


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Dear Reader !

Namaste !

In our June issue we had carried the article 'Resolving Religio-Cultural Differences in the service of the Indian People'.

In the July 7 issue of 'The Indian Express', Shri Asghar Ali Engineer, reacting to this article, had said : "To my pleasant surprise Mr. K.R. Malkani of Deendayal Upadhyaya Research Institute has prepared a draft document for dialogue with Muslims. This draft document, I must say, is remarkably balanced and certainly can become a basis for dialogue with the brothers of the majority community. Some representative organisation of Muslims should also prepare a similar draft document for dialogue with Hindus. There is sufficient basis in Islamic theology for such an approach. The Institute of Islamic Studies is certainly ready to prepare such a draft document for dialogue." And now he has penned this document. The same is being carried in this issue.

Shri Sallen Ghosh writes about the dangers of offshore oil deals with foreign firms, to our national security. And then we carry the last and third instalment of Shri Dharampal's "India's Dual Brotherhood to loss Freedom".

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Offshore Oil Deals : Threats To National Security

By : Sailendra Nath Ghosh

IT IS STRANGE that on the one hand, we have been spending enormous amounts in the name of defence preparedness and on the other, creating holes in our defence system. We have not cared to see that defence, in terms of pre-emptive emphasis on military hardware is ineffectual defence, and development on the pattern of 'Western industrialism' (whose days have passed even in Europe and North America) is really anti-development.

The purpose of this paper, however, is not to discuss these basic issues in their various aspects. It will limit itself to examining the likely impact of the recent offshore oil exploration deals on our security interests and longterm oil supply requirements.

On June 4 this year, the Government of India and the Oil and Natural Gas Commission signed two separate contracts with Shell India Production Development, BV Netherlands, a company in the Shell group, for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in two offshore blocks, off the coasts of Karnataka and Kerala. The two blocks together covered 49000 sq. km.

On July 22, again, the Government and ONGC both signed a contract with Amoco India Petroleum Company, U.S.A. (Amoco group) for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in a Krishna-Godavari block covering an area of 1500 sq. km.

These three were the seventh, eighth and ninth contracts signed with foreign oil companies for offshore blocks. Prior to these, the sixth deal had been signed in April last between Government of India and Oil India on the one hand and the American oil companies, Chevron and Texaco on the other, for exploration of the Mahanadi basin and the Bay of Bengal. Even earlier, the Chevron-Texaco combine had received leases for two blocks in Krishna-Godavari basin and one in the Polar basin. It is this Chevron which in 1980, had been, given a lease for the exploration and exploitation in Saurashtra offshore region, which yielded no results and has since been terminated.

With these nine deals, a total offshore area of 1,21,088 sq. km. has been leased out to the foreign companies or their subsidiaries. Operation under the badge of "India Production Company" does not change the companies' transnational character.

Under the terms of the contracts, the exploration risk will be borne by these companies. They will do the seismic survey and exploration drilling under phased programmes. If no petroleum is found, these companies will have the option to terminate the contract. If petroleum is discovered in commercial quantities, ONGC will have the option to participate in the discovery to the extent of 40 per cent and receive corresponding share of the produce. The companies' shares of the crude oil produced from these blocks will be available to the Government of India at international market price until India reaches the level of self-sufficiency. If no oil is found, all data acquired by these companies will be made available to ONGC/Oil India.

Contracts with Shell, Amoco etc. have provisions that the Government may like to enter into separate agreements for transfer of technology. ONGC personnel would be associated with the activities in the blocks to give them exposure to the exploration techniques used by these companies.

To the extent that the terms of the agreements have been published, their implications are as follows :

- (i) The foreign oil companies, by virtue of their bearing the initial risk of exploration, will be entitled to 60 per cent ownership of the discovered crude oil resources.
- (ii) After a field's commercial possibilities have been established, India's oil exploration agency, ONGC or Oil India, whichever is the signatory to the respective lease deal, will have the option to enter as a *passive* partner with 40 per cent interest, upon payment of 40 per cent of the amount which the transnational company would show as having been its exploration cost from the very beginning. The Indian national agency's active partnership and voice in the management, during development of the field as well as exploitation, is ruled out. Its liability to share the cost as presented by the foreign agency would remain unquestioned.
- (iii) The transnational company will pay (to the Government of India) out of its 60 per cent share of crude oil, a tax *in kind* on its profits after it has recovered all its exploration costs. This tax will be on a sliding scale, which should mean that as the company's profit increases, the tax should also increase. (The exact formula, regarding the varying rates as per slabs of profits, has not been disclosed, if it has been worked out.)

- (iv) The balance of oil which will remain with the transnational will have to be sold to the Government of India until India reaches self-sufficiency but the Government will have to pay *international market price* for this part of the oil—which means, even if the actual exploration cost works out to only five dollars per barrel, the Government will have to pay at a much higher rate. The international market price is about 16 dollars per barrel for the present. It can be expected to rise in future.
- (v) The transnational company will have the option to terminate the contract as and when it deems fit, but the Government of India will have no such option.
- (vi) No time limit has been fixed to lay the transnational under any obligation to surrender the leased area in the event of failure to strike oil. There has been no stipulation about the minimum of exploration cost that would have to be incurred or the minimum number of wells that would have to be drilled within a specified period.

Vesting exploration rights in a foreign company is a security risk

Entrusting the exploitation of any natural resource in any part of the country, to a foreign agency is wrong in principle. When a foreign company insists on excluding national companies from an effective or even active share in the management and control of operations, and the home government accedes to this demand, it becomes ominous. The ominousness is far more pronounced when the concerned natural resource is petroleum, which is the object of international intrigue and power rivalry. (Notably, most part of this century has been known as the age of oil imperialism.) And when it comes to offshore operation for oil, the vesting of even exploration rights in a transnational company can spell disaster for national security.

The Government could not have been unaware of these truths derived from world-wide experience over decades.

India could not possibly afford to forget its experience with Stanvac which, in the fifties, had been given the right of exclusive management and control of exploration and production in the Bengal basin, despite the provision for the government's minority participation after the matur-

ing of production possibilities. Four years after the signing of the agreement, the Government came to regret that there was no provision for the government giving notice of termination agreement even though the company enjoyed this right. The exploration cost shown by the company was inordinately high, its drilling efforts inadequate, and its evaluation of the stratigraphy data unsatisfactory in Indian geoscientists' view.

Moreover, the observed behaviour of international companies during periods of world oil surplus, ought to have put us on our guard. In such situations, they develop a vested interest in slowing down the exploration effort and stretching it over a long period, should a prospect appear potential. Only the companies, which are short on oil in relation to their global supply commitments, could be free from this trend.

It is universal knowledge (i) that for the last fifteen years, the world oil price level has had to be supported by a system of production quotas enforced by OPEC and (ii) that the international oil companies, too, have an interest in keeping the price level artificially high, for it helps maximise their profits. Therefore, they have been observing a policy of keeping their hold on the prospects and yet delaying the discoveries, as far as possible, in the countries outside OPEC. Only in cases where they are placed under an obligation to surrender the leased area in the event of their failure to find hydrocarbons within a stipulated period, they have to abandon this dithering.

Why, then, did the Government have to enter into these deals, and on these terms? What would be their implications for our national security? Will these be in the interest of our longterm self-sufficiency or energy independence?

Let us take up the second question first.

It is an open secret that oil exploration companies operating in the seas keep in close touch with the Navy Departments of their home governments. What is often overlooked is that offshore exploration rights give scope for certain intensive studies of the sea and hence for the collection of certain strategic information, which are not available by other means.

There is also a misconception that all the critical information, in which an alien power could be interested, is already available to the super powers. It is often argued that the satellites orbiting in space, the international oceanographic expeditions and the submarine movements that have taken place have already yielded all vital information. This is just not true.

Undoubtedly, enough harm has been caused by allowing foreign companies to prospect for oil in offshore Kutch, offshore Saurashtra, Cauvery basin and the Bay of Bengal. These lease periods gave the companies opportunities for continuing studies which have possibly yielded them some of our most important strategic information. But the argument that "harm has already been done" cannot be a justification for allowing the continuation and furtherance of the harm.

It is necessary to note in this connection the limitations of satellites in space and the submarines in hurried movements. The advantages that an operating company can reap from the opportunities a lease gives for systematic, persistent and repeated studies of certain phenomena of the sea are enormous in comparison.

Satellites can take pictures in separate bands of ultra-violet, infra-red, and micro-waves. Hence these cannot yield the most crucial information about the sea layers. Among the pictures that a satellite can take, those in ultra-violet are not of much use. Even air can attenuate these.

Vital strategic information remains in the hands of foreigners

Pictures in infra-red cannot penetrate to the seabed because water attenuates the pictures, infra-red pictures can at the most detect some gross phenomena at, or very near, the water surface.

That the pictures taken by satellites are not all-inclusive can be proved by a well-known fact. Before the Pokhran "implosion" by India's atomic energy agency, the U.S. satellite orbiting in space did definitely sense a rise in local temperature but could not be sure that it was due to an activity involving a nuclear device. The satellite's potential to yield information needed for planning an offensive activity under another continent's sea water is even more limited.

Then, the ideas (i) that alien power is interested only in the seabed configuration and (ii) that it is only a depression in the sea bottom which can give opportunities for submarine hideouts are simplistic. An alien power is also interested in knowing the sea profile, particularly its sound propagation characteristics and the zones of sound barriers. It is interested in knowing at which location in the sea, at which depth, in which season, between which hours of the day or night, an inversion layer develops to bend the sound energy and hence to leave the object below virtually free from detection. These data enable an alien power to know in which

season, between which hours of the earth's diurnal rotation, a submarine can enter into a layer impervious to sound energy and stay there for long. To minimise the chances of its detection it would like to know the limits of "active" and "passive" detection systems in the different layers of the sea at different points. This means, it would like to know the limits, at each point of the sea, of sound energy transmitted by sonars and the limits of detection by static hydrophone arrays.

Detection range of the active as well as the passive system depends principally on :

- (i) The temperature profile of the sea, from the surface to the bottom, for different times of the day and the night in different seasons;
- (ii) The salinity profile, from the surface to the bottom, of each zone;
- (iii) The details of the seabed configurations, in which the variations over small areas and the specifics are far more important than the generalities and broad features.

Undoubtedly, salinity and depth variation affect the temperature profile. Hence the studies overlap to a certain extent. But each has to be studied, because the ultimate purpose of an interested power is to locate :

- (i) *The inversion layer*, i.e. the layer below which the transmitted sound energy will not travel to cause detection; and
- (ii) *the zone* which can elude the hydrophones.

The inversion layers are both space-dependent and time-dependent phenomena.

Alien powers can get utmost information about these layers by enlisting the support of an oil exploration company which has the licence to operate legally in an offshore area and has thus the scope to mask its practice of taking regular observations for the above purpose. An oil exploration company operating in the sea within a country's economic zone can yield more sensitive information than a battleship cruising the ocean at a distance.

Moreover, there are other dangers from transnational operators in the sea. These emanate from certain highly sensitive micro-instruments

which have been developed in recent years. If installed on the drilling platform or even on barges—or, may be, on the hydrographic survey ship—these will be able to collect the acoustic signature of each member of our merchant or naval fleet, surface or subsurface, which happens to pass by. The recordings of noise characteristics of each of these vessels can easily be passed on, by an oil exploration company, to an interested power. These will be of immense help to the enemy submarine's passive detection system against our own vessels.

Even if ONGC or Oil India were, or are, associated with these transnational firms from the very beginning and charged with technical monitoring, as distinct from mere management monitoring, many subterfuges will still be available to an operating company to mix its legitimate seismic recording function with the covert function of collecting strategic information. Micro-instruments of like appearance, together with the hardly noticeable difference between operations for legitimate data collection and those for finding our vulnerabilities will always help an operator to put on a gloss.

Even association of national oil companies will not help much

Thus, these offshore oil exploration deals are against our security interests. These can serve to undermine our defence capabilities.

Since many of our policy makers seek to belittle the security aspect of such deals, let us refer to a recent unwitting confirmation of our case that the offshore oil explorations often have a military aspect. A news item in the Hindustan Times of June 6 this year stated that the U.S.A. since 1982, kept pressuring Japan to delay the implementation of the Soviet-Japan project to drill for oil and natural gas in the Northern Pacific, off the Soviet-controlled Sakhalin island, on the plea that this would help Japan's active partner in oil exploration—namely, the U.S.S.R.—get an initiation into the secrets of the drilling equipment's military applications. (That the U.S.A. had yet another unstated purpose—to prevent Japan's dependence on Soviet oil and gas supplies is another matter.)

Now, let us turn to the likely impact of these deals on India's longterm oil sufficiency or energy independence. To talk of longterm self-sufficiency in any exhaustible resource is wrong. The more a country steps up its consumption of an inexhaustible resource, the more does

longterm uncertainty get built up in its system. The real question, therefore, is of longterm relative sufficiency and maximisation of the use of the resources for the country's benefit. These deals will impair the country's relative sufficiency. To the extent that the leased-out areas produce oil, India's compulsion grows to buy the oil found under its territorial waters as *foreign oil*. In comparison, it would have been better if the oil had remained underground, to be discovered by Indian national companies over a longer period, under India's full ownership. To the extent that these deals proclaim ONGC's or Oil India's deficiency and lower their prestige in the eyes of the "Third World" countries which were tending to engage ONGC or Oil India as consultants, this would impair India's chance of building up closer relationship with these countries, which also means jeopardising our chances of securing oil from them in critical times on advantageous terms. And if these multinationals fail to find oil and yet hold on to these leases for indefinite periods—which they would have the right to do under provisions of these contracts—it will only delay India's independent efforts at exploration. For quite some time to come, the multinationals with abundant reserves of crude oil—or their subsidiaries—will have reasons to explore perfunctorily and yet to hold on to these leases to thwart this importing country's search for relative self-sufficiency.

Let us now turn to the Government of India's reasons for concluding the deals. The immediate and *apparent* reasons are: (i) ONGC's and Oil India's failure to discover any sizeable reserve after the Bombay find; (ii) the Government's unwillingness or incapacity to bear exploration risk in the face of rising defence expenditure and high-cost development of "high-tech" industries and installations.

These "reasons" give rise to many questions. Did the Government make serious efforts to restrain oil consumption? Did it realize that the rise of consumption by an annual average of 7% means doubling the demand every ten years and that at this rate of rise of consumption of an exhaustible resource, the country could only expect bankruptcy and steep collapse of the economy as well as of the social order in two or three decades? Were the persons, who were brought from outside the oil industry to lead ONGC or Oil India, told that they would be judged by their capacity to produce oil economically from the known reserves but even more, by their successes in locating new reserves? Evidently the heads of these enterprises tended to exploit the outcomes of earlier efforts and to claim credit for "peaks of production" and "savings in foreign exchange" during their tenure. But did the Government care to hark back to "reserve assessments" continually by way of reviewing ONGC's and Oil India's performance? Did it demand any in-depth review by, and records of debates among, our geoscientists for each prospect which

has remained non-producing? How much scope did we give our geo-scientists for dialogues with intuitive thinkers in petroleum geology in other countries? Did we engage some reputed oil-finders to have a fresh look at the data relating to our non-producing prospects? Is not the hiring of some experienced consultants from time to time a better way than giving up a prospect or giving it away to a foreign company?

Without recourse to the above measures, no government has the right to cease bearing the risks of oil exploration. After all, how much is the risk of exploration in relation to the expected gains? We need to ask these questions afresh for two reasons. Because the Government, after hailing the Krishna-Godavari basin as a second "Bombay High", developed cold feet when strong winds and waves resulted in a mishap in which some equipment, too, was lost. And because the shift which thus began in 1980 has now become a tidal wave of "foreignisation" of oil exploration. It is also possible that risk-avoiding propensity will find a new escapist logic from the recent North Sea disaster.

Despite high risks, oil exploration is subject to the law of probability

The giant multinational oil companies have, for nearly a century, built up horrors about the risks of oil exploration, hiding the enormity of profits in relation to these risks, so that the "less developed countries" easily lose their nerve and hand over their prospects to the multinationals. India in the late fifties and early sixties had debunked, by reasoning and in practice, this scare-raising theory that oil exploration is basically a gamble.

The truth is that oil exploration, despite its high risks, is subject to the law of probability. Great advances in geological concepts and geophysical techniques, particularly in the wake of the second world war, have given its risks the attributes of calculated business risks. When the risks are spread over many prospects and great attention is paid to the conceptualisation of different geological possibilities based on the geological and geophysical data (i.e. construction of alternative hypotheses about the sequence of strata, faults, unconformities, fluid contents etc., alternative picturisations of paleogeography and their changes with time), there are possibilities of hitting the jackpots, in which losses would appear insignificant. Whoever seeks to avoid the risks, loses far more in the bargain. This is borne out by our own experience in this country at every stage.

In the 'fifties, Arthur Lall, as India's emissary, contacted in the USA a high Stanvac official, Richardson, who had an Indian wife and asked him whether India—which had, then, no exploration agency of its own—should undertake oil exploration and drilling on a contract basis, i.e. with hired equipment and crew, as a hundred per cent Indian enterprise, involving no sharing of costs or resources with any transnational agency. Richardson said that that would be the right course provided India was willing to risk a few hundred crores of rupees. He hastened to add that not much risk was, however, involved. Arthur Lall reported this advice to New Delhi but was advised that the Government was unlikely to sanction the necessary funds. Arthur Lall ruled the day and noted in a letter to Dr. S.S. Bhatnagar: "Thus did India put a vital industry under American control". That the Stanvac was perfunctory in its exploration efforts and that this lease meant waste of time, from India's point of view, is now well-known.

In the late 'fifties and early sixties, India's self-reliant efforts at oil exploration, led by K.D. Malaviya—in the face of tremendous opposition from government officials and the scepticism and financial conservatism of the redoubtable V.T. Krishnamachari, C.D. Deshmukh, T.T. Krishnamachari and Morarji Desai—led to discoveries of oil in Sibsagar and Lakwa. Besides, these efforts laid the foundation for an independent national industry which won many laurels later. This was a saga of undaunted efforts against internal opposition and sabotage, which has hardly any parallel in world petroleum history and which showed in the end that bearing the exploration risk pays handsomely if the national leadership is capable of exciting the potential of the scientists and technologists. It was also during this period that the Brazilian President Varga's suicide shocked Pandit Nehru and Maulana Azad into an awareness of the diabolical games of multinationals and the imperatives of an independent national industry. Unfortunately, these are the lessons that our present political leadership did not learn or is now tending to forget.

In early 1968, both the Ministry of Petroleum headed by Ashoka Mehta and the ONGC leadership had decided that exploration of the offshore region of Bombay High was beyond national competence. They advised the Union Cabinet to lease out Bombay High to an American company, Tenneco. Since the arguments for and against bearing the high risks of offshore oil exploration are the same now as in 1968, the grounds that clinched the decision in favour of this nation's self-effort and the history behind the rejection of the then Petroleum Ministry's foreignophile proposal need to be recounted. The present writer had to play a vital role in this episode and would like to relate the story both for record and for its message.

September 1988

On receiving the Petroleum Ministry's proposal to the Union Cabinet for the lease-out, Shri P.N. Haksar, who was then Secretary in the Prime Minister's Secretariat and the Prime Minister's principal adviser and confidant, called up the present writer and asked for his opinion. (The present writer was then Chief of Petroleum Information Service, a body to do research and give policy leads, and also editor, 'Oil Commentary' which functioned as an independent review journal, though financed by State enterprises.) In reply to Shri Haksar's queries, it was stated (i) that the exploration should be done by ONGC itself; (ii) that ONGC-men would be able to do this if the national leadership excites their potential and fires their imagination by throwing a challenge to them; (iii) that the science and technology of onland and offshore operation is the same, the only additional problems in offshore operation being to keep the drillship in position against the storm and the tides, and that the Indian Navy should be called upon to help the ONGC; (iv) that, to meet the deficiencies in our expertise, we should hire individual foreign consultants and should approach the U. N. and, if necessary, the US Government for help in securing their services; (v) that the foreign offshore companies everywhere operate in liaison with the Navy of their home governments;

The author's inside view of Petroleum Politics

therefore, leasing out to a foreign company will be a security risk; (vi) that it will weaken our non-alignment stance because the other power bloc would construe such a vital decision as definite proof of our leanings towards its opposing side; (vii) that India is not a small country and cannot overlook the strategic geopolitical significance of the lease; (viii) that the Government should stake at least Rs. 200 crores: if we fail to find oil, this money would go down the drain; if we succeed, the country would come to acquire wealth worth hundreds of thousands of crores.

Shri Haksar, who was temperamentally not in favour of the multinationals, became convinced by these arguments that India could explore Bombay High by mobilising national will. It was at his briefing that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rejected the Petroleum Ministry's proposal. The fields in Bombay High are now producing about 20 million tonnes per year. Many of the cautious gentlemen, who had then regarded this advice for self-reliance in offshore exploration as crazy, are yet to take the proper lesson.

Many foreign-prone commentators aver that even the Soviet Union, which was once dead against foreign companies, has now allowed foreign

companies to explore for oil within its territory, and that leasing out, therefore, should no longer be considered taboo. To the best of this author's knowledge, the Soviet Union has allowed foreign companies to explore for oil and gas only in the land mass of Siberia, where it was difficult to station its own people with amenities. If it ever allows any foreign company to explore for oil in any offshore region, it is doubtful whether it will allow exclusive management rights to any foreign company. Even if the Soviet Union comes to do it, that is not a thing which we should emulate.

India is lucky because it has the scope to distribute the risks of exploration over many structures. Those who seek to hustle the Government into leasing out to foreign companies, argue that the latter will do a quick job of it. They forget that the cost of such hustling is perpetual dependence.

This, again, raises the question, why this hurry? If we now find a field with reserves equal to that of Bombay High, should we use it up? If we allow the present consumption of 45 million tonnes to go up, at the existing rate, to 90 million tonnes by 1998 and to 180 million tonnes by 2008 AD, are we not heading for a disaster? Is it not essential to restrain the growth in our consumption, and even to reduce it steadily, by developing alternative forms of energy with a sense of urgency? Should we not treat our new finds as "bridging" resources to take care of our future needs—and rather buy now some quantities from foreign markets when the price is not intolerably high? Can we overlook that in times to come, as oil keeps depleting, its international price will tend to rise higher?

When the proposal for the Mathura Refinery was pending consideration of the Planning Commission, the present writer had raised a question that addition to refining capacity would create an in-built pressure for importing more crude oil, thereby increasing this country's dependence on external supplies, and that this manner of easing the pressure of demand for energy would slacken our efforts for alternate forms of energy. The Indian Oil Corporation, thereafter, secured the Commission's clearance on the understanding that the Mathura Refinery would be the last petroleum refinery in India. The implication was that even if considerable reserves of crude oil were found in the country, these would need to be preserved for future use and that alternative forms of energy would have to be quickly developed. All these have now been forgotten. Newer and newer refineries are being planned in the belief that the economy would come to a dead end without more and more use of petroleum products. A thoughtless commercial civilisation has no concern for the future, not even for the remaining years of the present adult generation.

Undoubtedly, there are great problems. To be able to restrain consumption, it was essential to have a concept of alternative pattern of development for an alternative pattern of life-style. It would also mean alternative patterning of industry, organically farmed agriculture, mass transportation, low-temperature carbonization of coal on a large scale, fluid-bed combustion technology, liquefaction of coal, generation of solar and solar-related energy and bio-energy as a household industry. It would also have to have a different kind of defence policy in which capturing the minds of people of the "adversary" country and utmost people's solidarity at home would be no less important than military hardware. The country has no leadership to have the vision and implement it. Hence the existing pattern of development goes on.

It is this pattern of development that compelled the leasing out of offshore blocks to foreign companies. The connection between the two is direct. Whoever opts for this pattern will have to fall in the World Bank, IMF and US capitalists trap. Even some Soviet-led countries have become preys to IMF conditionality. When the Government of India, in 1980, rejected ONGC's request for foreign exchange (i) for purchase of more sophisticated equipment from abroad in lieu of the equipment sunk in the Krishna Godavari basin and (ii) for engaging consultancy services to back

World Bank financing interferes with our domestic policies

up its efforts, *decided instead* to approach the World Bank for financing, the condition was created for foreign intervention in our domestic policies. The World Bank took its own time to make an appraisal of the project before it could agree to the "aid" request. Meanwhile, pressure was mounted to hand over the said project to oil multinationals. The IMF, too, stepped in with its conditionality clause for its 5 billion SDR loan to India. The memorandum of assurances submitted by the Government of India included opening up of oil exploration in India to oil multinationals. So much for our vaunted "independent policy despite IMF loans".

In the foregoing section we have discussed the *immediate and apparent* reasons for these deals. The memorandum to IMF is *the deeper reason*. The Government had to bind itself for obtaining the massive loan and for keeping the door open for yet more loans from IMF. This would show that when a country follows the western pattern of development, equates development with "equipment build-up" and defence with "military build-up" and loses in its appeal to people's hearts at home and in the adversary countries, it has to open up its seas, lands, mines and everything to the multinationals. India has been driven to the orbital pull of imperialist interests. Hence, it is having to open up. These deals have been the real "opening up of the womb" of India which the late Ashoka Mehta had promised to our eternal shame. □

The measure of a man.....

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Hindu-Muslim Problem— A Cooperative Approach :

A Document for Promotion of Hindu-Muslim Dialogue

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Bombay-400 055.

IT IS BANAL to state that even after years of Independence the Hindu-Muslim problem is as far away from solution as it ever was. If anything, it has worsened. There are many reasons for that—political, religious as well as socio-economic. One can only regret that political processes are getting more and more communalised in our country. Also, socio-economic constraints and slow rate of development is intensifying rivalry between different caste and community groups. No wonder then that communal and caste problems are getting more and more intractable.

Both politicians and competitors for economic resources and jobs invoke religion for their respective ends and it appears as if religion is the main culprit in the whole fight, which is not true. However, since it is the general perception, and it is perceptions which matter, not reality, it is important to deal with the religious aspect as well, so as to create a meaningful cooperative spirit between the two major religious communities of India i.e. Hindus and Muslims. Thus this paper would mainly deal with the religious aspect of the problem and that too with Islam in particular, as it is being written to project the Islamic viewpoint on the communal conflict.

ISLAM HAS BEEN greatly misunderstood, thanks to bigotry and fanaticism on both sides. It is thought to be intolerant of other religions, especially of Hinduism, and it is also sought to be projected as aggressively expansionist. Sociologically and psychologically speaking, when we confront an idea or a system of ideas, or an ideological system, in a conflict situation, our view of it gets prejudiced. Islam and Hinduism, on a political level, confronted each other in a conflicting situation, each trying to steal political march over the other and hence the political elite from both the communities developed highly prejudiced view of each other's religion and also of each other (though, of course, there was

political collaboration also among a section of the two elites at one level). On the level of the masses, on the other hand, Sufi and folk Islam became popular and evoked no animosity. We shall deal with it separately.

First we shall examine some of the Islamic teachings to see whether Islam encourages pluralism in matters of religion or not so as to correctly judge its potential for peaceful coexistence with other religions. The holy Quran says emphatically, "For every one of you we appointed a law and a way. And if Allah had pleased he would have made you a single people, but that He might try you in what He gave you. So vie one with another in virtuous deeds". (The Quran 5 : 48)

No one should be left in doubt after reading this verse that Islam discourages pluralism or wants to establish supremacy of Islam. It clearly says that "for everyone of you We appointed a law and a way" and that "if Allah had pleased He would have made you a single people" but obviously he didn't as He wanted to try humans whether they can live in peace despite plurality of religions and faiths and that all we should do to live in harmony is to excel each other in good deeds.

Also the holy Quran repeatedly says, "To every nation We appointed acts of devotion, which they observe, so let them not dispute with thee in the matter, and call to thy Lord". (Quran 22.67) Also it says in another verse, "And for every nation We appointed acts of devotion that they might mention the name of Allah on what He has given them of the cattle quadruped". (Quran 22.34)

And yet in another verse it repeats the theme in these words, "And everyone has direction to which he turns (i.e. everyone has a way of worshipping Him) so vie with one another in good work". (Q.2:148) Also in one Meccan chapter (109) the holy book elaborately goes on to say :

Say : O disbelievers,
I do not worship that which you worship
and neither do you worship that which I worship
And I will not worship that which you have worshipped
and neither will you worship that which I worship,
Unto you your religion and unto me my religion.

One can find many more such verses in the Quran which do not approve of any compulsion in religion at all. "There is no compulsion in religion", (2.256) it unequivocally declares :

It is also thought that Muslims are required by the Quran to demolish others' religious places and construct mosques. May be some

uninformed Muslims believe that. The Quran, on the other hand, says contrary to that. It says in this respect, "And if Allah did not check some people by others, cloisters, and churches, and synagogues, and mosques in which Allah's name is much remembered, would have been pulled down". (22.40)

It is clear from the above verse that Allah's name is remembered whether it is mosque or synagogue or church and that Allah protected all places of worship by dispelling one set of people by the other i.e., those who did not protect these places were dispelled by Allah by those who could. Thus there is clear disapproval of non-protection, let alone demolition of any religious place of worship. Any Muslim who demolishes or justifies demolition of any place of worship is clearly acting contrary to the injunction of the Quran. Allah would dispel such people and punish them as His name is much remembered in all these places of worship.

The second Caliph Hazrat Umar did not pray in the church of Palestine when he visited it during his sojourn to that city. When the

Islam has been greatly misunderstood thanks to bigotry on both sides

Archbishop of Palestine inquired of the reason, the Caliph said it should not be later claimed by the Muslims as their Caliph prayed here. Thus he took all precaution that a church should not be claimed by Muslims for conversion into mosque. Thus both the Quran and the practice of the Prophet's Caliph is against demolishing any place of worship, whatever religion it belongs to. However, it must be admitted that practice never conforms to the ideals. For political vendetta some Muslims not only ravaged some non-Muslim places of worship but also their own holiest place of worship, Ka'ba. In early history of Islam the forces of Ummayyad caliph Yazid burnt Ka'ba as the same had been occupied by his political rival Abdulla bin Zubayr. (Tabari, however, maintains that the fire was accidental.) Whatever the case it is a fact that the Ka'ba was surrounded by the forces of Yazid and battle waged there. (Tarikh Tabari vol 7, page 14, of Khurshid Ahmed Fariq *Tarikh-i-Islam* (Delhi, 1978), pp 318-320).

It is also maintained by some that Islam believes in beheading all those who do not believe in Islam. Partly it has been answered by the verses above. When there is no compulsion of any kind in matters religious where is the question of converting anyone with the help of the sword. As for the word *Kafir* it has been greatly misunderstood. It is necessary that it should be seen in its proper perspective. *Kafir* literally

means disbeliever. Anyone who disbelieved in the truth revealed by God is *Kafir*. But, and it is important to note the Quran says that all that was revealed before to other prophets was also from Allah and that Allah had sent prophets among all nations and in their own language. "And for every nation", the Quran declares, "there is a messenger. So when their messenger comes, the matter is decided between them with justice, and they are not wronged". (10:47)

Thus prophets are sent to every nation and the main purpose is to settle things among them with justice so that they (i. e. people) are not wronged. So all those who believe in one or the other prophet (whoever the prophet, he should be messenger of God) and adhere to the norms of justice, are believers. The Quran not only requires belief in all prophets but also equal respect for them without any distinction. "We make no difference between any of His messengers", says the Quran. (2:285) The Quran also requires that a believer should accept all His prophets, including those in the past, and sent to different nations, without making any distinction among them. Thus the Quran says: "Those who believe in Allah and His messengers and desire to make a distinction between Allah and His messengers and say: we believe in some and disbelieve in others: and desire to take a course in between—these are truly disbelievers..." (4:150-151)

Thus true disbelievers (*Kafirun haqqan*) are those who do not accept all the messengers sent by God and make distinction between them. It is also important to note that all the prophets have not been named in the Quran. The Quran itself makes it clear, "And (We sent) messengers we have mentioned to thee (i. e. the Prophet) and messengers We have not mentioned to thee". (4:164) Thus in the light of this and other verses mentioned above some Sufi saints like Abdur Rahim Jan-i-Janan concluded that God had sent prophets among the Hindus too and likened Brahma to Adam and accepted the Vedas as the revealed books. Certainly it would not be in keeping with the true Quranic spirit to denounce the Hindus as kafirs as often done by some sectarian Muslims.

It was never the unanimous view of the ulema to reject Hindus as kafirs. The prophet himself while concluding a treaty with the Parsis of Bahrain and Umman accepted them as *ahl al-kitab* (the people of the book) though they have not been mentioned in the Quran as such. Similarly the third Caliph Hazrat Uthman accepted the Berber tribals of north Africa as people of the book (See Bayhaqi vol. 9, p 161 and Baladhuri *Futuh al-Buldan* pp 232 of Khurshid Ahmed Fariq, op. cit. pp 116) although it is doubtful whether they possessed any book at all. When the Berbers of north Africa whom Ibn Khalladun describes as barbarians and most uncivilised people could be accepted as *ahl al-kitab*

why could Hindus not be who were highly civilised and cultured and were already in possession of highly developed philosophy, metaphysical theories and physical sciences. The Arabs in fact were highly impressed by the achievements of Indians. The famous historian Masudi observes about India:

"In the remote past when all other nations were divided into various tribes (i. e. when others were at the tribal stage) certain people of India adorned with the qualities of nobility, rectitude, wisdom and learning were trying to bring together people under a central government. They first established a central authority and claimed to rule over others. They appointed the Great Brahman, the Supreme Leader, as their ruler. It was the age of the ascendancy of the learned. The people made progress in all the fields of life. They extracted iron from mines, made swords and other weapons, built palaces, studied the Heavens and stars and the movement of the sun (Muhammed Zaki *Arab Account of India*, Delhi, 1981).

Jahiz, who was highly talented essayist during the Abbasid period is also all praise for India and its achievements. He says:

Jahiz is all praise for India and its achievements

"The inhabitants of India are highly meritorious in astrology and medicine. They have a peculiar script. In medicine too they have a supreme insight. They have in their possession some strange secrets of the art of Aesculapian....In making busts and statues, in making pictures out of colours and in architecture they are superb.....Their music is also enchanting. One of their musical instruments is known as *kanka* (?) which is played on by striking a chord strung in a gourd.....There is an uncommon fund of poetical wealth and oratorical affluence in their possession. They know the arts of medicine, philosophy and ethics. The book *Kalelah wa Dimnah* (translation of *Panchatantra*) has come to us from them. They have plenty of courage and common-sense and many qualities which are wanting even in Chinese. Cleanliness is a noted feature. They have good looks, tall stature and a taste for perfumes. It is from their land that the peerless ambergris comes for the kings. *Streams of higher thinking flowed down from India to Arabia*. (Jahiz, *Fakhrus-Sudan 'Alal Baidan* pp 80-81, IC, 1932, 624-625 (cf. Muhammed Zaki op. cit. p-24). (emphasis supplied)

Abdul Karim Shahrastani, a 12th century scholar of comparative religions, also admits that Indians are a great nation and a great

(religious) community (*Ummat-e-kabirah wa millat-e-azimah*) but they have divergent views and ideologies. (Shahrastrani *Al Milal wa al Nihal* vol III, pp 236-37)

Thus we see the early Arab and non-Arab Muslim historians shower lavish praise on Indians and things Indian. They were all praise for their religion, metaphysics and ethics as well. Mahmud Shabistani, a noted scholar of early 14th century in his *Gulshani-i-Raz* even justified idolatry. He says, "The idol is the expression of love and unity in this world, and to wear the sacred thread is to take the resolve of service. As both faith and unfaith are founded in existence, unity of God is the essence of idol worship. As things are the essence of expression, one out of them must at least be the idol. If the Muslim knew what the idol is then he would not go astray in his faith. The latter did not see in the idol anything but external creation, and for this reason he became *kafir* in the eyes of the law. If thou too would not see that reality is hidden in the idol, thou wilt also be not known as a Muslim according to law. (Dr. Tarachand *The Hindu Muslim problem* pp 34-35 of B. Pande *Islam and Indian culture* (Patna, 1987) pp 9-10)

As pointed out earlier the third caliph Uthman had accepted even north African Berbers as *ahl-al-kitab* (people of the Book) who were nothing more than barbarians, how could then one declare Hindus as kafirs and condemn them. It was for nothing that when Muhammad bin Qasim, confronted with Hindus, wanted to determine their religious status and questioned the ulama about it, they could not take any unanimous decision, the majority accepting them *ahl-al-kitab*.

It is also important to note that most of the early Arab historians were all praise for the Hindus and their intellectual achievements, the latter-day ulama were hostile to them, often condemning them as *kafirs*. Why this difference of attitude? To understand this it is necessary to understand that our attitudes about others are often determined by our interests, socio-economic or political. The early Arab historians were all praise for India and things Indian as they perceived a lot of benefits by contacts with them and tried to learn from them. They were at lower developing level of intellectual achievements than the Hindus of India and hence praised them. However, it was different with the latter day ulama who were patronised by Central Asian Muslim nobles in competition with the Hindu elite. It was political hostility which assumed the form of religious hostility and many ulama came to term Hindus as *kafirs*.

No wonder then that Sufis took an entirely different attitude towards Hindus from that of the ulama. The sufis were not aspirants for power.

On the contrary they kept away from it and absorbed themselves in spiritual exercise. They found many parallels in the spiritual practice of Hindu yogis. Once Nizamuddin Auliya, great sufi saint of the Sultanate period, was walking along with his disciple Amir Khusrau, along the bank of Jamuna, he saw some Hindu women bathing and worshipping the sun. He promptly said *har qaum ra dine wa gila gahe* (for every people there is their religion and way of prayer). The sufi concept of *fana fi Allah* also seems to have been derived from the Buddhist concept of *nirvana* which predates it.

It is also important to note that the sufis did not even hesitate to use the local Hindu idiom in putting across ideas and teachings. A sufi saint from Maharashtra Sheikh Mohammed named his book on Sufism *Yogasangraha*. He used Marathi language and Sanskrit terms rather than Arabic ones. For he calls *dil* (heart) as *antahakaran*, *jahaliyat* as *tamogun* and *kamaliyat* as *sadgun*. In fact he uses all those terms which were used by Patanjali, Shankaracharyas and commentators of Vedantas. (See Asghar Ali Engineer "Seminar on sufism and Communal Harmony"—

Sufisaints did not hesitate to use the local Hindu idiom

A reportage, Occasional paper No 4, Vol 4, April 1988, Institute of Islamic Studies. Bombay.)

Sheikh Mohammed was not alone or an exception. There were many other sufi saints who thought like him. They were genuinely interested in spiritual practices. They knew its outward forms varied, not its contents. They were least prejudiced against Hindu practices and religious idiom. Some sufis of Gujrat even projected the Prophet as Krishna and composed poems to this effect. (Khawaja Hasan Nizami in *Fatimi D'awat-e-Islam*.) Also the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujud* (literary Unity of Being) was quite universalist one on account of its pantheistic contents. The entire universe, according to this doctrine, was creation of God and reflects His glory. Thus there is no question of fraternising with one section of humanity holding similar beliefs and rejecting the other having different outward beliefs. The sufis holding to the doctrine *wahdat al-wujud* fraternised with all.

Today for reasons other than religious, we are too much obsessed with our past. As pointed out above, it is essentially political hostility which has been, for reasons of legitimization, transformed into religious

antagonism. We oversimplify history and see into it nothing but religious conflict between the Hindus and Muslims. However, as serious students of human affairs we should remember that human and specially inter-group or inter-communal relations are characterised by ambiguity, complexity and relativity. We do not wish to examine this question here in detail. Much has already been written about it. All we wish to emphasise here is that any historical event must be examined in all its richness, depth, complexity and ambiguity.

We should also remember, as pointed out earlier too, human behaviour is not motivated by any one factor alone, however important it may be. Religion may be very important but it is not the sole motivating factor even for ordinary human beings, not involved in any power game much less so for the rulers. If we give up oversimplistic approach and try to understand various events, historical or contemporary, in all its complexity and ambiguity, we will be better able to comprehend real motives and it would help reducing religious conflict. It would promote better understanding.

Let us keep in mind that how much do we differ among ourselves on interpretation of contemporary events. Let us take Blue Star operation, for example. Did Indira Gandhi order it for her own political motives or did she do it for her hostility towards Sikhism or she wanted to work up Hindu chauvinism for winning elections? Had she turned communal or she conceived herself to be the only leader capable of promoting the country's unity. We would adopt one or the other opinion depending on our political interests or involvement or on our *a priori* inclination. The debate goes on. Among Sikhs too, there is no unanimity of opinion.

When we could differ so deeply on a contemporary event, how can we say anything with certainty about remote past. Still we flaunt our opinion about historical events with great degree of certitude completely ignoring complexity and possible range of motivation of the historical actors. These historical actors were neither religious bigots nor great liberals. They were certainly not motivated by these considerations alone. They were mainly motivated by their own political interests. Let us not lose sight of these facts. If we adopt this attitude much of our perception of history and historical events can change. It is highly necessary to defuse the communal situation in our country.

A CHANGING SOCIETY throws up very complex problems, ethnic problem being one among them. Communalism in India is a modern phenomenon in this sense that with the advent of the British rule the

socio-economic structure and consequent political relationship between different communities, specially between the Hindus and Muslims, began to change. No pluralist society which is undergoing change can be free of communal or ethnic tensions, manageable or of unmanageable proportions. The communal phenomenon jumped to the fore when feudal-autocratic power relationship began to change to capitalist-democratic relationship. This change began to deepen further when socio-economic transformation became relatively faster after independence. New forces and new relationships began to emerge on our social and political all its horizons. This transformation again needs to be understood in complexity, richness and ambiguity, without resorting to over simplifications.

Most of the third world countries are experiencing the ethnic or communal problem in various degrees. All those countries which were considered model of unity and amity are being torn asunder by ethnic and communal conflict. Whoever thought just a decade ago that the peaceful island of Fiji in Pacific would experience violent ethnic convulsions?

Economic and political conflicts are assuming religious form

The Fiji Indians and the natives began to fight. The conflict, to be sure, was of economic and political nature. The conflict broke out with the election of Fiji Indian-supported coalition led by Dr. Timoci Bavadra. It generated resentment among the natives who felt left out both in economic and political race for power. The native Fijians asserted themselves, democracy was subverted and the natives seized power through military dictatorship.

The Tamil-Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka is also a result of socio-economic balance changing there. The Tamils were thought to be a privileged minority by the Sinhalas and even otherwise peaceful Buddhist monks got involved in the anti-Tamil movement and resorted to violence. Until recently these countries had known ethnic peace but the developmental process generated conflict. The expression of conflict always assumes communal or racial overtones. Many more examples can be given from other countries of the world.

The Hindu-Muslim problem in India (and now the Hindu-Sikh also has been added to it) is of the same variety. Actually speaking the Hindu-Muslim problem is not of a religious nature. The conflict lay in fact

in the secular arena which unfortunately gets expressed in religious idiom and the problem gets projected as a religious problem. Anyway we have to tackle it from the viewpoint of its perceivers, not only of actors. The religious problem also has many aspects to it; not least is the cultural aspect.

OUR HINDU BROTHERS complain that the Muslims are unwilling to become part of national mainstream. It is partly true, partly not. If we look at it from the point of view of north Indian Muslim *urban elite* it appears to be true. But it is not true in the case of either north Indian rural Muslims or Muslims in general in southern and eastern parts of India.

In fact the centre of gravity of communal problem lay in the Hindi belt (which can also include Gujarat and Maharashtra) and the urban elite in this belt insists on a separate identity and has a definite sense of Indo-Islamic culture. The urban middle class Muslims of this belt are quite proud of this Indo-Islamic identity. Also, it has a history of Hindu-Muslim conflict since nineteenth century. It has been the centre of Aligarh movement. Above all it was the centre of Muslim power. In this belt we have largely those Muslims, especially in urban areas, who are descendants of the erstwhile ruling classes. The battle for Pakistan was also mainly fought in this belt.

It is therefore not surprising if the feelings of separate identity are stronger in this belt. Again, it is the Hindus of this belt who feel very strongly about separatist attitudes among Muslims. It is therefore quite natural if they feel that Muslims refuse to be part of Indian mainstream. However, the problem has its own complexity and ambiguity. Also, as is often done, its genesis should not be seen only in religion. The roots of separation are in politics, not in religion.

Let us go back in history to search of the roots for this separatism. When Emperor Akbar adopted a liberal policy towards Hindus, it created resentment among a section of Muslim nobles, mainly those who were of Central Asian origin. Subsequently this section of Muslim nobles found their rallying point in Mujaddid Sirhindi, a Naqshbandi Sufi theologian. In fact it all began with Baqi Billah of Naqshbandi order from Punjab. He was born in 1563 and died in 1603 in Delhi. Wilfred Cantwell Smith (*On Understanding Islam* Delhi, 1985, pp 177.) It was Baqi Billah who began contacting the Muslim nobles and subsequently converted Sirhindi, who was a liberal, influenced by Abu'l Fazl, a great liberal sufi intellectual.

Mujaddid Alf Thani Sirhindi wrote letters (*Maktubat*) to various Muslim nobles and stressed the importance of Islamic orthodoxy and opposed the un-Islamic policies of the emperor. He found support among those nobles who did not want to share power with the Hindu nobles. The tussle continued and Aurangzeb also courted the support of Muslim nobles to wrest political power from heir-apparent Dara Shikoh who again was a great liberal. The Muslim nobility sided with Aurangzeb who won. Shah Waliullah also tried to inspire muslim nobility to restore Muslim power but failed.

Of course the Central Asian Muslim nobility had lost its original identity and developed a new Indo-Islamic identity which was both Islamic and Indian. This fact must be recognised as it has important bearing on the question we are discussing. The ingredients of this identity are both Islamic as well as Indian. Its Islamicness asserts itself in certain circumstances and its Indianness in certain others, depending on the situation, and struggle for power.

After the advent of British power a new phase of struggle for power began and it was during this struggle that among the urban Muslim elite

The Hindu complaint against Muslims is partly right and partly wrong

of north India—which was the theatre of this struggle—the Islamic element of its identity began to assert itself again. It was so because the struggle was between the Muslim and Hindu elite. So much of an assertion was quite expected. The Muslim elite, in order to mobilise Muslim masses for their struggle for power tried to generate Islamic identity among them too. There has been strong element of Hinduism in folk Islam. The names, the traditions, the costumes and other cultural elements had strong Hindu influence. The Muslim elite, *not for religious but for political reasons*, began to urge the Muslim masses to purge their customs of local Hindu elements. The Deobandi ulama, on the other hand, took up this campaign for religious reasons. They thought, whether one agrees with them or not, that unless we practice 'pure Islam' we will not be able to check the degeneration among the Muslims.

However, our main concern is not this stream of thought. We are more concerned with the political stream of thought here. Analysing increasing degree of separatism in 19th century Bengal, Rafiuddin says :

"Such changes were hit due solely to the campaigns of Islamization. Improvements in communication that brought the rural Muslims into close contact with their urban co-religionists, wider diffusion of education, Islamic as well as Western and, finally, communal tensions resulting from a variety of social and political factors, all contributed to the increasing aloofness of the ordinary Muslims from their Hindu neighbours. (Rafiuddin Ahmed *The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906—A Quest for Identity*, Delhi, 1981-pp-107).

Rafiuddin describes various changes which began to take place in the emerging identity of Bengali Muslims. He observes; "The earlier *nasihat* namas, written as late as the seventies of the nineteenth century, often referred to the Creator as 'Sri Sri Huq', 'Sri Sri Iswar', 'Sri Sri Karim'. The increasing tendency now was to substitute such 'un-Islamic' honorifics as 'Sri Sri' by 'purer'—i.e. Arabic and Persian—invocations such as 'Allah Akbar' or 'Allahu Ghani'. The style of addressing a person also showed the same trend, 'Sri, Srijuta', and 'Sril Srijuta' of an earlier era giving way generally to such Arabised honorifics as 'janab', 'Mushri' and 'Maulavi'. Even the titles of *nasihat* namas underwent rapid transformation. Bengali titles were replaced by Arabic ones, such as 'Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya', 'Akhhbar al-Marifat', 'Bedar al-Ghafilin' and so on. These changes were symbolic of the psychology behind the campaigns of Islamization. They also showed how the crusade against polytheism was increasingly taking the road to cultural separatism. (Rafiuddin Ahmed *The Bengal Muslims*...pp 109).

Similar process took place (One must see Pratap Aggarwal's 'Study of Meo Muslims' in this connection.) among other Muslim communities, for example Meos of Rajasthan and Haryana. They were also highly assimilated Muslim communities, but as the struggle between Hindus and Muslims intensified during freedom struggle, the process of cultural separatism and Islamization reached its height at the time of partition. It was at the time of partition that the Khoja Muslims of Gujarat gave up their Hindu names and customs. (There used to be puja of Ganesha among Khoja Muslims until the partition, when the Aga Khan began the process of Islamisation.)

It is highly necessary that this cultural separatism and Islamization should be seen, not as an integral part of Muslim fanaticism but a socio-political process which partly resulted from the political struggle between the elites of two communities. It was, so to say, also the result of heightened political consciousness. Of course, it is very difficult to say whether cultural and religious consciousness precedes political consciousness or vice versa. It is a highly complex process. But one thing can be

empirically established that political struggle between two communities also does lead to religio-cultural separatism.

Often Indonesia's example is cited in this connection. The Muslims there have been deeply influenced by Hindu culture. Their national cultural symbols are Hindu. Even their national dance is based on Ramayana. Their names also resemble Hindu names in many cases. All this is true. But in Indonesia Muslims are in overwhelming majority and there was, or there is, no struggle between Hindus and Muslims. There is no fear of Hindu domination. As pointed out above, the identity formation i.e. crystallization of ingredients of one's identity, is as much a socio-political process as religious and cultural. And the sense of separateness begins with the urban elite, not with the rural masses.

As it is obvious from the example of nineteenth century Bengal, there was remarkable degree of cultural assimilation, perhaps as striking as that of Indonesia, but things began to change with more education and intensified struggle between the elites of the two communities. Also,

How 'Sri Sri Huq' became 'Allah-o-Akbar' etc.

even today, there is greater and intensified sense of cultural separatism, among the north Indian urban elites. And the process of intensification is still on with intensification of the process of communalization. Even in these conditions there is quite a degree of cultural assimilation between Hindus and Muslims in the rural areas. Their dialect, mode of dressing and social customs have lot of similarities. Number of empirical and anthropological studies bear this out. (Imtiaz Ahmed 'Caste and Social Stratification Among Muslims in India' Delhi,—1978.)

Whatever the political compulsions or process, cultural or religious separatism cannot go beyond certain limit. Even at its height of separatism the identity of Muslim elite remains, as pointed out before, an Indo-Islamic identity. The Muslims of India cannot get away from their sense of Indianness in cultural and social sense. Their social ethics are as much Indian as Islamic. Their Muslimness cannot completely submerge their Indianness. The Islamic world also refers to them as Indian Muslims ('Hindi', ed.).

Also, in southern and north-eastern parts of India, like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Assam, Kashmir and West Bengal (leaving aside Bihari Muslims of Calcutta) there is remarkable degree of cultural assimilation between

Hindus and Muslims not only in rural but also urban areas. They enjoy common social customs, cultural values and, of course, speak the same language. In Kerala the marriage ceremony is called *Mangalam* and their marriage customs are matriarchal like the Hindus (wherever there is matriarchal system in Kerala). In Kashmir, the sufi saints are referred to as *rishis* (Nuruddin Rishi etc.). These rishis are venerated by both Hindus and Muslims. In Kashmir another commonly venerated sufi poetess is Lalleshwari (popularly known as Lal Ded) who was contemporary of Nuruddin Rishi (Nund Rishi). She was a Shaivite and she composed poems in popular language. Kashmiri Shaivism has a strong element of unity of God (*tawhid*).

Thus, it would be seen that the sense of cultural separatism is prevalent in a small section of urban population in North India and its importance should not be exaggerated. And, as pointed out above, this sense of cultural separatism is getting further intensified due to intensification of communal feelings. Electoral processes and political opportunism have much to do with the intensification of communalism all over India. If the sense of cultural separatism is to be arrested, instead of attacking it, one would do better to attack communalism and create better and more harmonious relationship between Hindus and Muslims. Here, in our opinion, two dimensions of the problem must be clearly recognised, if it is to be tackled more objectively and fruitfully. First, we must recognise the fact that with more education, a sense of ones own identity is bound to develop which would tend to separate him/her from other community/caste. It is happening with all castes and communities. It is a psychological process. Even dalits, due to spread of education, are becoming highly caste-conscious. This seems to be inevitable and must be accepted in right perspective.

Second dimension of the problem relates to a deliberate attempt, by the leadership or the elites of the community, to serve their own interests, to build up an atmosphere of confrontation leading to conscious efforts at separatism between the communities. It is this process that we have to bring to an effective end. Confrontation must be replaced by cooperation. Polemics must be replaced by dialogue.

We also have to recognise the fact that India has chosen a secular and democratic course. Also, ours is a pluralist society. Democracy cannot be stabilised without secularism in the modern context, and secularism cannot remain stable without genuine pluralism, both religious as well as cultural. To strengthen the forces of pluralism (on which would depend secularism and democracy), we will have to develop a sense of equal respect for all religions and cultures. Mere tolerance

would not do. In a way tolerance is a negative quality—as something exists any way, let us tolerate it. We should go beyond this attitude and inculcate equal respect for other religion(s). Respect is a positive quality. The Muslims should show as much respect for Hinduism as for their own religion, Islam. Similarly, Hindus should not view Islam with any sense of suspicion. It is true Hinduism is not doctrinaire but Hindus do tend to become doctrinaire. It is practice we are concerned with not merely theory. Islam is, theologically speaking, no less tolerant as shown from the Quranic verses above. But, Muslims are far from being tolerant in practice.

Both the communities—at least some prominent members sincerely committed to the cause of communal peace—must undertake genuine self-criticism of their respective communities. We tend to throw blame always on others and completely ignore our own faults. This is very common human psychology; we all are its victim. Some of us must come out of this and attempt a bold self-criticism. We will also do better if we recognise that communalism *per se* is bad. It should not be divided in

Basically it is a political struggle between the elites of two communities

the artificial categories of minority and majority communalism. One feeds the other. We have very well witnessed this—if any proof is required—during the Shah Banu and Ramjanam Bhoomi-Babri Mosque agitations. Muslim communalism was at its aggressive worst, which in turn fed Hindn communalism and it appeared as if there is total confrontation between the two communities.

The common Hindus and Muslims should recognise that it is the game of vested interests and that they often become its victim. In most towns, cities and villages they live cheek by jowl and in peace. There is no confrontation among them, unless it is created from above. Common people are genuinely religious but far less communal, whereas the elite and the leadership is far less religious but far more communal. They also have more respect for each other's religion than the elite. Also, common people are involved in their own struggles for living. Those who take confrontationist attitude hardly ever concern themselves with the people's struggles. They raise abstract emotional issues—Babri mosque-Ram Janambhoomi, and hardly ever issues pertaining to people's struggles. These priorities must be reversed, if communal confrontation is to be de-escalated.

Muslim intelligentsia has also become super-sensitive on religious-cultural matters. While some of their religious-cultural sensibilities are genuine, they should not lose their sense of proportion. They should also take into account the sensibilities of majority community and should realise that a minimum degree of tension is bound to remain between major communities in a pluralist democracy. They should not tend to over-react, as they often do, further exacerbating the situation. An open mind and accommodative approach would be far more helpful.

The Hindu should also realise that progress of the country is possible only when there is communal peace and cooperative spirit between majority and minority. If minority feelings get intensified, the integrity of the country will be endangered, much more so with heightened communal consciousness. They should show a little more accommodation for the minorities and show respect for their cultural-religious sensibilities (though culture is a much more complex category and is often common between majority and minority, especially at regional levels. Minorities, as a rule, tend to be more sensitive on such issues.

Muslims should also realise that indigenous element in their identity content is very important and should not be de-emphasised. True religiosity and genuine faith is far above petty-mindedness and it cannot be affected by imbibing of local traditions. In fact no Muslim community is 'pure Islamic community' in the world. 'Pure Islamic Community', anthropologically speaking, is a mythical category. They should also not make their identity merely past-oriented. Present and future also must enter into their identity-consciousness, if they want their life to be more meaningful in the contemporary world. They should thus opt for progressive and not regressive identity. It means they should be open to change and shake their feudal past. The Muslims have imbibed feudal values so deeply that they find it difficult to shake themselves free. But it will have to be done. Islam has very little in common with feudalism.

There are some tentative suggestions for developing a cooperative approach between Hindus and Muslims. It is easier said than done. But, let us remember, nothing is impossible given will and determination. We should not be dismayed by the problems cropping up. They are bound to arise. After all we are engaged in the process of nation-building. It is a pretty mighty task. In Europe the process was comparatively simpler. Their were societies based on single religion and language and the process of industrialisation was also far ahead. Ours is a multi-lingual, multi-religious society and industrialisation is also proceeding at a slow pace.

Indian Self-Image, Future Prospects and Exploration of Possibilities

By : Dharampal

I HAVE ALREADY dealt at some length with certain aspects of Indian life and society around two hundred years ago about the time when India began to be systematically conquered by Great Britain. The data which I presented, you may perhaps agree, did indicate that in terms of social functioning, infrastructural arrangements, and the quality of ordinary life, India did not seem to be doing too badly. And perhaps the life of the ordinary citizen, i.e., of about 80% of the Indian people, was in many ways, both as regards their consumption and their habitats, superior to what it has been during the last century and a half. As I also mentioned yesterday, an eminent economist has recently estimated that the wages of an agricultural labourer in Chingleput around 1795 was around Rs. 7.50 per day, while the wages of a similar labourer in 1975 was only Rs. 2.50, both wages being calculated at 1975 prices. Also, the data indicated better supra-local arrangements, and if the indication of this data were followed through further research, it may be found that in a socio-cultural sense our society had better organisational linkages than it has had since then. The data perhaps also suggests that militarily in comparison to the west, this was a weak society, and that, therefore, it did not have any strong urges towards systematic organised innovation, or any particular fascination with the concept of progress.

Though most of our major historical personalities of the 19th century and even of the early 20th seem to have had little inkling of such being the structure of our society, Mahatma Gandhi did seem to have some acquaintance with its general functioning. Much of it is indicated in the 'Hind Swaraj' though it is true that the picture which the 'Hind Swaraj' provides is rather too idealised and utopian. But then 'Hind Swaraj' was essentially a polemical document and was aimed at contrasting the civilization of India with the civilization of the modern west.

However, when it came to concretising the basic frame of this earlier Indian model, Gandhiji did try to convey it through various means. One of the earliest, and perhaps the most major, way of concretising the earlier Indian structural arrangement was in the constitution of the Indian National Congress in which the congress was given a popular base, and its units were organised on the basis of locality, linguistic region, and the country as a whole. When asked in 1931, in London, how a free India would be organised, Gandhiji had said that this had already been indicated in the 1920 constitution of the Congress. In January 1930, Gandhiji

spelled out, in the independence pledge, the great damage done to India by British rule. The pledge stated that India had been ruined by the British not only politically and economically but also culturally and spiritually. A year later, in March 1931, the Congress adopted the resolution on the national objectives of the freedom movement spelling out what India will do when it became free.

By 1938, freedom seemed to be not too distant and the more western-minded leaders of India—political, academic, industrial—began to contemplate planning for the future. One of the results of this was the National Planning Committee of the National Congress, appointed by then Congress President, Subhas Chandra Bose, and presided over by Jawaharlal Nehru. The main Committee had 15-20 members, including academics and leaders of Indian industry. It constituted about 30 sub-committees which dealt with a variety of subjects, and in all over 200 persons, a few of them still prominent in today's Indian public life, were associated with the work of the national planning committee. The reports of the main committee as also of the sub-committees were published around 1947 and consist of some 30-35 volumes. Today, we can clearly see that the main stress in these reports is on economics, the direction western-modern, the approach largely mechanical and cliché-ridden, and on the whole, the product is largely shoddy. We must, however, also remember that most of the work was done at a rather difficult period, with the president and many of the members of the committee being in prison most of the time during 1940-1945.

During some particular deliberations of the Cottage Industries sub-committee of the main body, held at Wardha, around September 1939, Gandhiji is said to have consented to a programme of modern industrialisation provided that the promotion and extension of cottage industry went hand in hand with modern industrial development, and that "India was definitely not to depend on foreign loans for development", that all money, private as well as public, was mobilised for this purpose, and that "a certain standard of living had to be defined as the objective" and both the modern industrial plan as well as the plan of cottage industry "approximated to each other within a comparable measure of time."

Earlier on, in 1934, while initiating the village industries movement, he had written, "If the villagers had enough to eat and clothe themselves with, there would be no cause for home-grinding or home-husking, assuming that the question of health was not of any importance, or if it was, there was no difference between home-ground flour and mill-ground, or home-husked rice and mill-husked". Even still earlier in 1925, he told some one from the Punjab, that "in the present state of India, anything like a

universal introduction of electric power in our villages, is an utterly impracticable proposition" but he had added, "that time may come". Incidentally, during 1922-23, *Young India*, Gandhiji's weekly, but at the time when he was in prison, had envisaged a militia of one crore of men when India was wholly free. There can be little doubt that this had been written in accordance with Gandhiji's general ideas on the practical and the feasible.

IN 1945, the Congress in its Working Committee (i.e., its chief executive body though perhaps not its brain-trust or think-tank) seems to have deliberated on the shape of things in free India. Though no records of the discussions seem to be yet available, it seems that it was somewhat heated and perhaps even acrimonious. An idea of it comes through a letter of Gandhiji to Jawaharlal Nehru. In his letter of October 2nd, 1945, Gandhiji said "I take first the sharp difference of opinion that has arisen between us. If such a difference really exists, people should also know about it, for the work of Swaraj will suffer if they are kept in the dark." Gandhiji wanted a public discussion on this point, perhaps not only in the All India Congress Committee (the general body of the Congress) but also in the country at large.

Fundamental differences between Gandhi and Nehru in 1945

Such a discussion did not seem to suit Jawaharlal Nehru and perhaps many others who had cast their lot with western modernism, and the British-created structures and institutions, which had existed and had been running India for nearly two centuries. He, therefore, wrote to Gandhiji: "How far it is desirable for the Congress to consider these fundamental questions, involving varying philosophies of life, it is for you to judge. I would imagine that a body like the Congress should not lose itself in arguments on such matters which can only produce great confusion in people's minds resulting in inability to act in the present." He added, as a sort of warning, that, "This may also result in creating barriers between the Congress and others in the country." But in his normal equivocal manner he added that, "ultimately of course this and other questions will have to be decided by representatives of free India."

From 1946 to 1949, the representatives of free India did meet in a Constituent Assembly. But practically on every point they were faced with *fait accompli*. Various expert committees of course had been set up to help draft the constitution, but most members of these were occupied

otherwise and, therefore, the draft of the constitution was a mish-mash of the existing British frame-work of Indian governance and of bits and pieces picked up and joined to it from the countries of Europe and the United States of America. Heated debates took place on various aspects of the draft prepared by the Law Minister and the Constitutional Adviser, both mentally westernised to an extreme degree, but nothing much could be altered as regards the basic frame, because doing so would have delayed the adoption of a new constitution by a previously decided date.

The constraint of the date was in fact brought to the notice of the President of the Constituent Assembly by the Constitutional Adviser when a heated debate took place on the basic unit of the new polity—whether it should be a locality or a habitat, as was the historical Indian practice, or it should be the adult individual as obtained in the Western world. With such a sacred constraint, much like the still current constraint of the astrologically forecast auspicious moment for this and that, no basic alteration could be made in the draft. Additions, etc., of course, did take place, but these perhaps only added to the bulk of the Articles and the paper on which these were printed, and made the Constitution sort of fool-proof, i.e., completely irrelevant with regard to any major transformation in the Indian polity by constitutional means, and inadvertently made the Indian political system even more frozen and unworkable than it already was during British Rule.

The assurance of Jawaharlal Nehru that “ultimately of course this and other questions will have to be decided by representatives of free India” thus turned out to be a mere eye-wash. Perhaps it was so intended. But whatever the intention, the consequences were the take-over of India by the westernised elite, and initially an elite whose familiarity with the West was merely limited to the 19th century West—a West for which Nature was an enemy, rationalism its god, and never-ending exploitation of physical resources the supreme goal. Further, even this acquaintance was largely superficial and couched in the rhetoric and clichés of the 19th century with the result that the political and administrative institutions of India and its basic scientific and technological concepts and knowledge, or its over-riding philosophical, political and economic ideas seldom moved beyond the European ideas of the early twentieth century, and would today be wholly incomprehensible to most of the present-day young men and women of Britain, from whose immediate ancestors these ideas were derived.

The results in most fields, as we well know, have been wholly disastrous. I may perhaps add here that the Education Ministry of the Govern-

ment of India did in fact a great service to India—the only service which it perhaps has ever done—when it produced the 1985 document “Challenge of Education” reviewing the state of Indian Education. I personally have little doubt, and I think many of you will agree with me, that if such review were done for other departments of government also, whether at the national or state levels, the findings will be similar to those of the Education review. Perhaps I may add that the situation as regards governmental functioning even in Karnataka will be found nearly as dismal as in Delhi, or in most of the other states, except in my own state of Uttar Pradesh which will perhaps as usual occupy the bottom place.

It is only because of the ingenuity, the relative perseverance, and the robustness of our ordinary people—many of whom somehow make do without adequate shelter, or clothing, or even water—that we still survive as a people and as a civilisation. Though we do not seem to much like whatever they do, the festivals and the fire-walking that they celebrate, the occasional unclad trance-dancing they resort to despite all the obstacles we the elite put in their way, and the various other things which,

India was taken over after Independence by its Westernised minority

unknown to us, are intimate parts of their lives, only shows that they still are grounded in the soil of India, and can be expected to see it emerge into a more worthwhile future, notwithstanding our own alienation, indifference, and high-handedness.

But it is not only those who are directly tied to the Indian state system—the number of such persons adds up to more than one crore, though only less than two lakhs of them have any say in decision-making, or in actual control of others—the many lakhs who work in the social and cultural field in non-governmental capacities, seem to have done little better. Many such persons are my friends, and in fact I am myself no different from them. In a larger sense we have become peripheral to the needs of Indian civilisation and society; unwittingly we have become instruments of the erosion of Indian values and institutions, in fact, we have become even more tied than those serving the state, to alien ideas and practices of all types, and though we may perform many tasks more economically and even with greater compassion, the psychological, mental and material chasm between us and our people is no less wide than it was, say, before 1920, or as described by Swami Vivekananda nearly a century ago.

The surrounding climate has been allowed to become such, or perhaps our senses have become so blunted that even as patriotic and sacred and well run a place as the Vivekananda Kendra is unable to escape the effect of this alien environment. Situated in Tamilnadu within a mile of the famous rock and the ancient temple of Kanyakumari, the language of discourse, instead of being Tamil or Hindi, has, in such a centre of patriotism, become English, the verses on the walls of the meditation hall are in English, the captions to the exhibits on Vivekananda are in English alone, and even the medium of instruction for the little children in the excellent Kendra school is English. It is understandable why Hindi cannot be the sole language in these matters at the Kendra, but it is incomprehensible, at least to me—I know I am rather short-sighted in these matters—why Tamil could not have been adopted instead of English, or at least given first preference, and English or Hindi used to supplement Tamil. If this can happen at Vivekananda Kendra, it is little wonder that even villages or small towns which lie on the side of motor roads are proudly displaying that these villages possess one or more English-medium schools.

Personally, I have nothing against English, even to its becoming the lingua-franca of India, if such is the considered national decision. Nor have I in a similar situation anything against the total westernisation of India in the western idiom of the present, not of course in the idiom of 19th century west, or in the idiom of Plato or Aristotle. But do we have the vigour, perseverance and capacity to devote ourselves deliberately and persistently to transform India into a functioning Western state and society. So far there are no such signs. We do not even actually aspire to do so, not even those who daily moan the rise of superstition and fundamentalism in India, and the decline of the scientific temper, rationality, and the Indian brand of secularism. Their disorientation and alienation has become such, or the dazzle of the West is so attractive, that quite possibly, if pushed a little harder, most of this gentry will start queuing at United States consulates and similar other foreign sanctuaries, to represent that Westernised Indians have become victims of political discrimination and that they should be given refuge. If there were opportunities, many of them may ask for similar facilities from the USSR, or from the Arab Emirates, or from the other softer areas of the Arab World. One can only hope that their own efforts as well as time will cure them and bring them back to a state of Indianness. It is not that many of them do not have talent, or do not have conviction. But their talent and conviction for their own good, and for the good of India, has to be expressed in an Indian context, and not in a supposedly empty void.

TO GAIN some perspective and to understand our dilemma, we perhaps need to look at other countries, and what happened in some of them when they were faced with somewhat similar issues. One can of course examine 19th century North America where violence, stark individualism, cut-throat competition for increasingly acquired or discovered resources, and indifference to those who lost the race, must have been rampant. But then white North America commanded vast resources, especially after it had virtually eliminated the indigenous peoples, who for the whole of the Americas are currently estimated at 90 to 112 millions at the time of Columbus (AD-1492), a larger number than the total population of Europe at that time.

We can also look at 19th century Great Britain, whose physical resources were vastly poorer, but then Britain dominated most of the world in the 19th century. The other country we can look at, is one which has been admired by many of us for nearly a century, even by Swami Vivekananda when he had a brief halt there in his first trip to the USA in 1893. That country is Japan.

Even Vivekananda Kendra School in Kanyakumari has English medium

After the conversion of half a million of its people to Christianity by the Jesuits in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, Japan closed its frontiers to people from Europe for over two centuries. It was only around 1860 that it reopened itself, under external pressure, to the Western world. It is said that in the intervening 200 years, Japan kept a very limited contact with the Dutch, which served as a sort of photographic camera aperture, through which Japan could concentratedly take note of what interested it and yet not be distracted by being exposed to what did not interest it.

Soon after Japan resumed links with the West, it sent some of its young men to the countries of the West. One of them, Maeda Masana, who went to France in 1869 felt very depressed for many months and seeing Paris' splendour, felt that Japan would never be able to match it. But soon after the Franco-German War, France seemed to be in a shambles and had to rebuild itself again. While the happening itself must have made him sad, somehow his spirits picked up from then on and he could write that "I felt confidence in our ability to achieve what the West achieved."

He returned to Japan in 1878, and became one of the chief architects of *Kogyo Iken* Japan's ten-year plan, completed in 1884 in thirty

volumes. Discussing the various constituents which were required to make such a Plan functional, the plan stated :

"Which requirement should be considered as most important in the present efforts of the government in building Japanese industries? It can be neither capital nor laws and regulations, because both are dead things in themselves and totally ineffective. The spirit/willingness sets both capital and regulations in motion....If we assign to these three factors with respect to their effectiveness, spirit/willingness should be assigned five parts, laws and regulations four, and capital no more than one part."

With this spirit and willingness, Japan made rapid strides in science and technology and emerged as a powerful nation. It may be worthwhile to recapitulate the impressions Japan made less than 40 years after the launching of the ten-year plan, on an eminent American inventor and engineer, Elmer Sperry in 1922. The following sums up what Sperry thought :

"Sperry left Japan in November with strong impressions of the country's rapid strides in technology. At a time when many Americans thought of Japan as imitative and second-rate, Sperry's keen and experienced eye saw the unmistakable signs of technological excellence and maturity. Later, he carried this message to the world-wide engineering fraternity, which was also ill-informed about Japanese technology. Sperry had been especially impressed by two large dockyards, one of which he judged to be four times larger than any in America. He admired the systematic layout and operation of the yard, where they take in Swedish pig-iron at one end of the place (only it happens to be the middle) and put out a 33,000-ton battle-ship at the other end. He observed that America had only two model ship basins for scientific experiments but that Japan had four. In Japan he also saw superior machine tools which were, he knew, the essence of precision manufacture and represented a heavy capital investment. He judged a Japanese-built, horizontal milling machine and a forging press to be larger than any in America. In a decade when the construction of high-voltage electrical transmission networks, or grids, was a sign of advanced technology, Sperry found the Japanese construction of the finest kind, better than he had seen in America. He also heard that the Japanese had three times more high tension transmission lines per capita than the United States. The Japanese were no longer dependent upon the import of complex materials and machines such as generators, turbines and armour plate."

What spirit/willingness can do is even more apparent when we see today's Japan. This seems to be a Universal law. It had been recognized in India also. According to our traditional wisdom also, spirit is the deciding factor in the fulfilment of a goal, not the tools. The goals are

of course determined by the basic character of a civilisation. The emergence of European dominance must have also arisen from this factor of spirit/willingness. When Europe started its outward journey, it was not particularly advanced in education, science, technology, agriculture, etc., in comparison to other societies. But it was able in time to dominate the whole world, in keeping with its basic character due to its spirit and will-power. It developed its institutions to fulfil this goal and could consolidate the necessary resources later.

A Similar spirit and will-power seemed to be present when Mahatma Gandhi started to harness the energies of our society. At that time our self-image was at its lowest ebb and all our resources had been confiscated, resulting in widespread deprivation and helplessness. He created the necessary organisational framework, so that society could move towards the goals of swaraj and self-governance.

IT IS CONSIDERED by some scholars who have tried to reflect on the past that Ram Mohan Roy, with his enthusiasm for westernisation, what

Japan acquired confidence when it saw Germany defeat France in 1871

Elphinstone called his Firangeeness, was in fact coining a strategy of countering the dominance of the West. As far as he was concerned, it may well be so, and the thought needs deeper examination. But as events unfolded themselves, what he may have meant, got wholly ignored, and those who drew inspiration from him or his written word, were led, leaving their own idols, to the worship of the varied idols of the West. Even such worship done with understanding may have been for the good of India, and thus of humanity. But they lacked understanding, they were caught in the softer phraseology and idiom of the West, and did not get an inkling of the West's hard core, a core which had lasted for over two thousand years, and had acquired great sophistication during that period.

Coming as he did from late 19th century Bengal, and nurtured and educated in urban Bengal's environment, it was natural that Vivekananda was often unable to link the strength and generosity of the ordinary people with their potential capacities. Not that he did not meet with great generosity in different parts of India from even the poorest Indian. Many such incidents in Rajasthan, in South India, etc., are graphically described in the various biographies written on him. Fired with a sense

of great mission, and perhaps aware from an early age that he was not to live long, he naturally was in a great hurry. And so his conclusion that in India "no appreciation of merit can yet be found, no financial strength and what is most lamentable of all, not a bit of practicality." And this logically led to the belief that "our well-being is impossible without men and money coming from the West." If he had lived longer, say as long as Gandhiji lived, he perhaps would have realized that it is not only the educated and the prosperous to whom one has to address oneself. Given a certain sense of communion and an ability to communicate, in words or even in silence, with the poor and down-trodden, it was possible to generate courage, strength, practicality as well as resources, also from the deprived and down-trodden. Such communication with the deprived and the down-trodden as a consequence would have brought many of the educated and the prosperous to become participants in the new Yagna.

It was left to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi to take up this new task. Coming as he did from the rugged and more enterprising people of Kathiawad (Saurashtra) his links with the relatively uncorrupted past of his people were obviously stronger. Grounded in such past, he naturally, at his more confident youthful age, could see through the life of the West more clearly and with fewer blinkers. If he had decided to continue living in Britain, or taken to legal practice in Bombay, it is quite possible that even his judgement of the West would have got blurred as time passed. But life in white-dominated South Africa sharpened his previous impressions of the West and confirmed his earlier conclusions.

It is possible that this acquaintance with the West in England and then in South Africa also made him understand the real nature of the working of western authoritarianism, whether in one garb or another, and helped him to appreciate the plight and subjugation of the ordinary Western man of the late 19th century and early 20th century. It is such experience and reflection on it, as well as his long and close contact with the ordinary and poor Indians settled in South Africa, which helped him to forge the close links he had from about 1916 onwards, with the deprived and down-trodden in practically every nook and corner of this vast land of Bharatvarsha.

If I may say so, I have a feeling that the British rulers, from around 1909, or at least from 1918—when Gilbert Murray's article on Gandhiji appeared in the 'Hibbert Journal', had realised that this man had understood what made the west tick, and this understanding implied that, given the organisational interest and skill he had, he not only had the potential of a great Indian following, but also an international

appeal. His being acclaimed as the new Christ from New York in 1920-21, and the warm and applauding reception he had from the unemployed men and women workers of Lancashire's textile industry in 1931, seem to well illustrate this international appeal.

DESPITE the fact that Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1942, had wanted India to stay in the Western sphere of influence, or Clement Attlee, again in 1942, had thought that inspite of any exploitation etc., which Britain might have practised in India, the British on the whole could be proud of their moral mission in India, and despite the admiration of many Indians, including Jawaharlal Nehru, for British institutions and civilisation, it was still possible till about May 1946 for India to have opted for a wholly different path. During the Indo-British negotiations of April-June 1946, the British, at the highest level, had come out with a plan of wholly evacuating what they called 'Hindu India' (i.e., India south of the Vindhya, Rajasthan, most of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, etc.) and

*We see the West's soft phraseology;
we do not see its hard core*

leaving this 'Hindu India' to its own devices and moving British personnel and authority to the Muslim dominated areas of the Punjab, Sindh, etc., in the West, and to Muslim areas of Bengal in the east. But the plans became unnecessary because Indian nationalism felt too exhausted, and crumbled, and accepted the slightly amended British offer of eventual peaceful transfer. Of course, Indian nationalism, and perhaps even the British Viceroy in India, had no inkling of the emergency British plan which was prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee for the British Prime Minister and the British Cabinet Committee of India.

After the June 1946 compromise, or rather surrender, by the Congress, it was more or less smooth sailing in Indo-British relationship. Still Indian ideas and long-term objectives could, to an extent, have been salvaged if the British, through Louis Mountbatten or, at his suggestion, had not decided to rush the transfer of power. The plan seems to have been to take Indians unawares, more or less in the same way as Gandhiji had taken the British unawares during 1919 and thereafter, to sweep them off their feet, and leave them no time for reflection. Though earlier beaten by Gandhiji, the British knew the Indians well. They were well acquainted with the Indian slowness in matters where each moment counted, their inexperience of statecraft, their habit of opting for painless solutions, and their never refusing whatever was offered to them, even if the gift was of

no earthly use to them ever. Incidentally, that Louis Mountbatten was the man to sort out the Indian situation, was mentioned to the British Government by Lady Willingdon, with 15 years of Indian experience, as early as 1943. My own impression is that the role of Louis Mountbatten the last British pro-consul in India, is comparable to the role of Robert Clive, the first British Pro-Consul here. Both applied similar strategies and saw to it that the Indians had no time to deliberate or reflect on what needed to be done either in the 1750's or in the late 1940's.

THE QUESTION now is how do we get out of the present mess, how do we salvage whatever can be salvaged from our past, how do we undo the neglect and deliberate damage of the past 200 years, and what is the conceptual framework and value system on which our long-term future has to be grounded? A century ago this task would naturally have been easier, as a similar task must have been for Japan. Even in the 1940's, when a large section of our people were mobilized for a promising future, the task would have been less difficult. Today, with our extensive despondency, and far greater alienation and disorientation, the task is no longer so simple. Today it requires a far greater ingenuity along with prolonged perseverance.

Still, India today has certain advantages. Firstly, British oppression as well as the struggle against it are matters of history, and harping on them is no longer the preoccupation of most Indians. Secondly, the experience of the past 40 years and the compulsion to look after our own affairs, however badly they may have been looked after till now, has made us understand state-craft better, has relatively brought us down to earth, and to an extent made us more familiar with the ways of the world at large. We have also in the meanwhile produced and trained a fairly large number of young men and women in the various disciplines and professions whose competence is comparable to that of the best in other lands. A proportion of them are also questioning the usefulness of what they do with regard to India's present as well as future and raise basic issues about the applicability of the fundamental premises of the theories and practices of their know-how and its relevance to India's needs.

On the other hand, self-confidence, and the sense of national and personal dignity has yet to emerge in India. There is no doubt much personal ambition amongst a large number and also the capacity and tenacity to individually make good in the Western sense. There are others, and their number is not too small, whose dedication is to serve the nation, or the deprived, or some cause or the other, despite personal discomfort. Yet what all of us seem to lack is an overview, and a sense of discrimination. Even personal ambition, not to mention devotion to

the nation, the deprived etc. could have served far larger social as well as personal ends if we had achieved a sense of direction in terms of our complex totality and in relation to what would be feasible, given our situation and the present-day world context.

Three years ago we did begin to talk of salvaging our heritage by taking steps like the cleaning of the Ganga, or of helping 80% or more of our people in terms of fuel and fodder by undertaking a plan of annually bringing 50 lakh hectares of waste-land under fuel and fodder trees, or of starting educational institutions of excellence, at least one in each district of India. But like other older Indian resolves, like the creation of neighbourhood schools in every habitat of India, or the provision of clean drinking water to each and every family, or the eradication of deprivation and poverty, the new resolves seem to have met a similar fate.

It is possible that the present Prime Minister who publicly promised the quick implementation of the three programmes, really meant to carry out these plans. But instead, our rivers are drying up and being converted

Mountbatten's role was the same as that of Clive 200 years ago

into sewers, our forests are not only greatly denuded but the new ones are being mainly planted to produce wood, bamboos and pulp for industries like paper, etc., or even to supply foreign markets. There is little sign either of the schools of excellence where even the children of the deprived were to be admitted or any talk what-so-ever of the neighbourhood schools.

The only two things in which we seem to have had phenomenal rates of growth are, firstly, in the number of TV sets possessed by the elite, and not so elite, Indian families. Secondly, there is a similar increase in the amount of noise through the blaring of microphones and loud speakers in every nook and corner of India, the noise made by rickety motor transport or their terrible horns, the noise created at all hours of day and night by the aircrafts, or the indiscriminate multiplication of more and more noisy fire-crackers.

It is possible that all this has resulted from unthinking planning or the indifference or inability of governmental authority to provide proper direction in such matters. But it can be that what has happened is the result of deliberate decision as well as of neglect, so that the vocal as well as not-so-vocal people can be dulled into a state of somnolence, or into

utter helplessness, and thus allow a non-functioning crumbling state to keep postponing the necessary surgery to itself, a surgery which it has been in need of not only since 1947, but even during the later part of British rule.

We as a people of course are major culprits in allowing the continuation of such a state of affairs. But it is the prosperous areas of the world which are equally guilty by parting our leaders and governments, and by annually offering aid of thousands of crores for this and that, so that while the elite can have a relatively good time, they do not interact or establish any links with their people, and, India and its regions continue in a state of stagnancy and whatever new they produce is mostly not according to Indian choice and preference but for purposes which the aid-givers basically determine.

WE HAVE SOME major tasks. Firstly, we have been split into two societies which, except that they live on the same land, have little else in common. The split is not recent; in northern India it may date back to the days of Mughal dominance. But it is far more pronounced today. The two societies seem now to live in almost separate worlds and seem to share almost nothing in common. If we are not aiming at a society of a small number of citizens dominating a far larger number of slaves, as in ancient Greece, or of serfs as in pre-modern Europe, or of whatever such subjugated persons may be called in countries of today's South America, we have to take steps to bridge this gap fast. The only way in which the task of bridging can be begun effectively is to have the two societies share the same common facilities in the field of school education, health services, water and energy supply, sanitation, and cultural activities and sports. This may initially imply a lowering of standards, or a decline in sophistication. Well, that has to be tolerated.

The present standards and sophistication of which we are so proud and cling to, are just a surface phenomena standing on a foundation of sand, without any roots or vitality. When the two societies have come nearer, have achieved communication and a meaningful dialogue, it is only then that standards of our choice can be created and sophistication will have a chance to be rooted in the Indian milieu. Sharing the standards of Mr. Ronald Reagan, or the President of Harvard University, or of Mr. Mikhail Gorbachov, or of the French and Scandinavian elite, or even of the relatively depressed British elite, can only bring ruin to India.

The same applies to the Indian ruling class craze for "foreign". It is not really a new craze; even in the 1920's and 1930's the elite Indians

used to go to Vienna etc. for eye operations and the like, to transport themselves at the slightest pretext to the medical centres of the USA or the USSR, or some other medically advanced lands. It is a disgraceful act not only for those who indulge in it, but also for the Indian medical system. No harm will come to India, or even to such persons if they decided to live with their various ailments, as is done by the majority of India's citizens.

Though one has to be careful in the expenditure of public resources, even to an extent in the spending of resources of one's own, the point that this practice of rushing abroad for medical or any such treatment must have a stop is to serve much larger Indian norms, and to prove one's commitment to things Indian. That even a peasant leader like the new Chief Minister of Haryana, lacks this sense, is indeed sad.

The comment of our Prime Minister that even if one crore rupees have been spent on his recently concluded ten-day international trip "the benefits from the trip are well beyond its cost, many hundred folds perhaps", is indeed comical. In the context of the pattern of other state

We all lack an overview, a sense of discrimination

expenditures, it does not matter very much that one crore is spent on his trip. But the assurance that this expense has to result in a many hundred fold multiplication is what is symptomatic of the decay and disorientation of the mind of the Indian ruling elite. That the qualification required of an Indian Prime Minister, or of a Chief Minister, is his begging capacity, should in fact disqualify any such persons from such elective offices.

THE PRIMARY CAUSE of the increasing distance in Indian society between the elite (around some two lakh families and certainly not more than $\frac{1}{4}\%$ of India's population) and the rest of the Indian people is the dependence, sought, and welcomed by us, on foreign resources and foreign models in practically every field. All this has to be abandoned; the sooner the better. This dependence has not only made the elite and the institutions they control wholly irresponsible and unaccountable, but much more it has begun to determine and shape the use of Indian internal resources themselves.

In 1780 Warren Hastings had said that the British military training and arms, given through one treaty or another, to an Indian Rajya would only make that Rajya and its army weaker and much less mobile, and not

a bit stronger, as was feared by his commander-in-chief. In the then Indian context it was a very sound judgement, and as the erosion in the circumstances and morale of India has mainly increased since then, this logic has even more validity today than it had at that time. The main culprit in this matter is the post-1947 Indian State and those who have been managing it at the highest level.

Those who are not directly associated with the state and pretend to distance themselves from it are, however, in a moral sense equally guilty. The voluntary bodies of practically all hues, the various dissident movements, whether inspired by liberation theology, or some other current world fashion or by Western feminism, intellectuals of all kinds, including those who now and then hop over abroad to collect funds and sympathy for this and that Indian calamity, real or imaginary, and even our countless religious sanyasins who glow amidst the admiration of their Western devotees, are no less guilty in this manner. In fact their guilt is far more serious, as their claim to stand for morality and principles and yet joining in this game of dependence, has given legitimacy to such acts of the elite and governing structure.

The vitiated atmosphere this dependence has produced, has affected even the serious efforts of those who feel committed to indigenous excellence. Even our illustrious Sthapatis seem to have become its prey. Instead of paying attention to the question that all new structures which are now being built in India, especially India's vastly increasing temples and other places of culture and learning, are basically founded on Indian concepts of design, beauty and the use of Indian materials, their obsession with mere excellence has made them abandon or forget this primary task.

MANY STEPS have to be taken to enable us to pass over from the disoriented present into a future when the disorientation has disappeared and society as such has achieved a certain coherence. The steps to bridge this interim period have to be in the political, social as well as the technological fields.

While a small section of our people have been operating according to the modern western idiom in most public functioning, the majority still function, to the extent that circumstances allow them, according to their old idiom, technological skills and social norms. As the westernised few control most of the resources, the skills and tools of the majority are in a ramshackle and blunted state.

Yet we know that within the present arrangement neither the westernised nor the majority have the opportunity or the possibility of doing

anything which can take us out of the present stalemate. The two unwittingly seem to be engaged in a game where one cancels out what the other attempts. The best course would be to separate the two in some ingenious manner where the talents of both have the opportunity to find unobstructed expression and some of what they do has the possibility of opening new avenues in various spheres.

The best will be that centralised authority in Delhi as well as in the states of India withdraws most of its functioning from the localities, allows the localities to organise their life as they will, within a broad civilizational frame, and which enables the centralised authority to shed most of its unnecessary load and enables it to perform the tasks which it alone can perform. This problem of course needs much reflection and working out and solutions may vary from area to area.

The other is to somehow enable the talents of the ordinary men and women to help in the building of the New India. Today our professionals are drawn from hardly 2% of our population. Steps need to be taken

Elphinstone had noted Rama Mohan Roy's Feringheeness

when this base of professional recruitment could be broadened at least 30-40 times and in due course to 100% of India's people. It is only then that we will acquire the necessary innovative skills not only in matters of science and technology, in health care, in sanitary arrangements, in more efficient and worthwhile use of resources, but also in the field of social and political organisation. An India in which all of its citizens, men as well as women, are unable to participate in the running of its public and social life will always be a weak and unhappy India and a prey to alien power or ideology. The creation of a New India implies the end to such an unhappy state, and I presume that, despite our varied differences, that is what we all aspire for.

ALL THAT has been done in India in the last 40 years needs comprehensive review. The review of education by the Government of India can in fact serve as a model for all reviews which are undertaken. The reviews should relate both to internal areas of activity as well as of our relations with the world at large.

In the internal sphere, the reviews should deal with all aspects of agriculture, irrigation plans (including big dams, etc.), the field of animal husbandry, horticulture, forests, (including the controversial social forces-

try), the production of various types of energy and the uses to which such energy is put, the problem of soil erosion and its causes and the steps that have been taken regarding it, the major causes of water scarcity over vast areas of India and the increasing drought conditions, the state of our textiles, steel and other consumer goods, and processed food product industries (produced according to indigenous technology as well as according to the modern western), our medicare and health services, the sanitation system, the municipal services of our cities, towns and rural habitats, the design, aesthetics, and utility of our houses and public buildings, the state and usefulness of our public transport (road, rail or air) and the state of our physical and cultural environment.

All new programmes, especially in terms of new construction or purchase of expensive equipment, need to be suspended till such reviews are complete and the nation has considered them and arrived at specific conclusions with regard to each review. Organisation and working of the law and order machinery, the judicial system from the Tehsil court to the Supreme Court, and of our defence systems have also to be reviewed similarly. That a state system which employs over one crore people, excluding lakhs of those treated as casual labour, serves such little purpose, and is of no earthly use to the vast majority of Indians, should shake us out of our lethargy and complacency.

Similar review has to be undertaken of our relations with the world at large, of our relative indifference to people in countries with whom we have long and historically shared close civilizational and economic links, and how best we can get re-oriented in our relations with other people and areas both nearer to us, as well as distant. Blind imitation, and the sort of links we have had till now, have rather separated us from the community of nations instead of taking us nearer them. And our influence on them has been minimal.

WE MUST ALSO apply our minds to the longer term problems of the restructuring of the future India—say an India which would have completely come into its own by the year 2020, and would by then be based on deep and sound foundations. For that we have to acquire a thorough understanding of our past, whether it is reflected through myths or through historically verifiable facts, and equally acquire an adequate comprehension, from an Indian perspective, of other civilizations of the world. We have not only to adequately comprehend the modern world, i.e., the world of the past 300-400 years, but even more we have to have an understanding of its sources by getting to the roots of what Plato, Aristotle, Moses, Confucius, Lao-tse meant, or the assumptions of Hebrew civilization which form the basis of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and of the more ancient civilizations and people of Africa and the Americas.

It is perhaps the ancient world view of the people of Africa and the Americas, and of those of East and South East Asia which is more akin to our own and has an immediate relevance to the problems of the violent world created since about the time of Columbus and Vasco da Gama.

Such an effort would provide us appropriate values (which to some degree may be somewhat different from the ancient values of India), theories, frameworks, etc., and help us structure a more lasting polity, and its various appurtenances, like aesthetics, science and technology, production methods and new economic arrangements.

For this, besides spirit/willingness, and intellect we need various other tools. For knowing our past alone we need to gather all our inscriptions and epigraphical, manuscript and other material on our heritage in suitable places of scholarship, and decipher, classify and take steps to make all such materials available for study and reflection. A high Delhi authority estimates our stock of manuscripts at one crore to thirty crores. The manuscripts which are so far known, and are scattered over the world, are said to be listed in over 500 catalogues. We do not yet even

There are over one crore manuscripts waiting to be listed and read

know the total number so listed and are awaiting the arrival of appropriate computers when the number of manuscripts listed in these catalogues will be provided. It is understood, however, that this number will be somewhere between 5-10 lakhs.

It is quite probable that when we actually look at each of these listed manuscripts perhaps half of them may no longer be in any state that any one could decipher anything substantial from them. That we have such manuscript wealth, even that it may number 30 crores, has been off and on talked of, for many many years. And that with all the resources and talent Delhi has, it does not even yet know the number or condition of the insignificantly small proportion which has been listed in the catalogues is indicative of either indifference or of Delhi's utter uselessness to India and India's current or civilisational needs.

But despite such indifference, neglect and waste we have to begin doing something now. This task cannot be performed by Delhi alone. It has to become the responsibility of duly constituted qualified, well endowed, and appropriate institutions in the various linguistic and cultural regions of India, one institution for each region. These institutions should

serve as depositories of all manuscripts wealth of the region, or of copies or microfilms of what is not obtainable in the original. In the same places we must also create centres of inscriptional and epigraphical material, as well as libraries which contain every printed and published item of the particular region, and the more important material in Sanskrit, or any other Indian or foreign language material regarding India's past and civilization. Such libraries should also have a selection of the more serious material on the world at large, particularly that which helps us to understand how other areas and civilizations tick. A country as vast as India does certainly require 10-20 such places like the British Library, or the Bodleian in Oxford, or the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris, or the Library of Congress in the USA, or similar repositories in Japan, China, USSR, Germany, Rome, etc.

Besides epigraphical, manuscript and printed resources we need to pay attention to our ancient artefacts, the multiple tools and designs of our civilization. For this we need museums of such artefacts in every district of India which can also serve as places which help in acquainting the people of the locality, including the school and other students, with their heritage, and how we functioned in the past. The museums will also have to have suitable charts to explain matters, and display samples of the productions of these artefacts. Besides, of course, we need to recognise and strengthen our existing regional and national museums, discard a large part of the 17th, 18th, 19th century European knick-knacks which clutter some of them, and if need be create a few special well planned museums pertaining to the artefacts of other civilisations.

EDUCATION IN INDIA has to be structured anew. What we have inherited from the British needs to be scrapped, at least as a system, altogether. Education during the first 6-8 years must be the concern of the neighbourhood schools, except for such few children who have to be given well-defined special education for one professional specialization or the other in residential institutions. The content of what is taught at every level has to have a review and wholly new text books, relevant to each and every linguistic or cultural area, must replace the text books which are used today.

Most education, at least till we have fully come into our own, should terminate by the age of 16 or 18, after which it is only vocational or professional training which must be the rule. The present universities or colleges, in which the failure rate at B.A. and B.Sc. level is 50% and even many of those who pass are said to do so through questionable means, have really no imaginable role in today's India. It is not that the academics in them or their other supporting staff, have to become unemployed. They can all be absorbed in other more useful tasks in various fields of Indian endeavour.

The current medical system must also be reorganised similarly. If the state wishes to have a major role in looking after the medical needs of its citizens, we have to go for something like the post-1945 British National Health Service Plan. All medical practitioners must be absorbed in such a plan, and the expense of both treatment and medicine must be wholly borne by the State. The grandiose, of course, must go, and in a reasonable period of one or two decades, Indian medical practice must more and more rely on indigenous theory methods, and medicinal raw-materials. Kidney replacement or by-pass heart surgery are not the urgent need of India, and for most of such ailments, there must be old Indian cures in the Siddha, the Ayurvedic, or the folk systems, which only need to be resurrected through appropriate research in ancient methods.

Our water supply systems, the sanitation systems, the plumbing in houses, the other western gadgetry are in the context of our resources, as well as our physical environment, at vast waste. The same is true even of the few more aesthetically and lavishly built five-star type of buildings.

Real India is asserting itself by claiming old temples and building new ones

We certainly do not require them, and most of the foreigners who visit us have no use for them either. If there are a few foreigners, like heads of foreign states etc., they could have been accommodated in places like the Viceregal palace (now called Rashtrapati Bhavan), the innumerable governors' houses, etc.

One of these Governor's houses built in the Himalaya occupies over 200 acres of scarce and precious Himalayan land, and the house itself, built in the style of a major British manor, about 100 years ago, has around 300 rooms, counting the large bathrooms and the separate covered and partitioned verandahs. In the last 40 years, its annual occupation does not seem to have averaged more than 2-3 weeks. The sooner such buildings, including the five-star types, and the circuit houses, etc., get demolished, or are put to some more plebeian uses, for tying cattle, or using them as weaving sheds, etc., the better for our social health. It is distasteful that we are planning to construct yet another such building as a National Centre for Arts, in the name of Shrimati Indira Gandhi. If the arts did require a place in Delhi, the British Viceroy's house was the obvious place for them.

THE REGAINING of freedom, as we well know, has given rise to many dormant issues and conflicts in our society. It has also brought forth the

manifestation of a variety of individual and social observances which we had assumed were gone for ever. That we were wrong in such assumptions should now be clear. That freedom, or the relaxation of long imposed control, leads to the gradual relaxation and flowering of the body as well as the mind, has been long known to the wise, not only in India, but also elsewhere. The assertion of Welsh and Scottish cultural nationalism in Britain, of the French language culture in Canada, the assertions of the various linguistic and cultural regions even in the USSR, and the more recent assertion of the residual indigenous Americans and the Blacks in the USA should have made us understand that the relaxation in control and oppression results in the re-manifestation of suppressed emotions and practices. As the suppression was far greater and prolonged in northern India, such reassertion has also been more pronounced there.

One manifestation of this re-assertion has been the demand for the restoration of the honour and sanctity of the ancient sacred places, and the rebuilding of temples and other structures destroyed or decayed during the period of foreign dominance. Unless freedom is to be snatched away again there is no stopping of such re-assertion. The only thing that could be tried is that it happens in as reasonable and painless a manner as possible and that most of those who have somehow become worshippers of the *status quo* are helped to appreciate the social necessity of the restoration of such honour and sense of sanctity.

It is possible that percolating of the sense of freedom amongst the peasantry and other rural folk may also in time lead to the rejection of most of the hideous and oppressive structures built by the British. Well, there is no way of ignoring such demands, and the India Gates, etc., may be the first casualty when such demands arise. The need is that we the elite give up our rigid and frozen postures, achieve some appreciation of social urges, and get prepared for change. The change, of which we have been such loud vocal worshippers, when it comes will have its own logic and not be governed by our preconceived notions of it. □

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
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