

# PRABUDDHA BHARATA

VOL. XLIV

APRIL, 1939

No. 4



“उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।”

“Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.”

---

## RAG ASA OF GURU NANAK

BY PROF. CHARANJIT SINGH BINDRA, M.A., LL.B.

### I

I live so long as I remember the Lord,  
For life without his love is worse than death—  
Though it be ever so hard to live in his love.  
Whoever does strive to walk the path of love  
With joy eternal will he have himself filled,  
In spite of all the sufferings that ail his heart.

### II

Why then forget the Lord, O my lonesome heart,  
The Lord, who is the Master of Truth and Virtue !  
Innumerable men may venture to measure the riches  
Of Truth that is infinite; but all do fail:  
Their efforts combined would not either avail.

### III

Neither does He die, nor is there lamentation  
For him. His bounty continues for ever, never does  
It cease. That is the attribute supreme, possessed  
By none but the matchless One through aeons, through ages.

## IV

As great He is as great is his beatitude :  
 He is the great Master who made the day and the night.  
 Whoever forgets the Lord shall lose his caste with man—  
 Oh, Nanak, how all would shun the outcast pariah !

---

 IDEAL OF EDUCATION FOR INDIAN WOMEN

BY THE EDITOR

## I

With the dawn of nationalism in India there is perceptible in every department of her corporate life a vigorous striving to gain back her lost individuality. The wave of this new-born enthusiasm has already reached into the most secluded corners of the land, and it is encouraging to find that even the womanhood of India, so long cooped up in the cloistered seclusion of their hearth, have responded to the stimulating forces of the present day and are taking an active part in the manifold works of national reconstruction. In the words of the Hon'ble Mrs. V. L. Pandit, Minister of U. P. for Local Self-government and Health, "To-day she is fighting not only man's monopoly of seeking a living but also man's monopoly of civilisation, for there can be no civilisation in which man and woman are not equal partners. There can be no nation which has not been built up by their joint efforts. There can be no unity for which both man and woman have not worked and planned together, and there can be no freedom unless man and woman march forward together to achieve it." As a matter of fact both men and women have their responsible functions to perform on the physical, social and cultural planes. History bristles with instances of how the masculine torch-bearers of culture have more often than not

received help and inspiration from the creative genius of noble women. It is therefore quite reasonable to hold that the two sexes should conjointly tackle the problem of social and national well-being and work out the furtherance of civilisation and the collective good of humanity at large.

It cannot be denied that the modern movement that has been set on foot for the amelioration of the condition of Indian women owes its origin much to the influence of Occidental education which has brought in its wake an influx of revolutionary ideas into the vortex of Indian life. It is yet to be determined how far this Western culture has helped Indian women in their struggle for emancipation. No doubt it has proved advantageous in granting them adequate scope for the exercise of their intellectual powers, but it can hardly be gainsaid that this has also brought into the field certain malignant forces to which the unwary and the unsophisticated minds have fallen an easy victim. It is a historical phenomenon that any blind pursuit after novelties produces a very serious effect on the morale and the socio-religious life of the people, and it becomes a Herculean task for many unborn generations to counteract its baneful influence. The over-zealous advocates of female emancipation in India, in their anxiety for a quick

change and reform, have already begun to give the go-by to the sanctity of their social ideal. While admitting that the curse of exclusiveness that hangs over the devoted heads of our womanhood should be removed for their spontaneous growth and development in the genial atmosphere of our cultural life, we cannot but strongly urge at the same time that, in the vindication of their social rights and privileges, the Indian women must not go beyond the legitimate bounds of freedom consistent with the dignity of their position and functions as builders of the nation. They are in fact the real repositories of the tender graces, moral virtues as also of the spiritual forces that go to the formation of the religious life of their children—the future heroes of the land. For, the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world, and the mothers hold in their hands the real power to build a healthy and prosperous people.

## II

It is but a truism that much of our domestic peace and happiness as well as national well-being depends upon the kind of education that is imparted to our womanhood. They have natural gifts of imagination and sensitive emotion. Their manifold qualities of head and heart, if fully developed by means of proper education suited to the genius and temper of the people, will fill every hearth and home with peace and love, harmony and joy, and make heroes and heroines of their children. But it will be nothing short of a national tragedy to hasten to discard their old-time grace and sweetness, their tolerance and piety, and their childlike depth of love and simplicity, in favour of the crude products of Western education and social aggressiveness. It is in India that the people have been taught from hoary antiquity to look upon woman as the

veritable embodiment of the Eternal Being realized as Mother Divine. It is here in this land of saints and seers that this lofty idea has crystallized into a living principle in the philosophy of life and has been intimately associated with women-folk in general. It will not be an exaggeration to say that this idea reached its culmination in India in an age when many other races of the outside world were either not born at all, or rocking in the cradle of an infant culture, or were just stepping out into the light of a civilised life from the darkness of rank barbarism. Needless to say that it is this idea of sanctity attaching to the person of a woman that has ever since determined our dealings with, and attitude towards, the women of the world at large. Any attempt, therefore, to lower this sublime idealism is not only an insult to the wisdom of the ancient seers—the pioneers of Indian thought and culture, but a direct blow at the very spiritual foundation on which our social edifice stands.

## III

The education of women in India should be made a major issue in the present-day schemes for national improvement; for, as Margaret E. Cousins has pointed out in the *Awakening of Asian Womanhood*, “only one girl out of every hundred, or only thirteen out of every thousand, get education in India. The disgrace of this state of affairs is appalling, nay, criminal, when one thinks how in the West ninety girls out of every hundred get a good, free and compulsory education lasting at least eight years. In addition there is the insult shown to the feminine side in the fact that for every thirteen girls educated there are one hundred and thirty-eight boys provided with schooling, that is, over ten times as much attention is paid to boys in India in one of the most

vital points of the nation's life than is paid to girls—a suicidal policy indeed! For the result is that of every one hundred boys who wish to march forward, ninety will be held back by the illiteracy of their untaught girl-wives.” In view of this appalling illiteracy of our women-folk, the sooner some practical measures are taken to liquidate it, the better for the nation. That education is a liberating force of the greatest importance can hardly be over-emphasized. A trained and well-furnished mind gives its owner self-confidence, discrimination, a proper comparative sense of values, and independence necessary as an accompaniment to greater freedom of action, responsibility and movement. Time was when India could boast of her daughters as women of responsibility, power and capability, women who were morally and intellectually equipped with powers to face and fight all forms of national evil. But today it is a task of almost paralyzing magnitude to pull up the percentage of literate women from the shameful two per cent. to ninety-two or more. And though there is a fairly widespread desire for the education of girls, no great efforts have as yet been made by the people themselves to provide educational facilities for them. Moreover, as the *Eighth Quinquennial Review of Education in India* shows, “it is difficult to exaggerate the obstacles to the progress of women's education in India. All the influences which operate against the spread of education amongst boys—the conservatism and prejudice of the people, the remoteness of the advantages accruing from education, the indifferent quality of the education offered and its cost—all gain added strength in opposing the education of girls.”

The infinite potentiality that lies hidden in women must no longer be allowed to slumber but should be

kindled by the divine spark of education. Women are not less gifted by nature than men, and their training must be such as would enable them not only to be loyal to the ideals of domestic life but also to influence and shape the corporate activities of the nation. Indian ideals of womanhood, it must be remembered, bear much closer relation to ancient than to modern types, and religion has always been the central pivot round which the life of the Hindu society has been spinning from time immemorial. If education fails to stimulate into activity those latent spiritual instincts of their nature, the benefits of their new liberty would be no better than ‘Dead Sea apples’. The graces and virtues grown in their cloistered existence should be transformed into dynamic forces of creative potentiality to meet the exigencies of the modern age. Rightly has Sister Nivedita pointed out, “The moral ideal of India of today has taken on new dimensions—the national and civic. Here also woman must be trained to play her part. Every age has its own intellectual synthesis, which must be apprehended, before the ideal of that age can be attained. The numberless pathways of definite mental concept, by which the orthodox Hindu woman must go to self-fulfilment, form, to the Western mind, a veritable labyrinth . . . It is no longer merely the spiritual or emotional content of a statement that has to be conveyed to the learner, as in the mythologico-social culture of the past. The student must now seek to understand the limitations of the statement, its relation to cognate ideas and the steps by which the race has to come to this particular statement. The modern synthesis, in other words, is scientific, geographical, and historical, and these three modes of knowing must needs—since there is no sex in truth—be

achieved by woman as by man." No truer words have been so beautifully uttered. But it should not be forgotten that while a synthesis of the type indicated above is a great desideratum for the achievement of the ideal of efficiency to meet the exigencies of the present century, the education of the Indian woman would be a complete failure if it does not begin and end in the exaltation of the national ideals of womanhood, as embodied in her own history and heroic literature.

#### IV

A great pioneer of female education in India, Sister Nivedita has further suggested that schools large and small, schools in the home and outside it, schools elementary and advanced, are an essential part of any working out of this problem of female education. The highest ambition of the school must be to give moral support to the ideals taught in the home, and the home to those imparted in the school;—the densest ignorance would be better for our women than any departure from this particular canon. In order to actualize this ideal India calls for vows and services of a vast spiritual knight-hood. Hundreds of youngmen are necessary to league themselves together for the deepening of education in the best ways amongst women. And time would soon come when Indian women would no longer need the help and guidance from the masculine partners of their life in matters educational, but would themselves boldly take up the problem and solve it in the way most conducive to their interests as well as to the interests of the nation as a whole. What is needed is the form and method of education that would bring about a harmonious development of the faculties of their intellect and mind. Once such a form is successfully thought out

and its adequacy demonstrated, we shall, without further ado, have an era amongst us of woman's education. To-day the destiny of our social life is really in a melting pot. The age-long political subjection has devitalized the once heroic race of the country and made it forgetful of the ideal of its womanhood. But the lives of the great spiritual figures of the century are not still wanting to point out with unfailing directness the real ideal to be realized by our women. It has been demonstrated in the life of Sri Ramakrishna that conjugal life is not merely for self-gratification but for the sublimation of the lower instincts into a dynamic spiritual force. Even the illustrious consort of this saint of Dakshineswar lived in this materialistic age the ideal life of a Hindu wife, which every Indian woman must strive to emulate. She was Sri Ramakrishna's final word as to the ideal of Indian womanhood. No other finer instance of a harmonious blending of the nobler qualities of head and heart—of purity and devotion, modesty and heroism, renunciation and service—can elsewhere be witnessed in the recent life-history of any nation of the world. Such a life is the priceless treasure to humanity in every age and clime and should be held before every woman of our household to preserve the integrity and sacredness of our domestic life.

#### V

But it would be a mistake to suppose that India has produced only women of soft virtues and of tender texture—women fitted merely to adorn the cloistered corner of a household. It is here in India that different ideals and various types of character have found their highest synthesis and noblest fulfilment. It is the land not only of Suryâ and Indrasenâ, Mamatâ and Apalâ, Viswa-

vârâ and Ghosâ, Lopamudrâ and Indrâni, of Maitreyi and Gârgi but also of Sitâ and Sâvitri, Sati and Gândhâri, Madâlasâ and Tâpasi, Sândili and Sulavâ, Churalâ and Lilâ. The annals of India even now testify to the political wisdom and the administrative genius of such sharp-witted women of heroic mould and noble calibre as Draupadi and Vidula, Padmini and Durgavati, Chand-bibi and Nurjahan, Jhansi-Rani and Ahalyabai, Rani Bhavani and Janhavi—women whose sparkling achievements and heroism excite even now the admiration of all. The soil of India was fertile enough to give birth to all types of women at different times to maintain the honour and dignity of her hearth and home. It is time that the infinite potentiality that lies dormant in the soul of our mothers and sisters is awakened by means of a well-balanced education on national lines and harnessed to the evolution of a richer culture as also to the attainment of the lofty ideal set before us. Needless to say the education of our woman will be a failure if it is not able to awaken in her a sense of self-respect and self-confidence, a spirit of heroic self-sacrifice, a deep-seated love for the motherland and above all, the much-needed strength and courage to fight the battles of life side by side with the other sex. The age-long subjection coupled with a woeful lack of proper cultivation of the heroic instincts of human nature has created a unique mentality that has not in it the promise of a heroic expansion and robust optimism. Any attempt to encourage the sickening exhibition of feminine graces and parts in undesirable places and atmosphere and thereby to allow our mothers and sisters to imbibe ideas that are likely to weaken the moral foundation of our social life is to be nipped in the bud with a strong hand. The country is already too much

steeped in such namby-pamby ideas. What is needed is the worship of the ideal wherein heroism and nobleness, purity and strength, love and piety are blended in a beautiful harmony. An evolution of such a balanced character will not only make every household a play-ground of peace and joy but would help as well the achievement of a nobler destiny in the collective life of the nation. It is then alone that the children who receive their moulding of character in the most plastic and formative period of life from their mothers would develop into eminent personalities fitted in every way to fulfil the higher ideals of life and prove real benefactors to the country and the world outside. For, as Dr. Oswald Schwarz has remarked in the *Hibbert Journal*, March 1938, 'the foundations of our happiness in later life as well as of all troubles, difficulties, problems and abnormalities are almost invariably laid in the first few years of our childhood . . . Man starts from the body of his mother on his long journey through life, and this biological fact has its parallel in the psychological sphere. We owe to our mothers the sense of a soil in which we are rooted, of a place in this world which is entirely ours, of a human being with whom we are inseparably connected. In a phrase, a mother gives to a man a home in the vastness of the world.' As a matter of fact the future of our individual and collective life depends to a large extent on the moulding that we receive at the hands of our enlightened mothers in the genial atmosphere of the home. To-day India stands on the threshold of a new era and needs the concerted action of both her men and women for her national solidarity and cultural conquests. To ignore at this hour our duties to womanhood and to keep them blind to the heavy responsibilities of social and national life is

nothing short of a suicide and a stultification of the sacred idealism for which our country stands. "Until we have made ready a place for our woman, until we throw wide the portals of our life, and go out, and take her by the hand to bring her in, the Motherland Herself stands veiled and ineffective, with eyes lost, in set patience, on the earth. It is essential, for the joyous revealing of that great Mother, that she be first surrounded by the mighty circle

of these, Her daughters, the Indian women of the days to come. It is they who must consecrate themselves before Her, touching Her feet with their proud heads, and vowing to Her their own, their husbands', and their children's lives. Then and then only will She stand crowned before the world. Her sanctuary to-day is full of shadows. But when the womanhood of India can perform the great *ârati* of nationality, that temple shall be all light, nay, the dawn verily shall be near at hand."

---

## SACRED MEMORIES OF SRI RAMAKRISHNA\*

BY SWAMI AKHANDANANDA

After the death of his father Swamiji (Swami Vivekananda) did not turn up to see Sri Ramakrishna for a long time. The Master would think much of him, and at times he would send some one for him. Yet Swamiji did not come—his mental state was so bad. Swamiji did not come lest his miseries in any way should trouble the Master.

Later on, whenever I went to the Master, I met one or the other of the Swamiji,—Brahmanandaji, Abhedanandaji or Saradanandaji.

One day I went to the Master after having taken my simple meal cooked by myself. When I was coming back in the evening, some one suggested that I might as well go with a man who was about to return. The Master protested, "O, no, no; he is a little boy, he can't run with that fast-walking, military man. He will go with these lady devotees (Jogen-ma, Gouri-ma and others)." Saradanandaji was there.

After evening Arati, we all came upto Baranagar and together hired a carriage. Saradanandaji, being older than I,

naturally said, "You are younger, go in. I will be on the coach-box." Three ladies and myself got into the carriage.

Thus these most auspicious days of my boyhood—one after another, each and all—became the principal assets of my life.

The Master would never use any carriage but a second class one of a particular owner, because his horse were stout and strong. The Master would become restless if the horses were whipped; he would exclaim, 'Oh, they're beating me!' So whenever the owner heard that Paramahansa Dev was to go, he would send the best horses, so that they would not require any whipping and would be running at ease.

One day the carriage came. The Master got up. I and Adbhutananda accompanied him. Stopping the carriage at the Baghbazar Street, he asked whether I would call Naran—a boy who used to visit him at Dakshineswar. I called Naran, and the Master talked to him, inquired why he had not been to

\* Translated from the original Bengali "*Smritikatha*".

Dakshineswar for a long time and insisted on his going there.

Next we stopped at the house of Vishwanath Upadhyay (whom the Master called 'Captain')—the ambassador from Nepal, in the Shampukur locality. We went upstairs, the inmates lay prostrate before him. There he took a little ice water—his favourite drink. After that, we moved to Balaram Babu's house, thence back to Dakshineswar. The Master would never spend his night anywhere but in Dakshineswar. Probably he lived a night or two in Calcutta at Balaram Babu's. I have heard Swamiji say that the Master would not take his food anywhere but in Balaram Babu's. The Master said, "His food is pure." That is why Swamiji once said, "Have you marked—Mahapurushas (*i.e.* God-realized great men) can never spend their nights in cities like Calcutta?"

At that time some one or other of the saints of almost all denominations lived in Dakshineswar temple garden. They would be blessed in keeping the company of the Master, and by occasional instructions from him. Once such a great man with matted hair and bare body lived for sometime near the Bungalow in the garden. The Master said to me, "A great Sadhu (a Mahapurusha) from Kashmir is staying over there." I went there and bowed down to him. He looked very grave and talked but little. He simply gave answers to a question or two put by me. Whenever such a Sadhu came to Dakshineswar, the Master would have us go to him to have a *darshan*.

It was a Saturday in summer. I went to him in the morning. At about two o'clock the Master said to me, "Get a little ice for me." I proceeded towards Alambazar, with some pice; ice sold for one or two pice a seer then. While on the way, I was determined not to

come back without ice. How wonderful! I had not even to walk five minutes when I saw an ice-vendor coming towards Dakshineswar. My joy knew no bounds. I was as if broken to pieces in joy. On my return the Master asked, "Have you got it?" O, he was so glad to see the ice! I burst forth, "Wonderful! I was determined to bring it, however far I might have to go, but I had not even gone a little distance—and I got it. It seems he was coming for you." Then he took a little water with ice. That night I spent with him.

One day a number of devotees—one of them a landlord—were going to Dakshineswar by boat. While in midstream the wind blew strong and waves were striking the boat and rocking it. The helmsman was all alert. Now one of the fellow passengers—a plump but handsome man of jovial temperament—began to shake the boat from within. I was a boy and felt afraid. Thus the boat touched Dakshineswar.

It was afternoon. The Master was sitting on his smaller cot as we entered the room. One of them spoke, "Sir, we have brought here devotees from Benares." The Master exclaimed, "I see they are a band of Sivoham" (those holding the Advaita idea that 'I am Siva—God'); and in great glee he asked them to take their seat.

The landlord was the first to question, "Sir, He that is the Full Brahman has no want in the universe. He pervades all space and time; how is his incarnation possible?" The Master replied, "Well, the Full Brahman is the Witness, pervading all space and time, equally. It is his Energy (Sakti) that incarnates. Somewhere it is 10 phases (or parts of His Sakti) that are manifested, at others 12, still rarely at others 16 parts. He, in whom 16 parts of the Divine Energy incarnate, is hailed as the



Full Brahman. He is worshipped, e.g., Sri Krishna. In Rama, it is 12 parts.”

Another devotee asked, “Well Sir, this body is the root of all miseries. Now if we destroy it, everything comes to an end.” The Master replied, “See, in a pottery unburnt earthen pots are burnt, and they can be put into shape again, noo so the burnt ones. In like manner, if the body be destroyed before attainment of knowledge one has to take up a body again and again.” Question: “Well Sir, why then so much care for the body?” The Master, “Just see, in moulding works, they preserve with care the mould until they get a good impression out of it. When that is done it matters little whether the mould remains or not. So, too, one has to attain knowledge through this body. One has to realize the Self, and after that it doesn’t matter whether the body stands or falls. But, so long as this is not the case, the body needs to be well cared for.”

Then he sang some of his favourite songs. The landlord began to sob. The Master was very pleased and said, “O, fire is put under his pot of butter, so this sizzling. Later on he will be silent.”

After a long time the Master got up, and others went away to have a walk round. Of the visitors one was of Brahmo tendency, being a devotee of Keshab. The Master took him to the eastern portico and asked, “Do you perform your daily practices?”—to which he replied, “I don’t like them.” The Master, “You know, you should not do away with anything by force. In the case of gourd etc., the fruit rots away if the flower is plucked off, but the flower falls off naturally when the fruit is ripe.” The Master asked again, “What do you love, God with

form or without form?” “Formless”, was the expected reply.

The Master went on, “Through daily practice Sandhyâ merges into Gayatri and Gayatri into Om, and that into the still transcendental state of Turiya. Then the daily practices etc., fall off (naturally) of themselves. How can you meditate on the Formless all at once? The archer first learns by aiming at thick plantain trees, then thinner trees, next fruits, then leaves, and lastly at the flying birds. First with form, then on to the Formless.”

Just before this, in the room he was saying to all, “While hearing the Râmâyana, my mind would go back to the days of Ayodhya—on the bank of the Sarayu. I saw Ramchandra green as the new Durva leaves, with *Jangia* on, bow in hand and quiver on the back, and with him Sita and Lakshmana. O, what a joy, at the sight of them! I lost all consciousness. I much enjoyed that Form!”

With such holy talks, that day was spent in joy which tastes the sweeter, the more I recount. We all came back in a boat.

There may be other spiritual guides who dictate to their disciples some methods, and thus help and direct them to realization. But with our Master, it was a special case; he was a spiritual guide of quite a different nature. Out of grace, he could bestow realisation on those that came to him, simply by his touch, glance or even by his will. He wanted all to enjoy that union with the Divine. He was so eager to infuse the spirit in all—to wake up the sleeping spirituality. Of course it was only to his closer disciples that he talked of his own inner realizations and deeper life-experiences.

# DARA SHIKUH: A MYSTIC PRINCE

BY DR. YUSUF HUSSAIN KHAN, D. LITT. (Paris)

All students of the history of Mughal India know that history has not been fair to prince Dara Shikuh, son of the Emperor Shahjehan, and that it owes an ample reparation to his memory. There is no greater unfairness and injustice to a great personality than the fact that it should be ignored. Yet, some really great men have been wilfully ignored by history. A great human interest attaches to some of these failures in history. Dara Shikuh is one of them; his greatness as a man has, unfortunately, been obscured by his failure as a political leader.

Like his great-grandfather Akbar, he had the courage to hold and maintain his own convictions even if they happened to be against the religious authorities of his time. Yet, there is a very vital difference between the method of approach of Akbar's School and that of Dara. The former maintained that reason was the ultimate authority in religion, the foundation of certainty in knowledge as well as the most practical way of treating human affairs. Faizi, Abul Fazl and other members of Akbar's School were rationalists *par excellence*. To this, one of the sayings of Akbar himself, quoted by Abul Fazl in the *Ain-i-Akbari*, bears testimony. He says: "Commending obedience to the dictates of reason and reproving a slavish following of others need the aid of no arguments."<sup>1</sup> His Din-i-Ilahi is another name for rationalistic theism, inasmuch as it sought to set up human reason

as the final criterion of judgement. The followers of the Din-i-Ilahi tried to establish that the Shariat contained certain particulars which were false and unacceptable to reason, for instance, the conversations with God Almighty, the descent of incorporeal heavenly beings in human forms, the Prophet's ascension to heaven in an elemental body, the circuit round the Kaba, the throwing of stones and the kissing of the Hajar-il-Aswad, etc. The followers of Din-i-Ilahi further maintained that there was no need of medium or fixed direction of prayer, and that if the necessity of a fixed place were to be admitted, the stars above would be much preferable; and if a centre were desired the Sun in heaven would be the best one.<sup>2</sup> In like manner they said that the most undesirable thing in a prophetic mission was the obligation to submit to a human being, subject to the incidental distempers and human imperfections.<sup>3</sup>

The accounts given by Mohsin Fani, Mulla Abdul Qadir and Nizamuddin, in the *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, show conclusively that the Divine Faith (Din-i-Ilahi), besides being based on purely rationalistic principles, was also a creed calculated to achieve certain practical ends. It was primarily meant as a political sop to the Hindus without whose active co-operation it was impossible for Akbar to consolidate his Empire and to carry out his administrative arrangements with success. His

<sup>1</sup> *Ain-i-Akbari*, Part 3, p. 384 (S. Jarret's edition).

<sup>2</sup> *Dabistan-i-Mazahib*, p. 401, Calcutta; see also *Muntakhabat Tawarikh*, Vol. 3, p. 204.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

scepticism as to the revelation of Quaranic teachings led him to seek the true religion in a shallow eclecticism. He grafted Zoroastrian, Christian and Hindu teachings on Islam, and thought that his new faith would help him to gratify and conciliate the vast masses of the Hindu population who formed the backbone of his Empire.

There is, on the contrary, no tinge of worldly opportunism in Dara Shikuh's convictions. He is not a rationalist but a mystic. It is true he did not care to lay exclusive emphasis on the ethical and practical side of Islam; nevertheless, he never came forward to challenge the observances of orthodox Islam, though he did not consider them essential for his own salvation. In fact, he bore too great a love for the Prophet to question any of his teachings. One does, however, come across many Muslim mystics, long before Dara, who while attaching no importance to dogmatic formalism, attested that they were still within the fold of Islam. In this respect there is no innovation in Dara's ideas. Like other Sufis he endeavoured, without seeking help from any external authority, to grasp the absolute reality of religion through intuitive perception. From the third century of the Hijri era onwards, the Sufis have been the chief exponents of the doctrine of the inner light and 'the theology of the heart' as against formal literalism and scripture worship in Islamic countries. In course of time, Sufism identified itself with the movement which had for its object the emancipation of the individual soul from the dead-weight of dogma. Bayazid Bustami and Husain Masur-al Hallaj are cases in point. They were condemned as heretics who disturbed the mental peace of the Mussalmans. But it is difficult to find anything like calculated heresy in their

teachings. Only some of their statements, unfortunately worded as they were, created an impression that they were opposed to Islamic doctrines. In fact, they and others like them believed in the sanctity of the individual. They rightly maintained that religion, being a matter of the heart, could not be realized through reason. It needed a higher system of knowledge based on the intuitive experience of the individual, which in their terminology was called 'Zauq'. This thoroughgoing individualism accounts, to a certain extent, for their seeming neglect of the ethical in favour of the transcendental in religion.

Dara Shikuh from his very childhood was brought up in the company of Hindu and Muslim mystics. As he possessed an especially sensitive and delicate nature, he soon developed into a staunch believer and an enthusiastic interpreter of the cult of the heart. The rationalistic dialectic of Akbar's School on the one hand and the utter lack of feeling in orthodox Islam on the other, turned Dara towards the devotional mysticism of the Sufis. The Islam of the Mullas of his time ossified into a system of prescribed ritual, failed to satisfy the inner spiritual longings of the heart. His struggles with his own frustrations and doubts must have been all the more terrible as he did not, like Akbar, wish to impugn the authority of any Islamic principle of faith. He did not reject Islam, and his acts of conformity to it were not dictated by policy. There was no alternative left for him but to take shelter under Sufism, and so he did. The elasticity of Sufism could very well accommodate men of extremely divergent views; along with pious Muslims, punctilious in observance of their religion, rank doubters who questioned the very fundamentals of Islamic

theology were to be found in its all-embracing fold. The generous and devotional teachings of Sufism provided ample scope for Dara's spiritual fulfilment and opened for him the path to self-realization and internal purity.

Dara was initiated into the Qadiriya order of Sufis by Miyan Mir (died in 1635 A.D.) and Shah Mohmad Lisam Allah Rostaqi (died in 1662). In one of his works, *Sakinat-ul Arwliya*, he gives the following account of his initiation :

"I was asleep when a supernatural voice addressing me four times said : 'God has given thee that which no Emperor of the world has ever possessed'. On waking up, I said to myself that it must certainly be the wealth of the spiritual knowledge that Almighty God had bestowed on me as His real favour. I had always been looking forward to it. In the year 1049 of Hijri (1639 A. K.), being eighteen years of age, I succeeded in procuring the amity of one of His friends and it was due to the kindness of the dear one (Aziz) towards me that in one single night I learned as much as others would have done in a month. And I gained in one month what others would have done in a year. Briefly, although I am considered as one who observes outward practices (Ahl-i Zahir), yet I am not from among them; and although I am not from among them, yet I am one of them."

In the same treatise Dara describes the austere practices of regulating the breath which he learned from Miyan Mir. These practices were considered to be essential for one who wishes to be proficient in mystic contemplation and introspection. In his treatise, *Risala-i Haq Numa*<sup>4</sup>, Dara has given a full

account of the modes and inner meanings of these practices which were mainly borrowed from the Hindu system of Yoga. According to Dara even the Prophet Muhammad used to do such exercises in order to attain to spiritual perfection. He says: "The Prophet of God (May Divine peace be on him) before he had revelation, used to go to the cave of Hira to practise such introspective exercises till at last Gabriel appeared to him."

Mullah Shah, Dara's spiritual guide and master, seems to have been a man of considerable intellectual culture, as is evident from his discourses and poems. Dara, in his treatise, *Hismat-ul Arifin*, represents him as explaining the Quranic verse, "You who believe! it is ordained for you not to say prayers when you are drunk,"<sup>5</sup> as follows: "If the drunkenness be of the world, prayer is interdicted, as drunkenness would vitiate the prayer: reverence for prayer is thus inculcated. And if the drunkenness be (through perception) of the Reality, prayer is prohibited out of regard for this divine intoxication." Similarly Dara's interpretation of the words "faithful" and "infidel" is marked by mystic subtilty as well as catholicity of outlook. "The faithful," he says, "is that infidel (Kafir) who has attained God, has seen Him and knows Him; while the infidel is that faithful who has not attained God, who has not seen Him and does not know Him."<sup>6</sup> Besides his oral discourses Mulla Shah's poetry is characterized by a deep note of pantheistic inspiration accompanied by the devotional fervour of a feeling heart: "There was a time when I was high and I was low; I had a status and I had none. Now, I have begun to worship myself; those days

<sup>4</sup> *The Quran*, Ch. IV, Verse 43.

<sup>6</sup> *Hismatul 'Arifin*, p. 32, Mujtabai Press, Delhi.

<sup>4</sup> Published by the Newal Kishore Press, Lucknow.

are passed when I used to be a worshipper of God.”

The following is a good specimen of his catholicity of view: “The thread of our rosary has become the Brahmanic string, and our spiritual director has turned our faces towards the tavern. The light of our infidelity (kufr) has annihilated the darkness of Islam; and (worldly) mischief will no longer be able to resist (the warmth) of our sighs. The creator of the world, putting Himself in my place, said: “O Shah, get up, thy place has become mine!”

In the following verses Mullah Shah gives expression to the mystic state of the traveller towards the Truth when he becomes immersed in Divine Unity. In this state of complete quietude he loses all distinctions of pluralities and diversities, names and attributes, and becomes identified with Him: “Long have we been searching for the Beloved; we have been to the door of every monastery and tavern. But when, in the course of our quest, we looked attentively towards ourselves we immediately affirmed that we ourselves were the Beloved.” Dara Shikuh in his different treatises sets forth in detail the teachings of his spiritual teacher, Mullah Shah, as well as his own personal religious experiences. These treatises can be divided into three categories. The first category comprises those works in which he gives expression to his inner ecstasies and his ardent aspiration towards the Ineffable. His method of treatment is generally intuitive, which has all along been the traditional method of Sufistic theology. And the tendency of his thought is essentially pantheistic, having as its fundamental motive the direct contact or the union of the human spirit with the Divine Being and the transformation of duality into Unity. Like other Sufis before him, Dara does not put much faith in the exterior means of

attaining to the Truth, such as the Shari'at and its prescribed rules of conduct, or in the efficacy of prayers. On the contrary, he relies for his knowledge on a certain ecstatic state of his heart which leads to the complete identification of the individual with the Being of beings. His conception of God is anything but one of an objective reality. His God is his own personal experience. His writings, in fact, represent a reaction against that rigid orthodoxy which has been responsible for the under-estimation of spiritual life in favour of outward observances. According to Dara supreme bliss of knowledge and truth is to be attained not by the intellect but by an appeal to intuition and feeling which serve as the basis for all religions of the heart. To this category belongs his treatise called *Tariqatul Haqiqat* (the path to Reality).

The second category of Dara's works consists of mystic biographies. To this group of treatises belong (1) *Sakinatul Awliya*, and (2) *Hisamatul 'Arifin* (known also by the name of *Shatahat*). The author himself has clearly given the reasons which prompted him to undertake these works. He says: “Some time back, in a state of ecstasy and enthusiasm, I uttered certain words appertaining to the highest form of knowledge; certain sordid and mean fellows and some dry, insipid and bigoted persons, on account of their narrow outlook, accused me of heresy. It was this which made me realize the importance of collecting together the sayings of the great believers in Unity, the Saints who before us have acquired the knowledge of Reality, . . . . so that these sayings may serve as an argument against the fellows who are really Dajjals (anti-Christ) although they wore the face of Christ, and Pharaohs and Abu Jehls, although they assume the guise

of Moses and of the followers of Mohammed.”

The third category of Dara's works consists of works in which he tries to establish a sort of *rapprochement* between Sufism and the principles of Hindu philosophy. His attempts to achieve this end clearly show that he did not want to engraft the one on the other through a shallow eclecticism like his grandfather Akbar. *He was actuated by a desire to prove that both Islam and Hinduism, in appearance so fundamentally dissimilar, are essentially the same. Both represent spiritual efforts of man to realize Truth and God.* For this purpose Dara employed the best scientific method of his time and attempted a comparative study of the mystic lexicography of both religions. The following is the list of his works on this topic: (1) *Risala-i Haq Numa*<sup>7</sup>: It is a study of the Yoga System. The author gives a detailed account of the practices of contemplation which are helpful in acquiring true knowledge. (2) *Majma'ul Bahrain*<sup>8</sup>: This treatise attempts a detailed comparative study of the mystic terms of the Sufis and the Hindu philosophers. In the introduction Dara sets forth views regarding his personal religious ideal which, like all thought in its highest expression, is of a synthetic formation. As we have already shown, he had no intention of founding a new eclectic religion or of discountenancing Islam in any shape or form; on the contrary, he only designed to prove the sameness of Truth in Islam and Hinduism by his tolerant attempt to understand both religions. He says: “I begin by the name of Him who in fact has no name. He will be benevolent and kind by whatever name I may

<sup>7</sup> Published by the Newal Kishore Press, Lucknow.

<sup>8</sup> Edited by Mr. Mahfuzul Haq, Calcutta.

address Him. . . . Islam and Hinduism are like twin brothers. These two symmetric points define simultaneously His visage, without which it would have remained obscure. Idolatry and Islam can be likened to two columns at the entrance to the path leading to the Unique One who has no equal and who is in everything and exterior to everything. All proceeds from Him, He is the first and the last. . . . . And infinite benedictions to His most perfect manifestation, the sign of the creation of the universe, Mohammad the Pure, and to his distinguished Descendants and Companions!”

Other works of Dara in which he tries to understand and penetrate the secrets of Hindu esoteric knowledge are: (3) *Nadirun Nukat*: It is an interview of Dara Shikuh with Baba Lal Das, a famous votary of the Kabirpanthi sect. These interesting conversations were held in Lahore and were transcribed by Munshi Chandrabhan of Patiala. The tone of these interviews is characterized by profound and amicable sincerity. The chief questions put by Dara, and Baba Lal's replies to them, deal with the problems of cosmogony, metaphysics and especially the mystic symbolism of the Hindus.<sup>9</sup>

(4) *Bhagavad-Gitâ*: The Persian translation of this famous Sanskrit classic has, by an error, been attributed to Abul Fazl.<sup>10</sup> The translation was, in fact, made under Dara's direction.

(5) *Yoga Vasishtha*: This work was first translated into Persian during the reign of Akbar. As it was full of mistakes, Dara himself undertook a new Persian translation from the original

<sup>9</sup> The Text and the French translation of this interview published in the *Journale Asiatique*, October-December, 1926, under the title of *Les Entretiens de Lahore*.

<sup>10</sup> India Office Persian Press: Ethe's Catalogue No. 1949, Col. 1089.

Sanskrit. In the introduction to his work he says: "Since the existing translations of this sacred book have not proved of much use to the seekers after truth, it is my desire that a new translation should be undertaken in conference with learned men of all sects who are conversant with the texts. Although I had profited by perusing a translation of it ascribed to Shaikh Faizi, yet two saintly persons once appeared to me in a dream. One of them was tall with grey hair, while the other was short—the former Vasishtha, the latter Rama Chandra. As I read the translation Vasishtha patted me on the back and told Rama Chandra that I was a brother to him, as both he and I were seekers after truth. He asked Rama Chandra to embrace me, which he did with an exuberance of love. Thereupon Vasishtha gave some sweets to Rama Chandra and asked him to hand them over to me. I took and ate them. After this vision my desire to have the book translated afresh was intensified."<sup>11</sup>

(6) *Sirr-i-Akbar* :<sup>12</sup> This is a Persian translation of the Upanishads. The preface to this treatise begins with the words 'Om Sri Ganeshaya Namah', which is a traditional formula for beginning Brahminic texts. The author, as in the introductions to his other monographs of this category, tries to establish a concord between the teachings of Sufism and Hindu Philosophy. He states that he has had opportunities of meeting savants and pious persons of diverse religions and hearing their opinions on the Unity of God. He studied the New as well as the Old

Testament, but the doctrine of Unity, as expounded in these books, failed to give him full satisfaction. Afterwards he came to know that Hindu monotheists had given a clear explanation of the Unity of God in the Upanishads, which are the essence of the four Vedas. As he was searching for Reality, no matter in what language—it might be in Arabic, Syrian, Chaldean or Sanskrit—he resolved to collect all the Upanishads which were 'a mine of Monotheism' and to have them translated into Persian. He therefore convened a conference of savants in order to take their advice in this matter. With their help he himself began translating the Upanishads from Sanskrit into Persian without adding or taking away an iota and without obeying any selfish motive. In these texts Dara found a key to all those secrets into which he had been longing to penetrate so long. He says that the Upanishads are the most ancient of divine books revealed to mankind, and they are the main source of monotheistic teaching. He found them to be in perfect accord with Quranic doctrines. By means of the Upanishads he came to know that which he did not know before and to understand that which he did not understand before. In his introduction to the *Sirr-i-Akbar*, Dara gives a considerable list of comparative mystic terms obtaining in Islam and Hinduism. He thereby shows that essentially both religions draw their inspiration from a common source and that the differences between them are only incidental. Here are a few of these terms :

<i>Islamic terms.</i>	<i>Hindu terms.</i>
Alam	... Loka.
Alam-i kabir	... Brahmananda.
Alam-i Zat	... Brahma-loka.
Ananiyat	... Ahankara
'Arif	... Gnanin.

<sup>11</sup> *Journal of the Punjab Society*, 1912, pp. 22-26.

<sup>12</sup> *Sirr-i-Akbar*, Br. Museum, Rieu, Add, 18404. Manuscripts of this are also available in the India Office Library and the Bodleian Library of Oxford. Some are extant in India too.

'Arsh	...	Aksha.
'Awaz-i mutlaq	...	Anahata-nada.
Hadis	...	Aja.
Hal	...	Vartamana.
Haqiqat Mohammadi	...	Kevala-Gnana.
Havas	...	Indriya.
Iradat-i azali	...	Maya.
Istigraq	...	Samadhi.
Jabrut	...	Susupti.
Jan-i Buzurg	...	Paramatma.
Lahut	...	Turya.
Muhit-i Anasir	...	Mana Aksha.
Qiyamat-i Kubra	...	Maha-pralaya.
Ruh-i kul	...	Chidatman.
Sifat-i fana	...	Tamo-guna.
Sifat-i Baqa	...	Satva-guna.
Sifat-i Ijad	...	Rajo-guna.

In this connection it should be noted that besides the influence exercised on him by his Sufi teachers, Dara came in contact with Sarmad, the famous Sufi anarchist of Delhi. There is a good deal of conflict of opinion about the origin of Sarmad. Niccolò Manucci in his *Storia do Mogor* affirms that Dara evinced great delight in talking to a Hebrew called Sarmad, an atheist who went always naked, except when he appeared in the presence of the prince (Dara Shikuh) when he contented himself with a piece of cloth at his waist.<sup>13</sup> Ali Quli Khan Walih Daghistani, the author of *Riazus Shu'ara*, gives the following account of Sarmad: "He (Sarmad) is a Jew of Kashan. After having embraced Islam, he first came to Surat in connection with his commercial affairs. Here he received Divine inspiration which made him lose all consciousness of himself. He threw to the winds all his worldly possessions. He discarded his clothing and set out on his wanderings. In the course of these wanderings he passed

<sup>13</sup> *Storia do Mogor*, Vol. I, p. 223.

through Shahjahanabad (Delhi) where Prince Mohammed Dara Shikuh, the eldest son and heir-apparent of the king Shahjehan, became his devoted admirer. He also grew fond of the prince.<sup>14</sup> Mohsin Fani too is of opinion that Sarmad was originally a Jew; he embraced Islam but maintained his belief in metempsychosis.<sup>15</sup>

These accounts of Sarmad show conclusively that he was a Sufi of a very advanced school of thought. He must also have been a man of culture and erudition as is evident from his *Ruba'iyat* rightly praised for their exquisite elegance and penetrating vision. The intimate relations of Dara with Sarmad are confirmed by one of the former's letters: "My master and guide! for so many days I have been thinking of coming to you but I could not. If I am I, then why this suspension of my intention? If I am not I, then this is no fault of mine. If the martyrdom of Imam Husain was in accordance with the Divine Will, Yazid has nothing to do with that affair. And if it was against the Divine Will, how would you account for the Quranic verse: 'Allah doeth what He wills and commandeth what He wishes.' When the holy Prophet was engaged in a battle with the infidels, the armies of Islam were routed by the enemies. Learned people say that this was meant to be a lesson in patience. But one who has already reached perfection does not require lessons any more."

To this Sarmad is reported to have replied: "Dear friend! whatever learnt, we have entirely forgotten ex-

<sup>14</sup> *Riazus Shu'ara*, p. 391. (Manuscript, Asafia Library, Hyderabad, Deccan).

<sup>15</sup> *Dabistan-i Mazahib*: see also *Mirat-i Khiyal*, by Sher Khan Lodhi (ref. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's *Sawanah-i Sarmad Shahid*).



cept the words of our beloved which we go on repeating."<sup>16</sup>

After the execution of Dara, Sarmad was brought to Aurangzeb who questioned him about his prophecy that Dara would succeed to Shahjehan's throne: Sarmad is reported by Daghistani to have replied: "God has given him eternal sovereignty and my prophecy has not proved false."<sup>17</sup> According to Manucci, Aurangzeb asked him where his devoted prince was. He replied that he (Dara) was present at the place. "But you cannot see him, for you tyrannize over those of your own blood; and in order to usurp the kingdom, you took away the life of your brothers, and committed other barbarities."<sup>18</sup>

Aurangzeb summoned a Council of Ulemas, presided over by Shaikh Abdul Qavi, to pass their verdict on the heretic sayings of Sarmad. The Emperor himself took an active part in the proceedings. The charges against Sarmad were that instead of reciting the complete Kalima, he only repeated its first part, "La Ilaha" ("There is no God") and intentionally suppressed the remaining portion "Illallah" ("except God"). Sarmad replied that it would have been sheer hypocrisy on his part if he approached the "positive" without having gone through the stages of the "negative". Another charge against him was that he had been heard singing the following verses: "I am a believer in the Quran, I am also a Hindu priest and a monk. I am a Jewish rabbi as well as an infidel and a Muslim."

The third charge against him was that he did not attend public prayers and went about the streets naked. Natural-

<sup>16</sup> *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1912, p. 112.

<sup>17</sup> *Riazus Shu'ara*, p. 391 (Manuscript, Asafia Library).

<sup>18</sup> *Storia do Mogor*, Vol. I, p. 384.

ly, Sarmad failed to give satisfactory explanations about his conduct, which was alleged to have been against the moral standard of Islam and flagrant violation of public decency. Unanimous judgement was passed against him; he was judged guilty of apostasy and condemned to death. He was executed in 1071 Hijri (1161 A.A.) and buried in front of the Jami' Masjid of Delhi. The people have kept alive the memory of his martyrdom by resorting to his tomb every Thursday in hundreds. Pilgrims come from distant places to seek favour of Sarmad the martyr (Sarmad-i Shahid).

In this study we do not propose to expatiate on the personal qualities and political career of Dara Shikuh as these have already been fully treated by several authors of distinction. The famous Italian traveller Niccolao Manucci, who came to India in the seventeenth century to try his fortunes at the Mughal Court, and who personally saw much of Dara, says about his character: "A man of dignified manners, of a comely countenance, joyous and polite in conversation, ready and gracious in speech, of most extraordinary kindness and compassion but overconfident in his opinion of himself, considering himself competent in all things and having no need of advisers. He was very fond of music and dancing."<sup>19</sup>

This seems to be an exact picture of Dara's personal qualities and his limitations. He was a man of artistic tastes and, in the words of Massignon, 'presented to his contemporaries the undecided profile of an artist! His mystic enthusiasm was certainly no match for the cold and reasoned diplomacy of his younger brother Aurangzeb; yet in the face of dire adversity, he did not show any signs of weakness. Manucci

<sup>19</sup> *Storia do Mogor*, Vol. I, p. 221.

relates that before issuing the sentence of death, Aurangzeb caused Dara to be brought before him and asked his brother what he would have done if he had been favoured by fortune. Knowing full well that 'his life was not going to be spared, and that the question was meant as a goad, Dara replied boldly and resolutely, like a prince and high-hearted leader, that if such had been the case the four principal gates of

Delhi would have yielded the answer to his question, where would have been exposed the four quarters of his body'.

If surmises were allowed in history, it would be interesting to guess what the fate of the Mughal Empire would have been if Dara Shikuh had succeeded Shahjehan. The course of Indian history would probably have been different.

---

## LIBERTY IN THE MODERN WORLD

BY PROF. P. S. NAIDU, M.A.

'But what more oft, in nations grown corrupt,  
And by their vices brought to servitude,  
Than to love bondage more than liberty  
Bondage with ease than strenuous liberty.'

—MILTON, *Samson Agonistes*

### I

When one re-reads, in the light of recent events, Schiller's paper on 'Burning Questions'<sup>1</sup> written a few years ago in a slightly cynical vein, one wonders whether the great humanist ever imagined that the question of liberty would one day become an intensely 'burning question' for the philosopher. Be that as it may, the charge levelled in that paper against the philosophers that 'they are not sensitive enough to vital issues' no longer holds true. The International and the Indian Philosophical Congresses have, of late, given considerable prominence to political and sociological problems. While collectivists all over the world are crying themselves hoarse over the dogma, 'the state is absolute; outside the state there is nothing', while Fascist and Communist leaders declare that the individual citizen of the state should be

deprived of 'all useless and possibly harmful freedom', while independent nations are being reduced to a state of servility almost over-night, while even in the democratic countries repressive laws are being put on the statute book, and while nearer home, at the first conference of provincial premiers, measures for the curtailment of civil liberty formed the first and the most important item on the agenda, it is but right that we should, in a calm atmosphere and in the cold light of reason, analyse the nature of the ideas that seem to inspire the activities of political leaders to-day. We affirm emphatically that an objective and scientific evaluation of the theoretical doctrine behind practical politics is the surest corrective of the unbalanced and frenzied behaviour of the leaders of the masses in the contemporary world.

The need for a comprehensive philosophical analysis of political ideas is the

<sup>1</sup> *The 'Personalist'*, xvi, 1935.

greatest at the present moment. Burke, Leslie Stephen and others of their way of thinking have, no doubt, inveighed vehemently against political philosophy. The former has used very picturesque language in describing political philosophy as 'the great Serbonian bog, 'twixt Damiatra and Mount Cassius old, where armies whole have sunk', and has laid it down as a dictum that 'one sure symptom of an ill-conducted state is the propensity of the people to resort to theories'; while the latter exclaimed, 'Happy is the nation which has no political philosophy'! Even to-day, adherents of this school of thought are not few in number. The reviewer of Mr. Voiget's brilliant book in the *Times Literary Supplement*<sup>2</sup> reveals the mental attitude of a certain type of contemporary practical politician when he says, 'It is not possible for any man, least of all for a man with deep moral convictions to get all the facts of this tangled and complex world neatly taped out.'

It is this unfortunate trend of thought which had been gaining an ascendancy over the Western mind, that is responsible for the divorcing of politics from metaphysics and of late from ethics, so that, at the present day, it is claimed that political action is outside the jurisdiction of the moral standard. As against this tendency in the political field, centrifugal to what is best and highest in human nature, a healthy reaction has already set in. Bosanquet has emphatically asserted his conviction 'that a better understanding of fundamental principles would very greatly contribute to the more rational handling of practical problems'.<sup>3</sup> Professor Joad's recent book, *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics*, has established beyond doubt that political problems must be tracked down to their

ethical foundations. Even Mussolini has felt the need for a theoretical foundation for his practical politics. Vehemently denying the charge of his adversaries that Fascism has no capacity to produce a doctrine of its own, he says, 'Fascism is now a completely individual thing, not only as a regime, but as a doctrine . . . to-day Fascism has formed its own distinct and peculiar point of view, to which it can refer . . . all problems practical and intellectual . . .'<sup>4</sup> Professor Keynes has made the very shrewd observation that 'the active men of an epoch are generally applying the theories of men who are long since dead.' The learned Professor's remark is eminently suggestive. If the progress of clear thinking had kept pace with vigorous activity in the political field, the world would have been very different from what it is to-day. The best citizen would then have been the best man too. But we find a different state of affairs in the contemporary states. So, it is none too soon to review critically two of the most fundamental political ideas which guide the destinies of nations in the modern world.

## II

When the student of human nature essays a psycho-philosophical analysis of political ideas, he is amazed at the amount of loose thinking that is covered up by such neat expressions as 'liberty', 'progress', 'supreme good' and 'happiness'. The Spencerian formula for freedom, the credo of Liberals and Utilitarians, is a striking example of vague thinking in political philosophy. Mr. Walter Lippmann's ideas of 'higher law,' 'good life' and 'good society' carry forward the same

<sup>4</sup> *The Political and Social Doctrines of Fascism* by Mussolini, *Ency. Ital.*, vol. 14. All the sayings of Mussolini quoted in this paper have been drawn from this source.

<sup>2</sup> *Unto Cæsar*, T.L.S., April 2, 1938.

<sup>3</sup> *Philosophical Theory of the State*.

Spencerian tradition of studied vagueness. Even Bosanquet flounders when he deals with the question of liberty. '... in order to be ourselves we must be always becoming something which we are not . . . . Liberty as the condition of our being ourselves cannot simply be something which we have, still less something which we have always had . . . . It must be a condition relevant to our continued struggle to assert the control of something in us . . . .'<sup>5</sup> How often does the vague expression *something* occur here! And what is the idea behind it which is struggling for expression? It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the two concepts, *Authority* and *Freedom*, before we adjudge their status in the contemporary political world.

### III

Freedom and Authority are not nouns, but adverbs masquerading as substantives.<sup>6</sup> They are, in fact, characteristics of behaviour under certain specifiable conditions. The act of behaviour whose characteristic is connoted by the term *authority* demands the inter-relation of two active persons, the agent who asserts authority, and the patient who submits to it. The propensities of self-assertion and self-submission are dominant over the other propensities in the mental structure of these two persons. He who dominates or commands is self-assertive, and he who obeys is self-submissive. The peculiarity of the former propensity is that, as an essential constituent of its natural excitant, it demands the stimulation of self-submission in another individual. When such submission is secured, its usual course runs smooth.

<sup>5</sup> *Philosophical Theory of the State.*

<sup>6</sup> The psychological analysis in this paper is based on a foundation of McDougallian Hormic Theory of the Mind.

But when the individual, of whom submission is demanded, offers resistance, then, submission may be enforced through the excitation of the propensity of fear. Fear may be stimulated either directly through the threat of physical pain, or indirectly through the threat of formidable hindrances to the progress of other propensities, such as acquisitiveness, gregariousness or parental propensity. In both cases the desired result is secured, that is, authority succeeds in enforcing obedience, but in the latter case anger also is stimulated, and this in conjunction with fear generates the sentiment of hatred against the commanding agent.

This brief analysis of authority applies to a very rudimentary stage of human culture. When sentiments, concrete and abstract, have been built up, and when these have been organised into an abiding scale of values, with a master sentiment presiding over the others, then, authority works in an indirect, but powerful and cultured manner. The agent exercising authority would naturally attempt to stimulate the aesthetic, moral and religious sentiments in the mind of the patient in order to secure obedience.

It is unnatural to speak of authority commanding in its own right. The exercise of authority can be justified only in terms of the end sought to be realised. What, then, constitutes the proper title to command? What is the legitimate sanction for authority? *The only natural sanction for authority is the liberty of the individual.*

But what is liberty? To what end is freedom? Let us remind ourselves that freedom or liberty, as well as authority, is a characteristic of human behaviour. So, the question is, what is the nature of the activity which is considered to be free, or in the interests of which freedom is demanded? Our psychological view-

point is the only one capable of aiding us in finding an answer to this momentous question.

The human mind is made of elementary propensities which are, in several instances, antagonistic to one another. Submission and assertion; acquisitiveness and sympathy; disgust and love are a few of the warring pairs of propensities. In the early stages of individual and racial development almost every propensity obtains full freedom of action. But very soon conflicts appear, and then either the subordination or suppression of an elementary propensity becomes necessary. Sentiments are thus built through the organisation of two or more propensities (which may or may not be antagonistic) round concrete objects and then round abstract ideas. Finally these sentiments are arranged in an ascending scale of values with a master-sentiment at the top as the absolute standard with reference to which the worth of other sentiments down below the scale is to be valued. The only master-sentiment which has absolute worth in its own right is the Brahman-regarding sentiment.

In the constitution of the human mind nature has implanted a supreme propensity, *sympathy*, which sustains the unity of the individual with Brahman. Amidst the persistently individuating tendencies of this earthly existence, this propensity keeps reminding man of the true end of his life. Though its still small voice is being stifled by modern civilisation, yet it seems to assert itself in the most unexpected directions.

*Freedom or liberty, then, is the characteristic of human activity which aims at the organisation of the Brahman-regarding sentiment.* Hormic psychology has rendered invaluable service to political man by its brilliant analysis of sentiments, emotions and propensities;

but by assigning the sovereign place to the self-regarding sentiment it has undone all the good it has done in its analytical sphere. For, the self-regarding sentiment is based on self-assertion, and even where it rests on gregariousness it turns out that selfishness is the most powerful constituent of the sentiment. It is true that in the West self-regard is the main-spring of all human activity. But it is one thing to describe the nature of self-regard as a fact, and another to hold it up as an ideal. Hormic psychology commits the fallacy of transgressing into the normative realm and prescribing self-regard as the master-sentiment for human beings.

The Brahman-regarding sentiment is unique. It reconciles the warring propensities with one another, gathers them up into its own texture, and finally annihilates them by assimilating them. It is the truly natural end of human behaviour, and as such is the only ideal worth striving for.

*That action is free which aims at the ideal of the Brahman-regarding sentiment. Liberty is liberty for the free and unhindered progress of such activity. Authority is justifiable only when it prescribes to itself this liberty of the individual as its sole end.* Neither the possession of mere strength, nor the acquisition of knowledge through wide experience, nor even the achievement of moral excellence through the successful formation of the Brahman-regarding sentiment can constitute a reasonable sanction for the exercise of authority, for these hark back to a system of dragooning or regimenting the individuals according to some rigid plan which cuts at the very root of liberty as conceived by us. There are as many paths of liberty as there are individuals. As each individual pursues the path of liberty in his own unique way, it should

be the sole purpose of authority to preserve the liberty of the individual.

The plan of procedure for authority as conceived by us is bound to appear startlingly novel. The agent exercising authority, in order to keep the individual on the path of liberty, is not to stimulate the anger or fear propensities of the patient by displaying self-assertion, but is to appeal to sympathy by the dismay of the same propensity in his behaviour. Coercion, if coercion is necessary, should be self-coercion; that is, the authority should impose on himself any physical or mental pain that may be considered to be effective. We shall elaborate this point in the concluding section of the paper.

The most serious fallacy in the theoretical (philosophical as well as sociological) analysis of 'authority' and 'liberty' from the time of Rousseau down to the present day is the over-emphasis on the 'form' of these concepts to the utter neglect of their significant content. We have referred already to the definitions of Spencer and Bosanquet. 'Freedom', says a modern writer,<sup>7</sup> 'is not the following of chance desires, but the fulfilment of deliberately planned purposes', but he gives no indication as to the nature of these purposes. 'Freedom', says a sociologist, 'is opportunity for right development,' but he gives us no clue as to his standards of rightness and wrongness. Freedom has been defined in a very vague manner as 'opportunity for self-realisation and self-determination'. What is the nature of the self which is to determine itself? What is the ideal to be realised by the self? These questions are left unanswered by the defenders of freedom. Lord Cecil, dis-

<sup>7</sup> 'The Divine Source of Liberty', Archbishop of York, *Hibbert Journal*, XXXVI, 1937-1938.

cussing on liberty and authority, said, 'Liberty is the essential condition of human progress, as it is also in its perfection the consummation of that progress,' yet nowhere in the course of his brilliant lecture does he give us a definition of progress, nor does he indicate the direction in which progress is to be achieved. The protagonists of liberty have imbibed the doctrine of *laissez faire* of liberalism, the doctrine which has been responsible for the downfall of the party through its neglect of historic relativity. Such undue prominence was given by the liberals to the empty and abstract form of liberty, that the concrete content was pushed into the dim distant back-ground. But, as it is the concrete content that counts in the practical world, we find that its neglect has resulted in liberalism being pushed out of the political world. Political philosophers have unveiled the fallacy in liberalism. Liberty, they say, should be divorced from liberalism, and should be placed on an independent basis. Freedom in democratic theory is now seen to be not freedom from all things at once, but independence from something for something else. In other words, it is realised that freedom is only means to an end. What is the end of freedom?

Attempts have been made to fill the empty form of liberty with the concept of human personality. In the absence of a clear psychological analysis of personality such attempts are bound to end in failure, for the bare concept of personality is as empty of content as that of liberty. Dewey speaks of liberty as the 'freedom to do your own stuff and take your own risk'.<sup>8</sup> What is the stuff you want to do? What for are you to take risks?

Through the signal failure of these indeterminate conceptions of liberty in

<sup>8</sup> *Journal of Philosophy*, xxxii, 1935.

the practical field, theorists have had the insufficiency of the view of freedom as 'the right of each to the maximum freedom compatible with equal freedom for all others', forced on their attention. Professor Mettrick<sup>9</sup> commenting on President Hoover's views on freedom says, ' . . . . . by mutual modifications of conflicting impulses and sentiments, guided by fuller knowledge and deeper insight acquired through experience, do we establish that inner harmony which is freedom'. Even this writer, who seems to approach our point of view most closely, fails to analyse the concept of harmony. So, what might have filled us with satisfaction leaves us with a sense of want.

Sociological thinkers of a particular type hold that freedom (that is the Spencerian formula of freedom) cannot afford an objective standard of policy, and so propose certain objective tests of liberty. The right to acquire and enjoy property, the independence of the judiciary and such other 'tests' of liberty have been enunciated by these thinkers. De Lohme, in his analysis of the constitution of England, says that in a liberal state 'every man, while he respects the persons of others and allows them quietly to enjoy the products of their industry, should be certain himself likewise to enjoy the products of his own industry, and his person should be also secure'. While we appreciate these attempts to clarify the vague concept of freedom, we have to point out that by their exclusive emphasis on acquisitiveness and assertion they do harm to those aspects of human personality that have abiding value for us. No definition of liberty, the older because of studied looseness and the newer because of its economic bias, gives us the real content of free-

dom. Any valuable and workable definition must be derived from a psychological analysis of the human mind. We have formulated such a definition in the earlier part of this section.

#### IV

Before we estimate the status of freedom and authority as understood by us, in the fabric of contemporary governments, it is necessary to examine briefly a statement which is so arresting as to carry with it the semblance of self-evidence. Professor W. Davies writing on 'Authority' says, ' . . . . . not war, but something more deep-seated is the cause of the hopeless upsetting of equilibrium in the contemporary world; and that is the absence of universally recognised authority . . . . . The principle of authority is the foundation of all civilisation; and when it is undermined, or even weakened, the whole fabric quickly tumbles to the ground'.<sup>10</sup> The evidence that the Professor puts forward in support of his thesis is chiefly historical. Europe had been under the sway of authority of one kind or other, ecclesiastical, political or military, until liberalism began to assert itself. In Ancient Greece there was political liberty of a certain type, but the state so entwined itself with the life of the individual that there was very little personal liberty. During the middle ages the Church exercised supreme authority over all aspects of individual and group life, and when the church was dethroned, monarchy was enthroned in its stead. For well over seventeen centuries authority ruled supreme in the West. Whenever any attempt was made to undermine authority the result was the destruction of the stable foundations of civilisation. Even the French revolution ended in transforming the 'sovereignty of the people' into a

<sup>9</sup> *International Journal of Ethics*, 38, 1927-28.

<sup>10</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, 1935-36.

'military dictatorship based on force, and exercising an authority far more absolute than that of the old monarchies'. Only for a brief period during the nineteenth century, and that too only in England and France, did liberty assert herself over authority. But liberty has had a very sorry downfall, and authority is coming to its own again. Authority, therefore, is the basic idea in European civilisation. Its form has been changing, but its content has remained unaltered. Authority alone will save Europe from the danger which is now threatening it.

This line of argument, despite the imposing array of historical evidence in its favour, is as idle as a similar argument which may be advanced in support of the reign of ignorance. Mankind has been steeped in ignorance for millions of years. Knowledge is only of recent origin. Compared with the reign of ignorance its reign is of negligible duration. Mankind has never been, and will never be in love with higher knowledge, for the acquisition of such knowledge demands pain and sacrifice. And with the growth of dictatorships ignorance is coming to its own again. Hence knowledge is not desirable.

Ultimate values cannot be brushed aside easily by such spurious arguments. Knowledge and liberty are supreme values, and though they be of recent origin, their potential capacity for good is so powerful that they are bound to annihilate the forces opposing them. They will humanise man in spite of himself, and in spite of his defeatist tendencies and inferiority complexes.

But, there is a very pathetic and tragic fact hidden underneath the passionate pleading for authority by Professor Davies. The liberty which the West has been striving for is liberty

for self-regard. The elemental propensities are to have free play, each in its own right, and the individual is to have perfect liberty in the exercise of self-assertion. When liberty of this kind is achieved, the individual becomes so much of an individual, so isolated from others in his province of liberty, that the feeling of appalling loneliness and desolation begins to creep into his mind. Gregariousness begins to assert itself, and the Western man is so terrified of his loneliness brought about by liberty, that he seeks some desperate measure for regaining the sense of his lost kinship with his fellowman. It is at this critical stage that, as Trotter and Graham Wallas have pointed out, war is welcomed as a source of relief from loneliness and boredom. The man who has achieved liberty now craves for something which would rekindle in his bosom the emotion for collectivism, the emotion for living, enjoying and dying with his fellow-beings. Since war is apparently the only means of achieving this end, he hugs it to his bosom. That is why modern dictatorships are, without exception, military in character. The pursuit of liberty, paradoxically enough, seems to lead in the West to the destruction of all that is highest and noblest in human personality. The cause of this tragedy is plain enough, though practical politicians are turning a blind eye towards it. It is the ill-conceived and mis-directed pursuit of utilitarian liberty. So long as self-regard is made the main spring of political activity, so long will the *laissez faire* of liberalism be followed by the tyranny of dictatorships, so long will pointless liberty be dogged by inhuman authority, and all will move round in a blind circle leading man nowhere. The only way of getting out of this *impasse* is to give direction to liberty. Liberty, which is now ill-direc-



ted, may be well directed, and its the Brahman-regarding sentiment in the empty form may be filled with rich con-European scale of values. tent, by replacing the self-regarding by (To be continued)

## IS CONVERSION ALIEN TO THE SPIRIT OF HINDUISM

BY DR. A. S. ALTEKAR, M.A., LL.B., D. LITT.

The belief current among the conservative sections of Hindu society is that conversion and even reconversion are against the true spirit of Hindu culture. Those, who are not born Hindus, can never enter into the Hindu fold. Those who have once left it, may be even under duress and can never be admitted back into it. The seventeenth century Pandits of Benares shared the same belief. "We do not at all maintain," said they to Bernier, "that Hinduism, though the best religion in the world, is intended for the whole of humanity. God has devised it only for us who are born as Hindus."

### THE VEDIC AND EPIC PRACTICE

The above opinion of the learned Pandits of Benares is however not supported by ancient tradition, history or scriptures. The gospel of the Vedic Aryans was to Aryanise the universe, and they acted up to it with all their might and main. A large number of non-Aryan tribes were Aryanised and assigned a definite place in Hinduism according to their cultural development. Nay, we find that the later day prejudice against the marriage with a non-Aryan bride was not shared by early Smriti writers. A number of epic heroes like Bhima and Arjuna are seen to have married non-Aryan brides like Hidimba and Ulupi. It is interesting to note that their action evokes not even a mild protest from venerable Vedavyasa; children of these unions

were not denied admission to the Aryan fold.

### ABSORPTION OF GREEK INVADERS

From about the fourth century B. C. a number of foreign tribes invaded India and settled down there. The Greeks, Scythians, the Parthians, the Kushanas, the Hunas were the chief among them. They have been all Hinduised and absorbed into Hindu society. During the Greek ascendancy in India at least 50,000 Greeks must have settled down in the country. Gradually they were all drawn in the capacious fold of Hinduism. One of their kings, the great Menander, is definitely known to have died a Buddhist; Plutarch tells us that cities in India vied for the honour of getting a share of his relics as they did for those of the Buddha. The last Greek king in India, Hermaes, is definitely described as a *thera* or Buddhist monk on his coins. Many of the most magnificent caves in western India owe their creation to the munificence of Greek Buddhists. It should not be, however, supposed that it was only Buddhism that opened its fold to foreigners. There is clear historical evidence to prove this. In the second century B.C. Antialkides, a Greek king of famous Takshasila, had sent an ambassador named Heliodorus to Vidisa, the capital of the Malva kingdom. An inscription discovered at the site of this old city states that this Heliodorous was a *paramabhāgavata* or

a great devotee of God Vishnu and had erected a Garudadhvaja in front of a temple of the deity he revered. There can therefore be no doubt that many Greek settlers were attracted by the Bhakti school of Hinduism and were absorbed into it.

#### CONVERSION OF THE SCYTHIANS AND HUNAS

There is similar historical evidence to show that other foreign tribes were also gradually absorbed. Shodas, the Scythian king of Mathura of the first century A.D., is known to have had a Brahmana priest. Wima Kadphises, the famous Kushana ruler, who had conquered a greater part of northern India, describes himself on his coins as a devout follower of Shiva and puts, naturally enough, the image of his deity on the reverse of his coins. It is interesting to note that no other deity but Shiva ever appears on his coinage. The Scythian house in Kathiawar which was ruling there from c. 120 to 395 A.D., was Shaiva in its religious persuasion and a great patron of Sanskrit language and culture. Kanishka, the famous Kushana emperor, was a Buddhist. The huge Huna hordes that inundated northern India during 450-600 A.D. were all absorbed into Hinduism; their last great emperor, Mihirakula, never bowed his head, to quote the words of a contemporary inscription, before anybody but Sthanu or Shiva.

#### HINDUISATION OF INDIAN ARCHIPELAGO

In the early centuries of the Christian era, the islands of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, etc., were colonised by the Hindus and Buddhists and the native inhabitants were converted to their own faiths. A sacrificial pillar commemorating a Vedic sacrifice performed by a convert in Borneo has been recovered.

#### CONVERSION IN THE MUSLIM PERIOD

This practice of converting non-Hindus to the Hindu fold was prevalent at the time of Muslim invasions, but Hinduism could not successfully put it into practice and absorb the new invaders. There were various reasons for it. In the first place the Muslims had, unlike the earlier invaders, a definite creed of their own, to which they were passionately wedded. Nothing could dislodge their faith in Alla, Mohammed and the Koran. They were not prepared to recognise any one else but Mohammed as the Prophet of God. An effort to identify Rama and Rahim could not therefore succeed. Secondly, they were beef-eaters and the Hindus intensely revered the cow. Thirdly, they were idol-breakers and the Hindus had at this time become intense idol-worshippers. It was therefore found impossible to effect a synthesis of Hinduism and Islam. Caste system had by this time become rigid, and even supposing some Muslims had desired to enter the Hindu fold, it would have become impossible to assign them a proper place in the Hindu social structure.

#### RECONVERSION PERMITTED BY SHASTRAS

Absorption of the Muslim invaders within its own fold was given up by Hinduism as an impossible task. But for several centuries it used to make serious efforts to reconvert such Hindus as had embraced Islam through force or fraud or temptation. The problem of reconversion first arose in Sindh in an acute form in the eighth century when that province was captured by the Arabs at that time. Contemporary Hindu thinkers gave their serious attention to the problem, and under the leadership of Devala, they composed a new Smriti to meet the new situation, which boldly declared that even women,

who had conceived as a result of conversion or criminal assault, could be admitted back into their old religion. The Agnipurana also permits reconversion irrespective of the time that may have elapsed since conversion.

#### WAS RECONVERSION A REALITY?

It may be argued that these authorities may have permitted reconversion, but society may not have followed the advice. There is, however, clear evidence to show that such was not the case. Al Biladuri, a Muslim historian of Sindh, admits that when the Muslim rule in the province received a setback towards the end of the eighth century most of the Muslim converts again became Hindus. A grandson of king Jaipal of the Punjab, who was taken with him as a hostage by Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, found the temptation of embracing Islam and accepting the governorship of a city as a reward too great. He was converted and christened as Nawas Shah and sent back to the Punjab as a governor of a district. When he was once more among his co-religionists, remorse overtook him and he returned to his old religion. When the Sultan learnt, to quote the words of a Muslim contemporary historian, 'that he had thrown off the slough of Islam and held conversations with the chiefs of idolatry respecting the casting off of the firm rope of Islam round his neck, he went swifter than wind and turned out Nawas Shah from the government'. There is therefore evidence to show that the views of Devala and Agnipurana that persons converted can be admitted back into Hinduism were followed by society down to the tenth century A.D.

#### GROWING OPPOSITION TO RECONVERSION

In the orthodox circles, however, the opinion was gradually gaining ground

that converts should not be readmitted. Alberuni who was staying in India in the eleventh century, made careful enquiries and learnt that Brahmanas were opposed to reconversion, while the rest of the society was in favour of the practice. The chief difficulty was about assigning a caste to the reconvert. Public opinion therefore was becoming more and more unfavourable towards the practice. Jeria and Malkana Rajputs could not return to the Hindu fold in spite of their keen desire to do so. The Hindus, forcibly converted by Tippu Sultan, did not succeed in their frantic efforts to be readmitted to their old fold; they had to remain as a separate caste.

#### 17TH AND 18TH CENTURY INSTANCES OF RECONVERSION

It should not be however supposed that all sections of the Hindu society had acquiesced in the view that reconversion should be given up. Narhar Narlekar, a Maratha Brahman, was taken captive and converted at the battle of Panipat. He could effect his escape only after twelve years. In spite of this long time that elapsed since his conversion, the orthodox Brahmanas of Pratishtan or Paithan, which is known as the Kasi of South India, voted for his reconversion in 1772 A.D. The great Shivaji reconverted a Sardar of the Nimbalkar family and proved the sincerity of his conviction by marrying his own daughter to him. The Rajas of Tanjore followed the policy of their enlightened and distinguished ancestor, and, in order to counteract the conversion activity of the Jesuits, decreed that all converts to Christianity would forfeit their property unless they returned to their old fold before a certain date. Manuci states that as a result of this order most of the converts once more became Hindus.

## CONCLUSION

The above survey will show that conversion and reconversion are not alien to the spirit of Hinduism; both were practised by it till quite recent times. Growing rigidity of the caste system and incapacity of the medieval leaders of society to realise the needs of the time are mainly responsible for the discontinuance of the practice. As Alberuni

has observed, it was only the stupidity of Hindu society that frowned the practice out of existence. *We cleanse, but never amputate, a part of our body that has been soiled. It is therefore but in the fitness of things that those who genuinely desire to accept Hindu religion or return to it should be allowed to do so. Our culture and religion are not opposed to such a course.*

---

 IDEALS OF SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

BY THE HON'BLE SIR MAURICE GWYER, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Kt.

The activities of the movement associated with the name of Ramakrishna take two forms. There is the Mission, with branches all over the world, conducted by the members of the Order of Ramakrishna and devoted to works of charity and mercy which are at the service of all without distinction of race or creed; and there are also the Maths, places of prayer and meditation, where members of the Order retire from time to time for rest and spiritual refreshment. These two institutions, though obviously a close relation exists between them, are distinct organizations and independent of each other. The ideal of the ascetic, renouncing all in an endeavour to come nearer to God, has been known and revered in India for countless generations. The conception of a worldwide association of men all equally bound by vows of poverty, chastity and obedience but also actively engaged in rendering service to their fellow-men is, I think, of more modern growth. It is a conception not unfamiliar to us in the West, though there its historical development has followed different lines; but at the root of both the systems lies the idea of renunciation and service. It may be that in the

West the obligation is assumed because of the belief in a divine injunction to feed the hungry, to tend the sick and to love one's neighbour as oneself; whereas this Order of India believe that God is best served by serving man, because man is a manifestation of God. But in either case the obligation demands renunciation and service, and that kind of service which, rejecting every self-regarding motive, looks for no other reward than the knowledge that the service is given.

But both systems would be equally meaningless, if they did not postulate the essential spirituality of life. This was not an unknown doctrine in India, but I conceive the contribution of the founder of the Ramakrishna Mission to the development of religious ideas in this country to be this, that he saw the spiritual life not in terms of the individual alone but in those of a whole people, perhaps of a whole world. It is good that teachers should rise up from time to time who can preach with vehemence and conviction great truths like this; and I cannot doubt that these are the truths which our civilization must grasp and believe, if it is not to perish altogether.

The founder, believing that self-realization ought to be man's supreme achievement, taught with all the fervour at his command that first of all man must secure the freedom of his own soul. In these days when the world is faced with an organised effort to bind the human race with fetters of iron, and things of the spirit are derided and denied, the last hope would indeed be gone if man abandoned the struggle for that freedom. No price can be too high to pay for it. It demands sacrifice and renunciation. And it is for this, and not for their ease or comfort, or any of their material possessions, that the democracies will have to fight, if fight one day they must, against the dangers that threaten them.

I think that the two qualities on the need of which the founder of this Mission insisted most of all were sincerity and simplicity. And by sincerity I suppose he meant that quality which rejects what is false, because it is never content with anything less than truth. It is perhaps the result at first of a conscious effort, but later on it becomes a habit of mind and a part of a man's intellectual equipment, so that it is possible almost by instinct to distinguish the true from the false. In a world drenched with propaganda, when falsehood is deliberately made to masquerade as truth and people are fed with lies in the interests of a policy or an ideology, sincerity is not perhaps one of the virtues now in fashion; but I am old-fashioned enough to believe, though sometimes I find it difficult, that truth will in the end prevail. And so too with simplicity, which is another aspect of truth, since it implies the discarding of catchwords and shams, and of all the irrelevant things with which we have complicated and confused our lives.

Sincerity and simplicity are the qualities of a saint, but saints are not

always practical men. And what I admire in Vivekananda also is his strong sense of reality and proportion. He reports his own Master as saying: "First form character, first learn spirituality, and the results will come of themselves." This is the same conclusion as that of the great Greek philosopher, that good acts are those acts which the good man does. Action issues from character; and it is not so much what a man does as what a man is. And I remember with pleasure one of the parables told by Ramakrishna himself. I mean the parable of the Guru, the disciple and the mad elephant. The story is that the disciple once encountered a mad elephant. Every one shouted to him to escape from its path and the *mahout* cried out, "Save yourself, save yourself;" but the disciple stood his ground and was attacked by the elephant and seriously injured. His Guru later on inquired from him why he had acted thus, to which the disciple replied that, having been taught that God was manifest in all life, he supposed that the elephant also was a manifestation of God and therefore no harm could come to him. But the Guru said, "It is true that God was manifest in the elephant, but was He not also manifest in the *mahout*, and even more so? Why then did you pay no attention to his warning?" So too on another occasion he is reported to have said, "A devotee ought not to be a fool." And I think that Vivekananda's sense of reality and proportion is shown most strongly in his foundation of the Ramakrishna Order, devoted not only to contemplation and meditation but also to the service of their fellow-men in order that they may the better serve God. I would never speak lightly of the exclusively contemplative life, in which many men and women have found happiness and peace; and there are

countries to-day where people may well find in it the only escape from persecution and the miseries of a regimented existence. But in countries like India where the pulse of life beats strongly, and men are still allowed to think for themselves, the conception of a life of renunciation conjoined with service seems to me to have the higher value. But whether this be so or not, I do not think that the founder of this Mission hesitated between the two; and the extension of its work into so many spheres of human activity and into so many lands justifies the choice which he made.

The brethren of the Mission would be the first to admit that others have laboured, and are still labouring, in the same field. But they themselves do seem to me to represent the birth of a new idea destined to have far-reaching consequences. *Here is a movement, issuing from Indian soil and based upon the adaptation or application of conceptions long familiar to Indian thought, but which has nevertheless given those conceptions a novel content and direction and has related them to modern*

*needs. Its principles are those of unity and not division, of co-operation, not conflict; and the unity is a spiritual one, transcending divisions of caste and creed. Is there not here a great message of hope?*

The picture of Vivekananda among his disciples, their equal and friend rather than their master, is a very attractive one. It was an English poet who wrote, "He prayeth best who loveth best, all things both great and small;" and I may fitly conclude what I have to say by quoting words which Vivekananda is said to have used on two occasions. During an epidemic he said to one who complained of not being able to talk of religion when he came to see him, "So long as even a single dog in my country is without food, my whole religion will be to feed it." And the other occasion was during a great famine when a devotee had maintained to him that the death of so many was a matter concerning only the victims' Karma and was none of his business; to this Vivekananda replied in a passion of indignation, "Are they men, those who have no pity for men?"

---

## FROM EXISTENCE TO SUPER-EXISTENCE

BY KALIDAS BHATTACHARYA, M.A.

### I

Should existents be explained by principles which need not exist? People in the past could not think of it. Geometry that was required by Physics was so long Euclidean, *i.e.*, a geometry of Euclidean tri-dimensional space. But the revolutionary Physics of to-day employs a geometry—the N-dimensional—which as such is no description of existents. The results are astounding. And this has changed, not without

reasons, the entire metaphysical background of sciences. If existents can be explained, explained better than they have hitherto been, by means of categories that are non-existent, should not metaphysics transvaluate the value of Existence? For here there is an N-dimensional entity—absolutely fanciful and having the tri-dimensional space as one of its functions—which is a much better explanatory principle than what have so long been employed. As Exist-

ence is thus a function of such Super-existence, the former can no longer stand as the only value for metaphysics. True, science will still explain existents. But it will naturally look beyond them to Super-existence, otherwise called subsistence, as more real, or, if the term 'real' is not preferred, as more metaphysical.

Existence cannot be of diverse types. It is one unique system. Its value is only pragmatic. As an intrinsic value it is only one with many others. Or probably it has no intrinsic value at all. If a wider system of Super-existence comprehends it, it becomes a subordinate value. Similarly another system of Super-existence—still wider—may comprehend this wider value thereby making it subordinate. But this means that there is no widest or absolute value. Which of these alternatives is correct it is for speculation to decide. Many preferred the first. Moderns prefer the second. Both however represent the spirit of Relativity.

This spirit of Relativity has inspired academic metaphysicians also. Not that the idea of Super-existence was unknown to them. Far from it; all Rationalist philosophy speaks of it. The difference is that each system of Rationalism had a unique type of Super-existence, one absolute Truth, whereas the relativistic attitude is just against this *one* absolute. Sometimes it even does away with the idea of 'absolute' altogether. If the N-dimensional geometry comprehends the Euclidean, it is possible that there be another geometry to comprehend the N-dimensional, and so on. Another difference between Rational philosophy and Relativity is that reality spoken of in the former is not *anti-existential*. It is true that some system annuls Existence. But this is because Existence itself rings its death-knell and makes way for Super-

existence. There is no question of forced usurpation as in Relativity. If I myself admit the superiority of my professors, this does not mean that they are anti-me. Modern relativist metaphysicians, on the other hand, fully imbibe the spirit of Relativity. Their Super-existence, termed 'subsistence', is hostile to Existence. Also they have no unique type of subsistence. Mathematical logicians, for instance, speak of many systems of postulates and propositional computations. Among themselves again they vie with one another for constructing better philosophies.

Metaphysics then has to decide between three alternatives. Either

- (1) Existence is the type of truth, or
- (2) There is Relativity of subsistents, or
- (3) Super-existence is the only truth.

In this essay we propose to point out that the Relativity of subsistents paves the way for the true Super-existence. The second alternative shakes our belief in the first, and this, in its turn, leads to the third.

## II

As Existentialists we generally believe that the whole is made up of parts, and the continuous of discretives, that the effect has to be understood as what comes from the cause, that in an evolutionary process the latter is always intelligible only in terms of the preceding and lastly that the object has to be understood as what is to the subject.

The greatest merit of metaphysical relativists lies in changing all these attitudes. They often advocate just the reversed outlook. They suggest that the whole may equally be taken as the original verity, and parts as functions of this whole, functioning being no substantiation of the functioned. Similarly instead of looking to the continuous as being made up of discretives they preach

that continuity is the metaphysical verity and that discretions are self-attenuations of it—a function, we may say. As for causality the cause should no longer be understood as metaphysically prior and the effect posterior; rather the effect is truer, the cause being understood as what is only a requisite for it. Similarly in evolution later evolutes are always truer, the preceding being regarded as means towards them. Evolution, in other words, is only the gradual unfolding of Truth. In short, in the world and the thinking of it the past has to be understood in terms of the future, *as what the future was not*. The past is the future veiled, the future is the truth. As for the subject and the object they prescribe that the ego-centric predicaments should be thrown off. In place of viewing the object as what is to the subject this latter should rather be understood in some terms of the object.

Relativists prescribe these changes only because these conceptions are more comprehensive and easier of handling. For, in each case, if you accept the common-sense point of view there is left an inexplicable surplus. If parts are combined into a whole, what is that which converts them into the whole? It cannot be a part among parts. For then the whole is not forthcoming. Nor can it be said that when the requisite parts are there the whole suddenly descends on them as from the heaven. Similarly about other categories.

This argument of relativists should unnerve the bigoted common-sense thinkers. Their explanation is inadequate. But Relativity offers a complete account.

Then there are other phenomena which also cry a halt to common-sense and make it rethink its thoughts. What about the illusory, or those things which appear but are not true? The

snake that you perceive while really there is a rope, or an image in the mirror or the small appearance of the moon—these are not zeroes; and yet they are not existent. Why then do you say that Existence is the only type of reality?

Then there are forms of things which are not real in the same sense in which things themselves are real. The table is rectangular—here both table and rectangularity are real. The table is an existent; but does rectangularity *exist* in the same sense? This will be more clear in the case of relations. A and B exist; but does the relation between them *exist* too? Many believe that relation is the *svarûpa* of relata. This must be admitted if relation is to be taken as an objective entity, not a contribution of thought. But what is the meaning of *svarûpa*? Relation is truly believed to be real, and yet it is no other than relata. This means that it is a non-existent reality, *i.e.*, a subsistent. Similarly about the rectangularity of the table.

### III

There are then super-existents. But are they subsistents, *i.e.*, hostile to Existence and admitting of no finality? The reply is 'No.' The reason is stated in the following paragraphs.

Any type of Super-existence is to common sense an implication of Existence. There is no full direct consciousness of it for the present. Only intellectually, which ultimately means "symbolically", we are aware of it. Implication however is of two kinds. In the one the implied ever remains symbolical—a function of what we start from, and to be always understood in terms of it, at the most as what it is not. In the other the very process of implicational analysis reveals it as a *living* abstraction, something in Exist-



ence, which though always a factor of Existence is nevertheless felt as a living factor, *i.e.*, as capable of transcendence. To the first type of implication the attitude of philosophy is simply to lay bare the implicate, never to posit it as a living reality—something *to be* revealed in some form of direct consciousness. What is implied in this sense is only a new dimension of Existence. This would be like necessity that is allowed by freedom. Such necessity is to be understood in terms of freedom only, as a function of freedom, a new dimension of it, so to say. So is what is implied in the first sense. There is another good analogy. If in a dream lasting for an hour twelve years are dreamt, this period is only a new dimension—illusory it may be—of this one hour. So is the first kind of implied content; only here there need be no illusion.

What is implied in the second sense is however an original entity standing on its own legs. It may be revealed to us, human mortals, only as in Existence. Nevertheless it is felt as independently real, as *to be realised* in isolation. The case may be compared to two friends who are always found together, never one apart from the other. The two are always together; yet neither is felt as depending on the other for his reality. The two, for whatever reasons, are immediately felt to be different beings; and if one constantly accompanies the other there arises the problem as how to find them separate. So about what is implied in the second sense. It is felt as realisable, though full realisation remains a problem. A type of yogic philosophy might suggest ways of this realisation.

The two types of implication may be respectively called backward and forward implication. If X implies Y in the first sense, Y is always to be under-

stood only in terms of X, and, in the case of a complete enmity between the two, as what X is not. In the case of a forward implication however there is always some direct feeling of Y, though in company with X, Y is felt as a living distinct in X or in the XY complex.

This however makes the whole situation complicated. If Y is to be understood as an independent entity, how then to account for the fact that to us it is always found in a complex—X or XY? Exactly in the same way, we reply, as the togetherness of the two friends spoken of above. Once we are conscious that the friends are two independent human beings who might have remained apart their togetherness immediately appears accidental, however frequent it may be. Here also if Y is felt as a living distinct, capable of transcendence, the complex X or XY in which it is found should appear as accidental; and the problem for true philosophy would be to re-vitalise this transcendence and, therefore, the accidentality of X or XY. This accidentality means that X or XY is to be understood as what Y is not—just the reverse of the direction we found in backward implication.

Now subsistence is what is backwardly implied by Existence. It is never felt as a living distinct in the Existence-complex. There are indeed Subsistentists who assert that subsistents in a certain collocation form Existence. But this is only after you have hypostatized subsistence. The question is—can we so hypostatise? The simple answer is—No, because subsistents are never felt as living distincts, as what are capable of transcendence. A subsistent is always spoken of as *being*—we say the subsistent is there, it is a subsistent, etc.—and no state can be imagined in which we can escape this is-ness of the

subsistent. This proves beyond doubt that subsistence is necessarily a function only of Existence.

There is indeed a way of escape which however turns out fatal on another ground. The Subsistentalist might say that he is not concerned with any type of *reality* at all. The real it is difficult to describe except as existent or intelligible in terms of Existence; but the Subsistentalist might hold that he has no concern with reals. This however, to confess frankly, is unintelligible. There need be no fetish of Existence; but how we can ever get aloof from *the real* we fail to understand.

Subsistence then, whichever meaning is attached to the term, has no metaphysical status. The only status it has is that it is a new, lower, dimension of Existence.

The Subsistentalist may argue that all difficulties he is made to face are equally there for any type of Super-existence, that type, *e.g.*, which is implied in a forward way. To this however there is a plain reply—if there is any such forward implication the type of Super-existence that is implied need not be understood in terms of Existence; it is felt as a living distinct; and as such Existence always stands as problematically condemned—either annulled or assigned a lower metaphysical status, in the minimum, understandable as what this Super-existence is not. For remember, if Y is felt as a living distinct the complex X or XY in which it is felt appears at once as accidental; and an accident means what is problematically unreal or at least less real.

This may be taken as the typical reply of all Transcendentalists who speak of Super-existence. Subsistence then is unmetaphysical. The forward type of Super-existence is not so, provided there is some ground to admit it, some direct feeling—however vague and

inadequate—of it in the human mortal region of Existence. It is no use intellectualising over an entity which is never felt, nor even appears as felt. This is why we do not and would not consider philosophies which are intellectual, which seek only to *prove* Super-existence and indulge in fruitless logomachies.

#### IV

But is there any ground for the forward type of Super-existence? In this section Super-existence will always mean this forward type.

There is ground. It has been prepared by Subsistentalists. They by challenging the monopoly of Existence and suggesting a topsy-turvy of our outlook have done more good to Super-existence than they thought of. They have suggested looking to the whole as an original entity and treating parts as accidental. Push this a few steps farther and there is the idea of the Absolute as Infinite, perfect and all-good, the finite and imperfect world with all evils in it being but accidental and so problematically less real. They have suggested that discretives be understood in terms of the continuous. How close is this to the idea of the Absolute as the only reality and of finites as but its limitations! Their idea of a cause as what the effect is not is really at the basis of the conception that the existent world is real only as it is lightened or enlivened by the ideal world. They have turned upside down the relation between the subject and the object. This easily leads to the alternative conception of the Absolute as object only or subject only or subject-object in whatever correlation.

The only question then is whether this change of attitude is *feelable* or not. It is no use idly speculating on possible changes of attitude. The true

problem for a starting philosophy is to see whether we *feel* that parts are understood in terms of the whole, discretely in terms of the continuous, etc.

Transcendentalists argue that they do feel these. Their catchword is that the finite and the imperfect are immediately felt as the limitations of the Infinite and the Perfect. No bit of space can be understood except as a portion of a wider space, no quality except in terms of its ideal. The wider and the better are always felt as presupposed by the narrower and the worse. The widest and the best—in short, the ideal in any case—is *a priori* which determines our consciousness of the existentially actual. The privilege of the *a priori* has been advocated by all spiritual philosophers from time immemorial. In the West this is explicit. In the East this is no less explicit in the Upanisads, though in later systems this has been translated into intellectual argumentative formulae.

The reduction of the *a priori* to forms of thought is no different approach to Super-existence. This follows automatically. Indeed the identification of the *a priori* with pure thought is little more than a verbal proposition. Were the *a priori* non-thought, it would have forfeited the peculiar universality and necessity about it. Knowledge about matter or non-thought has only a pragmatic validity; it does not claim to be absolutely true. The *a priori*, on the other hand, spurns all pragmatic computation. It has no degree, no ideal for approach, in short, no contingency about it. It is not unnatural then that systems after systems identify Truth with thought.

Spiritual systems can be divided into two classes, according as they are catholic or not. Non-catholic or exclusive systems condemn the material aspect, in other words, whatever is not subjective thinking. Catholic systems *comprehend* the material either by the concept of alternation or by that of some form of identity in difference. To the Alternationist thought and object are alternatively real—both being forward implicates of Existence. The other type of Catholic spiritualists conceive thought as necessarily immanent in objects. To the last type Reality is Thinking-Object, to the second it is Thought *or* Object, to the first it is Thinking only. There may of course be other sub-divisions. Thinking may, for instance, be understood as not merely theoretical, but practical (*i.e.* Will) or aesthetic also, or something which is common to all three, represented by the uncoloured term 'Consciousness.' Some again may take the Absolute to be thinking in any of these senses and yet admit object—the thing-in-itself—not as a living distinct in Existence but as what thinking is not, *i.e.*, in terms of thinking.

It is no use dilating on the various types of Super-existence. It is enough that we have laid bare the ground of spiritualism in general. It has been shewn that Existence is not the only type of Reality. This is first suggested by the theory of subsistence which being truly under-existence leads by a natural logic to suspect if there is Super-existence also. Not that this is a necessary logic. There are many spiritual adepts who pass directly from Existence to Super-existence.

# BUDDHISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NAGARJUNA

BY SWAMI VIMUKTANANDA

## NAGARJUNA'S MULAMADHYAMAKARIKA

Besides systematizing the scattered mass of literature that existed before him in the form of *sutras*, Nâgârjuna contributed a great deal to the stock of Mahâyâna thought by writing original treatises, of which *Mulamadhyamakârikâ* (or *Mâdhyamikakârikâ*) occupies the highest place.<sup>1</sup> These memorable verses, in which he set forth the main tenets of his Mâdhyamika school, were held in such high esteem by the succeeding generations and evoked such praise from them that in later days many philosophers of note came forward to write commentaries on them in elucidation of the sublime thoughts embedded in them. Nâgârjuna himself was conscious of the important role the book was destined to play in the development of the new school of thought, and realizing the terseness of its style, he himself elaborated the Kârikâs by a commentary, *Akutobhaya* by name. Then followed Âryadeva's *Hastabala* (c. 300 A.D.), Buddhapâlita's *Mulamadhyamaka-Vriti*, Bhâva-Viveka's *Madhyama-hridaya-kârikâ* (both c.550 A.D.) and Chandrakirti's *Prasannapada-Mâdhyamika-Vritti* (c. 700 A.D.). Besides, there were other exponents of the Mâdhyamika philosophy, such as Kumârajiva, Gunashri, Gunamati, Sthiramati and Krishna, some of whom commented upon *Mâdhyamika-Kârikâ*.

Nâgârjuna, at the very beginning of

<sup>1</sup> His other original works on philosophy are *Vigraha-Vyâvartani* and *Pramâna-vidhvamsana*, both of which criticize the Nyâya theory of *pramâna* (proof) and as such they are preoccupied more with refuting others than establishing any theory of their own.

his book, has given in a nutshell the fundamentals of his philosophy in a couple of invocatory verses. There he has stated *pratityasamutpâda* (dependent origination), the *sine qua non* of *samsâra*, by eight "noes." He has denied origination and cessation, permanence and discontinuance, unity and diversity, coming and going, of *pratityasamutpâda* and declared that it is in reality non-origination and therefore equated with *sunya* or Nirvâna. In fact, he has asserted that this phenomenon, in spite of all its solidity and concreteness, is after all devoid of all substantiality, but not absolutely nothing, as it is grounded on the Noumenon, where ceases all manifoldness (*prapanchopasama*) and which is all quiescence (*shiva*). Throughout his whole work, he has made an attempt to subject all categories of thought to a critical examination and thus expose, through his irrefragable logic, their inanity as ultimate philosophical principles. He has, therefore, rightly styled each of the twenty-seven chapters of his book as "Examination" (of different categories). The chapters are: (1) Examination of Causality, (2) of Motion, (3) of the Senses, (4) of the Constituents, (5) of the Elements, (6) of the Attributes and Substance, (7) of the Composite, (8) of Action and the Actor, (9) of Priority, (10) of Fire and Fuel, (11) of the Limit of What is Before and What is Behind, (12) of Sufferings, (13) of Disposition, (14) of Relations, (15) of Particularity, (16) of Bondage and Freedom, (17) of Results of Action, (18) of Soul, (19) of Time, (20) of Totality (of causes and conditions), (21) of

Origination and Cessation, (22) of Tathâgata (Buddha), (23) of Perverted Knowledge, (24) of Noble Truths, (25) of Nirvâna, (26) of the Twelve Links (of the causal nexus), (27) of Conceptions.

#### THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGY

Nâgârjuna, in his long dissertation on the different categories, has proved that the things and events that we are cognizant of in our daily life, and which we falsely believe to be the components of reality, have but a relative existence, inasmuch as they appear and disappear following some causal laws. To believe that the categories have real existence because they have a practical bearing on life and are endowed with some pragmatic value, is a sort of enlightened superstition. All the popular doctrines which have hitherto been held to be unassailable are found incapable of sustaining themselves before a searching examination of *reductio ad absurdum*. Even the intellect in its quest after the ultimate reality, which must be non-contradictory, stands self-condemned, as it finds perplexing antinomies in the world of experience with which it is to deal. The reality always eludes the detection of the mind and refuses to be caught in the meshes of thought. To revel, therefore, in one's private opinions, and uncriticised judgment, thinking them to be the ultimate philosophical principles corresponding to reality, may be a pastime for the intellectualists, but it is no sign of sound philosophical thinking. Nâgârjuna finds all the conclusions of philosophy reached by the power of human intellect as so many paradoxes hidden by mere thoughtless phraseology. He, therefore, explodes them all and proves them to be only a figment of imagination, mere thought fabricated out of emptiness.

#### HIS METHOD

To arrive at the ultimate reality he followed his analytical method with the dispassionate zeal of a philosopher. He applied this method *mutatis mutandis* in examining all the existing categories and proved their untenability as philosophical finalities. In his examination of motion he has shown that "neither one passes a path he has already traversed, nor does he pass a path that is yet to be passed; and one cannot comprehend the existence of a path that is different from what is passed and what is yet to be passed."<sup>2</sup> Commenting upon this Chandrakirti has said that what is already passed cannot be passed now, for such an act will make the past and the present happen at a given moment, which is an impossibility; so also what is yet to be passed cannot be passed at this moment, as the present and the future can by no means be brought together, and the absurdity of a third alternative is obvious. He further shows that if at a particular point of time one is to make a movement, there is no space for him to move in, except what is either before or behind him. Of course, one may say that there is the space covered by his feet, which is neither behind nor before; but if one closely analyses it one will find that the space under his toes lies before his heels, and that under his heels lies behind the toes; and if one follows this method to its logical conclusion, one will be driven to a situation where it will be altogether impossible for him to escape the tangle of this "before and behind" or "what is passed and what is yet to be passed". This will naturally lead to the impossibility of motion. One is here reminded of Zeno's argument against motion or change. If one is to pass through a certain space, he argues, one must first

<sup>2</sup> *Mâdhyamika-Kârîka* II. 1.

cover half of that space, and again, if he is to cover this half, he is to move through half of this half, and so on *ad infinitum*; and therefore motion is impossible. But Nâgârjuna penetrated more deeply into the matter and proved that while it was absurd even to take the first step, the question of moving through half of a given space is inadmissible. Nâgârjuna applied this method almost *ad nauseam* throughout his work, while examining the existing categories and conclusions of philosophy, in order to disprove their absolute character. He has thus shown that the cause and effect, substance and attributes, doer and deed, relation and the relata, freedom and bondage, permanence and change, origination and cessation, Noble Truths, sufferings, Nirvâna and even Buddha are but in the world of relations and do not belong to the category of reality.

#### HIS SCEPTICISM

The empirical method of Nâgârjuna has naturally led him to scepticism, which prompts him to get rid of all superstitious belief, however deep-rooted it may be. By his powerful dialectics he has reduced all popular notions to mere fantasies and warned everybody not to believe anything that the uncritical judgment presented to our mind. But his scepticism is not wholly destructive. He has shattered the outer crust of the phenomena so that the inner reality may reveal itself. If he is too hard upon prevalent philosophical formulas and conclusions and religious dogmas and doctrines, it is only to bring out their inner truth, which is oftener than not hidden under dense verbiage and fantastic explanations.

#### THE NATURE OF REALITY

To him reality is beyond all comprehension, albeit it is not absolutely nothing. No category of thought ever

has the power to impart the knowledge of reality. But our incapacity to comprehend it does not mean its denial. So Nâgârjuna follows a negative method to describe the reality, and he calls it *sunya* because there is hardly any other term that can better express it when we approach it through absolute negation. The Upanishadic method of 'neti' 'neti' (not this, not this) is vividly reflected in Nâgârjuna's way of describing the reality through eight 'noes'. By dint of his daring logic he has proved to the hilt the insubstantiality of all postulates, and *sunyatâ* has been forced upon him as a natural conclusion of his thoroughgoing research in the realm of reality.

But here is a moot point. Is this *sunyatâ* a hard reality, or only a pious hypothesis? Is anything posited by the term, or is it merely assumed to do away with all preconceived notions? This can be answered from various standpoints. At the very outset we must state that even *sunya* is incapable of describing the reality as it is, and therefore it falls short of a true definition of the same. But knowing as we do the limitations of its scope, we can deal with the various aspects of *sunya* from different angles of vision and see how far it can carry us in our philosophical quest.

We have already seen that the phenomenal world is but a complex of innumerable relations, and as such it is devoid of reality, as it has no intrinsic nature of its own. "That which is not self-natured", says Nâgârjuna, "cannot inhere in the nature of something else";<sup>3</sup> and therefore it cannot originate and come into being. This world is therefore *sunya* or non-being. But do we include even the soul, the conscious agent, in the phenomena and call it also non-being? And if it is so, how do we

<sup>3</sup> M. K. I. 2.

know that it is *sunya*? Nâgârjuna emphatically denies the existence of any soul or *âtman* and asks whether this *âtman* is within the *skandhas* or not. If it is, it must be non-being, and if it is not, how could it have any existence at all? But consciousness is already included in the *skandhas* (as *vijnâna skandha*) and as such it is within the phenomena and must inherit their nature. One thing to be noted here is that although Nâgârjuna has repudiated the idea of any individual soul, he is rather reticent about the Paramâtman or universal soul. It may be that the Vedantic idea of Paramâtman was then in a nebular form and not crystallized, as it has been in a later period at the hands of great polemics such as, Sankara, or that Nâgârjuna did not find much difference between his idea of the final reality and that of Vedânta.

Now we have found that the phenomenal world with all its material and spiritual creation is ultimately non-being in its essence. This is exactly the position of the Satyasiddhi school, who assert absolute nihilism. But Nâgârjuna differs from them and goes a step further. He opines that although *sunya* means a complete negation in so far as the phenomena are concerned, it has a Noumenal aspect, in that it is neither existence nor non-existence, neither finite nor infinite, neither one nor many; in short, it is inexpressible in terms of relativity. The absolute or the reality in itself will always defy a correct and adequate definition, and yet we cannot deny it on that score. *Sunya* in its transcendental aspect, therefore, does not mean absolute nothingness but that it is beyond all definitions and relations. While referring to the ultimate character of reality, the Upanishadic thinkers also pleaded their incapacity to define it. "Wherefrom," they say, "words come back

baffled with the mind."<sup>4</sup> Nâgârjuna also echoes the same thought when he declares that "the nature of reality is incomprehensible, quiescence, indescribable in terms of relativity, without thought and without variety."<sup>5</sup>

But here a question arises. When the reality or *sunyatâ* of Nâgârjuna is bereft of all relations and stripped of all attributes, will it not lapse into an empty residue, a mere abstraction of thought, without having any value or reference to life and experience? Nâgârjuna of course does not answer it either positively or negatively, but he says: "It cannot be called *sunya* (void) or non-*sunya*, or both or neither but in order to comprehend the same we call it all these,"<sup>6</sup> and to show its universal character and utility in life he further adds: "Everything becomes possible to a man who comprehends the compatibility of *sunyatâ*."<sup>7</sup> When one truly realizes this *sunyatâ*, which is in its absolute character not a pure blank or a flat monotony of emptiness, but all-comprehensive, all-embracing reality, then *samsâra* loses all its distinctive characters and merges itself in the all-absorbing truth. It is ignorance that has covered the truth, and made it appear as *samsâra*. When this outer wrappage is peeled off, there remains "not the slightest distinction between *Samsâra* and *Nirvâna*."<sup>8</sup>

#### THE DEGREES OF REALITY

Although Nâgârjuna is relentless in his denial of *samsâra* while expounding his theory of reality, yet he is never oblivious of human frailty and weakness; and so coming down from the giddy height of his philosophical mood

<sup>4</sup> *Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *M. K.* 18. 9.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 22. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* 24. 14.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* 25. 19.

to the level of workaday practical life, he has conceded some value to this world of phenomena and declared that "the teachings of Buddha are based on two kinds of truth, conventional (*samvriti*) and transcendental (*paramârtha*)."<sup>9</sup> It is by following the conventional truth that Buddha has spoken of the four Noble Truths, the eightfold path, *pratityasamutpâda* and a host of other religious and philosophical theories, doctrines and dogmas. But he has had recourse to transcendental truth while declaring *sunyatâ*, which is beyond all intellection and conception, to be the last generalization of all that exists. The Hinayânists, without knowing the difference between these two forms of teachings, have mistaken the apparent for the real and thus made confusion worse confounded. It is, therefore, a foremost necessity for one to know the distinction between these two forms of truth before one can strive for a proper understanding of the Master's teachings. *Samvriti satya*, which holds good in our everyday life, is also absolutely necessary for realizing the *paramârtha*, as we are to begin from this stage and climb higher and higher till we ascend to the last rung of our spiritual *sâdhanâ*, where alone we can expect to take up the *paramârtha* or higher practices that will ultimately bring us face to face with the reality.<sup>10</sup>

The conventional teachings are for the generality of people and therefore form the exoteric aspect of Buddhism, whereas the transcendental teachings, which are for a selected few, come under its esoteric aspect. The division of reality into *samvriti* and *paramârtha* has its parallel in Vedantic division of it into the *prâtibhâshika* (the apparent), *vyâvahârîka* (the practical) and *pâramârthika* (the transcendental). The

first two come under *samvriti*, with its two divisions of *alokasamvriti* or apparent (which refers to a particular deluded individual) and *lokasamvriti* or practical (which, though in the world of delusion, has a universal appeal). But by this division of truth into *samvriti* and *paramârtha* one should not think that there is such difference actually existing in the reality. This is an expedient method of bringing within the easy reach of the common folk (*prithagjana*) the highest truth, which otherwise would always remain beyond their comprehension. Both these truths are valid in so far as the relative world is concerned and have no reference to ultimate reality.

#### CONCLUSION

The philosophy of Nâgârjuna marks an important epoch in the annals of Indian thought. His dialectics introduced in Indian philosophy a new method, which many philosophers irrespective of their denominations followed in later days in their works, willy-nilly. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if a Gaudapâda or a Sankara imbibes the same method and applies it in expounding his own philosophy. It is an indubitable fact that no philosopher can possibly escape the influence of those who come before him. Rather he receives ample help from them, and without jeopardizing thereby his own conclusion, can build up an entirely new system of philosophy. Nâgârjuna himself, while expounding the nature of the final reality, might have had Upanishadic conclusions in his mind, but it does not necessarily dispute the fact that the Sunyavâda that he advanced was to all intents and purposes an entirely new movement in the thought world. Thus Gaudapâda and Sankara might have adopted the dialectic method evolved by Nâgârjuna, and yet it did

<sup>9</sup> M. K. 24. 8.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* 24. 9 & 10.



not prevent them from building up their own philosophy, following the line of the Upanishadic thinkers. Nâgârjuna, therefore, is as much indebted to Hinduism as Gaudapâda or Sankara to Buddhism. But if one takes a detached view of the evolution of Indian thought, one will find that Sunyavâda and Advaitavâda, when grasped in all their

bearings, are complementary rather than antagonistic.

In dealing with Nâgârjuna's philosophy we could hardly touch even the outer fringe of it, and a vast territory still lies unexplored before us. We shall, however, have opportunity to deal more fully with the subject in the course of the translation of his *Mâdhya-mika-kârikâ*.

---

## NOTES AND COMMENTS

### IN THIS NUMBER

In the *Editorial* we have discussed the effects of the *Occidental* system of education on our social life and pointed out the ideal type of education needed for an all-round growth and progress of our womanhood. Dr. Yusuf Hussain Khan, D.Litt. (Paris), Reader in History, Osmania University, Hyderabad, in his learned article on *Dara Shikuh : A Mystic Prince*, has given a brilliant pen-picture of the mystic faith of Prince Dara who was actuated by a desire to prove that both Islam and Hinduism, though outwardly dissimilar, are essentially the same and that both represent spiritual efforts of man to realize the highest Truth. The readers will find in the *Liberty in the Modern World* by Prof. P. S. Naidu, M.A., of the Annamalai University, a learned discussion on the present status of 'authority' and 'freedom' in the contemporary governments, and also a bold outline of the method whereby India should evolve a spiritualized political programme which must not be a cheap imitative mixture of Communism and Fascism but one that is native to her soil and pregnant with her spiritual genius. Dr. A. S. Altekar, M.A., LL.B., D.Litt., Head of the Department of Ancient Indian History

and Culture, Benares Hindu University, in his thoughtful contribution entitled *Is Conversion Alien to the Spirit of Hinduism*, has ably pointed out in the light of Hindu scriptures and other historical facts that Hindu thought and culture are not opposed to conversion and reconversion. The writer urges that those who genuinely desire to accept Hindu religion or return to it should be allowed to do so by the leaders of Hindu society. In the *Ideals of Swami Vivekananda*, which is an illuminating address delivered at the Vivekananda Anniversary, New Delhi, by the Hon'ble Sir Maurice Gwyer, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Kt., Chief Justice of the Federal Court, India, he deals with the principles for which Swami Vivekananda stood, and emphasizes that the modern civilisation must grasp them if it is not to perish altogether. Mr. Kalidas Bhattacharya, M.A., Lecturer of the Vidyasagar College, Calcutta, has pointed out in his interesting article, *From Existence to Super-existence*, that existence is not the only type of reality and that the relativity of subsistents paves the way for Super-existence. He also says that there are spiritual adepts who pass directly from existence to Super-existence. In *Buddhism and the Philosophy of Nagarjuna*, Swami Vimukta-

nanda of the Ramakrishna Mission gives a brief sketch of the salient features of Nagarjuna's Sunyavada as embodied in his *Mulamadhyamakârikâ*, an English rendering of which will be presented to our readers from the next month.

### WHAT INDIA STANDS FOR

In India, even at present, in spite of the onslaught of the various foreign ideas, and the diverse changes that have swept over the land, no one can gainsay the fact that it is the ancient ideals of religion that still hold the field. If we turn the pages of Indian history from times past, it will be evident what an important role religion has ever played in the evolution of her corporate life. In the various centres of her national activity, political or social, economical or educational, it is religion that has acted as a stimulus for her self-expression. Whenever there had been a retrogression in this particular line, a prophet or a great religious reformer appeared on the scene to bring about a religious upheaval, and thereby ushered in an era of social and political solidarity in the country. The advent of Lord Buddha and the popularity of Buddhism made the Mauryan kings the greatest of the Indian emperors. Asoka, 'the greatest of the kings,' extended his sway not by the power of his sword but by the simple teachings of his faith—truth and *ahimsâ*. The virile political organisation of the Sikhs was the outcome of the spiritual contributions of Guru Nanak, Guru Govinda Singh and his heroic brothers-in-faith. If India has fallen to-day from her high pedestal, is religion to be held responsible for that?

There is a certain class of people, specially a few politicians, who have begun of late to decry religion and things relating to it in season and out of season. They fall foul of religion and

attribute to it everything that is politically and materially backward in our land. They go to the extent of telling that religion has been the curse of our land, that it has stunted the growth of our national consciousness, and as such it requires to be banished from the field of active life! But the real cause for the present emasculation of our people is to be sought elsewhere. It is, as Swami Vivekananda has pointed out, the utter indifference to the spirit of religion upon which the edifice of our national life rests, that has brought about such a stagnation in our collective existence. The Swami has said with his prophetic voice that India has a glorious mission to fulfil in the world. If India is to rise again to her pristine position of greatness she must develop those traits in her character which are in consonance with the highest ideals of her eternal religion. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, in his recent speech at Madras, struck the very same note when he said, "If there is any mission for India, it is not the mission in politics or economics; it is the mission with regard to philosophy and religion. The history of this country has for its landmarks, not kings, emperors, battles and wars, but saints, scriptures and holy lights. . . . It is those saints who have given life to our country, who have enabled this country to endure and survive all these centuries of misrule, plague, pestilence, wars and other things. It is that which has given us a strange power or real vitality. It is essential in these distracted times to point out the necessity of emphasising the values of the spirit."

To those superficial critics who complain that religion has made the people unworldly and materially poor, Sir Radhakrishnan replies: "All I want to emphasise is that religion, in the strict sense of the term, is not an exile from life. True spirituality is always appli-

cable to the daily affairs of life; we cannot say that it is in any manner irrelevant to particular political conditions and economic demands. . . . Are not the rich of the world the most unhappy to-day? Go to America, there they will tell you that the largest number of suicides is to be found among the rich and wealthy and not among the poor. Are you likely to say that jealousy, stupidity, pride and hatred will cease to exist, so soon as we have all the comforts and conveniences of life which wealth can buy? Are you prepared to say that purity of personal relationship will not be spoiled by selfishness? Let us realise there are other values than economic values. Mere self-sufficiency and material needs are not the *sine qua non* of essential happiness."

What a truly religious soul can do for the country's rejuvenation has recently been pointed out by Mr. S. Satyamurti, in his inspiring address at Madras on the occasion of the birthday celebration of Swami Vivekananda. Mr. Satyamurti said, "Swami Vivekananda gave us not only our religion, but he gave us also patriotism, he gave us the Swadeshi gospel; above all, he gave us our self-

respect and he placed India on the map of the world." He further observed that Mahatma Gandhi in all that he is doing is a lineal descendant of Swami Vivekananda; and if Gandhiji is able to achieve what he has been able to achieve, it is because of the pioneering work done by the great Swami. "Swami Vivekananda and his great Guru Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa," he remarked, "have recreated India, and if India becomes free and self-governing, it goes not a little to the credit of the Swami's work here and elsewhere."

Signs are not wanting to-day to show the approaching dawn of a new era in India. Under the Gandhian ideology which is wedded to truth and religion, many have already manfully responded to the clarion call for liberating the land from the domination of alien influences. India is waking up once again from her long deep slumber to build her destiny anew and to play her glorious role in the regeneration of humanity at large. Indeed India stands not for the crude principle that flourishes in sordid materialism, but for the lofty ideal which seeks its fulfilment in the spiritualisation of the human race—the *raison d'être* of her existence in the world.

---

## REVIEWS AND NOTICES

BRADLEY AND BERGSON: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. BY RAM MURTI LOOMBA, M.A., WITH A FOREWORD BY NARENDRA NATH SEN GUPTA, M.A., PH.D., PROFESSOR AND HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, LUCKNOW UNIVERSITY. *The Upper India Publishing House Ltd., Lucknow. Price Rs. 2-8. Pp. 187.*

This book of Mr. Ram Murti Loomba, M.A., is a comparative study of the philosophical systems of Bradley and Bergson. If William James characterises Bradley's philosophy as an instance of 'vicious intel-

lectualism' because of his conception of 'static timeless reality', Mr. Loomba treats Bradley very sympathetically. He holds that in Bradley there is much of anti-intellectualistic tendency which can even out-balance his intellectualism. By emphasising this tendency in Bradley, he is able to find out the true Bergsonian spirit in him. The difference lies only in the fact that Bradley is less radical than Bergson. Both of them, if judged aright, marshal us to the last phase of the development of the idealistic philosophy, viz., towards 'anti-intellectualis-

tic idealism', which had a faint beginning in Hegel's Phenomenology, where there is an indication of the priority of 'immediate sense-experience', forming the very basis of later dialectic thinking. This anti-intellectualistic tendency, according to Mr. Loomba, is the most rational and natural tendency in the path of intellectual development.

"Both Bradley and Bergson", continues Mr. Loomba, "definitely revolt against intellectualism." This revolt against intellectualism is due to the thought about reality as "pure sentient experience" (Bradley), or "pure duration" (Bergson). Both emphasise the fact that reality is a "whole experience", where there is no division of content into 'what' and 'that' (Bradley), or where there is no 'dissection' of the 'flowing content' (Bergson). This 'content' for both is a heterogeneous (qualitative variety), continuous and concrete whole of experience. It is a unity-in-multiplicity as having qualitative variety in unity. If it be a complete whole (Bradley) or a continuous experience (Bergson), the intellect which separates or analyses the content into 'what' and 'that' (Bradley), or the intellect which 'dissects' the flowing reality (Bergson), cannot grasp the 'whole' (Bradley) or the 'flowing reality' (Bergson). Reality, for Bradley, is 'immediate experience', so how can it be grasped by our intellectualistic ways of understanding which analyse the 'whole'? To get that 'whole' means to 'transcend' intellect. It is nothing but intellectual suicide. So what is given by our discursive thought is nothing but 'appearance' and not 'reality'. So Bradley's famous book, "Appearance And Reality", is a vehement criticism against our intellectualistic ways of understanding.

In the same way Bergson points out that our intellect cannot grasp the 'flowing reality' for its 'natural inability to comprehend life.' Its function lies in dissection of the 'moving reality.' It goes 'about' the 'flowing reality', it cannot 'install' itself into it. This points out Bergson's emphasis on the 'resemblance theory of knowledge'. For him knowledge means being 'one' with reality. It is a merging into it. The intellect cannot merge into reality. It is only possible through 'intuition' where we live the life of 'pure duration'. This 'pure duration' is the very stuff of reality. It is not a hypothetical conception of the Absolute, not a 'thing-in-

itself', not an intellectual figment as an 'atomic sensation', but a 'concrete experience' of a 'flowing reality', which is all-pervasive and continuous whole, not an experience of 'mere succession', but of constant 'interpenetration'—a constant swelling of an 'explosive force' to manifest itself in creative varieties of multifarious forms in multifarious directions. It is a positive significant clear experience of a unity-in-multiplicity—a process dynamic and active, not a total grasp of all phenomenal diversity in one act of consciousness (Bradley), but a temporal process of change and flux in which there is all-progressive flow of qualitative differences and forms not all at once, but in continuous succession, some forms disappearing, others originating—a principle of ever-creative activity. This is the contribution of Bergson's thought to philosophy.

"If this conception of reality as held by Bergson," says Mr. Loomba, "has a sense of finalism or teleological vein in it, it is 'of a common impetus rather than a finalism of a common goal or ideal' (as held by other idealists including Bradley)". Like all other idealists, Bergson seeks the 'qualitative principle of reality', and thereby he shares the anthropomorphism characteristic of idealistic philosophy. We can safely say, following Mr. Loomba, that Bergson's philosophy is a development towards 'anti-intellectualistic idealism', which Bradley fails to achieve inspite of all his criticism against our intellectualistic ways of understanding reality. This failure of Bradley, according to the author, is due to his rationalistic bias. He takes intellect as merely 'logical', and reality as a 'static whole'. But the 'intellect' for Bergson is more a theory of life than an abstract theory of knowledge. Bergson's treatment of the intellect is 'biological', he is concerned with the historical appearance of the intellect. In this sense, Bergson is more true to reality. Bradley's last weakness lies in his conception of reality as a 'static timeless whole'. If reality is revealed to our immediate sentient experience, how can it be a static whole? It is an experience of a moment, not a total grasp of all experiences. The very conception of the Absolute as a total grasp of all experiences, leads him to think of a static whole where 'all' are 'somehow' found together. But this whole is non-relational, but yet not a homogeneous whole

like the Brahman of Advaita philosophy. It is a 'heterogeneous' whole as having qualitative variety. But how can there be qualitative variety without continuity? It cannot therefore be 'timeless'. It cannot be timeless as it is an 'experience'. To think of timeless whole, non-relational yet 'somehow' relational, cannot naturally follow from a strict logic.

This is why Mr. Loomba tells us to follow Bergson, who carries idealism to its last phase of development, viz., towards 'anti-intellectualistic idealism'. This new insight into Bergson's philosophy, which arises from the ashes of the philosophy of Bradley, and gleams with the freshness of life and vigour like the 'Phoenix' of old, must be deemed by all contemporary Western thinkers as a piece of original thought and research.

Anil Kumar Sarkar, M.A.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADVAITA.  
BY T. M. P. MAHADEVAN, M.A., PH.D.  
*Luzac & Co., 46, Great Russell Street,  
London, W.C. 1. Can be had of the Presi-  
dent, Sri Satchidananda Sangha, 44, Nagap-  
pier Street, Triplicane, Madras. Pp. 284.  
Price Rs. 5 or 7s. 6d. net.*

To English readers Advaita philosophy is principally associated with the name of Samkara, though it has a far more ancient past and attained greater fullness and development in later years. Except, however, for brief references in histories of Indian philosophy post-Samkara Advaitism has hardly been made accessible to students and readers in a systematic and comprehensive manner. The present author, therefore, has made a contribution of great value to the subject by his masterly presentation for the first time of the Advaita doctrine, specially as set forth in the writings of Vidyâranya, whose reputation stands very high among the dialecticians of the post-Samkara period.

Vidyâranya is placed by many in the fourteenth century A.D. Later tradition identified him with Madhava, the reputed author and politician. In recent years there has been a tendency to discredit the view. Our author however finds such disagreement resting upon not very formidable doubts, and he gives ground for regarding the traditional view as of greater probability.

The work is principally based on the *Panchadasi*, the *Vivaranaprimeya Samgraha* and the *Drig-Drisyā-Viveka*, though the

presentation of the Advaita dialectics had to be rounded off by drawing upon other important sources like Dharmarāja, Vimuktatman, Chitsukha, and Appayadikshita. The epistemological approach to philosophy is characteristic of the great body of systematic thinkers of India; and the author begins his account by an exposition of the ways of knowing from the Advaita standpoint. The Advaita theory of knowledge is critical of the Nyāya and Sāmkhya accounts and principally rests upon its special theory of psychosis which is the transformation of the internal organ pervading the object. Such transformation of the internal organ in contact with the object brings the individual self into association with it and thus gives rise to knowledge.

The six means of valid knowledge, enumerated by the Advaitin, do not however rest upon the same level, for Sruti (Scripture) *pramāna* is superior to all. Truth, according to the Advaitin, is knowledge which is never sublated and is novel. But the knowledge which the senses etc. give, though valid in the empirical sense, is sublated at a later stage by the Sruti *pramāna*. There is thus error within Error. And the problem is, how does the Error arise? It is replied, Error is born of *avidyā* which does not admit of any precise determination either as real or unreal. The answer is the same as in all absolutistic metaphysics that distinctions and differences in the One are incomprehensible.

Three chapters examine the definition of Brahman as Existence-Intelligence-Bliss, and present Reality as intelligent experience where thought and existence unite in an inseparable whole. The rest of the work is devoted to the other main topics of Advaita Vedanta, namely, the character of Sākshi, Isvara and Jiva, and their mutual relation, —the doctrine of Mâyā in its three different aspects, the Way and the final Goal.

The book is a very able and lucid presentation of the post-Samkara Advaita dialectics within a reasonable compass; and the exposition derives certain value from the fact that the position presented bears a certain relation to the author's personality as representing his own outlook on life and existence.

ZEN BUDDHISM AND ITS INFLUENCE  
ON JAPANESE CULTURE. BY D. T.  
SUZUKI. *The Eastern Buddhist Society,  
Kyoto, Japan. Pp. (including Index) 288.*

Prof. Suzuki is already a well-known writer on the attractive subject of 'Zen Buddhism', and a book written by him on the subject dealing specially with its influence on Japanese culture is assured of a welcome from its readers. The romantic nature poetry of the Japanese, Prof. Suzuki knows, has nothing to do with Zen except in an indirect fashion, and that because of an experience of transparency—revealing the identity of the subject and the object; Zen is something more, living in and enjoying nature, not merely the perception of this identity. Zen attitude to modern times, the author says, is that of revolt against the materialisation of nature for the sake of pleasure.

The book makes delightful reading, inasmuch as it sparkles with pointed anecdotes and careful discrimination. It is of further interest to an Indian in that it throws light on certain aspects of Indian culture and practice that lack colour when viewed through a Western perspective. Thus asymmetry is not a stigma but it may be explained as an expression of national philosophy; the old practice of a student living with his preceptor also appears in a new light and stands justified, as brought out by the author's explanation of Zen and swordsmanship, while the experience of monks and ascetics turning away questioners by abuse and threats of personal violence also becomes understandable from his explanation of similar practices in Japan with teachers of Zen.

One feels tempted to ask, is not Zen the common property of all East?

PROF. PRIYARANJAN SEN, M.A., P.R.S.

**SPEECHES OF BHULABHAI DESAI.**  
*Published by Messrs. G. A. Natesan & Co., Madras. Pages X+615. Price Rs. 3-8.*

Mr. Bhulabhai Desai occupies to-day a high place in Indian politics as the leader of those who are serving the country and fighting for its freedom through parliamentary system. Neither an extremist nor a conservative as Mr. Desai is, his speeches are always marked by sobriety of thought, soundness of reason and clearness of expression, and as such they invariably carry the weight and attention they deserve even from those who differ from him. His mellifluous eloquence and learned utterances on any subject he touches upon, be it political, social or economical, have ever been a treat

to many. Mr. G. A. Natesan has done a real service to the country by bringing out some of Mr. Desai's speeches in an attractive, well-printed and at the same time moderately priced book-form.

In the book under review are collected together some interesting speeches that were made by Mr. Desai on various occasions during the period from July, 1934 to September, 1938. Some are his electioneering orations which he delivered as the Secretary to the Congress Parliamentary Board, at various places, on the eve of general elections to the Provincial Legislatures; some are on the topics of common and national interest, viz., communal award, communism and class war, principles of a modern state, etc., and most of the rest are his speeches in the Central Legislative Assembly during its sessions both at Delhi and Simla. His slashing attack with dauntless courage on the policy of repression of the Government which the latter adopted not long before, especially in Bengal; his authoritative and informative speeches on the Indian Finance Bill, Indian Companies Bill, Indian Insurance Bill, etc., and lastly his trenchant, yet courteous and dignified criticism of the Executive Council, during the Budget Session—all, made on the floor of the Central Legislature by one of the chosen spokesmen of India's will and aspirations, we are sure, will be read with profit and profound interest, not only by the students of politics, commerce and law, but also by every Indian who has got a love for his country in his heart.

Of these speeches which are mostly political, that which Mr. Desai delivered at the Sen Gupta memorial meeting in Madras and is aptly put under the caption "India's mission in the world," may justly be ranked as a fine specimen of sermon on religion. "Religion," says he, "is that which stirs you to action, righteousness and truth." To inspire every one to act with a "spirit of service and self-effacement" is, according to him, the mission of India. This is indeed a noble ideal which, if rightly understood and followed, can go a long way to contribute to an enduring peace among the warring sects and the belligerent classes, not only in India but also in the outside world as well.

**THE GANDHI SUTRAS.** BY D. S. SARMA, M.A., PRINCIPAL, PACHAIYAPPA'S COLLEGE, MADRAS. *Price Rs. 1-8.*

This is a highly praiseworthy attempt.

Mr. Sarma has, with great skill, ingenuity and devotion, addressed himself to a task which is expected to yield highly beneficial results. He has prepared a digest of Mahatma Gandhi's teaching in 108 sutras after the established practice of our country, and divided them into three chapters—ordinary rules of Dharma, Satyagraha, and its special implications. The Sutras in Sanskrit are his own, and they will satisfy the rigorous tests of the Sanskrit Sutra. Each Sutra is followed by its English translation, and then comes the Bhasya or commentary, which is carefully given in Mahatmaji's own words, with necessary references. For this the author had to ransack the files of the *Young India*, the *Harijan*, and similar other sources for a correct understanding of Mahatmaji's thought, and he has thus assimilated Gandhi ideas both analytically and synthetically. The presentation cannot but delight the heart of every one interested in Gandhi literature for whom the book is indispensable.

Its wide publicity is to be desired by students of Indian culture. The profits of the sale proceeds will go to the Harijan Sevak Sangha.

PROF. PRIYARANJAN SEN, M.A., P.R.S.

THE MYSTICISM OF TIME IN RIG-VEDA (WITH A CHAPTER ON SOMA). BY DR. MOHAN SINGH, M.A., PH.D. D.LITT., OF THE PUNJAB UNIVERSITY. Published by Messrs. Atma Ram & Sons, Anarkali, Lahore (India). Pp. 64. Price 5.

Dr. Mohan Singh of Lahore, who is an eminent scholar, is the author of several books in Hindi, Urdu and Punjabi, besides English. The learned author observes that the Veda is all Mysticism couched in terms of every day articles, animals, common ideas, popular conceptions and ceremonies. In this book he deals particularly with the Vedic Mysticism of Time by which he means Brahma-Vidyâ of Kâla, contemplation of Brahman in Time and as Time, *i.e.*, meditation of Brahman as Sâkâra and Nirâkâra Kâla or Time manifest and Time unmanifest.

In other words, Mysticism of Time is the search of God through Time, or, as the author terms it, 'theologisation of astronomy'. By Time is meant 'observations' carried out by Astronomy, Physics, Mathematics and Yoga. The author emphasises that the Vedic thought has basically a three-fold significance, *i.e.* Âdhibhautic, Âdhidai-

vic and Âdhyântic corresponding to the bodily, heavenly and metaphysical as found in the three kinds of commentaries on the Veda (Samhita) such as the Brâhmana, Aranyaka and Upanishad. The very word 'Samhita' denotes unity in the Trinity of commentaries meaning thereby that, though they explain the Samhita in three different ways, they have mutual correspondences.

The Vedic law of three-fold correspondences, the author remarks, exists between Time, Space and Causality or, in Vedic terminology, year, sacrifice and speech. All external things, events and processes have been used in the Veda correspondentially, the objective being to point out the mental and spiritual. Correspondences which are external make the Veda an eternal picture of archetypal patterns in all the three spheres. Astronomical terms are found in the Veda to correspond with Vedanta and Yoga, even as in the Tantras Yoga is linked up with Astronomy. For instance, Saraswati, the Goddess of learning, is the Saraswati, a river; Saraswati, the Nâdi in the human body, and Saraswati, the Orion in the heavens. Parallelism between Yoga and Astronomy shows that microcosmic human system corresponds in every way with the macrocosmic universe even as New Physics has proved that an atom is a miniature solar system.

The Rig Veda of 43,200 syllables, the author opines, is the eternal whole recurrent Time, and the Samhita is the Time-order of a year, of 5 years, etc. Even the Vedic characters which are etymological formations are personifications of Time, Space and Causation. The Hindu Dramas, the Buddhist and medieval Hindu legends serve the same purpose of teaching us Brahma-Vidyâ, and their elaboration through new events and characters has also been carried out with the definite purpose of teaching the mysticism of Time, Space and Causation through racial and geographical archetypal patterns. The Truth of Brahma-Vidyâ is revealed to us through phases of Time as it stands at the Uttarayana (return journey), Nivritti (renunciation) and Parokshânubhava (realisation). As the Rig Veda is, in the opinion of the author, mainly occupied with Time-mysticism, it has been called primarily a Time-Book (somewhat like the Chinese Time-Books).

The fundamental object of the Veda, Dr. Mohan Singh pertinently points out, is to teach the Brahma-Vidyâ but the astro-

nomical data are there only to show the exact and comprehensive parallelism, inter-relatedness, inter-dependence and finally the identity or unity of the cosmic order.

Philosophy of Time is the dominant note in the scientific and philosophic thought of the modern West. Hence Vedic Mysticism of Time as thought-out and formulated by Dr. Mohan Singh will, we hope, shed new light on modern thought and will therefore be warmly welcomed by advanced students of both science and philosophy in India and in the West.

The get up of the book is not quite up to the mark and the price seems to be too high.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA.

### HINDI

1. SATHA-PANCHA CHOUPÂYEE. Pp. 326. Price 10 annas.
2. BHAGAVAD-GITA BHÂSHÂ. Pp. 354. Price ½ annas. Both published by the Gita Press, Gorakhpur.

1. This volume, as the name suggests, contains five hundred quatrains taken from *Ramacharita Mânasa*, the monumental devotional work of Tulasidas. Each original verse, printed in clear bold type, is followed by its meaning, and a copious commentary in Hindi. The commentary is written in lucid popular language and the publishers have taken every care to make the book very helpful to its readers.

2. This book contains a running translation of 700 verses of the *Bhagavad-Gita*

together with an illuminating note (the *Mâhâtmya*) on each chapter.

### SANSKRIT

SRI SUKTA BHASYA. BY SRI RANGANATHA MUNI. Edited by A. Srinivasa Raghavan, M.A., The Maharajah's College, Pudukottah. Price Rs. 1-8. Pp. 313.

Sri Sukta is the well-known hymn to the Goddess Lakshmi found in the Rig-Veda. The present edition contains the lucid and authoritative commentary, in Sanskrit, of Sri Ranganatha Muni, as well as the text of Sri Sukta with a running translation of each verse. It moreover contains many other Lakshmi Stotras composed by the Acharyas, among which mention may be made of Lakshmi Sahasranama, and also an alphabetical index to it. The book supplies a long-felt want and we hope it will be very popular among all religiously minded persons, chiefly the Vishishtâdvaitins.

### BENGALI-ENGLISH

BENGALI GRAMMAR AT A GLANCE. BY SWAMI MADHAVANANDA. Published by The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 19, Keshub Chandra Sen Street, Calcutta. Pp. 46. Price As. 6.

The indispensable need of a grammar in mastering a language can hardly be over-emphasised. This handy edition of Bengali Grammar contains all useful information necessary for beginners, especially non-Bengalis who know English, but not Sanskrit. The book furnishes some practical hints on the alphabet as well.

## NEWS AND REPORTS

### SWAMI SUDDHANANDA

The Vivekananda Society of Calcutta organised a full two days' programme in sacred memory of Srimat Swami Suddhanandaji Maharaj, Fifth President of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission, who was intimately connected with the Society for many years and took most active interest in its progress. A public meeting was held on the 11th February (after Puja, Homa and Chandipath at the Society Premises); in the spacious court-yard of Sj. Ramakrishna Dutt, an enthusiastic member of the

Society at No. 8, Jagannath Sur Lane. Three big-sized portraits of Sri Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda and Swami Suddhananda were very tastefully decorated with beautiful flowers, which were a great attraction to the public. Srimat Swami Madhavananda, Secretary of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission, presided over the function and many prominent sadhus of Belur Math and lay members took part in the proceedings. The President and other lecturers in neat speeches dwelt on the many-sided qualities of the great saint and paid glowing tributes to his sacred memory. After the meeting,



members of the Siddhveswari Kali Kirtan Sampraday of Chorbagan kindly entertained the audience with their melodious Sri Ramakrishna Kirtan which was highly appreciated. Next morning a procession started with songs and decorated portraits of Sri Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda and Swami Suddhananda from the society premises and went round several streets of North Calcutta. In the evening the members of the Ratnakar Sangha of Bhowanipur pleased the audience with their melodious Matrimahima Kirtan after which the function ended with distribution of Prasadam to the ladies and gentlemen present.

#### SRI RAMAKRISHNA MISSION AT LAHORE

At the request of a number of local devotees interested in the ideals and activities of the Mission, the Governing Body of the Mission decided to open a Branch Centre at Lahore at the beginning of the year and deputed Swami Adyananda for the purpose.

The formal opening of the centre took place on the 21st of February, 1939, on the occasion of the birthday anniversary of Sri Ramakrishna. There was *puja*, *homa* and *path* at the rented house at No. 3/A, Lodge Road, where the Mission is located at present. In the evening a largely attended public meeting was held at the Sanatan Dharam College Hall, presided over by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. V. Bhide. The speakers included Swami Adyananda, Sir Gokul Chand Narang, Prof. S. N. Das Gupta, Principal T. N. Moulik, Dr. T. N. Sita Ram, Prof. Hiralal Chopra, Prof. Teja Singh, who addressed the meeting on the ideas, ideals and activities of the Mission in the different parts of the world.

Since the opening of the centre, Swami Adyananda has begun weekly religious classes at the Mission premises. Other activities will be gradually undertaken.

#### SWAMI SIDDHATMANANDA'S TOUR

Swami Siddhatmananda of Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, recently went on a preaching tour in parts of U.P. and C.P. Beginning from December last he toured for three months visiting, among others, the following important places, Allahabad, Jubbulpore, Bilaspur, Raipur, Nagpur, Amraoti, and Akola. He delivered eighteen

public lectures at most of these places on various subjects, such as, "Religion and Society", "Religion and Modern Outlook", "Religion in our Daily Life", "Science, Philosophy and Religion", "The Message of Ramakrishna", etc. Apart from these he held conversations and granted private interviews at all the places and enlightened many seekers on the different problems of life, universal principles of Vedanta and teachings of Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda. The meetings which were largely attended including the *élite* of the towns created great enthusiasm and interest everywhere. Particularly the students at all these places evinced a keen interest in the lectures and discourses; and the Swami was invited to speak at the City College and Robertson College, Jubbulpore, King Edward College, Amraoti, and Berar Arts College, Akola. These lectures were arranged by the Philosophical Unions and the students actively participated in the discussions which followed.

#### 104TH BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY OF SRI RAMAKRISHNA AT THE BELUR MATH, DT. HOWRAH

The Belur Math celebrated on Tuesday, the 21st of February, 1939, the 104th birthday anniversary of Sri Ramakrishna as usual with Puja, Homa, and the feeding of the devotees. Nine Brahmacharins and fourteen probationers were initiated respectively into Sannyasa and Brahmacharya on this sacred occasion. In the afternoon a public meeting was held in the Math premises under the presidentship of Dr. Prabhu Dutt Shastri, M.A., Ph.D., I.E.S., Vidyasagar, and speeches were delivered on the life and teachings of the great Master. In his presidential address Dr. Shastri dwelt at length upon the varied spiritual realisations of Sri Ramakrishna, and the harmony of faiths established by this great prophet of the modern age for the well-being of humanity. The learned President deplored the present pitiable condition of the Hindus and said that 'if the spirit of the teachings of Sri Ramakrishna were to enter into their soul, they would transform their lives into lives for mutual love, service and renunciation in the right sense, and in such honest living there would be no nation greater than the Hindus.' Among others, Swami Madhavananda (Secretary of the Ramakrishna Mission), Prof. Mahendra Nath Sircar, M.A., Ph.D.,

and S. Kumudbandhu Sen also addressed the gathering.

The public celebration was held on Sunday the 26th February in the Math premises. This year the magnificent newly built temple of Sri Ramakrishna was a special attraction, and pilgrims numbering about three lakhs congregated on that sacred occasion to pay their respectful homage to the great Master. In a specially erected huge pandal a large-sized photo of Sri Ramakrishna was tastefully decorated, and various bhajana and concert parties delighted the audience with their excellent performances. About 25,000 (twenty-five thousand) devotees were sumptuously fed on the occasion. Thirty-four batches of volunteers (numbering 1,200) rendered splendid service on the occasion, and the function came to an end late at night after the usual display of fire-works.

#### SRI RAMAKRISHNA BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY

##### RAMAKRISHNA MISSION, SINGAPORE

On the occasion of the celebration of the 104th birthday anniversary of Sri Ramakrishna held on the 21st of February last, the Mission premises were nicely decorated and a crowded programme was gone through. Worship, prayer and the recitation of devotional songs by the students of the Mission schools formed the main features of the morning programme, after which the feeding of the children numbering over two hundred took place.

The most important item of the day was in the evening when several instructive and inspiring lectures were delivered at the Mission Hall explaining the life and teachings of Sri Ramakrishna.

Brahmachari Kailasam spoke eloquently in Tamil on the "Message of Sri Ramakrishna", which was followed by a speech in English by Sotharar Ponuthuray.

Swami Bhaswarananda who presided spoke next on the "Human Aspect of the Life Divine" and explained in simple English how Sri Ramakrishna, who was himself an "Avatar" (an incarnation of God) showed to the world in a practical manner that Divine realisation was possible through meditation and devotion. Though a Divine Being himself, Sri Ramakrishna, (the

Swamiji said), did not lose the human aspect; but on the contrary, he lived a simple life dedicated to the service of humanity.

The function concluded with a lecture in Tamil by Brahmachari Kailasam who described at length the life history of Sri Ramakrishna with the aid of coloured slides which the large audience, especially the children, thoroughly enjoyed.

#### 104TH BIRTHDAY OF SRI RAMAKRISHNA

##### RAMAKRISHNA MISSION SEVASHRAMA, KANKHAL

The 104th birthday of Bhagavan Sri Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsadeva was celebrated at the Ramakrishna Mission Sevashrama, Kankhal (Hardwar), with great enthusiasm for six days. On the 21st of February the function began with puja, Sri Chandi-path, homa, arati and bhajan and was followed by Srimad-Bhagavat-path, music by the local musicians, Ramanama-sankirtan and sadhuseva on which occasion copies of a Hindi booklet on the life and teachings of Sri Ramakrishna were distributed among the sadhus.

On the 26th of February a meeting was held at 4-30 p.m. under the presidentship of 108 Sri Mangal Girijee Maharaj, Mandaleswar. S. H. D. Bahuguna, M.A., member of the Municipal Board, addressing the audience showed how even in his childhood Sri Ramakrishna although belonging to an orthodox Brahmin family could keep himself above caste distinction and said that the same ideal was inspiring the Ramakrishna Mission even now. Swami Muktananda referred to his visit to U. S. A., where he had seen the Vedanta Societies run by the Swamies of the Mission and said that it was the spirit of Sri Ramakrishna that was inspiring them to do philanthropic works in India and preach Vedanta in America. He exhorted all youngmen specially of U. P. and the Punjab to imbibe the spirit and take part in the activities of the Mission. Pandit Liladhar Shastri, Headmaster of the Rishikul Brahmacharyya Vidyalaya, spoke eloquently on the life of Sri Ramakrishna and said that his advent was for the revival of the Sanatan Dharma and showed how since his arrival it was being preached and accepted in many places even outside India. Swami Devananda spoke

on various activities of the Ramakrishna Mission in general and Kankhal in particular. Pandit Haribansa Shastri, of the Sindhi Pathshala, Brahmachari Darshananda of Chaitandeva Kutia and S. J. Kishorilal Bajpayee of the Municipal H. E. School also spoke on the life of Sri Ramakrishna and his teachings.

The meeting which terminated late in the evening was attended by many sadhus and gentlemen of the locality.

**BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY OF  
SRI RAMAKRISHNA,  
VIVEKANANDA ASHRAMA  
SHYAMLATAL**

The one hundred and fourth birthday anniversary of Sri Ramakrishna was celebrated on the 26th of February last in the Vivekananda Ashrama, Shyاملatal (Himalayas), with due pomp and solemnity. In a specially erected pandal a big portrait of Sri Ramakrishna was tastefully decorated with abundant festoons and foliage. On either side stood the pictures of Lord Buddha, Acharya Samkara, Swami Vivekananda, Mother Kali and other gods, which added to the beauty and sanctity of the auspicious event. A large crowd gathered on that sacred occasion. About 400 poor hill people were sumptuously fed. Besides devotional songs, chantings of hymns and discourses on the life and teachings of Sri Ramakrishna in the afternoon, a meeting was also organised in the evening under the presidentship of Swami Lokeshananda. Swami Apurvananda dwelt at length upon the different aspects of the life and message of Sri Ramakrishna as also upon his substantial contribution to the world civilisation. The meeting was also addressed by Pandit H. R. Dhasmana and other prominent men of the locality. The President in the course of his speech emphasized the divinity of the Master and the simplicity of his gospel. The meeting terminated with the recitation of a selected piece from Swami Vivekananda's works by a boy of a neighbouring school. After the conclusion of the meeting different bhajana parties sang devotional songs to the delight of all.

**VIVEKANANDA ANNIVERSARY,  
MYMENSINGH**

The seventy-seventh birth anniversary of Swami Vivekananda was duly celebrated in the Ramakrishna Ashrama, Mymensingh on

Sunday, the 29th January last. In this connection a well-attended meeting was held in the Lecture Hall of the Ashrama with Mr. M. A. T. Iyengar, I.C.S., Additional District Magistrate in the chair. After the 'Bandemataram' and a beautiful song on Vivekananda sung by Miss Uma Devi, Prof. A. K. Banerjee, M.A. of the A. M. College, Mr. M. N. Roy, a Sub-judge and Swami Jagadiswarananda of the Belur Math spoke eloquently on the various aspects of the life and message of the illustrious patriot-saint of Modern India. Swami Brahmeswarananda, the monk-in-charge of the local Mission Centre, read an illuminating paper on the spiritual teachings of the great Swami. A large number of the *élite* of the town were present in the meeting which terminated after a short but excellent speech by the President who impressively dwelt on the vastness and deep significance of the Gospel of Vivekananda.

**SRI RAMAKRISHNA MATH CHARITABLE  
DISPENSARY, MADRAS**

**REPORT FOR 1938**

This prominent centre of service attached to the Ramakrishna Math, Madras, has been of immense benefit to the suffering people of the locality for the last twelve years, and the work of the dispensary has increased by leaps and bounds during this brief period of its existence. This is borne out by enormous rise in the number of patients treated now from what it was in 1925. The total number of cases treated during the year under review was 93,650 of which 33,746 were new and 59,904 repeated cases. The number of examinations in the newly opened laboratory section was 290. An appeal is made to the generous public to come forward with liberal contributions for fulfilling the immediate needs of the institution.

**SRI RAMAKRISHNA ASHRAMA,  
JAGNATHPLOT, RAJKOT**

**REPORT FOR 1938**

The annual report for the twelfth year of the Ramakrishna Ashrama, Rajkot, records a steady development of its missionary and philanthropic activities. The Swami-in-charge had an extensive lecturing tour through many places of Kathiawar and Gujarat. Anniversaries of Sri Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda and other prophets were celebrated with bhajans, devotional music

and public lectures. Feeding of the poor was an important item of the programme of Ramakrishna anniversary. The Charitable Dispensary which is situated at the Ashrama premises treated 21,191 patients in its Allopathic and Ayurvedic sections during the period under review. The Ashrama library had 2,001 books on different subjects, which were profitably utilised by the reading public. The free Reading Room attached to the library received 12 periodicals and 2 dailies. The total expenditure during the year was Rs. 7,276-8-0, whereas receipts were Rs. 7,809-8-3, thus leaving a balance of Rs. 538-0-3.

The immediate needs of the institution are :

(1) *The Vivekananda Gurukul* : A spacious building at an estimated cost of Rs. 10,000/- will have to be erected for accommodating the students of the Vivekananda Gurukul (A Residential High School) which the Ashram intends to start in June next.

(2) *Ramakrishna Centenary Dispensary* : The Ashram contemplates to equip the Dispensary with the latest scientific resources and also to make provisions for those who want to have indoor treatment under the direct care of the doctor. The estimated initial cost for the above needs of the dispensary is Rs. 10,000/-, and an endowment of Rs. 40,000/- is essential for meeting the present recurring expenditure of the dispensary.

(3) *Sri Ramakrishna Temple and Prayer Hall* : In order that the inmates of the Gurukul and the public can pray together a Temple with a prayer hall in memory of Sri Ramakrishna will have to be erected at an approximate cost of Rs. 20,000/-.

For carrying on the above activities, financial help from the public is badly needed. All contributions will be thankfully received and acknowledged by the President, Ramakrishna Ashram, Rajkot, Kathiawar.

#### THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION, ASHRAMA, PATNA

REPORT FOR 1938

The Ramakrishna Mission, Patna, enters upon the seventeenth year of its useful exist-

ence. During the year under review it carried on its educational, philanthropic and missionary activities very satisfactorily.

*Missionary* : Weekly religious discourses and classes were regularly held in different parts of the city. Also the Swamis of the Ashrama arranged public lectures, undertook lecturing tours and granted private individual interviews to those that earnestly sought them.

*Educational* : The Ashrama has been conducting two free primary schools for the children of the labouring class. At the end of the year there were 50 and 32 pupils respectively in each of the two schools including five girls. The results of the last examination were satisfactory. The Ashrama maintained a Students' Home which provided free boarding and lodging to the University students and also trained them according to ancient Gurukul system.

*Philanthropic* : A charitable homœopathic dispensary was started in July under an able and experienced physician. Within this short period the total number of patients treated was 8,434 of which 1,993 were new cases and 6,441 repeated cases.

#### THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION, SINGAPORE

REPORT FOR 1936 AND 37

During the years under review the birth centenary of Sri Ramakrishna and the birthday of Buddha and Jesus Christ were successfully celebrated. Seven public lecturers were arranged and fifteen religious discourses held at the Mission premises, while the bi-weekly classes were conducted as usual. The Mission conducted two schools for boys, one school for girls and a night school for labourers. The number of boys in the schools at the end of 1937 was 228 of whom 66 were free ; the number of girls was 102 of whom 19 were free, and the night school had an average strength of 85 adults. Other activities of the Mission were : giving free medical aid to the poor, free distribution of clothings, food and cash to the poor and helpless on festive occasions and imparting of cultural education to the masses by holding lantern lectures. The Mission maintained a library and reading room for free public use.