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Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

AT THE FEET OF THE HOLY MOTHER

RECORDED BY PRAVRAJIKA BHARATIPRANA

TRANSLATED BY SRIMATI LEELA MAZUMDAR

Varanasi

Wishing to be near the Mother during the Christmas holidays, Sister Sudhira took some of us to Varanasi. When we went to see the Mother, she spoke of various things and then asked after Jogen-Ma, adding: 'It is so sad that she could not come with us. She was very ill. The Master and the Mother (Goddess) have spared her. I was so anxious about her.'...

We spent a number of days at Varanasi, living in a separate rented house. One evening, as Sister Sudhira and I sat near the Mother, she said: "Whoever has called upon the Master once has nothing more to fear. If one calls upon him repeatedly, he becomes compassionate; and so a devoted attachment comes into being. This love for love's sake should be hidden from all eyes. The *gopis* of Vrajadhāma experienced it; they knew nothing but Kṛṣṇa. Nīlakantha used to sing, "One must guard with care this jewel of love". The Mother herself sang the

song in such a sweet voice that it still rings in my ears. At the end of the song, the Mother said: 'How beautiful are Nīlakantha's songs! The Master loved them. When he was at Dakshineswar, Nīlakantha would sometimes come to him and sing. We were so happy in those days. All sorts of people would come to him. A regular joy-fair seemed to have opened at Dakshineswar.'...

One afternoon, the Mother picked us up at three to go and see the home for old women. As soon as we descended from the carriage on arrival, a young married woman came and took the Mother upstairs. All the old ladies placed flowers at the Mother's feet and bowed to her.

The Mother cried: 'What is this? These are all (holy women) living in retirement at Varanasi; why should they bow to me?'

The young woman said: 'Why, so they should, Mother. You are supporting them.'

'There are Viśvanātha and Annapūrṇā to do

that, my child. I suppose you look after these old ladies?’

‘Yes, Mother, as the Lord wills.’

‘That is good. To care for these homeless old ladies is to care for the Lord. What a fine work these boys (of the Ramakrishna Mission) have built up!’ The Mother asked after each of them, and inspected their rooms before we came back.

One evening, after returning from Sarnath, we went to the Mother’s house and found her lying down with Radhu at her side. When the latter had listened to our description of Sarnath, she cried, ‘Let us go and see it, Mother’.

The Mother said: ‘How can I go, my dear? Have I any feet to carry me sightseeing? I can’t even go to see Viśvanātha. I feel like going, too, when I see these people going, but my feet are useless. How can I go? Now I can do nothing. When my feet were strong, I walked all the way from our village to Dakshineswar. I was a great walker in those days. When we went to Vrindaban after the departure of the Master, I went everywhere on foot.’

One day, we went to the Mother’s house and saw a woman sitting near her with a daughter of about ten or eleven years. The woman was very poor....She said: ‘I am in great distress, Mother. You can just ask them (the monks of the Ramakrishna Mission) to do something for me.’

The Mother replied: ‘I can suggest to them. They beg for money, you know, my dear. Who can keep count of the people they help? Must they not spend as they think best?’ The Mother gave her a rupee and a cloth and said, ‘Have your meal here today’. The Mother was on the terrace, and cooking was being done below. The woman said, ‘My daughter remarks that the cooking is giving out a fine smell’.

The Mother said: ‘Now, hear that! Should one speak like that? It has all to be offered to the Master.’

When *prasāda* was being served, the Mother gave direction for giving them plentifully.... When they had departed, the Mother said: ‘Quite a number of people of this kind come to me and say, “Please ask your boys to help me”. How can I ask them to do anything? Should they not act as they think best? Methinks, my dear, all the poor everywhere have collected here (in Varanasi). How can they cope with it all?...How hard they work! It all depends on His will, my dear. He knows what things He does and how.’

Another evening, when we went to see the Mother, she began to speak of Devabrata Maharaj (Swami Prajnananda) and Sachin (Swami Chinmayananda),¹ who had to go away all of a sudden.

The Mother said: ‘Alas, Devabrata went away today. The government had promised to give help regarding the land next to the Sevashrama, but they objected to their presence; so Rakhal (Swami Brahmananda) asked them to leave. They are innocent as you know, but still they are dogged like this. The poor boys did not even eat before they left.’

Sister Sudhira replied, ‘Brother and Sachin ate at our place, Mother, before leaving’.

The Mother cried: ‘Oh, they did? I am so glad; I was upset about it.’

Sister Sudhira said: ‘Wherever brother goes, they are after him. That is why he says, “Look, here are my in-laws! I must go and meet them”.’

The Mother said: ‘Yes, indeed, the nationalist movement ended long ago, but still they pursue him.’...

Udbodhan

It is Jagaddhātrī *pūjā* today. Devotees have been arriving since morning. They are cele-

¹They were suspected of anti-government activities before renouncing the world. Sister Sudhira was Devabrata’s younger sister.

brating the *pūjā* at Jogen-Ma's house also. She came in the morning and left immediately after inviting the Mother. A disciple came and bowed to her saying, 'Mother, your humble son will be gratified if you graciously visit his home'. The Mother answered: 'Very well, I shall try to go in the evening. Please come then, I shall go if possible.'

We went to Jogen-Ma's place with the Mother at noon and paid our respects to the goddess. The Mother had taken no food all day, because of the *pūjā* at her own (village) home. When everything was over at about four in the afternoon, the Mother partook of the consecrated food and rested for a while.

The disciple then came to fetch her. The Mother said, 'He was so eager that I should go; I must pay them a visit'. The house was not far off. As soon as the Mother stepped down from the carriage, they washed her feet and preserved the water. It was a small, broken-down house. We bowed to the image and went inside. . . . An old lady began to talk to her: 'Mother, please bless my son. He is so eager to celebrate this *pūjā*, but he has no proper house or anything. He has managed somehow all by himself.'

The Mother answered: 'He has done it all very nicely, indeed. Now that the Mother of the world has come to your home, your son will have his house and everything else. Your son is a good man and very devout.' . . .

After we had returned, Nalini began to complain: 'What a house, Mother; there was hardly any room to sit. How ever did they manage to celebrate the *pūjā* in such a house?'

The Mother answered: 'What more could they do? They are poor, but they have brought the Mother to their home. He is a Brahmin and devout. The Mother in Her mercy has set foot in his home.' . . .

The Mother was sitting in her room another evening. The Master's disciple Purna Babu was very ill; there was no hope. His mother had

arrived. As soon as she saw her, the Mother cried: 'There she is, pestering me everyday to make him well! I know he won't live; still I have to say he will recover, only to comfort them.' . . . To the old lady she said: 'What can I do, mother? Ask the Master. He will make him well.'

'You can do it if you like, Mother.'

'No, I can only let him know.'

Later, she said to us: 'The Master told them that he would not live if he married. She wouldn't listen to him, but married the boy off for fear of his becoming a *sannyāsīn*.'

A few days later, the Mother, Jogen-Ma, and the others were resting after evening prayers. The Mother was dozing off, when she said, 'So Purna is dead, Jogen?' - Jogen-Ma was astonished: 'Who told you so, Mother?' 'I was asleep, and thought I heard someone say so.' Jogen-Ma then said: 'Yes, he passed away in the evening. They did not inform you.' That evening, she spoke only of Purna Babu and grieved for him.

When the Master was ill at Dakshineswar, the Mother had cared for him. Later, the disciples brought him over to Calcutta for treatment. At this time, one day, Golap-Ma had casually remarked to Jogen-Ma, 'I think the Master is displeased with the Mother, and has gone away to Calcutta'. When the Mother heard this from Jogen-Ma, she took a carriage to Calcutta and, going to the Master, wept and said, 'Is it true that you came away here, because you are displeased with me?' The Master asked, 'Who said so?' 'Golap.' The Master was angry: 'What! She dares to say these things and make you weep? Does she not know who you are? Where is she? Let her come.' Then the Mother grew calm again and returned to Dakshineswar. Later, when Golap-Ma came to the Master, he rebuked her severely: 'What did you say to make her weep? Don't you know who she is? Go immediately and beg for her forgiveness.'

Golap-Ma immediately walked all the way to

Dakshineswar and wept before the Mother: 'The Master is angry with me. I did not realize what I was saying.' The Mother said nothing, but laughed and patted her three times on the back crying, 'O Golap! O Golap! O Golap!'; and Golap-Ma was immediately comforted. She herself told me this story. . . .

In 1918, Golap-Ma fell seriously ill. It was then that I heard the Mother praying to the Master: 'O Master, make her well. I cannot live here without Golap and Jogen. How can I stay here without them?'

Then she said to us: 'Jogen and Golap know

about all the stages of my life. Golap has no inhibitions, no conceit. And look at Jogen. In those days, she would fall into such deep meditation that, if a fly settled inside her eye, she was not aware of it. Those who pray for them are blessed indeed.' . . .

One evening, the Mother said to us: 'Do you know, everyone says that I worry about Radhu all the time, that I am too deeply attached to her? If there was not this attachment, this body would not have survived the Master. It is for the achievement of his own purpose that he has caused this attachment. When I grow indifferent to her, this body will not last.'

LEST WE FORGET OURSELVES

Na karmaṇā na prajayā dhanena tyāgenaike amṛtatvamānaśuḥ—Not by work, not by progeny, not by wealth (they have attained immortality). Some have attained immortality by renunciation.

—*Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*, XII.14.

I

A foreign dignitary who visited India a couple of years ago, after going round the country and seeing her various nation-building activities, said that the whole of India looked like a huge factory! Evidently, he must have been impressed by the giant strides that free India has taken in her industrial development during the short period of twelve years. True, anyone going round the country and witnessing the progress that India is making in building up a new economic pattern and a new social order is sure to be profoundly impressed by what he sees. There is an upsurge of a new life in every sphere, and vast developments are rapidly changing the face of India. In her two five-year plans, she has aimed at and executed large undertakings, the fruits of which are either already being reaped or will be reaped very soon. Adequate attention is being bestowed on almost every aspect of our socio-economic life; and within the limited resources at the

disposal of the nation, schemes of work are being formulated and executed in gradual stages.

Ten or twelve years in the life of a nation is but a small period. But what has been achieved in this brief period, particularly viewed against the background of what India was on the eve of independence—with partition of the country and its tragic consequence of large-scale refugee relief and rehabilitation on the one hand, and the immense problem of Kashmir on the other—viewed against this background, it really called forth tremendous courage, vision, and ambition on the part of those who were guiding the destinies of the country. Starting with the most basic needs of our common people, viz. food, cloth, and shelter, up to the highly advanced pursuits of scientific research, everything is being directed towards the one purpose of conferring better material benefits to the nation, and is being undertaken with care and zest.

One may turn any side, or go to any part of

the country, one will come across either a huge multi-purpose project, or a vast irrigation system, or a large-scale industrial enterprise, or an immense factory, where hundreds and thousands of people are busily engaged in our national reconstruction. Indeed, India looks like a huge factory!

One's heart is filled with joy to see that the nation is throbbing with a new life, and intense activity is visible everywhere. Men and money are being freely used to explore and exploit the natural resources that are scattered over the hills and planes, forests and fields of our vast territory. Life-giving waters are being brought to thirsty deserts, and man-made mountains are being built up to harness the irrigation-cum-power potential of mighty rivers, by the ingenuity of man. Fast communications have developed connecting the different parts of the country, bringing people closer to each other, and opening up wider opportunities to know each other better for mutual benefit and exchange of ideas. The political unity of the nation is being tangibly felt and visibly seen in the context of the new change that is taking place all over the country, notwithstanding the differences that are there in our regional peculiarities and characteristics.

Compared to what the country had been in pre-independence days, the progress that India has made today is something that even a robust optimist would have hesitated to conjure up. A country whose material resources had been systematically drained away, leaving her millions on the verge of poverty, has begun to march ahead with faith and determination, and is taking long strides towards progress and prosperity. Hardly twelve years have passed; and within this short period, her all-round progress has been phenomenal, which has impressed the people all over the world. India has become, as it were, a model for many under-developed countries in Asia, Africa, and South-East Asia, which have become politically free only recently. India has men and women of talents and vast natural resources. What she requires now,

so far as her material advancement is concerned, is the proper and intelligent use of those talents and resources by means of honest and hard labour.

India is on the march. After a long period of political hibernation, which was forced on her by historical circumstances, she has emerged out to take her rightful place in the comity of nations and to contribute her mite to the general welfare and prosperity of mankind.

Looking at this physical aspect of India, we feel justly proud. It is a very hopeful and impressive picture of India, indeed. It does not require a prophet to foresee that, at the pace she is advancing today, she will very soon become economically viable and stable, and her people can look forward to a bright future so far as their material needs are concerned. That is assured by the way the plans are becoming successful and yielding fruits.

II

At this juncture, when every effort is being directed in full blast towards her national development, India cannot afford to neglect the need of the spiritual regeneration of her people as well. This is the time for India to pause and think. She must lay due stress on the spiritual values to be pursued by her people, and plan for their spiritual growth *pari passu* with their material development. For, if this aspect of her reconstruction is overlooked, and all the energies of the nation are bent only in the direction of the social and economic aspects, then India, too, may go the way of the other countries which have pursued only material values and neglected the moral and the spiritual. In the absence of the soul-purifying influence that flows from the pursuit of spiritual values, their social body has become afflicted with diverse kinds of unwholesome and debasing evils.

India should take care that those evils do not creep into her body social, by working intelligently and with foresight. The spectacle

that the other countries present seems to point out that if one concentrates one's energies only on the acquisition of material wealth and physical comfort, one's soul becomes impoverished and weak. As the country advances outwardly, making enormous progress and amassing great wealth, its soul becomes poorer in spiritual worth, and fails to offer succour and solace to her people in times of distress and difficulty. On the one side, there is affluent prosperity flowing over their land; and on the other, there is the distressing impoverishment of the spiritual essence in man.

In the background of such a situation, when we turn to the picture of India that is in the making, a few questions would naturally arise in our mind. Is it that the material regeneration of a country must invariably lead to the moral degeneration of its people? Is the latter inevitable in the context of the former? Should it be that, as a nation progresses materially, evils should creep into individual and social lives as a matter of course? Must the two always coexist and go together hand in hand? Cannot man acquire wealth and happiness and at the same time be moral, just, and pure? Cannot a society or a nation materially prosper, with all scientific knowledge and technological advancement, and at the same time be free from all the moral and social evils? What is the answer?

India's answer is and ought to be that such an ideal of life, where material prosperity can be combined with justice, morality, and equity, is possible, and should be the aim of every individual and every society. That had always been the aim of her life, national as well as individual. She had always held the view that man, while he pursues the social and economic values for building up a healthy and prosperous condition of life for himself and his fellow-beings, should acquire everything through just and fair means. Morality was the basis of the social structure. Anything that was not done according to the accepted code of moral conduct was looked down upon and censured in no un-

certain terms. The whole of society would come down upon that group or that individual who resorted to unjust and immoral ways to grow rich. The rod of *dharma* (*daṇḍa*) was ever watchful, and regulated the conduct of men and women. The entire scheme of life was so planned and directed that the sense of justice and fair play grew spontaneously in the minds of men and women. And for the recalcitrant, the disloyal, and the wayward, the rod was not spared, and the hand of law came down upon them heavily, inexorably, and without mercy.

Herein lies the lesson that India has to relearn in the context of what is happening at present in the fields of her social and economic development. If she is to grow up according to her genius, she has to recapture those ideals which have sustained her through thousands of years. If she remains true to those ideals, she will not only grow more prosperous, but will also have a future more glorious than the past. If, unfortunately, she forgets those ideals and values which have coursed through her veins for centuries, she will cease to be herself with her own characteristic way and goal of life; she is not going to be the India of what her great sages and seers had visualized her to be. We must therefore be very vigilant, lest we forget ourselves.

Amidst the cloud of dust that has been raised by the intense activity that is going on in full swing all over the country, and in the enthusiasm and ambition of our leaders to provide better conditions of life for our millions as quickly as possible, the vision of the nation as regards the basic approach to life's problems and attitudes seems to have become somewhat blurred. But when the dust settles down—and it must settle down soon—when there is time and opportunity for calm thinking about both the past and the future of India, it is our firm belief that the nation will not proceed on a wrong path, but will realize her ancient values and restore them to their respective places of respect and importance.

In this important work of national reconstruction, in which we must aspire to bring about a harmony between modern scientific attitude, mood, and temper with the spiritual genius of India, we can take a valuable lesson from the experience of the so-called scientifically advanced and highly industrialized countries of the world—a lesson to avoid the pitfalls in which they find themselves trapped. The experience of others may help us in two ways. If their experience has been good and made them better morally and spiritually, we can emulate them. If the contrary is the case, we can avoid the wrong steps taken by them and be wary with regard to our plans and programmes.

What is their experience, as we see it? In those highly industrialized and scientifically advanced countries, if one only dives deep into the hearts of earnest men and women, one would discover that their souls are seized with a sense of despair and despondency. There is a deep urge in their hearts to get at an unknown source from which would flow spiritual solace and mental peace. They have had worldly goods to their fill; they have been floating in the river of plenty. There has been material affluence, and ample provision has been made for their physical enjoyment. Every conceivable item of joy and comfort, which would contribute to their physical well-being and pleasure, has been devised and provided to them. But still there is anguish and anxiety; for man does not live by bread alone. He has a soul deep within him. No amount of physical comfort or enjoyment can ever bring joy and satisfaction to the spiritually hungry soul. A cry of despair is rising to the sky from the hearts of those that are spiritually starved. The fire of materialism is raging in their hearts. Having had the benefits of the modern scientific civilization to their fill, and keenly feeling their spiritual bankruptcy, they are searching for those values which would bring them mental peace and spiritual solace. They are now turning to those perennial sources which have

kept alive an unbroken flow of spiritual knowledge and tradition.

Such is the experience of those who have been pursuing material values during the last one hundred years or so. India has been a direct witness to this painful drama; that should open her eyes now, when she is concentrating her energies on the development of her material condition. She should learn a lesson from the experience of others, and avoid the dangers that they have faced. The good that they have achieved is certainly welcome to India, but the pitfalls they have encountered and the errors they have committed must be eye-openers to her. The good must certainly be copied; even so the evil has to be avoided. From the suffering that they have passed through, we can learn an invaluable lesson. We have to guard against moral depravity on the one side, and spiritual poverty on the other, which, when a nation suffers from them, lead to insecurity in society and immorality in individual lives.

III

Destiny has marked out India for a spiritual role. In the task of bringing peace and solace to the spiritually hungry, India has a duty to perform. That has been her age-long tradition—to be a beacon light for all wandering and wavering souls. That role she has to play again, and time and again, as in the past, after getting herself suffused and saturated with spiritual ideas and ideals. That is the foremost task before the nation; and India can ill afford to forget it, while she is working for the economic regeneration of her people. She must lay the greatest stress on the moral and spiritual development of her people, and not simply imitate others seeing only their outward success.

Imitation becomes praiseworthy if it ennoble the person who emulates. Merely copying others, being attracted by external glamour or success, and at the cost of one's own inner worth and heritage, will lead to one's self-destruction. This is as much true of a nation as it is of an individual. A nation cannot go

against the grains of its genius. The cumulative force of the strivings and successes, ambitions and aspirations, spiritual and temporal, of men and women for hundreds of years becomes crystallized as the nation's genius, its precious heritage. Successive generations cherish it and strive to consolidate it by living it in their own lives. That is how the national individuality and its prestige are preserved by the children of the soil. Anything that goes against the grains of the national tradition and culture, and disturbs the even flow of the stream of the national life, must be discarded as unnational or even anti-national. We must be guarded against its silent infiltration into our path, causing obstruction and diversion and, maybe, even our complete destruction.

Every nation has a soul; and the soul-force of the nation expresses itself in a way characteristically its own. It will not and cannot express in any other way. The characteristic disposition of India is for religion and spirituality. Spirituality is her backbone, the very basis of her national existence. So long as that is intact, so long as that is in perfect working condition, no other ideology or value will upset her own ancient values. The day that central core of her being, her very soul, becomes affected, or impotent due to lack of proper nourishment, that day will begin her downfall, which may ultimately lead her to total ruin. Will that be allowed to happen? 'Shall India die? Then from the world all spirituality will be extinct; all moral perfection will be extinct; all sweet-souled sympathy for religion will be extinct; all ideality will be extinct; and in its place will reign the duality of lust and luxury as the male and female dieties, with money as its priest; fraud, force, and competition its ceremonies; and the human soul its sacrifice. Such a thing can never be' (*The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, Vol. IV. p. 294).

India is the land of religion and spirituality; it is the land of gentleness, piety, and goodness. It is the land of renunciation, service, and self-sacrifice. Her glory in the world will shine in

full brilliance as long as her banner of the spirit is held aloft before the world. It is not through work, wealth, or power that she can command the respect of the world. Even if she tries to, she cannot do that. In the realm of the spirit, she is wise with age, and carries in her soul a veritable storehouse of spiritual knowledge, which is almost inexhaustible. Her contribution to the world was, is, and will always be precisely in this realm. As it has been beautifully said, in the harmony of nations, the note of India is religion and spirituality.

If Indians today feel proud of their heritage of spiritual culture, if they feel that they should prove themselves to be the true descendants of the sages of India, then it is incumbent on every man and woman of our generation to take up the cause of our national ideals and actively work for them not only by propagating them, but by practising them in their own lives.

IV

In what has been said in the foregoing sections, it is not our intention to show that we are against modern scientific advancement or industrialization that is growing apace in the country, much less against the ways and means that are being adopted for the amelioration of the economic and the social condition of the masses of our countrymen. Far from that. The purpose of our present discussion is something entirely different, and we would emphasize that point with all the force at our command. To state it briefly, it is this. While India is taking long strides in her socio-economic development, spending so much of her energy and using so much of money and material towards that end, when millions of her people are engaged in this vast experiment of building up a new India, let us be warned against forgetting her very soul, which preserves her, sustains her, and adds lustre to the life of her people.

The task before the nation therefore is one which is to be accomplished not by governmental agency, not by politicians either. It is to be silently and steadily built in individual

homes by the individuals themselves. It is the building up of the character of the nation, and helping the growing generation to shape its life according to the spiritual and moral patterns that have been set before India by our forefathers. Unless the soul of India is preserved intact, giving spiritual nourishment to it in adequate measure, no amount of wealth or material good can help her to stand erect and discharge her duty towards mankind.

The responsibility for this spiritual regeneration lies on the shoulders of every son and daughter of India. The spiritual battery of the nation needs to be recharged again by the lives and activities of her children. When she herself has regained sufficient spiritual strength, she can supply power and energy to all others who need her spiritual strength and enlightenment. This is the bounden duty of every true Indian today. He or she should realize that responsibility and contribute his or her share in the moral and spiritual regeneration of India. Let us not forget what India expects from each one of us.

Let us industrialize our country by all means, and let us get all the boons that science and technology can confer on us. They will all certainly contribute to the material well-being of

the teeming millions of our countrymen. Let a cheer of joy and happiness come on their face, and let them feel that they, too, are proud Indians with a great past at their back. Let them feed themselves well, and clothe themselves properly. But that is not to be an end in itself. It is not the end and aim of human life, no, not at least from the Indian point of view. Seeking only physical sustenance and pleasure is comparable only to the existence of an animal. That is not the goal of man according to the Indian concept. Man has a divine spark in him. Man is divine. That divinity of man should come into play even in the affairs of the world. It is the full manifestation of that divinity that is the goal of man. It is that goal that should inspire man in his life and inform all his activities in this world. All his pursuits and accomplishments must be subservient to this paramount aim of human life. India must work towards that end: to arouse every man to a spiritual consciousness, not only her own children, but all human beings. To raise man from the physical and animal level to the level of a divine being is the mission of India. That is her watchword. May we not forget it; may we remember what is our clear duty towards India and the world.



TRUTH

BY DR. P. S. SASTRI

If the validity of a cognition is determined by something external to it, this something can be the knowledge of the object, or the knowledge of the efficacy of the object to evoke an activity, or the agreement of this knowledge with the object. A cognition whose validity is not determined by itself is subject to doubt; and a doubtful cognition cannot lead to any activity. Moreover, a purely external criterion for the validity and invalidity as well would

mean that there is some knowledge, and that it becomes at a later time valid or invalid. And a knowledge which is neither true nor false can be apprehended only when it can be self-contradictory.¹

One can try to overcome this problem by taking up a new line. A cognition is valid if it does not come into conflict with other expe-

¹ PPV., 102.4-5.

riences at different places and times, if it does reveal the nature of the object, and if it can give rise to a successful activity. It can give rise to an activity only through the apprehension of the object.²

But if the validity is known externally, what is this external factor? It cannot be the knowledge of that which brought forth this cognition, for we can rely on the latter only when we are definite that it is valid. To find out that it is valid, we need another and another. This is a *regressus ad infinitum*.³ What can we say about the validity of an inferential cognition? If it were to depend on a perceptual apprehension, the latter would require a successful activity; and an activity to be successful requires a valid cognition. Thus we are back at the initial enquiry. If the validity were to depend on another inferential cognition, it would lead to a regress. To avoid this difficulty, even the realist accepts the view that an inferential cognition is valid in and by itself.⁴ Such a view is necessitated by the fact that an inferential cognition originates from the perception of the middle term; and the middle term is necessarily and inseparably related to the minor.⁵

We cannot say that a cognition and its validity arise together. If one is the cause of the other, they cannot coexist.⁶ If we accept an external criterion, does the validity arise after the emergence of knowledge? It cannot be, since by the time we know the validity the cognition to which it refers has ceased to be. There is nothing to which this validity can be related. On the contrary, the apprehension is the same whether it is a true or an untrue cognition; and prior to this apprehension, there can be no ascertainment of the validity. And a cognition

which is neither valid nor invalid cannot bring forth any activity.⁷

It may be argued that a cognition is a cognition of something externally existing. As the cognition of the external, how can it be a cognition of itself? Another cognition may cognize it as being a cognition, but not as being valid. Thus a perceptual cognition cannot be brought forth to invalidate an inferential one. Perception can at best reveal the existence of the middle term directly. It apprehends the given, not the validity or the truth of the given in an inferential cognition. This perception as referring to a different time, place, or condition can reveal the falsity or truth of the present cognition. As far as the given is concerned, these differences of time, place, and condition do not enter into the present perceptual act.⁸ This in essence would mean that a cognition cannot determine its own validity, and that it need not necessarily be valid knowledge.

If a cognition were to give rise also to its own validity, this validity would be a property of knowledge. How is this property to be related to knowledge? As one having a property and also being liable to be negated, this property cannot have an internal relation. But a conjunctive relation would transform validity to the status of knowledge. Moreover, validity cannot be something that emerges at any specific time or place, since its very emergence is an impossibility. If it emerges, is it due to the factors involved in the knowledge-situation? Then these factors give rise to knowledge which must be equated with valid knowledge. If it emerges from the knowledge itself, then it cannot establish the validity of its own ground. It cannot emerge from other factors not presented in a cognition.

It may be argued that the factors that give rise to the valid knowledge do also give rise to invalid knowledge. Then how are we justified in declaring one to be valid and the other

² See NVTT., 5.16-19; 22-23.

³ PPV., 102.5-6.

⁴ VVN., 165-6; NVTT., 5.21.

⁵ See NVTT., 12.21-25; P., 61.1-2; 112.2-3; 118.1-119.7. cf. TP., 125.11-126.3; TC., 277-9; 282-4.

⁶ PPV., 102.12-13.

⁷ PPV., 102.6-9; VPS., 101.

⁸ B., 852.4-7.

to be invalid? If it is said that certain defects enter into an invalid cognition, one can retort by saying that a valid cognition depends on the absence of these very defects, and that to this extent its validity depends on something external.⁹ And if the validity arises from certain factors involved in the cognition, we should know that these factors are valid. Their validity likewise involves the validity of something else. This regress cannot be avoided.¹⁰

A valid means of cognition must necessarily refer to an object;¹¹ and its validity depends on the absence of doubt and error in the resulting cognition.¹² This absence of doubt and error cannot be determined by any other means of cognition; for, if it were so, we need a third cognition to establish the validity of the second. A valid cognition is strong in itself to reveal its validity.¹³

But we know that we have a knowledge of the objects only when we employ the means of cognition. To know that perception and inference are the ways of knowing, I need another means of cognition, and still another. In this way the cognitive process would be unknowable. If the validity of a means of cognition is proved by another means of cognition, the validity of the latter requires a third; and this leads to an infinite *regressus*.¹⁴ This difficulty can be overcome when we admit that the validity of a cognition is apprehended by a similar cognition. Though the perception of an object depends on the eye, the eye as such does not lead us to a regress. Likewise, a cognition can determine the validity of another. But somewhere we have to admit the self-evident validity of some cognition or other.¹⁵

If a means of cognition is said to be valid by

itself and in itself, the same may be said of the objects also, since the objects and the means of cognition involve one another. In such a case, we need not recognize any means of cognition. The objects will be self-apprehensible. And the world of things devoid of a means of cognition will be rationally unintelligible.¹⁶

This may be true. But I take recourse to the means of cognition only when I am to affirm or deny something.¹⁷ If affirmation and denial are not the only ways of expressing an experience, and the law of the excluded middle has no validity, then the means of cognition are futile. Even if we admit that there are ways of knowing like perception and inference, how do we know that these are means of cognition and that these are valid?

Vātsyāyana advances the illustration of light on the question of the validity of the means of cognition.¹⁸ Light, as an element in the perceptual apprehension, is a valid means enabling the perception of the apprehensible entities. This light, in its turn, is cognized by another perception. Since the absence of light prevents us from seeing things, and since its presence reveals them, we take the presence of light as an essential condition of visibility. Likewise, we can know only through perception that perception gives us the apprehension of things.¹⁹ Light is not only visible, but is the cause of the visibility of other entities. And the various valid means of cognition are not only cognizable by themselves, but are also the causes that give rise to the valid knowledge of objects. In other words, every means of cognition is both a means and an object.²⁰ These means of cognition reveal the objects and give us knowledge. They are the means employed by a consciousness for purposes of knowledge.²¹

⁹ cf. TP., 115.

¹⁰ PPV., 102.9-10; VPS., 101.

¹¹ PVA., 20.30.

¹² Kir., II.318.4 ff.; NM., I.25.21-22.

¹³ B., 203.10.

¹⁴ NBV., 2.1.17; Vi.Vy., 31, 32.

¹⁵ NVTT., 370.3-9.

¹⁶ NBV., 2.1.18.

¹⁷ Vi.Vy., 30.

¹⁸ NBV., 116-119.

¹⁹ Vi.Vy., 34; NV., 199.8-11; NVTT., 371.5-372.16.

²⁰ NBV., 117.7-15.

²¹ NBV., 119.4 ff.

This argument raises a difficulty. When there is no light, the objects in a dark room are not seen. But they are seen when they are illuminated by light. If fire is self-illuminating, it must originally be darkness or be enveloped by darkness. Otherwise, it is meaningless to speak of the fire illuminating itself. If fire were luminous from the very beginning, it would be impossible to say that it can illuminate itself.²²

When we speak of the intrinsic validity of a cognition that is not contradicted later on, what do we mean by it? Is the cognition valid because it is a cognition, or because it is a valid cognition? In the former case, even an erroneous cognition would become a valid one. The latter is begging the question. One may argue that cognition not only gives the knowledge of an object, but also cognizes its own validity. In such a case, the cognition must be capable of cognizing its own possible invalidity; and then no one can mistake a thing to be something else.²³ If a cognition is self-revealing like fire, and if it also reveals the objects at the same time, this cannot be its character. Fire burns other objects, and yet it does not burn itself. Then how can a cognition give the knowledge of objects and also of itself? If fire is self-revealing and also other-revealing, darkness, too, must not only hide the objects, but also hide itself; and then there would be no darkness.²⁴ The erroneous cognition must then suppress itself, as it suppresses the nature of the object. If there is no darkness in the fire, where is the darkness that can be destroyed by fire? If they coexist, one is not removed by the other; and if there is no darkness, there is nothing called revealing the objects.²⁵ Likewise, it would be impossible for a cognition to reveal itself and the objects.

One may argue that a cognition is like fire. When fire is produced, just in that very moment

it can illuminate the objects. But then fire should reach darkness to dispel it; and if it does not dispel darkness, we cannot say that it is shining.²⁶ If fire can dispel darkness even without reaching darkness, then a fire which is at one specific place must remove darkness from every place.²⁷ Likewise, if a means of cognition establishes its own validity, it cannot have any relation to anything else. But a cognition is a cognition of something. It has a relation and as such it cannot be valid in itself. If a means of cognition is valid without a reference to the objects, it is not a means of cognition. It would be useless. Every means of cognition is directed to an object, and it gives rise to a knowledge of that. The cognition and the object are related to one another. If the cognition is self-revealing and other-revealing, and if it is reciprocally related to the object, is the object cognized first? If it is not cognized first, the cognition cannot be other-revealing; and if it is cognized first, the cognition is not self-revealing. That is, there is no relation when there is no cognition, and the relation is useless if the object is already revealed. Then the means of cognition are ineffective. When the objects are revealed by cognition, there is no need to employ the means of cognition. Further, the means of cognition are those that refer to the objects. This implies that the objects already exist prior to the operation of the means of cognition. The means of cognition only enable us to know them. As such the objects have no necessary relation to a cognition, and the cognition cannot therefore have the other-revealing character.²⁸

A means of cognition then cannot establish its own validity, nor is it established by another object or means of cognition.²⁹ On the contrary, the validity depends on the certainty or necessity. It is a necessity which compels me

²² Vi.Vy., 35; PDS., 8

²³ P., 50.8-13.

²⁴ Vi.Vy., 36-37

²⁵ Vi.Vy., 38; cf. MMK., 7.8 ff.; MMV., 47-49.

²⁶ Vi.Vy., 39.

²⁷ Vi.Vy., 40; PDS., 9.

²⁸ Vi.Vy., 41-45.

²⁹ Vi.Vy., 52.

to judge in one specific way as soon as I apprehend something. That is, there must be the abiding identity of consciousness which can have the same cognition at any time with reference to the same; and there must be the identity of the object also. The necessity that compels me to hold to the identity of the given is the logical ground.³⁰ It is this necessity that characterizes all *a priori* knowledge, all knowledge even of the mathematical truths.³¹

It has become customary among realists to argue that a proposition is anything that is believed, disbelieved, doubted, or supposed.³² The proposition being an object proposed in thought cannot be confused with a thinker's attitudes like assertion, doubt, or supposition.³³ Even the proposition being the meaning of a sentence or statement, the realist cannot apply these attitudes to the former. When I make a statement, I do not make it by way of supposition. I believe a person, but I do not suppose a person. I can believe or suppose that which is not a fact. The realist's attitude presupposes an external or extrinsic criterion, which we have found to be untenable. The terms true and false, as we have seen, are applicable to reality and through reality to thought, not to the assertion. We can apply them to the assertion only when we admit that this assertion is an expression of thinking about a fact. In other words, these terms are not the qualifications of a proposition only or of the states of mind. They refer to the judgement only, in so far as the judgement refers to and defines reality.³⁴

Valid knowledge may be taken to be that which is not previously apprehended and which is not open to contradiction or negation. At the same time, it is definite, unambiguous knowl-

edge about an object.³⁵ When we have a knowledge of time, this can be a valid knowledge only if time is an object. I cognize an object for several moments. Am I not having a known knowledge at the second and subsequent moments? This difficulty can be overcome when we admit that at every moment the object is that which is qualified by that moment. With the change of the moment, there is a change in the qualification of the object.³⁶ But one can retort by saying that what he cognizes throughout is the same identical jar, not a series of exclusive moments. This retort is valid in so far as cognition is not momentary. As long as we are cognizing an object, so long there is only one epistemic activity and therefore only a single cognition; for an epistemic activity continues to remain till that which can displace it arises.³⁷ Thus when I cognize a jar, there is an epistemic activity which is an expression of consciousness; and in this activity is gathered the knowledge of the object as an image or impression. The image or impression remains as one throughout the time of the cognition. Different persons can have a valid apprehension of the same object, even though one apprehends what the other has cognized.³⁸

It is the distinct cognition of an object that completes a cognitive act, since thereby the object is apprehended. When I cognize the object a second time, I have already some impression left by it as my recollection; and this second cognition includes memory in it. Since memory can give rise to an invalid cognition,³⁹ the second cognition does not claim absolute validity. It is liable to be contradicted. As such the apprehended is not the object of a valid cognition. A valid cognition refers to the hitherto unapprehended.⁴⁰ Then the inferential

³⁰ cf. Sigwart, I.240.

³¹ See Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of Immortality*, pp. 46-47; Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, chapter 7.

³² See Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 33.

³³ cf. Johnson, I.6.

³⁴ See Bosanquet, *Essentials*, pp. 67-69.

³⁵ VVN., 5.

³⁶ See VP., 20.

³⁷ VP., 26-27; cf. NVTT., 21; TC., 379 ff.; VP., 28.

³⁸ cf. AKJ., I.245.

³⁹ See NM., I.21.15-16.

⁴⁰ cf. NBT., 3.21-4.4.

cognition cannot be valid, since it is based on the perceptual apprehension of the coexistence or association of the logical reason and the predicate.⁴¹

Statements which contradict one another cannot be valid.⁴² Such a contradiction can admit only two alternatives, one of which may be true. But consider the statements: 'The sun rises in the east' and 'The sun does not rise in the east'. These two are mutually exclusive, and yet neither is scientifically true. These instances reveal that the criterion of non-contradiction can determine the truth of a given fact only when it is not a formal criterion. Even then, this criterion involves us in a number of difficulties.

This criterion is a veiled metaphor. (a) A knowledge is non-contradicted when another cognition of the same object gives rise to the same knowledge. (b) It is non-contradicted when there is no contradictory apprehension arising from a different cognition. (c) It is non-contradicted when it has an object which necessarily gives that knowledge. Let us consider the first interpretation. I look at a book. This perception extends over a certain time, and I have a stream of cognitions. The first cognition of the first moment notices the book. The subsequent moments give me a more and more determinate knowledge. Each subsequent moment does not give me the same knowledge which I have in the first moment. There may not be any explicit contradiction, but there is no identical knowledge. The second interpretation, too, does not help much. Suppose I am erroneously apprehending nacre to be silver. I know then that it is only silver. If I have not arrived at the negation of this cognition, I will have the same knowledge whenever I cognize it. The person having jaundice may repeat his cognitions, and no cognition contradicts another.⁴³ The third interpretation

would render valid even the cognitions in a dream.⁴⁴ This criterion can at best impose a limit. The knowledge that we have from the operation of a means of cognition can be valid only within finite existence.⁴⁵

When a cognition that is not liable to be contradicted is said to be valid, this criterion only implies that it is impossible to have or to think its contradictory. It is one which cannot be contradicted.⁴⁶ It does not mean that we do not find any contradiction.⁴⁷ In other words, the criterion of non-contradiction is an *a priori* principle. We take a cognition to be valid by 'the immediate consciousness of evident truth which accompanies necessary thought',⁴⁸ and we become certain of its validity by our inability to think that its opposite is possible. The valid judgement is that which is necessary and possible. It is a necessity that compels thought to accept it. Such a necessity implies the principle of ground and consequence. An affirmation of the ground necessarily implies the affirmation of its consequences, and a denial of the consequence means the denial of the ground. This principle is the same as that of non-contradiction. In the light of this principle, a judgement is valid if it expresses logical necessity,⁴⁹ and then alone can it be objective and universal. The necessity of a proposition arises from the ground on which it is based and to which it refers. Such a necessity may or may not be experientially certified. In the former case it is formally certified; it has an *a priori* validity. The latter has a contingent validity.⁵⁰ By insisting on the principle of non-contradiction, the Advaita implies a theory of truth which may be broadly

⁴¹ cf. PVK., 25.5-6.

⁴² B., 435.4.

⁴³ KKK., 252.

⁴⁴ KKK., 254.9-11.

⁴⁵ VP., 37.

⁴⁶ VVN., 167; cf. SV., 1.1.2.61; Sigwart, I.185.

⁴⁷ See Manorathanandi on PV., I.4.

⁴⁸ Sigwart, I.14.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, I.189.

⁵⁰ cf. Johnson, I.59-60.

spoken of as coherence. That which is not contradicted belongs to the totality of coherent knowledge. We can judge an experience as true only when we know that it is not capable of being contradicted; and we can have such a knowledge only when we are certain that there is a necessity that makes the present knowledge true. This necessity is ultimately grounded in the self-evident character of self-consciousness.⁵¹

⁵¹ See Mill, *Logic*, 4; cf. *New Realism*, 66-67; Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, chapter 11; *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 72.

[Abbreviations used in the footnotes: AKJ.—*Anekāntajayapatāka*; B.—*Bhāmātī*; Kir.—*Kiraṇāvali*; KKK.—*Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādyā*; MMK.—*Mādhyaṃaka Kārikā*; MMV.—*Prasannapāda* on MMK.; NBT.—*Nyāya Bindu Ṭikā*; NBV.—*Nyāya Bhāṣya*; NM.—*Nyāyamañjarī*; NV.—*Nyāya Vārtika*; NVT.—*Tātparya Ṭikā*; P.—*Pariśuddhi*; PPV.—*Vivaraṇam*; PVA.—*Pramāṇavārtikālaṅkāra*; PVK.—*Karṇakagoṃin* on *Pramāṇa Vārtika*; SV.—*Śloka Vārtika*; TC.—*Tattva Cintāmaṇi*; TP.—*Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha; VP.—*Vedānta Paribhāṣā*; VPS.—*Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha*; VVN.—*Nyāya Kaṇikā*; Vi.Vy.—*Vigraha Vyāvartanī*.]

THE CONCEPT OF NISKĀMA-KARMA

BY DR. ROMA CHAUDHURI

Indian philosophy, as is well known, consists of six *āstika* (orthodox) and three *nāstika* (heterodox) systems, besides having a few minor systems. The main orthodox systems are: Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta; and the main heterodox systems are: Cārvāka, Bauddha, and Jaina. Naturally, all these various systems differ from one another in many points from the philosophical standpoint; and because of this, we have all the known philosophical theories in Indian philosophy, from monism to pluralism, atheism to absolutism, and materialism to idealism.

But, in spite of such differences, there are some fundamental points of similarity, some innermost bonds of unity, among these systems which, in the final analysis, enable one easily to identify all these systems as springing from the very same soil, as being nurtured by the very same light and air, as blooming forth finally as symbols of the very same spiritual beauty, and as having the fragrance of the same age-old culture and civilization. One such universal and eternal concept in Indian philosophy is that of *niṣkāma-karma*.

This concept has at once a simplicity and a grandeur that has never failed to capture the imagination of our saints and sages, seers and devotees throughout the ages. To those wise minds and pure hearts, this simple and ever-green truth flashed forth in its pristine purity that to work for selfish ends was to live the life of a brute; while to work for the sake of duty, for the sake of others, with no selfish end in view, was the least one could do to live the life of a human being. On the one side, this is, indeed, a very simple concept: Work unselfishly, do not think of self. And on the other, it is also a grand and broad conception, one that is the very foundation, the very life-blood of all philosophy and all ethics.

Philosophy aims at unity and universality. Unity means that there is one fundamental truth, or law, or principle—call it by any name—which alone affords a full and satisfactory explanation of all other truths, or laws, or principles. In fact, there cannot be, from the standpoint of philosophy, religion, ethics, or science, or for the matter of that, from any standpoint whatsoever, more than one truth, or

law, or principle. For from no conceivable standpoint can a self-contradictory system be possible. But if apparently there be many truths, many laws, many principles coexisting, then either they are mutually inconsistent, being absolutely different from one another, or they are only apparently different from one another, being only the various manifestations of the very same fundamental truth, or law, or principle. However, as the very idea of a self-contradictory system existing for any length of time is wholly fantastic, it has been admitted, from all standpoints, that this vast and variegated universe of ours is really the manifestation of the very same universal truth, or law, or principle. In this sense, unity and universality constitute the very ground of philosophy and ethics. *Unity* is applicable from the standpoint of the universe or multiplicity, implying that all the multifarious things unitedly proceed finally from the One. *Universality* is applicable from the standpoint of Truth, or the One, implying that the One is present universally in all things. In this sense, the concept of unity and universality, taken together, is the grandest and broadest of all concepts, comprising as it does the entire expanse of the heaven and the earth.

In essence, the concept of *niṣkāma-karma*, too, is nothing but this concept of unity and universality, for, here, to work for one is to work for all; to think of self is to think of the world. Really, in *niṣkāma-karma*, there is no place for one, no place for self—either one's own self or that of another. It is, by nature, entirely and eternally selfless, without any desire whatsoever for any gain, either for one's own self or for that of another. Accordingly, even the ordinary *puṇya-karmas* (benevolent and pious acts), wholly meant for the good of others, are regarded as *sakāma-karmas* and, as such, detrimental to *mokṣa* or salvation. Undoubtedly, from the worldly point of view, they are infinitely better and more laudable than *pāpa-karmas* (selfish and sinful acts); and that is why, while *puṇya-karmas* entitle one to *svarga* (heaven), *pāpa-karmas* lead one to *naraka* (hell). And according to the Indian concep-

tion, even *svarga* is a lower value as compared to *mokṣa* (final beatitude) in the eternal flight of the soul towards infinite expansion, infinite perfection, and infinite realization. Hence, from the spiritual point of view, even *puṇya-karmas*, which are so very useful and essential from the worldly point of view, have to be discarded by those who aspire after *mokṣa* or salvation.

It is this entirely impersonal nature of *niṣkāma-karma* that makes for its inherent grandness and eminence referred to above; for what is impersonal, and not confined to a person, is naturally universal, and embraces all persons.

A question may be asked here. If *niṣkāma-karma* is so very impersonal in nature, is it not then the coldest, the most colourless, and the most meaningless kind of *karma* ever imaginable? For, if a thing is not done from the depth of one's heart, if it lacks the warmth of fellow-feeling and the tinge of benevolent desire, and if it is not aimed at any end whatsoever, then how can it lead one to that state which implies the fullest expansion, manifestation, development, and perfection of all the aspects of one's being?

This raises a fundamental question in Indian philosophy, namely, whether *development* means *negation* of the undeveloped state and *emergence* of a new one; or only its fuller *manifestation*; or, in other words, whether the developed and undeveloped states differ in *kind* or only in *degree*. Thus the point at issue here is whether the ideas and feelings and desires of the state of bondage are purified and perfected, expanded and developed during the state of salvation; or they are simply annihilated to give way to some new states and processes.

The solution offered by our ancient saints and sages to this intriguing question is, indeed, an ingenuous one. According to this, the very concept of *development* has no place in Indian philosophy. One of the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy is that *satya* is *nitya*, i.e. Truth and Eternity are identical. That is, what

is true is eternally true; it cannot change its nature either for the better or for the worse. In this sense, Self, the eternal Truth, cannot be developed, but can only be manifested. That is to say, it cannot be asserted that, at first, in the state of bondage, the Self was in an undeveloped state, and, then, in the state of salvation, it comes to be or becomes developed. For this goes against the universal Indian conception of Self as ever perfect. Hence, according to this view, the ever perfect, ever full, ever glorious Self only remains hidden under the veil of ignorance during the state of bondage, and becomes manifested in its pristine perfection, fullness, and glory in the state of salvation, when that veil is removed. Really speaking, there is no question of a higher and a lower, or a developed and an undeveloped state here. The so-called lower and undeveloped state is not a real state of the Self at all; it is only a passing phase, a mere screen to veil the ever real, ever perfect, ever present Self. It being so, the ideas, feelings, and desires of our empirical existence, however full, however sublime, and however noble, have no place during the state of *mokṣa* or self-realization.

And so, *niṣkāma-karmas* are not more perfect forms of *sakāma-puṇya-karmas*. They are *karmas* without any trace whatsoever of even any lofty feeling or benevolent desire. But that does not make such *karmas* cold, callous or colourless, nor purposeless, nor valueless.

There are two kinds of *niṣkāma-karmas*: those that precede *mokṣa* and those that follow it. The first kind constitute the preliminary steps to *sādhanās*, like *jñāna* and *bhakti*, which actually lead to *mokṣa*. For, so long as the mind is swayed by *rāga* and *dveṣa*, worldly passions like attachment and aversion, it cannot evidently devote itself to anything higher and nobler. Hence, when, through the performance of *niṣkāma-karmas*, all *sakāma-karmas* together with their springs, viz. selfish desires, are totally sublimated, the mind is purified of all lower, animal, and worldly tendencies; and in such a pure mind alone can there ever be

the rise of knowledge and devotion, which finally bring about salvation. The second kind of *niṣkāma-karmas*, on the other hand, are those done by the free soul, the *jīvanmukta*, after *mokṣa*. The *jīvanmukta* has, indeed, no duties to perform, no ends to attain, no obligation at all to anyone, in the ordinary sense of the term. Still, he does not by any means lead a lazy, inactive, and purposeless life. On the contrary, as he stands as a living example to all, showing them the path to salvation, he has to act constantly for teaching others. Thus the *niṣkāma-karmas* of the *mumukṣu*, an aspirant after salvation, purify his mind and make him fit for undertaking *sādhanās* or adopting direct spiritual means to salvation. The *niṣkāma-karmas* of the *mukta*, free soul, on the other hand, help other *mumukṣus* in the path to salvation.

Of these two kinds of *niṣkāma-karmas*, evidently the first is not so full, perfect, and spontaneous as the second. In the first case, the aspirant is still a novice, a traveller who has just taken the first step in his long, difficult, and hazardous journey to an altogether new realm. As such, his *niṣkāma-karmas* may excusably be something more or less forced; and all his feelings and desires may have to be sublimated more or less with effort, leaving his mind in a more or less blank state. Thus, he may perform his duties only for the sake of duty itself; and all the ordinary charges against that well-known, solemn, and sublime ethical doctrine of 'Duty for the sake of duty' (cf. Kant) may be brought against such *niṣkāma-karmas*, at the most. For the *mumukṣu* is yet a *baddhajīva*, a soul in bondage; and, as such, his actions are susceptible to ordinary criticism and evaluation, according to the ordinary standards of ethical judgement. According to such standards, of course, *sakāma-puṇya-karmas*, flowing with the milk of human kindness, and proceeding from the warm feelings of love and sympathy, from sublime and benevolent desires to help others, are far better than such strictly neutral *niṣkāma-karmas*, devoid of all these. But here also the question remains as to whether

any kind of feeling or desire or satisfaction, even entirely for others, is desirable at all. In fact, when we do something out of selfish motives for our own good, we aim at our own personal pleasure. But even when we do something out of those so-called unselfish motives for the good of others, then also, in exactly the same manner, we aim at our personal pleasure, as here, too, the good of others will give us intense pleasure. In this sense, even the benevolent acts are not really unselfish, and that is why, in Indian philosophy, even the *puṇya-karmas* have been branded as *sakāma* or selfish, and rightly so.

Herein lies the crux of the whole problem, as well as its solution. If a *karma* or an act, though springing out of a lofty feeling of love for others and sublime desire for the good of others, is undertaken for the personal pleasure of the *kartr̥* or agent, it is really a *sakāma* or selfish act. But if a *karma*, springing from the above causes, is undertaken only for the good of others, and not for any personal pleasure that this good may yield to the *kartr̥*, then it is really *niškāma* or unselfish or selfless act. So in the case of *niškāma-karmas* of the first kind, viz. of a *mumukṣu*, lofty feelings of universal love and sublime desires for universal service are present; but there is no desire in him for personal pleasure at all. It is correct therefore to say that this kind of *niškāma-karmas* are neither cold nor callous, nor colourless, nor purposeless, nor valueless, in any sense whatsoever.

But in the case of *niškāma-karmas* of the second kind, viz. of a *mukta*, the above questions

do not arise at all. In this case, the *jīvanmukta* is not an ordinary *jīva* subject to feelings and desires, and so his actions cannot be judged by ordinary standards. In him, there can be no question at all of even sublime feelings of love and benevolent desires to serve, for the *jīvanmukta* realizes all beings as Brahman or, what is the same thing, as Ātman, and so can no longer have any feelings of love, sympathy, mercy, pity, and the like for them. He only tries to help them to remove their veils of ignorance and thereby make them realize their own real nature, their Self in its innate purity. Thus the *niškāma-karmas* of a *jīvanmukta*, though not proceeding from mundane considerations, are essentially fuller and more perfect than even the most loving and most benevolent actions of virtuous men.

This concept of *niškāma-karma* is peculiar to Indian thought. For in Western and Islamic systems of philosophy, religion, and ethics, ordinary *puṇya-karmas* (virtuous deeds) are taken to be *niškāma* or unselfish. There the *puṇya-karmas* are regarded as the highest possible kind of *karmas* performable; and *svarga* or heaven, the highest possible kind of goal attainable. In Indian philosophy alone, *karmas* higher even than the *puṇya-karmas*, and a goal higher even than *svarga*, are conceived of and recommended as the *summum bonum* of life. It is in Indian thought that we have that supreme and sublime concept of Ānanda or Bliss, which is infinitely superior to, and essentially different from, *sukha* or pleasure, which other systems aim at.



Ordinary mankind, driven everywhere by false desire, what do they know of work? The man propelled by his own feelings and his own senses, what does he know about work? He works, who is not propelled by his own desires, by any selfishness whatsoever. He works, who has no ulterior motive in view. He works, who has nothing to gain from work

THE SUCCESSORS OF GURU NĀNAK

BY SRI M. V. BHIDE

Of the Sikh Gurus, the best known are Guru Nānak, the first Guru, who gave the Sikhs their creed, and Guru Govind Singh, the last Guru, who formed them into a nation. The intervening Gurus, too, were pious and able men, who carried on steadily the work of Guru Nānak and contributed considerably to the progress of the Sikh religion.

Guru Aṅgad, the Second Guru, was originally called Lehna and was the son of a trader named Pheru. He was an orthodox Hindu at first, and used to go on an yearly pilgrimage to the temple of Durgā at Jwalamukhi. It was on the occasion of one of these pilgrimages that he stopped at Kartarpur to see Guru Nānak, of whose piety he had heard a great deal. The Guru's religious discourse produced such a deep impression on him that he gave up his pilgrimage and became a convert to the new faith. From then, he was one of the most devoted and trusted disciples of Guru Nānak.

There are many tales of his readiness to make any sacrifice for the Guru and to follow his teaching. On one occasion, Guru Nānak tried to test the devotion of his followers, by subjecting it to a severe ordeal. At midnight, he besmeared himself with ashes and putting on a fearful disguise went to a jungle. Several of his disciples followed him, but one by one they remained behind as the hardships of the journey increased. Only Lehna remained with him at last. Seeing some carrion lying on the ground, the Guru said to Lehna, 'If thou art a true disciple of mine, eat that'. Without a moment's hesitation, Lehna ran towards the carrion; but lo! it had in the meanwhile changed into a dish of sweets. So pleased was Guru Nānak with Lehna that he said to him. 'Thou art verily a part of my body, Aṅgad'.

Two days before his departure from the world, Guru Nānak appointed Guru Aṅgad as

his successor. Guru Nānak had two sons; but with a true appreciation of the piety, devotion, and self-sacrifice of Aṅgad, he named the latter to take his place.

Guru Aṅgad assumed the office of the Guru in A.D. 1526, when he was about 25, and held it till A.D. 1552. He preached Nānak's religion to crowds of devotees, who came to wait upon him from far and near. Even Emperor Humayun, when in distress, after his defeat by Shershāh, is said to have sought the spiritual assistance of the Guru. The Guru was in deep meditation when the emperor arrived, and hence the latter had to wait for a time. The emperor got impatient and in a fit of anger put his hand on the hilt of his sword with the intention of striking the Guru. The sword, however, would not come out of the sheath; and the Guru opening his eyes at the moment said: 'When you ought to have used your sword against Shershāh, you could not do so, and now you are drawing your sword on religious men.' The emperor on hearing this felt ashamed of himself and prayed for pardon. The Guru blessed him thereafter, but told him that he would have to spend some time in exile before he recovered his possessions.

Guru Aṅgad's time was on the whole peaceful and uneventful. The hymns of Guru Nānak were collected in his time, and written in the Gurumukhī character, which was invented by him. The Gurumukhī is a modified form of the Devanāgarī characters. The object of the Guru was probably to discourage the study of Sanskrit religious books by the Sikh disciples.

Guru Aṅgad, like Guru Nānak, led a married life, and had two sons. But like Guru Nānak, he too elected Amardās, a devoted follower of his, to succeed him as the Guru.

Guru Amardās, the Third Guru, was born

of a Khatri family in the year A.D. 1479. In his early life, he too was an orthodox Hindu of the Vaiṣṇava sect, but, coming in contact with some Sikhs, became a convert to their faith. By his devotion and constant attendance on Guru Aṅgad, he soon gained the first place amongst his disciples, and was eventually chosen as the successor of the Guru. It was in 1552, i.e. at a considerably advanced age, that Amardās became the head of the Sikh fraternity. Guru Amardās took up his residence at Govindwel (now a small town near Amritsar), in the founding of which he had assisted. A liberal kitchen was maintained by him through the offerings received from the devotees, and all who went to wait upon the Guru were fed therefrom. In fact, it was one of the rules in the time of this Guru that none was to see him unless he had partaken of the food prepared at the Guru's kitchen. The rule was probably intended to prepare the visitor for the Guru's instruction by removing his caste prejudices.

The number of the followers of the Guru continued to increase and began to cause some anxiety to the orthodox Hindus and Mohammedans. The Sikhs were subjected to many annoyances at the hands of the Mohammedans, but the Guru's constant advice to his followers was: 'Take not revenge; there is no greater penance than patience and no more potent weapon than forgiveness.' The orthodox Hindus made a representation to Emperor Akbar against the heterodox doctrines of the Sikh Gurus, but Akbar, on hearing the reply of the Guru's representative, saw nothing objectionable in them and allowed them liberty of conscience. The emperor, with his well-known catholicity in the matter of religion, even paid a state visit to the Guru, and being much pleased with his teachings offered to grant him a *jāgir* of certain villages. The Guru refused the grant saying: 'I have obtained lands and rent-free tenures from my Creator! Whatever comes to me daily is spent daily, and for the morrow my trust is on God.' The emperor, however, pressed him to accept the gift and

ultimately conferred it upon Bibī Bhānī, one of the Guru's daughters.

It was this Guru who conceived the idea of founding a suitable place for Sikh religious gatherings and pilgrimages. He deputed his favourite disciple Jetha with that object to found a town and excavate a tank near by, which was to be called 'Amritsar' (the tank of nectar). This was the beginning of the modern town of Amritsar and the tank, in which stands the famous Golden Temple of the Sikhs. The work was still unfinished when the Guru breathed his last in 1574, at the age of 95. Before his death, he had appointed his trusted disciple and son-in-law Jetha to be his successor, and the latter assumed his office with the title Guru Rāmdās.

Guru Amardās was a prolific writer of hymns, several of which are of great beauty. Leading the life of a householder himself, he laid stress on the futility of *yoga* and asceticism and taught that the love of God and faith were the true means of salvation. 'Be a hermit in your house', says he in one of his beautiful hymns. Again: 'As a lotus, while growing in the mud, turns its petals towards the sun, so should man, while engaged in wordly affairs, always turn his thoughts to God by means of the instruction of the Guru.'

Guru Rāmdās, the Fourth Guru, belonged to a Khatri family of Lahore. Being of a devotional turn of mind, he came to Govindwel to pay his respects to Guru Amardās and became his disciple. He soon won the favour of the Guru by his piety and observance of the Guru's precepts, and was married to Bibī Bhānī, a daughter of the Guru. This was the lady on whom Emperor Akbar had conferred a *jāgir* of certain villages, when it was refused by Guru Amardās. Guru Rāmdās (or Jetha as he was then called) was entrusted with the management of these villages, and it was in one of them that the work of founding the town of Amritsar and the tank by its side had been commenced by him. The work was continued after Guru Rāmdās succeeded Guru Amardās,

but it did not make satisfactory progress for want of sufficient funds. The Guru then decided to send missionaries round to preach the Sikh religion and collect offerings from the faithful. These missionaries, who were called *masauds*, helped to bring in large contributions. The Guru took up his abode in a hut and supervised the excavation of the tank; but his tenure proved to be short, and he left the world in A.D. 1581, before the work was completed. During his time, however, the miraculous way in which a leper was cured of his disease by a bath in the tank water had served to spread its fame far and wide.

Guru Rāmdās appointed his youngest son Arjan, who had proved himself a pious and devout Sikh, to succeed him. For the first time, the office of the Guru descended from father to son. But the choice was amply justified, as Arjan proved to be one of the ablest of the Sikh Gurus.

Guru Arjan, the Fifth Guru, was born in A.D. 1563; and he was thus only 18 years of age when he succeeded his father. But he was a man of great energy, and set himself to place Sikhism on a sound footing. He first completed the construction of the sacred tank at Amritsar and built therein the Har Mandir, now known as the Darbār Sāhib or the Golden Temple.¹ The Guru now began to reside in Amritsar, which was growing into a flourishing town and a centre of Sikh culture and power. The Guru then took up the important work of his lifetime, viz. the compilation of the *Granth Sāhib*, the sacred book of the Sikhs. The hymns of the Sikh Gurus had not been collected together as yet. A tendency had been noticed on the part of unimportant bards to pass off their spurious writings as production of the Gurus, and Guru Arjan realized the danger therefrom to the true principles of Sikhism. The hymns of the preceding Gurus were therefore carefully collected by him from all available sources.

¹ This temple was once demolished by Ahmed Shāh Abādāli about the year A.D. 1763, but was subsequently rebuilt by the Sikhs.

To these were added some hymns of Guru Arjan himself, as well as those of earlier religious reformers like Jayadev, Kabīr, Nāmdev, Rāmānand, and others, whose teachings were similar in spirit to those of the Sikh Gurus, and the whole compilation was called the *Granth Sāhib*.

The hymns were composed in different *rāgs* or musical tunes and were arranged accordingly. In each group, the productions of the different Gurus were distinguished by Mohallas—the hymns of the First Guru being included in Mohalla I; those of the Second Guru in Mohalla II; and so on. When the whole compilation was ready, the Guru exhorted his followers that the *Granth Sāhib* was the embodiment of the Gurus and that they were to look to it alone for the true principles of their creed. The *Granth Sāhib* was then duly installed in the Har Mandir or the Darbar Sāhib referred to already. The Har Mandir contains the *Granth Sāhib* alone as the object of worship, and has, of course, no image of any kind. Unlike the Hindu temples, it is kept open on all sides to show that the House of God is accessible to all.

The number of Sikhs continued to increase. But in the time of Guru Arjan began that conflict with the political power which was eventually to turn the Sikhs into a militant body in the time of Guru Govind Singh.

Prithi Cand, the eldest son of Guru Rāmdās, who had been superseded in the appointment of Guru Arjan as the Fifth Guru, never forgave the latter, and was constantly engaged in nefarious plots against the Guru and his young son Har Govind. He remained unsuccessful so long as Akbar was on the throne; but on the death of that emperor, two events gave Prithi Cand the opportunity he was seeking to involve the Guru in trouble. Candu Shāh, the Finance Minister of the emperor, had sought to give his daughter in marriage to Har Govind, the son of Guru Arjan, but the latter had declined the alliance on learning that Candu Shāh really looked down upon him, and had made the proposal

simply owing to his having failed to secure any other bridegroom to his taste. Candu Shāh felt deeply injured and now made a common cause with Prithi Cand to take revenge upon the Guru.

Khushru, the son of Jehāngīr, had in the meantime risen in revolt, and in the hour of his defeat and distress sought assistance of Guru Arjan. The Guru had the liberality to give assistance to the prince to enable him to make his escape to Kashmir. But Candu Shāh and Prithi Cand seized the opportunity to represent this to the emperor as an act of treason. Guru Arjan was then summoned to appear before the emperor at Lahore. The emperor asked Guru Arjan, by way of punishment, to pay a fine of two lakhs of rupees and also to erase from the *Granth Sāhib* those hymns which were opposed to the orthodox Hindu and Mohammedan creeds. The Guru, however, pleaded innocence and respectfully but firmly refused to do either. The emperor thereupon delivered up the Guru to his enemy Candu Shāh to do with him what he pleased. Prithi Cand had died in the meantime, but Candu Shāh gratified his vindictiveness by subjecting the Guru to unspeakable tortures, which he suffered heroically. At last, the Guru asked to be allowed to have a bath in the river Rāvī, as a last wish. Singing the *Japjī*, the great Sikh prayer, he plunged into the river, and his body is said to have disappeared in the rapid stream.

Guru Arjan had acquired a great fame as a spiritual leader of the Sikhs, and was visited by a number of saints and devotees. Even Emperor Akbar is said to have paid him the compliment of a visit and, after hearing some selections from the *Granth Sāhib*, pronounced it as a 'volume worthy of reverence'. Guru Arjan himself composed a large number of hymns, which take up a considerable portion of the *Granth Sāhib*, some of which, like the *Sukhmanī*, are famous and well known to all Sikhs. Gurdās, a famous Sikh writer on religious subjects, was a relative friend and a favourite disciple of his, and wrote the *Granth Sāhib* at his

dictation. Gurdās's famous *Vārs* and *Kabits* (religious poems) were greatly admired by Guru Arjan; and although they could not be given a place in the *Granth Sāhib*, the Guru declared that all Sikhs who read the writings of Gurdās would derive spiritual benefit therefrom.

Guru Har Govind, the young son of Guru Arjan, who succeeded him as the Sixth Guru according to his last wishes, was only about 12 years of age, when Guru Arjan met a martyr's death in the year 1606. Smarting under the grief caused by his father's death, and with a natural bent for a military career, Har Govind decided from the outset to be the temporal as well as the spiritual leader of the Sikhs. When the venerable Bhāi Budha, a disciple of Guru Nānak himself, who lived long enough to see the Sixth Guru, affixed the *tilak* (sacred mark) on his forehead and placed before him the *seli* (woollen cord) and turban worn by the former Gurus, Guru Har Govind ordered the *seli* to be deposited in the treasure-room and said, 'My sword-belt will be my "*seli*", and I shall wear my turban with a royal insignia'. The Guru soon had the 'Akāl Bunga' constructed at Amritsar, where he used to sit in state and receive the homage of his followers, who had already learned to call the Gurus 'Saccā Pādshāh' or the 'True Emperor'. He ordered his agents to receive offerings of arms and horses as well as of money and set himself to the formation of a band of military followers. Endowed with handsome appearance, a robust physique, and a love of chase and other manly sports, he soon attracted the flower of the youth of Jallandar Doab to take service under him and collected a troop of five hundred picked horsemen.

The report of these doings of the Guru caused no little anxiety to Candu Shāh, who had brought about Guru Arjan's death, and who apprehended his own punishment at the hands of his son. He stirred up the emperor, by exaggerated accounts of the Guru's military preparations, to suspect him of treacherous designs and to order him to appear before him at Delhi. The emperor was unable to find any

serious fault with the young Guru, but through the machinations of Candu Shāh was led to send the Guru to the Fort of Gwalior to do penance for his (emperor's) recovery from a malady from which he was then suffering. The Guru was, however, recalled not long afterwards at the intercession of some of his friends at the Imperial Court. Noticing a priceless gem on the turban of the Guru, the emperor asked him where a similar one could be procured. The Guru replied that his father had a rosary of similar gems, but it was now in possession of Candu Shāh. The opportunity was taken to disclose all Candu Shāh's doings to the emperor, and the emperor was ultimately convinced of the baseness of Candu Shāh. He then delivered up Candu Shāh to the Guru for such punishment as he pleased, and the Guru's followers spared no ignominy or torture in their desire to avenge Guru Arjan's death.

Guru Har Govind's life was full of strifes and adventures. From his very infancy, when his aunt made an attempt on his life by sending a murderer in the shape of a nurse, he bore, as it were, an enchanted life and had many a miraculous escape in the hour of danger. After the death of Emperor Jehāngīr in 1628, he was engaged in frequent warfare with Shāh Jehān, whose mind had been poisoned by the Guru's enemies and who was ready to listen to complaints against him. Sometimes, however, the Guru's own followers were bold enough to give provocation, as, for instance, when they managed to take away two priceless steeds from the emperor's stables, possibly as a retort for similar action taken by the emperor on a previous occasion. On three different occasions, the Guru was able to defeat the imperial troops, against fearful odds, with the help of his devout and brave followers. During the last years of his life, however, he seemed to have thought it politic to shift from Amritsar and to take up his abode at Kiratpur, where he breathed his last in 1645. Before his death, he appointed as his successor Har Rāi, the second son of his eldest son Guruditta (who had predeceased him), superseding the eldest grand-

son Dhīrmal, who had proved himself disloyal and unfit for the office of the Guru.

Guru Har Govind was a born leader of men, and his personal valour on the battle-field was a source of inspiration to his soldiers. On two occasions, he overpowered and killed in a hand-to-hand fight the Moghul generals Muklis Khān and Painsa Khān.² The manly exploits of the spiritual Guru added considerably to the number of his followers. Under him, the Sikhs learned to sacrifice their lives in the cause of religion—a lesson which the course of events compelled them to learn well; for the bigoted Aurangzeb was soon to ascend the imperial throne at Delhi and put to test their religious zeal. Unlike his predecessors, Guru Har Govind made no literary contribution to the *Granth Sāhib*, and his strenuous life probably afforded him little leisure for the same. On the banks of the Biās, he founded a town called Shri Har Govindpur which exists to this day, and the Guru's arms are still preserved and venerated in the Akāl Bunga at Amritsar.

Guru Har Rāi, the Seventh Guru, was only 14 years of age when he assumed his office. His grandfather had exhorted him to maintain his troop of armed followers, in view of the political exigencies of the time. But Har Rāi was a man of quiet disposition and was anxious to avoid conflict with the political power. He was constantly engaged in devotional meditations and preferred to live at Kiratpur for the sake of quietude. But it was not long before he found himself drawn out into political partisanship. Emperor Shāh Jehān's serious illness was the signal for rebellion on the part of his sons. Aurangzeb soon got the supremacy, and Dārā Shukoh, the eldest son, was obliged to seek shelter as an exile. In his wanderings, he had an interview with the Guru, who showed him sympathy, on account of his religious turn of

² Painsa Khān, a Pathan, was first a favourite captain in the Guru's army. He was dismissed owing to his having sworn falsely in the presence of the Guru and became thereafter his inveterate enemy.

mind, and advised him to value spiritual power more than a worldly empire. Aurangzeb, who was an avowed enemy of non-Muslims, on hearing of this interview, made it a pretext for summoning Guru Har Rāi before him. The Guru wrote him a reply that he was only a fakir and had no business with kings and asked to be excused from appearing. When the emperor re-summoned him, he thought it politic to send his son Rām Rāi as his representative. While at Delhi, Rām Rāi, who was aspiring to be the Guru after Guru Har Rāi, tried to curry favour with the emperor by distorting certain hymns of Guru Nānak, so as to render them more pleasing to the Muslim emperor. Guru Har Rāi was highly displeased on hearing about this, and declared that Har Kishan, his second son, would be the Guru after him. The Guru did not live long after this incident. In 1661, he died, appointing his young son Har Kishan, a boy of only five years, as his successor, the Eighth Guru.

Rām Rāi was not, however, disposed to allow his supersession to go unchallenged. A fierce contest raged between the supporters of Rām Rāi and Guru Har Kishan, and ultimately the dispute was referred to the emperor by Rām Rāi and his supporters. The emperor found in the dispute of the brothers a suitable opportunity for maturing his plans against the Sikh faith. He summoned Guru Har Kishan to Delhi. During his stay there, an attempt is said to have been made by the emperor to test the sagacity or spiritual power of the young Guru by asking him to recognize the chief queen from a number of similarly attired ladies—a trial in which the Guru came out successful. The Guru was, however, soon attacked by small-pox while at Delhi, and succumbed to it in 1664. Before his death, his followers asked him as to who was to be their Guru after him. The young Guru is said to have asked them to go to Bakala, and told them that they would find his successor there. Tegh Bahādur, one of the sons of Guru Har Govind, used to live at Bakala since his father's death, and was known for his piety and indifference to the world. The last

words of the young Guru were understood to refer to Tegh Bahādur as his successor.

Guru Tegh Bahādur, the Ninth Guru, was already in his fifty-second year, when he became the spiritual head of the Sikhs. He was at first very reluctant to undertake the onerous duties of the position, but was ultimately persuaded to do so by the large majority of the Sikhs who preferred him to the other aspirants and called him their true Guru. He soon founded the town of Anandpur, at some distance from Kartarpur, and took up his abode there. He was a man with an intensely devotional turn of mind, and was the first Guru after Guru Arjan to compose hymns and convey religious instruction through them to his disciples. He started on an extensive missionary tour, visiting Kurukshetra, Agra, Prayag, Varanasi, Gaya, and ultimately made a sojourn at Patna. It was at Patna that a son was born to him, who was named Govind Rāi—the future Guru Govind Singh.

From Patna, he accompanied Rājā Rām Singh, who had sought his blessing and spiritual help, on an expedition into Bengal. Sometime after his return to Patna, he turned his thoughts to the Punjab and returned to his home at Anandpur after an absence of several years. The peaceful life of the Guru at that place was, however, suddenly interrupted by an unforeseen incident. Aurangzeb, in his blind fanaticism, had set his heart on converting the whole of India to Mohammedanism. A body of Kashmiri Pandits, who had been persecuted and turned out of their homes, came to seek the help of the Guru. The latter advised them to tell the emperor that he should first convert Guru Tegh Bahādur, the Guru of the Sikhs, and that, if he became a convert, all of them and other Hindus would be ready to follow his example. The emperor thereupon summoned the Guru to appear before him. The Guru started accordingly, and was marching in short stages, preaching to the faithful on the way. The emperor became impatient on account of the delay, and had him arrested and brought up

before him from Agra. The emperor then explained to him the benefits he would derive himself, and confer upon others, by embracing Islam. The Guru, however, pointed out the futility of attempting to make converts by force and declined to give up his faith. The emperor was greatly enraged, cast the Guru in a dungeon, and gave orders for his being tortured till he agreed to accept Islam. But the Guru submitted patiently to all bodily torture and remained firm in his faith.

It was during the period of his confinement that Guru Tegh Bahādur uttered his famous prophecy about the conquest of India by the English. One day, while he was engaged in toilet, he was looking towards the south. The emperor, to whom this was reported, had him brought up and accused him of looking towards the ladies of his harem. The Guru thereupon replied: 'I am not looking at your Zanana, but towards the seas. From beyond the seas is coming a white race, which will eventually tear your Parda and destroy your empire.' This reply only increased the anger of the emperor, who had tried in vain to bring the Guru round to his faith. Despairing at last of converting

him, Aurangzeb issued orders for the execution of the Guru. The Guru, on learning of the order, asked to be allowed to bathe and say his last prayers. As he began to say his prayers, he asked the executioner to cut off his head when he bent down before the Guru at the conclusion of the prayer.

The executioner did accordingly. It is said that as the head was severed it flew off into the lap of a Sikh disciple who was close by. It was cremated then by the Sikhs of Delhi, and a monument called the 'Sish Ganj' was erected thereon. The trunk is said to have been conveyed secretly to Anandpur, and the funeral ceremonies were then duly performed by the young Govind Rāi.

Thus fell Guru Tegh Bahādur, second martyr to the cause of Sikhism. A hymn attributed to him fittingly conveys his message to his disciples:

'Give thy head rather than forsake

those whom you have undertaken to protect;

Guru Tegh Bahādur said: "Give thy life, but forsake not thy faith".'

IDENTITY AND SAMENESS

BY SRI BENOY GOPAL RAY

I

Let us start our inquiry concerning the above problem with a simple fact. I have a chair in my room. Everyday I sit on it, and I am familiar with it in many other ways. I say that the chair that I experience today is identical with the one I experienced yesterday or the day before. What is the basis of this proposition which involves a belief in its truth? Within the last twenty-four hours the chair has undergone some changes, and I cannot say

that the chair of today is identical with the chair of yesterday. All that I can attribute is sameness and not identity to the two experiences.

Identity may mean either A is A or A remains A through A¹, A², A³, and so on. The first alternative can be safely ruled out on empirical grounds. Our sense impressions both inward and outward do not guarantee any knowledge of identity. Any two successive visual impressions of an orange before me may be the same,

but not identical. The second alternative is highly misleading. A changes into various phases, and yet we say that the identical A persists through these changes. This is also unwarranted, since we have no direct knowledge of the identity of A. In this case, identity, if any, is a matter of inference.

What is the universal element in this act of inference? It may be presumed that uniformity of nature offers us the universal element. Under identical conditions, a thing behaves in an identical way. But the point is that conditions never remain identical, and so the question of identity of behaviour does not arise. There may be a second ground of inference. The various phases of A must belong to an identical reality; otherwise, how can we at all talk of phases? The different phases imply the existence of A, which remains identical all through. This ground may be brushed aside by saying that each phase may be taken as a distinct existence having relation with the second, which, again, is another distinct existence. The phases need not be taken as qualities belonging to a substance. Napoleon marries Josephine is one existence, and Napoleon marries the princess of Austria is just another. Of course, there is a relation between the two, but one need not conclude that the identical Napoleon persists through these changes. Identity-in-difference, the pet formula of the idealists, when empirically analysed, resolves into differences as existents and identity as a convenient concept to explain their relations.

We come to this position: The chair that I experience today is not identical with the chair of yesterday. It may be the same as yesterday's. What is meant by sameness? Generally, when we say that two things are the same, we mean that on certain points they are identical and on others they are different. Difference may be an object of empirical knowledge, but not identity. I can very well experience the different phases of a thing, because it changes. If change were an unreality, we might have empirical knowledge of identity. But the

case is just the reverse. So the logical ground of the concept of sameness is very flimsy. If sameness has at all a ground, it is psychological and not logical. I *believe* that the chair that I see today is the same as yesterday's. On what grounds is the belief based? Popularly speaking, the chair has not undergone any great change in the last twenty-four hours, and so I say that it is the same chair. Had the chair changed considerably, would I still take it to be the same chair? The point, if pursued, would lead to interesting results. Let us suppose that the seat of the chair is broken, and a new seat made of another piece of wood has been inserted in its place. I say, well, it is the same chair. Then the four legs are broken and are replaced by new ones. I say, again, it is the same chair. Then the back is broken and replaced by a fresh one. I still say, it is the same chair. How do I say so? I say so only on a belief in the sameness of the chair. My belief is further strengthened by habit. A friend who saw and sat on the chair before it was broken comes after a pretty long interval. The repaired chair may strike his eyes as a different one; it is because he had not believed in the sameness of the chair all through. Nor has habit contributed to his belief.

So, in the last analysis, sameness rests on belief, a subjective factor. We believe that the thing is the same, and that is all. If somebody believes the other way, no amount of rational and objective proof can convince him of its sameness. The child believes that its mother remains the same. I believe that I am riding the same car that I purchased a year ago. Objectively speaking, a thing is different at every moment. Only we believe it to be the same. The belief serves a great practical end. All normal individuals form sets of belief within themselves; otherwise, our day-to-day life becomes impossible. To find out the cause of these beliefs is often futile. We have to accept them and not explain them. When a number of people agree to the sameness of a thing, what does it prove? It only proves that the particular beliefs in this case have agreed with one

another. I and my students believe that the fan over our heads is the same as it existed a session ago. In this case, our particular beliefs in its sameness have simply concurred.

II

In the preceding section, I have discussed the question of sameness of objects and selves other than myself. But what about the identity or sameness of my own self? Am I directly aware of the identity of my own self? Some philosophers say 'yes', and some say, 'no'. Let us subject the query to scrutiny. As we are judging the whole topic from the empirical standpoint, it is worth-while to begin with Hume. Against the Cartesians, Hume maintains that the self is not a simple, indivisible, immaterial substance in which our perceptions inhere. We are aware of our perceptions only. A percipient mind is not necessary for the existence of a perception. Each perception is a distinct existence. Then what is a self? It is 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement' (*Treatise*, Second Edition, Edited by Selby-Bigge, p. 252). If the self has any identity, it is only a serial identity. Hume explains serial identity with the example of a republic. The republic may change its citizens and even laws, yet it is the identical republic. A person may 'vary his character and disposition as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity' (*ibid.*, p. 261). A play remains identical, though there are changes of scenes and intervals. Identity in this case is the unity of a series. Thus it is clear that Hume believes in the identity of self, but not in its substantiality.

Strictly speaking, there can be no identity without substantiality. Some Indian philosophers are thorough on this point. According to them, there is one identical Brahman, the supreme substantial Reality. All modifications are modifications of It, but they are unreal. The human self is the veiled identical Brahman. The multiplicity of selves and objects is due to an unreal modification of Brahman. The

supreme aim of philosophy is to know the identity of the self, which is Brahman. It can be known not by any sensuous or empirical means. Self-identity is a matter of non-sensuous knowledge. The Indian standpoint is not empirical, but transcendental. And so, we leave it there. The analogy between the republic or play and the self is not a happy one. A play does not know itself to be the identical play. But I know myself to be the identical self. I attribute identity to the play, because it shows a unity of purpose. A series has to be evaluated as such by a thinking self. So, the problem of personal identity cannot be solved in the Humean way. When Hume uses the word identity, I think, he means only sameness, for, according to his philosophy, there cannot be any impression of identity. Again, Hume will not allow anything in his philosophy that cannot be traced to some impression or other.

As Hume's serial identity does not solve the problem, we now turn to memory as a basis of personal identity. It is upheld in certain quarters that an individual knows that he is the identical individual, because he can call up past experiences as his own. That he can remember his past experiences with warmth and intimacy is a proof that he is the identical individual. We would like to analyse this contention. I can remember some experiences of mine that occurred when I was five years old, but beyond that I do not remember any. My mother tells me of my pranks when I was three years old, but I do not remember them. Consistently with the above position, am I to conclude that from the fifth year onwards I have been one individual and before that I was another individual? But to my mother I have been the same individual all through. Again, as one ages one's memory also declines. If a person cannot remember any of his experiences beyond the age of ten, are we to believe that his identity extends from tenth year onwards? These are absurd positions. How can memory be a solid basis for personal identity? Memory rises and falls, but not identity.

The problem of identity does not bother a

modern psychologist. Psychologists, these days, speak of individual integrity and not of individual identity. An integrated personality is one in whom habits of thought and expression, attitudes, interests, and desires are combined in a harmonious unity. But perfect integration is a rare thing. Most of us are inconsistent in our behaviours. In one state, we are responsive to the environment; in another, we remain withdrawn. We behave quite differently when hungry and when well fed. Our desires are not all fully integrated into a single purpose of life. Woodworth and Marquis suggest that most of us are only relatively well integrated. Abnormal people are completely lacking in integration.

So, we conclude this discussion by saying that no rational proof can be adduced to justify self-identity. Self-sameness also cannot be justified on rational grounds. Awareness of self-sameness is due only to a belief. I believe that I have been the same self since my childhood, and I believe that I will continue to be the same self till death. This act of belief, which is universal amongst normal people, makes our day-to-day life possible. Descartes used to say: 'I think, therefore, I am.' By 'I', he meant ontological identity. On empirical evidence, his formula should be changed like this: 'I think, therefore, I believe that I am.' In this case, by 'I' is meant only psychological sameness.



JESUS CHRIST, AN INCARNATION OF GOD

BY PROFESSOR J. N. DEY

Every sincere soul making a devout study of the life of Jesus is sure to get fresh revelations about the glories of that Son of God. As we contemplate on him, there are several aspects of him that come uppermost in our mind, the most prominent of which is Jesus' being an incarnation of God. In our consideration here, we shall confine ourselves to this aspect. In doing so, we shall have to quote from Jesus' own words on many an occasion; and we shall refrain from quoting parallel ones from other incarnations like Śrī Rāmacandra, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Bhagavān Buddha, Sri Ramakrishna, and others. The followers of any one of these incarnations will easily be able to get at them. The beauty about the characteristics of incarnations like Jesus is that one can never say that one has understood them completely. The more one advances in this direction, one finds that newer angles of vision always crop up, which fill one with silent wonder, and the immensity of which is bound to plunge one in joy inexplicable.

For a knowledge of the life and doings of

Jesus, we have to depend upon the gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. 'Mathew, writing for Jewish readers, is an apologist, proving Jesus of Nazareth to be the Messiah announced by the scriptures and long desired by the chosen people of God, yet one whom the Jews, blinded by prejudice, rejected, thus forfeiting the Messianic Kingdom. Instead of them, the Gentiles would enter the Kingdom. St. Matthew has always stressed the Messianic quality of the Lord.' 'Mark is supposed to have written for those who were already believers, but were not Jewish but Gentile converts. In keeping with this aim, St. Mark gives especial prominence to the deeds and miracles of Jesus, so as to show by this demonstration of supernatural powers that Christ is the Lord and Saviour of all.' In the third gospel, that by St. Luke, 'Christ appears as the universal and merciful Saviour'. 'St. John wrote his gospel many years after the other evangelists, in order to demonstrate the divinity of Christ and his mission against the heresies that were then

springing up. In this, the discourses of Christ are accurately reproduced as regards the substance, that is, what he means to say; for, at a number of places, he has added to the discourses of the Lord his own theological interpretation.'

In keeping with the tradition followed by all incarnations of God, we find that from his very advent to this world in human form to the last moment of his stay here there were any number of instances where proof of his being an incarnation of God was given by others and also by himself. 'And the Angel Gabriel came unto Mary and said, Hail, thou art highly favoured, the Lord is with thee: Blessed art thou among women. She was much perplexed, when the angel continued, Mary, do not be afraid. Thou shalt conceive in thy womb and shalt bear a son and shalt call him Jesus.' Then Mary went to Elezabeth, who also was with child. 'No sooner had Elezabeth heard Mary's greeting than the child leaped in her womb and Elezabeth herself was filled with the Holy Ghost, so that she cried out with a loud voice, Blessed art thou among women and blessed is the fruit of thy womb. How have I deserved to be thus visited by the mother of my Lord?' When Elezabeth bore a son (John the Baptist), her husband Zachary, who had been rendered dumb, was filled with the Holy Ghost, and broke into speech saying, 'And thou, my child, will be known for a prophet of the most High, going before the Lord to clear His way for him.'

Then, at the time of his birth, some shepherds, who were keeping night watches over their flocks, found an angel appearing before them who said: 'Do not be afraid; behold, the news I bring you is good news. This day in the city of David, a Saviour has been born for you, no other than the Lord Christ.' And so they went with all haste and found Mary and Joseph there with the child lying in the manger. On seeing him, they discovered the truth of what had been told them about this child. All those who heard it were full of amazement at the story which the shepherds told them.

When the child was brought to Jerusalem for purification, Simeon, an upright man, was filled with the Holy Spirit and taking him in his arm blessed God and said, 'This is the Light which shall give revelation to the Gentiles'.

When Jesus was twelve years old, his parents, after going up to Jerusalem as the custom was at the time of the feast, and completing the days of observance, set about their return home. But the boy Jesus, unknown to his parents, continued his stay in Jerusalem. And they, thinking that he was among their travelling companions, had gone a whole day's journey before they discovered this. So they returned to Jerusalem and, after three days, found him sitting in the temple in the midst of those who taught there, discussing divine topics. When asked by the mother, 'My son, why hast thou treated us so?', he answered, 'What reason had you to search for me? Could you not tell that I must needs be in the place which belongs to my Father?' These words which he spoke to them were beyond their understanding.

Later on, we find: 'And now the people was full of expectation; all had some surmise in their hearts, whether John might not be the Christ. But John gave them their answer by saying publicly, "As for me, I am baptizing you with water; but one is yet to come who is mightier than I, so that I am not worthy to untie the strap of his shoes. He will baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire".'

When Jesus came and stood before John at the Jordon, to be baptized by him, John would have restrained him; it is I, he said, that ought to be baptized by thee, and dost thou come to me instead? But Jesus answered, 'Let it be so for the present; it is well that we should thus fulfil all the observance'. So Jesus was baptized, and as he came straight up out of the water, and stood praying, suddenly heaven was opened; the Holy Ghost came down upon him like a dove, and a voice came from heaven which said, 'Thou art my beloved Son'. And now Jesus was led by the Spirit away into the wilderness, to be tempted there by the devil. This

was the period when he understood his complete unity with God; when he practised his *sādhana* to realize his oneness with the divine Father; when he knew that 'man cannot live by bread alone', that 'Thou shalt not put the Lord thy God to the proof', and that 'Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and serve none but Him'.

And now the Paschal Feast, which the Jews keep, was drawing near, and so Jesus went up to Jerusalem. And in the temple there, he found the merchants selling oxen and sheep and pigeons, and the money-changers sitting at their trade. So he made a kind of whip out of cords and drove them all out of the temple, spilling the bankers' coin and overthrowing their tables. And he said: 'Take these away, do not turn my Father's house into a place of barter.' And this was the admonition he gave them: 'Is it not written, My house shall be known among all nations for a house of prayer? Whereas you have made it into a den of thieves.' Then the Jews answered him, 'What sign canst thou show us as thy warrant for doing this?' Jesus answered them, 'Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up again'. At which the Jews said, 'This temple took forty-six years to build, wilt thou raise it up in three days?' But the temple he was speaking of was his own body; and when he had risen from the dead, his disciples remembered this saying of his, and learned to believe in the scriptures and in the words Jesus had spoken.

Then there was a man called Nicodemus, a Pharisee and one of the rulers of the Jews, who came to see Jesus by night. 'Master,' he said to him, 'we know that thou hast come from God to teach us; no one, unless God were with him, could do the miracles which thou doest.' Jesus answered him, 'Believe me when I tell thee this; a man cannot see the Kingdom of God without being born anew'. 'Why,' Nicodemus asked him, 'how is it possible that a man should be born when he is already old? Can he enter a second time into his mother's womb, and so come to birth?' Jesus answered, 'Believe me,

no man can enter into the Kingdom of God unless birth comes to him from water, and from the Holy Ghost'. (This to us means initiation and then realization through the grace of the Lord.) Nicodemus answered him, 'How can such things come to be?' 'What,' answered Jesus, 'can such things be strange to thee, who art one of the teachers of Israel? Believe me, we speak of what is known to us, and testify of what our eyes have seen, and still you will not accept our testimony.'

In the course of his conversation with the Samaritan woman from whom Jesus asked for a drink of water, he said: 'Anyone who drinks such water as this will be thirsty again afterwards; the man who drinks the water I give him will not know thirst any more. The water I give him will be a spring of water within him, that flows continually to bring him everlasting life.' And, then, in the end of this, he said to her, 'I, who speak to thee, am Christ, the Messiah'.

To his disciples who could not understand him, he said, 'I have food to eat of which you know nothing, . . . my meat is to do the will of Him who sent me, and to accomplish the task He gave me'.

Both the realized soul and the incarnation of God have the knowledge of their identity with God. But as this difference is in the realm of duality, the incarnation has much more power than the ordinary realized soul. In the case of every incarnation of God, we find that on certain occasions he had to make use of these special powers. Every one of these instances became a miracle for the common man. In the case of Jesus, we have any number of miracles wrought. In fact, the gospels read as nothing but a continuous sequence of miracles. Why it is so, it is not for us to question. Sufficient it is that the time demanded them, and so they came to pass. We have Jesus' own statements as, 'You must see signs and miracles happen or you will not believe'; or, 'And now to convince you that the Son of Man has power to forgive sins while he is on earth,

I tell thee rise up, take thy bed with thee, and go home'; or, 'And so I tell thee, if great sins have been forgiven her, she has also greatly loved. He loves little, who has little forgiven him'; or, 'So he rose up and checked the wind, and said to the sea, Peace, be still. And the wind dropped and there was deep calm. Then he said to them, Why are you faint-hearted? Have you still no faith?'; or again, 'My daughter, thy faith has brought thee recovery; go in peace and be rid of thy affliction'; or, 'No need to fear; thou hast only to believe, and she will recover'; or, 'Have you the faith to believe that I can do this? And they said to him, Yes, Lord. Thereupon he touched their eyes and said, Your faith shall not be disappointed'; or, 'I promise you, if you have faith, though it be but as a grain of mustard seed, you have only to say to this mountain, Remove from this place to that, and it will remove; nothing will be impossible for you'.

Then, one of the greatest of proofs of an incarnation is his own statement about himself. This Jesus did any number of times: 'And now once more Jesus spoke to them, I am the Light of the world.... He who follows me can never walk in darkness; he will possess the light which is life. Whereupon the Pharisees told him, Thou art testifying on thy own behalf, thy testimony is worth nothing. Jesus answered them, My testimony is trustworthy, even when I testify on my own behalf; I know whence I have come and where I am going. You set yourselves up to judge after your earthly fashion; I do not set myself up to judge anybody. And what if I should judge? My judgement is judgement indeed; it is not I alone, my Father who sent me is with me. Just so it is prescribed in your law, the testimony of two men is trustworthy; well, one is myself, testifying in my own behalf, and my Father who sent me testifies in my behalf too. Hereupon they said to him, Where is this Father of thine? And Jesus answered, You have no knowledge, either of

me or of my Father; had you knowledge of me, you would have knowledge of my Father as well.' Or, 'I am the door; a man will find salvation if he makes his way in through me; he will come and go at will, and find pastures'; or again, 'None knows what the Son is, except the Father, and none knows what the Father is, except the Son, and those to whom it is the Son's good pleasure to reveal Him. Come to me all ye that labour and are burdened; I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon yourselves and learn from me; I am gentle and humble of heart; and you shall find rest for your souls; for my yoke is easy, and my burden is light'; or, 'And Jesus cried out, If a man believes in me, it is in Him who sent me, not in me that he believes; to see me is to see Him who sent me. I have come into the world as light, so that all those who believe in me may continue no longer in darkness. I have bestowed my love upon you, just as my Father has bestowed His love upon me; live on, then, in my love. You will live on in my love, if you keep my commandments, just as it is by keeping my Father's commandments that I live on in His love. All this I have told you, so that my joy may be yours'; or, 'Whoever has seen me, has seen the Father; what dost thou mean by saying, let us see the Father? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words I speak to you are not my own words; and the Father who dwells continually in me achieves in me His own acts of power'.

Again, like other incarnations, Jesus has said, 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, I am there in the midst of them'. So, let us take advantage of this opportunity and pray to him that we may be enabled to attain the Kingdom of God; for has he not promised, 'I am the bread of life, he who comes to me will never be hungry, he who has faith in me will never know thirst' and 'Seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you'?



THE HUMANISM OF TAGORE

BY PROFESSOR SUDHANSU BIMAL MOOKHERJI

Rabindranath Tagore is one of the greatest Indians of all times. He is, in fact, much more than an individual. He symbolizes a whole epoch in our national life. His name connotes a definite landmark in the history of modern India. Tremendous, indeed, has been his impact on the mental, moral, and spiritual outlook of the Indian nation. To be brief, Tagore belongs to the small group of deathless mortals, whose memory remains evergreen in the posterity's mind.

Tagore's 'life and personality have become a fabric of India's life'. His writings give expression 'to the moods and misgivings, hopes and fears of millions'. Being a true representative of the universal outlook of Indian thought, 'the value of his work lies not in tribal or national characteristics, but on those elements of universality which appeal to the whole world' (Quoted from the Appeal of the Central Committee for Tagore Centenary Celebration issued on the 14th May 1959).

Great as a poet, Tagore is infinitely greater as a man. It was his constant endeavour throughout his long life of eighty years to bring India's eternal message of love and peace to a world torn by greed, jealousy, and rivalry. His faith in the essential oneness and indivisibility of humanity and the 'one world' ideal was unshakable. He was a firm believer in the sublime ideals of love and concord, of peace, amity, and brotherhood preached and lived in the sylvan retreats of ancient India.

Tagore's outlook on life inevitably made an internationalist of him. The Visva-Bharati, Tagore's University at Santiniketan, embodies the international outlook of its architect. It is the poet's dream in a tangible shape. To bring the whole world together is Visva-Bharati's *sādhana*; '*yatra viśvam bhavatyekanīdam*' is its motto. Tagore shared the belief and conviction

of all true internationalists that internationalism without nationalism has no roots and nationalism without internationalism has no fruits. If nationalism is the beginning of the pilgrimage, internationalism is the journey's end. Nationalism and internationalism are, in fact, like the garden and the hedges that surround it. Far from being contradictory or mutually exclusive, nationalism and internationalism are thus complementary. Tagore was thus a nationalist and an internationalist at one and the same time. He held before us the great legacy of our past. He exhorted us to have faith in ourselves, to try to stand on our own legs, 'to stand erect with heads held high', and to resist evil and injustice wherever they may be found. His nationalism found expression in a profound love for the dumb, down-trodden millions of India, and for India's rich cultural heritage in all its aspects. If the Visva-Bharati stands for human brotherhood, it also stands for the resuscitation of the stream of our culture. Tagore, however, was no revivalist. Nor should his nationalism be equated with chauvinism.

Tagore reveals his inner self in his writings, and a perusal thereof shows how his heart bled for the day-to-day miseries and sufferings, degradations and humiliations of his countrymen. A 'positive attitude of sympathy for all, even for the lowly and lost,' is one of the fundamental characteristics of the Tagore literature. He believed in each individual living his or her life in his or her own way. 'He is', says Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, 'the champion of the individual in his age-long struggle against the mass tyranny which crushes him. . . . Tagore is the poet of sorrow and sufferings. The pathos of men's striving, the bitterness of life submerged in the shadows, the waste and loneliness of women's lives have found few more profoundly moved spectators' (*Great Indians*, p. 90).

Tagore was extremely sensitive—almost allergic—to cruelty. His heart bled at man's inhumanity to man, which 'makes countless thousands mourn'. It is why he was the first Indian to protest publicly against the British Government's barbarities in the Punjab in 1919.

Our present-day leaders cry themselves hoarse over the uplift of the down-trodden masses. That Rabindranath was one of the pioneers in the rural uplift work in India may be unknown to many. He began the work about fifty years ago. His Sriniketan at Surul bears eloquent testimony to his conception of rural welfare. He gave his time, energy, and physical resources to create self-confidence and a sense of joy of living in the 'exploited, down trodden, neglected, and untaught' masses of rural India. His influence has been felt, in fact, in every sphere of our national activity today. The poet was the path-finder. Our leaders follow his footsteps as best they can or will.

The poet, we all know, is the worshipper of Satyam, Śivam, and Sundaram—Truth, Goodness, and Beauty—but he is something more in Tagore's opinion. He must lend his hand in building up a better and more just world. There are occasions when he must snatch himself away 'from the mere appreciation of literature'. He must not turn a deaf ear to the wails of miseries around him. He has no right to confine himself in the ivory tower. Nor must he be a lotus-eater. The stern realities of life must be faced. The poet, too, must come out of his haven of isolation in the hour of need. He must do his best to give 'voice to the ignorant, gloomy, and mute faces' and 'kindle hope in the weary, broken, and withered hearts' of the countless millions who have been ignored, neglected, and exploited for centuries.

A striking feature of Tagore's literary work is 'the ultimateness of spiritual values to be obtained by inward honesty and cultivation of inner life' (*Great Indians*, p. 72). He declared in no uncertain terms in his last public statement: 'One day shall be borne out the full truth of what the sages have proclaimed—"By un-

righteousness man prospers, gains what appears desirable, conquers enemies, but perishes at the root"' (*Crisis in Civilization*, p. 18).

Yet the world was not a snare; its good, no evil or delusion to Tagore. He looked upon them as opportunities for self-development, as pathways for realization. Life is a gift from the hands of God Himself, and must be loyally accepted. "This is the great tradition that has come down from the seers of the Upaniṣads and the author of the *Gītā*. They delight in life. For since God has taken upon Himself the bonds of creation, why should we not take upon ourselves the bonds of this world' (*ibid.*, p. 87). We worship God in all the true objects of our worship. Tagore's Hibbert Lectures (1930) exhort us to realize the Brahman (the ultimate Reality) in us all. 'A truly spiritual man need not turn his back on the realities of the world. He should, on the contrary, work in it with the sole object of creating better material and spiritual conditions' (*ibid.*, p. 87). But one must work in a spirit of detachment.

Tagore was a great believer in God. But his God is not the God of a particular religion or community. He is the Prāṇeśvara (Lord of Life) of every one. He is, in other words, the God of Man; and Tagore's religion is the Religion of Man, of which he spoke in his Hibbert Lectures. This God does not live isolated in the high heavens beyond the mortal reach. He refuses to accept isolation and lives in our midst as one of us. He tells his worshipper:

'In a poor man's guise from
door to door I wander,
The house that shelters the
homeless is my temple.'

Tagore's God enjoys the company of the lowliest of the lowly, the humblest of the humble. Tagore realized this truth in his life and wrote:

'When my obeisance I make to Thee,
Where does it stop? ...
Behind all, below all, among the destitute.'

Tagore's God is to be found in the temple

of man. God is with us and within us in the vices and virtues, in the sorrows and sufferings, in the dust and dirt of our daily life. He is our constant companion. Tagore drew man and God closer to each other. In his vision, the two merged to make a complete entity. Tagore, in other words, elevated humanity to a higher pedestal.

Little wonder, Tagore had an unshakable faith in man—faith in the innate goodness and greatness of man. Man was to him the highest and the most sublime of all truths, the apex of God's creation.

A few months before his death, when he saw the 'crumbling ruins' of the proud civilization of the West 'strewn like vast heaps of futility' around him, he firmly refused 'to commit the grievous sin of losing faith in Man'. He looked 'forward to the opening of a (new) chapter in his (man's) history after the cataclysm (World War II) is over and the atmosphere rendered clean with the spirit of service and sacrifice' (*Crisis in Civilization*, pp. 17-18).*

*Translations of extracts from Tagore are by the writer himself.

ŚRĪ-BHĀṢYA

BY SWAMI VIRESWARANANDA

(Continued from previous issue)

TOPIC 7

THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS A PART OF BRAHMAN.

अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि

दाशकित्वादित्वमधीयत एके ॥ २।३।४२ ॥

42. (The soul is) a part (of the Lord), on account of difference (between the two) being declared and otherwise also (i.e. as non-different from Brahman); in some (*śākhās* or recensions of the Vedic texts) (Brahman) is spoken of as being fisherman, knave, etc.

The question of the relation of the soul to Brahman is now taken up for discussion. Is the soul quite different from Brahman, or is it Brahman under ignorance, or is it Brahman determined by a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), or is it a part of Brahman? Different schools of thought hold different views. One group holds that the soul is quite different from Brahman, and their relation is like that between the master and the servant, for the scriptural texts

declare their difference: 'Knowing that the individual self and the Lord, the moving Force, to be different' (*Śve. U.*, I.6); 'Two birds of beautiful plumage... of these, one eats the fruits of the tree with relish, while the other looks on without eating' (*Śve. U.*, IV.6); 'There are two, one the knowing (the Lord) and the other ignorant (the soul), the master and the servant, both unborn' (*Śve. U.*, I.9). In these texts, the difference between the two is declared by the scriptures, showing that the relation between the two is like that between the master and the servant, the ruler and the ruled. The Lord is not subject to *karma*, while the soul is subject to *karma*, and enjoys and suffers the result of it. The texts which declare the non-difference between the two are to be taken in a secondary sense, or as mere eulogy.

Another group holds that the soul is Brahman under ignorance and that the two are non-different, for this is declared by texts like, 'That thou art' (*Chā. U.*, VI.8 ff.); 'This soul

(Ātman) is Brahman' (*Br. U.*, IV. 4.5). The texts which declare difference between the two are but repetitions of what we commonly experience through other means of knowledge and, as such, carry no weight, while the texts which declare non-difference give us a knowledge which is not known through other sources. Hence these texts, which declare non-difference, are more authoritative, for the scriptures are to give us knowledge which is not had through other sources of knowledge. They hold that the soul cannot be a part of Brahman, for a part is possible only in a thing which is divisible, but Brahman is indivisible and one and, as such, cannot have a part.

A third group holds that the soul is nothing but Brahman as determined by a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*). They quote for authority the same texts as the second group and say that the dualistic texts only declare the apparent difference between the two due to the limiting adjunct.

As against all these views, the *sūtra* says that the soul is a part of Brahman, since there is declaration of difference and also of unity in the scriptures. The view that the two are absolutely different cannot stand in the face of texts which declare non-difference. Some recensions (*śākhās*) read that Brahman is the fisherman, the knave, etc., which teach the general non-difference of the self. Both sets of texts have to be taken in their primary sense. Again, Brahman which is ever all-knowing etc. can never come under the influence of ignorance: 'From Him, who is omniscient in general and all-knowing in general, and whose austerity is characterized by knowledge' etc. (*Mu. U.*, I.1.9). Nor can the soul be Brahman under a limiting adjunct, for, in that case, Brahman will have to experience all the happiness and misery experienced by the soul in this world, which would contradict all

scriptural texts which declare the nature of Brahman.

Therefore, the only alternative left is that the soul is a part of Brahman, in which case alone both these sets of texts can be taken in their primary sense. By part, however, is meant that which constitutes one aspect (*deśa*) of a substance. Hence a distinguishing quality of a substance is a part of that substance. The lustre of gems, the generic character of a cow in cows, or the body of an embodied being, is a part of the gem, the cow, or the embodied being. In this sense, the soul which is the body of Brahman, as declared by the scriptural texts, is a part of It. These qualities which distinguish the substance are experienced as different from the substance; hence the texts which declare the difference. On the other hand, inasmuch as these qualities cannot exist without the substance, they are non-different from it; hence the texts which declare non-difference.

मन्त्रवर्णात् ॥ २३१४३ ॥

43. And also from the words of the *mantra* (it is known that the soul is a part of the Lord).

A further reason is given to show that the soul is a part of Brahman. 'One foot of It are all beings' (*Chā. U.*, III.12.6), where the souls are said to be parts of the Lord. The text uses the plural 'all beings', as there are many souls. 'He who is eternal and intelligent dispenses the desired objects to many' (*Ka. U.*, II.2.13). All these souls are different due to different characteristics, though they are all alike as having intelligence for their essential nature.

अपि स्मर्यते ॥ २३१४४ ॥

44. And it is also so stated in the *Smṛti*: 'An eternal portion of myself having become a living soul' (*Gītā*, XV. 7).

(To be continued)



NOTES AND COMMENTS

TO OUR READERS

In considering the problem of the validity of cognition and knowledge, the Advaita Vedānta insists on the principle of non-contradiction. By this, it implies a theory of truth 'which may be broadly spoken of as coherence'. This is the subject-matter of the brilliant and scholarly article on 'Truth' by Dr. P. S. Sastri, M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., of the University of Saugor, who is a frequent writer to *Prabuddha Bharata*. . . .

Indian thought has a twofold concept of *niṣkāma-karma*: one is applicable to the aspirant after spiritual freedom; and the other, to the free soul, the *jīvanmukta*. This is explained in clear and simple language by Dr. Rama Chaudhuri, M.A., D.Phil., Principal, Lady Brabourne College, Calcutta, in her article on 'The Concept of Niṣkāma-karma'. . . .

'The Successors of Guru Nānak' by Sri M. V. Bhide, I.C.S. (Retd.), of Poona, presented in this issue, is a devout study of the lives of the eight Gurus of Sikhism—from the Second Guru to the Ninth Guru—who succeeded Guru Nānak one after another. His article on 'Guru Nānak and His Teachings' appeared in the March 1959 issue of *Prabuddha Bharata*. . . .

The notions of identity and sameness, which are so much woven into the texture of our day-

to-day life, cannot, in the final analysis, stand the scrutiny of reason. That they are based merely on beliefs, which serve a practical end, is shown in the short but stimulating article on 'Identity and Sameness' by Sri Benoy Gopal Ray, Reader in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan. . . .

Every year, the Ramakrishna Mission Sevashrama, Kankhal (Hardwar), observes Christmas Eve, when the life and teachings of Christ are discussed by competent persons. In 1958, Professor, J. N. Dey, M.Sc., L.T., of St. George's College, Barlowganj (Mussoorie), was invited to speak on the occasion. The article on 'Jesus Christ, an Incarnation of God', included in this issue, is the text of the lecture he gave on that occasion. . . .

Rabindranath Tagore's religion was the religion of man; his philosophy, humanism; for his writings breathe the spirit of humanism throughout, giving expression 'to the moods and misgivings, hopes and fears of millions'. In the short article entitled 'The Humanism of Tagore', this aspect of the religion and philosophy of our national poet is dealt with by Professor Sudhansu Bimal Mookherji, of the Department of Letters, Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta, Indonesia.



REVIEWS AND NOTICES

1. THE EDUCATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL. BY ALFRED ADLER. Pages 142. Price \$3.50.

2. PREFACE TO EMPATHY. BY DAVID A. STEWART. Pages 155. Price \$3.75.

Both published by Philosophical Library, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16.

The Philosophical Library has been bringing out, in recent times, treatises of a rather unusual kind, often outside the comprehension of the lay reader.

Original, stimulating, but sometimes abstruse, these books undoubtedly constitute a definite contribution to our understanding of human nature. The two books under review belong to this class.

1. In these days, when individuality is counted as a disvalue even in democratic countries, it is refreshing to read a volume devoted to the cause of the individual and his education.

The author of the first book opens his treatise with

the eternally true statement that 'the individual is an end, and not a means'. But how is this to be translated into practice? The entire book is, in a sense, an answer to this question. As a first step, the author analyses the four problems relating to individuality in the first 33 chapters. The remaining chapters, 34-43, are devoted to a discussion of the education of the individual. The four problems, picturesquely called the Four Horsemen, are the individual's relation to others, his sense of equality, the possibility of his escape from the ephemeral, and the meaning of his actions. These problems are analysed, and on the basis of that analysis, suggestions for education are made.

The author draws freely on European literature and depth psychology to illustrate and elaborate his ideas, which are slightly out of the ordinary. The language is highly figurative, often mystical. It may tax the patience of the ordinary reader. Even the chapter headings are unusual e.g. Chapter XIV—'Reddish Nine Imperial Royal'; Chapter XL—'What Do You Mean, My Mother?' And the author does not make any important contribution to the elucidation of the value of the individual. All the same the book is worth studying carefully.

2. Socrates believed that correct knowledge will necessarily lead to correct conduct or virtue. However, we know to our cost how wide is the gap between *knowing* and *doing*. 'To close this gap is... the most challenging problem in the world today.' The author of the second book offers 'empathy' as a solution to this problem. This empathy is very different from what the ordinary psychologist understands by the term. *The Dictionary of Psychology* (James Drever) defines empathy as 'feeling oneself into, and losing one's identity in, a work of art'. Our author, on the other hand, holds that 'to empathize is not only to feel, think, and act like another person, but also to learn *how one differs from him*' (p. 151; italics are the reviewer's). Not the loss of individuality, but the intensification of it is the result of this act of empathy. The entire volume is devoted to the elucidation of this new concept in psychology.

In the first three chapters, the author discusses the role of empathy in psychology, ethics, and group dynamics. The remaining six chapters are devoted to a clarification of the nature of empathy. The author draws heavily on Freud; but it must be said that he tries to improve on the great psycho-analytic leader's concepts of 'identification', 'transference', and 'resistance'. The empathetic probe is applied to these processes of the unconscious, and it is shown how they make for the understanding of one's self and the other self, with which one's self is in contact at the moment.

Empathy is a creative process, and is the basis of personal knowing (chapter I). On the basis of this knowing, the author develops the basic concepts of a new *personal psychology*, original, thought-provoking, and pregnant with great possibilities. And in the course of his discussion, the author highlights the need for a new approach to methodology in psychology. The modern scientific approach, heavily weighted with analysis and atomizing is unhelpful. We want to understand the *whole* individual. Measurement, statistics, etc., will not help. Empathy contains the answer. The intuitive and non-quantitative approach alone is the correct one in psychology. The author defends, throughout the book, the methods of psycho-analysis, and gives straight answers to Eysenck's criticisms of modern psychology. In the reviewer's view, the book is a very fair and objective evaluation of the present position in psychology. It is a book that must be read by all students of psychology, sociology, and psychiatry, as, right through the book, the author takes particular care to apply the pragmatic test to the theory by showing its curative implications in medicine.

PROFESSOR P. S. NAIDU

HUMAN RELATIONS AND POWER. BY ALBERT MUELLER-DEHAM. *Published by Philosophical Library, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16. Pages xxi+407. Price \$3.75.*

Here is another substantial and valuable treatise brought out by the Philosophical Library. At the moment, many of us are preoccupied with understanding the social forces which are shaping the mighty events of contemporary world. Sociology is gradually coming to the forefront as a science, to which we can turn for help when sorely perplexed by the contemporary scene in politics, economics, industry, etc. Yet sociology lacks those firm concepts, hypotheses, and laws which are needed for understanding, predicting, and controlling events in the complex fields mentioned above, for the obvious reason that these fields are, first and foremost, fields of human relationship; and human relationship is not easily subject to scientific treatment. Only an approximation to truth can be made here, and even this approximation seems to elude the sociologist. It is here that the significant contribution of our author comes in. In *Human Relations and Power*, he makes a determined attempt to reorient sociological thinking.

The book is divided into four parts: the first two are devoted to a new analysis of social forces, and the third and the fourth to the application of the new concepts to politics and ethics. To the mind of the reviewer, the second part appears to be the most arresting section of the volume. Here is a new analysis of *power* as a force in social relations; and then

there is a synthesis of the emerging concepts with those in the first part. Out of this analysis-cum-synthesis arises 'synthetic sociology'.

'However, power being also one of the central concepts of politics, the results of Part II are a foundation for political theory.' Accordingly, in Part III, our author applies his new concepts to a study of important political institutions. He also presents the state, with its forms and types, in a new light, and works out arguments in favour of 'limited democracy with divided power', such as the U.S.A.

The last part applies the sociological theory to ethics. Here the author is on slippery ground. His discussion of individual as well as social ethics is not conclusive. But as he himself admits, this section is only an appendix, and should be treated as such.

Coming from the pen of a doctor of medicine, the book deserves careful study. It is original and brilliant, and blazes a new trail in the unexplored regions of sociology. In a sense the thesis of the book is a plea for the inconclusiveness of sociology, and, as such, must be studied by all sociologists.

PROFESSOR P. S. NAIDU

FAITH AND LOVE. BY RABBI ALEXANDER ALAN STEINBACK. *Published by Philosophical Library, 15 East 40th Street, New York 16. Pages 114. Price \$3.00.*

This beautiful book, one of the best published by the Philosophical Library, contains 37 short essays, the majority of which appeared in abbreviated form in *The Messenger*, a monthly published from the Temple Ahavath Sholom, Brooklyn, of which the author is senior Rabbi. It discusses the various spiritual problems that beset humanity today. The sagely suggestions and solutions offered reveal the author's real affection for the worldly, lost in lust and lucre. Spiritual values, which are unfortunately at a sad discount nowadays, are given an important place in moulding the life of man.

The Rabbi says: 'Unless there be a spiritual hunger throbbing in a man's existence, he is on his way to stagnation' (p. 24). 'Finding God means He becomes so real to us that we can hold intimate conversation with him in the manner of Moses as described in scripture: "And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face as a man speaketh unto his friend." Perhaps we do not possess the spiritual stature of a Moses, but this should not deter us from *wanting* and needing to speak with God face to face' (p. 39). 'We are slow to realize that God is always calling upon us, always striving to break through the material walls that close us in. But we go about our mundane ways without giving heed. We rely completely upon our own human vocabulary, only to discover some

day that it is inadequate for speech with the Divine. One must be conversant with a Divine vocabulary in order to converse with the Divine' (p. 56). 'Your brother's heart is God's altar and when you lay upon it offerings of love and understanding, you consecrate the divine familyhood of which God is the universal Father' (p. 107). 'Behind and above the pulsebeat of the universe is the Infinite Spirit that animates all. The universe is a partial manuscript of which every human is a syllable. Every life—your life and my life, and all life that ever was and is destined yet to be—comes from the same source' (p. 101).

These poetic and highly spiritually significant passages quoted above are enough to show the worth of the book. There is something for everyone in this inspiring book.

SHITAMSHUCHAITANYA

HOMAGE TO ŚAÑKARA. BY T. M. P. MAHADEVAN. *Published by Ganesh & Co. (Madras) Private Ltd., Madras-17. 1959. Pages 51. Price Re. 1.50.*

The book under review is the fourth published in the *Śaṅkara Jayanti Series*. It contains a short account of the life and teachings of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, who saved India from the onrush of non-Vedic forces which threatened the very life of the nation. As the learned author says: 'He diagnosed the disease that was eating into the vitals of society as one which had its roots in disunity, and prescribed the only remedy that would effect a cure, viz., the saving knowledge of unity, the Upaniṣadic philosophy of the non-dual Spirit' (p. 3).

This book does not claim to be exhaustive, but it can certainly be a popular introduction to Śaṅkara and his philosophy. Only a very brief statement of the Advaita Vedānta as expounded by Śaṅkara finds place in the pages of the book, the presentation of which, of course, bears the stamp of the scholarship of Dr. Mahadevan.

In the book are also included two hymns with English translation: *Toṭakāṣṭakam*, a hymn in praise of Śaṅkara by Toṭakācārya, and *Gurvaṣṭakam*, a homage to the *guru* by Śaṅkara himself. Seven beautiful illustrations depicting some of the notable events in the life of the great teacher have adorned the book. The general get-up of the book keeps to the excellent standard of the Ganesh & Co. publications. It gives one real pleasure to recommend this book to every student of Śaṅkara and his philosophy.

SHITAMSHUCHAITANYA.

WHISPERS FROM ETERNITY. BY PARAMAHANSA YOGANANDA. *Second Edition. Published by*

Self-realization Fellowship, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 1958. Pages 266. Price \$3.00.

This book 'whispers' from every page of it the devotional outpourings from the heart of a *yogin*, which, if devoutly listened to and brought into practice in daily life, are sure to 'restore in many men the wilting blossom of high aspiration'.

The soulful prayers and thoughts that are contained in the book can be read with profit by the followers of all religions; and they give 'answers to questions of the modern scientific mind, seeking God intelligently'.

The book is divided into four sections: Section I contains Prayers and Soul Thoughts; Section II, Invocations to the Manifestations of God in the Temples of Great Lives; Section III, Children's Prayers; and Section IV, Experiences in Superconsciousness and Messages to Devotees. At the end of the book, there is a useful glossary to explain Sanskrit words and other expressions used in spiritual parlance. The printing and the general appearance of the book are pleasing and attractive.

S. A.

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION NEW DELHI

REPORT FOR 1958

The Mission's activities in Delhi come under the following heads:

Religious and Cultural: Regular discourses and occasional lectures conducted in the Ashram premises as well as outside, *bhajans*, worship, and meditation conducted in the temple, and observance of the birthdays of Sri Ramakrishna, Sri Sarada Devi, Swami Vivekananda, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Jesus Christ, Bhagavān Buddha, Guru Nānak, and Śrī Śaṅkara. The weekly religious classes on Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtras*, commenced last year, were continued during the year at the Vivekananda Hall of the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, under the auspices of the Vedanta Samiti of the University, which was formed in 1952 by some of its staff and students with a view to study Vedānta in all its phases. An average of 150 students and staff attended these classes conducted every Sunday morning. Thirty-nine discourses on *Tulasī Rāmāyaṇa* were arranged during the year at the Mission premises, and the total attendance was 35,100. The number of weekly religious classes conducted within the Mission premises and outside were 25 and 23, with a total attendance of 31,000 and 3,635 respectively. About 100 students took advantage of the Sanskrit classes held four days in a week.

At the request of the Government of India, the Secretary went on a lecture tour of Japan in September-October 1958; and he visited Singapore and Fiji Islands on his way back. In all these places, he addressed a number of university groups and other

distinguished gatherings on the life and thought of the Indian people.

Library: Total number of books: 10,751; newspapers: 14; periodicals: 103. Number of books issued: 10,580. Average daily attendance at the reading room: 350.

Medical: The Outdoor General Dispensary: The treatment is mainly based on the homoeopathic system. Number of patients treated: 49,476 (new cases: 14,027).

The Tuberculosis Clinic: Number of patients treated in the clinic: 1,08,644 (new cases: 1,937). Indoor cases treated in the observation wards: 531, of which 262 were women. Free milk, donated by CARE, was supplied to 400 families of the patients.

The Sarada Mahila Samiti: This is an informal group of women inspired by the ideals of the Mission and devoted to silent service. Apart from rendering valuable help to the Mission in its various activities, the Samiti continued its programme of social work in the Lady Hardinge Medical College Hospital for women and children. The Samiti also commenced in the Mission premises a moral and spiritual education class for children between the ages 6 and 12. About 60 children attended the classes.

THE RAMAKRISHNA SEVASHRAMA SHYAMALATAL, HIMALAYAS

REPORT FOR 1958

The Ramakrishna Sevashrama at Shyamalatal is a charitable institution consisting of a dispensary and a hospital. It was started in 1914 as part of the philanthropic activity carried on by the Vivekananda

Ashrama founded by Swami Virajanandaji. It stands in the interior part of the Himalayas amidst picturesque surroundings at a height of about 4,944 ft. above the sea level and at a distance of 16 miles from the nearest railway station of Tanakpur, N. E. Railway. It is the only institution of its kind within a radius of 15 miles, and caters to the medical needs of the poor and helpless people within this region. In its indoor department, the Sevashrama has provision for 12 beds, which is too short of its requirements. Number of patients treated in 1958: outdoor: new cases: 6,564; old cases: 1,824; total: 8,388; indoor: 188.

There is also a veterinary department for the treatment of domestic animals. Number of cases treated in this department in 1958: outdoor: 1,959 (new cases: 1,651; repeated cases: 308); indoor: 8. Total: 1,967.

Urgent Needs of the Sevashrama:

1. For increasing the number of beds in the indoor department and to furnish the hospital with up-to-date medical appliances Rs. 25,000
2. A Permanent Fund for the upkeep of the hospital and for general expenses Rs. 50,000
3. A Permanent Fund for the treatment of animals Rs. 25,000

**SRI RAMAKRISHNA KUTIR
ALMORA, HIMALAYAS**

This Ashrama, a branch centre of the Ramakrishna Math, Belur, came into existence in 1916 through the efforts of Swami Turiyanandaji and Swami Shivanandaji, two of the direct disciples of Sri Ramakrishna. It is situated in a secluded, charming spot of the Himalayas, on the outskirts of the little town of Almora in Uttar Pradesh. It commands a beautiful view of the Himalayan snow-range, and is free from the din and bustle of town life. Thus it serves as an ideal place for an exclusive life of meditation and *tapasyā*.

It was the earnest desire of Swami Vivekananda that there should be some monasteries in the silent and sublime retreats of the Himalayas, where *sannyāsins* and *brahmacārins* of the Ramakrishna Order could stay during their periods of leave from active work and devote themselves exclusively to spiritual practices and scriptural studies. This Ashrama has fulfilled that desire of the Swami partially. It has been of great help to those members of the Order who have completed a strenuous period of useful and active service elsewhere, as also to other friends and devotees who wish to spend some time exclusively in spiritual practice.

The Ashrama is situated on the road to the famous sacred places of pilgrimage, such as Kailas and Manasarovar, and as such, it serves as a convenient halting place for monks and other pilgrims on their way to and from these places. It offers them accommodation and pecuniary and other aids whenever necessary.

The Ashrama is now in a position to accommodate 25 *sādhus* and 10 guests at a time. There is a library containing 4,000 books.

Present Needs of the Ashrama:

1. Puja and Sadhu Seva Fund .. Rs. 6,000
2. Building Repairs and Maintenance Rs. 2,000
3. Extension of the library, prayer hall, and lecture hall Rs. 35,000

**THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION
MANGALORE**

REPORT FOR 1958

Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama was started in Mangalore in 1947, and at the persistent demand of the public, a branch of the Mission also was opened in 1951. A permanent site measuring about 7 acres with a building situated on it was acquired through gift from the Hindu Seva Sangha of Mangalore in August 1951. The Mission also took charge of the Balakashrama till then managed by the Hindu Seva Sangha. In April 1955, an outdoor charitable dispensary was started.

The Boys' Home (Balakashrama): It maintains meritorious boys of indigent circumstances, irrespective of caste or creed, by providing them free board, lodging, stationery, clothing, etc. within the limits of the resources at its disposal. The boys are encouraged to cultivate virtuous tendencies, acquire the art of social duty, develop refined tastes, and imbibe a taste for the higher values of life. The boys manage the affairs of the Home themselves and participate in the daily routine of the Ashrama, such as the morning and evening congregational prayers. A weekly discourse is being conducted by one of the Swamis. The boys are taught to chant the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the *Viṣṇusahasranāma*, and the *Lalitāsahasranāma*, and to sing devotional songs.

The Charitable Dispensary: Total number of patients treated in 1958: 31,919 (new cases: 8,226).

Some of the Needs of the Centre:

1. Endowments for the maintenance of poor students Rs. 300 per boy
2. A dormitory .. Rs. 25,000
3. Furniture (shelves, desks, etc.) Rs. 1,000
4. Bedding and clothing for the boys.
5. A permanent endowment fund procuring a monthly income of at least Rs. 500 for the maintenance of the dispensary.