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“उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।”

“Arise, Awake! And stop not till the Goal is reached.”

AMBROSIA

[Swami Adbhutananda, our Latu Maharaj, was a unique personality, raised to sainthood from the status of an illiterate, orphan boy-servant. The following is a translation of the comprehensive collection by Swami Siddhananda of the words of wisdom that flowed spontaneously out of his lips in intimate talks with a few devoted souls. The original is entitled *Sat-Kathā*.]

Lead your life, keeping the ideal of Shri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda always bright before your eyes. Know that the Holy Mother is the Power (Shakti) of Shri Ramakrishna. They two are the grand summation of all gods and goddesses. The Holy Mother herself has stated this, had felt it. Where's the place for doubts then? Where will you find such lofty ideals? Even among their direct disciples that Power is working in diverse ways. All these are the sports of the Lord, the Ideal yearned for. They are the World Teachers. But how many have faith in this? To believe is to adore.

From the very first acquaintance, I looked upon Holy Mother as my own mother. The Mother is our mother dear. Who can question it? Similarly Shri Ramakrishna is our father, our all-in-all. With this conviction deeply rooted in me I became absolutely fearless. I lived with them as a baby with its parents. At regular hours I had my food and spiritual practices, and no bother. What endearing

tricks did the Master use to apply on me to get me take my meal in time, if, engaged in meditation, I happened to be late? Whenever I would meditate too hard he would cajole me out of it!

Shri Ramakrishna would daily ask Yogin (Swami Yogananda) to put by the fruits offered to Kali the Mother. Once Yogin thought thus, 'O the hold of heredity on man's mind! Even a saint like the Master could not overcome the tendencies of a Brahmin priest. It is for this reason he would not forgo the few paltry fruits.' No sooner had the thought flashed on Yogin's mind than out came these words from the lips of the Master, 'The priests, many of them, are bad characters; they store the sacramental food for their mistresses. When people like you partake of it the donors' purpose is served; they get merits.' Yogin's eyes were opened; he was seized with remorse. 'What folly! I cast a slur on the Master! Does he not lay by the sacramental food for our benefit?'

GOD—THE PRINCIPLE OF THE HIGHEST GOOD?*

BY THE EDITOR

A Professor of an American University has contributed a nice article to a religious journal. 'Religion and the Cultural Evolution of Man' is a piece of writing that reveals the catholicity, sincerity, and depth of thought of the writer so palpably that it is impossible not to love and admire the author. He can safely be taken as a paragon representative of the modern rational man seeking true religion that will not contradict the conclusions of science and rational philosophy and at the same time satisfy the higher aspirations of the moral man. The creed that he has advocated in the article will readily be accepted by all those, who, in spite of their moral and intellectual excellences, feel a sort of vacuum in their life which needs filling up with spirituality that will not transcend human relations, that will not take us beyond this sensuous beautiful earth of ours. It is a religion that promises literally to bring down the Kingdom of Heaven on earth—a Heaven that is described in the Semitic scriptures and the Indo-Aryan Purāṇas, where there will be equal co-operative enjoyment of the finest happiness, derived from the benefits of a

'Federal World Government, Civil Liberties, Economic Justice, Planned Parenthood, Democracy, and anti-totalitarianism, and the elimination of race prejudice', 'which will help every enlightened human being to achieve that intellectual and spiritual integrity and serenity which are necessary for a true sense of well-being and happiness.' 'With this, plus world peace and justice, man's creative energies would no longer be

*Circumstances beyond our control held back our September editorial, which appears in this issue. This has upset our current year's plan of finishing the series, 'Does Vedanta accept Evolution?' and of fulfilling our promise of evaluating the economic ideals of Shri Nehru and Bhave *vis-a-vis* our National Reconstruction, which latter must be left over for the next year.

wasted in futile conflicts, but could be directed to truly great and productive work in industry, government, art, science, religion, education, and recreation, so that man could realize all of the grandeur and the glory that can pertain to this our earthly life—to this our human enterprise.'

The learned Professor goes on to add:

'Let us admit that these theological problems about God, the supreme being, prayer, and immortality are not the most serious ones the world faces today. Those of war and peace, inflation and depression, economic injustice, and race conflict are more important.....But religious problems are also important. In order that the men who build peace, prosperity, and justice shall put forth their best effort, they must be at peace within their own souls. They must experience an inner spiritual harmony without deep frustrations. They must be adjusted to themselves, to their followers, to the ideal, and to the universe. . . . True religion will help those who build the future for mankind to make this quadruple adjustment.'

The writer has not left undefined any of the theological and metaphysical terms he has used. With the precision of a scientist he defines God as

'the principle of the highest good, which is never fully actualized'; 'God is not an omnipotent force, and is not necessarily any force at all.' 'It is a principle of perfection having an absolute logico-spiritual validity. It is that and that alone, to which, without any qualification whatever, man can give the last full measure of devotion. It is the ideal of the highest good. It is that which is most deeply satisfactory in the long run to the individual.'

Such a clear definition and description of God are rarely met with. Next, the Professor takes up the 'supreme being'. He says with his characteristic clarity,

'The word "being" is the present participle of the verb "to be", and the term "supreme being" stands just for what ultimately is or exists. Modern physics indicates that the substantial core of nature, the ultimate reality of the universe, is structured energy. Matter is one form of energy; electro-magnetic waves or quanta are another.'

The Professor does not leave the matter here, he continues to clarify it further:

'But true religion is not the worship of the supreme being. That ultimate substance of the whole cosmos has unintentionally produced all the evils as well as all the blessings. It has produced everything, good and evil. Whatever does evil, even indirectly, is to that extent evil. The supreme being is partly evil. The worship of evil is idolatrous. God and the supreme being are utterly different sorts of things.'

The Professor's definition of prayer is equally rational:

'Prayer is a soliloquy in which we remind ourselves of the ultimate good and ideal, the principle of divinity; and we renew our devotion to it, so that later on it may not be wholly ignored or violated in the thick of active living.'

As regards religion this arch-rationalist says, 'The true essence of religion is the love of God. It is an active devotion to the ideal of man's highest good.'

The Professor has kind words indicative of genuine appreciation of all religions, dead or alive. 'All religions are true religions. All teach devotion to great ideals.' There are many other points worth quoting extensively. But space would not permit us further enjoyment of these dainties.

II

This is a religion, which, as far as it goes, is acceptable to all. Even a Communist cannot raise any objection to it. Only its moral tone will be a little uncomfortable to his method of removing obstacles. In the absence of 'traitors' he will have no difficulty in subscribing to this universal creed. This will satisfy the Professor's ideal of the Federal World Government, for if the Communists are left out it will not be a world government. His God being nothing else but 'the principle of the highest good', any hedonist or eudemonist, whether a Communist or not, will eagerly hold fast to it. So we shall have a universal religion, universal morals, a universal state, and a universal economy for all, based on 'the principle of the highest good', which is God. Comforts and pleasures, urges and hankerings for the More *ad libitum* we shall not have to renounce. At the same

time we shall have the ideal pleasure of tasting what renunciation is; for man will avoid naturally anything that makes for an internal hitch or conflict; and in this avoidance he will enjoy the bliss of renunciation. This surely is the ideal renunciation, for no religion is foolish enough to enjoin giving up what is good—renunciation means renunciation of evil. View this religion from whatever angle we may, it is difficult to find fault with it. It is a discovery worth pondering over.

There is, however, a small snag in the theory. Man is active because of his hankerings. By adopting the method of trial and error and elimination, which experience teaches, he eliminates obstacles to the satisfaction of his urges. Where then is the place for a vacuum in man's heart? Man goes on working, trampling under foot the obstacles to his happiness by elimination, and thus progresses. How could there be a 'vacuum' in him, if it is not a temporary mental depression due to a momentary failure to overcome an obstacle? If this be so, what could poor God do, a mere principle, which is born of man's loins and which is fed, every moment of its existence, by his power? What would be logical for man is to exert his will and energy and reason a little more and overcome the obstacle. Surely Indian *Pūrvamīmāṃsakas*, who have made God and all other minor gods subservient to the will of man, and in fact denied their very existence, have given us a far better solution in this regard. If we are to swear by logic, let us push it to its farthest reach and dispense with God and religion. What matters it if people call us atheists? They will follow us tomorrow if they find us happy and prosperous by living a life consistent with reason and based on personal and collective endeavour. The sense of 'vacuum' is a phantom of an idle brain, may be a diseased one, which 'surgery will cure or end.

So we are to analyse the Professor's 'principle of the highest good' to save the nice theory from a total shipwreck. For this is the vital point of his theory. If God is not

a living God but man's own abstraction and generalization then it is childish and foolish to approach Him for any boon. How absurd it is to create a doll and then pray to it, 'Give me strength to perform my duties. Make me holy. Remind me in times of need what I am to do!' Are we still such babes as to need a fictitious object to raise ourselves to higher level of moral excellences? Can we not do it by our own exertion? Why do we need a church to 'like its moral idealism, its poetical rituals, its music, its architecture, and its fine social fellowship'? We can just start a club and have them all, minus the superstitions and 'corrupt and fraudulent' ideas of the church we criticize. Why are we enamoured of its terms and practices if we do not subscribe to its ideas and sentiments? If anything strikes us as superstitious it is but simple reason that we discard it altogether. Compromise with half-truths and falsehood is ungentlemanly, to say the least. If with our own ideas and plans we fail to create the atmosphere we like in a church, that must lead us to a searching of the heart if our interpretation of the church atmosphere has not left out something very essential that imparts the tone of purity, benevolence, and charity to it. If man and man's 'fellowship' are all that we care for there is absolutely no reason why we should fail to create the atmosphere we need. If man is the final truth we cannot possibly go beyond. There cannot be any sense of incompleteness in our heart.

If, however, we feel miserable with a sense of imperfection, as we actually do, an imperfection that is found in all men we come across, this is proof positive that man is not the last word of creation. When this man loves, admires, and adores men like Buddha and Christ, he is to change his connotation of man and take Buddha and Christ at their words and not thrust on them his own interpretation of their lives and sayings. What are the qualities that have made them so different from the ordinary run of men? It is not their philanthropy; a Rocke-

feller or a Ford is a better philanthropist. How many people did Buddha and Christ feed? How many articles of comfort, luxury, culture, and civilization have they manufactured? What avenues of employment have they discovered, what mysteries of physical nature have they unravelled? As to their wonderful sayings? Is there one which was not known before? If we are to judge them by their sayings and doings history can boast of other personalities, who are greater than they. The miracles they performed are not the key to the glory of their character and influence, for those acts affected but a few who are no more; and when we think of and adore them, we do not usually take such actions of theirs into consideration. What then can account for their unique characters that continue to exercise such wonderful influence over generations of mankind? Their purity and holiness? Why should we care for them? What place have they in achieving 'the highest good', which we have taken as the ideal of human life, 'good' signifying through context and craving, pleasure or happiness? Happiness at its lowest indicates sensual pleasures; at its highest, those derived from arts and culture; none of which has any necessary connection with purity or holiness. And what do we understand by the two words? If holiness is not the same as purity, it remains un-understandable with regard to the standard of 'the highest good'. And purity, with the same standard, is only half understood, meaning mere observance of moral principles.

III

We do not live in the days of Buddha and Christ; we do not understand in full measure Ramakrishna either. But we have seen Mahatma Gandhi, and many of the living great Indians lived with him and regard him as the ideal of their lives and refer to his life and utterances in all matters. But this very Mahatma in all critical periods of his personal and collective life, prayed and fasted,

fasted and prayed, to what he called Rāma; in fact, to his Ashrama associates, his whole life was one continuous prayer to Rāma for light and grace, which most of his best followers do not understand, do not feel any necessity to understand; some consider this as a bit of superstition in an otherwise perfect life, a superstition which they wink over and carefully avoid. These latter class of Mahatma's followers are sincere souls, some are gems of humanity. What is however wrong with them is that they have set the so-called 'highest good' as the ideal of life; and in that standard Rāma has no place or, if at all, it is in a lumber room, dark and carefully locked. It is only another 'naked faquir' who understands the other faquir's Rāma and has become a force, as mad in his method and ideal as the prototype. This is an enigma which eludes the worldly-wise. The latter look at them and find something there that their inner life accepts as noble and admirable. They look inward into themselves and find a lack of poise and power; they busy themselves in acquiring power, thinking that the poise would come through the doors of power, only to see at last that they got neither and what they regarded as power was but prestige, the antithesis of both. This is a tragedy that has been enacted in the drama of humanity, times without number. There is hardly any period of human history when the experiment has not been repeated with failure, but the wise intellect of man has never learnt the lesson.

No, purity and holiness are not deductions from the 'highest good'; but the 'highest good' has to pay homage to them, its true source and sustenance. This is a conclusion that is borne out by the lives of saints throughout the world. These simple humble souls, possessing no riches of the world and its vaunted culture, live a calm serene life, contented with themselves, many of them engaged in no so-called philanthropic activities, some even decrying and denouncing them; and yet people run after them, are mad to get their favour, to serve them; and

in serving them, in sitting close to them, in hearing the thousand times told hackneyed phrases and parables feel themselves blessed, their peace of mind returned, wounds healed, distractions smoothed. How to explain this strange phenomenon? People, who are generally so selfish, would sit for hours together, forgetting their work and getting no worldly gain, but feeling lifted up, improved, and strengthened. They return to their home and office and find themselves better fitted for work with mind concentrated, heart mellowed, and personality more integrated. Some, of course, do feel for some time a distaste for ordinary life and work. This is due to an intense hankering after a better and more spiritual life, to attain and possess what they call God. It is a period of antithesis, which, in due course, settles down to a serene synthesis, when the beauty of this life more than makes up for the interlude of inaction and pessimism, with the spontaneous overflow of love and joy, that infects all who come in contact with it. The common explanation is their universal love, which is so different from the one we generally experience in life. But how does it grow? Orthodox religions have their easy and rational answer: It comes from the love of God, from experiencing the presence of the all-pervading Lord in all beings. What do the heterodox give us in place of the living God of love of the theists? 'The principle of the highest good.' Can one love a principle? When we talk of loving a cause or a principle we use a metaphor. There is a world of difference between loving a man and following a principle. The difference is as great as a virtuous woman's upbringing of her own child and removing the need of a common man in the street. Both the actions are prompted by love; yet while the child grows in her loving image, the man in the street is left cold except for the glow of warmth in his face at the moment when the want is removed. Here the child and the man are both living persons, still the difference is so great between love and duty.

Where a dead principle is concerned love is impossible.

Love is born of personalities, it grows around them, and is universalized in and through them. It is never seen shorn of personalities. Even when we observe abstract love, if we inquire into its history and analyse the present content we are sure to find personalities, intertwining which love plays its part. And it is this love that attracts people to saintly lives, and brings about wonderful changes in them. This love, because of its permanent association with personality, runs the risk of being converted into a dangerous weapon if the personality is vicious. Man grows in love and virtue by loving active association with a personality, and if this personality has defects, the admirer, who consciously and unconsciously imitates the latter, gets naturally infected with them. So if I am to grow into a Buddha or a Christ, Buddha or Christ must be a living and ideal personality. Then alone can contemplation on their personalities give us the highest result. Principles are poor substitutes for them. By tenaciously acting up to a principle we may approach it very closely or may even become embodiments of it. But it will make us stoic, and stoics do not attract and are therefore bad ideals. This imitation of a principle is very difficult, almost impossible, unless it is exemplified in some person whom we love and revere. And if this person is not loving, the above defects just referred to will appear here too.

Hence it is pure embodied love that really helps people to shake off their defects and be whole and perfect. There is a world of difference, one may say, a real qualitative difference, between pure love and the one that sells in the market under its trade mark. It is the element of purity in love that makes it so potent and beneficial. How to acquire purity in the world with 'the highest good' as the ideal is now the problem.

IV

With the West, except the Catholic saints,

purity has a content that is fundamentally different from that of the East—the Vedantists, Buddhists, Taoists, Hasidim, and Sūfis. This Western ideal of purity is quite consistent with our Professor's God, 'the principle of the highest good'. In India too a sect is rising with a scholar as its founder, who has written a 'philosophy of enjoyment'. With God as 'the principle of the highest good' 'enjoyment' becomes the ideal of life, individual and collective; and 'sacrifice', if it means anything, it must be consistent with enjoyment. As enjoyment is based on the satisfaction of personal cravings it is exclusive, however, wide the area of the personal interest may be. Purity, according to this ideal, turns out to be faithfulness to this ideal of enjoyment. This enjoyment may be very wide and refined, but it cannot rid itself of personal limitations and exclusiveness. Hence purity is reduced to non-interference in others' enjoyment and helping the cause so far as it does not compromise personal enjoyment. It may go one step farther and compromise personal sacrifice up to a certain limit, provided it yields a good dividend in future, brings in greater personal enjoyment in due course. All the moral principles enumerated in the different scriptures and books on ethics are observed, they derive their sanction, because they lead to the elimination of obstacles to enjoyment. Purity is desirable, not for its own sake, not for something higher than it, but for the sake of enjoyment. Man, according to this ideal, hugs to limitations, which personality involves, because of his passion for enjoyment. This purity feeds and intensifies selfishness. All the do's and don'ts waltz round selfishness; and the wider and subtler it is, the more dangerous are its consequences, as we witness it today in the mutual conduct of nations.

The other quality, holiness, has no understandable content according to this view, if it is not synonymous with purity. If it be the same as purity it suffers from the defects noted above. Hence love associated with such purity and holiness will not serve the purpose of that blessed attraction which brings peace and

happiness to mankind. The theists, whether monotheists, pantheists, or penentheists, have quite a tangible content of holiness. To them God is the holiest of the Holy. As persons approach Him they become more and more holy till at last they merge in Him, the true and the only Holy. To others, it remains vague and perhaps evokes a smile. But to all lovers of orthodox God the content is palpable. They understand it, they feel it. It is transferable and receivable. Its serene potency in bringing about changes in personalities is observed even by persons other than the giver and the receiver. It is something that cannot be rationally denied, though it cannot be explained or conveyed to others in terms of moral excellences known to man. It is so unworldly that no terms of the world can describe it without detracting something very essential from it. The content of any other word can be explained by similitude; it is diametrically opposed to any other, so attempts at its explanation are bound to fail. Yet to observe it in a holy man is to fall in love with it, to adore it, to get stuck to it. It is a charm that cannot be resisted, that no one wishes to resist. And, unlike the lust that struts as love, it uplifts, strengthens, and ennobles, and goes on doing so, till the man so charmed is transfigured into the object of attraction, the Lord, God.

The business of the Professor's 'highest good' appears too paltry to those who have tasted of this holiness. All the riches of the world, its name and fame, its power and position, appear stale and insipid, their chains fall off unnoticed, and the freedom thus gained limps behind in the vain attempt to catch up with the personality that is lost in the immensity, the Holy. This charming approach to and identification with the real Universal will always remain a pious wish with the followers of the Professor's God, 'the principle of the highest good', for the simple psychological reason that man's selfishness, the source of all evils, remains undetected and goes on permeating all his achievements and brings him at last to a crash. Even when it is known in rare fortunate cases, the persons do not know how to get rid of it,

this having enthroned itself as his very 'I', beyond which he cannot go within, and outside which there is nothing dearer than it, it being the standard of all values, the centre of all interests. The way to transcend it does not lie in going round and round the world or criss-crossing it but in knowing and understanding the 'I', which is impossible unless one comes across a man in whom it is a realization, who has himself gone beyond the 'self'. And with the world as the ideal, with what Swami Vivekananda used to call the Western ideal of 'idealizing the real' no man can achieve it. This world is a world of particulars which maintain themselves by excluding others, by refusing overtures from others. The universal is neither out there in the external world nor in here in the internal world but in the depth of this naughty 'I', the key to unlock which lies with the impersonal personalities like Buddha and Christ, who are actually the holiness personified—they are persons, not principles, which, as we have seen, are our creations, our generalizations, not reals to be found in the world. Persons as particulars, however expansive, die and are no more and cannot be guides. Persons universalized are immortals, not their bodies or teeth or remains; and as such they are true guides, dynamic, irresistibly so. Their living presence is not a fiction of the diseased brain, nor a hallucination or a product of self-hypnotism, which are all temporary and which weaken the subjects; but are more real than the so-called mortal reals, proved so by their functions and results that are abiding and beneficent to the persons concerned and to the world at large. This is the factor which imparts to churches and temples the atmosphere that are not found in clubs and seance rooms. This is the factor that accounts for the holiness of persons who are said to have seen God that imparts to them the power to convert fishermen to fishers of men. It is something that is unworldly, call it, if you will, otherworldly and smile; but it is something which has no similarity with anything of the world, untouched by the God of the orthodox. If

we like the church atmosphere we cannot possibly have it minus the God of the church.

V

The Professor's God is not the 'supreme being'; for 'the supreme being is partly evil. The worship of evil is idolatrous. God and the supreme being are utterly different sorts of things.' In the light of physics and grammar this 'supreme being' is 'the ultimate reality of the universe', which 'is structured energy. Matter is one form of energy; electro-magnetic waves or quanta are another.' Such a perfect removal of vagueness from the precincts of religion was not seen before. But superstitions die hard. For the Professor has endowed this scientists' matter with 'intention', when, in his zeal to debar the 'supreme being' from being worshipped, he says, 'That ultimate substance of the whole cosmos has *unintentionally* (Italics ours) produced all the evils as well as all the blessings.' One is reminded of Shri Rama-krishna's joke, 'Oh, my uncle's cow-shed is packed with finest horses!' Horses do not live in cow-sheds. If the ultimate substance is really the scientists' matter why add 'intention' to it? If it had the slightest intention, it would have protested against its modern prostitution by man. Or is it because of its wonderful patience that it speaks not? Again if it has produced 'all the blessings' and 'all the evils', it has produced everything of the universe; hence it is omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient, and still it has unwittingly produced 'all the evils'!

A budding devotee in his divine 'pique' said he could have created a better world, free from evils. If the Creator has created evils, creatures have no other alternative than to accept them cheerfully or even with a long face; but how could they dare refuse to worship Him and thus defy such an omnipotent being? He is a jealous God! And if the 'supreme being' is really 'matter' why should people worship it? They ought to engage themselves in devising means to harness and enslave it, as they have actually been doing. But we are forgetting that the 'supreme being' is not the Professor's object

of worship. His God is 'the principle of the highest good', a portion of the 'supreme being', which leads us to the absurd position of a part being greater than the whole. We are not to worship the whole, the supreme being, but a part of it, its good part, for to worship evil is idolatrous!

This new God is an ideal, 'the ideal of the highest good'; consequently it 'is never fully actualized'. 'Highest good' is a vague expression that varies from man to man and from one stage of the same man to another, and there is no standard by which it is to be judged. Where does this ideal reside? In one's mind to be sure. Mind is either a storehouse of thoughts, feelings, etc. or they themselves. Thoughts being immaterial, do not stand in need of a platform to stand upon. These thoughts, etc. have a reference to the past as well as to the future, the latter being known as hopes and aspirations. So the Professor's ideal, if it is to have a content, is these individuals' hopes and aspirations, for they are not 'actualized'. The word 'fully' need not be taken seriously, for it is there only to show that some hopes and aspirations are fulfilled as an individual progresses in his life. Yes, life is a constant fulfilment of hopes and aspirations, which take new forms and recede as quickly—it is a continuous chase. But then there is no finality. These hopes and aspirations are so various and numerous and they subside and reappear so suddenly and whimsically that in the vast chartless ocean of thought nobody knows whether the movement that is perceptible is towards or away from anything, for, everything is moving to and fro. Unless the 'highest good' is defined no one can distinguish between legitimate hopes and aspirations on the one hand and whims and temptations on the other. What we actually find in life is that one moment's hope is actualized in another, sooner or later. But there is no knowing if the fulfilment is a gain or a loss. In this world of changing circumstances and changing personalities what are desired at any particular moment may not be good. How then can we know 'the highest good'? Pages of history are replete

with the failures of many ideals of the so-called 'highest good'.

Again, the Professor says, 'it is not necessarily any force at all.' If by 'force' he means 'electro-magnetic waves or quanta' 'the ideal of the highest good' is surely not a force. But these momentary hopes and aspirations, to which 'the ideal' has been reduced, are motive powers, the fly-wheels of all the cultures and civilizations of the world. No ideal can ever be passive. It must attract man towards it and endow him with the strength necessary for its realization, nay, must make him restless for becoming it. The ideal must have the power to galvanize life. These hopes and aspirations are dynamic and compel man to obey them, to give them 'the last full measure of devotion'. But they can never be taken as 'the principle of perfection', being momentary and blind—blind in the sense of knowing no direction. If there be such a 'principle of perfection', which we have failed so far to find out in the world of the Professor's scientific philosophy, then, no doubt, it would have 'the absolute logico-spiritual validity'. To a rationalist, 'spirit' ought to mean psyche, mind. Psychology deals with mental facts and functions and logic draws conclusions from data, whose validity cannot be vouched for, being based on limited observations. So the whole phrase 'the absolute logico-spiritual validity' remains vague and mysterious. From whatever angle of vision we may try to judge this new ideal God, we are mystified. The rationalist Professor has unwittingly, like his supreme being's unintentional creation of evil, converted himself into a mystic, though without his living God.

The Professor has something to say about 'prayer' too. It is a 'soliloquy' to remind one of the 'ultimate good and ideal', the 'principle of divinity' so that 'it may not be wholly ignored or violated in the thick of active living.' What is 'ultimate' in this world of matter? Why call it again the principle of divinity? Is it an idea or something material? Even if it be an idea, we do not know any idea to be ultimate. Good and bad we understand; but nobody knows an ultimate good or an ultimate

evil. The Professor himself says it 'is never fully actualized.' The Buddhist idea of 'the More' is understandable; but 'the Most' seems to be too autocratic to suit the modern age of democracy. There are innumerable ideas. Does the Professor think that they can all be traced to one idea? It would be too orthodox for a rationalist to admit this. Again, which are more fundamental—the ideas or the persons? Or is it to be admitted that we are also ideas? Then in this vast surging sea of ideas who are to decide which is ultimate, what the reference is, and why it is so? If remembrance of the ideal is the goal of prayers why call them prayers? Why should we allow a superstition to linger? Let us call the act 'thinking' or more appropriately 'willing'. We will to do or become something. But remembrance is not sufficient for action. It is by performance that we acquire the habit to act nobly. The goal being but a principle according to which we are to act when circumstances would arise, the question of becoming it does not arise. Man remains man, he sets for himself a number of rules of conduct that ensures his happiness along with others', and by constantly acting up to these principles he grows into the habit of acting that way. In such a scheme of life prayers, soliloquys, meditations have no place. Thinking, so far as the acquisition of moral excellences is concerned, is, except for the understanding of the principles, not necessary. Hamlet is a fine example of soliloquys. As reason does not give us a heaven or a life after death, man dies and is reduced to nothing. In what aspect does this religion of the learned Professor differ from the eclectic materialism of the Communists? They are honest and thorough, one cannot but admire them for their sincerity. But the half-baked rationalistic theists are neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring. Humanism is a saleable commodity but rational superstition is a square circle to be adored only inwardly, and not to be expressed. Either God is true and to be divine is the goal or throw religion overboard and build life on positive sciences. Morality cannot be built on the data supplied by the

positive sciences, which make enjoyment the goal of life. Sacrifice, which is the antithesis of enjoyment, is the foundation of morality. Social enjoyment at its best is based on compromise, which is a broken reed to lean on. Against the gush of passions, and the tears, sobs, and entreaties of near relatives, against clannish, racial, and national demands, when one is to fight in favour of one's conscience, that requires a strength of mind and a pas-

sionate love for a living ideal which no compromise, arrived at for the sake of greater future happiness, can ever endow one with. No, God is not a dead principle but a living personality, all-knowing, all-powerful, and omnipresent, evolving and dissolving the universe; and prayer is not a 'soliloquy' but a yearning supplication to and communing with Him.

THE CONTENT OF FREEDOM

BY PROF. P. S. NAIDU

'Two friends of Liberty her praise rehearsed,
But where the one would bless, the other curses;
Freedom to one, means not to be coerced
To one, to be a part of what coerces.

The cry is now heard from all quarters of the civilized globe that freedom is being destroyed over one half of the world, and that the lovers of freedom should gird up their loins and fight in her defence. The impassioned utterance of the late General Smuts may be taken as representing, fairly well, the inarticulate feelings of many thinking men today. While condemning the anti-democratic spirit which has run amuck in Europe, the soldier-philosopher says that it 'threatens, not only to replace the individual's participation in the government by a new slavery which is made effective through the curtailing of the freedom of thought, speech, action, and self-expression, but also to substitute for the old spirit of sturdy independence a propaganda-moulded servile mass mentality, which in the end, will kill all creative activity and thereby all possibility of progress in future!' These words of the great leader make a direct appeal to our heart. We are moved and even thrilled by the liberal sentiments expressed in touching language. But when our spirits have calmed down, the question gradually takes

shape in our minds, what is this freedom which we have lost or are losing? What is its content? Of its chameleon-like form we have had some glimpses. But no-one has taken the trouble to look inside the form in order to find out whether there is any abiding content in it. And unless we grasp the content we shall land ourselves into confusion. We shall have to throw up our hands in despair when faced with the question: What is the freedom that democrats are fighting for, and consider it worth while fighting for?

There are two reasons why the various analyses, each brilliant in itself, of freedom have not yielded any fruitful results. The first is that all theoretical discussions (as well as practices based upon such discussions) have tended to emphasize the objective conditions of freedom to the utter exclusion of the psychological springs of freedom.

As a consequence of this over-emphasis on the environment, the illusion has persisted that freedom is some kind of tangible but tantalizing 'stuff'. The fact is freedom is merely an attribute of behaviour. In the

second place, the goal of freedom has never been understood clearly. Sometimes liberty is taken as an end in itself, at other times it is considered to be a pre-condition of 'good life', the goodness of 'good life' being left undefined. What is needed, therefore, is a psychological analysis of freedom which will fill its empty and ever-changing form with rich content. Such an analysis will be attempted here.

In the well-known accounts of freedom the right of the individual citizen to free thought speech, and association, and to the free enjoyment of the fruits of his own labour has been upheld. But, at the same time, it has been insisted that such enjoyment of freedom should not interfere with similar enjoyment by other members of the group. There is the rub. Freedom seems to imply a negation of itself. And when this negation is carried to its logical conclusion, freedom gets emptied of all content, and retains only a meaningless form. It is exactly at this point that a psychological analysis is indicated. 'Freedom' is not a noun, but it is an adverb masquerading as a noun. Freedom is free behaviour. Action or behaviour is denoted by a verb, and an attribute of action by an adverb. Contemporary psychology has established beyond doubt that the so-called faculties of man, indicated by nouns in common usage, such as memory, will, reason, etc. are fictitious entities, and that the reality is either an activity or a characteristic of an activity. Freedom is one such noun in common usage, and it stands for certain attributes of human behaviour. Politics, economics, and other social studies make free use of these misleading 'nouns'; and the sooner the latter are deprived of their illusory connotation and shown up in their true colours, the sooner will clarity of thinking be achieved.

Freedom, then, is free behaviour, and in analysing behaviour three factors have to be considered:

- (1) the behaving self,
- (2) the body of the self which is the seat of activity, and

- (3) the environment in which the self acts through the body.

The third factor has been dealt with thoroughly by political theorists and sociologists. The distinction has been made between the physical, biological, and social sections of the environment, and the fact that the question of freedom can arise only in connection with the social environment has been argued out. In fact, the attention given to this aspect of the problem by the non-psychological theorists is so great and exclusive that 'freedom' is conceived solely in terms of the external conditions of freedom. The second factor, the body of the 'free' agent has received some little attention at the hands of the students of sociology and political science. But sometimes they, especially the later, take up a deterministic or behaviouristic attitude, identifying the body as far as its function goes, with the physical environment, while at other times they look upon it as the seat of real 'freedom'. The confusion in thinking resulting from such shifting attitudes is very annoying; but that is a natural consequence of lack of psychological training.

'Freedom' or 'free behaviour' is unhampered or unhindered behaviour. When we speak of a hindrance or obstacle to behaviour we imply thereby that behaviour has a direction and a goal. This direction pointing to a specific goal is also implied in two aspects of modern political theory. They are firstly the insistence that 'freedom' of the individual should be confined to the region delimited by the exercise of similar freedom by other individuals, and secondly, that lower freedom would be suppressed in the interests of the higher. Herein is the clue which we should follow up in our psychological analysis.

In order to understand behaviour, free or unfree, we have to look for its motivating causes, not in the external environment, but in the dynamic structure of the mind of the behaving agent. The real springs of action lie in the mind, not in the external world. Contemporary hormic psychology has completed, in an admirable manner, the task of

tracing behaviour to its root causes or main springs in the minds. There are certain innate propensities, such as fear, anger, lust (in the German sense), disgust, sympathy, wonder, assertion, and laughter, which when activated impel the organism to pursue a certain course of action in order to reach a specific goal. Let us consider sex-lust, which is a very powerful propensity. Under its impulsion the organism will, with great energy and determination, pursue the end, namely, union with the mate. Each propensity, then, imposes a directional effect, determined with respect to the goal to be attained, on the behaviour of the organism. 'Free' behaviour is merely behaviour which is progressing smoothly towards its goal; the goal being prescribed by the innate psychological structure of the mind of the behaving agent. In the abstract this definition of 'freedom' is complete. But freedom in this sense is possible only for the lone individual, for a Robinson Crusoe in his desert island. In society, he who claims complete freedom of behaviour for himself, and acts on that claim is bound to tread on the toes of others. So it is that political theorists have found it necessary to delimit the field for the exercise of freedom. The need for such control of freedom will become evident when the structure of a competitive society is analysed.

Under normal circumstances so long as one goes about his business earning his wage, maintaining his family, and pursuing his hobbies or indulging in harmless or inoffensive enjoyments, one is free to do as he pleases. Each individual moves freely along his own line of action towards his own goal. Even so, each individual, now and then, sends forth a line of obstruction, in thought at least, cutting across the free line of action of his neighbours. Jealousy, envy, covetousness, and ambition have free play in the minds of members of social groups. One covets the wealth of another; another is jealous of the natural gifts for leadership which a lucky neighbour possesses. But very soon these hindrances, operating merely on the imaginal level, are withdrawn by their agents,

and once again behaviour progresses smoothly.

When we consider a competitive society of the modern type, the situation seems to be entirely different. In such a society, which often goes by the wrong name of a co-operative society, a single object M is desired by many members of the group at once. Consider a mining claim in an uncharted area. He who has the skill to reach the spot first and 'peg out' his claim establishes his right for the exclusive possession of the area. Here, speed of action on the part of one individual has acted as a source of effective hindrance to the behavioural progress of all others, these latter being slower. The behavioural line of H reaches M , while those of others are cut short before the goal is reached. There is another way in which I_1 can succeed in getting sole possession of M . He may threaten I_2 with physical injury if he continues to compete, and thus cut short the latter's name at M_2 , he may buy off I_3 and terminate his line of action at M_3 , he may deceive I_4 by inducing him to seek another claim. In this way I_1 may have all the hindrances removed by playing upon the different innate propensities of other competing individuals. But there is really no freedom here. The entire course of action is beset with obstacles.

The argument so far has been confined to the level of primitive propensities. It must, however, be pointed out that the immediate motive to human behaviour is a 'sentiment' (in the hormic sense), and not a crude primal emotion. This fact complicates the problem of freedom still further, for a sentiment is the result of an organization of many fundamental emotions, and if a single emotion is subject, on the behavioural side, to several limitations and obstacles in a competitive society, then a sentiment will suffer from very many restrictions. Each individual of a group will have built up several sentiments round other members, and round objects in the environment; and all the sentiments will crave for satisfaction. There will be crossings and recrossings of several behavioural lines of action giving rise to hindrances of innumerable types.

Freedom, if there is any in such a field of action, is very restricted in scope. Of absolute freedom there is no trace here.

Freedom, then, on our analysis, is freedom of the individual members of a group to act without hindrance in pursuing the goals of sentiments or of primitive propensities. Such freedom is vouchsafed to the individual member by his group only when he does not hinder other members in their pursuit of their own goals. This restriction often ends in determination, and finally in complete negation of freedom. Why are these restrictions imposed? Are they due solely to the presence of other members in the group, or to some other factor? In other words, is freedom an end in itself, or is it a means to an end? The answer to this question is very significant. We are told that freedom is a means to an end. Freedom is freedom for something else. It is not a supreme value. It is a value, but a value which must be estimated in terms of something higher than itself.

We may approach this aspect of the problem from a different angle. If freedom is merely the freedom of the individual to pursue and reach without hindrance the goal of his own propensities and sentiments, then there will be utter chaos in a society of competing individuals, each one of whom is pursuing goals which are bound to conflict with one another. So, it is said that freedom should be exercised in the pursuit of a common goal; rather, society should prescribe a common end for all its members. 'Good life', 'good society', 'self-realization', etc. have been held up as the common ends in relation to which freedom is to be exercised. It is with reference to these ends that a distinction is made between lower freedom and higher freedom, and the individual is called upon to sacrifice 'lower' freedom in the interests of the 'higher'. In times of crises, freedom of speech, and freedom of criticism in the press should be sacrificed in order that the higher freedom of the 'good life' to come may be achieved. But what is this 'good life'? I am afraid there is no clear conception in the

minds of political theorists of 'good life', of 'good society', or even of 'self-realization'.

Our discussion so far has made it plain that the springs of freedom are to be found in the internal structure of the mind, and not in the external circumstances of the physical, the biological, or even the social environment. Freedom, or free behaviour is invariably determined by the innate constitution of the mind of the behaving agent. Action is controlled by mental structure, and this in its turn is determined by innate and acquired factors. So long as man is activated by propensities and sentiments, or so long as he is moved by desire, so long will his behaviour be controlled, willynilly, by factors which are partly beyond his control. In other words, freedom is absolutely impossible for one who is in this world, and also of this world. It is useless to speak of freedom in society, as it is constituted at present, with heavy emphasis on the material goods of this world. True freedom can come only by the annihilation of the native propensities and acquired sentiments.

A clear answer to the question relating to the ultimate goal of freedom is to be found along the lines suggested by our psychological analysis. It is now agreed that freedom has a goal. In the West, however, this goal is conceived in terms of the fierce self-regarding sentiment, and self-seeking propensities. A feeble attempt has been made to give some sort of direction to freedom in the Western scheme of social organization. But so long as the flame of desire is being fed fiercely by the constant stimulation of innate propensities, freedom is impossible of attainment. So long as one is attached to the objects of this world, so long will he be in bondage. True freedom can be attained only by causing the springs of desire to dry up. Detachment is the only means of obtaining freedom. Hormic psychology teaches us that the primitive and crude propensities get refined in the process of their organization into sentiments, concrete and abstract. And when these sentiments are arranged according to a scale of values with a master sentiment at the top, then true

freedom will be achieved. But what is this master sentiment to be? If, with the West, we take it to be some earthly sentiment, such as self-regard, service, patriotism, etc. then we shall soon be caught up in the trammels of desire. If, following the Vedantic traditions, we make the Brahman-regarding sentiment our final goal, then in the very process of attaining, all desire will be consumed, all lower freedom will be abolished, and true freedom will be attained. True freedom is freedom from slavery to our desires, to the propensities and sentiments which have objects of this earth as their goal. The *jīvan-mukta* is the only truly free person. As he is identical with Brahman, he is also identical with other *jīvas*. His actions, even when he is in this world (but not of it), and moves in it, are completely free. Since the individuals have also merged themselves in Brahman their behavioural lines (pertaining to this world) will all radiate from a single focus, and will be divergent. There will be no crossings between the lines; yet they will be united in their common purpose or goal.

We have shown that the main issues in relation to the problem of freedom have been

clouded by a lack of psychological insight. Freedom has been conceived solely in terms of its external conditions as absence of restraint, the inner springs of freedom being neglected. When we examine the inner aspect of free behaviour we discover that, both in theory and practice, the West has failed in controlling the conditions for the exercise of individual freedom to give direction, point, or purpose to the dynamic springs of free human action. The West has also failed to realize that so long as fierce desires and passions, especially the inordinate desire for proprietary right over objects and over bodies of human beings are being stimulated, real freedom will be impossible. The fundamental propensities whose incessant working is the cause of all unfreedom should be destroyed. And the most successful method of destroying them is to have them gathered up in the Brahman-regarding sentiment. Viewed in this way freedom gets rich content and direction. Freedom is freedom for attaining Brahman, which is the natural goal of man. Free action will be aimed at the annihilation of desires and the attainment of the state of the *jīvan-mukta*.

PREFACE TO VEDANTA

BY DR. P. NAGARAJA RAO

The dominant note that characterizes Indian culture and thought are its twin passions for religion¹ and Philosophy. We should look for India's best contribution to world's thought in its religion and Philosophy. Indian Philosophy is not any and every kind

¹ Louis Renou writes: 'Religion is not an independent phenomenon in India. Religion is not conceived as a duty, or a problem facing every human being on reaching maturity. It is an heritage and a tradition. It is not an obsession of the human mind as it is constantly asserted.' (*Religions of Ancient India*, p. 48).

of approach to the study of Reality. It is the acceptance of tested knowledge and examined beliefs in the light of not only the intellect but also integral experience, resulting in an enlightenment which puts an end to all sorrows and brings in abiding bliss. All the systems of Indian Philosophy aim at the spiritual realization of the soul which secures it bliss.² Some modern critics look upon the systems of Indian Philosophy as not warring

² With the single exception of the Cārvāka school.

with one another but as constituting a whole, where each system supplements the other and all find their consummation and fulfilment in Vedānta.

Vedānta is regarded as the perfect system of the Hindus. Hinduism is the popular name for the religion of Vedānta. It stands out as the most significantly 'clear native Philosophy of India'. It is the most impressive attempt at system building made in India. It answers at once to the strict demands of metaphysics and the deep requirements of a sound religion, which does not surrender the claims of reason or the needs of humanity. Vedānta in one form or other has become a great contemporary spiritual force working for the good of humanity. It has attracted the great intellectuals of our age to its fold. Its influence on world's thought particularly that of the West, is deep and wide-spread. Vedānta has influenced the personalities of Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Nietzsche, and Keyserling in Europe. Its influence on the Irish renaissance is seen through the personalities of W. B. Yeats and G. W. Russell. Its great influence on American thought is most vigorous and is best illustrated in the works of Emerson, Thoreau, Walt Whitman, Aldous Huxley, Gerald Heard, Christopher Isherwood, and Somerset Maugham.

Romain Rolland declared, 'The only religion that can have any hold on the intellectual people is the rationalistic religion of Advaita Vedānta.' Vedānta and its fundamental ideas pervade the whole Indian literature.

There is a popular Sanskrit couplet³ that states, 'Like jackals in a wood the various systems of Philosophy will howl, so long as the lion of Vedānta, with mane ruffled, does not roar.' The words of Aldous Huxley about the *Gītā*, describes the Philosophy of Vedānta also: Vedānta is 'one of the clearest and most comprehensive summaries of the Perennial Philosophy ever to have been made.

³ *Tāvad garjanti śāstrāṇi jambūka vipine yathā,
Na garjati jātakṣepād yāvad vedānta-kesarī.*

Hence its enduring value, [is] not only for Indians, but for all mankind.'

The system of Vedānta is twofold: Absolutistic and Theistic. The former is represented by Śaṅkara's Advaita and the latter by Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita.

All of them build their systems on the authority of the Scriptures. Scripture is the source for the fundamental tenets of Vedānta. The Vedas are regarded as eternal (*nitya*) and not as the composition of any human being. It is the transcript and record of the revelation vouchsafed to the seers and sages of India. The Ṛiṣis are the media of the revelation at the beginning of each aeon. Each Veda is divided into four sections called Mantras, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and Upaniṣads. There are four Vedas called *Rig*, *Yajur*, *Sāma*, and *Aiṅharvaṇ*.

The Mantras are hymns addressed to the various deities like Indra, Varuṇa, Agni. They exhibit great poetic qualities. They are the earliest poetry of the human mind. The Ṛiṣis of the Vedas are said to perceive the Mantras.⁴ In the words of Tagore the Vedic Mantras are the

'poetic testament of a people's collective reaction to the wonder and awe of existence. A people of vigorous and unsophisticated imagination awakened at the very dawn of civilization to a sense of the inexhaustible mystery that is implicit in life. It was a simple faith of theirs that attributed divinity to every element and force of Nature, but it was a brave and joyous one, in which fear of the gods was balanced by trust in them, in which the sense of mystery only gave enchantment to life, without weighing it down with bafflement.'⁵

The Brāhmaṇas lay down the rules and directions concerning the performance of various sacrifices. They are prose passages. They do not have any philosophical thought worth the name. The Āraṇyakas mark the transition from the Brāhmaṇas to the Upaniṣads. They are composed in quiet forest hermitages, hence the name Āraṇyakas. They give us allegorical and mystic interpre-

⁴ *Ṛiṣayo mantra-draṣṭārah.*

⁵ *Hindu Scriptures*, ed. by Nicol Macnicol. Foreword by Rabindranath Tagore. Everyman's Library, 1938.

tation of some of the sacrifices. Certain forms of meditation are also suggested. The concluding portions of the Vedas are called the Upaniṣads. They are described as Vedānta for two reasons: They are the concluding portions of the Vedas and also are the quintessence of the Philosophy of the Vedas.

Every system of Vedānta declares that it derives its doctrines from three texts (*Prasthāna-traya*), namely, the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, and the *Vedānta-Sūtras*. Each school holds that its interpretation of the texts is the only correct version and those of the others wrong. Thus we have the different systems of Vedānta being fastened on to one and the same text. This has been possible because of the presence of more than one way of looking at the texts. There is an inherent ambiguity in all these texts. They all do not speak with one voice. The text for Vedānta is the Upaniṣads. The other two, though authoritative, are based on the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads are the *Shruti*, i.e. revelation, while the *Gītā* and the *Vedānta-Sūtras* are *Smritis*, i.e. human compositions embodying the meaning of the *Shrutis*. Let us advert to the consideration of the Upaniṣads. The term Upaniṣad has been interpreted in different ways.⁶ The etymological meaning of the word is to sit close by devotedly (*sad-upa-ni*). It also means secret knowledge (*guhya ādeshah*). It is applied to the key passages of the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara interprets the term to mean that which destroys ignorance and leads to Brahman. There are a large number of treatises that go by the name of the Upaniṣads. Only some twelve are interpreted by the Vedāntins. They are ascribed to an age earlier than that of Gautama the Buddha.⁷

The American savant Thoreau exhorted his countrymen not to read the *New York*

Times, but to read the eternities, meaning the Upaniṣads. The Spanish writer J. Mascaro described the Upaniṣads as the 'Himalayas of the Soul'.⁸ Just as that great mountain height determines the climate, the rainfall, and the physical features of the peninsula, so do these heights of light and wisdom determine the scope and the quality of the spiritual life of the race that inhabits it. In point of popularity the Upaniṣads are second only to the great charter of Hinduism, the *Bhagavad-Gītā*.

Schopenhauer, after reading them exclaimed, 'And oh, how thoroughly is the mind here washed clean of all early engrafted Jewish superstitions, . . .! In the whole world there is no study . . . so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upaniṣads. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death!' Max Müller, who has translated the Upaniṣads, describes them 'as the light of the morning, like the pure air of the mountains, so simple and so true if once understood.'

All the Upaniṣads are not alike. They differ in their length and methods of exposition. Some are only a few verses and others are very long. Some are in verse, and some in prose. Yet others combine both. In style and manner also they vary widely; sometimes we have simple concrete narrative, sometimes abstract metaphysical speculation, and at other times argumentative dialogue. The tone also fluctuates. There is in some passages high seriousness, and in others homely humours, and in yet others innumerable analogies.⁹

The philosophy of the Upaniṣads is the Philosophy of the two Vedāntas. Each school, the monistic and the theistic, claims that it solely and completely represents the Philoso-

⁶ The root *sad* yields three senses according to Sureshvara—to decay, to go or to know.

⁷ Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan's article on Upaniṣads. *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*. Pp. 55-75. Edited by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and others.

⁸ *Himalayas of the Soul* by J. Mascaro. The Wisdom of the East series. Edited by L. Cranmer-Byng and Allan W. Watts.

⁹ See *Breath of the Eternal* (an anthology of the Upaniṣads) by Swami Prabhavananda and Frederic Manchester (Published by Vedanta Society of Southern California, U.S.A.)

phy of the Upaniṣads. It is very difficult to adjudge whether the Upaniṣads are completely after the heart of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja. The Upaniṣads are the records of the intuitions of the great seers. They have reported their vision and experiences. They have not built systems of thought. They are all not the works of a single author. They are the reports of the first-hand mystic experience of sages and not a dialectical and metaphysical discussion about Reality. They are 'more poetic than philosophical'. They take the forms of informal discussions, parables, and intimate dialogues. In the words of Shri Aurobindo, 'The Rīṣis disclose what they have seen, they do not argue. The dialogue is often between a qualified aspirant and a sage. It is not a free broadcasting of truth. The Rīṣis imparted the truth to aspirants only after testing the sincerity and strength of the student's mind.'

Heraclitus is reported to have said, 'If men care for gold they must dig for it; otherwise they must be content with straw.'

The Upaniṣads, like all great classics, have the power of self-renewal. They are neither old nor new. They are eternal. They are ageless. They are modern and topical in a sense. They have a message for all ages and specially for our own. Modernity is not a question of date but of outlook. When we read and ponder over the passages in the Upaniṣads they re-emerge in answer to our present problems. They have the power to produce from age to age the necessary corrective to men's sense of values and conduct of life by recreating the spiritual ideal which gives them the vision of Truth. 'Where there is no vision, the people perish.'

The two schools of Vedānta claim that their Philosophy is identical with the thoughts in the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā*, and the *Vedānta-Sūtras*. They do not agree with the modern scholars who hold the opinion that it is foolish metaphysical ambition to read one rigorous system of thought in this book of ancient wisdom, the Upaniṣads. The orthodox Vedāntin regards that a single system of thought is developed in all the triple texts; hence they

have commented on all the three texts and derived their doctrines from them.¹⁰

The other two texts which are the source books and authorities for Vedānta are the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and the *Vedānta-Sūtras*. These two are human compositions. They derive their authority from their theme. Śaṅkara treats the *Gītā* as one of the triple texts because the Lord Himself has delivered the message. The *Gītā* is the most popular Hindu scripture. It is enshrined in the *Mahābhārata* and is admired by all as the layman's Upaniṣad. Here too both the schools of Vedānta claim that it embodies their Philosophy of life and not their rival's. Though a completely objective approach is not possible, still one feels, taking the verses of the *Gītā* by and large, that it is more akin to theistic Vedānta than the absolutism of Śaṅkara. There is very little support for Śaṅkara's doctrines in the *Gītā* except for a few verses in Chapter XIII. Śaṅkara strives hard to read his doctrines in the *Gītā*. The *Gītā* speaks in one voice unlike the Upaniṣads. It is prevalently theistic. It is the treasure-house for the method of devotion.

The Philosophy of the *Gītā* is the Philosophy of the theistic Vedānta. Its general importance is very great. It affirms the reality and validity of religious experience and man's imperative need for it. It presents unambiguously a complete and comprehensive ideal of true religion. It outlines a religion based on the Philosophy of action. It declares that religion has no secrets which absolves us from right living. It asks each of us to take up the duty that is dictated by our *svabhāva* (talents)

¹⁰ Max Müller writes: 'With us philosophy always means something systematic, while what we find here are philosophic rhapsodies rather than consecutive treatises. But that is the very reason why the Upaniṣads are so interesting to the historical student. Nowhere, except in India, can we watch that period of chaotic thought, half poetical, half religious, which preceded, in India at least, the age of philosophy properly so called. . . . And however unsystematic these relics of the childhood of philosophy may seem, *there is really more system in them than appears at first sight.*'

and *svadharma* (individual's norm of life). It does not force all men into one path or one vocation. Each grows to his best in his own way. All paths lead to God. There are not only many mansions in the Lord's Home, but there are many paths to it. The Lord of the *Gītā* pleads for the unity of religions and the fellowship of faiths. Every faith is a path to God.¹¹ Tolerance is the chief article of the religion of the *Gītā*. It recognizes that formal renunciations of all actions is wrong. There is no freedom from action, but there is 'only freedom in action'.

The supreme secret of the *Gītā* is the path of devotion and surrender. The ideal man of the *Gītā* is called the Karma-Yogin. The dialogue form, the dramatic context, the charming personages, the universality of the message of the discourse, and the resplendent demonstration of the *Vishvarūpa* to Arjuna, 'the close companion, the chosen instrument, and the representative man' have all made the *Gītā* a world scripture.

The *Gītā* has attracted the attention of all the modern savants. Gandhiji, Dr. Tagore, Tilak, Shri Aurobindo, and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, have all found their inspiration in the *Gītā* and have written about it. The *Gītā* is the first Sanskrit work to be translated into English (1785).

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's estimate of the *Gītā* sums up the nature and contents of the scripture.

'It sets forth a tradition which has emerged from the religious life of mankind. It is articulated by a profound seer who sees truth in its many-sidedness and believes in its saving power. It represents not any sect of Hinduism but Hinduism as a whole, not merely Hinduism but religion as such, in its universality without limit of time and space, embracing within its synthesis the whole gamut of the human spirit from the crude fetishism

¹¹ Some run swiftly, some walk, some creep painfully, but everyone will reach the goal who keep on. Some seek a Father in Heaven above. Some ask a Human image to adore. Some crave a Spirit vast as life and love. Within Thy mansions we have all and more.

of the savage to the creative affirmation of the saint.'¹²

Both the schools of Vedānta cite the verses of the *Gītā* in their support. It is not so difficult to see a certain unity of outlook in the *Gītā* (even that is not agreed to by many). The *Gītā* has proved a source of comfort for millions of men throughout the centuries in their set-backs and successes in life. It has been the most powerful shaping factor in the renewal of the spiritual life of man. It is regarded on all hands as the best guide in life.

The status accorded to the *Gītā* as one of the triple texts on which Vedānta is based is not as fundamental as that of the Upaniṣads. Vedānta recognizes two types of scriptures—*Shruti* (the Upaniṣads) and *Smṛitis*. The *Smṛitis* lay down the laws of conduct in the light of the Vedas and guide individuals and communities in their daily life and apply the eternal truths of the Vedas to the changing conditions of our life. Their authority is derived from the Vedas. There are several such *Smṛitis*, e.g. that of Manu, Yājñavalkya, and Parāshara. The *Mahābhārata* is one such great *Smṛiti* and the *Gītā* is a part of it. The *Gītā* is given a special place because it is the directly delivered message of the Lord.

As for the *Smṛitis*, they are acceptable when they are in agreement with the *Shruti*, and are to be disregarded when they contradict the *Shruti*. They have only a derivative validity.¹³

The third important foundation of Vedānta is the *Vedānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. It is variously called *Brahma-Sūtras* because its subject matter is Brahman, *Uttara-mīmāṃsā-Sūtras*, *Vyāsa-Sūtras*, and *Shārīraka*. The *Sūtras* aim at the systematic working out of the teaching of the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads speak in different voices in the different contexts. The *Sūtras* reconcile the apparent contradictions and set them in order. The various

¹² Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's *Bhagavad-Gītā*. See Introduction.

¹³ For a clear and full discussion of the topic see Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, II. i. 1.

passages in the Upaniṣads are arranged under different topics (*adhikaraṇas*). The Sūtras aim at definiteness and coherence and seek to demonstrate that the teaching of the Upaniṣads forms a consistent whole, free from all contradictions. The Sūtra form is not self-evident. In the words of Thibaut there is scarcely one single Sūtra intelligible without a commentary. The Sūtras are often concise to excess. They retain what is essential in a given phrase. They do not include all those aspects that can be supplied, with some strain, by the reflection and the memory of the reader. They rigidly exclude all words that can possibly be spared and they avoid all unnecessary repetition. They are like algebraic equations which have to expand when we are to understand their implications.¹⁴

¹⁴ 'Svalpākṣaram-asandigdham sāravat
vishvatomukham,
Astobham-anaṅvadyāñca sūtram
sūtravido viduḥ.'

The exact number of the Sūtras is 535 according to Śaṅkara and 564 according to Madhva. The schools of Vedānta have all commented on the Sūtras. We have the commentaries from Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbārka, Nīlakanṭha, etc. The two schools of Vedānta are represented by the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara's commentary is both a philosophical classic and a piece of great literature. Śaṅkara belongs to the group of the great philosophical prose-writers which includes Śhābara, Vācaspati, and the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Each of the school of Vedānta claims that their system alone is in complete accord with the *Vedānta-Sūtras*. Critical scholars like Thibaut opine that the Upaniṣads are after the heart of Śaṅkara and the Sūtras after the heart of Rāmānuja. The avowed function of the Sūtras is to synthesize the Upaniṣads.

(To be continued)

THE IMPELLING MOTION AND SPIRIT*

BY DR. NELSON S. BUSHNELL

When Narendranath Datta, who later became Swami Vivekananda, was still only about eighteen years old, we are told that he 'felt the imperative need of being instructed by a man who had seen God.' At first he received no satisfactory help from leaders of various religious sects. Then 'he remembered having heard the name of Ramakrishna Paramahansa from Professor Hastie, who, while lecturing his class on [a poem of] Wordsworth . . . , had spoken of trances, remarking that such religious ecstasies were the result of purity and concentration. He

had said, further, that an exalted experience of this kind was a rare phenomenon, especially in modern times "I have known," he had said, "only one person who has realized that blessed state, and he is Ramakrishna of Dakshineswar. You will understand trances if you visit the saint".¹

Shortly after, Narendra had the good fortune to make the acquaintance of the Master, and throughout the remainder of Swami Vivekananda's life the influence of the English poet, William Wordsworth, continued. It is mentioned in Swami Nikhilananda's biography of Vivekananda that 'the

*A comparison of ideas found in the poet Wordsworth with some of Indian origin, condensed from an address delivered in 1954 at the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Centre, New York, U.S.A.

¹Swami Nikhilananda, *Vivekananda: The Yogas and other works*, p. 9.

English poets stirred his feelings, especially Wordsworth and Shelley.' (p. 19.) While still a youth, under the influence of Ramakrishna he

'entered a new realm of consciousness. He saw the whole universe permeated by the Divine Spirit, and returned home in a daze. While eating his meal, he felt the presence of Brahman in everything—in the food, and in himself too. While walking in the street, he saw the carriages, the horses, the crowd, and himself as if made of the same substance. After a few days the intensity of the vision lessened to some extent, but still he could see the world only as a dream. While strolling in the public park of Calcutta, he struck his head against the iron railings, several times, to see if they were real or a mere illusion of the mind.' (p. 18.)

At almost exactly the same time an Englishman was writing a letter in Oxford, England, describing a meeting which he had had with Wordsworth in the poet's old age. He explained that he had ventured to ask the poet the meaning of a passage in Wordsworth's *Immortality Ode*, a poem of which Vivekananda himself was very fond; the Swami quotes from it (though not with complete agreement!) at the beginning of a lecture delivered in London fifteen years later. (p. 237.)

It is best to relate the aged poet's response to the question in the very words of the original letter:

"The venerable old man raised his aged form erect; he was walking in the middle, and passed across me to a five-barred gate in the wall which bounded the road on the side of the lake. He clenched the top bar firmly with his right hand, pushed strongly against it, and then uttered these ever-memorable words: "There was a time in my life when I had to push against something that resisted, to be sure that there was anything outside of me. I was sure of my own mind; everything else fell away, and vanished into thought".²

The authenticity of such youthful experiences of Wordsworth is verified by several other references which he made to them. No account of them, it seems, appeared in

² Wm. Knight, ed., *Poetical Works of ... Wordsworth*, IV, 58.

print even in England until about the time when Vivekananda himself was having the almost identical experience independently in India; the parallelism between the two young men is thus most striking.

Throughout Vivekananda's life we find him occasionally expressing ideas closely similar to some appearing in familiar poems of Wordsworth, and typical of Wordsworth's view of life during the period of his most significant *poetic* activity. It should be interesting, therefore, to examine that view of life, the motives that controlled it, the circumstances through which it was achieved, and the ideals that it comprises. The real driving-power behind Wordsworth's finest poetry was the attempt, conscious or unconscious, to recapture the experiences of his extraordinarily happy childhood and early youth. To these he refers in most moving and suggestive terms: for instance, childhood and youth were to him

A time when meadow, grove, and stream,
The earth, and every common sight,
To me did seem
Apparelled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.

(*Immortality Ode*, i).³

I cannot paint
What then I was. The sounding cataract
Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
Their colours and their form, were then to me
An appetite; a feeling and a love.

(*Tintern Abbey*, 75-80)

Even when he tries to convince himself that he does not really regret the loss of youth, he gives himself away by the impassioned eloquence with which he describes that loss:

That time is past,
And all its aching joys are now no more,
And all its dizzy raptures.

(*Tintern Abbey*, 83-5)

The radiance which was once so bright
[Is] now for ever taken from my sight;
...Nothing can bring back the hour
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower;
(*Immortality Ode*, x)

³ Throughout this paper individual poems by Wordsworth are referred to by familiar 'catch' titles.

It will be noted, by one who reads the poet's account of the specific incidents which gave rise to these past ecstasies, that they took place usually when he was in solitude and in rural surroundings, and we are reminded of Ramakrishna's insistence on similar circumstances as conducive to religious experience:

The mind cannot dwell on God if it is immersed day and night in worldliness, in worldly duties and responsibilities; it is most necessary to go into solitude now and then and think of God. To fix the mind on God is very difficult, in the beginning, unless one practises meditation in solitude. . . . To meditate, you should withdraw within yourself or retire to a secluded corner or to the forest.

(*Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*, p. 5)

The impact of these moments was due in part to Wordsworth's tendency constantly to make associations between the incident at hand and related experiences. We might compare the importance that Vivekananda attached to this associative tendency of the human mind. 'Any one idea or, according to our psychology, any one wave that is produced in the mind-stuff, or *chitta*, must always give rise to many similar waves. This is the psychological idea of association, and causation is only an aspect of this grand pervasive principle of association.' (*Vivekananda*, p. 495.)

In addition to this longing to recapture the past, Wordsworth gives evidence of persistent attempts to explore and exploit new or neglected areas in the human consciousness; he cannot forget that more-potent period of his youth when the fact of his own consciousness was the only fact. The method that Wordsworth adopted to achieve this recapture and exploration was primarily recollection in a state of tranquillity, which he calls 'wise passiveness'. The poet recognizes the *apparent* unreliability of such recollection, in which the past details are likely to be coloured by later, and by present, influences. He compares himself to a man looking down on still water and seeing the mixture of objects on the bottom and reflections on the surface:

As one who hangs down-bending from the side
Of a slow-moving boat, upon the breast
Of a still water, solacing himself
With such discoveries as his eye can make,
Beneath him in the bottom of the deeps
Sees many beauteous sights—weeds,
fishes, flowers,
Grots, pebbles, roots of trees; and fancies more,
Yet often is perplexed, and cannot part
The shadow from the substance; rocks and sky,
Mountains and clouds [reflected in the depth
Of the clear flood, from] things which there abide
In their true dwelling.

(*The Prelude*, 1805, IV, 247-58)

But the reality thus perceived, it can be argued, comes all the closer to the ideal because it combines several levels of experience. This intense recollection, which we would perhaps call contemplation or meditation, resulted in a state of trance, almost of suspended animation, which some of us might look upon as resembling the experience of reality achieved by the Hindu mystics in *samādhi*. Ramakrishna, because of his conscious divine power, was apparently able to induce *samādhi* almost at will; he could recapture the experience of reality. Wordsworth attempted to do it through wise passiveness. Perhaps other weaker men have mistakenly attempted it through the abolition of selfish identity by over-indulgence in drink, drugs, or other sensuous stimulation.

Wordsworth best describes such an experience of reality in the following poetic terms:

That blessed mood,
In which the burthen of the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened:—that serene and blessed mood,
In which the affections gently lead us on,—
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.

(*Tintern Abbey*, 41-49)

It is in this psychological state of wise passiveness that Wordsworth finds his imagination most stimulated. Imagination might

be summarily described as a power inherent in human nature permitting us to grasp or achieve certain experiences or ideas without the conscious employment of our physical senses or our reasoning powers, and thus in a seemingly instantaneous and miraculous fashion. When Wordsworth says in a much argued passage 'The winds come to me from the fields of sleep' it is possible that he means simply that imagination, (the winds of inspiration is a common poetic figure of speech) operates most effectively when the conscious activity of his mind is suspended as if in sleep. Also, the 'external' world which we supposedly perceive with the waking senses, is perhaps as much created by the inner imagination; and Wordsworth speaks 'of all that we behold From this green earth; of all the mighty world Of eye, and ear as being 'both what they half create. And what perceive'. (*Tintern Abbey*, 105-7.)

Of the specific ideas which developed in Wordsworth, either as a result of conscious examination of the external world, or out of these inner experiences we have been examining, the most commonly known reflect his conception of nature and its relationship to man. By nature (when speaking of Wordsworth) we mean primarily those forces, physical or non-physical inherent in the universe and expressed through its outward phenomena, including both the non-human world of trees, animals, earth, and stars; and the activities of human beings. We note at once that Wordsworth sees man associated with and closely related to the non-human universe. This fact is constantly brought out in four short poems included in *Lyrical Ballads*. Each of these relates an incident taking place with the poet in a specific outdoor scene, beside a lake, or at sunset among the long green fields, or 'while in a grove I sat reclined', or on the first mild day of March with the redbreast singing from the tall larch-tree. In such surroundings the poet is driven to make one of his most astounding claims, if taken literally (and it is quite possibly meant to be so taken):

Through primrose tufts, in that green bower;
The periwinkle trailed its wreaths;
And 'tis my faith that every flower
Enjoys the air it breathes.

The birds around me hopped and played,
Their thoughts I cannot measure:—
But the least motion which they made,
It seemed a thrill of pleasure.

The budding twigs spread out their fan,
To catch the breezy air;
And I must think, do all I can,
That there was pleasure there.

(*Lines in Early Spring*)

It will be observed that he himself recognizes this belief as irrational, overpowering his will: 'I *must* think, do *all I can*. . . .'

A question has just been raised as to whether this bald claim of conscious happiness in the inanimate, or at least vegetable, objects of nature is to be taken seriously. Now, a peculiar thing about poetry is that it attempts to convey to us the real, essential truth of an experience, even though the actual terms used may seem to contradict scientific fact. If, for instance, the chairman of an orphan asylum decides to name his institution 'The Cradle', he is being a poet. The institution is not in prosaic fact a cradle; it is not a wooden piece of furniture on rockers in which babies are lulled to sleep. Nevertheless, the title which he chooses is more expressive of the real purpose and function of the institution than if he named it with scientific accuracy 'A Refuge For Homeless Orphans'. The poet may go even farther than this. He may exaggerate the prosaic fact to such an extent that we not only are made aware of the essential nature of the experience he is intending to convey to us, but also we are violently shocked into a realization of the enormous difference between this experience and everyday life.

It is with such a purpose, in part, that great religious teachers have made use of parables or *apparently* familiar, everyday stories, in order to impress their teachings upon us. The really striking thing about many of the parables of Jesus and Ramakrishna is that although they may appear at

first blush to recount everyday incidents, they are likely to wind up with an absolutely fantastic conclusion, one purpose of which is to impress upon us the shocking gulf of difference between worldly life and the kingdom of the spirit. Both the prodigal son and his father really end by acting in a most unprecedented fashion. A Samaritan is the last person in the world whom we would expect to find behaving as the Good Samaritan behaves; it is only God who does such things. Many of the illustrative parables used by Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, drawn from legendary sources, present supernatural phenomena whose behaviour is diametrically different from that of the everyday world.

A favourite habit of Wordsworth is to make use of such startling exaggerations as the one quoted above regarding the conscious joy in nature. We may therefore agree that Wordsworth means exactly what he says. On the assumption that even vegetable nature is a product of that universal consciousness of which the poet feels himself a part, it must share in the attributes of that consciousness, not the least of which is conscious joy.

The next step, therefore, would be to affirm that the power residing in nature is identical with God. In conclusion to the recently quoted passage, Wordsworth says, 'if this belief from Heaven be sent, if such be nature's Holy plan. . . .' It is important to observe that Wordsworth (at least in that period of his life with which we are here concerned) does not believe that this Heavenly 'Holy' God will be found incarnated exclusively in any individual personal form. The exercise of this force he perceives primarily in the physical activities of the universe, often symbolized in the rotation of the earth itself. It is a power which 'rolls' through all things, and he refers to it most uncompromisingly, in a deservedly famous poem, one of those associated with the (probably imaginary) Lucy, in which he reconciles himself to her death, and loss of private individual identity:

A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears:
She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.
No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees.

If nature is God, nature must perform the divine function of moral instruction. Hence while observing the sunset and the woodland, Wordsworth hears the thrush sing and exclaims,

He, too, is no mean preacher:
Come forth into the light of things,
Let Nature be your Teacher. . . .
One impulse from a vernal wood
May teach you more of man,
Of moral evil and of good,
Than all the sages can.
Sweet is the lore which Nature brings;
Our meddling intellect
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:—
We murder to dissect.

(Tables Turned)

Here again we see the typical use of exaggeration, or what strikes us as being exaggeration. What Wordsworth tells us flatly is equivalent to the claim that *all* the sages (including Socrates and Lord Buddha and Jesus) are actually inferior as moral teachers to the perceptions induced by a single spontaneous impulse from the woodland in the springtime.

These varying or developing ideas regarding what we might call the nature of nature, and its relation to man, are really implicit in a passage written at an early date for the autobiographical *Prelude*, but toned down to more orthodox terms when the poet revised the still unpublished lines in his later and more conservative years:

I, at this time,
Saw blessings spread around me like a sea.
Thus did my days pass on, and now at length
From Nature and her overflowing soul,
I had received so much, that all my thoughts
Were steeped in feeling; I was only then
Contented, when with bliss ineffable

I felt the sentiment of Being spread
 O'er all that moves and all that seemeth still;
 O'er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought
 And human knowledge, to the human eye
 Invisible, yet liveth to the heart;
 O'er all that leaps and runs, and shouts and sings,
 Or beats the gladsome air; o'er all that glides
 Beneath the wave, yea, in the wave itself,
 And mighty depth of waters. Wonder not
 If such my transports were, for in all things now
 I saw one life, and felt that it was joy.
 One song they sang, and it was audible,
 Most audible, then, when the fleshly ear,
 O'ercome by humblest prelude of that strain,
 Forgot her functions, and slept undisturbed.

(*Prelude*, 1805, II. 413ff.)

The same conception of one joyful life-force infusing and animating the entire universe appears in even more memorable terms in the reflective poem known conveniently as *Tintern Abbey* (93-102).

I have felt

A presence that disturbs me with the joy
 Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
 Of something far more deeply interfused,
 Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
 And the round ocean and the living air,
 And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
 A motion and a spirit, that impels
 All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
 And rolls through all things.

With the knowledge of this basic belief in mind we might examine a brief and familiar poem often referred to as *The Daffodils*.

I wandered lonely as a Cloud
 That floats on high o'er vales and hills,
 When all at once I saw a crowd,
 A host of golden Daffodils;
 Beside the Lake, beneath the trees,
 Fluttering and dancing in the breeze.
 Continuous as the stars that shine
 And twinkle on the milky way,
 They stretched in never-ending line
 Along the margin of a bay:
 Ten thousand saw I at a glance,
 Tossing their heads in sprightly dance.
 The waves beside them danced, but they
 Out-did the sparkling waves in glee:—
 A poet could not but be gay,
 In such a jocund company;
 I gazed—and gazed—but little thought
 What wealth the show to me had brought:
 For oft, when on my couch I lie
 In vacant or in pensive mood,
 They flash upon that inward eye

Which is the bliss of solitude,
 And then my heart with pleasure fills,
 And dances with the Daffodils.

Looking back over the specific wording and descriptive detail of this charming lyric we see that Wordsworth has made us experience the flowers not only as botanical objects once present to his eye but also as a manifestation of the one joyful force of the universe. They belong to the same race as do we supposedly human beings. They are a crowd, a host, a company; they toss 'their heads in sprightly dance, outdoing the waves in glee', 'a jocund' or joyful 'company'. Note also, however, that they are eternal, in timelessness 'continuous as the stars', and universal, limitless in space, 'in never-ending line'. And, incidentally, that when first beheld they revealed themselves to the solitary poet wandering as detachedly and irresponsibly as a cloud; and that when they return to him in recollection he is lying on his couch in vacant, pensive mood (wise passiveness), in which his inward eye is awakened to perceive their true significance.

With this approach toward the natural universe we are not surprised to find Wordsworth highly critical of the society of worldly men, its conventions, and its convictions. The worldly guides of reason and the will power he repudiates. We have already heard him speak of the intellect as meddling and murderous. He denounces the forms of society as being joyless, and his heart is grieved 'to think what man has made of man.' . . . 'Have I not reason to lament' of it, he asks. Here of course we are reminded of Ramakrishna's constant criticism of a pre-occupation with worldly life, one example of which is quoted above. In the great *Immortality Ode* of which Vivekananda was so fond, Wordsworth bewails the fact that as a child begins to grow up into adult society, shades of the prison house begin to close upon him. The characteristics of the prison house (of adult society) are 'listlessness or mad endeavour'; and with a tragic irony the child himself, driven by the biologic demands

of his homely nurse, the earth (who here seems to be playing a very un-Wordsworthian role), eagerly co-operates in the process of growing up into this regrettable world, with 'its fretful stir unprofitable,' its fever 'where no kindness is' in 'all the dreary intercourse of daily life.' (*Tintern Abbey* 52f., 130f.)

Man has, however, compensatory powers, not the least of which is love. We are here speaking of love not in the cruder sense of physical desire, or even in the ethical sense of self-sacrifice for the good of others, but rather as a yearning for, and awareness of, identity between two separate beings. Such love exists for no ulterior motive but as an end in itself. The conception in Vedanta of the *bhakta*, who loves God for the mere sake of loving Him, suggests the attitude of Wordsworth, who loved nature because he couldn't help it, not for the sake of any reward.

A further aid that man has and cannot possibly escape is the influence upon him of his unconscious or subconscious mind in determining the development of his personality. In one of the short early poems inspired by a delightful spring evening Wordsworth proclaims,

Love, now a universal birth,
From heart to heart is stealing.
From earth to man, from man to earth:
—It is the hour of feeling.
One moment now may give us more
Than years of toiling reason:
Our minds shall drink at every pore
The spirit of the season.
Some silent laws our hearts will make,
Which they shall long obey:
We for the year to come may take
Our temper from to-day.
And from the blessed power that rolls
About, below, above,
We'll frame the measure of our souls:
They shall be tuned to love.

(*To My Sister*)

The implication of the phrase 'silent laws' is that the personality will be permanently shaped and guided, though quite unconsciously, by the impact of this moment upon it.

This idea of the persistent influence of unconsciously or subconsciously remembered experience leads Wordsworth to another cluster of ideas which he felt might prove to be a stumbling block to orthodox Christian believers. Because of this constantly stimulating chain of subconscious influences the poet is convinced of the continuity of human personality, not only in this earthly life but also before it. Everybody knows that in the *Immortality Ode* he proclaims that

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.

Incidentally it is from this passage that Vivekananda quoted (with reservations). (p. 237.) It is because of the child's closeness to, and lingering memory of, the divine existence out of which he is born into this earthly life that Wordsworth can look upon the infant as being a 'best philosopher, mighty prophet, and seer blessed'. One wonders if Swami Vivekananda himself had a subconscious recollection of this declaration when he wrote,

'Now, human language is the attempt to express the truth that is within. I am fully persuaded that a baby, whose language consists of unintelligible sounds, is attempting to express the highest philosophy; only the baby has not the organs to express it, nor the means. The difference between the language of the highest philosophers and the utterances of babies is one of clarity and not of kind.' (p. 210.)

Another possible example of Wordsworthian influence on or at least parallelism to Vivekananda is found in a lecture on Immortality delivered by the Swami in America, 'Evolution as such does not come out of zero. Then where does it come from? From previous involution. The child is the man involved, and the man is the child evolved.' (p. 303.) We are reminded of the famous little lyric which Wordsworth wrote on this subject and part of which he later used as an epigraph or motto for that same *Immortality Ode* :

My heart leaps up when I behold

A Rainbow in the sky:

So was it when my life began;

So is it now I am a Man;

So be it when I shall grow old,

Or let me die!

The Child is Father of the Man;

And I could wish my days to be

Bound each to each by natural piety.

—'natural piety' being of course used in the old Latin sense of worship for one's ancestor or father, in this case, worship of one's own self as child.

Before we bring these remarks to a conclusion, it is desirable to make some reference to the great autobiographical poem, *The Prelude*, which has already been mentioned in other connections. The importance of *The Prelude* and its really impressive significance and convincingness is to a considerable extent due to the fact that it was a private and confessional poem written by Wordsworth in confidence to his closest friend and father-confessor in such matters, his fellow poet, Coleridge. Furthermore, it was written explicitly as an attempt to explore his own powers and to estimate his own fitness to write the epic poem for which he was ambitious. In such circumstances it is unthinkable that it should not be as sincere as the poet knew how to make it. This sincerity is enhanced by the fact that Wordsworth did not permit the manuscript to be published within his lifetime but kept it constantly beside him and subject to continuing revision in order that he might make it express as accurately as possible what he believed—or what at a later date he believed he had believed. Some of the revisions seem to many readers artistically unfortunate, and it is likely that Wordsworth in his aged orthodoxy found it difficult to believe that he actually could have been so liberal in his ideas in the youthful period of first composition, which was likewise the period of his deepest and most intense inspiration. Hence throughout this paper quotations have been drawn from the first version of the poem, except for trivial changes that improve the

clarity of statement.

In this *Prelude*, however, there appear other motives than those of self-exploration. There is also the motive, familiar to every religious convert, of preaching his own new gospel of a happiness and poise won through arduous spiritual struggle against inner despair. Hence *The Prelude* is for the reader of Wordsworth in itself an epic—an epic of liberation. It is noteworthy that in the introductory book when he lists the various subjects which he was dallying with as possibly appropriate for the epic which he hoped at a later date to write, those tentative subjects almost all deal with legendary or historical characters who were themselves great liberators. So by the time that he has finished *The Prelude* Wordsworth has himself charted the course by which he developed a sense of his own integrity as a self participating in a universal self; developing in that process a reliance upon the powers of his own sub-conscious or unconscious mind, his own feelings, and his own imagination; and leading to a liberating faith in the one joyful life that is a motion and a spirit impelling all thinking things, all objects of all thought, and rolling through all things. It is thus that he achieves liberation from the social pressures of the world in which he must live, liberation from the frustration and disillusionment into which a collapse of juvenile desires and ideals (before his great period of creative activity) had precipitated him, and liberation from the exclusive bondage of a consciously directed will and a consciously articulated reason.

When we may feel, as all of us must

some times feel, that

The world is too much with us,

late and soon;

Getting and spending we lay waste our powers: that 'We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon;' that 'For everything we are out of tune'—when with Wordsworth we feel these things, we may find—in Wordsworth, again, or in ideas which he shared with others—help that will release our cramped personalities into true spiritual freedom.

IS ART CONDITIONED?

BY SHRI P. SAMA RAO

In the great plethora of views held by philosophers like Shri Śaṅkara, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Tolstoi, etc., poets like Goethe, Coleridge, Blake, Shelley, Keats, etc., and aestheticians like Ruskin, Croce, Santayana, A. K. Coomaraswamy, etc., there is no one way about either the conception, or intention, or execution of the work of art. Reason pure and simple, with its usual intellectualism, shuffles off its skeins with the purpose of apprehending what art is; but it also failed to grasp its spiritual content in the same manner as non-reason, inclusive of intuition and mystical sense, has failed to determine what its execution or technique should be in the light of individuality, *samśkāra*, self-perfection, and tradition. The infinite views, mostly confounding, are mainly due to the infinite variety of personality. There can still be only one view about art if only the thinkers shed their personalities and attorn to the one all-creative and exclusive source of all things in a great spirit of selfless consecration and cultivate the faith that whatever they conceive and execute artistically is only done at Its inspiration and guidance. All forms of art are but Its infinite manifestations in the concrete realm of physical being. Words are as much symbolic as the lines or sounds or colour washes or modelling are, and in their sublimity and fineness are reminiscent of God's personality. As Roger Fry suggests 'Art is a blasphemy' in that it strives to condition the Absolute by bestowing upon It the form, the melody, and the sense. For the Absolute is everything or nothing, just as mystic vision in its attempt to become It conjures. Thus art is both conditioned and unconditioned from different standpoints.

The *Bhramara-Kīṭaka Nyāya* (the aspirant becomes the very thing aspired after) is true both in the empirical and in the empyrean realms. A caterpillar developing into a charm-

ing butterfly, the devotee becoming the very god to whom he consecrates himself, and the beautiful thought concretizing itself into ineffable form are some of the incontrovertible instances of being transfigured into delectable becoming. Thus we see the seed growing into the sapling, the sapling into the tree, the tree into the blossom, the blossom into the fruit, and the fruit into the seed again. This eternal evolution of the self into its parent Self through time to the timeless Eternal is the one Law of Life, an artist, much more than anyone else, should not fail to realize this. The sweet touch of his personality which he adds to his product is not so much his own as his divine Creator's, of whom he himself is an indelible specimen. So an enduring piece of art is always reminiscent of this kinship; and the higher is its value, the more precisely it conveys the sensuous aspect of the Godhead. The beauty in nature is but His reflection.

High art is never photographic. The mind of the artist is not a lifeless lens. The high quality of his creation is directly proportional to his spiritual essence. Spirituality is therefore its very backbone.

When once it is granted that inspiration is the motive-force behind artistic creation there is nothing like volition in the form of intention in the artist. That is the fundamental truth, although some amount of will is necessary for his initial dedication and consecration to the fountain-head of his artistic existence. If fineness and delicacy, melody and grace, strength in flexibility and plasticity are the ideal qualities of the divine, rough daubing of paint, or the crude hacking of the model, or electric posing, all done with an eye to impressionism, cannot endow any permanent value to the product. Imagination should not be strained to transfigure beauty out of something quite dis-

parate from it. It is not the essence of art to suggest anything out of nothing. The modern trends at realism, surrealism, expressionism, cubism, etc., however admirable they be intellectually, are not the marrow of high art.

Art is therefore conditioned to the extent it endeavours to define the Indefinable; it is unconditioned in the sense it has always got to suggest the infinite quality of the Godhead. Therein lies its permanence and glow.

TIME AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

BY DR. P. S. SASTRI

The philosophies of history are philosophies of process, of change, of time. They are constructed out of the elements called events. If we examine the nature of these events, we will know the nature of time.

Every event must have a certain magnitude, by which we mean in the language of Aristotle that it have a beginning, a middle, and an end. If Reality however is an interrelated whole, any such event is the outcome of arbitrary limitation of extent and content. It is an artificial piece cut and separated for the convenience of the thinker. How or where it should be cut, is determined by the preconceived notions of the thinker concerned. In other words, a drastic process of selection which is implicit in the idea of a historical event is at the basis of most historical thinking. It is evident that the historical event is a mental construct, a convenient, though faulty, fiction. The historian selects one event or one series of events, ignoring the interrelationship of all events and of all series of events. Under this blatant falsification of the process we are made to understand the past only by misunderstanding it. This misunderstanding is, we are told, necessary because of the assumption that we cannot narrate a coherent story of man in the absence of some clue to its meaning, and this clue is first devised by the mind of the thinker and then read into the events or facts. If the events or facts refuse to admit this clue the facts are rejected, because for *all* philosophies of history thought is implicitly more real than

existence. No philosophy of history has so far equated thought with absolute existence successfully.

Further, historical judgements passed on the alleged historical events are made only from within the historic process, since the person who makes them cannot be outside history. He cannot be a detached contemplator of the events; and then the personal factor is bound to vitiate the value of such judgements.

There is another avenue. History as a process implies the continuity of time. Every so-called event has the past implicitly present in it. The present event has a meaning and a content only when the past and the future are implicit in it. But the present is neither the cause nor a condition of the future; nor is it the effect of a past. That is, Reality is not a continuous series, but one and indivisible. It has the continuity which the self has, and it therefore appears at different levels in different ways. In other words, it is a unity from which we derive our temporal notions, but to which we cannot apply these notions; and it is a unity effected in and through concrete individual selves. To be historical, then, an event has a meaning in so far as it is integral to universal life or reality; and in abstracting it from life we divest it of all meaning or character. And meaning is always human, so far as human beings apprehend it.

Every event is related to the present whence it acquires historical value. We bring an event into relation with our present life and then

apprehend it as historical. We do not literally bring any thing into relation with our present, nor are we capable of such a thing. It only means that our apprehension of the present gets widened. This widening is not undergone by many. As a result history for the large mass of mankind cannot exist, nor can it fully become concrete and actual at any event in any experience.

The historian cannot start from the universal if he were to remain faithful to his subject. He cannot rise higher than his facts without thereby ceasing to be a historian. By its very nature history tends to deal with particular events or facts. And the historian speaks not of existence in the present, but of something that *was* once and then no more. Any generalization about that which *was*, lacks objective validity and universality. This preoccupation with the particular events in the belief that these alone are real, makes the historical outlook take wide sweeps and pass through a linear progression.

The historian selects a piece of human life and attempts to find the part played by the various events. Objects like institutions, religions, and languages are not historical events in themselves. They become historical only when they are viewed in the human context. That is, those that are ineffectual are ruled out of his study. He will take note of Cleopatra's nose as a historical event because it acted as a causal force in the history of the Roman empire. The notorious causal law makes him choose only the seemingly dominant events. He makes short work of the various forces and their forces. This abridged version, we are told, is the real historic process. But this too includes some invented events like the anecdotes of Herodotus, the fabricated speeches of Thucydides, and the imagined dialogues of Plutarch. At the Diet of Worms, Luther gave in a low and hesitant voice only a 'no'; but the historian's version of '*Hier stehe ich; ich kann nicht anders*', may be more representative of Luther's spirit. This brings to light the fact that a historian can at times be nearer the spirit of events by deviating

from the facts. Here the historian constructs a probability and converts it into a causal law, into a necessity. Every event so constructed is an over-simplification of the complexity of life. The real factor in this complex process is the conscious endeavour taking place in the finite centres. If we take the historic process to be purposive, it has to acquire new meanings as it unfolds in us. This unfolding seems to connect the various finite centres more intimately, thus falling outside time itself. In this more intimate relationship alone can we find the meaning and value suggested by historical events.

To understand the nature of the historical event we should, in the first instance, avoid the ego-centric eccentricities of some philosophies of history. The frames of reference of these historian philosophers constitute their mental discipline which they hold to be the only valuable ones. All other subjects are somehow resolved into the particular mental discipline of the thinker. We cannot afford to ignore the fact that the various branches of knowledge are interrelated. And we should not mistake mutual dependency for subordination.

We have to admit in the second instance that the historical events constitutive of the historic process reveal the interaction of human beings and their environments. Neither can be converted into the other, and neither can be spoken of as externally related to the other. It is fundamental to all historical investigations that the origins of the historic process cannot be traced to simple elements; for, there is no history without meaning, and meaning is brought to bear on the process by something which is already in that process. This something is the subject of the experience. Without the activity of this subject there is neither science nor meaning in human life, whence the subject cannot be an object of investigation.

In the third instance we have to understand the nature of the historical events by rejecting all aid from metaphors. St. Augustine compares history to the life-cycle of man. Toynbee employs the figure taken from con-

ception and delivery. Others have treated it as an organism, and yet others as evolutionary. Though these and similar metaphors are frequently employed, most philosophers of history would shudder to hear that the history of the universe is similar to a great poem.

With these considerations we can proceed further without entertaining the fallacy of isolation; for this fallacy gives rise to a tendency to study only that event which seems to repeat itself. We cannot minimize the importance of non-repeated events. The historian can never write the complete history of every individual in a given country. He has to select and in so doing sacrifice the apparent trivial event in the interests of the apparent important event. This selection is determined for him by the interests of the people who are contemporaneous with that event. Their conversations are sifted into the then journals and newspapers which in their turn get themselves selectively transformed into history. This is the process through which a historical event comes into being from a factual event, and this reveals that the historian's difficulty does not lie in the selection of events, but in deciding what an event is. It is here that historians differ from one another; and in defining the event every historian comes with his own preconceived epistemological theory.

History painfully collects something that appears to be valuable to the historian. But if time is not real, if human life is after all unreal and adjectival, there should be no value in this painstaking endeavour. The human being belongs to humanity and to the macro-cosm as well. And this can provide a clue to the difficulty emerging in the philosophies of history. But the history of philosophical thought has been busy reducing the one to the other. Thus James Ward wrote: 'The course of history shows us the gradual building up of society and civilisation, but ever widening social groups and ends of ever increasing scope are still in every case individual and concrete. The higher over-individual ends, politics, industry, science, literature, art, imply differentiation among men that in spite of its significance would

defy classification.' That is, the value of the historical process lies not merely in its objective products, but in the effect of these upon individual selves. The function of the self is to effect the diverse manifestations of reality into a significant unity, while the function of the historic process is taken to be that of moulding the selves thus conceived. The historical evolution of experience, as opposed to that of the physical world, is specifically characterized by the 'increase of spiritual energy and continued conservation by unique centres of their hardly acquired values'. (David Morrison, *Arist. Soc.* XIV. p. 308.) Thus there is a human striving on the one hand, and a striving on the part of Reality on the other. If the former is contained in the latter, the whole has to sustain human striving and ensure the preservation of that which alone has striven against all odds. This is not an idle continuity of human existence that we demand; for in the sphere to which the vital core of our being refers, there arise no considerations of time, and, therefore, of continuity.

In the last of his Gifford Lectures Bergson gave expression to the view that continuity of movement of its inner life is the characteristic feature of personality. Evolution is moving towards the constituting of distinct personalities. Personality has a backward-looking aspect called memory and a forward-looking aspect called will. The latter utilizes the past in building up a new and larger life, whence it is the creative aspect of personality. That is, the evolutionary process is the necessary mechanism for the creation of creators. The creator has a life of personality which is an unbroken and continuous change in time. But Bergson was never troubled by the self-contradictory notion of an ever-changing creator. The history of such a creator is beyond the grasp of the historians. An ever-changing process is bound to deny the reality of human values. We are, on the other hand, on a safer and sounder doctrine when we hold to the conservation of the deepest core of our existence. If the purpose of the world collides with a human purpose and destroys it, we

cannot call it rational; and if that purpose is ultimate and real, it must and should conserve the human value or values. As Lotze observed: 'If we were forced to believe that all personal life is but a stage of development through which an impersonal Absolute has to pass, we should either cease our efforts, since we can discover no obligation to co-operate in helping on a process totally indifferent both in itself and for us, or we should have to confess to ourselves that a human heart in all its finitude and transitoriness is incomparably nobler, richer, and more exalted than that . . . Absolute with its logically necessary development.' (*Microcosmus*, II. 164.) Considerations like these are out of place in the strictly philosophical study of history, as it has been constructed so far by the varied thinkers. Though these are the most important events, they are generally ignored, or their importance is minimized. To quote Lotze again: 'We will always combat these conceptions which acknowledge only one half, and that the poorer half, of the world; only the unfolding of facts to new facts, of forms to new forms, and not the continual mental elaboration of all these outward events into that which alone in the universe has worth and truth—into the bliss and despair, the admiration and loathing, the love and the hate, the joyous certainty and the despairing longing, and all the nameless fear and fervour in which that life passes which alone is worthy to be called life.' (*Ibid.* II. 166-7.)

Before we proceed further we may note the difficulty in determining the trivial and important events. Any event which influences many people for a longer time may be taken to be an important one. But what about the illness of Napoleon which weakened his judgement and which thereby brought about his collapse and the consequent reshaping of Europe? Setting this aside, we may admit that the historian has no need to trouble himself with the transformations of energy or with the laws of physical sciences. He is concerned with the events taking place at the human level. Since a historical event has this character, its influ-

ence on people and institutions comes from men who hold the key positions in the various countries. This is the truth underlying political history where importance is attached to the government and to the parliament. And as a result some philosophies of history develop into the philosophies of the state or law. And when we speak of important event, we give an evaluative sense to the term important; for it refers not merely to effects but to some standards. This standard is treated as the clue to the meaning of history. Such a clue is transformed into a scheme or plan regulating the events. The moment the standard is brought into the study of history in the form of a plan, that very moment we cease to stick to ethical neutrality.

Does the nature of an event necessitate the reality of the process? Any process is temporal. If time is real and if the world-process is evolutionary, it offers an end which is not attained and which is not attainable. And since the process, which is an interrelated whole, is not complete till the end is achieved, the nature of any event constitutive of this process cannot be known fully. The nature of the direction taken by the process is also beyond human comprehension. The historian-philosopher and his events are within the process. Hence if history is a process, and if process is temporal, the historian who is in the process cannot know the event which is in the same process. Man, however, is in nature and history is in man. In the interrelated whole called the historical process the supreme operating agent is man, and man always moves in the two worlds of actuality and ideality. He wants to be something for which he struggles; and he also wants to be that which he must be and should be. The process moves on this background which is one of infinite yearning, and which is his frame of reference. The activities of such conscious selves are manifested in the events. The background of all this is the entire universe of which our solid globe is an infinitesimal speck. This leads us to two sets of events, viz. the events of the universe, and the events of human life.

The principles at work in these two sets of events cannot easily be equated with one another without reducing the existence of the one to that of the other. The events of the first set to some extent reveal mechanical causation, while human action bears a reference to final causes. But if these two sets are identical on an ultimate analysis, the world-process would have to be teleological in which context human events would be moments.

This might make us think that the historical events constitutive of the historical process are not ultimate, that they are but the manifesta-

tions of a consciousness which is beyond time, and that therefore they are the fragmentary presentations of the perfect real. Being fragmentary the event offers a shadow for a substance. In other words, the historical event has no great ultimate importance. If it is to survive and to have a meaning, it has to be related to the highest human experience. And the creative achievement in the self is to be related to its recognition and acceptance of a perfection which is embodied in the highest experiences of art, of religion, and of the great human endeavours.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TO OUR READERS

The concept of 'freedom' in modern society is being emptied of all conventional contents; and curtains, iron or golden, are falling around human life and making it miserable. The psychological analysis of 'The Content of Freedom' by Prof. P. S. Naidu, M.A., is therefore very opportune. Tracing individual behaviours to 'certain innate propensities' and 'immediate motive to human behaviour' to certain 'sentiment (in the hormic sense)', and finding no sure standard of 'goodness' in the political theorists' 'good life', 'good society', 'and even "self-realization"', the learned professor has come to the conclusion that 'true freedom can come only by the annihilation of the native propensities and acquired sentiments', by 'following the Vedantic traditions' and making 'the Brahman-regarding sentiment our final goal'—'The *jīvan-mukta* is the only truly free person.' . . .

'Preface to Vedānta' by Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao, M.A., D.Litt., is a fine introduction to the Vedānta Philosophy that gives an adequate view of the Śaṅkara school. The learned Doctor has given a faithful account of the orthodox view and at the same time has pro-

vided reasons that appeal to modern minds. Replete with fine quotations and written in a racy style, the article is indeed a treat. . . .

'The Impelling Motion and Spirit' by Dr. Nelson S. Bushnell reviews some of the best poems of Wordsworth from a new angle of vision. 'The real driving power behind Wordsworth's finest poetry was the attempt, conscious or unconscious, to recapture the experiences of his extraordinarily happy childhood and early youth.' The nature of these experiences is described in the poet's own words: 'There was a time in my life when I had to push against something that resisted, to be sure that there was anything outside of me. I was sure of my own mind; everything else fell away, and vanished into thought.' First-rank poets are in rapport with nature. But this experience of Wordsworth's is something very different from what we understand by that expression. Read in the light of this experience, his poems reveal a far deeper meaning than they were hitherto supposed to have. The article is quite illuminating and has a special charm for all lovers of Wordsworth's poetry. . . .

Shri P. Sama Rao, B.A., B.L., returns to his favourite theme, Art, and poses, 'Is Art

conditioned?' According to him 'all forms of Art are but' 'infinite manifestations' of the Absolute. He suggests with Roger Fry that 'Art is a blasphemy' 'in that it strives to condition the Absolute by bestowing upon It the form, the melody, and the sense.' He, however, retrieves Art from this position when he concludes: 'Art is therefore conditioned to the extent it endeavours to define the Indefinable; it is unconditioned in the sense it has always got to suggest the infinite quality of the God-head. Therein lies its permanence and glow. ...

'Time and Philosophy of History' by Dr. P. S. Sastri, M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., may be regarded as a continuation of 'The Process of History', which appeared in the November issue of *Prabuddha Bharata*. 'The Reality', from the Vedantic standpoint, 'is an interrelated whole', 'one and indivisible'; whereas history deals with a process constitutive of separate events, selected by historian-philosophers with a view to imparting a meaning to the process. So the whole thing—the events, the process, the selection, and the meaning—contradicts the nature of the Reality. All the four are mental constructs of historians, who, being themselves within the process, cannot know it. If, however, history is to have a meaning, the events are to be taken 'as manifestations of a consciousness which is beyond time', having 'no great ultimate existence'; and the meaning is to be sought in the subjects, the human beings, in their spiritual contents, 'in the recognition and acceptance of a perfection which is embodied in the highest experiences of art, of religion, and of the great human endeavours', rather than in the objective events and "the higher over-individual ends, politics, industry, science, literature, art". How truly has the learned Professor put his finger on 'the manifestation of perfection already in man'!

CONGRESS REPLACES THE NATIONAL BASE!

'Insaf', the columnist has raised a pertinent question in *The Hindustan Times* of June 15. It is a question that is exercising the mind

of every thinking Indian. It has been raised many times, somewhat to the annoyance of our Prime Minister. A question ceases to be asked when the answer is found. The problem however remains unsolved. It is unbecoming of man to play the ostrich.

Insaf's poser is:

'The question, however, arises whether India is developing enough internal strength to sustain her independent role in the international sphere—a role which is almost unique for it is not born of selfish considerations but of Gandhian ideology. ... India has still to provide a solid base for her nationalism. ... Mr. Nehru and top Congress leadership feel that the old base' 'which resisted successfully repeated onslaughts of other religions and political systems' 'has cracked and it must be wholly replaced. ... They expect that the Socialistic pattern of society which they are evolving, will gather enough strength in their lifetime to provide the new base for India's nationalism.

'They realize that there is an element of gamble in it. It is only if national wealth is rapidly increased and equitably distributed and the human element morally purified that a base can be laid strong enough to sustain the superstructure after the present leadership passes.

'Another question is whether faith in God and a spiritual outlook can be sustained while material values alone are emphasized in building up a socialistic pattern of society. Christianity provides the base for democracy in the West while communist states are based on a purely materialist conception. Can India destroy the base which the Hindu way of life and thought has provided through the ages and avoid going the communist way?'

Next the columnist shows how the Congress is the only organized political body in the country and yet in what an awful quandry it is; what disruptive forces are working throughout the land; what peril the Congress will have to face when it seeks to give effect to the recommendations of the Fazl Ali Commission; how Shri Dhebar and Pant are trying their best to keep the Congress ship on an even keel. And he closes his very able columns with a sly hint if Bhaveji's movement is not the solution.

We have already expressed ourselves briefly on the comparative merits of Nehru and Bhave movements and we will do it in

extenso in our December issue. Here we will just touch upon one point only—a very dangerous one indeed. The information that 'Insaf' has given us of the Congress quandry is so true that he seems to know the great organization thoroughly. When such a man doles out a piece of information it is likely to be correct. Have then the Congress leadership really given up the national base and are bent upon playing a gamble? Is it what they mean by the 'socialistic pattern of society'? If Insaf's data are correct his conclusion is perfectly logical—the yellow socialism is bound to turn red; and some people are out to out-Godse Godse. We were jubilant over the idea that the Congress was aiming at establishing a socialistic society on the foundation of spirituality. Shri Aurobindo talked of spiritual communes. Somebody else had conceived the idea. Bhaveji's new conception of Grāmodaya is exactly the same. Caste and other hundred and one social evils have nothing to do with the spiritual basis of Indianism. They are all foolish social accretions which are stifling true spirituality. They must be thrown overboard. But to pronounce the very base of Indian culture as cracked is simply preposterous. Those who talk so often of 'clean means' owe it to the public to make a clear statement if the society they aim at is going to be Godless.

'DISTRIBUTION OF POVERTY'?

Shri Harekrushna Mahatab, now Rajyapal of the Bombay State, but known to India as a sincere servant and true leader of the country, has raised an important question with regard to the Bhūdān movement, which should lead people to rethink more deeply about the matter. According to him the mere distribution of land is 'distribution of poverty'. The statement is too true to need any explanation. Still a little amplification is necessary. *The Hindustan Times* (July 11) reports:

'Mr. Mahatab said that in recent days, the "land problem" appeared big and acute since land had become almost the only source of livelihood for people in the villages on account of the extinction of various other sources of employment like

cottage and village industries. There was now, therefore, added pressure on land. Thus, it was essentially a problem of poverty, the problem of too many people depending on land. This problem could not be solved by merely transferring the right of ownership in land from one person to another.'

'It was not necessary and even possible that everyone in the country or the villages must possess some land. Land should be left in the possession of those who would cultivate it on their own account and responsibility.'

'Mr. Mahatab said it should also be remembered that agriculture and cultivation of land should be kept a paying proposition and a lucrative employment, otherwise agriculture would cease to have any attraction for the enterprising and the progressive.'

'Land should, therefore, be possessed by those who in addition to knowledge of tilling had "the power of organization and development to get the best results economically out of land".'

'In regard to the essential problem, namely, the problem of poverty and consequent pressure on land, Mr. Mahatab said that this could be solved, not by the re-distribution of land or parcelling it out into tiny fragments among many but only by expanding other sources of employment and creating new sources.'

Economically the argument is incontrovertible. Really the parcelling out of land is ruinous to the tillers and the country as a whole. The answer, as reported (fragmentarily we suppose), is sentimental not rational. Says Bhaveji:

'The critics will have to realize that riches or poverty, whatever we may have, will have to be distributed equitably. Poverty will be lessened when it is distributed.'

'We are aiming not at fragmenting land but at uniting the hearts of the people which have been torn asunder. When the hearts are united we will be able to work unitedly to increase our wealth. That is why we are calling upon everybody, including even the poor, to donate his share.'

Shri Mahatab's argument remains untouched.

But Bhaveji has his true answer. The answer lies in the collectivization of land. Let everybody in the village possess land but let the tilling be done by the village union and crop shared off according to land. Without preliminary equitable distribution of land, it is not possible; and voluntary sharing between

heart and heart is infinitely superior to parliamentary legislation, which is not only wooden in its method, but bitter in its consequence.

Even this will not meet Shri Mahatab's logic fully. Collectivization must be accompanied by mechanization and modernization of agriculture. All villages may not have big tractors, but they ought to have baby tractors of various types according to their needs. Then only agriculture will be 'paying' and 'lucrative'.

Mechanization will relieve man-power for various types of village industries, which, when electricity is brought to every village door, will cease to be primitive, and produce wealth and leisure to make people happy, peace-loving, and prosperous. We are, however, not sure if Bhaveji is in favour of bringing machines to peaceful villages. Bapuji was

not against labour-saving machines. Nobody is in favour of introducing big mills and factories into villages. And labour-saving machines, with proper protective legislations, are wealth-producing too. Bhaveji does not seem to be a fanatic. His rational mind will accept the introduction of small machines in villages, even medium-sized ones in big villages.

We are grateful to Shri Mahatab to have raised the question in proper time and direct the country's attention to an economic problem which might have led the country a little off the right track. Bhaveji's village scheme, the Sarvodaya, being a little adapted in the light of the above discussion, will combine the best points of the two warring present-day ideologies on the basis of India's moral and spiritual culture and will bring in a new era of peace and prosperity in India and the world.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

TOWARDS NEW EDUCATION. By M. K. GANDHI. *Published by Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad 9. Pages vii + 90. Price Rs. 1-4.*

Gandhiji held very definite ideas regarding the type of education that an Indian child should get. In formulating his scheme of Basic Education, adumbrated in 1937, he took cognizance of certain vital factors pertaining to social conditions peculiar to India. As a land of predominantly agricultural population who are chronically poor, India demanded, in his view, a craft-centred scheme of training as distinguished from a purely academic course. 'Earn while you learn' was his motto. In this he was largely correct. In the book under review the editors have selected, from out of Gandhiji's extensive writings and speeches, key passages setting forth his views on New Education or *Nai Talim*, comprising Pre-Basic Education (up to age 7), Basic Education (from age 7 to 14), and Post-Basic Education (after age 14). His views on such important and related questions as religious education, medium of instruction, national language and script, women's education, national universities, etc. have also been represented by select

passages. The book provides a clear picture of the development of Gandhiji's educational ideas.

A VISION OF FUTURE INDIA. By K. G. MASHRUWALA. *Published by Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad 9. Pages v + 69. Price Re. 1.*

Shri K. G. Mashruwala, as an inheritor of the Gandhian tradition and as the spokesman of the Sarvodaya principles and social order as visualized by Gandhiji, had definite views to offer on the lines of future reconstruction *vis-a-vis* the guiding principles of the Planning Commission set up by the Government of India. This book embodies his detailed examination and criticism of the basic assumptions of Planning Commission in the light of the Sarvodaya and decentralization economy. As a collection of his more important writings and correspondence on the subject, the booklet will help all serious-minded persons in the country in assessing more or less correctly the difference between the Gandhian outlook and approach as represented by Shri Mashruwala and the official one in their efforts today to achieve the economic millennium for the country.

DEHUMANIZATION IN MODERN SOCIETY. BY RENE FULOP-MILLER. *Published by Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad 9. Pages vii+28. Price As. 7.*

Rene Fulop-Miller, the celebrated author of *Lenin and Gandhi* and a 'close student of modern society and the new trends in civilization' analyses in this booklet (being the text of a lecture delivered in America) the causes that have contributed to the 'dehumanization of man' in modern society. The entire study is centred on the decadence of moral and spiritual values in contemporary history brought about by the 'machine age' dominated by motives of class interest and economic gain. The phrase 'dehumanization of man' has profound implications. For, present-day social theorists are tending to view man not as a being endowed with sentiments and emotions, but as a cog in the vast soulless machinery of the modern state. By 'education' and upbringing he has been trained to cultivate a new form of idolatry—the idolatry of the machine. Man, as a spiritual being, has given place to the abstract concept of man as an economic being. As the author illuminatingly points out: 'Unfortunately we happen to live in a time when abstractions have left the desks, studies and laboratories where they were hatched. They have made their way into life, politics and history. The abstract word has become flesh, and the individual human being has suddenly become part of abstract principles. Man is not judged on his face value, but by the abstract category which he represents.'

As a classical example of such abstractions carried to the point of absurdity in the realm of arts, he points out modern surrealist painting and sculpture, and the so-called cubism of Europe, which 'reveal the deliberate attempt to abstract so much of man's concrete figure and face that the dehumanized portrait of man resembles man as little as possible.' (p. 22.) Modern art, in his view, reveals not man's higher endowments, but his restlessness and discord with himself. With insight and understanding the author discusses how the abstract theory of the 'Aryan race' in Germany led to the tragedy of the Second World War. This 'dehumanization' of man into an abstract entity has entered into the very texture of contemporary thought. Social organization, in his view, should veer round from economic and political determinism and devote itself to deepening man's moral personality. In this fundamental conception he is remarkably in close agreement with Gandhiji. The book is an accurate and persuasive presentation of a point of view which many must have discerned but might not have found the occasion or the words to express. The author's authoritative discussions are throughout backed by solid scholarship and deep thinking.

TO STUDENTS. BY M. K. GANDHI. *Published by Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad 9. Pages viii+224. Price Rs. 2-8.*

This is an abridged edition of the volume *To the Students*—an anthology of Gandhiji's speeches and writings pertaining to the students, scattered over a period of more than two decades—published in 1949. No popular Indian leader of recent times came in such close contact with or had such immense influence over the student population of the country as Gandhiji. As such he had a thorough grasp of their problems and could view their difficulties with sympathetic understanding. The 'practical idealist' that he was, Gandhiji demanded the highest standards of personal purity and sacrifice from the students and therefore his greatest emphasis, as revealed in the book, was on religion, character, and service. In the post-independence era it is these values that have recorded a steep decline. From the point of view of national integrity and efficiency, Gandhiji's highly practical guidance as embodied in the book has more than a mere passing value. Though addressed mainly to the students, the work should be read with profit by others as well; for, the questions that Gandhiji has discussed so forcefully and clearly here touch all important phases of national life, and bring out in bold relief his reactions to such fundamental questions as 'The Need for Religion', 'The Need for Character', Terrorism *versus* non-violence, Student Participation in Politics, Higher Education and Poverty, Constructive work, etc.

THE SEVEN STEPS TO THE NEW AGE. BY PAUL RICHARD. *Published by Ganesh & Co., (Madras) Ltd., Madras 17. Pages x+128. Price Rs. 3.*

The dream of a new perfection for men and nations based on 'transcendental realism' or spiritual idealism has been the theme of sages, prophets, and poets, since the dawn of civilization. Such visions of a New Age wherein man will be divine, and human society a community of free souls—a cosmic version of St. Augustine's 'City of God'—have been the inspirers of men to courage, heroism, and sacrifice in the course of history. The distinguished savant M. Paul Richard has outlined in this book a hierarchy of values calculated to awaken man to divine consciousness. The sociological results that would flow from this divine transformation will be, according to him, a grand political Federation of Nations which will break down the barriers of parochial nationalism and narrow ideologies. In the ushering in of this New Era he sees Asia playing a dominant role, centred round three of its great nations—India, China, and Russia. The unity of free peoples which he envisages will, however, be a spiritual integration and not a mere geographical unity.

The 'Seven Steps to the New Age', outlined here, consist of a gradual ascent of man through (1) new education, (2) social structures, (3) international structures, (4) and civilization to (5) divine consciousness, (6) God, (7) and life. Every student of the current world situation will agree with the author that 'There is no new life without a new faith—a new illumination from within.' The book is not a development of a thesis, but notes based on the author's reflections and observations on the perplexing contradictions—cultural and political—which have made our epoch what it is.

REBUILDING OUR VILLAGES. BY M. K. GANDHI. *Published by Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. Pages 126. Price Rs. 1-8.*

Gandhiji's ideas and activities are often misconstrued as utopian and anachronistic by not a negligible few. It is not because what he preaches are too idealistic, but because being in the grip of influences other than Indian, we fail to grasp the profound significance of his suggestions. He passionately strives for the material upliftment of the lowliest and the lost, but that is not the last word of his mission. He is moved by an equally earnest zeal for making his countrymen realize the very high and lasting value of strong moral character and spiritual growth. With an unerring clarity he sees that if the world today is heading towards chaos and doom it is precisely because of complete disregard for moral and spiritual values. So, he set about to lay the foundations of peace, social justice, and freedom in the everyday life of the masses, through the teachings of non-violence, which was the salt of his life. Accordingly, he demands a spirit of service and self-sacrifice of every social worker. These qualities, Gandhiji maintains, have a profound spiritual basis. It is only when such workers take the field constructive works will yield a rich harvest. Gandhiji holds that as long as workers are not of tested moral integrity, Development Projects, however nicely drawn up, are sure to be barren of results.

Much of the criticism levelled against Gandhiji's village reconstruction and other ideas, loses its edge when we understand that his objective is not so much the material advancement of the masses as their spiritual unfoldment. This book, ably edited by Bharatan Kumarappa, lays the greatest emphasis on the development of the virtues of self-help, purity, and spirit of sacrifice in every village worker. In a style, simple and direct, he refers to all the important problems of village reconstruction, viz. sanitation, health, education, economy, and lays down the best means of tackling them, in keeping with our ancient traditions. Much attention is being paid today, and quite rightly, to the Community Development Projects and National Extension Services; but we should be on our guard

that in a craze for higher material gains we may not copy the West in all its oddities, at the cost of our cherished heritage. This timely publication is both a warning against our follies and a guide to conducting our projects in the right spirit.

We are indebted to the Navajivan Publishing House for its laudable efforts to carry the message of the saint of Sabarmati to the constructive workers of the land, at an easy price.

B. S. C.

INSPIRED WRITINGS OF HINDUISM. BY THEODORE GOLDSTUCKER. *Published by Sushil Gupta (India) Ltd., 35, Central Avenue, Calcutta 12. Pp. 128. Price 3/-.*

Goldstucker, according to Max Müller, was one of the greatest Sankritists. But we are sorry that nothing of that greatness can be found in this book, except perhaps something of that in his first essay on the Veda, which is followed by three others, viz. The Vedic Literature, The Inspired Writings of Hinduism, and The Evolution of Indian Thought. All these essays were first published between 1859 and 1868. The two essays on the Veda, and the Vedic Literature taken together will give a good idea of the meaning, content, import, and the different aspects of the four Vedas. But the other two, we are constrained to say, betray a lack of insight into the spirit of Indian thought. That is why some of his remarks about the Brahmin priests, and the doctrine of the revelation of the Veda, are not only incorrect, but somewhat objectionable also. Goldstucker is essentially a philologist and historian by training and temperament. He can therefore be depended upon so far as the collection of materials are concerned. Beyond that he is not likely to be accepted by many.

The value of the book, therefore, lies not in Goldstucker's interpretation of the inspired writings of Hinduism but in his account of the Veda and the Vedic Literature. And whatever value the book might have, it is positively in the first two narrative essays, which were not so long within our easy reach. The publishers, therefore, must be thanked for their efforts to make them accessible in a book form.

ANIL KUMAR BANERJEE

PHILOSOPHY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT. BY CHARLES S. SEELY. *Published by Philosophical Library, 15, East 40th Street, New York 16. Pp. xiv & 313. Price \$5.00*

The book sets out to make an analytical study of Idealism and Materialism and the influence of these philosophies on the present world struggle between Capitalism and Socialism. The author has covered the whole field objectively and critically in a manner which should amply serve the immediate purpose of elucidating the ideological conflict.

Technically, the book is indeed admirable, and the author's gift of lucid compression and dispassionate analysis deserves all praise. The author has given a bold and penetrating analysis of the conflicting philosophies and their bearings on the struggle between Capitalism and Socialism—a struggle which is the fundamental fact of this age. The exposition is as cogent as it is provocative, and the author is to be congratulated upon a fine piece of work.

The author's main thesis is also well reasoned and acute. It is this. If capitalists use their weapons intelligently, and increase their use of reform through extension of state guaranteed economic and social security measures, the life of capitalism may yet be extended considerably, even though the present world is slowly and surely moving from a capitalistic base to a socialistic base. Now, this contention has to be judged in the perspective of world history. As the most potent weapons of ideological warfare, the philosophies of Idealism and Materialism have influenced history in the past, and they will finally decide the issue of world peace in the future. It is a pity that these philosophies have not received the attention they deserve. While Idealism has attracted some amount of notice, the study of Materialism is generally neglected and even discouraged, except in communistic countries. In the capitalist countries, Materialism is considered to be 'bad' and 'foreign' philosophy which would corrupt the public mind. But, if world peace is to be preserved and another World War has to be avoided, both Materialism and Idealism must be studied and understood. Mankind has reached a stage at which ideas cannot be destroyed or suppressed by force. With a view to making the two philosophies easily intelligible, the author has explained how and why they developed and also how and why they inspired thought and action in the course of history. He has critically indicated the main arguments by which these rival philosophies are supported, and shown how the present world order is leading to the emergence of socialism as the dominant world ideology. He has frankly admitted that there is much that is useless or obsolete in the philosophy of capitalism, and he has sounded a note of warning that if capitalism will rely only on force and false propaganda, it will ultimately go down much sooner than its votaries could expect.

The author expresses his honest faith that war must and can be prevented on the basis of understanding and adjustment. We concede that more attention is now being devoted to ways and means of preventing the Third World War, but our doubts must remain as to whether the ideological conflict can be resolved without sacrifice of freedom, as the

author seems to suggest. In any case, his reasoning impresses by its transparent honesty and sobriety, and this is enough justification for the book.

DR. NANDALAL CHATTERJI

LECTURES ON SAIVA-SIDDHANTA. BY K. VAJRAVELU MUDALIAR. *Published by Annamalai University, Annamalainagar, South India. Pages 96. Price Rs. 4.*

These lectures were delivered by the learned author in 1951 under the Sri Arulnandi Sivacharya Swamigal Sivajana Siddhiyar Lectureship Endowment founded by His Holiness Sri-la-sri Kasivasi Arulnandi Tambiran of Tiruppanandal Math in South India.

Shaiva-Siddhanta is one of the choicest products of the South Indian, i.e. Dravidian, spiritual genius. But this does not mean that the Aryans and the Dravidians belonged to different ethnic stocks or that either or both came into India from outside. Both were autochthonous in India—Aryans in the North and Dravidians in the South. They were one people and developed an interfused and inter-blended culture which is the Indian culture. Shaiva-Siddhanta and Vedanta are but branches from a single stem. The author shows this clearly by basing his exposition on the four Mahāvākyas (*Prajñānam Brahma, Aham Brahmāsmi, Tat-tvam-asi, Ayam-Ātmā Brahma*).

The author says that Mukti means the soul's being one with Shiva just as it was one with Ānava-mala before liberation. In liberation (Niṣṭhā) the soul identifies itself with the infinite bliss of Shiva and does not then cognize the world. The world is real but changing; God is real and unchanging. Mānikkavāchagar says, in his mystical poem *Tiruvāchakam*, that in divine bliss the soul is one with the Oversoul and yet is separate in fact. *Shivo'ham* is the Bhāvanā (mystic consciousness) of such identity. Shiva is Māyī and Prakṛiti is Māyā. God is formless and yet has form and the Shivalinga represents this Rupa-Arupa truth. God vitalizes Shakti into activity.

The author gives an elaborate exposition of the Panchākshara Mantra (*Namaḥ Shivāya*). The work shows very well the author's erudition and power of exposition.

K. S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI

BENGALI

JAPASŪTRAM. WITH 'KĀRIKĀ' AND BENGALI EXPOSITION. VOLS. I & II. BY SWAMI PRATYAGATMANANDA SARASWATI. *Published by Kalipada Maitra, 77, Jatin Das Road, Calcutta 29. Pp. 291 & 354. Price Rs. 4/- & Rs. 5/-.*

The volumes under review constitute a part of

a big series, expected to be published gradually. They contain original 'sūtras' and explanatory verses (*kārikās*), with elaborate exposition in Bengali, all composed by the author himself. Evidently, the work is a treatise on the philosophy of *japa*; in fact, however, it covers the whole range of spiritual *sādhanā*. *Japa mantra*, according to the author, is not merely concerned with *mantra* but with everything connected with almost all the spiritual practices. *Japa* will continue even up to the final rest in the self. Importance of *japa* as a *sādhanā* cannot be superseded by the importance of meditation or devotion. Rather, what remains incomplete in meditation, *bhakti*, etc. is completed by *japa*. (II. 7 & 103). Of course, *Vedānta* and *Yoga* will differ on this point, since *japa*, according to them, may continue only upto *savitarka samāpatti*. (*Yoga Sūtras* 1.42.) Success of *japa* or any *sādhanā* undoubtedly depends on (1) the knowledge of technique, (2) knowledge of principles, and (3) necessary devotion. We also agree with the author when he says 'Spiritual *sādhanā* mainly depends upon the force-currents emerging from the deepest region of the soul'. (Vol I. 3.)

The author's rational exposition of *mantra* and *yantra* are helpful and illuminating. The natural stir or stress in everything is represented in a natural sound, which is caught by the yogic ear. This intrinsic natural sound is the *mantra*. The supreme sound representing the primal stir of creation is *Pranava* or 'Aum'. All other 'bījas' or *mantras* are in the same way sound-representations of different things or principles. Rhythm is an important factor in *japa*. Undoubtedly *shraddhā* or devotion is most important. But it is not easy to attain devotion. There should be a synthetic tuning among rhythm (action), knowledge, and love (devotion). The science of sound may, to some extent, explain the science of *japa*. But the knowledge of the science of sound, the author admits, is not an indispensable condition for *japa*. The *sūtras* and the verses in Sanskrit are very pregnant and suggestive. The verses on the meditation on 'Shri guru', Ganesha, and Kālī are of great spiritual value. The introductory verses, though highly technical, are important for understanding the

metaphysics of *japa*. The interpretations of the word *japa* have been, of course, strained and arbitrary. Perfect and complete knowledge according to the author, involves both *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* to make it an integral vision (I. 32.). But according to the Advaitist, *adhyāropa* being natural and unending (without the knowledge of the Absolute), perfect knowledge implies the knowledge of the Absolute through *apavāda*, which is a process of annihilation through correct vision. The author himself admits (I. 34.) that the ultimate reality cannot be realized through the knowledge of the finite. The verses (I. 49 & 50.) describing the causes which render *japa* ineffectual are applicable to any kind of spiritual practice. They are the obstacles to the progress of any *sādhanā*.

The second volume, which is mainly engaged in interpreting the seven *vyāhritis* and other technical *mantras* and words of spiritual importance, is also of great metaphysical and spiritual value. Mystic words used in the Vedas or in the Tantras have been interpreted with profound scholarship and wisdom. But the author has done some injustice to the Advaitists by calling 'māyā' 'adhyāsa', etc. only a 'plea' (*phikir*) to seal our lips. (II. 131.) The author should know that it is only the Advaitist who knows and declares that actually there is no language or reason for Advaita. The reasons and theories advanced are only to satisfy our intellect. 'Advaitasiddhi' and 'Gauḍa-Brahmānandī' can serve this purpose, though they may not bring final realization. Are not all the theories and arguments in the *Japasūtra* 'pleas' for our intellectual understanding? Does the *Japasūtra* with all its scholarship and jugglery of interpretations take us far towards perfection? Such a fling does not behove a scholar of synthetic views like the author.

It must, however, be admitted that the work is a great contribution to the philosophical and spiritual literature in Sanskrit-Bengali. The emotional portions of the work are highly inspiring. The spiritual hints are suggestive and helpful. The work is sure to profit those who are interested in philosophy and practice of spirituality.

DINESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARYA, SHASTRI

Corrigendum : In the September issue of the Prabuddha Bharata in the article 'What is Man?' by Shri Jagdish Sahai, there is a misprint on p. 376, left column, line 14 from the top. The word 'dignity' should be 'destiny'.

MAYAVATI CHARITABLE HOSPITAL

REPORT FOR 1954

Origin and Growth: The Advaita Ashrama at Mayavati was started by Swami Vivekananda—far away in the interior of the Himalayas in the Almora District, U.P.—to be a suitable centre for practising and disseminating the Highest Truth in life. The Ashrama has not been, however, out of touch with life and society. The Ashrama has got a publication department which has brought out quite a volume of religious literature; it has been publishing the *Prabuddha Bharata*, a monthly journal in English, dealing with Vedanta and different problems of Indian national life; and now and then it sends out preachers to different parts of India and abroad. The Ashrama also runs a hospital to serve the suffering humanity as embodied divinity, without any distinction of caste or creed or high or low.

The Mayavati Charitable Hospital came into being in response to most pressing local needs. The condition of the villagers, mostly ignorant and poor, is so helpless in times of disease and sickness that it was found necessary to open a regular dispensary in 1903. Since then it has developed into a hospital and has grown in size and importance. Now quite a large number of patients come from a distance of even 50 to 60 miles taking 4 to 5 days for the journey.

The hospital has 13 regular beds. But sometimes arrangements have to be made for a much larger number of indoor patients. People come from such a great distance and in such helpless condition that they have to be accommodated anyhow in improvised beds.

The operation room is fitted with most up-to-date equipments and there is also a small clinical laboratory. There is arrangement for the amusement and recreation of the patients through a gramophone. There is also a small library for those who can read.

The hospital is in charge of a monastic member qualified for the task. There is also a qualified and experienced doctor to assist the work and increase its efficiency.

Work during 1954: The total number of patients treated during the year in the Indoor department was 201 of which 152 were cured and discharged, 26 were relieved, 17 were discharged otherwise or left, and 6 died. In the Outdoor department the total number of patients treated was 12,484 of which 8,447 were new and 4,037 repeated cases.

The visitors' remarks show a great admiration for the tidiness, equipment, efficiency, and usefulness of the hospital.

The hospital has to depend for the most part on the generous public for donations and subscriptions. The Receipts and Payments Account, for the year ended 31st December 1954, shows Rs. 7,721-14-9 as the net expendable receipts and Rs. 7,818-14-1 as the expenditure during the year. The hospital needs funds for its improvement and expansion. Contributions for endowment of beds, one or more, may be made in memory of near and dear ones.

The Management express their grateful thanks for the donations by the generous donors and hope they will extend the same co-operation on which the work of the hospital depends, and thus help to serve the sick and the diseased in this far-away mountain region.

All contributions, however small, will be thankfully received and acknowledged by the undersigned:

SWAMI GAMBHIRANANDA
President, Advaita Ashrama
P.O. Mayavati, Dt. Almora, U.P.