode is undoubtedly amusing but is it not at the same time an eloquent testimony to Swami Vivekananda's burning patriotism?

'Why do you', demanded Reeves Calkins, 'teach religion in *my* country?' 'Why do you teach religion in *my* country?' Swami Vivekananda asked. Both looked at each other presumably not as friends. The Swami smiled, and laughter is infectious. Both of them were off their guards, and both burst out laughing and became friends.

Swami Vivekananda and Swami Shivananda were seated in a room at Benaras. They had an exchange of repartees. Both laughed. 'Well Mahapurush' [that was the name given by Swami Vivekananda to Swami Shivananda] said the Swami, 'so you think that I am Śukrācārya, the spiritual guide of the demons?' A delicate nerve of one of the eyes of Swami Vivekananda was damaged, and therefore he was slightly visually handicapped. That is why he compared himself with Śukrācārya, who was one-eyed. The second point of comparison was that Śukrācārya, though not a demon, was the preceptor of the demons. Swami Vivekananda similarly was the preceptor of the Westerners without being a Westerner himself.

Swami Premananda could not get up in time and attend the prayer. Swami Vivekananda sent a messenger to ring the bells near his ears. Swami Brahmananda also was once a defaulter. Sarat Chakrabarty [a disciple of Swami Vivekananda] was ordered by the Swami to ring the bells near his ears. Swami Vivekananda wanted all to be punctual and regular, and even then the playful boy was irrepressible.

'Educate the masses', was Swami Vivekananda's motto. And that motto was also explained in a witty manner. He asked his disciples not to 'associate themselves with Prahlād'. When asked to explain it the Swami said, 'You know Prahlād burst into tears when he read *ka* [the first letter of the Bengali alphabet] for that reminded him of Kṛṣṇa. And, therefore, those who were opposed to education might be called the followers of Prahlād.'

Navagopal Ghosh, a disciple of Sri Ramakrishna had a shrine for the Master. He made elaborate arrangements for the purpose. Swami Vivekananda and others came there in time. Mrs. Navagopal Ghosh said, 'Swamiji, we have not the means to worship the Master.' 'Our Master', replied the Swami, 'never lived in a house made of marble, and here he is enshrined in a marble house. He was born in a thatched cottage in the village. If he refuses to live here amidst such comforts, where else can he live?' All people laughed at this.

Swami Vivekananda had been to the Zoological garden at Calcutta with Sister Nivedita and Sarat Chandra Chakrabarty. The Superintendent showed them a large snake, which, he said, became the tortoise in the process of evolution. The East Bengal people are fond of tortoises. The Swami, therefore, said to Sarat Chandra, 'You take tortoises, that means you take snakes also.' The Swami explained it in English, and Sister Nivedita along with others had a hearty laugh.

Untouchability and casteism never found favour with Swami Vivekananda, who looked upon everybody as Śiva. That is why he was never tired of condemning this social stigma, but in his condemnation also, he was refreshingly playful. At the Zoological garden, the Superintendent had made arrangements for snacks and tea. They were at the same table. Sarat Chandra shrank a little while he had to take the tea and sweets, touched by Nivedita. Reluctantly he had to take these things. He, however, decided not to take water. The Swami took some water and gave it to him. Now disarmed, he had to take water also. Sarat Chandra did not know what was in store for him. The Swami returned to Belur Math, and in the presence of a number of people, announced the news: 'You will be surprized to know that this orthodox Brahmin has taken the leavings of Nivedita.' And then turning to Sarat Chandra, he asked, 'You have taken the sweets, that's all right. But why did you take the water?' 'You are my *Guru*', said Sarat Chandra, 'I can take anything at your command.' 'But henceforth', Swami Vivekananda replied, 'no body will recognize you as a Brahmin.'

Sarat Chandra brought a large fish to Belur Math. The Swami prepared a few courses in the English style with vermicelli. Actually vermicelli is a paste of some materials as macaroni, made in slender threads. Not familiar with that stuff, Sarat Chandra asked him what it was. 'They are', the Swami replied, 'English earthworms. I have dried and brought them here.' Everybody laughed at poor Sarat Chandra's discomposure.

Once a youngman had been coming to Swami Vivekananda rather frequently. The Swami knew that his university examination was not far off, and he was coming to the Swami with a view to becoming a monk so that he might ward off the bogey of examination. The Swami told the youngman to pass his M.A. examination and then be a monk. For to be a monk was far more difficult than to pass the M.A. examination.

On a July evening, it was raining heavily. Swami Vivekananda asked everybody to walk barefooted. Dharma Pala insisted on walking with shoes on. 'Never mind, I will wade with my shoes on,' he said. Some of them slipped, and the Swami burst into laughter like a child.

'What is in a name?' said Shakespeare. But there is much in name, as far as Swami Vivekananda is concerned. Swami Vivekananda christened more people than anybody we know of. The names are an unmistakable proof of Swami Vivekananda's sense of humour, not unmixed with love and affection. Let us start with his brothers-in-faith. Latu [Swami Adbhutananda] was originally known as Rakhturam, which in the process of evolution became Latu or Leto. Sri Ramakrishna usually called him Leto. Swami Vivekananda made Leto Plato. There is a history behind the name, and it is not a bad idea to know it, 'Have you ever heard of the worship of the earth?', asked Latu. Swami Vivekananda wondered. 'Look here, Naren', said Latu, 'the earth is the grand repository of all our resources. And hence my question, do all people worship the earth?' Swami Saradananda was seated by Swami Vivekananda. 'Look here, Sarat', Swami Vivekananda said, 'Lato is talking

like Plato, the philosopher.' And hence the name Plato caught on. Hariprasanna, known in the Order as Swami Vijnanananda was named by the Swami as the Bishop of Allahabad, and occasionally as 'Peshan'. Swami Trigunatitananda's name, however could not be changed. In one of the letters, Swami Vivekananda wrote, 'Don't you think you should curtail your enormously long name? Your name will scare away even the god of death. Now it is too late to change it.' Swami Shivananda came to be known as 'Mahapurush', for once he said, through the grace of the Master he had completely conquered lust—an almost impossible feat. The famous author of *Sri Ramakrishna Punthi* was Sri Akshay Kumar Sen, and Swami Vivekananda improvised a peculiar name for him—'Śānkhcunnī', i.e., the ghost with a nasal tone. Girish Chandra Ghosh became G.C., as Bernard Shaw became G. B. S. Jajneswar Bhattacharyya, the son of the family-priest of Swami Premananda had a little beard. He looked like an East Bengal Muslim. Moreover, his nickname was Fakir. And hence quite logically Swami Vivekananda called him 'Fakirud-din Haider'.

Swami Vivekananda was not stand-offish in relation to his own disciples. Margaret Noble, known as Nivedita today, became Margot. Josephine MacLeod had several names—Joe, Joe Joe, Jaya and Yum. Mrs. Ole Bull was known as 'Dhīrā Mātā'. Mr. and Mrs. George Hale were named 'Father Pope' and 'Mother Church' re-spectively. Francis Leggett became 'Frank-incence'. Mrs. Eddy, the founder of the Christian Scientific Association was called Mrs. Whirlpool since Eddy and Whirlpool are synonymous. Singaravelu Mudaliar was called 'Kiddy', because in Tamil 'Kiddy' means a parrot. Alasinga who selflessly furthered the cause of the Swami, had two names—the Haramohan of Madras and 'Achingā', Alasinga's younger brother was, therefore, called 'chichingā' (snake-gourd). Swami Vivekananda established two journals, *Prabuddha Bharata* and *Udbodhan*. The first became 'Awakened', which is but a literal translation of '*Prabuddha*', but '*Udbodhan*' [Awakening] became 'Udbandhan' [hanging]. We are quite sure, the Swami must have improvised other names also, but we have not been able to discover them.

So long we had been dwelling at length on Vivekananda, the wit as revealed in his life and activities. Swami Vivekananda's writings are also full of witticisms, despite their philosophic contents. We shall select a few passages to show his wit.

'You always want to economize', wrote Swami Vivekananda to Balaram Bose, 'how can Lord help you? Lord wou'd bring money from his father's residence'. To Mary Hale, the Swami wrote about the cupidity of a presbyterian Priest. A ship was about to sink, and the priest, asked all the passengers to pray, and what did he do? He began to collect piaculative pence from all of them. In a letter to Swami Trigunatitananda, Swami Vivekananda wrote: 'Notovitch writes that Jesus came to India... The picture of Jesus and the Samaritan woman was in a monastery. But how do you know it to be "Jesu" and not "Ghishu?"' In a letter (written from Dar-jeeling) to Mary Hale, the Swami writes: 'I am very well here, for life in the plains has become a torture. I cannot put the tip of my nose out into the streets, but there is a curious crowd!! Fame is not all milk and honey!! I am going to train a big beard, now it is turning grey. It gives a venerable appearance and saves one from American scandal-mongers! O thou white hair, how much thou canst conceal, all glory unto thee, Hallelujah!' Again in a letter to Ramakrishnananda, he writes, 'You have recommended a man, saddled with a family. He threatens that if help is

not extended, he would embrace Christianity. If so, Hindu India would lose the brightest jewel... Hari, Sarada and myself are dancing waltz. You would wonder how we could maintain balance.'

In a letter to Ramakrishnananda, Swami Vivekananda wrote: 'I am glad to know that instead of pursuing your favourite poses of worship and *Kling Fot* [Tantrik practices], you have dedicated yourself to the cause of emancipating the people of Madras.' Then he continued, 'You have recommended a youngman, who has no means of livelihood. It is the same old story, but what is new about it is the Madrasi version, "I have a large number of children"... You will faint away to learn that the business of worship has been considerably reduced.'

While describing the miserable plight of the English in Africa, Swami Vivekananda wrote: 'A soldier on duty cried out that he had caught a Tartar. "Bring him in', was the command from inside. "He refuses to come", said the soldier. The command became sterner, "Then you come yourself". "The Tartar does not allow me to come either", was the meek reply.'

Bhābbār Kathā is a collection of humorous stories in a satirical vein. They are written in an inimitable style and have untranslatable delicacies. Yet they may be summarized. A man once went to a temple to have a *darśan* of the deity. Emotionally worked up, he thought he should sing a song. The priest had taken an intoxicant. As soon as the deafening song excoriated his ears, he was alerted. 'Why are you shouting in a stentorian voice?' asked the priest. 'I am trying to propitiate the deity' was the reply. 'Do you think, asked the priest, that the deity is a fool? You have not pleased *me* even. Is the deity even a greater fool than I?'

There are some who parade their love of God, but the heart is dry within. Bhola Chand is a man of this type. There is hardly any sin or crime he has not committed. Once he heard from somebody that God had assured Arjuna that if he could completely surrender himself to Him, He would deliver him. Bhola Chand resorted to all sorts of crimes with renewed vigour and energy. But at the same time he cried at the top of his voice, 'I have surrendered myself to God. I have, therefore, nothing to worry about.' Bhola Chand thought that he could throw dust in God's eyes. Is God such a fool?

Swami Vivekananda could be at times extremely satirical. There are men who are seen to preach the teachings of the Vedānta Philosophy, without, however, practising them. Bholapuri claims to be a Vedāntist. When people die of hunger or disease, he remains completely indifferent. 'None can die', he would say pontifically, 'the body may perish, but the soul is immortal.' He refuses to do any work. When questioned, he says that everything was done in his former birth. He loses his serenity only when he does not get enough alms from the householders. He is unbalanced when he is not duly recognized. He, then, feels that such people are undesirable, and the world should be rid of them. Bholapuri also thinks that God can be imposed upon.

Ram Charan also looks upon God as a fool. Ram Charan was asked, 'Well Ram Charan, you have not learned anything; you cannot do anything; you are not capable of any physical strain; you are a drug-addict, and moreover you are a habitual delinquent. How, then, do you earn your living?' 'That is easy', replied Ram Charan glibly, 'I instruct people'.

At Lucknow, Mohurrum was being celebrated with great eclat. The Hindus and the Muslims and people of all communities crowded there. Two unsophisticated Rajput

landlords were also present on the occasion. Mohurrum commemorated the tragic death of two holy men—Hassan and Hossain at the hands of Ezid, who is a symbol of sin. The devout Muslims even today beat their breasts and cry as they recollect the tragedy. The Rajput landlords were about to enter the mosque. The porter said, 'Look here, gentlemen, here is the effigy of Ezid, who killed Hassan and Hossain. You must beat the effigy with shoes for five times, and then alone can you get in'. But strange were the ways of the unsophisticated Rajputs. They fell prostrate at the feet of the effigy and said with devotion, 'Glory unto thee, O Ezid, Thou hast beaten them so severely that they are crying even now.' Most people, according to Swami Vivekananda, do not appreciate the spirit of religion and think just the other way round.

Swami Vivekananda had come to fulfil, and not to destroy. Nobody could be a greater Hindu than the Swami, and yet he detested the time-worn conventions. There is a temple of the Hindus that kisses the sky. All the gods and goddesses of the Hindu pantheon are enshrined there. Nobody is getting inside the temple, at the gate of which there is a hydra-headed figure, having one hundred hands, two hundred tummies and five hundred legs. 'Who is he?' asked the Swami. 'That is social convention', was the reply, 'You may at times listen to the Vedas, Vedānta and philosophy, but you must unhesitatingly carry out the commands of the god, known as social convention.'

Superstition and social convention are deeply rooted in us. Gurgure Krishnabyal Bhattacharyya claims to be omniscient. He is lanky, and his friends say complacently that it is due to deep meditation. The enemies say, it is due to starvation or his having begot thirty children in a year. He can scientifically interpret everything. He will explain why people have pigtails; why the soil of the courtyard of the public woman is necessary for *Durgā Pūjā* and why it is desirable to make a girl of ten conceive. With pontifical solemnity he claims that India is the only religious land, and the Brahmins are the only favoured few who can appreciate religion. Of the Brahmins, the members of the Krishnabyal family are the most religious, and of them Gurgure is decidedly the holiest. If somebody wants to question the conventions, Gurgure would assuringly say, 'sleep to your heart's content. I shall vicariously do everything for you. Don't, however, forget to pay me handsomely.' And then everybody slept again. Swami Vivekananda sought to awaken the sleeping leviathan. In all the stories in *Bhābbār Kathā*, Swami Vivekananda is a satirist, who tries to awaken the masses and free them from the bondage of social conventions and sentimentalism. He is at times angry and even cruel, but he is cruel only to be kind. The playful note, however, is never absent.

Parivrājak is a *magnum opus* not so much for the philosophy as for the inexhaustible fund of humour. We shall select a few passages to illustrate our point. Swami Vivekananda's companion on board the ship was Swami Turiyananda, who got frightened to see the knives and forks at the hands of the white passengers at the dining table. Swami Turiyananda, Swami Vivekananda hinted, had a tender body. Swami Vivekananda wondered if Hanuman who crossed the Indian Ocean ever had any sea-sickness. The very absurdity of the conception adds a humorous touch. Swami Vivekananda's pen-portrait of a typical Bengali poet, Shyamacharan excites our laughter. Shyamacharan has travelled as far as Burdwan, and at Calcutta he lives in a room on the groundfloor, which is so well-lighted and ventilated that he has burnt a candle even at noon. The walls are

beautifully bespattered with the red pigment of *pān,* and the music of the lizards, mice and moles can be heard all the while. Amidst such congenial surroundings, Shyamacharan, comfortably seated on a cot and tugging at his hubble-bubble, writes magnificent poetry about the Himalayas, sea and ocean and the arid desert.

Swami Vivekananda carried some water of the Gaṅgā in a vessel, which looked like a *Badnā* [a vessel normally used by the Muslims]. At night the Swami was startled to find that Mother Gaṅgā had refused to be in *Badnā.* If the Mother would repeat her old game of piercing through the Himalayas, casting adrift *Airāvat* the divine Elephant, and demolishing Jahnu Muni's hermitage, it would not be a pleasant experience. The Swami prayed to the Mother, 'Well, mum, don't be so impatient. We shall reach Madras tomorrow, and there you can do as you like. At Madras the people are more intelligent than even the elephants and their tonsured heads with pigtails are almost made of stones. As a matter of fact, even the Himalayas are as soft as butter when compared to their heads.' [The readers are to remember that Swami Vivekananda casts no fling at any people. He was too loving to do that. He just makes fun.] Swami Vivekananda's prayer was unheeded. He, therefore, hit upon a plan and said, 'O mum, the people who are approaching are the beef-eating Muslims; and the sweepers who are cleaning the cabins are the untouchables. If you still persist in coming out, I shall let them touch you. If you are still adamant. I shall send you straightway to your father's house, and you will remain there petrified.' And the Mother came to her senses.

The ship was rolling, and Swami Turiyananda had sea-sickness. He gave the gorge, and Swami Vivekananda commented: 'Turiyananda is trying to discover the rice which he had taken in his childhood on the occasion of his *annaprāśan.*' Swami Turiyananda requested Swami Vivekananda to complete his article on *Vartamān Bhārat* [India today]. Playfully he asked Turiyananda, 'Well, brother, what is the condition of India today?' Still suffering from sea-sickness, Turiyananda replied, 'Extremely miserable, getting very much muddled up!'

As they had entered into the sea, Turiyananda suggested that for the safety of the voyage they should promise to offer a goat to the Mother Gaṅgā. Swami Vivekananda who never failed to tease, readily agreed. Next day Turiyananda asked Swami Vivekananda about it. The Swami showed him the meat of the goat at the dining table. 'But you are eating that', wondered Turiyananda. Swami Vivekananda then told him a story. To a certain place, where Gaṅgā was not flowing nearby, a son-in-law, living in Calcutta came. The drums were being beaten. The mother-in-law insisted, 'My child, you must take this milk.' The son-in-law thought that that was the social practice there. He took the milk, and the drums were beaten again. 'My child', said the mother-in-law, with tears of joy, 'You have behaved like my son. You belong to Calcutta, and, therefore, you have the water of the Gaṅgā in your stomach. I put the powder of your father-in-law's bones in the milk. You have taken it and therefore, your father-in-law has now secured his desired shelter in Gaṅgā.' The conclusion of the story was equally smashing. 'Look here', Swami Vivekananda said, 'I belong to Calcutta. All the goats I am eating are in touch with the holy Gaṅgā.'

Swami Vivekananda remarked on the boats of East Bengal. 'They are so durable that as soon as the wind blows, the passengers are asked to remember their gods.' While paying his compliments to the English, Swami Vivekananda is distinctly ironical. 'In our country we make a distinction

between the gentlemen and the outcasts. But to our benign government, all are "natives". There is no distinction between a porter and a prince. Long live the British Government.'

Every nation, Swami Vivekananda said, claimed to be Aryans. Some are hundred per cent Aryans, some slightly less. Some Indians thought that if they but denounced their national religion and clothes, the British Government would love and laud them to the skies. But just the reverse happened. They are being kicked and whipped and bullied.

Swami Vivekananda entered into a barber's shop. The beard was sickeningly long. 'Your looks offend me', said the barber. 'Perhaps the barber did not like Swami Vivekananda's saffron robes and turban. The Swami, therefore, decided to buy western clothes, which, he thought, would be the surest possport to the barber. An American gentleman put him along the right track, 'If you wear saffron robes that's all right. But once you wear western clothes, they will chase you.' Why all this? because the Americans thought they were Aryans. Swami Vivekananda gave the lie to this belief by narrating a story. A *Dom* [a man of the lowest caste of the Hindu community] once said, 'We are of the highest caste. We are '*domamams*.'

Ceylon is the land of the Buddhists. Non-violence is their accepted creed. On the temples there, one can see the pictures symbolizing the punishment of those, who have resorted to violence. A thief once got into the house of a non-violent Ceylonese. The sons beat him severely. The father out of sheer compassion said, 'Don't forget that non-violence is our motto. You just put the thief in a sack, tie it, and throw him into the water.' The thief, overwhelmed with gratitude, exclaimed, 'How kind you are!'

We shall conclude our account by narrating Swami Vivekananda's description of the shark-hunt. It is not the description that matters. It is, in fact, the inimitable style of the Swami, which, I fear, even the best translators will fail to reconstruct. This applies to all that Swami Vivekananda has written. Our scholars in Bengali language and literature have devoted all their energy to the study of writers, whose writings have today become bibliographical treasures, fit for the museum; but Swami Vivekananda, who is a maker of Bengali prose still remains unexplored.

The shark was coming. The pilot fish preceded him. The pilot fish directs the shark to spot out the game. In return it gets a little leavings. But from the largeness of the shark's mouth it appears that in most cases the pilot fish is disappointed.

An angling rod was found out. The rod was much larger than one with which the bucket in a well is salvaged ... Everybody was on the tenterhooks to have a look at the shark ... The shark was baited, and forty to fifty persons began to pull it hard. It was done at an inopportune moment, and the shark escaped. Another shark appeared on the scene. Had the sharks any language, the escaping shark would have invariably told his fellow: 'Look here, be on your guard, the animal [the chunk of meat and the hook] is tasteful no doubt, but its bones are frightfully hard'... The other shark would have also suggested some medicine, like the biles of fish, the spleen of the haunch-backed pomfret, the broth of oisters and various other specifics of the sea... Perhaps the shark was in touch with men and developed human propensities, and that explains his silence. He simply smiled and said, 'I hope, you are all right.' He did not like to be deceived alone... The shark came preceded by the pilot fish in much the same way as Gaṅgā was preceded by Bhagīrath... The bait was made of English bacon, which looked like Śrī Kṛṣṇ, surrounded by the Gopīs.

Swami Vivekananda brought a new message to the suffering humanity—the message of joy and happiness. On his life, character and works is writ large one word 'Joy'.

SEMINAL IDEAS OF THE ARYANS

Dr. R. R. Diwakar

Seminal ideas are those from which other ideas flow; other ideas are deducible from seminal ideas. If seminal ideas are theories or axioms, derived or derivable ideas are like corollaries. Seminal ideas are the roots or the seeds from which other ideas emerge.

I have called them 'Aryan' because I find them already current by the time of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Śrī Kṛṣṇa chides Arjuna for his un-Aryan attitude and behaviour when he sees that his Kṣatriya friend, out of temporary emotional reactions, wants to abstain from doing his duty, namely, fighting a righteous war, *Anāryajuṣṭam asvargyam akīrtikaram Arjuna.* (*Gītā* II. 2)

I would like to emphasize that these are not merely ideas or concepts belonging to the world of thought or to the domain of intellect. These ideas were not merely spun out by philosophers and woven into thought-systems by metaphysicians but were experienced by seers and saints by their total being. They formed the warp and woof of the daily living of many leaders of society. Thus these ideas were the flesh and blood of the faith which formed the bed-rock of their philosophy of life.

The full vision of the Being-Becoming, the Cosmos is the primary thing. Not Being and Becoming, nor Being-cum-Becoming but eternal and simultaneous, indivisible, Being-Becoming is the *sat*, that is, total existence, all that has been eternally there, all that is and all that ever will be, eternally and infinitely. The totality, the whole is the Reality, and that is perfect, not merely in its 'being' but in its 'becoming' also, not only in its totality but in its infinitesimal parts and fractions as well. It is our limited powers of perception and the relative views that we take for our own purposes, that we impose imperfection on what we perceive and experience. To a totally objective consciousness, neither the totality nor its infinite number of parts can present any imperfection at any point of time or space. We say a tender plant is not full-grown and is imperfect in relation to the tree, which we visiualize. But in so far as the plant is a part of the totality and has come into existence by some cosmic law and discharges an ordained function every moment of its life and at every point of space, it is as perfect as the whole cosmos itself. *Pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidaṁ pūrṇāt pūrṇamudacyate ...* (*Iśā, Śāntimantra*)

The second most important idea is that the cosmos, sentient as well as insentient, is an instinct with an informing spirit, not foreign to it but inherent in it. There is nothing that is not suffused with the spirit i.e. with the principle of consciousness or intelligence, the power to know. This *sat* is not merely being or existence but is replete with *cit*. *Iśāvāsyamidaṁ sarvaṁ yatkiñca jagatyāṁ jagat.* (ibid., 1)

The next idea is that while every creature has life and consciousness in different ascending degrees, in the evolutionary

process, man has reached a stage when he has not only consciousness but has the potentiality of developing self-consciousness and thus participating in his further evolution. People, who do not cognize this important fact of evolution, are soul-killers. *Ye ke cātmahano janāḥ* (ibid., 3); *Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ Śrotavyaḥ* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II. iv. 5); *Uddharet ātmanātmānam na ātmānam avasādayet* (*Gītā*, VI. 5). The deepest and innermost truth in man is his Ātman, his soul, his total being with all the dimensions of consciousness. *Aṇoraṇīyān mahato mahīyān ātmāsya jantoḥ nihito guhāyām.* (*Kaṭha*, I. ii. 20)

The fourth idea is that the consciousness of man, on account of its power of concentration and meditation, is capable of identifying itself with other conscious beings, in fact, with the whole of the sentient world. It is this power which makes not only sympathy and empathy possible, but all vicarious joy, sorrow, suffering are the results of this capacity. Love in its essence is total identity of interest. Fear and hatred are the antithesis of love. *Yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaivābhūt vijānataḥ, tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvamanupaśyataḥ.* (*Iśā*, 7)

The last important idea I am mentioning here is that the capacity of human consciousness, according to the Aryan tradition, is so great that the human soul can not only aspire but attain oneness with the total Supreme Cosmic Spirit, even here and now. In essence, the human soul is but a spark of the Supreme Spirit and therefore a reunion is a possibility, which is as certain as the wave merging in the ocean. *Yo asāvasau Puruṣaḥ sohamasmi* (*ibid.*, 16); *Paramātmeti cāpyukto dehesmin Puruṣaḥ paraḥ* (*Gītā* XIII. 22); *Brahmaveda Brahmaiva bhavati* (*Muṇḍaka* III. ii. 9).

Some more ideas can and may be traced to the Aryan cultural tradition. But what is important is not the number of ideas but the main seminal concepts which, between them, can furnish the basis for a whole philosophy of life; a philosophy which inspires a relentless pursuit of the truth of life and serves as the fountainhead of the ethnic which makes for a vigorous but harmonious, integrated individual and social life.

The great lives of Vaśiṣṭha and Viśvāmitra, of Vālmīki and Yājñyavalkya, of Sāvitrī and Gārgī, of Janaka and Kṛṣṇa, of Rāma and Sītā and Hanumān, all in the Purāṇic age, of Buddha and Aśoka, of the Ācāryas, of modern renascent personalities like Raja Ram Mohan and several others, including Tagore, Gandhi, Aurobindo in the historic and modern period, illustrate the shape and form given in practice to the seminal ideas, which have been enumerated above.

The exact difference between theory and practice is the difference between philosophy as a system of thought and living according to the inner spiritual experiences, based on a life of search for truth through purity and *tapasyā*.

THE INEFFABILITY OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

Dr. K. P. S. Choudhary

Man is a language-using animal as it is through language that his mundane experiences and ideas become sharable by other human beings. At the very outset it is, however, to be noted that language is seen to be primarily moulded by the conceptual intellect. It is evident that any human language is expressed through some suitable meaningful words or concepts; a definition is rather the expression of concept in words.

Of the many problems cropped up with regard to the subject we have taken up, these stand out as the most important: 'Is mystical experience expressible?' 'Can language be used during the mystical experience?' and 'How is language related to the mystical experience?' We may, to a certain extent, get the solutions, if we elucidate the view that 'ineffability' is being caused by some radical or ineradicable defect of the concept-generating intellect or categories of the discursive understanding.

There exists in the deepest mystical intuition, the mystics of different faiths constantly reiterate, a sort of experience which is, in its very nature, incapable of communication or verbalization to others. What exactly do we mean by the term 'ineffability'? The ineffability is that for which no words are possible. But why can no words be found? The reason is that every word in language, except proper names, stands for a concept, and the conceptual apprehension always implies the distinction between subject and object as well as other distinctions, while mystical experience, being relationless indivisible unity—the conception of which does not need the conception of anything in order to be conceived, is unconceptualizable. Plainly, since all words are the products of our sensory-intellectual consciousness and mystical experience is essentially non-sensuous relationless unity i.e. it is destitute of the whole empirical content of images and thought-waves, as a result of which all desires and volitions would also disappear as they normally exist only as attachments to the mundane objects, hence any words of any of the elements of the sensory-intellectual consciousness have no competence to express or reveal the true nature of mystical experience.

The proposition that the intellect is inherently incapable of handling mystical experience is equivalent to the proposition that concepts cannot handle it, for intellect is what Kant called 'the faculty of concepts'. Intellect is the name given to the process of understanding objects by means of concepts. The formation of a concept depends on there being a multiplicity or at least a duality of distinguishable or relational things, for to have a concept of anything means to know to what other things it bears the relation of similarity. The mystical experience, being an undifferentiated unity, empty of all empirical thoughts, formless, relationless, not one thing among the things of the world, is incapable of being enmeshed in concepts at all; in the unitary experience there are no separate items or distinguishable objects to be conceptualized. So within the undifferentiated unity there is no multiplicity and therefore there can be no classes, no concepts and no words. To cite Plotinus: 'For understanding proceeds by concepts, and the concept is a multiple affair and the soul misses the One when she falls into

number and plurality. She must then pass beyond understanding.'

Mystical experience is for the same reason a 'mystery'. To say that mystical experience as incapable of being apprehended by the conceptual intellect is to say that it is 'wholly other' as wholly outside the natural or phenomenal order of being, i.e. it is not a part of the universe (the universe is a totality of all its interrelated things and beings), one thing among other things; but its being lies in a plane or dimension wholly different from system of things, which constitutes the natural order. It is beyond the capacity of the conceptual intellect with its adjuncts and categories to handle the divine order, since it is the very nature of intellect to operate, as has already been observed, by means of relation, division, separation, discrimination and analysis. The point to be noted is that the conceptual understanding is exclusively applicable to the territory of spatio-temporal order of existence, which in fact is an experience of multiplicity. The intellect operates its laws within the limits of natural order, but if it strives to go beyond the limits of sensible order of existence, obviously it will fall into all sorts of ambiguities, contradictions and paradoxes.

The mystical experience itself cannot, however, be paradoxical or self-consistent, simply because it is an undifferentiated unity, without parts; while contradiction means the logical opposition of one part to another, self-consistency means the logical harmony of one part with another. Hence, the mystical experience can be neither self-contradictory nor self-consistent, for both of these are logical concepts or categories. It is neither logical nor illogical but alogical. What we want to point out is that the contradictions are in us, not in the mystical experience. They arise from the attempt to comprehend the relationless unity by the relational concepts. The relationless unity rejects these concepts and when the conceptual intellect seeks to force these concepts upon integral experience, the only result is that the intellect falls into the net of contradictions.

We must now return to the crucial questions which are left unanswered: 'Can language be used during the state of mystical rapture?' and 'Can language be used after the experience when it is being remembered?' Our account is sufficiently clear to indicate the point that there are two orders of being, the natural order and the divine order, the differentiated consciousness (sensory–intellectual consciousness) and the undifferentiated consciousness (unitary mystical consciousness). Plotinus makes the right distinction: 'In this apprehension we have neither power nor time to say anything about it. Afterwards we can reason about it.' We cannot during the state of mystical swoon class it or conceptualize it and speak of it even as 'undifferentiated', for this is to classify it as distinct from what is differentiated. We cannot speak of it as the 'One', because to do so is to distinguish it from multiplicity. But afterwards when the mystic comes back, for he cannot for ever remain absorbed in his trance-state, to his normal or relative plane of consciousness, the matter is quite different, he can now have concepts and can therefore, use words. In the state of sensory-intellectual consciousness, he can speak of an experience as 'undifferentiated', 'empty', 'one' and so on.

From the above exposition, it would seem to imply that after the intuitive experience there is no difficulty at all in speaking about it. What then becomes of 'ineffability'? The whole literature of the subject reveals that mystics do in fact face stumbling block in describing even a 'remembered mystical experience'. Does

not then our theory stated so far deny it entirely? But this is not so. The mystic, of course, feels that there is for him some sort of block or barrier in trying to use language to express the nature of the mystic-experiences. What is the difficulty about the use of language which the mystic faces? If the words he used do not convey the essential core of his experiences, i.e. if the mystical experiences are too deep for words, then why does he not invent new language or new words? Language is meant for expressing our sensory-intellectual thoughts. The mystic can, of course, invent or use new words, and language but such language will be beyond the possibility of comprehension by his fellowmen. So, he will have to use the ordinary common language to be understood by his fellowmen while describing his mystical experience. The mystic admits that he is speechless but words break out from his lips, he is then astonished and embarrassed to find himself talking in contradictions. He blames the language. Of course, he often helps himself out by the use of metaphors. But so do all other users of language. The mystic does not understand the root of his own trouble with language. He only vaguely feels that something must be wrong with what he says and is perplexed by this. What is it about the 'understanding' which produces in the mystic a sense of extreme difficulty with language, a feeling that the words he uses never succeed in expressing what he wants to say? The mystic is embarrassed, because he is, like other people, a logically minded man in his non-mystical moments. He lives in the space-time world, which is the territory of the laws of logic. And the laws of logic are the characteristic rules of the operations of the discriminating understanding; the laws of logic are simply linguistic rules of the word 'multiplicity'; the 'many' is the sphere of logic, the 'One' not so. The mystic's struggle with words is owing to some kind of logical difficulty, which interfere with the mystic's free expression of his experiences. Have we not admitted that the laws of logic, or for the matter of that, the unconceptualizab'lity of mystical experiences cannot be abstracted into concepts when we have it? All conceptual determinations and intellectual differentiations arise only when the experience is over i.e. when it is being remembered and not while it is being experienced. It is now clear that it is the conceptual differentiating character of the intellectual process of think:ng and expressing which is the cause of mystic's feeling of embarrassment with language. Suzuki says, 'When language is forced to be used for things of this world (the mystical world) it becomes warped and assumes all kinds of crookedness: Oxymora, paradoxes, contradictions, absurdities, oddities, ambiguities, and irrationalities. Language itself is not to be blamed for it. It is we ourselves who, ignorant of its proper functions, try to apply it to that for which it was never intended'.

The statement we have been explaining throughout the pages that 'the mystical experience is beyond reason' plainly does not mean that it is outside the sphere of the reasonable. No doubt, the mystic will urge that in the end the mystical life is the only reasonable one for a man to live. That his experience is 'beyond reason' means simply that it is outside the sphere of logic, and that it is beyond the reach of the conceptual understanding altogether; and, no doubt, these two statements are very closely connected and may even imply each other. And we cannot reject this testimony, unless we reject the whole of mysticism as a fraud. It is evident that all those who have mystical experience feel that there is some sense in

which that experience is absolutely unique, not like any common-sense kind of experience, completely incommensurable with the sense experience of spatio-temporal order of existence. He who reaches up to the mystical consciousness has reached a plane utterly outside and beyond the plane of everyday consciousness, not to be understood or judged by the criteria of that plane. It is very clear that mystics feel this. But all attempts to show that the mystical paradoxes can be got rid of by some logical or linguistic device are just so many attempts to reduce mysticism to common-sense, to take away its unique character, and reduce it to the level of our everyday experience. There is nothing wrong with common-sense or with everyday experience. But we cannot have it both ways. We can have mystical consciousness, as pointed out already, only by way of emptying consciousness of all empirical thoughts, concepts and volitions. This is the vacuum. There is nothing left to be conscious of. And yet there emerges a pure consciousness called mystical consciousness, which is not a consciousness of anything. And the darkness of this vacuum (empty consciousness) is the light of a full consciousness—Suso's 'dazzling obscurity'. There is a line of T. S. Eliot that I should like to quote :

> So the darkness shall be the light,
> and the stillness the dancing.

The first clause definitely says the same thing as Suso's phrase 'dazzling obscurity' ; the second line tells us that the static is the dynamic, the stillness is the dancing. The mind is emptied of all specific empirical contents so that there would be no multiplicity ; and ultimately the state of pure undifferentiated consciousness may be attained.

In all this what we mean to state is that the mystic basically believes that his undifferentiated consciousness does not differ merely in degree, but rather in kind from the empirical or relative consciousness. The mystic must be right ; for he sees what we see, and he sees much more than what we do not see and comprehend. So he is in a better position. We ridicule him while we do not have his experience ; we explain away his experiences, because we are unable to believe that anything exists, which we cannot ourselves comprehend. If the mystics are right then their special or unique kind of consciousness (mystical consciousness) is such that it cannot in any way be grasped in terms or adjuncts of everyday consciousness or common-sense, because they have nothing in common except the fact of being consciousness. The difficulty with language is, therefore, probably a function of the difference between the two kinds of consciousness. From the above exposition, at least one thing is clear ; the mystical consciousness lies in a region which is forever beyond all proof or disproof.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IN THIS NUMBER

P. S. Sastri, M.A., M. Litt., Ph.D., is the Head of the Department of English, Nagpur University, Nagpur, Maharashtra. Dr. Sastri's article on 'Consciousness : Phenomenal and Noumenal' deals with one of the central questions of Advaita Vedānta.

Devaprasad Bhattacharya M.A., D.Phil (Cal.), is a senior lecturer in the Depart-

ment of Philosophy, Sripat Singh college, Jiaganj, Murshidabad, West Bengal. In his article entitled 'Causality : An Analysis', Dr. Bhattacharya presents a discussion which is modern in its outlook and logical in its arguments.

S. P. Sen Gupta M.A., Ph.D., (London) is the Head of the Department of English in the University of North Bengal. The article 'Vivekananda The Wit—3' is the concluding section of Dr. Sen Gupta's interesting discussion on the subject.

Dr. R. R. Diwakar's articles are always marked by a freshness of outlook, which is constructive as well as thought-provoking. In this issue, he writes on 'Seminal Ideas of the Aryans'.

K. P. S. Choudhary, M.A., B.L., Ph.D., (B.H.U.) is a lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Patna University, Bihar. A senator of the University of Bhagalpur, Bihar, Dr. Choudhary was previously the Vice-Principal-cum-Head of the Department of Philosophy, A.P.S.M. College, Barauni. His article here is a short discussion on 'The Ineffability of Mystical experience'.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

THE ARYAN ECLIPTIC CYCLE. By Mr. H. S. Spencer. (With a Foreword By Dr. Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer) H. P. Vaswani, 1 Rajkamal, 795/3 Padamjee Park, Poona-2. 1965. Pages 442. Price Rs. 25.

Ever since Tilak talked about the Arctic home of the Aryans, many scholars began finding fresh arguments in support of it. This theory along with those of European pundits believes that the Aryans entered India from outside. Tilak also sought to date the migrations and movements of the Aryans in the light of the references to the stars and to the precession of equinoxes found in the ancient Aryan texts. This twofold approach, claim these thinkers, is supported by the findings of the various sciences.

Mr. Spencer uses scriptural evidence after interpreting it, to yield interesting results. Holding fast to the Arctic theory, he explains the important political, religious, and philosophical movements of the Indo-Iranians, and dates them in the light of the stellar positions given in the texts. The astronomical cycle of the precession of the equinoxes covers a period of 25920 years to return to the starting point. In this book, the author presents a bird's eye view of the Indo-Iranian religious history from 25628 B.C. to 292 A.D. After explaining this in four chapters, he winds up the discussion in the last chapter by speaking about the events subsequent to 292 A.D. He shows that Zarathustra was the first prophet of God, that Śrī Kṛṣṇa was the incarnation of Zarathustra, and that the same prophet was later reborn as Jesus Christ.

There are serious difficulties in the way of the theory of the Arctic home of the Aryans. The migrations in the historical period have always been to the north and to the west, not to the south or to the east. Linguistically too, the literatures in the various Indo-European languages came after the Vedic texts. The Greek texts came before the Latin, and the Germanic texts follow the Latin. The latest westward migration and the latest literature appear in the continent of America. The absence of any reference to the rising and setting of the sun in the Vedic or Avestic texts (123) is no argument; for, the absence of the word for salt would make them dieting without salt! Why should the Aryans pray for a life of a hundred winters (*himāḥ*) and a hundred autumns (*śaradaḥ*), if they were in the polar regions once? How could there be the six seasons? (163)

The author pleads for a symbolic interpretation of the scriptural texts (101). But when he speaks of Indian or Jewish religions, he adopts a literal reading and finds here 'anthropomorphous polytheism' (97. cf. 179). The Dead sea scrolls, he admits, talk of 'the path or the way which was taught by the Teacher of Righteousness who had been and would come again' (114). But the specific use of *path* or *way* appears only in Buddhism. And why should it be Zarathustra, and not the Buddha? The Maruts are not Aurora Borealis (178), if we remember that they appear as the Pramatha-gaṇas of Śiva.

Migrations from the Arctic regions would make the Europeans to be the first to separate (128).

Then why did they wait for many centuries to evolve a social life or a literature? The absence of common names for sea, mountain, and forest only shows, as in the case of salt, that we do not possess all the leterature that was once extant. Yet we can relate Sanskrit *maricika* with Russian *mer,* Latin *marine* and Anglo-Saxan *mere;* just as *dam* of *dampatī* appears in Russian *dom* and European *domestic.*

The Avestic and Vedic texts refer to the Nakṣatras. These are taken by Mr. Spencer to be the constellations rising with the vernal or autumnal equinox. The equinoxes take roughly 960 years to traverse one nakṣatra. Mr. Spencer's argument fails him when he derives a nakṣatra from the deity mentioned (179). Even then he does not place Śrī Rāma with Punarvasu which covers 6428 B.C. to 6189 B.C. (253). But accepting this cycle, he places the birth of Zarathustra in 7129 B.C. (217). But this cannot lead anyone to hold the religion of the Aryans was stellar worship (230). Finding that creation arose from the *word* according to the Avesta and the Bible, he finds the same in the Hindu scriptures (240). One may refer to the Upaniṣadic *'tad aicchata ...'* and the fifth *Vedānta-Sūtra.* Nor can we agree that the Ṛg-Vedic hymns came into being after Zarathustra (244).

A few errors may be noted. Verethaghna is not Vitrahan (51) but Vritraghna. Avestic Kavi Ushan is not Kavi Ushna or Isoodhana, but Kavi Usanas. Rangha did not become the Gaṅgā (185), for it was the Vedic river Rasa. The *Mahābhārata* war was not fought in Dec. 3102 B.C. (246), because the war was over more than thirty years before *Kali* entered in 3102 B.C. The interpretation of Śrī Rāma as a Robin Hood during his exile (249) is fantastic. Similarly erroneous is the duration of the *yugas* (250ff) given. Moreover, the *avatārs* are always said to appear before the end of a *yuga.* This fact has not been noticed. The author takes the *Mahābhārata* to be a Zoroastrian text (254ff). Such an approach appears in equating Avestic Vahishta with Viṣṇu (257), and not with Vasiṣṭha. Nor is Bhṛgu the same as Bharga Upastha or Avesta (262), since *Zend Avesta* is *Chando Veda.*

In his survey of the religious cults of Egypt, Middle East, and Crete, Mr. Spencer offers valuable clues. But when he foists the Mother-cult on the Dravidians, he not only exhibits different interpretation of the Vedic literature but admits the westward migration of the Dravidians from India (347, 349). Then why can't we say the same of the Aryans too? Then the Cannanite Boal would be the Purāṇic Bali, who is resurrected once a year in India at the time of the harvest. The Minos of Crete is Manu, the lawgiver. Noah (372-3) is a variant of *nauḥ* found in English *navy.*

DR. P. S. SASTRI

NEWS AND REPORTS

RAMAKRISHNA MISSION TUBERCULOSIS SANATORIUM, RANCHI, BIHAR

REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1966-67

This Sanatorium was started in 1951 with only 32 beds. It has now grown into a well-equipped Sanatorium of 240 beds, having all facilities necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of Tuberculosis patients including major chest surgery. There is also a Rehabilitation Centre where ex-patients are given training in various departments of the Sanatorium, such as Laboratory, X-Ray Department, Nursing, Stores, Office, Power House, Water Works, Poultry Farm, Tailoring Department etc.

During the year 1966-67, 548 patients were treated, of these 360 were discharged. 100 surgical operations were performed, including 2 pneumonectomy, 3 lobectomy, 92 thoracoplasty, 1 thoracotomy and 2 thoracoscopy. 91 poor T. B. patients were treated free of all charges and 18 at concession rates in the In-patients Department, with the help of donations, subscriptions and the income derived from the endowments and estates at Calcutta and Patna. Poor patients belonging to locality were given priority in this matter. 491 T. B. patients and 935 patients suffering from other diseases were also given free medical advice and treatment in the Out-patients Department. 147 beds were maintained free by different organizations and agencies. 40 ex-patients were accommodated in the After-care Colony & Rehabilitation Centre. Most of them were employed in the Sanatorium after their training in various departments.

During 1966-67, the income was Rs. 7,36,769-78 P. and the expenditure Rs. 8,25,939-71 P. resulting in a deficit of Rs. 89,169-93 P. The yearly per capita expenditure, which had been Rs. 3, 469-19 P. in 1965-66, rose to Rs. 3,645-73 P. in 1966-67.