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“उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।”

“Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.”

SIVA'S DANCE

BY R. B. PINGLAY

The grey entwined locks fiercely fly,
The double-drum din its maddening sound ;
The martial horn blows its terrible tone,
The agile feet of Lord dance to a rhythm.
This is Siva's Dance.

The adorning terrified snakes drift on
Like billows on the impatient deep ;
They whiz and whiz and crave for rest,
While the feet of Lord dance to a rhythm.
This is Siva's Dance.

The skull garland restlessly rolls
O'er the ruddy breast of the Lord ;
The Trident darts up and down,
Now north and south, now east and west.
This is Siva's Dance.

Moon is enveloped in fear great,
And Ganga hides in His wild locks ;
The unwearied feet tread, endlessly, hard
The soft bosom of the Mother Earth.
This is Siva's Dance.

FROM SUFFERING TO FULFILMENT

BY THE EDITOR

I

History of human thought shows no epoch that does not possess a peculiar philosophy of its own, and no system that does not bear the impress of the age in which it has been born. Rare indeed is that speculation, philosophical or other, that succeeds in getting over the environs of its age, and far more rare is the genius that plunges into the depths of the Eternal and delivers unto humanity an inspiring message of spiritual fulfilment and redemption. The trammels of intellect, hard and rigid as they are, pinion to no small extent the soaring wings of human imagination and thus prevent its flight into the bosom of the Infinite. The verdict of intellect, it should be remembered, is not the absolute reality or the final word to the supreme spiritual possession of man. The tendency to neglect the perceptual basis is the besetting temptation of an intellectual temper, and it oftener than not sunders the world into units of Self and not-Self,—ushering in a metaphysical and moral dualism, an antagonism between body and soul and a consequent separation between man and God. Intellect, as it is, can hardly rise to an integral experience of the wholeness of human personality as also to a vision of the fundamental at-one-ment of the individual with the universe, where there is a complete levelling of all artificial distinctions created by intellect,—a happy synthesis of matter and Spirit, of the Eagle and the Cross. A blind deification of reason to the negation of the spiritual content of life and consequent accent of importance laid on the material values of

earthly existence has of late been the dominant characteristic of Occidental philosophy—a feature that has served only to intensify the crustacean isolation of the generality of men from the living waters of spiritual life. Some great minds have already risen in revolt against such barren intellectualism that has robbed human life of its grace and beauty and served only to occasion painful tragedies in the affairs of mankind. Among these philosophical thinkers may be mentioned the name of Count Hermann Keyserling whose latest production, *From Suffering to Fulfilment**, embodies a bold challenge to the rank materialism of the modern age and delivers an inspiring message of a nobler spiritual fulfilment of human life to the power-intoxicated people of the West.

II

The learned author has presented at the outset a very realistic picture of the spiritual decadence of the Modern West and indicated in bold and clear terms the growing spirit of revolt against the tendency of the age to compel the energies of man to move along the ruts other than the spiritual. “Western man,” writes the author, “is to-day, in his conceptual refinements and their practical application in programmes and institutions, as much a prisoner as the man of the Middle Ages was in his unreasoned faith based upon the emotional order.” The present spiritual decadence, in his

*FROM SUFFERING TO FULFILMENT: By Count Hermann Keyserling. Translated from French by Jane Marshall. Published by Selwyn & Blount, Paternoster House, Paternoster Row, London, E. C. 4. Demy 8vo. Pp. 308. Price sixteen shillings net.

opinion, has proceeded chiefly from the fact that Spirit for the last century and a half has enjoyed too much ease and comfort and that it has no longer had to struggle for life at all. But reality cannot be mocked with impunity. A false optimism, a sham altruism and idealism that was nothing but cowardice in disguise, acting in concert, could only make the tragedy of human life still more terrible than it had ever appeared before. It is no wonder therefore that the best minds amongst the revolutionaries of the twentieth century have stood upright in indignant protest against the forces of evil and are labouring to throw down the barriers and clear away the scaffoldings. The age of blind submission to traditionalism or sloppy sentimentalism is gone by. The old struggle for freedom, both intellectual and spiritual, is beginning over again. Unmistakable signs are discernible on the horizon of the West, that betoken the approaching dawn of a new era, great and deeply spiritualized, determined by sovereign personality,—the first era of the true reign of Spirit. "To-day, in the age of the great revolt of the earth-forces," writes the author, "the battle-ground, and the order of battle are no longer the same as in the eighteenth century : to-day the only man who asserts his freedom is he who holds out as a free man in the face of the collectivist and mechanist fatum, who declines to 'run away', but who also declines to die for any special idea—no particular dogmatic truth is at stake this time—who knows how to live like a free man in spite of all chains, all pressure, all gags, with which people try to shackle, suppress and stifle him, who by the life he lives not only affirms the substantiality of his Spirit, but also proves it. . . . It is the martyr alone, in the original sense of this word which means 'witness', who counts to-day as the

champion of freedom. And the polar character of every manifestation of life implies that this time it will not be the man who bawls his truth aloud, but he who radiates it in silence, who will, in the long run, in a changed world, restore the primacy of freedom." For, the voice of silence carries infinitely farther than the loudest shouting. And those that hold out and do not slavishly conform to what their conscience does not approve and have the strength to maintain, between the Spirit and the herd-mass, that tension till the final victory of the former, must enjoy the spontaneous homage of humanity. The author suggests that, for the realisation of this great end, all really free and independent men and women, purely conscious of their innate divinity, yielding to no outward pressure or suggestion, should band themselves into a fraternity; not as a party or a class, or a rigid organisation, or an order secular or monastic, but in the form of an outwardly loose and therefore inwardly all the more coherent community, united by one and the same consciousness of value and responsibility. This concerted action will usher in an integral culture resting on a total revelation,—a culture which would combine all the elements of human nature in a new and richer synthesis.

III

According to the author, the drama of the fate of the human race, at this critical point in its development, is going to be played out on the stage of the 'person'. Every individual life must be the centre of a new force and the nucleus of a creative evolution. The collectivist spirit with the concomitant regimentation of thought leaves very little room for deepening the spiritual life of man and integrating into his intrinsic personality all that is looked upon as external to his essential nature. His

innermost self being purely spiritual, all his experiences must relate to a synthesis of Spirit and matter. But "this Spirit, of which human personality is a crowning expression, is not Reason (Hegel), nor Matter (Büchner), nor Feeling (Goethe in his romantic stage), nor Will (Schopenhauer), nor the Ego (Fichte), nor Being (Parmenides), nor Becoming (Heraclitus), nor the Unconscious (Edouard de Hartmann and the modern psychologists), nor Economic Necessity (Marx), nor Politics (certain modern German thinkers)." It is the Self with which man ultimately identifies him,—the Self towards which he consciously or unconsciously aspires all his life and which, from the view of the individual who experiences, is an absolutely ultimate centre to which everything refers in the last resort. It is 'unique' and 'lonely', 'unconditioned' and 'incomparable'. What merely distinguishes one man from another is the empirical ego—the cluster of definite instincts and impulses—that brings about an artificial dichotomy in what is otherwise an indivisible whole. But the true Spirit is beyond and above all such earthly norms and polarities and imparts abiding value to all human possessions. The author therefore rightly observes, "Here it is the Hindus who have had the deepest comprehension of this truth . . . The Upanishad elevated the personal life of each man to the rank of a symbol of equal importance. It teaches us that 'it is not for the love of the husband that the husband is dear; it is for the love of the Self that the husband is dear.' " Indeed it is this Self which is to be realised as the pure and original initiative—the fountain of all joy and peace everlasting. It is, says the author, the Being-Knowledge-Blessedness (Sat-Chit-Ananda) of the Hindus, and the Love-Wisdom-Joy of the early Christians. It depends on the free choice of every indi-

vidual whether he should lose his personality so far as to degenerate to the level of the poorest and most insipid thing, or whether he should expand into a personality so rich that there no longer exists any not-Self which the Self has not incorporated and spiritualized.

IV

When we analyse human personality in its relation to the world as a whole, the primary phenomenon that is unsealed unto our eyes is that man by origin is composed of a multiplicity of strata—a bundle of latent and patent tendencies constituting his empirical self. There are obscure vital forces underlying these differentiated levels of being, which always tend to disturb the self-possession of man. But one should have to wrestle manfully against these dark forces if he desires to bring about an inner transformation. Needless to point out that this epic struggle calls up ever anew his deepest powers and steels them to clearness and ever stricter determination. Thus with the deepening of spiritual consciousness and the consequent transparency of pure Spirit, his empirical ego—the temporary personal centre of consciousness—loses its independence and ultimately becomes fused with the Spirit. Such an enlightened soul transcends all fear of death and becomes the enjoyer of true freedom and bliss immortal. Rightly does the author remark, "Fear and dread are original qualities of life as conditioned by Earth,—life which is perpetually threatened and is doomed to inevitable dissolution. But, on the other hand, it is only this earthly part of man which knows fear and dread. The more Spirit, whose essence is not of the earth, becomes determinant in man, the more fear gives way to courage, earthly heaviness to a playful lightness, and sadness to joy. For, nothing can threaten Spirit in it-

self; the idea of death looked at from the standpoint of Spirit is devoid of meaning, and earthly conflicts are for it not hindrances but means to the self-realisation of the Self." Thus in fact the aspirant rises, through relentless battle against Nature, to the vision of the Spirit which is the deepest ground of human personality. The intuition of the author has led him to lay particular emphasis on the realisation of this universal Spirit—the identity of the individual personality with the cosmic order, in a way that will make a direct appeal alike to Oriental and Occidental minds. He recognizes the intrinsic worth of an integral revelation which would not only unseal unto man everything that affects him from without, but which would also awaken the totality of his inner forces, so that hence forward in the grand fugue of his life, he may call into play the whole register both of the Self and of the universe together.

The author emphasizes that, to establish a harmony between the external world and the subjective order as also to attend to a synthetic understanding of the real significance of earthly existence, one must work under the banner of truth. The idea of truth is valid not only in the determination of the optimum relation between man and the external world, but also in the development of an inwardness of vision and steady penetration into the internal world. Human life is not a smooth sailing. Time and again life becomes an unbearable burden for the manifold ills it is heir to. In the buoyancy of youth one may, through his overmastering instincts and impulses, ignore the multiplicity of tribulations and miseries that dog him at every step. But to attain to the highest level of awakened consciousness and a simultaneous view of both the aspects of truth, one must not truckle to these adverse forces of life but

receive them as they come with good cheer and recognize their value as a stimulating means to the unfoldment of one's spiritual being. He must manfully bear the Cross to fight out the vital issues of life in the inmost depths of his own personality. Only a total awakening can deliver the captive human being from his suffering and create the equilibrium between the Self and the world which is in actual conformity with human nature at its deepest. The writer pertinently observes, "Integral experience of the world is possible only in that state of complete wakefulness which the Buddha sets before man as the goal of his aspiration after salvation . . . What kind of man the Buddha was has seldom been understood, at any rate in the West, because the majority of men are unconsciously inclined to understand any doctrine of suffering and of pity in the spirit of some sentimental demand. Now the Buddha was plainly free from all sentimentality. Indeed, when taught that life is suffering and that it was possible to do away with this suffering, he had not in view any sort of well-being in the earthly sense: he had in mind exclusively a total awakening and the path by which it might be achieved." The author suggests that it is not by shirking the dangers or responsibilities of life that real freedom from them is at all possible to achieve. A regulated life in the stimulating atmosphere of a church that enjoins upon every votary of truth the strict observance of its rites and rituals is preferable to any idle intellectual speculation or cowardly flight from the battlefield of spiritual life. He therefore recognizes the need of such an external discipline at the initial stage for the deliverance of Spirit from the shackles of matter. "The primacy which India recognizes in the psychic," says the author, "has, as its

logical consequence, the fact that the whole life of the Hindus who have not advanced beyond 'names and forms,' is a life of the strictest religious observance . . . The aim of this spiritual training is to help all instincts, all tendencies, all inclinations, to exert their full activity so as to avoid all suppression which might render them bad or ugly . . . It is finally to order the original chaotic complexity of the soul, not only in itself and for itself, but also to integrate it, in conformity with its true significance, by assigning to it its true place in the whole context of the individual's relations with the community, with the universe, and with God."

V

The author's conception of the church is as wide as humanity. He says that in religious experience within the bosom of the church, man is not alone,—he does not remain the captive of his narrowness; he is in communion with all those who, no matter at what epoch, have had the same experience; he is united to the whole of Christendom: to the apostles, the saints, to the brethren in Christ, to the living and the dead. In the church, in the spirit of union with a common centre, we feel the throb of a single common heart. Indeed when such a rhythm of spiritual union with the rest of humanity is realised, the real fulfilment comes and all watertight partitions between sacred and secular, Spirit and matter—between man and man, disappear once for all. He then reaches such a high level of comprehension that every phenomenon takes on a new and different significance. In the words of the author, "Protestantism which has been seen through will no longer be the old Protestantism. An orthodoxy which has become transparent will no longer be the old orthodoxy. A Catholicism seen

through will not be the old Catholicism. No partial view will any longer be falsely taken for an all-embracing view, every non-central position will be abandoned, every spiritual formation will be put in its astrologically exact position, and at the same time understood as the correct expression of the creative significance which animates it . . . Then the Catholic man would be understood as a synonym for the universal man, the man of humanity properly so called, and no longer as the champion of a limited profession of faith." It is in this way, he says, that Catholicism, Protestantism, orthodox religiosity,—Russian, Islamic, and Buddhist,—may, as comprehension of significance advances, remain in principle, on the plane of this life, what they were previously, and yet may nevertheless signify something absolutely new. It would simply bestow on them a fresh significance which would transfigure them.

Count Keyserling with his penetrating vision of possibilities foresees the birth of a future era when the blind guides (the exclusively Eagle-Men) will end by exterminating each other, or 'in a sudden psychic crisis they will collapse, for no one can long endure a one-sided emphasizing of the active pole of the vital equilibrium without ever withdrawing into himself again.' Time is not far when the unique individual will see opening out before him perspective such as the world has never known. To rise to this highest life needs a truthfulness which is proof against everything, a courage which knows no bounds, and an absolute loyalty to one's deepest Self. The ideal which the learned author has thus outlined in the book under review is one which every lover of truth and humanity should aspire to actualise in life, for without such a consummated spiritual experience no life can be said to have attained to real fulfilment. The

author's profound knowledge of human psychology, his breadth of outlook and intellectual sympathy with every form of religious thought, have pre-eminently fitted him for the responsible task of educating public opinion, especially that of the West at this crucial hour when the entire edifice of modern material culture stands on the brink of an immediate collapse. Though one may not fully agree with him in all the pronouncements he has made in this instructive volume, still the ideal he has held before mankind with the compelling earnestness and crystal sincerity of a

profoundly religious soul cannot but commend itself to all the real lovers of truth. This philosophical work, written with a mastery over detail and fluency of style, makes stimulating and delightful reading, and we have no doubt that it will help the readers to find out the real plague-spot in the modern life of the West and to get a glimpse of the actual anodyne needed to eradicate the evils from which humanity is suffering to-day. The book, in short, is a valuable contribution to the store of world's philosophical literature.

GOSPEL OF SRI RAMAKRISHNA

Sri Ramakrishna (to Isan): Do whatever is in your mind. You don't have any more doubts—have you?

Isan: I decided to do a kind of penance (*prâyashchitta*).

Sri Ramakrishna: Is that not possible in this path (the Tantrik way)? That which is Brahman is Sakti, Kâli. "Having known the secret that Kâli is Brahman I have given up all observances."

Isan: The hymn on Chandi says that Brahman Itself is the primal Sakti. Brahman and Sakti are non-different.

Sri Ramakrishna: It won't do merely to repeat it; it will be right only when you will realize it.

When the mind will be purified after Sâdhanâ (spiritual practice), you will truly feel that She is the doer; that mind, life and intellect are just Her forms. We are mere instruments. "Thou makest the elephant stick in the mire and the lame cross the mountain."

After the mind has been purified you will realize that She Herself is getting all

these expiatory rites etc., done. "She does Her own work, only man says, 'I do it'".

All doubts disappear on seeing Her; and there blows the favourable wind. The devotee is then freed of cares like the boatman, who sets the sail when the favourable wind blows, and just sits quietly holding the rudder, and smokes. . . .

Sri Ramakrishna: Worldly persons have always some desire or other. And they have fine devotion too. Sejo Babu once became involved in a litigation. One day he was saying to me in front of the image of Mother, "Do thou give this offering to Mother." I offered it in a broad spirit. But, how great was his faith that it would be fruitful if I would just offer it.

What a devotion Rati's mother had towards this¹! She would come often and do so much service! Rati's mother is a Vaishnavite. A few days later as soon as she found that I partook of the

¹ Sri Ramakrishna would often refer to himself in an impersonal manner.

food which had been offered to Mother Kali she stopped coming. She is one-sided. A person cannot be known at first sight. . . .

It was Wednesday morning, December 19, 1883. Sri Ramakrishna was talking to Mani.

Mani: Cannot both Knowledge and devotion be had?

Sri Ramakrishna: Only the most highly gifted ones can have both. The Iswarakotis like Chaitanyadeva have both. It is different with Jivakotis (ordinary mortals).

Light is of five kinds,—the light of a lamp, the light of other fires, the light of the moon, the light of the sun, and the light of the sun and the moon in the same locus. Devotion is the moon, and Knowledge the sun.

Sometimes the moon is seen to rise in the sky before the sun has set. The Incarnations of God are seen to possess

both the moon of devotion and the sun of Knowledge together.

Can everybody have Knowledge and devotion together for the mere wish? There are different vessels. Some bamboos have big hollows, and some very small ones. Is the comprehension of God possible by all vessels? Can a gallon-jar hold two gallons of milk?

Mani: Why, through His grace? A camel can pass through the eye of a needle through His grace—is that not so?

Sri Ramakrishna: But is grace without basis? If the beggar wants a pice it can be given. But suppose he asks for nothing short of the train fare!

Mani was standing in silence. Sri Ramakrishna too was keeping quiet. Suddenly he was saying, "Yes, that's true; through His grace it is possible for a few vessels; both are possible." . . .

SWAMI RAMA TIRTHA : AN APPRECIATION

BY REV. C. F. ANDREWS

[Very many years ago, I wrote for the Vishva-Bharati Quarterly an appreciation of one who was very near and dear to me in the Punjab, but whom I never saw or met. Spiritually, from the first moment I read his writings I felt a kinship and wrote a Preface to his collected works called 'In the Woods of Self-Realisation' when I was asked to do so by his devoted disciples.

In this number of the *Prabuddha Bharata*, I am asking the permission of the Editor to publish a new edition of this article which I have thoroughly revised, so that it may reach a further reading public. Of all the saints in the Punjab in the modern age, who owe their allegiance to the Advaita doctrine of Hinduism, Swami Rama Tirtha appears to me in many ways to come nearest to that intimate, mystical union which his faith implies.—C.F.A.]

The name of Swami Rama is one that I have learnt to honour through long residence in the Punjab, where his chief inspiration is still to be found. In the United Provinces, also, his influence has spread far and wide. Again and again,

I have seen faces light up at the mention of his name. Educated men and women in North India have told me how much they owed to him.

He came at a time when a deep unsettlement was disturbing the minds of

educated Indians with regard to religious truth; when the outer claims of the material world were becoming almost too absorbing. The training in the western sciences given in Indian Universities, divorced as it usually is from any religious culture, had frequently led to an indifference to religion altogether. After College days, the modern student's struggle for existence in the world had left little opportunity for the cultivation of the inner spirit. A concentration of the mind on worldly success had gathered round advanced education. The strain of being obliged to live at a more expensive standard was often itself the cause of the spiritual life being neglected, until it suffered from atrophy.

Into such an atmosphere of getting and spending and wasting all our powers Swami Rama's unworldly spirit came with a message that commanded attention by its very contrast. No one could be long in his presence without feeling that the highest happiness in life was to be found, not in the things of the body, but in the things of the soul. He seemed, from his earliest childhood, to have grown up instinctively with a realization of the spiritual realities. Every instinct in his nature pressed him forward to the devout, religious life. Many of those, with whom I have conversed about him, have told me of the innate spiritual power which he possessed,—a power which moved them profoundly whenever they met him personally and talked with him. His very presence was able to take their thoughts away from material things. He made them feel, if only for the moment, the reality of spiritual experience.

The published writings of Swami Rama Tirtha show clearly the inner secret of his great personal influence. There is a unique child-like simplicity in what he

writes, and an over-flowing joy and happiness, won through self-discipline and suffering. These qualities reveal a soul that is at peace within itself and has found a priceless treasure that it desires to impart to others. There is a striking personality behind his writings which makes itself felt in his language and mode of address. On every page we find a definite refusal to appeal to those lower motives that are ordinarily urged upon men as making for success in life, and a determination to find in the Soul itself, apart from all outward circumstances, the secret of all true and lasting joy and happiness.

The lectures that have been published have not had the revision of the author himself. He would have corrected the metrical form of some of his poems, which have clearly been put down on paper just as the inspiration to write came to him, without any laboured correction. But while there is certain loss to the reader on this account, there is also an advantage. For what is lost in correctness is gained in freshness. I cannot doubt that the friends of the author were right in tenderly and piously preserving every word of the manuscript before them. The readers will gladly make allowance for repetition and lack of finish, when the individuality of the Swami himself is brought so vividly before them. We feel the Swami himself present in his own words, and can almost picture him writing and speaking,—with a smile of happiness always on his face.

If I were asked to point out what I consider to be the special characteristics that mark out Swami Rama Tirtha's writings, I should mention first of all the point I have already emphasised, namely, the unworldliness that is everywhere apparent. Wealth, riches, luxuries, these are all laid aside without

a murmur. The Swami's own life had reached a calm haven, into which the stormy passions that are roused by the acquisition of wealth and worldly honours had never come. His inner life had been free from such things. He is such a child that he cannot even understand them. This child nature seems to come out in him as he speaks of them. He smiles at them with almost boyish amusement from his own retreat, or mocks at them with a gentle irony. His laughter appears most of all in his poems.

In the second place, I would mention his overflowing charity. He tries to win men, not to drive them; to make the best of them, not to blame them; to attract them, not to argue with them. The bitter and rancorous spirit is remarkably absent; and the tolerant spirit prevails. This is especially noticeable when he is dealing with religious beliefs other than his own. Here he is always courteous and sympathetic. He is the perfect gentleman in such matters.

Usually his one attempt is to absorb and assimilate all that he can approve in the religion of another; his one desire is to try to mould it into his own system of religious thought. In this respect, he shows the truly catholic spirit. For he has a very large share of that charity which 'thinketh no evil' and 'rejoiceth with the truth.'

The third feature that I should wish to notice in the life and writings of the Swami is his abounding joy. He was not in the least one of those gloomy ascetics, who seem to have left behind them all human happiness. He knew what physical hardship meant, in a way that few can have experienced. But this did not embitter him, or make his central message one of harshness. On the contrary, the very titles of his lectures are sufficient to give a picture

of the character of his own mind. "Happiness Within," "How to Make Your Homes Happy"—such are the subjects that appeal to him; and his heart goes out as he tries to make his joyous message clear. It is the record of his own experience, not that of another. He is full of happiness in himself, which he wishes to impart to the world; and he is never so joyous in spirit as when "Happiness" is his subject. It is this, also, which bubbles over in his poems, waking in others an echo of his own laughter. The outward setting of these poems, as I have already said, may often be crude, but the inner spirit is caught by the sympathetic reader beneath the imperfect vehicle of expression. The message of this gay spirit, this 'troubadour' of divine song, laughing at hardship and smiling at pain, is one that the world sorely needs.

This mention of his poems leads me on to one further feature which I would wish to mention. I do so with diffidence, as it is quite possible that others may take a different view to my own. But what I would venture to say is briefly this, that I find in Swami Rama Tirtha's *poetic* spirit, which lies beyond his own philosophy, the highest value of his written work. In this seems to lie its freshness, its originality, its contribution to the world of thought. His romantic love of Nature, strong in his life as in his death; his passion for sacrifice and renunciation; his eager thirst for reality and self-abandonment in search of truth; his joy and laughter in the victory he had won, are the true emblems of his inner poetic spirit. They go beyond the philosopher and reveal his true personality. It is the presence of these qualities which make him break out into song. To these qualities my own heart goes out most warmly in response. On these sides I

find by far the strongest attraction of the writer.

With the full philosophy of the Advaita Vedanta, as it is often stated in the writings of Swami Rama, I have not come to an agreement. Rightly or wrongly, it seems to me a short cut in trying to solve the problem of existence,—a solution which has overlooked certain persistent facts of human experience. I am always conscious of obstinate and irreducible elements in the equation of God, the Soul, and the Universe, which the Advaita system does not seem seriously to take into account. I would refer for an instance, in Swami Rama Tirtha's book, to the Chapter on the 'Prognosis and Diagnosis of Sin.' While containing some valuable thoughts, this Chapter appears to me to be unsatisfying in its conclusions, intended as they are to form a final answer to the problems of the origin of evil.

But, on the other hand, with the poetic spirit of Swami Rama where his thought is still in solution, and not crystallised into a formal logical system, I have a deep sympathy. Here I feel again on common ground; and my whole heart goes out to the young writer in his beautiful passages, on renunciation as the law of life eternal; or again in his vivid appreciation of beauty in nature; or again, to mention only one more instance, in his pure ideal of married life. The same sympathy rises within me as when I read some of the poetry of the Upanishads, or certain passages from that greatest of all Sanskrit poems, the Bhagavad Gita. There also the note is struck, which is heard many times in Swami Rama's writings, that only in the silence of the soul can the divine harmony of the Universe be heard.

The spirit of Wordsworth, among the English poets, appears to me very near

akin to the heart of Swami Rama Tirtha. In Swamiji's love of Nature, I can well imagine him, during his later days of wandering among the Himalayan mountains, echoing Wordsworth's great sonorous lines:—

I have learned
To look on Nature, not as in the
hour,
Of thoughtless youth; but hearing
often times
The still, sad music of humanity,
Not harsh nor grating, though of
ample power
To chasten and subdue. And I
have felt
A presence that disturbs me with
the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense
sublime
Of something far more deeply
interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of
setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the
living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind
of man.

I can imagine him also declaring himself an adherent of Wordsworth's own majestic creed:

Therefore am I still
A lover of the meadows and the
woods,
And mountains; and of all that we
behold
From the green earth; of all the
mighty world
Of eye and ear, both what they
half create,
And what perceive.

I have not been afraid to quote this famous passage almost at full length, even though it is so well known to every lover of English literature, and so very often quoted. For it is, I believe, the *poetry* of the West, rather than its philosophy,—especially the

poetry of that wonderful 'Revolution Period' in English Literature,—which comes nearest to India's heart.

In the same way, I venture to believe, it will be the poets of Modern India, as they seek to bring their spiritual instinct of the past into living touch with the new movements of the age, who will come nearest to the heart of the West. Amongst these poets of modern India, I would reckon that remarkable company of religious leaders, who have appeared in different parts of the country, during the last century, among whom Swami Rama's tender spirit showed such early promise of fulfilment.

In this approximation between India and the West, there will remain much that the West is not likely in the end to adopt. But there will be much on the other hand, that will throw light on cherished and familiar religious truths, giving them a new setting.

I cannot refrain, in this connexion, from quoting a passage from Swami Rama's lectures, which may illustrate my meaning :

"In the Lord's Prayer," he writes, "we say, 'Give us this day our daily bread,' and in another place we say, 'Man shall not live by bread alone.' Reconcile these statements; understand them thoroughly. The meaning of that Lord's Prayer, when it was stated, 'Give us this day our daily bread,' is not that you should be craving, willing and wishing: not at all. This is not the meaning. The meaning is that even a king, an emperor, who is in no danger of not having his daily bread, even a prince, who is sure that his daily bread is guaranteed to him,—even he is to offer that prayer. If so, evidently, 'Give us this day our daily bread' does not mean that they should put themselves in the begging mood; that they should ask for material pros-

perity; it does not mean that. That prayer means that every body, let him be a prince, a king, a monk, anybody, is to look upon all these things around him, all the wealth and plenty, all the riches, all the beautiful and attractive objects, as not his, as not belonging to him, but as God's,—not mine, not mine, but God's. That does not mean begging, but renouncing: giving up: renouncing unto God. You know how unreasonable it is, on the part of a king, to offer that prayer, 'Give us this day our daily bread,' if it be taken in its ordinary sense. How unreasonable! But it becomes reasonable enough, when the king, while he is offering that prayer puts himself into the mood, where all the jewels in his treasury, all the riches in his house, the house itself,—all these he renounces, as it were, he gives them up, he disclaims them. He breaks connection with them, so to say; and he stands apart from them. He is the monk of monks. He says, 'This is God's: this table, everything lying upon the table, is His, not mine; I do not possess anything. Anything that comes to me, comes from my Beloved One.' "

Such a passage as this gives, on the one hand, an example of Swami Rama's style, so simple, so direct, so careless with regard to repetition, if only the meaning can be made clear; and, on the other hand, it explains, what I have called the approximation of two different streams of human thought, issuing from two different springs. These, in their conjunction, should do very much indeed to fertilize the soil in which man's life is sown.

Eastern and Western conceptions of spiritual life are flowing forward to-day, like two great rivers which come from different sources. We need the poet thinkers, both in the West and in the East, who may be able to cut new

channels from one river of human experience to another. In this way, the soil of human life will be enriched, and its fertile area enlarged.

Among the different intersecting channels of new thought, which are being cut, three appear to me to be of special significance:

(1) There is the approach made by the West towards the East, in what Tennyson has called 'the Higher Pantheism.'

The sun, the moon, the stars,
the seas, the hills and plains,
Are not these, O Soul, the Vision of
Him who reigns?
Is not the Vision He? Though He
be not that which he seems,
Dreams are true while they last;
and do not we live in dreams?

As we read many passages in modern English poetry, we feel as though we were back in the Upanishads, repeating Indian thoughts uttered long centuries ago.

(2) Along with this conception of an all-pervading Divine Nature, there has developed in the West, even more clearly and distinctly in modern times, the conception of an eternally persisting personality.

Dark is the world to thee? Thyself
art the reason why:

For is He not all but that, which
has power to say 'I am I?'

But in its negative aspect, the loss of personal identity, or complete absorption, as the final end of the soul, is a conception which the poets of the West have never willingly accepted. This forms one of the main themes of 'In Memoriam.' I would quote the following lines:

That each, who seems a separate whole,
Should move his rounds, and fusing all
The skirts of self again, should fall,
Remerging in the general soul,
Is faith as vague as all unsweet.

Eternal Form shall still divide
The eternal soul from all besides,
And I shall know him when we meet.

So the poet sings of his dead friend, and again in more passionate accents at the close:

Dear friend, far off, my lost desire
So far, so near, in woe and weal,
O loved the most, when most I feel
There is a lower and a higher:
Known and unknown: human, divine:
Sweet human hand, and lips, and eye:
Dear human friend, that cannot die,
Mine, mine, for ever, ever mine.

Thus the modern West to-day expresses the conviction, which for century after century it has cherished, that love is eternal; and that each individual soul has an eternal, individual existence through the medium of Love.

Love is and was my king and Lord,
And will be, though as yet I keep
Within his court on earth, and sleep
Encompassed by his faithful guard,
And hear at times a sentinel,

Who moves about from place to place,
And whispers to the worlds of space,
In the deep night, that all is well.

It is again this central conviction of the eternity and ultimate reality of Love, involving both personal union and personal distinction between subject and object, that forms the burden of the poetry of Browning, the most virile and forceful of modern English Poets:

For Life, with all its yield of joy
and woe,
And hope and fear,—believe the
aged friend—
Is just our chance o' the prize of
learning Love,
How Love might be, hath been
indeed, and is.

There is a certain real danger in this emphasis on personality in the West, in its individual forms, even when thus closely associated with the highest ideal of Love. For Love itself may become

too individual and possessive. It may lead to a subtle self-assertion and to an individualism of a selfish type. But one thing is certain, the West will never accept as finally satisfying any philosophy, which does not allow it to hold the faith that love between human souls may be an eternal reality.

(3) There is a remarkable approach made from the side of the East in what both Swami Vivekananda and Swami Rama Tirtha have made familiar by the name of 'Practical Vedanta'—the approximation of the modern Vedanta to Christian philanthropy in its social and national applications. Here again, the approach may well have its limits, and the social and national development of the East may differ both in kind and in degree from that of Europe, with its own religious discipline of nearly two thousand years.

I do not wish it to be understood that this religious contact between East and West is always conscious and deliberate. On the contrary, from both sides, it

appears still to be almost unconscious,—a mingling of two atmospheres rather than the conscious acceptance of any new definitions. Many would repudiate the idea that any approximation as yet existed. But those who look beneath the surface, and have watched the trend of thought, both in the East and in the West, tell us clearly that an intermingling is actually taking place, not from one side only, but with mutual advantage.

It is because Swami Rama Tirtha was so singularly fitted to make some of these advances, that I regard his published works, and the tradition he has left behind, to be of true historic value. Therefore I would wish to do all in my power to keep his memory fresh and green. Such a saintly personality should be an inspiration both to those of the older generation who knew and loved him, and also to the younger student life of India, which has grown up since he passed away.

CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM IN THE BHAGAVAD-GITA

BY PROF. S. K. MAITRA, M.A., PH.D.

The conception of human freedom plays so important a part in Western philosophy that we are naturally tempted to inquire what its place is in the Bhagavad-Gita. But before we can deal with this question it is necessary to ascertain what human freedom means.

J. H. Hyslop, in a very comprehensive chapter in his *Elements of Ethics* on the Freedom of the Will, has given us three different meanings of freedom, namely, (a) spontaneity, (b) exemption from external control, and (c) velleity or the power of choosing between alternatives. His own view is that although

historically, freedom has one or other of these three meanings, yet properly speaking, freedom means velleity or the power of making alternative choice. The most essential thing in freedom, according to him, is that at the time of performing an action it should be equally open to one to adopt one or other of the possible alternatives that present themselves.

We believe that exhaustive as Hyslop's treatment of the problem of freedom is, he has failed to give sufficient importance to the distinction between two fundamentally different

ways of looking at the problem of freedom. We may look at the problem, for example, from the point of view of our personality as a whole, or we may view it from the more restricted standpoint of the will. We may, that is to say, ask either the question: Are human beings free? or the more limited question: Is the human will free? Failure to recognize this broad division of the main types of freedom leads to great confusion, and this is one of the reasons why some modern ethical writers do not consider the problem of freedom of any ethical importance.

If we examine carefully, in the light of this broad division of the meanings of freedom, the threefold meaning of freedom given by Hyslop, we find that the first two meanings of freedom relate to freedom of the Self or of our personality, while the third relates exclusively to freedom of the will.

Historically, rationalists have in general accepted the first view of freedom, as stated by us, whereas the empiricists and intuitionists have, on the whole, favoured the second view. Rationalists, like Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and the English neo-Hegelians take freedom to mean freedom of the Self, whilst empiricists, like Hume and Mill, and intuitionists, like Martineau, lean to the other view of freedom. For the rationalist the essential problem is whether our Self is free, or as Kant puts it, whether we are autonomous beings. For the empiricist or the intuitionist, on the other hand, the problem of freedom is the problem whether there is freedom of choice between alternative possibilities.

Let us first examine the rationalist view of freedom, as put forward by the greatest exponent of it, namely, Kant. According to Kant, the fundamental fact of morality is that we are not a part of the system of natural causes. We are

free causes, that is to say, we are not subject to the causation of anything other than ourselves. This is the great fact which distinguishes human beings from events in the natural world. In the natural world there are no free causes; all causes are necessary causes, being determined by something other than themselves. Human beings, as moral beings, have this great privilege that they are free causes. As free causes, they enjoy *autonomy* or the power of legislating for themselves. Natural events, on the other hand, exhibit *heteronomy* or the rule by something external. On this fundamental distinction Kant bases the whole of his ethical philosophy.

Let us see what consequences follow from this view. Because human beings are autonomous, they are ends in themselves, and not merely means to something else. The moral principle, therefore, may be stated in the following form: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in the person of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only. This view further leads to the conception of a kingdom of ends or a union of self-legislative beings, which is Kant's conception of ideal society.

Kant believes that to be governed by the principle of pleasure is heteronomy and not autonomy. This shows the fundamental weakness of hedonism in the eyes of Kant. He defines heteronomy as follows: "If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently, if it goes out of itself and seeks the law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy" (*Metaphysics of Morals*, Vide Abbott's *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 59).

Heteronomy, therefore, according to

Kant, means rule by any principle other than the pure law of Reason, or the conception of duty for duty's sake. The distinction, however, between autonomy and heteronomy changes somewhat the character of the conception of freedom as originally put forward by Kant. His original conception of freedom was that of being determined by oneself, as opposed to being determined by others. In the new conception of freedom as it emerges from the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, the contrast is not between determination by oneself and determination by other-than-oneself, but between determination by the pure law of Reason and determination either by feeling or by understanding and reason, 'the employment of which is, by the peculiar constitution of their nature, attended with satisfaction.' In both the latter cases, the determination, Kant says, is 'by a foreign impulse by means of a particular natural constitution of the subject adapted to receive it.' Taking the first type of heteronomy, the rule of feelings and inclinations, the contrast between it and the rule of Reason or autonomy is quite glaring. But this contrast is the contrast between two principles working within us, not the contrast between ourselves and something other than ourselves. So the original distinction between determination by oneself and determination by other-than-oneself is reduced to a distinction between two principles working within us.

This is a matter of considerable importance, for here we have the connecting link between the Kantian conception of freedom and that of the older rationalists (like Plato and Spinoza). The earlier rationalists conceived freedom in the sense of freedom from the bondage of the senses. Plato in his *Phædo* makes it very clear that deliverance from the bondage of the body, that

is, everything that is sensuous and material, is the true freedom, and that consequently, the philosopher, far from fearing death, rather welcomes it. He also says that philosophy gives the true knowledge which frees a man from the captivity of the body.

Spinoza also conceives freedom in the same way. In the demonstration of Prop. 57 of the Fourth Part of his *Ethics*, he says, "A free man, that is to say, a man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone, is not led by the fear of death. . ." In his demonstration of the next Proposition, he further says, "I have said that that man is free who is led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is born free and remains free has no other than adequate ideas, and therefore, has no conception of evil, and consequently, no conception of good." It is clear, therefore, that for Spinoza freedom and rationality mean the same thing. Negatively, bondage is described by Spinoza as subjection to emotions. "The impotence of man," he says, "to govern or restrain the affects I call bondage, for a man who is under this control is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse, although he sees the better before him" (*Ethics*, Part IV., Preface).

Among the neo-Hegelians, perhaps the most important is Thomas Hill Green. Green starts with the Kantian distinction between 'free causes' and natural causes. The question of freedom, therefore, with him is the question of the origin of motives. If motives are of natural origin, then there cannot be any freedom. He therefore examines the nature of the motive and finds that it is non-natural, being nothing else than the "idea of an end which a self-conscious subject presents to itself and

which it strives and tends to realize.”¹ The motive, in fact, is nothing but the expression of a man’s self or character. It is this which determines a man’s action, and that is why man is free. Green thus sticks to Kant’s conception of freedom as determination by the Self but he enormously extends the scope of the Self by relating it to the Absolute Self or the Eternal Consciousness, as he chooses to call it. This is, in fact, his originality—the beautiful way in which he combines the standpoint of Kant with that of Hegel. As a result of this, Green passes from the standpoint of Law to that of End. Morality, for him, is not mere conformity to a barren law, but it is the realization of an end, the end being nothing else than the complete fulfilment of the Self, which ultimately means the realization of the Absolute Self.

One thing should be noticed here, and that is, that the second conception of freedom of Kant, namely, that of rational freedom, does not find any place in Green. Self-determination, he is careful to point out, does not necessarily mean determination by Reason, for the Self which determines may be a Self which is just above the level of a brute. Every free action, that is to say, every action to which moral predicates can be attached, is a self-determined action, but that does not necessarily mean that it is a rational action, for there are Selves and Selves. Some Selves may show a high degree of rationality; others may be hopelessly irrational. Later idealistic thinkers, as for example, Mackenzie, try to make a compromise between Green’s position and that of Kant by saying that although freedom means nothing more

than self-determination, yet the highest freedom is rational freedom.²

We have not so far dealt with the views of the intuitionists. Martineau may be taken as a very good representative of them. Martineau thinks that freedom means (a) that there must be a plurality of simultaneous alternatives, and (b) that they must be possibilities to the man to whom they present themselves. This second condition Martineau further explains as follows:—“It must depend upon us in relation to them (alternatives) and not upon them in relation to each other, which of them we follow. It is said, ‘Yes, it depends upon ourselves,’ but what do I mean by ‘myself’? Simply *my character as it is*, made up by inheritance, temperament, experience, formed habit and self-discipline: of this aggregate from the past, with the outward motives from the present, every decision must be the result; and if the second factor is treated as the thing *given*, then the casting vote is vested with the other; and it is the *character*, i.e., the *self*, which decides. Now I do not deny that the Self which chooses includes all these things. . . But I cannot allow that *these exhaust the Ego*, and give a complete account of all its actual and possible phenomena. Besides the effects of which I am the accumulation, I claim also a *personal* causality which is still left over, when my phenomena have told me the tale of what they are and do. . . When I judge my own act, I feel sure that *it is mine*; and that, not in the sense that its necessitating antecedents were in my character, so that nothing could prevent its coming; but in the sense that I might have betaken myself to a different act at the critical

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Fifth Edition, p. 100.

² Vide Mackenzie: *Manual of Ethics*, 6th ed., p. 78.

moment, when the pleadings were over, and only the verdict remained.”³

It is thus clear that Martineau does not accept the view that freedom means determination by Self or character but he thinks that it implies, on the part of the man acting, the power to betake himself to a different act at the critical moment. It seems to us that if Martineau had understood that determination by Self or character does not mean determination by anything fixed or static, much of his criticism of the idealistic view of freedom would have lost its force. He makes a distinction between the Self and the Ego, the latter indicating something undetermined and indeterminable, whereas the Self, according to him, is something fixed and determined. Freedom thus means for him the causality of the Ego or, as he calls it, ‘personal causality,’ which he opposes to causality of Self or character. The whole discussion, we think, is vitiated by this artificial distinction between the Ego and the Self.

Freedom, as conceived by Martineau, is what Sidgwick has called “capricious freedom.”⁴ It means, as he explains, the power of acting without a motive. It is the same as that which Hyslop has called ‘velleity.’ Hyslop thinks that it has three varieties, for it may mean that volitions are (a) causeless, (b) motiveless, and (c) indifferent. There are two other types of freedom, according to Sidgwick, namely, (1) neutral freedom, and (2) rational freedom. Neutral freedom means freedom to do good as well as evil. It is the first of the two kinds of freedom we have found in Kant; it is also that which we have found in Green. Rational freedom means that a man is free only when he

is completely rational. It is the second kind of freedom we have found in Kant; it is also that which, we have seen, is found in the older rationalists (like Plato or Spinoza).

In the light of what we have said above, let us try to examine the conception of freedom as we find it in the Bhagavad-Gita. For the Gita freedom essentially implies rational freedom. That is to say, it looks upon a man as free so far as he is governed by reason. To be free means for the Gita to be determined by the rational self, to be free, that is to say, from the control of the senses and the passions. The characteristics of the *Sthitaprajña* as given in the second chapter or of the *Bhaktimân* given in the twelfth chapter or of the *Trigunâtita* as depicted in the fourteenth chapter are all characteristics of the free man. The free man is the man who is not in bondage, and the Gita very clearly points out what constitutes bondage. Expressed in most general terms, bondage is attachment to the object of desire. Freedom, therefore, implies non-attachment to the object of desire, and that is why the main part of the teaching of the Gita is directed towards showing the importance of the principle of non-attachment. This is, in fact, the pivot round which the teaching of the Gita moves, just as the conception of freedom is the pivot round which the ethical philosophy of Kant moves. There are hundreds of verses, the object of which is to show the essential importance of the principle of non-attachment. We quote only a few below :

“He who forsaketh all desires and goeth onwards, free from yearnings, selfless and without egoism—he goeth to Peace” (II. 71).

“Contentment with whatsoever he obtaineth without effort, free from the pairs of opposites, without envy,

³ Martineau: *Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, Pp. 38-40. Third Edition, Revised.

⁴ Vide *Methods of Ethics*, Appendix: The Kantian Conception of free-will.

balanced in success and failure, though acting, he is not bound" (IV. 22).

"Having abandoned attachment to the fruit of action, always content, nowhere seeking refuge, he is not doing anything, although doing actions" (IV. 20).

"Therefore, without attachment, constantly perform action which is duty, for by performing action without attachment, man verily reacheth the Supreme" (III. 19).

"The harmonized man, having abandoned the fruit of action, attaineth the eternal peace; the non-harmonized, impelled by desire, attached to fruit, are bound" (V. 13).

One thing we cannot too strongly emphasize here. The Gita, like the Western rationalists, lays more stress upon the freedom of man than upon the freedom of the will. And man is free, says the Gita, if he realizes his rational self, if he becomes *ātmavān* or *ātmārati*:

यस्त्वात्मरतिरेव स्यादात्मतृप्तश्च मानवः ।

आत्मभ्येव च सन्तुष्टस्तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥

(III. 16).

त्रैगुण्यविषया वेदा निस्त्रैगुण्यो भवार्जुन ।

निर्द्वन्द्वो नित्यसत्त्वस्थो निर्योगक्षेम आत्मवान् ॥

(II. 45).

"But the man who rejoiceth in the Self, is satisfied with the Self, and is content in the Self, for him verily there is nothing to do" (III. 16).

"The Vedas deal with the three *gunas*; be thou above these three *gunas*, beyond the pairs of opposites, ever steadfast in purity, careless of possessions, full of the Self" (II. 45).

There is no hindrance to the realization of a man's rational self; the hindrance is only himself.

"Raise the self by the Self and do not let the self become depressed; for verily is the Self the friend of the self and the self the enemy of the self" (VI. 5).

Man is free to raise himself to the level of absolute rationality. When he reaches that level he becomes one with God:

ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना ॥ (IV. 24)

This condition is elsewhere stated as the condition of *Brahmanirvāna* (II. 72, V. 24, V. 25), or of *Brahmabhūta* (XIV. 26, XVIII. 53). The man who reaches this condition is given various appellations. He is called *Brahmani Sthita* (V. 20), *Brahmayogayuktātmā* (V. 21), *Brahmabhūta* (V. 24), *Yuktatama* (VI. 47), *Me priya* (XII. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20).

If the question is asked: Does the Gita, however, give man freedom to choose the good as well as the evil, that is to say, what Sidgwick has called 'neutral freedom?', the answer is: Undoubtedly it does. This is clear from VI.5 and also VI.6, where it is said that a man can act in a way in which his self is his friend or can act in a way in which his self is his enemy, that is, can raise himself as well as lower himself. The cause of wrong doing is thus clearly stated in the Gita:

काम एष क्रोध एष रजोगुणसमुद्भवः ।

महाशनो महापाप्मा विद्ध्येनमिह वैरिणम् ॥

(III. 37).

—"It is desire, it is wrath, begotten by the *rajas* quality, all-consuming, all-polluting, know this as our foe here on earth." It is undoubtedly open to a man to allow this desire to get the mastery over him, as it is open to him to curb it. If he pursues the former course, then he chooses evil, if the latter, then he chooses the good.

Again it is stated in the sixteenth chapter that there are two fundamentally distinct types of qualities in man: *daivi* and *āsuri*. The *daivi* properties lead to salvation, the *āsuri* to bondage. Although these properties

are mentioned as the characteristics of two different types of man, it is not the object of the Gita to assert that the man with one set of properties can never get rid of them and acquire the other type. On the other hand, the twenty-first verse of the sixteenth chapter clearly indicates that it is possible for every man to get rid of the three evil propensities,—lust, wrath and greed, which are the three gates of hell.

The Gita undoubtedly believes that it is open to everybody either to take the path of virtue or the path of vice. If this were not so, the purpose of the Gita would be completely frustrated. For its object undoubtedly was to give instruction to Arjuna about what his duty was in the difficult situation in which he was placed, so as to dissuade him from following the path of his natural impulses leading to inaction. It believes, therefore, in the possibility of a man changing his course of action as a result of receiving moral instruction and adopting the right method of self-improvement. No matter how low and debased a person's moral condition may be, there is still chance for him or her to improve this condition. This is the substance of IX. 32:—

“मां हि पार्थ व्यपाश्रित्य येऽपि स्युः पापयोनयः,”

etc. We may regret the examples of *pāpayonayah* that are given in this verse, but the meaning of the verse is absolutely clear. It states, in a manner which leaves no room for doubt, that there is no human being but has a chance of improving his or her condition and obtaining salvation. The Gita does not believe in eternal perdition. If you remain in the slums of morality it is not the fault of your stars, but it is the fault of yourself.

The Gita undoubtedly does not regard human beings as the ultimate

authors of their destiny. It cannot do so without relegating God to a position of relative inferiority *vis a vis* human beings. When, therefore, the Gita says in the eighteenth chapter :

ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।

आमयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया ॥

(XVIII. 61),

it is not meant that human beings enjoy no freedom. It is only asserted that their consciousness of their own freedom should not make them lose sight of the position of God as the ultimate Controller and Director of everything. The Gita does not believe in a God who has abdicated His functions. The Gita has called God

“उपदेष्टाऽनुमन्ता च भर्ता भोक्ता महेश्वरः”

(XIII.23). So it has called Him

“जगतो माता धाता पितामहः”

(IX. 17), and also

“गतिर्भर्ता प्रभुः सान्नी निवासः शरणं सहृत् ।

प्रभवः प्रलयः स्थानं निधानं बीजमव्ययम्”

(IX. 18).

It does not believe in an inane God who has renounced all powers and is merely a benevolent spectator.

Moreover, if we look to the context of this verse, we shall find that immediately before this we have in verses 58 and 59 a warning given to Arjuna that if he persists in his self-conceit, he will be crushed or compelled to give up his conceit :

“Thinking on Me, thou shalt overcome all obstacles by My grace; but if from egoism thou wilt not listen, thou shalt be destroyed utterly.”

“Entrenched in egoism, thou thinkest, ‘I will not fight’; to no purpose is thy determination; thy nature will constrain thee” (XVIII. 58-59).

These verses, in fact, express in more

caustic terms the rebuke already administered to Arjuna in II.11 :

“Thou hast been mourning for them who should not be mourned for. Yet thou speakest words of wisdom.”

It is clear, therefore, that verses 58, 59 and 61 of the eighteenth chapter have for their object the removal of the conceit from Arjuna's mind, the conceit, namely, that he alone was competent to decide what his duty would be. These verses, therefore, in no way go against human freedom. They only assert the objective character of the moral judgment and the subordination of the individual judgment to the objective judgment of morality. God, as representing this objective judgment, has a coercive power over the individual.

But the beauty of the teaching of the Bhagavad-Gita is that this coercion is felt only when the individual, due to ignorance or the perversity of the will*, pursues a course which is contrary to the moral order of the universe. When the individual shakes off this ignorance or is cured of his moral perversity, then he is willing to submit himself to the guidance of God. He finds therein his true realisation and final salvation, and therefore, ungrudgingly, of his own free will, resigns himself unto God. This is the case with Arjuna himself, when at the end of his instruction he voluntarily resigns himself unto the Lord, saying :

“Destroyed is my delusion. I have gained knowledge through Thy grace, O Immutable One. I am firm, my doubts have been removed. I will do according to Thy word” (XVIII. 73).

* The Gita, strictly speaking, does not make any difference between the will and the intellect. Defect of the will, the Gita has repeatedly declared, is due to the defect of the intellect and *vice versa*. See III. 38-40, V, 15-16. See also IV. 42.

There are, however, two verses in the eleventh chapter, which seem to suggest a kind of fatalism more destructive of human freedom than even the verses of the eighteenth chapter we have examined above. These verses are :

“Therefore stand up! Win for thyself renown,

Conquer thy foes, enjoy the wealth-filled realm.

By Me they are already overcome, Be thou the instrumental cause, left-handed one.

Drona and Bhishma and Jayadratha, Karna and all the other warriors here, Are slain by Me. Destroy them fearlessly.

Fight! thou shalt crush thy rivals in the field” (XI. 33-34).

They seem to suggest that man is really powerless to do anything, everything being in reality done by God Himself. Here we meet with a very familiar problem in philosophy, the problem of reconciling the omnipotence of God with human freedom. This problem has presented itself to Spinoza also. Spinoza says in Prop. XLV of the Second Part of his *Ethics* :

“Prop. XLV. Every idea of anybody or actually existing individual thing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Demonstr. The idea of an individual thing actually existing necessarily involves both the essence and existence of the thing itself. But individual things cannot be conceived with God, and since God is their cause in so far as He is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, their ideas must necessarily involve the conception of that attribute, or, in other words, must involve the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Scholium. By existence is to be understood here not duration, that is, existence considered in the abstract, as

if it were a certain kind of quantity, but I speak of the nature itself of the existence which is assigned to individual things, because from the eternal necessity of the nature of God infinite numbers of things follow in infinite ways. I repeat that I speak of the existence itself of individual things in so far as they are in God. For although each individual thing is determined by another individual thing to existence in a certain way, the force nevertheless by which each thing perseveres in its existence follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God" (Spinoza's *Ethics*. Oxford Edition, p. 92. Tr. by W. Hale White and Amelia H. Stirling).

From this it is quite clear that according to Spinoza, every idea of any human being (and consequently, also every act of every human being, for according to Spinoza, will and idea are identical) is dependent upon the eternal and infinite essence of God, and therefore, upon His will. Yet Caird has shown that this does not imply that human beings have no freedom. "When we ask", says Caird, "what in his system is the relation of the finite world and individual finite things to God, the question is not settled simply by referring to his doctrine that all things exist in God, and that modes or finite things have no existence or operation independently of the infinite substance. Spinozism is not at once proved to be pantheistic by such expressions as these. For every system that is not dualistic, and for which the terms infinite and finite have any meaning, is pantheistic to the extent of holding that the world has no absolute or independent existence, and that the ultimate explanation of all things is to be found in God. Before pronouncing Spinoza a pantheist, therefore, the point to be determined is not whether he ascribes independent reality to finite things, but

whether he ascribes to them any reality at all" (Caird, *Spinoza*, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, pp. 161-62).

In the light of the above remarks of Caird, it is clear that merely because the Gita calls human beings 'instrumental causes', it cannot be said that it wants to say that they have no freedom. Human beings undoubtedly cannot be regarded as the ultimate causes of things if the supremacy of God is to be maintained. There cannot be two ultimate causes. If man is made absolutely independent of God in his thoughts as well as in his actions, then the position of God is bound to suffer, as is the case with the philosophy of Leibniz.

Let us face the question squarely. What exactly is meant when it is claimed that human beings are free? Is it meant that they enjoy absolute freedom even when they are limited, particular, individual beings? That is, of course, ridiculous, for it involves a contradiction in terms. All that can be claimed is that these finite individuals must be given a chance of being other than they are and of acting otherwise than they do, that is, of being other than mere finite, individual, particular beings and of acting otherwise than in a way contrary to the objective moral order. In other words, what can be claimed is that every finite individual must have freedom to improve himself, to rise above his limitations and ultimately to be one with God Himself. This freedom no one can assert that the Gita denies. The words of verse 32 of the ninth chapter are explicit on this point: "Everybody who takes refuge in me attains the supreme condition." Nobody is doomed for ever. The Gita does not prescribe eternal hell fire for anybody. Everybody can improve his or her moral condition, and ultimately

attain oneness with God and salvation. There is no coercion on the part of God to tie down any individual to his or her particular lot for ever. The greatest feature of the Gita is its triumphant optimism. There is perhaps no work extant in any literature which gives more hope to the weak and the fallen than the Gita. And its catholicity is really something marvellous. It offers salvation to followers of all creeds and faiths :

“Any devotee who seeketh to worship with faith any such aspect, I verily bestow upon him his unswerving faith.”

“He, endowed with that faith, seeketh the worship of such a one, and from him he obtaineth his desires, I verily decreeing the benefits.”

“Finite indeed is the fruit that belongeth to those who are of small intelligence. To the Devas go the worshippers of the Devas, but my devotees come unto me” (VII. 21-23).

Moreover, is it natural for a man to feel ‘cribbed, cabined and confined’ when he is ‘in tune with the infinite’? Does it not rather show a perverse mentality? Can there be any greater freedom for any individual than to be united with God?

Here also Spinoza comes to our aid. In reply to his correspondent Blyenbergh, who objects to Spinoza’s statement that a man is never more free than when he conceives things under their eternal forms, on the ground that

it makes men no better than stones, Spinoza says : “As to what you say, that I make men so dependent on God that I make them like the elements, plants and stones, this shows sufficiently that you most perversely misunderstand my opinion, and confuse things which concern the understanding with imagination. For if you had grasped with your pure understanding what dependence upon God is, you would certainly not think that things, in so far as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal and imperfect (who even dared to speak in so vile a fashion of the most perfect Being?). On the contrary, you would understand that for that reason, and in so far as they depend on God, they are perfect—so much so, that we best understand this dependence and necessary operation through God’s decree when we consider not logs and plants but the most intelligible and most perfect created things, as appears clearly from what I have said before, in the second place, about the meaning of Descartes which you should have noticed.” (Letter No. 21 to Blyenbergh, *Vide Correspondence of Spinoza* by Wolf, p. 178).

The Gita, therefore, triumphantly declares :

मन्मना भव मद्भक्तो मद्याजी मां नमस्कुरु ।
मामेवैष्यसि सत्यं ते प्रतिजाने प्रियोऽसि मे ॥

(XVIII. 65).

This is the highest freedom.

MY PILGRIMAGE

BY A WESTERNER

It was in the Indian spring of 1935, in the birth-month of Ramakrishna, that I, a very late-comer, found my way to the gate of the Ramakrishna Monastery at Belur. For some days I had sought direction amongst my English friends and at last it was suggested that out of several possible addresses the one at Howrah appeared promising. So we journeyed to Howrah station, my friend and I, and inquired from a station agent the way to Belur. To the sound of the name of Ramakrishna there was an instantaneous reaction which (and this is remarkable in the East) also translated itself into prompt action. The youthful station-master closed his booth and locked it, drew himself to his full and majestic height as he adjusted his loose white garments and said in friendly English, "Come, I will show you the way." An end of journeying and seeking; an end to uncertain wandering. In a few moments we were safe on the bus bound to Belur, and the driver had been instructed where to put us down. That he did put us down in a dusty road and that we wandered sometime in a very interesting brick yard was probably due to our own ignorance of the language. Eventually we came to a gate—a wooden gate—and met the barking of a dog as we moved to open it. A kindly face appeared to admonish the dog, but it was the face of a Hindu dressed in the single orange garment of the Sannyasin, and my heart sank after the difficulties of the morning. I made a lame effort to explain our presence, expecting not to be understood, and suddenly heard myself being answered in

a voice that has become one of my memories, and in the most fluent English; better English by all accepted standards than the best American variety I could hope to offer. I explained my desire to observe the medical work of the Ramakrishna Mission. Upon the Swami's earnest invitation to enter and rest, we disclaimed all intention of disturbing the solitude of a monastery by our unceremonious intrusion, but were finally persuaded to present our dust-laden and disturbed Occidental selves within this peaceful Oriental precinct. Seated on a shady piazza and left to collect our scattered impressions, we found that we had entered a quiet compound where men came and went engaged in various tasks without observing us or with only a friendly glance in passing; and it became increasingly evident that the severe and cloistral atmosphere could not be disturbed by the entrance of two uncertain and rather dishevelled Western females.

After a time, a calm Oriental time, our protector returned with two brass goblets of the most marvellous clear cold water I have ever drunk and also an assortment of delicate fruits and a cocoanut pastry tastefully arranged on a green leaf. Nectar of the Gods at the moment, food for body and for soul; only later did I know the consecration of that repast by which a stranger, an alien and even a "beef-eater" was accepted without question into sacred fellowship.

Now we were conducted along the bank of the Hoogli where white shrines gleamed in the sun; we hesitated before the

pure marble of the memorials to Ramakrishna and to Vivekananda; we entered the room where Vivekananda passed away and a new sanctity was born in our hearts. As we returned past the living quarters of the monks we were differently inspired by the fine quality of the vast fields of cabbages. On questioning our guide we were informed that even these would not be sufficient to feed the thousands who come at the birthday of Ramakrishna to seek the sanctification of a crumb of consecrated food. At the Swami's invitation we arranged to return next day for the vesper service and, rose laden, were directed back to Calcutta, more changed than we ourselves knew.

There are moments when our busy outer life seems to grow still and the care-strewn highways of the mind are swept by air from a rarefied height. Such a moment came to me when I squatted with a group of the orange-clad monks of the Ramakrishna Order in their simple temple of Belur-Math and

knew the unison and the beauty evoked by their ritual. The banks of the Hoogli at sunset; a temple garden, a rose garden, and such roses as few of us are privileged to see; the peaceful faces of the meditating monks; and then the approaching dark and the need to hasten; consecrated food left in my hand when I touched the Swami's in farewell, and his voice, a remembered voice, saying, "You will return"; these are impressions far too rarefied for a mere pen and too vivid to be written in common ink.

Next day I journeyed to Bodh-Gaya and laid roses from the garden of Ramakrishna on the altar of the Buddha. "Holy ground beneath my feet"—holy and vibrant. The event that had consecrated Dakshineswar and Belur lived on at Belur in full power. So might I have felt twenty centuries since, had I been privileged to visit Gethsemane after the event; or Bodh-Gaya earlier still.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE NUMBER 'THREE'

BY PROF. HARIDAS CHAUDHURI, M.A.

It is curious to note that the basic principles of existence and the fundamental philosophic concepts have oftener than not presented themselves to human thought in a triadic rhythm. The ground-conceptions of philosophy, directly as we pass them in review, readily fall into groups of three in one and develop into highly significant trinities. We shall not raise in this paper the deep question whether this is due to any mystic reality and significance attaching to the number 'three' or whether it may be traced to an unaccountable magic charm which the

number might exercise over our metaphysical speculations. We propose by a consideration of the ruling conceptions of thought and experience just to illustrate the immense philosophical importance which the number 'three' possesses, so that we might justifiably designate it as 'the philosophical number'. We should make it clear at the outset that we have not the least intention to indulge in any arithmetical mysticism of the sort expounded by Pythagoras, according to whom numbers are the constitutive essences of all things.

Among the philosophical triads there

are some in which the three members are equally fundamental aspects or expressions of one synthetic whole. In a second group of triads the synthesis or the integral truth is neither an inclusive whole of which the three members are three divergent aspects or component parts nor a transcendental unity of which they are special manifestations but is rather represented by the third member in which the other two obtain reconciliation and self-completion. Let us begin by a consideration of the first group.

There is a surprising measure of agreement among mystics and philosophers in their insistence on the triune nature of the highest reality or God. The intrinsic nature of the Most High is according to the Upanishadic seers a triunity comprising *sat*, *chit* and *ānanda*. Brahman is essentially the unity of pure existence, pure knowledge and pure bliss. Western theologians speak of God as All-powerful, All-wise and All-good. God as Power is the ultimate source of all existence and is therefore pure self-dependent existence, so that a separate mention of the element of existentiality is supposed unnecessary. The Upanishads, on the other hand, speak of Consciousness-Power (*chit-sakti*), so that as supreme consciousness God is also absolute self-realising power (*tapas*), and this justifies their omission of the separate mention of God as Power. But still there should have been no objection to such a separate recognition in both the cases, because a discrimination of divine attributes cannot signify anything more than a mere specification of mutually implicated aspects. Is the omission of such recognition to be traced to some strange fascination which the number 'three' might have for the human imagination?

Just as the intrinsic nature of God is analysed into three inseparable aspects (*kutastha lakshanas*), so also His extrinsic nature in relation to the world is capable of being resolved into a unity of three inter-connected powers (*tatastha lakshanas*). In relation to the world, God performs the threefold function of creation, preservation and destruction, and thus manifests Himself as Brahmá, Vishnu and Siva,—Creator, Preserver and Destroyer. The same trinity of the Godhead, when translated into the terms of the mathematically inspired metaphysic of Whitehead, gives us God as Wisdom, God as Love and God as Judgment. God as Wisdom constitutes His primordial nature by virtue of which He is "the unlimited conceptual realisation of the absolute wealth of potentiality,"¹ God as Love is "the multiple solidarity of free physical realisations in the temporal world".² He is the principle of concretion by which his conceptual plan becomes realised in fact. God as Judgment constitutes His consequent nature by virtue of which He is the ultimate unity of the multiplicity of actual fact with the primordial conceptual fact".³ God as Judgment "saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of His own life."⁴

"Om," the mystic syllable par excellence of Indian Philosophy, is also a three-membered whole. The *onkára* or *pranava* is a unity of three letters A, U, M, all of which are deeply significant. There is some diversity of opinion in regard to the precise significance of these three letters which are the three moments or inseparable factors of an integral Truth. According to the Tantras, the three letters A, U, M, stand for the three *gunas*,—*sattva*, *rajas*

¹ Whitehead's *Process and Reality*, p. 486.

² *Ibid.*, p. 490.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 490.

⁴ *Ibid.*

and *tamas*, which are embodied in Vishnu, Brahmá and Siva. The *pranava* is also supposed to contain within itself *náda-bindu*, *sakti* and *sánta*. According to another view⁵, the components of the *pranava* are supposed to represent the three states or rather “planes” of consciousness, viz., *jágrat* (wakefulness), *swapna* (dream), and *sushupti* (sound sleep). The A, U, M, as a whole, may be taken to signify the *turiya* which is a transcendental and supramental plane of consciousness of which *jágrat*, *swapna* and *sushupti* are forms of self-expression through self-limitation.

We may cite some other instances of the type we are considering, in illustration of the strange attachment of metaphysical speculation to the number ‘three’. Prof. Alexander designates his principal work on philosophy “Space, Time and Deity”. At least three ontological principles forming an indivisible trinity are imperatively necessary for an explanation of the cosmic process in its origin and in its forward march. Space-Time as an all-comprehensive system of motion is “the matrix of all existence and the nurse of all becoming.” But this Space-Time is also impregnated with a creative *nisus* by virtue of which there is a constant straining forward towards the production of something absolutely novel and unique. The possibility of this novel and unique quality looming large before the highest order of being already actualised is what Alexander calls the quality of deity. And the world of Space-Time as impregnated with a creative urge and as characterised by a continuous straining forward is what may be called God as actual. This conception of God will, however, be revolting to many as worse than a blasphemy. If we exalt God from the status of a quality to that of the inexhaustible

source of all qualities, and if we lift Him out of all limitations into the position of the Eternal, the Infinite and the Unconditioned, we will find that the principle of God’s self-limitation will present itself as a triple chord. It is by self-projection upon the tri-coloured canvas of space-time-causation that God manifests Himself as the universe.

In Psychology, bipartite classification of mental phenomena inevitably yields place to the tripartite classification as if in implicit obedience to the potent charm of our mystic number. Not mere Thought and Will, but Thinking, Feeling and Willing,—that gives the truth in Psychology, because short of such a triad the human mind refuses to be satisfied with anything. As to the fundamental attributes of the mind, which are also the attributes or constituent factors of the stuff of all existence, namely, *Prakriti*, we have again the triplicity of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Sattva* signifies light and knowledge, *rajas* stands for action and passion, and *tamas* denotes darkness and inertia. The divine equivalents of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are respectively *jyoti*, *tapas* and *sama*—the authentic spiritual light, the tranquilly intense divine force, and the divine quiet, rest and peace.⁶ Human beings are classified by the Tantras under three heads, to wit, *divya*, *vira* and *pasu*, in accordance with their nature and temperament. The *pasu* man is one whose mind is confined to the *sthula* or material aspect of things. The *vira* man is one who has an urge to reach the plane beyond matter and who is bent upon fighting the passions and desires which obstruct the path of spiritual advancement. The *divya* man is one who is endowed with knowledge, self-control and bliss, qualities which make him almost divine.

⁵ Sri Krishna Prema’s *The Yoga of the Bhagavat Gita*.

⁶ Sri Aurobindo’s *Lights on Yoga*, p. 15.

Corresponding to the three functions of the mind we have the three most cherished values or ideals of our life, viz., Truth, Beauty and Goodness. It is believed that Reality must be the eternal embodiment of these values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty,—*satyam*, *sivam* and *sundaram*.

In Epistemology, the analysis of the cognitive situation leads us to a discrimination of three distinct factors—knower, knowledge and known, *jñátá*, *jñána* and *jñeya*,—*pramátri*, *pramá* and *prameya*. A trinity of factors is indeed the minimum requirement in the explanation of every type of epistemological situation, though philosophers having a fondness for complications may insist upon resolving the objective factor into further elements. It will be beside our present purpose to raise here the question whether this threefold distinction is the essential feature of an ultimately valid complex situation or only the phenomenal manifestation of an undifferentiated unity.

We have tried to give above an account of some of the most important triads which figure in philosophical speculation, exercising probably a determining influence thereupon,—the triads whose members are equally fundamental, forming either a self-supporting complex or betraying themselves as modes of appearance of a transcendental background. We shall now turn to a brief consideration of the second group of triads in which the third member functions as the synthesis and self-consummation of the other two.

The whole philosophy of Hegel is an excellent exemplification of the second group of triads through which, in Hegel's opinion, thought must necessarily pass in its forward march of immanent self-development. Hegel's Science of Logic is one complex triadic rhythm which breaks up into a vast multitude

of other such triadic rhythms beginning with Being, Nothing and Becoming, and ending with the Idea of the True, the Idea of the Good and the Absolute Idea. Determinate Being as such, Finitude, Infinity; Quantity, Quantum, the Quantitative Ratio; the Notion, the Judgment, the Syllogism; Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology—these are some other notable triple vibrations in the dialectical symphony of Hegel. The trinity of the Godhead is, in Hegel's view, the synthetic unity of Absolute spirit in whose inclusive embrace Logic and Nature, Universality and Particularity count as two inseparable and integral factors. The kingdom of the Holy Ghost represents the final Truth in isolation from which the Kingdom of the Father and the Kingdom of the Son are unreal abstractions. We do not like to be drawn into the controversy whether the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost is for Hegel an all-embracing principle of self-objectifying self-consciousness of which the Father and the Son are the subjective and the objective factors respectively; or it signifies a community of eternally self-subsistent spirits in which the Father and the Son are the figurative representations of the aspect of unity and the aspect of plurality respectively.

According to Sri Aurobindo, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost stand respectively for the Transcendental, the Universal, and the Individual aspects of the Divine.⁷ Corresponding to these three aspects of the Godhead, there are three modes of being of the Divine Sakti.⁸ As Transcendental, the Mother is the original Supreme Sakti, Who stands above the worlds and links the creation to the ever-unmanifest mystery of the Supreme. As Universal

⁷ Sri Aurobindo's *The Riddle of This World*, p. 76.

⁸ Sri Aurobindo's *The Mother*, p. 36.

She is the cosmic Mahásakti, creating and sustaining multitudinous processes, forces and beings. As Individual, She mediates between the human personality and the divine nature.

The Bhagavat Gita brings out with admirable clearness and precision the triune aspect of reality, and speaks of the Purusha in its three forms of *kshara*, *akshara* and *uttama*. To put it more accurately, the highest Reality is, according to the Gita, the Purushottama who manifests Himself both as the Kshara Purusha, the mobile, multiple and personal soul, and the Akshara Purusha, the immobile, unitary and impersonal silence, without getting limited by these forms of manifestation. The Purushottama is both *kshara* and *akshara*, and yet not these alone, infinitely transcending their limitations; and the latter two have alike their ultimate source and final consummation in the former.

We have now seen how reality presents itself to thought, both as a whole

and in its parts, in a triadic rhythm or as a triple harmony. It is not within our competence to try to fathom the mystery of this surprisingly curious phenomenon. The one suggestion that might still be hazarded would be as follows: Students of Euclidean Geometry know that two straight lines can never enclose space. The minimum number of straight lines necessary for the enclosing of space is three. It is the triangle which is the symbol of a completed whole of space in geometry. Similarly, we require a triune conception in order to reach a completed whole of thought. The notion of the whole is at once the criterion of reality and the *nisus* of inspiration of speculative thought. One thought necessarily moves in triadic rhythm and reaches forward towards an all-comprehensive triadic symphony, because the spirit of totality is inalienably immanent in thought and constitutes its secret inspiration. And this spirit of totality requires a triad or trinity at the minimum for its self-imaging or self-representation.

THE PROBLEM OF TOLERANCE

BY PROFESSOR HENRI-L. MIEVILLE

(Continued from the last issue)

Let us now turn back to tolerance. After what I have said you will understand why I am not afraid of stating that tolerance appears to me like a kind of miracle, or better said, like a fortunate illogicality of the heart, whenever I meet it in dogmaticians of truth, whether philosophers or theologians, and in those whole-hearted advocates of the static conception of truth. I have a particular admiration for theologians who combine tolerance and orthodoxy, but I feel that such combination is

always bound to be fragile, because it is against nature.

Let us now take the other point of view. If truth is conceived as the expression of a never-completed activity of the mind and as translating the relations between the mind on the one hand, and being, the world of values, and having-to-become on the other hand, it then becomes quite possible and natural to admit that various aspects of that truth (which we never possess in its entirety) are successively revealed

to human vision, and that contradictory doctrines may all contain some element of truth. This idea is not a mere supposition without foundations; overpowering evidences of it may be found in the history of thought, whether scientific and philosophic or theologic. And it is easy to understand why that conception of truth gives the doctrine of tolerance a positive philosophical basis which no other conception can give it. With it, tolerance becomes not a kind of "second-best" and a concession made to the perversity of men and of the age, but a necessity, because co-operation of all human minds becomes indispensable in the quest of truth, in the experimenting of truth, and in the conquest of truth.

Our moral position towards the man who does not believe like us suddenly becomes quite different. This of course does not imply that we should or could adopt his views. The dictates of logic will not be suspended, and we shall still have to make a choice, we shall still think that such and such a view is wrong and incompatible with such and such other view. But we shall proceed with much greater care. Any sincere conviction which is opposed to ours will lead us to question the all-sufficiency of the ideas which *we* hold. And henceforth tolerance for us will not mean saying to him whose ideas we do not share: "My dear friend, you are mistaken, but sooner or later if you are sincere you will come to think as I do. However I shall condescend to bear up with you as you are." You realise how much of secret pride and superiority-complex is hidden in such an attitude. This takes us back to the definition of tolerance given by Littré: "condescension, indulgence for what we cannot or will not change". And we are very near the definition which Bossuet gave of "civil tolerance" in one of his *Avertissements*:

"impunity granted by the magistrate to all sects."

This change of attitude is so deep that the very word tolerance becomes intolerable: *ein hässliches, intolerantes Wort*, as Goethe called it. The word implies in fact a feeling which is now rejected, i.e., a secret desire that all divergences should cease, and the idea that all would become perfect if everybody thought as we do, as our party does, as our church does.

Naturally you will ask: how can I rejoice over the fact that there are men unjust and cruel who follow principles which are wrong and possibly hideous? Should we renounce "that vigorous hate which a virtuous soul should feel towards vice", as the poet puts it? Certainly not! And I will stop you before you indulge into great flows of eloquence. We are not expected to approve what we cannot approve, nor to make up a kind of Arlequin's dress with all the contradictory opinions which we meet; that would be grotesque. We are only expected not to believe that we are infallible. We are expected to realise that there is no such thing as complete darkness, and no such thing as full light, that light can only shine when all is not light, and that error may in a relative sense be a mother of truth.

I do not think that such a conception—which might contain the seed of a theodicaea—relieves us from the duty of fighting error and evil when we see them clearly. But there are many possible ways of carrying on that fight. In his famous treaty on "Perpetual Peace", Kant stated that war should only be made with a view to reaching peace, and that everything should be carefully avoided which might make peace morally impossible. That also applies to the war against error; such a war will only be efficient and fruitful if it is waged in

a spirit of tolerance—however paradoxical that may seem. Louis Lavelle wrote: “Every one of us should hold his gaze as firmly as he can on the truth which has been given to him, but he should always know that it is no more than one aspect of total truth; if he should impart it to somebody else, he should always do it with the greatest care, by making a suggestion and asking for help and never by introducing pressure or scandal.”⁷

I shall even go so far as to say that wishing the triumph of truth for the sake of truth is inhuman fanaticism. Truth as such is not an end in itself, any more than justice or beauty. Truth might be defined as the perfection of thought. And here the functional conception of truth takes on its full advantage over the static conception. The latter may be called upon to justify the *sacrificium intellectus*, the sacrifice of living thought to a deified truth which becomes something foreign to the mind as soon as we claim that the mind should bow before it in every case. This would be ignoring a fact of primordial importance: truth cannot become living, and cannot exist as such without the spontaneous co-operation of the minds which it helps. For that reason any philosophical or religious system which attempts to lay down once and for all as a group of dogmas truth as it should be understood, really attempts a kind of murder of the mind, in spite of all the solemn invocations which such a system may call forth to find its own justification in the eyes of men.

But conversely and for the same reason it is rash—I was going to say it is criminal—to launch a brutal attack on beliefs which may be naive and absurd, but which in the consciousness of the man who holds them may be

inextricably bound up with vitally important convictions which they translate on the intellectual plane.

It would be forgetting that our aim should not be to correct the belief for the sake of correcting it, and that substituting right ideas for wrong ideas is not an end in itself. That schoolmasterish attitude is undoubtedly one of the roots of fanaticism—and it is important to note that we may find it in the advocate of the functional theory of truth quite as well as in the dogmatist. The essential is not that a proposition which we believe to be true should be accepted by everybody; it is that everybody should think of it, which is something quite different. Of course it gives me pleasure to meet people who share my own views, and I may be right in believing that such a coincidence tends to prove my views to be correct. It cannot be a sufficient and conclusive criterion, since there have been and probably still are innumerable collective mistakes and errors, but we cannot imagine truth except as valid in principle for all thinking minds. This applies to the functional conception as well as to the other. The only difference—and a very important one too—is that in the functional conception, truth expresses the relation between human thought and “being” (सत्) such as that relation should be defined as a result of a given situation arising from historical and psychological contingencies,—whereas the static conception feels it can ignore human *becoming*, and also in a certain sense cosmic becoming, since it starts from the idea that truth can be imparted to us in a *ne varietur* system of concepts.

That explains why the transmission of the correct formula from one mind to another seems so important. To think correctly will no longer be to think according to the rules of reason, since

⁷ La Présence totale (Préface), Paris, Aubier, 1934.

those rules demand that thought should agree with itself and also, in the case of statements on given data, that thought should agree with the results of experience. To think correctly will be to acquiesce to a formula which embodies unchangeable truth. There will be a complete reversal: some formulated truth will become the criterion for thought, and thought will thereby be deprived of its right of judging and its duty to judge.⁸

Such is the obstacle which the static conception of truth puts in the way of tolerance. But what I now want to stress is that even with people who understand truth to be functional, the tolerant attitude will presuppose a certain moral behaviour and may therefore be absent. The essential thing as I said is that intellects should be made to think and not that all intellects should reach unanimity. What is all-important is therefore to want other minds *to be*. This brings us on to the moral plane. Understanding the conditions of thought will only add this—which of course is important—to want other minds to be is to want them to be able to think, and it is also to endeavour to help them in their effort to think. But thought can never work truly and efficiently without freedom on the one hand, and as full information as possible on the other. The man whose main concern is to convert his neighbour to his own views will find it extremely difficult not to exert on his neighbour's thought a pressure which would in fact tend to deprive him of his full freedom of thought. Energetic and strong individualities will therefore rebel against those indiscreet "converters" whose attitude really amounts to a kind of

embryonic intolerance. Real tolerance cannot decide in advance what a man *ought* to think before he is entitled to believe he is right.

We still have to consider an objection that may be made against doctrines which favour tolerance, and the objection is this: Has anything great ever been achieved without some amount of violence and intolerance?

The statement seems to me unjustified if general. Have there ever been any greater creators of "values", as Nietzsche called them, and greater moulders of souls than Buddha, Socrates or Christ? And yet they were not intolerant.

Every one of them had a supremely independent mentality and when they spoke "with authority", it was to bear witness to a truth which they all conceived as pre-eminently *liberating*.⁹ They knew that pressure and fear are the greatest obstacles to the efflorescence of spiritual life. And modern psychologists fully confirm their opinion.

⁹ We know the words of Christ: "You heard that it was said of old . . . but I say unto you . . ." And that other statement: "Does one of you want to do the will of God? He will know that my teaching is from God." Evidently Christ does not want his disciples to believe him blindly without any proof of any kind, and without any reference to critical thought or to experience. He does not speak imperatively; he does not claim the right to be blindly believed in on account of his achievements. And on this point Buddha is as definite as one can possibly be. He says: "Do not believe anything on grounds of tradition, nor on the testimony of an ancient sage. Believe nothing on the sole authority of your elders or of your teachers. But that which you have yourselves experienced, experimented and found true, that you may accept and on it you may base your actions" (Anguttara Nikaya). We know also that Socrates was the freest of men and that he spent his life teaching his listeners the difficult and bold art of thinking for themselves. This point has been more fully discussed in "Vers une philosophie de l'Esprit ou de la Totalité" (op. cit.).

⁸ This is what M. Miéville called elsewhere "a real perversion of thought" (Vers une philosophie de l'Esprit ou de la Totalité, Lausanne and Paris, 1937).

Most moral deformations and miseries are the result of pressure and intolerance.

But there is another question which I cannot leave aside entirely, although I have no time to treat it as fully as it would deserve: are there limits to tolerance, and if so, what are they? I shall only give a very brief reply.

From the angle of a philosophy of the individual or the "person" which conceives truth as dynamic and functional in a certain sense, no one is entitled to decide what his neighbour should think or believe. In principle therefore error should enjoy absolute freedom and tolerance should know no bounds. But while that principle results from one of the components of the spirit of tolerance (the intellectual element, the functional conception of truth), there is a different principle which results from the other component, love.

In our expressing what we believe, we should distinguish what comes from a source other than the wish to help and inform our neighbour. And that will show us the point—which is difficult to fix with precision—where tolerance ceases to be a right of the individual. I am thinking of some forms of intolerance, of encouragements to violence or immorality which encroach on the respect due to our neighbour, and which it is legitimate that we should oppose either individually or as an organised society, even if that should entail our exerting great pressure.

There is another distinction which should be made in this connection, and that is in reference to the doctrines which would lead to a reversal of fundamental moral values, and to the doctrines which only aim at a more or less complete reorganisation of the social and economic system at present in force. Racism and fascism, which deny the individual certain of its most essen-

tial rights (the right of every human being to freedom and to the respect of his fellow-beings as long as he himself respects the freedom of others) are theories which ought to be judged by entirely different criteria than those who can apply for instance to a collectivism the only aim of which would be to effect some social and economic reforms. Racism and fascism imperil human dignity; collectivism only attacks human material possessions. According to some of its greatest theoreticians, and particularly of some French ones, the object of collectivism is to safeguard the dignity and freedom of the person—which are greatly threatened by the capitalist system for the persons it enslaves economically. The opponents, it is true, will not fail to retort that the methods advocated, such as socialisation of all wealth, would bring about a completely contrary result, as happened in Russia where the communistic regime established a tyranny destructive of the most essential rights of a free individual. But as long as we believe in the sincerity of the will to give individuals conditions of life which would be more favourable to the blossoming out of the "person", the question as to whether the reforms advocated would be efficient is a technical problem and not a moral issue. It is important to realise that when we try to find an objective criterion, i.e., quite independent from the ruling passions of the day, for determining how far we should allow citizens openly to hold doctrines which are considered more or less dangerous. To deny that right merely because those doctrines imply a more or less complete negation of the present economic system would be a grave mistake.

We might say that freedom is something like the open air. Healthy lungs can breathe it without fearing the germs which it always carries. We might even

say that our lungs need that open air and the consequent fight against germs if they are to become stronger and more enduring. Similarly men deprived of freedom deteriorate intellectually and morally; they tend to become like the products of mass-production which are all hopelessly alike. How poor and uninteresting! The great concern of wise law-givers and of a wise government will always be to maintain the moral health of the nation, and they will always consider with the greatest attention any restriction which they might have to impose on the right of the people to express their convictions.

We have now come to a point when we may draw a conclusion on that problem of tolerance which has again

become acute on account of the brutal policy followed in certain countries, and also on account of the predilection which certain people have for a kind of domineering dogmatism.

We have asked whether tolerance should be counted a virtue, and we have replied in the affirmative. But we are not thinking of passive tolerance, which only expresses indifference or scorn, we can only think of active tolerance. This active tolerance is a virtue, not only because it is difficult to practise, but also because it is a condition of intellectual and spiritual progress, and because it is the outcome of love. Our reason and our heart agree to approve it and to demand it.

(Concluded)

SIKH MONOTHEISM AND ITS BACKGROUND

BY PROF. CHARANJIT SINGH BINDRA, M.A., LL.B.

Sikh religion is characterised by its trenchant and clear-cut monotheistic doctrine, though the cult of monotheism was not unknown in the Punjab at the time Guru Nanak first preached that gospel in the land of his birth. The Hindus had long before evolved in their own way a monotheistic philosophy as the cardinal principle of their theology, though it is contended still by some scholars that the Vedic Aryans had a polytheistic religion. Dr. Raja of the Madras University while admitting that the Vedic Aryans no doubt worshipped many gods and that each god in his turn was the highest god, points out in his article, *The Vedic Culture*, that side by side with this polytheism an extreme form of monism or even monotheism is also found and for his authority he quotes a well-known Rig-Vedic passage :

Ekam sad viprâ bahudhâ vadanti (R. V. I. 164.46) : "Truth is one; the sages call It by various names." Swami Sharvananda of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission goes still further on the authority of another passage (R. V. X. 90.1-3), saying that with the Vedic Aryans their particular god of adoration and worship ultimately was none other than a transcendental impersonal Principle that stands at the back of the whole universe and yet appears to be related to it as its creator and preserver, though in their full comprehension of that supreme Principle they realised Him as a cosmic being and the whole universe as his body. Again we have a verse in the Rig-Veda (X. 82.3) which is usually translated as follows : "He who is the father of us all, the procreator, the greatest Providence, He

who knows the whole universe, He is one, yet assumes many names of gods; about Him all people of the world become desirous to know."

Immediately before Guru Nanak, a renaissance was being attempted by Ramananda and his disciples, whose hymns have been incorporated in the holy Granth. When the Mohammedans found their way to this part of the world, they also were keen about propagating their concept of the monotheistic doctrine.

The idea of the unity of God is emphasised alike by the Sikhs, Christians, Hindus and Mohammedans. Still the concept of God as an entity varies from religion to religion. Christians, whether they are Unitarians or believers in the doctrine of Trinity, all agree to the fundamental proposition of Divine Incarnation and hold that God the Jehovah has no rival personality, though his functional aspects may be diverse. Mohammedans of course in their characteristic manner do not allow the splitting up of the concept of the Almighty Master, to whom all worship is due, into constituent personalities. On the other hand the Hindu doctrine of monotheism has made God not only a personality but by ingrafting the absolutist idea made Him an Impersonal Being as well. The Brahman of the Upanishads is both personal and impersonal. In the first mentioned aspect, which corresponds to the conception of God obtaining among the dualistic religions like Christianity and Islam, "He is the Lord of all; Omnipresent; the Cause of all; from Him all beings proceed and in Him they merge" (*Mândukya*, 6); and is called the *Isvara*, whose body is the sum total of all bodies and whose mind is the aggregate of all minds (*saguna*). But in His impersonal aspect He is devoid of all attributes (*nirguna*), the

Existence Absolute,—“the Ear of the ear, the Mind of the mind, the Vocal Organ of the vocal organ, the Vital Force of the vital force, the Eye of the eye” (*Kena*, I.2).

During the later part of the Middle Ages in India, after the appearance on the western horizon of a powerful religion, the religion of the Prophet Mohammad, Indian saints and mystics found it expedient to concentrate their energies on resuscitating the spiritual consciousness of the people. And the less orthodox preceptors, including the Mohammedan Sufis, devoted their lives to the construction of a bridge between the two orthodox religions, Hinduism and Islam, which at that stage had absolutely no points of contact with each other. Guru Nanak recognised the efforts of these souls; but made these forces bloom forth in the form of a new religion, the religion of the greater India. At the same time a tribute is due to the value and sincerity of the earnest attempts made by Kumârila, Sâyana, and the rest who tried to re-establish the authority of the Vedas and the Vedic way of life. The efforts of Sankara, Râmânûja, and the other philosophers who delved deeper into the mysteries of *jñâna* and *bhakti*; the efforts of Raghunandan and Hemâdri, who along with their colleagues, the authors of the *Nibandhas* (Digests of Conduct), devoted their lives to the regulation and conservation of the social order; and the numerous sects like those of Vaishnavism, Saivism, the Naths, and the Yogis, deserve mention in this connection. Though none of these was entirely successful, yet they made an important contribution to the warp and woof out of which the pattern of the religious renaissance in India was to be woven. Indeed Ramananda had revitalized with the love and devotion of his heart the ideas borrowed by him

from all the extant religions of his age and discarded all that was untrue, ephemeral or rigidly sectarian. This new path of spiritual realisation was further enriched by the sayings and lives of the Bhagats of the holy Granth, Kavir, Ravidas, Dhanna, Pippa and Sheikh Farid.

Guru Nanak, however, made a slight departure from the traditional way of thinking by founding the new way of life on a monotheistic doctrine, which though accepting the manifold manifestations of the deity, does not admit the conception of God being a composite of diverse personalities; nor does he suffer God to be reduced to a mere Principle analogous to the conception of Brahman. Again, God as described and perceived by the Gurus is a conscious entity possessed of all the attributes, though He transcends all anthropomorphic emotions that characterise the human personality.

The concept of God as the sole spring-head of all creation, as the entity that is self-sustained, is not subject to birth and death, is devoid of the emotions of fear and enmity,—is emphasised throughout the scripture of the Sikhs. We find a statement of this clear-cut and trenchant monotheistic doctrine at the very commencement of the Holy Book. This preamble appears again and again at the commencement of every collection of hymns under a common head. It is generally known as the Mool Mantra,—the statement of basic principles or the fundamentals. Macauliffe has rendered it thus: There is but one God whose name is true, the Creator, devoid of fear and enmity, immortal, unborn, self-existent.

Again we have it emphasised in the *Bilawal Thiti* of Guru Nanak that the attributes of being indissoluble, of being above birth and death and the distinctions of caste and creed, and of being

independent of time, space-limit and form, are peculiar to the One. Guru Arjan has enjoined the worship of such a One alone: *Eko jap eko salah, eko simar eko man mah* (Sukhmani, 19, viii),—Remember the One alone, all praise to Him alone; there is but One to meditate upon, the One alone whom you should set up in your heart. No other entity rival to God is conceivable. In Sikhism all possibility of any other god or deity being accepted as the supreme object of worship has been categorically excluded: *Sahib mera eko hai, eko hai bhai eko hai* (Rag Asa of Guru Nanak, 2): I have but one Master, O brother dear, but one alone, but one alone. In Sodar Song, the Sikh Te Deum, the Guru has explicitly relegated to Brahmâ, Shiva and Indra and all other deities the position of the worshippers of the Supreme. None other than the Lord may be exalted to the position of the Supreme Deity: *Bin kartar kirtam na maneo*,—Accept not any one as the creator but the Lord. Nor any one else is to be worshipped: *Eko simar Nanka*,—Meditate the One alone.

Webb points out in *God and Personality*, that all religions exhibit a tendency to work out ultimately a personal concept of God; for the concepts of sin, forgiveness, justice, sacrifice and union with God gain both in intelligibility and in moral power under such a view. But, according to this theory, God must needs be pictured to the imagination as a man writ large. In the Sikh religion while portraying God as a deity, it is particularly emphasised that the Creator, who is the Truth, knows no fear nor feelings of enmity: *nirbhao nirver* (Japji, Preamble). He comes not to the womb, and is not subject to the cycle of births and deaths: *Ajuni* (Japji, Preamble). He is independent of all outside agency

and influence. He is self-sustained: *Sebhang* (Japji, Preamble). Yet He sees through all eyes: *Sarab nen ap pekhan hara* (Guru Arjan's Sukhmani, 23, vi). He knows, feels and appreciates all: *Vekhe chakhe sabh kuchh janre* (Guru Nanak's Pati Asa, 32). He is cognisant and conscious of all that transpires: *Bujhe dekhe kara bibek*

(Guru Arjan's Sukhmani, 12, vi). And His will prevails everywhere, all is subject to His order: *Hukme andar sabh ko bahar hukam na ko* (Guru Nanak's Japji, Pauri 2). He is the Creator and He is happy and unconcerned (Guru Nanak's Japji, Pauri 3). He loves and is even capable of being loved in return.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF DHARMA

BY V. R. TALASIKAR, M.A., LL.B.

DHARMA AS A UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE

There is nothing in the word 'Dharma', of a technical and academic character, which would cause English readers to be taken aback. Many are inclined to suppose that the word 'Dharma' is a technical expression in Hindu ethics; and the concept underlying that word, a characteristic religious notion peculiar to Hindu society. But I think that there is no room for a mystic halo of a peculiar significance about the word 'Dharma', the mystical notion being a superimposition by Western students of Indian philosophy and religion.

I have tried to enumerate several meanings of the word 'Dharma' which I will classify and discuss at a later stage. The definitions of this word and their sociological and metaphysical implications as given in the respective systems of Hindu philosophy, will make it clear that 'Dharma' is a word of universal significance. The extent of its connotation is not limited to the social realities in the structure of Hindu society. It is not an isolated rule of conduct or ethical norm in an Oriental society of a non-industrial character, which is in political bondage and in a

supposed backward state of modern culture and civilization.

Dharma is a universal principle, a universal norm of cosmic application. It governs the birth, sustenance and decay of the entire creation, animate and otherwise. It is a word which despite its confusing comprehensiveness of meaning, deserves to be lifted integrally in the sociology of all societies.

MEANINGS OF THE WORD "DHARMA"

The denotation of this word is so extensive that it is very difficult to state precisely its meaning with a view to give a clear-cut idea to a non-Hindu student of sociology. Yet every average Hindu sufficiently understands what Dharma means, and when he would be outstepping the boundaries laid down by religious injunctions or Dharma.

Mr. Kane in his "*History of Dharma-shastra*" and Dr. Gualtherus Mees in his valuable publication, "*Dharma and Society*", have tried to enumerate the various senses in which the word is used in Hindu sociology, i.e., Smriti literature. The word 'Dharma' springs from the root *dhri*—to hold or sustain. In the Rigveda it is used in the sense of upholder, sustainer, the rule of conduct which sustains life; and hence religious

ordinances or rites, fixed principles or rules of conduct.

In the White Yajurveda it is used in the sense of merit acquired by the performance of religious rites. In the Aitareya Brahmana it stands for the whole body of religious duties. In the Chhandogya Upanishad three kinds of Dharma are mentioned: the first, constituted by sacrifice, study and charity as belonging to the householder's stage of life; the second constituted by austerities as belonging to the last stage of life, i.e., that of a hermit or recluse; and the third constituted by study and celibacy as belonging to the life of a pupil.

Prof. Betty Heimann, in her recent book entitled "*Indian and Western Philosophy*", says that the Indian term for duty is Dharma which literally means 'the fixed position'. Hence Dharma means: (i) the fixed position of duty; (ii) at the same time, of right, the sphere of function. Dharma is not restricted to the range of personal ethics; (iii) Dharma in its theological sense designates religious observance; (iv) it also means secular law; (v) Law of Nature.

ASPECTS OF DHARMA

The several meanings which I have quoted above clearly indicate that Dharma signifies a universal norm, may be ethical or cosmical, which incorporates in itself the established code of eternal, moral and survival values. This concept of the word Dharma does not confine itself to Hindu society alone; Western societies have also their own moral and sociological criteria and hence their own Dharma.

Dharma in its universal aspect appears as a cosmic law which is responsible for the sustenance of the whole world. The Mahabharata says that Dharma is so called because it sustains;

Dharma sustains the progeny. So the rule of conduct which is in consonance with eternal values is Dharma. We have nothing to do with this cosmical aspect and also the theological and ritualistic aspects of Dharma.

Here it is necessary to discuss at some length a very famous definition of Dharma, given by Kanâda, the founder of the atomistic school of Indian philosophy. He defines it as "*that from which result happiness and final beatitude.*" Ostensibly this appears to be a flawless definition. The first objection to this definition would be that the ends of Dharma are happiness and final beatitude, and Dharma would also be a path for the attainment of these ends. But the trouble about this definition is that what exactly constitutes Dharma or what particular type of conduct would amount to Dharma cannot be known until happiness and final beatitude have been achieved. The individual and social behaviour which would lead to happiness and beatitude have not been and cannot be determined in an empirical or a *posteriori* manner, after testing the results of experiments in that direction.

The second difficulty in the way of this definition is that it cannot be applied to individuals and societies simultaneously. Happiness can both be of the individual and also of society; but final beatitude is only a matter of individual concern, the whole society cannot reach a stage of final beatitude.

DHARMA AS A BIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE

It must never be forgotten that India's ethics is essentially cosmic-biological in character. Hindu sociology prohibits the union of different racial stocks, there being a greater insistence on the purity of blood and of genetic structure. On the one hand inbreeding is scrupulously avoided; so also wide

outbreeding or hybridization. The caste system is not a merely socio-political institution as is generally believed by Western pandits; caste is a primary breeding unit in the biological or eugenic sense.

Hence Gautama in his aphorisms defines Dharma as that which protects the progeny by means of a non-mixture of genetically different groups (*asamkara*). Here is the biological aim of society clearly enunciated, which requires that the society must live perpetually in the first place, before the demonstration of culture and power. A short-lived civilization, however powerful or intelligent like that of the Romans or Greeks, frustrates the biological end of Dharma.

HINDU SOCIOLOGICAL CANONS

The biological concept of religion serves as the basis of the sociological concept and of social relations. Jaimini, the ritualist philosopher, correctly starts with the idea that the ends of life being strictly *a priori*, Dharma is also *a priori*, and must be defined as a "desirable goal or result indicated by the injunctive passages from the Vedas, or the Revealed Text. Thus Hindu sociology understands by Dharma "privileges, duties and obligations of a man, his standard of conduct as a member of the Aryan community, as a member of one of the castes, as a person in a peculiar stage

of life or Ashrama" (*History of Dharmasastra* : Kane, p. 2).

Hindu sociology talks not of individual rights, but of duties. The sociological concept regarding the individual Dharma is, in the words of Prof. Hopkins, that "Dharma or ethical good usage implies in itself a whole code of conduct to avoid all crimes, to avoid no less spiritual sins, and to avoid all injury to other beings. It implies all recognized virtues of conduct which includes on the social side approved usages in the matter of family customs, caste distinctions, the stages of life, in short, the maintenance of the established order" (*Indian Ethics* : By Prof. Hopkins, p. 92).

I do not wish to criticize here Prof. Mackenzie's indictment of Indian ethics as being illogical and anti-social, for, it has been refuted by Prof. Hopkins in his valuable book on Indian ethics. It is a cardinal principle of Hindu sociology that "each member of Indian society has his due place and functions assigned to him; each enjoys some measure of importance as representing his Dharma or function within the community however insignificant he may be as an individual" (*Indian and Western Philosophy*, p. 142).

Dharma is universal norm applicable to all societies whether Eastern or other.

MULAMADHYAMA-KĀRIKĀ

BY SWAMI VIMUKTANANDA

CHAPTER II

THE EXAMINATION OF MOTION

But why should there be at all more than one agent to perform different acts even though these acts are simultaneous, for do we not see sometimes one and the same person standing, seeing and speaking at the same time and thus attending to various functions? This is true, but the case is different here.

It is not after all the physical presence of a person that can pass for an agent of an action, it is but his capacity to do an action, wherein inheres the real agency. In a person there may be various capacities for actions and so it is seen that the same person performs simultaneously different actions. But in doing the same kind of action there is only one capacity and so only one agency. Thus in a double act of passing one cannot think of two agents and therefore such an act is an impossibility.

But this does not do away with all agency, and if there is an agent there must be an action. In our common parlance also we always use such expression as "he is going," and this clearly shows that we actually experience activity in a person; and so it can be said without any fear of contradiction that there is an agent and so there is also action or movement.

गन्तारं चेत्तिरस्कृत्य गमनं नोपपद्यते ।

गमनेऽसति गन्ताथ कुत एव भविष्यति ॥ ७ ॥

गन्तारम् Goer तिरस्कृत्य ignoring गमनम् going न not उपपद्यते becomes possible चेत् however अथ then गमने असति while there is no going गन्ता goer कुतः how एव verily भविष्यति will be ?

7. An act of going, however, never becomes possible leaving aside the goer, and in the absence of the act of going again how will there be any goer at all?

It is true that the existence of a goer presupposes an act of going, and *vice versa*. But here it presents a difficulty. Since both the goer and going are correlated, one cannot possibly precede the other. So there is no going before the existence of a goer and, again, no goer in the absence of going, as there is nothing that can style him as such. This being so we are led to the inescapable vicious circle and so nothing can be proved from this. It is, therefore, our uncriticised judgment after all which tells us that there is such a thing as motion.

Moreover, the arguments that have been adduced to disprove the existence of the object of passing apply *mutatis mutandis* in the case of the agent of passing as well, and thus the agent and the object of passing being non-existent the act of passing itself must cease to exist.

गन्ता न गच्छति तावद्गन्ता नैव गच्छति ।

अन्यो गन्तुरगन्तुश्च कस्तृतीयो हि गच्छति ॥ ८ ॥

गन्ता Goer न not गच्छति goes अगन्ता one who has not yet started to go तावत् also न not एव verily गच्छति goes गन्तुः from goer अगन्तुः from non-goer च as well अन्यः another तृतीयः third कः who हि verily गच्छति goes ?

8. A goer does not go neither a non-goer; besides these goer and non-goer who is that third person that can go?

If there is such an act as going there should be somebody to go, but there is none. For, a goer cannot go since his going a second time is redundant; again a non-goer cannot go, he is *vi termini* not connected with going. And a third alternative is a logical impossibility. So in the absence of a goer the act of going is absurd.

In the following three stanzas additional arguments have been put forward to show how a goer cannot go.

गन्ता तावद्गच्छतीति कथमेवोपपत्स्यते ।

गमनेन विना गन्ता यदा नैवोपपद्यते ॥ ९ ॥

गन्ता Goer गच्छति goes इति this तावत् thus कथम् how एव verily उपपत्स्यते will be proved यदा when गमनेन विना without going गन्ता goer न not एव verily उपपद्यते becomes possible ?

9. How will it be proved that a goer goes since without the act of going a goer is simply unthinkable?

One is called a goer only after he is connected with the act of going. But when we say a goer goes there is only one act of going which indicates his movement, and there is no other act that can style him as a goer. Such being the case if we still persist in calling him a goer he will be only so called without being connected with the act of going, and as such the term goer will have no meaning whatsoever.

But there is at least one act of going and this can be connected with the goer. This is also untenable.

पक्षो गन्ता गच्छतीति यस्य तस्य प्रसज्यते ।

गमनेन विना गन्ता गन्तुर्गमनमिच्छतः ॥ १० ॥

गन्ता Goer गच्छति goes इति this यस्य whose पक्षः contention प्रसज्यते becomes possible गन्तुः of goer गमनम् going इच्छतः of one who desires तस्य his गमनेन विना without going गन्ता goer प्रसज्यते becomes inevitable.

10. One who desires to connect the act of going with the goer and holds the view that a goer goes divests the goer of (further act of) going.

Those who maintain that the act of going can be connected with the goer to style him so, cannot explain how a goer can go, since there is no second act of going which can signify his movement. So a goer, after he has been so styled, cannot make any further movement. It is therefore concluded that a goer cannot go.

To avoid the difficulty let us suppose that both the goer and his movement are connected with the act of going. This will also give rise to further complications.

गमने द्वे प्रसज्येते गन्ता यद्युत गच्छति ।

गन्तेति चोच्यते येन गन्ता सन् यच्च गच्छति ॥ ११ ॥

उत्त Or यदि if गन्ता goer गच्छति goes (तर्हि then) द्वे two गमने acts of going प्रसज्येते become unavoidable येन (गमनेन) by which (act of going) गन्ता goer इति this च also उच्यते is called गन्ता goer सन् being यत् (गमनम्) which (act of going) गच्छति goes.

11. Or, if a goer goes a double act of going will be needed, —one to give him the style of a goer and the other to make him go after he has been so styled.

It is after all an impossibility to escape the tangle of a double act of going if one is to maintain that a goer goes. A goer requires for his very designation an act of going, and after he is so designated it is absolutely necessary for a second act of going if he is at all to go. And if we suppose that there are two such acts there will also be necessity for two distinct agents which will court further complications, as has been already shown (*infra*, 6). All this indicates that there is no motion.

The empiricists will argue that while everybody through his observation and experience knows it for certain that there is motion how could such a direct experience be nullified by sheer force of logic? To them the only reply is that empirical experiences are not the criteria of truth. Things may be experienced and yet they may be no more than appearances, mere phantoms, devoid of all reality. To know the reality of things we must therefore appeal to the higher court of reasoning and logic and there we must strip the nature of its false cloak and see the reality as it is.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IN THIS NUMBER

The Editorial of this month is an elaborate review of Count Hermann Keyserling's latest valuable production entitled *From Suffering to Fulfilment*, in which the learned author has presented a very realistic picture of the spiritual decadence of the modern West, indicated in bold and clear terms the growing spirit of revolt against the materialistic tendency of the age, and delivered an inspiring message of a nobler spiritual fulfilment of human life to the power-intoxicated people of the West. Rev. C. F. Andrews is well known in India and abroad as a great lover of Indian thought and culture. In his learned article on *Swami Rama Tirtha : An Appreciation*, he has given a brilliant pen-picture of the distinctive traits in the life and writings of Swami Rama, and also pointed out the contributions of this great Indian monk towards the growing synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the East and the West. In the *Conception of Freedom in the Bhagavad-Gita* by Dr. S. K.

Maitra, M. A., Ph. D., Head of the Department of Philosophy in the Benares Hindu University, the readers will find an illuminating discussion on the various conceptions of freedom as prevalent amongst the great philosophers of the West, and also an elaborate treatment of what, in the opinion of the Gita, constitutes the true essence of human freedom. Prof. Haridas Chaudhuri, M. A., Professor of Philosophy in the City College, Calcutta, in his thoughtful article on *The Philosophical Importance of the Number 'Three'*, has ably shown how the basic principles of existence and fundamental philosophic concepts oftener than not present themselves to human thought in a triadic rhythm, and has elaborately dealt with the immense philosophical importance which the number 'three' possesses. Prof. Henri-L. Mieville, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Lausanne in Switzerland, concludes his learned dissertation on the *Problem of Tolerance. In Sikh Monotheism and Its Background*, Prof. Charanjit Singh Bindra, M. A., LL. B.,

of the Khalsa College, Amritsar, points out how the Sikh idea of God differs from the various conceptions of Divinity prevalent amongst other religious sect. Mr. V. R. Talasikar, M. A., LL. B., Editor of the *National Wealth*, in his interesting article on *The Sociological Concept of Dharma*, has enumerated several meanings of the word Dharma, and discussed at length their sociological and metaphysical implications as given in the various systems of Hindu philosophy.

WHERE THE TWO ENDS MEET

It is true that for generations the East and the West have misunderstood each other. The excess of egoism and the individualistic desire for superiority have given rise to the so-called fundamental differences between the East and the West. But in spite of the apparent distinctions between the Easterner and the Westerner in race, religion and almost every branch of human life, there is discernible a consciousness of a common humanity, and a sense of common responsibility in both of them. The strong and the noble of either hemisphere are sincerely trying to recognise each other and to form ties of friendship, thus bridging the gulf between the two.

Last March, in a lecture delivered under the auspices of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Prof. Guiseppe Tucci of the University of Rome, historically traced the points of contact between the early cultures of the East and the West. His observations on the results, which the contact between East and West brought about, in modern Europe or Asia, are worthy of note in this connection. He said: "The opposition of Asia to Europe may appear strange to some, because it seems at a first glance, that though

in Europe, in spite of so many political differences, there is a unity of culture, on the other hand, in Asia, we are confronted with a multiplicity of cultural currents. So that, apparently this real opposition of Asia, as a whole, to Europe cannot be taken for granted As to Asia this unity seems at first to be missing; we are confronted with a great diversity as regards cultural aspects, political ideas, speculation and art. Still to a closer examination it appears that all over Asia there is a common spiritual background, a particular mood of facing life and solving its problems, a peculiar attitude of man towards nature; that is to say, we can trace certain characters, which, in spite of the manifold aspects of Asiatic civilisation, we find in the greater part of Oriental nations.

"We are quite wrong to think that Hellenism or Christianity or Humanism were the only attempts at unifying cultures and spirits. Even in Asia there has been such an attempt and this is undoubtedly to be found in Buddhist Humanism. Buddhism conquered Asia and gave its imprint to it from India to Java, from China to Japan, from Tibet to Mongolia, contributing, perhaps more than other factors, to giving spiritual unity to Asia."

As regards the influence of Eastern mind and culture upon the Western, the Prof. said: "The intensified contacts with Asia and a better knowledge of its culture and thought have shown that our notion of history is to be reconsidered. This new conception which begins to be accepted by European thinkers is in a certain sense due to the increased knowledge of the Asiatic culture and to the discovery of the many links which united since

prehistoric times Europe with Asia; even the oldest civilisations are now discovered to have been to a certain extent interrelated. We realise that Greek philosophy of which we are so proud cannot claim longer to be superior to the speculation of India and that the history of judgment of Kant was anticipated by Dinnaga and Dharmakirti."

One of the factors that unite the East and the West, in the bonds of understanding and help, is Art. "While patriotism divides, Art unites. Art has no Fatherland except it be that of the highest human spirit, which is the mirror of the Spirit of God." Recent researches have clearly shown that more than 3,000 years before the advent of Christ, there existed a fundamental cultural homogeneity between Crete and other parts of the Mediterranean and the Harappa-Mohenjo-daro culture. "The knowledge of Eastern art," observed Prof. Tucci, "has in a certain way brought about a revolution in our ideas. We see for instance that in India, China and Japan art was understood as a symbol of spiritual ecstasies. The artist is not a mere spectator, but he becomes identified with the inner reality which pervades everything, not an art of forms therefore but an art of spiritual expression we have begun studying Oriental art in order to get from it new inspirations. It appears, therefore, that European culture at a closer contact with Asia, feels that it cannot claim any longer to be the centre of the universe."

As regards Religion, he said: "The intensified comparative study of religions showed that Christianity is after all not superior but equivalent to many other creeds which humanity imagined, in order to solve the mystery of life and death. Some aspects of

Christianity, for instance, belief in dogma, and the assertion that whatever is not in Christianity is false, appeared more and more in contrast with certain fundamental characters of Asiatic religious experiences. According to Eastern mind, all religions are equally true in so far as they are glimpses as it were of the truth which is beyond their symbols."

Thus the meeting of the East and the West on so many grounds may pave the way for a firm unity, if both stand on a common and universal culture of mankind. Though, to a narrow and superficial observer, these two cultures appear to differ widely, but in the pure realm of thought, it is wrong and unjust to say that their blending together is an impossible hope. In fact the terms, East and West, are mere geographical denominations and to speak of superiority or inferiority of either of them is unwarranted. "We must begin to think of the world," as Prof. Radhakrishnan says, "not in terms of maps and markets but of men and women. We must not avoid the labour of imagination to understand the other man's point of view, look at things with the other man's eyes, even if we are not prepared to spare his feelings. Each of us is a trustee for the health and happiness of humanity. We cannot exaggerate the magnitude of this trust and it imposes on us the obligation to bear with each other's foibles, help each other over the obstacles and build the peace of the world." Of course so long as the Eastern races suffer in their political and other relations with the Western ones, it is idle to talk of any rapprochement between the two. The Western nations, in their greed for pelf and power, have intensified their policy of re-armament and exploitation. This spirit of collective security and military imperialism, in the West, has

given rise to a fake civilisation, that "soaks its pretending hands with the blood of the innocent and drags the world to a new Armageddon which may turn out to be one vast cultural holocaust." To quote the words of a European Journalist: "The West is in serious danger of self-destruction if it does not somewhat change its methods and aims, and on the other hand, India is very much tempted to follow in the foot-steps of the West to get its share of all that material wealth and power, even if it

be at the cost of spirituality. But that is perhaps the very reason when the time has come in which the two may meet." We do not decry the necessity of the East copying the West or *vice versa*, but both should try their utmost to preserve their spiritual resources, their conviction of a common destiny of mankind. If each side plays its part towards evolving a universal spiritual kinship of man, then it will not be long before we see that the 'twain' have met.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

THE CRISIS AND THE CHRISTIAN.
 BY NATHANIEL MICKLEM. *Published by the Student Christian Movement Press, London. Copies may be had of the Y. M. C. A. Publishing House, 5, Great Russel Street, Calcutta. Pp. 60. Price Re. 1.*

The rapidly changing international situation and the fear of a crisis overtaking Europe in the near future have created a sense of bewilderment, worry and distress in the minds of some Christians, particularly those connected with the Church. The Christian Church which thinks it holds in its palm the salvation of its followers, finds it necessary to clarify its own position with regard to the critical world situation and the barbarities perpetrated by Christian nations in civilised Europe. The interesting book before us is the first of the series of booklets which the Student Christian Movement Press is publishing with the object of helping Christians "to clear their minds as to the fundamental nature of the present situation, the urgent issues it raises and the responsibility it lays upon" them.

According to Dr. Micklem, the present international crisis is due to collective sin resulting from the indifference of European statesmen to God, humanity and justice, for, those nations "that will not put His righteousness first, both internationally and socially, must surely perish". Hence the revengeful hands of Nemesis are raining death and destruction. The author calls upon every Christian to avoid war by supporting a policy

of persuasion, concession and appeasement, for, Christian ethics admits of compromise. This 'crisis booklet' which appears to be a sort of propaganda in favour of the policy pursued by some European countries to-day, does not seem to suggest any means for the establishment of permanent peace and goodwill among nations.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. BY V. RAJAGOPAL, M.A. *Published by D. B. Taraporevala Sons and Co., Bombay. Pp. 61. Price Re. 1.*

The author, himself an active worker in the practical field of Co-operation, after successfully arguing in the book under review, against the new drift in modern politics, both in the West and, to a certain extent, in India, which wants to adopt the totalitarian view of the state as a remedy for the ills that society has become heir to, on account of the unequal distribution of wealth, puts forth a strong plea for the adoption of economic co-operation. The totalitarian view of the state is sometimes called Collectivism, Communism or State-Socialism, by which the state, after taking up the entire control of production and distribution, undertakes to provide the state population with sufficient food, cloth, house, education and amusement. But, according to the author, this reduces the individual to nothing as he is to be of significance only as one living for the ministration of the state; it destroys the inborn family ties as

well as individual creative enthusiasm, and in its jealousy against individual perfection it actually brings about the fall of man. If Capitalism has thrown out monstrosities of men, Socialism "ignores and stifles the super-human powers of an individual" and "it carries on a propaganda against faith and religion, wherein the great qualities of manhood and womanhood are depicted."

The author pleads for the rejection of this soul-killing collectivistic state as it is incompatible with the inner nature of man and suggests the adoption of economic Co-operation, by which the society is reconstructed in such a way as to bring about a co-operation between the individual and the state that will create a new generation and enable it to live to the tune of its highest ideals. While Communism attempts to thrust a uniformity on all, Co-operation tries for unity in diversity. Those who are interested in remodelling the existing society on the above lines will find the book very informative and instructive.

INSPIRED TALKS. BY SWAMI VIVEKANANDA. *Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras. Pp. 220. Pocket Size. Price Re. 1-12.*

This is a faithful record of a series of talks given by Swami Vivekananda to a group of his intimate friends and disciples who gathered round him at a quite out-of-the-way cottage in Thousand Island Park in the St. Lawrence River whither the Swami repaired for rest and solitude after a couple of years of strenuous preaching and lecturing in America. These talks not being regular lectures, were taken in long hand and safely preserved by a loving lady disciple. Those inspiring words were first brought out in a book form in 1908 with the ardent hope that they must have the power to bring comfort and solace to all souls. The book has since run through several editions which show its intrinsic worth and popularity.

The talks range over various subjects taken from such sacred books as the Holy Bible, Bhagavad Gita, Vedanta-Sutras, Upanishads, Bhakti Sutras of Narada and Patanjali's Yoga Sutras. There are also talks on Sri Ramakrishna Deva and the Divine Mother; in the former we get a brief sketch of the Master and in the latter a masterly exposition in a succinct manner of Sakti Worship or the worship of Universal Energy as Mother.

The language is simple and is marked by brevity and directness appealing straight to the heart and intellect as well. Swami Vivekananda known to many as a thundering orator and a convincing debator is seen in these pages, on the contrary, as a peaceful Rishi of the Vedic ages sitting in the midst of a few ardent souls, mildly disseminating the message of peace and bliss and uttering words of profoundest wisdom.

The talks proper are preceded by two essays, viz., "Introductory Narrative" and "The Master", where we have touching reminiscences of the great Swami. An exhaustive Index also has been added to this new edition. The book is printed in clear and bold types and the get-up is handy and attractive.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, VOL. II. BY BENOY KUMAR SARKAR. *Published by Chukkervetty Chatterjee & Co., Ltd., 15, College Square, Calcutta. Pp. 308. Price Rs. 6.*

For long Dr. Sarkar has been engaged in the study of applied economics in the different fields of industry, banking, commerce and agriculture with a view to indicating the most fruitful lines along which Indian economic development may proceed. The present volume contains some of these studies and investigations in world economy in accordance with the method of quantitative comparisons which the author designates as "comparative industrialism and its equations."

The subjects dealt with relate to different problems, namely, the principles of control over foreign insurance companies as embodied in the economic legislation of the continent, note-legislation of the Reichs Bank and the Bank of France in the perspective of the Bank of England, Bank-capitalism of Young Bengal, Railway Industry and Commerce of India in International Railway Statistics, Traces of Rationalization in Indian Business Enterprise, World Crisis in Its Bearings on the Regions of the Second and the First Industrial Revolutions. These comparative studies are intended not to remain mere mathematical curios but to be helpful tools at the hands of economic experts in the task of the economic reconstruction of the world. Special significance attaches to the distinction he draws between the 1st and 2nd regions of Industrial Revolutions, for a firm grasp of the relationship between these two regions will help to expose the

fallacy of citing and emulating the contemporary development of the great powers of to-day while formulating schemes of economic and societal reconstruction for India in reference to the near future, without realizing the essentially primitive condition of the industrialization such as has been achieved up till now.

GREETINGS TO YOUNG INDIA. BY BENOY KUMAR SARKAR. *Published by N. M. Ray Chowdhury & Co., 72, Harrison Road, Calcutta. Pp. 160. Price Re. 1/-.*

This publication, which has run to its second edition, mostly consists of interviews with Prof. Sarkar which have already appeared in the papers, and reports of addresses delivered by him since his return to India in 1925. They touch upon a wide range of topics and reveal a truly remarkable foresight on the author's part with regard to the direction that the Indian movement in its different aspects took in subsequent years.

SELF-RESTRAINT VERSUS SELF-INDULGENCE, PART II. BY M. K. GANDHI. *Published by Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad. Pp. 147. Price Re. 1.*

This volume contains thirty-one articles written by Gandhiji—all except three of which are reprinted from the "Harijan"—and four extracts from Mr. Mahadev Desai's weekly letters. The first part of this book was published in 1928 and it is now running its fifth edition. As they were written mostly in reply to Indian correspondents and educationists, these masterly writings of Gandhiji offer us solutions to our social and ethical problems. Brahmacharya should be the guiding motto of every youth, and salvation of the race can be achieved by self-control only—not by self-indulgence. Gandhiji's own life is based on the solid foundation of the immortal teachings of the Gita, and these writings are illustrative of his unshakable conviction in those teachings, i.e., truth at any cost and non-violence under any circumstances.

CENT. PER CENT. SWADESHI OR THE ECONOMICS OF VILLAGE INDUSTRIES. *Published by Navajivan Press, Ahmedabad. Pp. 212. Price Re. 1-8.*

The articles collected in this book are from the writings of Mahatma Gandhi, Mr. Mahadev Desai, Mr. J. C. Kumarappa and

others on the economics of village industries and other allied subjects. The book has been published with the object of "creating a better understanding of the programme and principles of the movement for the revival and encouragement of village industries." The village industries that Gandhiji refers to are hand-spun cloth, hand-made paper, hand-pounded rice, preparation of jaggery (*gur*) and a variety of the common necessities of life. Gandhiji asks his critics: "Am I turning back the course of modern civilisation, when I ask the villagers not merely to grow raw produce but to turn it into marketable products, and thereby add a few more pies to their daily income?" The book is replete with practical suggestions on the various aspects and problems of the revival of village industries. The question of 'swadeshi' has been exhaustively discussed by one who is undoubtedly the father of the swadeshi movement. The book is as informative as it is instructive and will be welcomed by those interested in Gandhiji's Village Industries programme.

BENGALI

GIRISH NATYA SAHITYER VAISHISHTYA (GIRISH CHANDRA GHOSH LECTURES FOR 1938). BY SRI AMARENDRA-NATH ROY. *Published by the Calcutta University. Pp. vii+110.*

Thanks to Sir Ashutosh who first introduced the study and teaching of the dramatic literature of Girish Chandra in the B.A. and M.A. courses of the Calcutta University and thanks also to Dr. Shyamaprasad, his worthy son and successor, the ex-Vice-Chancellor, who has founded the G. C. Ghosh Lectureship, Bengal is having profound and critical studies of Girish literature by eminent scholars.

Mr. Roy, in a series of three lectures, has made a remarkable survey of the excellences of Girish dramas in a brilliant style. The book under review may be unhesitatingly regarded as a comprehensive study of Girish Chandra as well as a distinctive addition to Bengali literature. A perusal of this volume will certainly enable the reader to have a good glimpse of the depth and richness of Girish dramas. If the lectures of Mr. Roy's predecessor, Mr. Kumud Bandhu Sen, the first Girish lecturer, were an exhaustive and excellent introduction to the mind and art of Girish Chandra, Mr. Roy's lectures

are, no doubt, a critical appreciation of the great dramatist.

In the words of the late Mr. C. R. Das Bengal has not yet duly understood the genius of Girish Chandra. As Shakespeare was appreciated in England after the lapse of a century, so Girish Chandra will be more read and appreciated later in Bengal. His versatile genius is sure to attract students from other provinces and countries because his dramas are in many respects unique and wonderful among the best dramas of the world. Mr. Das's prediction is slowly coming to be true as some of Girish dramas are now being rendered into Indian and foreign languages. Sir Walter Raleigh's remarks that there is no watch-tower to have the bird's-eye view of the miraculous globe in which Shakespeare moved may with equal appropriateness be applied to Girish Chandra.

First of all, Mr. Roy compares him with Garric and Shakespeare and concludes that the former not only combined in himself the dramatic and histrionic genius of both but also excelled them in some other respects also. As an actor Garric was, of course, notable, but as an author he was ordinary and insignificant; whereas Shakespeare was a very great play-wright but he was almost nothing as an actor. It is said of Shakespeare that in his life only once he played the role of a ghost in the performance of Hamlet but in his whole life Girish Chandra played as many as sixty-two kinds of parts in a perfect manner. His acting was so efficient and impressive that the audience which consisted of the greatest men of the then Bengal including Sri Ramakrishna, used to be overwhelmed with feelings he evoked.

As an author Girish Chandra can very well stand comparison with Shakespeare, Shaw, Ibsen or even any great dramatist of the world. He could dictate at a time to four persons four dramas of different kinds, viz., to one a tragedy, to another a comedy, to a third a farce and to the fourth a tragi-comedy. Few dramatic geniuses of the world can claim such supreme distinction. He composed as many as eighty dramas and his other writings collected together may equal the Ramayana in bulk. Among his dramatis personæ, not less than seven hundred characters may be counted of whom 450 are male and 250 female. In his social dramas 90 male and 50 female characters play their parts, yet each character is a distinct figure and is not the duplicate of another. He

himself said that his characters were made out of a mixture of experience and imagination and that he had the rare privilege of observing the human nature from the lowest to the highest. It was Sri Ramakrishna, his spiritual teacher, who opened his insight and encouraged him in his favourite art for the edification of the public.

Like other great dramatists of India, Girish Chandra has drawn abundantly from the mythology of our land but some of his stories are entirely his original creations. Mental change or moral conversion is another special feature of Girish Chandra's dramas. How human love is converted into divine devotion is beautifully illustrated in his "Vilva Mangal".

Mr. Roy has creditably brought out in the short compass of three lectures the salient characteristics of Girish, and has thus been fully equal to the task with which he was entrusted by the University. We congratulate him on his able performance and wish his book a wider circulation.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

(1) RAMAKRISHNA SANGIT (THAKURER NAMAMRITA), pp. 106. (2) SRI RAMAKRISHNA STOTRA-GITI, pp. 18.

Published by Swami Yogavilas, Sri Ramakrishna-Matrimandir, Simultala, E. I. Ry. Can be had of the publisher free.

The first one is a nice collection of 196 songs composed by some distinguished devotees and litterateurs of Bengal including Dr. Rabindra Nath Tagore, Girish Chandra Ghosh, Rajani Kanta Sen, Sadhak Kamalakanta, Kalipada Ghosh, Krishnadhan Pal Banikantha, Swami Yogavilas and others. The second brochure contains some beautiful Sanskrit verses, and Bengali poems and songs about Sri Ramakrishna. Both the books will be useful to those who are interested in these subjects.

SRI RAMAKRISHNA KAVYALAHARI. BY SWAMI SHYAMANANDA, RANGOON, BURMA. Page 624. Price Rs. 2-12.

The present volume gives in verse a delightful account of the life of Sri Ramakrishna. Almost all the principal events in the life of the Master have been accommodated in it. Though the metre is faulty in many places, the verses reflect the writer's earnestness and sincerity of effort to bring within the easy reach of the common run of men

the fascinating life-story of Sri Ramakrishna in a very popular style. Dr. Rabindra Nath Tagore has enhanced the value of the book by writing a suitable foreword for it.

HINDI

SRI RAMAKRISHNA LILAMRITA. BY PANDIT DWARKANATH TIWARI, B.A., LL.B., with the foreword by Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. I, pages 337. Price Rs. 1-6-0. Vol II, pages 390. Price Rs. 1-8-0. Published by Swami Bhaskareswarananda, President, Sri Ramakrishna Ashram, Dhantoli, Nagpur, C.P.

We gladly welcome the publication of Sri Ramakrishna Lilamrita, which is an authoritative and exhaustive life (in two volumes) of Sri Ramakrishna in Hindi. It is the first of its kind ever written in that widely spoken language which in the near future commands the prospect of becoming the lingua franca of our country. Pandit Dwarkanath Tiwari has eminently supplied the long-felt need and thus placed the Hindi-knowing public under a deep debt of gratitude.

The material of this life has been collected from the most authentic sources such as the original Bengali works of Srimat Swami Saradananda (a direct disciple of Sri Ramakrishna and the author of Sri Ramakrishna Lilaprasanga), Sri Ramachandra Dutta, Devendranath Basu, 'M' and others. These two volumes successfully bring into prominent relief the many-sided life of Sri Ramakrishna who was an intensely practical Spiritual Reformer.

The clarity of expression and the sweetness of the language with its direct appeal

to the heart are the characteristic features of these volumes. They are profusely illustrated, nicely got up and neatly printed and the comparatively moderate price has brought them within the easy reach of the readers of all classes. We earnestly hope that the Hindi-knowing public will highly appreciate this complete and exhaustive life of Sri Ramakrishna which was hitherto not available in the Hindi book-world.

KALYAN MANASANKA. Published by the Gita Press, Gorakhpur, pp. 928.

The Gita Press has done a very valuable service to the Hindi-reading public by bringing out this most beautifully illustrated edition of "Sri Ramacharita Mânasa" by Goswami Tulasidas. It contains a useful introduction which acquaints the readers with the short lives of the different minor characters that are to be met with during the reading of the book. The work is divided into seven 'kândas' and each verse is followed by its running translation in simple Hindi. A common feature of the books published by the Gita Press is the abundance of charming plain and coloured illustrations which go to intensify the interest of the readers. In this issue there are as many as 193 illustrations of which a good number are multi-coloured and a few are multicoloured and gilded. The rich and instructive contents of these melodious verses of Tulasidas, which have a literary merit as well, will interest both the scholar and the devotee. We hope the Hindi-public will be immensely benefited by this laudable publication of the Gita Press.

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION, SINGAPORE

REPORT FOR 1938

The activities of the Ramakrishna Mission, Singapore, which has completed the tenth year of its useful existence, fall under the following heads:

(1) *Preaching work*: Religious classes and lectures in Tamil and English were regularly conducted on Fridays and Saturdays. Invited by the public, the representatives of the Mission including the President visited different parts of Malaya from time to time to

spread the universal teachings of Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda by means of lectures, classes, lantern lectures and discourses.

(2) *Educational work*: The Vivekananda Tamil School for boys had 116 students on the roll during the year, about 80 per cent of whom were given free tuition. The Saradamani Girls' School which was located in a rented house has now been shifted to a building of its own which was

purchased during the year. The number of girls in this school increased to 110 during the year under report as against 60 in the previous year. Besides general education, the boys are taught basket-weaving and fret-work and the girls are taught needle-work, clay-modelling and cookery. The Afternoon English Schools Section contained 96 boys during the year. The night classes were well attended by adults drawn from various walks of life. Both the boys and girls were afforded full facilities for proper physical development by drills and games, and the general health of the students was satisfactory.

Needs: Both the Boys' and Girls' Schools are now practically full and it is necessary to provide additional accommodation without delay. This requires at least \$15,000/-. Also the voluntary monthly contributions which go to maintain the Schools at present have to be replaced by a Permanent Fund which alone can ensure a permanent source of revenue. With these objects in view an earnest appeal is made to the generous public to come forward and help in solving the pressing problems of accommodation and the creation of a Permanent Fund.

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION CHARITABLE DISPENSARY, BELUR MATH, HOWRAH

REPORT FOR 1938

The Ramakrishna Mission Headquarters started this Charitable Dispensary in the year 1913 with a view to alleviating the sufferings of poor and helpless patients in and around Belur. Due to its immense popularity and the remarkable expansion of its work it has risen to be an important centre of medical relief in the District of Howrah. During the year under review the Dispensary treated 31,617 cases, as against 23,614 in the year before, thus showing an increase of nearly 30 per cent. The number of new cases was 16,144 of which 1322 were surgical. The total receipts including the previous year's balance amounted to Rs. 975-11-11 and the total expenditure to Rs. 676-7-3, thus leaving a closing balance of Rs. 299-4-8. The construction of a spacious building for the Dispensary, furnished with necessary modern appliances, at a cost of Rs. 13,000 was started in the month of June this year. But due to want of funds the building could not be

completed. A sum of about Rs. 3,800 is urgently required to complete the building. Funds for the general upkeep of the Dispensary are also badly wanted. An appeal is made to the kind-hearted public to come forward and help the Dispensary in all its needs.

RAMAKRISHNA MISSION STUDENTS' HOME, DUM-DUM, CALCUTTA

REPORT FOR 1938

The Ramakrishna Mission Students' Home, Calcutta, is a college students' hostel, specially meant for poor and meritorious students who are helped through their college course with free board, lodging, fees, books and other necessaries as far as possible. Its aim is to supplement the purely academic education imparted by the University by a thorough and systematic home-training calculated to develop the character and efficiency of its inmates. Paying students, who would like to receive this home training are also admitted. The features of the home-training may be summed up as follows:

Spiritual: Religious classes are regularly held, while the *utsavs* celebrated on a religious basis not only afford the students a healthy recreation but also go to intensify their spiritual aspiration.

Intellectual: The students run a monthly manuscript magazine and join in a Sunday class where socio-religious topics are discussed and papers on various subjects are read.

Practical: All household duties (except cooking), namely, sweeping, scouring utensils, marketing, cleaning, etc., are done by the students. Besides these, the students have to put in labour for rearing a kitchen garden and a number of flower beds.

At the end of the year under review there were 38 students, of whom 25 were free, 8 concession holders, and 5 paying. Seven free students sat for the B.A. and one free student sat for the B.Sc. examinations, all of whom came out successful, four of them securing honours in their respective subjects. Seven students passed the Intermediate examination and one student passed the P.Sc., M.B. examination.

At the present moment the condition of the current expenses fund is causing anxiety and the present monthly subscrip-

tion strength has to be increased by at least Rs. 200, in order to ensure smooth working of the institution. An endowment of Rs. 5,000 will go to maintain and educate one free student at a time and those who feel interested in this work are requested to help the poor students by offering their mite to this institution where every penny will be properly utilised.

SRI RAMAKRISHNA GURUKUL, THE VILANGANS, TRICHUR

REPORT FOR 1937 AND 1938

This institution aims at the educational and economic uplift of the Harijans of Kerala along the lines chalked out by Swami Vivekananda. It has two branches, namely, the Gurukul and the Matrimandir. The Matrimandir is the residential section for girls and is mainly intended for Harijans. It is run on the same lines as the Gurukul; the strength of the Matrimandir during each of the two years under review was 12. The Vidyamandir is the school where boys and girls, residential as well as day-scholars, receive their instruction. It was started in 1927 as a Lower Primary School, and raised to a Lower Secondary School in 1933, and in 1937 the High School was opened. It has also an Industrial and Agricultural section where boys are taught various kinds of small industries like weaving, mat-making, needle-work, embroidery, crochet, and knitting, and also gardening and agriculture, as well as dairying. The Vidyamandir had at the end of 1937, 168 boys and 107 girls in its Primary School section, 64 boys and 35 girls in its Secondary School section and 12 boys and 4 girls in the Industrial School section. At the end of 1938, the respective strengths in these three sections were, 164 boys and 112 girls, 70 boys and 36 girls and 8 boys and 4 girls. In the Gurukul residence, there were 34 boarders in 1937 and 33 in 1938. Though the institution is meant mainly for Harijans, a few deserving pupils of the higher castes as well as some paying boarders have also been admitted, so as to give the Harijans the benefit of association with the higher castes on equal terms. The pupils run a Co-operative Store which supplies the requisites of the school and the students are given practical instruction in business methods, salesmanship, co-operation, civics, etc. The Gurukul owns a press from where is published the only monthly

organ of the Mission in Malayalam, "Prabuddha Bharatam." The whole scheme of work is based on a secure foundation of moral and spiritual instruction consisting of Puja, Bhajan, lives of the saints and heroes, and religious classes emphasising toleration and mutual respect towards all Prophets and religions.

The third annual conference of the monks and workers of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission centres in South India was held in December 1938 at the Gurukul, when many monks and Brahmacharis of the Order from several centres attended. With the steady growth of this institution, its needs have increased on every side. We hope the interested public will not fail to offer the necessary sympathy and support to the Gurukul.

SRI RAMAKRISHNA ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION AT SONARGAON RAMAKRISHNA MISSION

The birth-anniversary celebration of Sri Ramakrishna was solemnised with great pomp and eclat at the Sonargaon Ramakrishna Mission (Dacca) on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd May. The first day's celebration began with religious songs and worship in the morning and a great ceremonial procession which paraded through the important routes of the neighbouring villages with a nicely decorated portrait of Sri Ramakrishna. In the afternoon Swami Bhaskarananda, President of the Ashrama, expounded the Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna before a large audience of both sexes.

On the second day of the celebration a big public meeting was held in the Ashrama premises under the presidentship of Srimat Swami Sambudhananda, President, Bombay Ramakrishna Ashrama, and founder and chief supervisor of the local Mission. Proceedings commenced with the chanting of Vedic hymns. Dr. Umananda Datta, Secretary, read out a report of the activities of the local Mission for 1938. S. Ramani Kumar Datta Gupta, B.L., speaking on the religion and philosophy of Sri Ramakrishna said that Ramakrishna was the Prophet of the modern age, that his advent synchronised with a unique spiritual renaissance and that people must follow the life-giving teachings of the Great Master in order to achieve their all-round uplift. Swami Sampurnananda of the Narayanganj R. K. Mission, and Swami Sambuddhananda also spoke eloquently on

the various contributions of the Master. The third day's celebration began with the opening of the new Charitable Dispensary and Public Library Buildings by Mr. J. George, I.C.S., District Magistrate and Collector of Dacca. The Dispensary Building has been erected in memory of late Abalaranjan Choudhury, an eighteen-year-old worker of the local Mission, who fell a victim to cholera while nursing some patients. The Public Library building has been erected by Rambhai Govardhandas Amin of Guzrat-Cambay in sacred memory of his late grandfather Hatibhai Uttamdas. Two almshouses of the Public Library are dedicated to the memory of the late Profulla

Chandra Banerjee, formerly Professor of the Dacca School of Engineering and a well-wisher of the local Mission. Mr. George declaring the buildings open expressed his great pleasure in having an opportunity to perform the function and hear an account of the manifold humanitarian activities of the Ramakrishna Mission in India and abroad. He very much appreciated the recent tornado-relief work done excellently by the Sonargaon Ramakrishna Mission in the Narayanganj Sub-division.

In the afternoon one thousand and five hundred people were treated to Prasada in the Mission premises. Local volunteers rendered excellent services in all these functions.

RAMAKRISHNA MISSION FLOOD RELIEF WORK IN MIDNAPUR

We have already informed the public that we have sent a batch of workers to relieve the flood-stricken people of the Daspur Thana in the Ghatal Sub-division of the Midnapur district. They have fixed their camp at the Kulhanda L. P. School, on the embankment of the Cossaye, whence, after a preliminary inspection in small fishing boats, they distributed on the 19th August, from two distributing centres at Dudhkumra Hat and Maoratala Hat, 40 mds. 8 srs. of rice, 2 mds. of dal and 1 md. of salt among 1,014 persons belonging to 14 villages in Union no. 12. Frequent rain is impeding the progress of our work, but in the next week many more villages will be included.

The picture of desolation which the workers have given is heart-rending. Though the water has partly subsided, yet it is still several feet deep all around, and boats being very scarce, people are swimming to our centres from great distances in crowds for doles. Their famished looks betray the dire agony through which they are passing with their families. Cultivators and labourers have been equally hit. The rice cultivation is entirely destroyed. The walls of almost all the mud houses have either collapsed or been badly damaged. These have to be rebuilt, though a little later. The immediate need is for foodstuffs. Many people are living on boiled jute leaves.

The area affected is vast. We need funds urgently to meet the increasing demands made on our slender purse. To those benevolent souls who can visualise the miserable plight of these thousands of their homeless and helpless sisters and brothers, we earnestly appeal to come to their rescue without the least delay. The continuity and extension of our work will depend on their generosity. Contributions, however small, will be thankfully received and acknowledged at the following addresses :

- (1) The Secretary, Ramakrishna Mission, Belur Math, Dt. Howrah.
- (2) The Manager, Udbodhan Office, 1, Mukherji Lane, Baghbazar, Calcutta.
- (3) The Manager, Advaita Ashrama, 4, Wellington Lane, Calcutta.

(SD.) SWAMI MADHAVANANDA,
Secretary, Ramakrishna Mission
22nd August, 1939