

Prabuddha Bharata

OR

AWAKENED INDIA

By Karma, Jnana, Bhakti, and Yoga, by one or more or
all of these the vision of the Paramatman is obtained.



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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Spiritual Talks of Swami Shivananda	1
A Fresh Resolve— <i>Editorial</i>	5
Syllogism and Fallacies— <i>By Dr. P. S. Sastri</i> .. .	9
Slogans for Unity— <i>By Swami Shraddhananda</i> .. .	20

PLEASE NOTE

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CONTENTS—(Contd.)

	<i>Page</i>
The Concept of Mokṣa—By <i>Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao</i>	23
A Plea for Evolving an Indian Philosophy of Education—By <i>Dr. Kirti Devi Seth</i> ..	27
The Crisis of Faith—By <i>Professor Batuknath Bhattacharya</i>	33
Notes and Comments	37
Reviews and Notices	38
News and Reports	40



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उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

SPIRITUAL TALKS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

Belur Math, October 1918

A young man, having seen Mahapurush Maharaj in a dream, had informed him about it in a letter. Now he was at the Belur Math for a few days with his permission. One morning, when Mahapurushji had just returned from the shrine, the young man saluted him with all reverence and said: 'Maharaj, you were kind enough to reveal yourself to me in a dream; now it is my sincerest desire that you should very graciously initiate me with a *mantra*.' As he spoke, he broke into tears and held Mahapurushji's feet with both hands. The boy's eagerness touched Mahapurushji's heart, and he said with affection: 'My son, I bless you heartily that your devotion, faith, and love for Sri Ramakrishna may be ever on the increase, and may you advance towards him for ever. As for initiation, I know nothing about it, nor do I give initiation to anyone.¹ The Master has not implanted the idea of a *guru* in my mind. I am simply his servant, his slave,

his son. Besides, so far, I have not been commissioned by him to give initiation. This much only I know that his name is the greatest *mantra* in this age; whoever will take his name with faith will have devotion and liberation as accomplished facts without further effort. To have liberation, it is enough if one makes a mental repetition of his name. To me, it does not appear that there is any need for initiation over and above that. There cannot be the least doubt that anyone who will take refuge in the Master, with all his being, will be liberated.'

The devotee: 'I call on Sri Ramakrishna with all sincerity, and I pray to him as well. Also, I fully believe that he is God Himself who has incarnated for fulfilling the needs of this age. You are one of his intimate apostles. I firmly believe that, if your grace descends on me, my life will be wholly fulfilled.'

Mahapurushji: 'It goes without saying that I have your good at heart. Else, why should I talk so much? I earnestly pray that you may have the highest good. Now that you believe in his incarnation through his grace, you need

¹ He started giving initiation only after becoming President of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission in 1922.

have no more worry. You are indeed blessed, for it is only as a result of the good deeds of many past lives that one comes to believe in God's incarnation. You have that belief already; why should you worry any more? Believe me when I say that you will certainly get freed from the bondage of this world. Go on calling on him from the bottom of your heart, and pray to him in all humility. He will make your faith all the more firm, and your heart will be filled with faith and devotion.'

The devotee: 'How should I make *japa* (repetition of God's name)? Is there any process for this?'

Mahapurushji: '*Japa* is nothing but mentally uttering God's name again and again with love. Go on doing so, and that practice will bring peace. There is no set process for *japa*; you can do this at all times and under all conditions—while walking, eating, lying down, sleeping, or dreaming. The one thing that matters is love. The more earnestness you have in your practice, the greater will be the joy. He dwells in our hearts, and adjudges everything in accordance with how the heart acts. If the heart has the true craving, if you call on Him with sincere longing, the result will be immediately perceptible. Like a child demanding things from its father with tearful eyes, crave for faith, devotion, and love from Him; you are sure to get them. He is a living and wakeful God, the saviour of the fallen, the remover of the sins of this iron age, full of the highest compassion, the lover of His devotees, and full of love. Go on calling on Him all the time. In addition to this constant remembrance, it is very necessary to sit for *japa* regularly in the morning and in the evening everyday at a fixed place and at a fixed time. Go on doing so.'

The devotee: 'How shall I meditate, Maharaj? I try to meditate, though I don't know what meditation really is, and I don't succeed much in concentrating the mind.'

Mahapurushji: 'It is a bit difficult to have concentration at the initial stages. Meditation becomes more natural when one gets real love

for God as a result of His grace and one's constant prayer and *japa*. Instead of starting with meditation, it is much better, at the first stage, to sit before the portrait of the Master like a tearful child with a persistent demand, and pray with earnestness to him who is ever holy, free from passion and lucre, pure, untouched by sin, full of compassion, the prophet of this age, and the teacher of the world. Pray thus: "Lord, you incarnated yourself for saving the world, and you suffered all kinds of pain for the good of humanity. Here am I, a lowly poor creature, without spiritual practices, adoration, knowledge, devotion, faith, and love. Be gracious, and fill me with faith, devotion, knowledge, love, and purity; make my human birth fruitful. Be gracious enough to reveal yourself in my heart; grant me your vision. One of your own spiritual sons taught me to pray like this. Take pity on me." If you go on praying like this, his grace will descend. Then the mind will be calmed, and it will remain fixed in *japa* and meditation. You will be filled with love and joy, and hope will dawn on you. Pray earnestly in this way, and then make *japa* just as I have told you. If you go on making the *japa* of his holy name, meditation will gradually become natural to you. As you go on repeating his name, try to visualize with the fullest conviction that he is looking at you affectionately. When this kind of thought continues for a long time, it becomes meditation. When you make the *japa*, pray thus: "Lord, help me to have deep meditation." He will grant the prayer; have no doubt about that. He is the *guru* in everybody's heart. He is the guide, the lord, father, mother, and friend. Meditation consists in lovingly thinking of his gracious form or his auspicious qualities in whatsoever way you can. For the present, you go on practising thus. As you progress, he himself will tell you from within, whenever the occasion arises, how you are to proceed further in your meditation. Pray with the greatest yearning, and weep. The tears will wash away the dirt from the heart, and he will reveal his true nature there out of his own grace. All this does not come

in a single day, all of a sudden. Continue in your effort diligently, and call on him. The response is bound to come, and with it bliss.'

The devotee: 'But the trouble is that I do not have that yearning itself. How can this yearning for realizing him be increased, Maharaj?'

Mahapurushji: 'As for yearning, my son, nobody can teach it to another; it comes of itself when the time is ripe. The more you feel the want of the Lord within you, the more intense will be the yearning in the heart. If it does not come, you should know that the hour has not struck as yet. The mother knows best which child has to be fed when. If there is any delay, it is because the mother thinks that the child should have its food later. Her reason is best known to her. The Lord is our Mother. One has to take refuge in Her with the fullest confidence and in a spirit of self-surrender. She is not just like a mother in the physical sense; She knows our minds. She knows perfectly well when a particular child wants Her earnestly, and She does oblige it accordingly at the right moment. Go on calling on Her, go on repeating Her name. Take refuge in Her with complete self-surrender. She will ordain all that is necessary, and that at the right moment. Purity is the basis of a religious life; God reveals Himself soon in a pure heart. Try to be pure in body, speech, and mind. You are a student now; a student's life is very pure. Sri Ramakrishna loved boys who had pure hearts which were free from worldly hankerings. A mind that is untouched by the thoughts of worldly things will be soon enlightened. The other things necessary are faith and conviction. With your heart full of sincerity and faith, accept the instructions I have given you, and start practising them accordingly. You will see that the Master will be gracious towards you, and you will be filled with joy. The main point is that one has to be diligent. The Master would say: "If one wished to be intoxicated, it won't do simply to go on uttering the name of the intoxicant. One has to procure the drug, diligently prepare it, and drink it. Then

only one can become inebriated." Similarly, repeat God's name, meditate on Him, and pray to Him from the bottom of your heart; then only you will have bliss.'

The devotee: 'I came to you with the great hope of being initiated by you; be kind to me, Maharaj.'

Mahapurushji: 'I told you, my son, that I have not received any direction so far from the Master about giving initiation. But you need not worry on that account. Go on calling on him sincerely; he will hear your prayer and fulfil your wish. Know it for certain that, when the time for your initiation will arrive, he himself will arrange everything propitiously. I also add my prayer that you may have the fullest faith in, and complete reliance on, the Master. May your heart be filled with love and holiness; may God increase your faith, devotion, and love every day. I earnestly pray for this.'

As he uttered these words, he sat for a while with closed eyes. Then he laid both his hands on the head of the devotee and blessed him, with his vision still drawn inwards. The devotee also began shedding tears out of the fullness of his heart. As he became a little calmer, Mahapurushji gave him with his own hands some *prasāda* which had been offered to the Master.

At that time, the Holy Mother was staying in the 'Udbodhan' office, in Baghbazar in Calcutta. Swami Saradananda also was there, while Swami Brahmananda and Swami Turiyananda lived in the house of the late Balaram Bose in the same locality of the city. After staying at the Belur Math for some days, the devotee expressed a desire to go to Calcutta to see the Holy Mother and the other intimate associates of the Master. When he asked for Mahapurushji's permission, he said: 'You will certainly go, that goes without saying. To think that you will miss seeing them when you are so near! It is your great good fortune that they are all in Calcutta at this time. One hardly gets such an opportunity. First, go to Baghbazar to see the Holy Mother. She is the

Mother of us all, none other than the Mother of the universe Herself. She incarnated herself for fulfilling the mission of the Master. The world is blessed by her very presence. None of us can understand her. Who, indeed, can understand her, since she is so guarded in the expression of her divine moods? She eludes everybody's mental grasp. She lives like an ordinary housewife, attending to her chores and meeting the needs of the devotees. Who ever can divine that she is none other than the divine Mother Herself? The Master told me one day: "The Mother who is there in the temple (of Kālī) and this Mother in the concert-tower are the same." Make your obeisance to the Mother and pray for faith and devotion. One can get devotion or liberation only when the Mother is pleased. There is Sharat Maharaj (Swami Saradananda) also at the 'Udbodhan' office, a most devoted attendant of the Holy Mother; you must see him as well. If you request him, he will arrange for your seeing the Mother. After being blessed by the Mother, you will go to Balaram Bose's house, where you will find Maharaj (Swami Brahmananda) and Hari Maharaj (Swami Turiyananda). On reaching there, tell them that I have sent you from the Belur Math for being blessed by them, and they will bless you. Maharaj is none other than the mind-born son of the Master. When you get his blessing, know that it is as good as the Master's. The world is now deriving the spiritual power of the Master through him. Hari Maharaj is, as it were, Śukadeva himself—a veritable manifestation of Vedānta in human form, a knower of Brahman. So long as they are on this earth, humanity is getting immense benefit by their sight, association, and blessing. After this, they will reveal themselves only during meditation, and one will have their vision in one's mind with great effort. When you return home, meditate on the days you have spent in this monastery, on the holy river Gaṅgā, amidst so many monks of great spiritual attainments. That will make your mind holy. You are a blessed man.'

Dacca, 1922

Mahapurush Maharaj visited Dacca in the beginning of 1922. While staying at the monastery there, one evening he joined the 'Gaurāvāsa Sammelana' at the earnest request of the devotees. As the news of his coming visit spread, many devoted men and women and monks assembled at the place. In accordance with the practice of the Sammelana, a devotee first sang a religious song beginning with the words, 'Lose thyself, O thou black-bee of my mind, at the lotus-feet of Sri Ramakrishna' etc. Next, the *Kathāmṛta* (*The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*) was to have been read. But the devotees were eager to hear Mahapurushji. He, however, insisted on the *Kathāmṛta* being read; and so the reading started. At one place, in connection with the hard rules of a monk's life, the Master says: 'For a monk, it is incumbent to give up lucre and passion. He must not even look at the picture of a woman.' In this context, a *brahmacārin* asked Mahapurushji: 'Maharaj, the Master says that a holy man should not so much as look at the picture of a woman, whereas we have even to speak with them in connection with the various duties we undertake. How are we to acquit ourselves under such circumstances?' Mahapurushji kept silent for a few moments, and then said: 'Look here, my son, did you not live with your mother and sisters at home? When you have to talk with women in connection with your duties, have the same unsophisticated mind and the same childlike attitude as you had at home with the women of your family. Have the idea in your mind that they are your mothers and sisters. But it goes without saying that, unless a special necessity arises, it is best to avoid conversations with women, even though they be devotees, and particularly so when alone. You can talk about the necessary matters in public. You have come to embrace the monastic life; you should always keep your vows intact and your ideal before you whenever you take a step in any direction. You should look upon all women as the veritable manifestations of the Mother

of the universe. This is your spiritual task.'

The *brahmacārin*: 'Even so, if the mind becomes affected by degrading ideas, what shall we do, Maharaj?'

In answer to this, Mahapurushji said rather in a stern voice: 'People in whose hearts passion stirs up under all kinds of situations at the very sight of women are not fit to be monks at all; not only that, they are not even fit for human society. The remedy for them is to retire to a solitary place that is entirely free from women, where they may not even have any sight of women. They should return to society after totally eradicating those beastly propensities through hard spiritual practices. Society, too, has its own rules, its own discipline.'

When the reading of the *Kathāmṛta* had progressed a little further, one of the members of the audience asked: 'What is the best path for realizing God?'

Mahapurushji: 'The scriptures contain various instructions for realizing God, but the final

word is self-surrender. One can be free from all worries only by surrendering oneself at the blessed feet of God, and continuing there with absolute reliance. In the *Gītā*, the Lord instructs Arjuna about *yoga*, devotion, knowledge, and all other things, and then says: "Relinquishing all *dharmas* (duties), take refuge in Me alone; I will liberate you from all sins; grieve not." That is the quintessence of the *Gītā*. The Lord promises: "Free yourself from all ideas of merit and demerit and everything else, and take refuge in Me; I shall save you from all sins." But it is true that complete self-surrender, and taking refuge in God, does not come in a day. It is an uphill task. All the practices you undertake—worship, study, *japa*, meditation, hard austerities—all that is meant for leading you to take refuge in Him. And above all is needed God's grace. If one goes on meditating and reflecting on God, and praying to Him with undivided attention, He becomes compassionate and grants this extremely rare self-surrender.'

A FRESH RESOLVE

I

The new year is come. This is the occasion to make a fresh resolve to do the right things at the right time. It affords us fresh opportunities for reflection and for earnest endeavour in the right direction. Some will hail the new year with high expectations, and many will look upon it with apprehension of greater hardship. To some, again, it will re-echo, even in the prevailing clamour and bustle, the calm voice: 'Believe, believe the decree has gone forth, the fiat of the Lord has gone forth—India must rise.' This was the voice of one who had the clear vision of future India—one who was never a visionary.

The conception of Swami Vivekananda's India is an awakened India dedicated to the service of humanity, an India which will quench,

with her cool stream of spirituality, the burning fire of materialism eating into the vitals of human civilization. Swami Vivekananda, whose birthday will be celebrated this month at various places in India and abroad, studied the condition of the Indian people in relation to world affairs, analysed the hopes and aspirations of humanity as a whole, compared the various ideals of human civilization, described the glorious future he foresaw for India, and pointed out the sure path to attain it. To him, India was to be the torchbearer in humanity's march towards a perfect civilization. He declared: 'For a complete civilization the world is waiting, waiting for the treasures to come out of India, waiting for the marvellous spiritual inheritance of the race.'

That India, after passing through many

vicissitudes in her long national history, is again marching forward to a definite destination is evident from the fresh revival that has been taking place in the spheres of her arts and literature, science and philosophy, economics and politics during the last one century. After a prolonged period of unhappy stagnation, signs of life are noticeable once again in almost every sphere of our national life. 'When the life-blood is strong and pure, no germ of disease can live in the body. Our life-blood is spirituality. If it flows clear, if it flows strong and pure and vigorous, everything is right; political, social and other material defects, even the poverty of the land, will be all cured if that blood is pure. . . . Religion and religion alone is the life of India, and when that goes, India will die, in spite of politics, in spite of social reforms, in spite of Kubera's wealth poured upon the head of every one of her children.'

II

India regained the consciousness of her true self at the end of the nineteenth century, and started expressing herself through various activities in her social and cultural life. She was no longer shy about her religion and philosophy, her conviction and outlook. Enlightened persons in many parts of the world became interested in her ideas and ideals. Indian scholars became zealous students of her past history. As a result, a brilliant group of historians and archaeologists appeared in the land, who were proud of our national heritage. Once, while at Alwar, Swami Vivekananda had felt the need for an Indian school of historical research. Happily, today, his hope has been fulfilled. The national movement for political emancipation gathered increasing momentum and, through crucial stages of trials and sufferings, reached its consummation in the middle of this century.

One remembers how Swami Vivekananda looked forward to the manifestation of *kṣatra-vīrya* (heroism of the Kṣatriya) and *brahma-tejas* (spiritual vigour of the Brāhmaṇa) for the complete renaissance of India. One is thrilled at the distinct expression of these two qualities

in Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and Mahatma Gandhi, respectively—the two great fighters in the nation's battle for freedom. If Mahatma Gandhi displayed the *sāttvika* qualities of the true Brāhmaṇa through his unassuming simplicity and non-violence, his graceful humility and voluntary poverty, his love of truth and tolerance, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose had the *rājasika* qualities of the warrior, expected of a true Kṣatriya. One complemented the other, and the two worked in their respective spheres and dedicated themselves for the cause of India's freedom. With the progress of the political movement, social service institutions appeared in different parts of the country, and educational institutions based on national ideals began to be founded everywhere. In the fields of letters, arts, and science, great geniuses appeared and inaugurated a great cultural renaissance in the country, which touched and animated every department of our national life.

III

The above observations may be supported by many factual records. But are not those just things of the past? The present happenings in the country and the persistent tension outside redound neither to the credit of India nor to the universal spirit of mankind. Atavism in its aggravated form of hatred and jealousy, mass poverty, and universal suffering only prove that the signs of all-round growth so complacently recorded were only a momentary effervescence. It is like darkness becoming all the more intense after the dazzling glow of the radiant flowers of a sudden fireworks display. It seems humanity is looking forward to discovering new cures for the devastating ills it suffers from. The previous remedies seem to have exhausted themselves of their potency. Instead of a bright future of a good and purposeful life on earth, which seeks the higher values, as prophesied by Swami Vivekananda, humanity seems doomed for an inglorious and painful death, since resurgent India is unable to play her part for the redemption of mankind.

But before resigning itself to such a fate, the present generation should ask itself whether it has accepted the seer's message and endeavoured to live up to it. Swami Vivekananda wanted a hundred thousand sincere workers, men and women, to preach 'the gospel of salvation, the gospel of help, the gospel of social raising-up, the gospel of equality'. Men, sincere to the backbone and ready to sacrifice everything for the country, were required to make India great. Have we tried to make ourselves worthy of the cause? The inherent drawbacks in our national character did not miss his eyes. With the eyes of a seer, he saw our lack of physical strength and want of obedience, generosity, and faith in ourselves. Impracticality and loss of seriousness were pointed out as gross deterrents. We pretend to know more than we actually do, and we pose to be wiser than we really are. We look upon almost everything with ridicule, and what is worse, we have no *śraddhā*. Swami Vivekananda emphasized the importance of maintaining the cultural integrity of the country, and warned us not to be dragged away from the real moorings of Indian national life. The Swami said: 'Don't for a moment think that it would be better for India if all the Indians dressed, ate, and behaved like another race.' According to him, organization, accumulation of power, and co-ordination of wills were the basic needs for making India great. He wanted us to always remember that every nation must save itself, and dependence on others in any sphere could seldom be expected to do any good.

IV

Independent India is conscious of her weakness, and she is striving hard to make it up. Development plans are there, and the country is passing through an industrial revolution silently, but steadily. Educational schemes are being formulated in plenty, and institutions are coming up in large numbers. Mills, factories, and industrial units are being installed, and thousands of our young men are being trained to operate them. Production is going

up, and encouraging data about national achievements are being prepared. But at the same time, one cannot ignore the dismal impression one gets from the unmistakable signs of dissatisfaction and frustration writ large in the faces of people from almost all strata of our society, particularly of our young men. The question that is commonly asked is, What positive gains have we made since the attainment of our independence? Has the nation been able to secure to all the citizens, 'justice—social, economic, and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; equality of status and of opportunity'? Has it been able 'to promote among them all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation'? The answer, we are afraid, will be far from encouraging. For this the Constitution can hardly be blamed; the fault lies somewhere else.

Our plans are basically sound. The available resources are tolerably encouraging, but the fault would seem to lie with the men who are entrusted with the task of executing the plans. What is lacking is the right type of men to implement these plans—men who are expected to give shape to the ideas of the leaders. The society that should provide the various fields of activity with suitable personnel looks sick and diseased; and the basic qualities, viz. personal integrity, sincerity of purpose, faith in the genius of the country, love for humanity, and above all, honesty in dealings, are sadly lacking in most of the people. As such, our present society is not able to produce the right type of men to build up India according to the chalked-out plan. This is due to our ignoring the key-note of our national life. In our hectic haste to make ourselves modern, we have almost banished religion. Science and technology, industry and agriculture, art and architecture, in fact, our national progress will be of no value without religion, which has ever been the life-force flowing in the veins of the nation. Swami Vivekananda said: 'The banner of the spiritual cannot be raised too high in this country. In it alone is salvation.' 'If you succeed in the at-

tempt to throw off your religion, and take up either politics or society or any other thing as your centre, as the vitality of your national life, the result will be that you will be extinct.' Do we prefer extinction to regeneration? The Swami has pointed out the way to regeneration, both individual and national. Should we not listen to his voice and pay heed to his warning?

V

The regrettable fact is that our leaders have not paid sufficient attention to the human element in our country; they have put more emphasis on machines than on individuals. That is the principal defect. No particular system of politics has ever been able to change the condition of a nation or a community. The security of a civilization can be guaranteed only if it is based on the goodness of men, and this goodness can be achieved only through spiritual culture. Religion, as distinct from rituals and dogmas, is the cohesive force that can hold together the diverse people of the land in their pursuit of the ideal. Swami Vivekananda declares: 'But if you attempt to get the secular knowledge without religion, I tell you plainly, vain is your attempt in India, it will never have a hold on the people.' One cannot deny that the present state of things in our country only corroborates the above observation. Instead of a harmonious growth all round, signs of disintegration are visible in several spheres of our social and national life.

But the blunder can yet be rectified, before it is too late. A nation cannot be built up overnight. The passion for only spectacular achievements will not serve the purpose. Society is similar to an organism, and national growth is an organic one. Fortunately for us, other encouraging forces seem to be working at the background to rectify the lost balance. India's bright future, as was revealed to Swami Vivekananda, seems to be coming true, though unawares. 'The beginnings of such things', says H. G. Wells, 'are never conspicuous. Great movements of the racial soul come at first "like a thief in the night", and then sud-

denly are discovered to be powerful and world-wide.' India's success, by her rational and humanistic outlook, in international and other spheres, where she has been able to maintain her integrity and genius, is a sure indication of that. The message of harmony of faiths of Sri Ramakrishna, with its resultant feeling of the understanding of inter-racial concord, the universal humanism of Rabindranath Tagore, and the gospel of non-violence preached by Mahatma Gandhi have raised India in the estimation of the world. Humanity, in its eternal quest for happiness and peace, love and order, wisdom and higher culture, is eagerly looking to India for guidance. She cannot and should not fail. If she is to live, she must live to show the light that has been given unto her by history and tradition. Progress in other fields also will never go in vain if we do not hesitate any further in accepting the message of this great seer of modern India. The superstructure already built up will justify the tremendous sacrifice so far made, if only proper attention is given to the human foundation. Is it not now high time to see things in their proper perspective?

VI

Swami Vivekananda prescribed a true type of education as the panacea of all social evils. It is heartening that our present leaders and educationists are striving their utmost to evolve a system of education best suited to India. Before searching for new systems and paradigms, it is advisable that they should listen to the voice of Swami Vivekananda, the voice through which India spoke about her ideals and aspirations, her method of work, and her mission in life. The future of India is in the making in our schools and colleges, and the nation for the moment is greatly worried about the growth and training of our students. The curriculum is long and tedious. In it, there is hardly any indication of the ways in which our students are to build up their character. No doubt, the latest findings of history and economics, science and technology are being continuously

incorporated in our school and college syllabi, but not so the findings about our own national culture and genius, its potentiality and solidarity, and its glorious achievements. Is it not reasonable to expect that our young people should know more about these? And we have these things presented to us in clear language in the immortal words of Swami Vivekananda.

Along with the nation-wide rejoicings on the occasion of our Republic Day, let us for a while try to be introspective and listen to this great son of India. The soul-stirring and thought-provoking words of Swami Vivekananda are to be found in several volumes. Will selections from them be out of place in the curricula and syllabi of our universities and school boards? Does not one feel stronger in mind and better in spirit when one goes through his lectures, 'Paper on Hinduism', 'My Plan of Campaign', 'Vedānta in Indian Life', 'The Future of India', Reply to the Calcutta Address, and the like? How Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose felt while going through the works of Swami Viveka-

nanda is thus recorded in his autobiography: 'I was thrilled to the marrow of my bones. . . . For days, weeks, months, I pored over his works. His letters, as well as his speeches from Colombo to Almora, replete as they were with practical advice to his countrymen, inspired me most. From this study, I emerged with a vivid idea of the essence of his teachings. *Ātmano mokṣārtham jagaddhitāya ca*—for your own salvation and for the service of humanity—that was to be the life's goal.'

This is a call not for any particular individual or a particular state or region, but for the whole country. While our leaders of the older generation read Swami Vivekananda's speeches and writings and drew inspiration from them, the young men of today are sadly indifferent to this great seer's enthralling ideas and man-making message.

We believe that his message will still work effectively, if it is given to the youth of India before it is too late.

SYLLOGISM AND FALLACIES

BY DR. P. S. SASTRI

1. Syllogism expresses a content apprehended by an individual, and it is communicated to others as a piece of valid knowledge. By itself, it is not a source of knowledge. It is only the working out in clearer terms of what is contained in the inferential cognition.¹ While inference is a cognition which unites two particulars by means of a general principle, syllogism is propositional, since it is a deduction of the particular proposition from a general proposition.² The concepts are replaced here by propositions which are universal.³ Thus syllogism is the linguistic statement expressed from a de-

sire to establish a truth which is arrived at through the operation of a valid means of cognition. The content of such a statement is earlier apprehended by the individual, and this statement reveals it clearly.⁴ As Dharmakīrti observed, it is a communication of the three aspects of the logical reason to others.⁵ These three aspects provide the two premises and the conclusion. Of these, the major premise is that determined by the corresponding particular facts.⁶

The logical reason gives us a knowledge of the major term because of a necessary relation

¹ NB., III.1.

² TS. and TSP., 431; TM., 13.

³ cf. Sigwart, I.326.

⁴ PVA., 498.4-5; NBT., 21.3-4; 46.2-6. cf. Kir., II.331.

⁵ NB., III.1.

⁶ NB., III.14; NBT., 52.6-7.

between two facts. This relation is a consequence of our ascertaining that the reason is dependent on the existence of the predicated major term. In the case of an analytical judgement, this ascertainment is made by applying the law of non-contradiction, which excludes the contrary. Then we begin to syllogize by recollecting implicitly the general proposition, which declares that its subject is inseparably related to its predicate. Thus, we remember a general proposition like 'Whatever is a product is impermanent'. Then we relate this recollected general proposition to the particular case. We argue that the character of a product being present in the sounds, the sounds are impermanent. The remembered general statement represents the knowledge of the logical reason and its inseparable relation to the major term. The cognition of the syllogism, in reality, is represented by the minor premise, where we show the application of what we recollect. Consequently, the cognition or statement of an unperceived entity is only a cognition of the invariable relationship. It is therefore said that the analytical deduction can be employed when the deduced is known to be necessarily present wherever the presence of the middle term is ascertained, and not in any other case.⁷ The major term follows necessarily from the presence of the reason, because it is contained in the latter.

2. The syllogistic formulation originates from a desire to know clearly that which is vague. This desire may be a positive or negative interest in the unknown object, and it is stimulated purely by pragmatic considerations. This desire gives rise to a doubt regarding the possible character of the object. The doubt suggests the means of apprehension, which gives us a cognition, and, when we take this cognition to be valid, the earlier doubt is quietened.⁸ There is thus the knowledge of the end and of the means that can lead to the end. Next, there is the desire to realize the end; and, finally, we have will in furtherance of that realiza-

tion. These three presuppose the necessary relation of the logical reason with something else; and they are followed by the knowledge that the reason is present in the object signified by the minor term.

3. The law of reason, which is represented by the fact of dependent existence, is revealed only in two ways according to the Buddhist.⁹ The dependent entity represents a reference to the same entity, or it is the effect of another. This interdependence is expressed by the affirmative general proposition. As such, one general proposition, either by itself or by its contraposed general proposition, asserts the presence of the logical reason in similar instances, and its absence in dissimilar cases.¹⁰ This law of the threefold logical mark is also known as the law of position and contraposition. When a single syllogism posits a relation and negates the contraposed, we get the mixed hypothetical syllogism.¹¹

Syllogism requires the presence of the logical reason in all similar minor terms. This requirement excludes the possibility of particular conclusions and premises. Then, we can have only the first two figures of the usual Aristotelian syllogism, viz. Barbara and Celarent. The second has a major premise, which is the contrapositive of the first. The contrapositive is implied by the universal affirmative statement of the necessary relationship.¹² The two do not have any ultimate difference. The only possible moods of a syllogism are, accordingly, *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*.¹³

The varieties of the relation between the middle and the major terms determine the forms of the syllogism. The Buddhist has only three basic forms, corresponding to his three relations of identity, causality, and contradiction. These may be called the analytical, the causal, and the negative forms of the syllogism. Uddyotakara holds that the number of the different

⁷ NB., III.14-15; NBT., 52.11-21.

⁸ See NBV., 55.7 ff.

⁹ cf. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 152.

¹⁰ NB., III.32-35; NBT., 57.14-18.

¹¹ cf. Sigwart, I.327.

¹² NBT., 47.22 ff.

¹³ See J. N. Keynes, *Formal Logic*, p.352.

forms or figures is unlimited. The syllogistic deduction of the effect is other than the deduction of the cause. These two forms are to be added to the three that result from the relation of agreement, difference, and agreement-and-difference between the terms. Those five can be further multiplied with reference to the three tenses characterizing the existence of the inferred object. Those fifteen can be further extended.¹⁴ According to the Sāṅkhya system, we get five syllogisms of the *modo tollente*.¹⁵ They are all arrived at by way of an exclusion.¹⁶

4. The syllogism is based upon the logical reason; and the forms of syllogism must accordingly be those determined by the function of this logical reason. Broadly speaking, every logical reason agrees with all similar instances, and differs from all dissimilar cases. The agreement provides an affirmative relation, while the difference gives a negative relation. Since this relation is not between particular entities, we can have a universal affirmative syllogism and a universal negative syllogism.¹⁷ When a syllogistic formulation expresses the agreement or the positive relation, the difference follows by implication.¹⁸ That is, the universal negative is implied by the universal affirmative. The contraposition or the difference may not be directly expressed; but, when the necessary relation is expressed in a positive form, the other is understood by implication.¹⁹ If this is not a fact, there can be no necessary relation.²⁰ When it is said that the healthy X does not dine by day, it implies his dining in the night. Likewise, the affirmative and the negative syllogisms differ only in the linguistic form, not in what they convey.²¹

5. There can be a syllogism based only on an affirmative relation between the middle and the major terms. Such a syllogism cannot have any dissimilar instance. It is based only on a

similar instance.²² Consider the syllogism: X is nameable, because it is an object for an apprehension. Whatever is such an object has a name. Here, all objects of apprehension constitute similar minor terms. But to prove conclusively that nameability is necessarily related to the character of an object, we need at least one dissimilar minor term which can show that something is not an object of perception and therefore is not nameable; and this is an impossibility, since we cannot argue about a non-object. That which is not an object of an apprehension, and is also not nameable, is that which does not exist; and a non-existent entity is neither a similar nor a dissimilar minor term. We do not apprehend such a negative relation.

But consider the case of a diamond, in which we find the co-existence of the earthly and the non-earthly characters. These two characters have a negative relation; and yet, in a diamond, one implies the other. One may argue that the necessary connection has not been disproved or falsified. Whatever is an object to the mind may be nameable. But whatever has an earthly quality is not a diamond.²³ Such an argument from a negation is based on the necessity operating between the terms, and this is an invariable one. We assume an invariable relation between being an object and being nameable. To show that it is invariable, we need something that is not an object and is also not nameable.²⁴ The absence of knowability involves terms that cannot be similar or dissimilar. We cannot therefore negate that which is not in itself negatable. The necessary relation is always a universal affirmative statement, which is capable of being transformed into a universal negative by negating the subject and predicate as well, besides transposing them. When one of the terms is un-negatable, then the statement is faulty.

Is there an inseparable inherent relation between the two? A middle term that is separable from the minor is, on this view, a non-

¹⁴ NV., 49.8-16.

¹⁵ See *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* on 5.

¹⁶ VVN., 30.

¹⁷ NB., III.2 ff.; NBT., 47.8-18.

¹⁸ NB., III.35-48; NBT., 55.21-56.1.

¹⁹ NBT., 56.2-3, 57.14-18.

²⁰ cf. NB., III.29-30.

²¹ See NBT., 48.4-13.

²² cf. Kir., II.294.

²³ KKK., 363.2.

²⁴ See VU., 89.16-19.

existent middle term. If it is not separable, we should say that the same entity, viewed from two points of view, appears as a middle term, and also as a major term. In the production of a pot, for instance, the potter's wheel is separable from the pot only after the pot has emerged. Earlier, it was inseparable.

6. The hypothetical *modus tollens* is a syllogism based on dissimilar instances, on difference.²⁵ Take the syllogism:

This living body is not without consciousness,
Because the absence of consciousness would
require the absence of breathing and the
like;

This body has breathing and other activities,

And therefore it is not without consciousness.
Such an inference, which is purely of a negative character, may be of value in rejecting a contrary conclusion. Indirectly, it can strengthen a positive conclusion; but, directly, it does not establish anything for certain. The absence of consciousness is arrived at from an absence of breathing and other functions. If these two absences are related to one another, they should be positive states; and, then, they are no longer negative. Moreover, it is not possible to make out the absence of a dissimilar term or relation.²⁶ To establish a significant negative relation, we need the law of the excluded middle, which has no logical validity in an ultimate sense.²⁷

What is actually achieved by a negative statement of the reason? Do we negate *only* the property attributed to the minor term, or do we negate the property attributed *only* to the minor term. Absence of breathing can be a feature of the dead body, and also of the material things. It is a predicate that can refer to many entities. We do not gain anything by negating such a predicate, for we are interested only in this living body. And the middle term to be rejected must be exclusively referred to the present major term, with which alone

it is incompatible.²⁸ But breathing and other activities are not found in connection with the non-living bodies. The mere absence of a positive fact does not entitle us to find a necessary connection between the non-living entities and the absence of breathing. It is not a necessary rule that that predicate which is not present in a dissimilar minor is present here.²⁹

The negative form is directed to establish the absence of an object. The absence of the object is to be cognized from the absence of the means of cognition. This is a futile process.³⁰ It involves the vicious circle, if not the fallacy of begging the question. Yet Dinnāga argued that this negative syllogism is always based on an affirmative one, with which it is identical.³¹ But this identity is not possible if the affirmative and negative propositions are not one and the same.

7. The combination of the affirmative and negative statements expressing the relation constitutes the mixed hypothetical syllogism, which provides the most general pattern of all inference.³² But when we are forced to reject the validity of the affirmative syllogism and also that of the negative syllogism, we cannot accept the claim to validity put forth by the mixed syllogism.

8. The syllogisms based on agreement, difference, and both are only those that need, respectively, a similar instance, a dissimilar instance, and the two together. These are only the aspects of the logical reason. Since a logical reason is never complete with any one of these aspects,³³ there cannot be these three forms of a valid syllogism.³⁴ If the three aspects of the logical reason are together essential, every inference must be both affirmative and negative.³⁵

By a process of contraposition, we get the negative premise from the affirmative. Let the

²⁸ See NV., 126.20 ff.

²⁹ NV., 132.2-3.

³⁰ VP., 205.

³¹ Nyāyamukha, 22.

³² cf. Sigwart, I.327.

³³ cf. NV., 49.6-8.

³⁴ HBT., 73.3-8.

³⁵ HBT., 74.22-26.

²⁵ See Kir., II.294.

²⁶ VP., 203.

²⁷ KKK., 363.4-6.

affirmative be the statement that 'Whatever is a product is impermanent'. We take the contradictory of the predicate here as the subject, and the contradictory of the original subject as the predicate. Thus, we get the statement, 'Whatever is non-impermanent is a non-product'.³⁶ This transformation shows that the affirmative and the negative forms do not basically differ from one another.

9. The three forms of inference mentioned in the *Nyāya-sūtra*³⁷ have evoked varied interpretations. Vātsyāyana gives two sets of three forms each. Inference from a previous sense-perception, inference by exclusion, and inference of something supersensible from the sensible are the three forms of the first group. Then, again, we have the inference of the effect from the cause, the inference of the cause from the effect, and the inference from the co-ordinate, forming the second group. In the last, we have actually an inference of a particular from another particular when both are included in the same class, and when they have no causal relation. That is, the first two forms of the second group are taken by the Buddhist as the syllogism based on the causal or synthetic relation; and the last answers to the Buddhist syllogism founded on the analytic relation.

Uddyotakara offers three groups. The first group consists of inferences based on the affirmative, negative, and affirmative-and-negative relations between the middle and major terms. Such a group actually makes the third member of the traditional syllogism an integral element of the second. The second group is based on a reinterpretation of Vātsyāyana's first set. The first inference here is that where the logical reason is invariably related to the predicate which precedes it. That is, the predicate is the ground, while the reason is its consequent. There is a second kind of inference, where we have a logical reason which has been observed as invariably related to the predicate in the other cases. In the third kind, we have a logi-

cal reason which is not common both to the predicate and to the negation of the predicate. These are actually the three aspects of the logical reason, and, as such, we need not consider this group as giving us a new set of inferential forms. Along with these marks, Uddyotakara observes that inference should not contradict perception and verbal testimony.

Vātsyāyana's second set forms Uddyotakara's third group, though Vātsyāyana's illustration of the third form is subjected to a criticism. This third form is an inference presenting a general conclusion based on a non-causal, and yet valid, relation between the middle and the major terms.

Vācaspati takes two of the principles laid down by Uddyotakara as essential to all valid inferences. The logical reason should be invariably related to its antecedent or ground, viz. the predicate; and the inference should not contradict perception and verbal testimony. Vātsyāyana's inference by exclusion is interpreted as the presence of the logical reason in similar cases only; and this is said to be necessary to all syllogisms based on the affirmative relation. The last form of Vātsyāyana's first group and Uddyotakara's second group is interpreted as the absence of the logical reason in dissimilar cases; and this is said to be essential to all syllogisms based on the negative relation. Finally, the presence of reason in similar cases and its absence in dissimilar instances should be stated jointly in the syllogism that needs both the affirmative and negative relations.

The terms designating the three forms of Vātsyāyana's first group received a slightly different interpretation in the *Māṭhara-vṛtti*. First, there is an inference based on a prior experience. Next, there is an inference from a part to the rest. The first is analogical; the second may be causal or analytical. The third is an argument based on a general rule which is applied to the members of the class. This is purely an analytical deduction. Not only are there three forms, but every syllogism has only three members according to Māṭhara. The reason,

³⁶ See *Hetutattvopadeśa*, 17. On NS., I.1.34, Vātsyāyana gives only *viparīta-vyatireka*.

³⁷ NS., I.1.5.

example, and minor term are taken to be the required terms in a syllogism, though he insists on the three marks of a logical reason, in which case the example is not a separate member.

Śabara, however, defines inference as a movement of thought from a part that is perceived to another that is not present before the senses, these two parts being known to be invariably associated. Then he classifies the possible inferences into two kinds only. The first is an inference of the supersensible from the sensible, while the second is based on the causal relation. The former is rejected by Vācaspati in his *Nyāya-kaṇikā*.³⁸

10. The syllogism based on a causal relation between the middle and major terms cannot be always valid. The cause is a cause only after it has given rise to an effect. Prior to the emergence of the effect, it is not a cause. Even if we call it a cause on the basis of our earlier experience, we cannot infer the existence of an effect from the cause, because the effect is yet to be. If we do infer, we have to admit the co-existence of the two,³⁹ and we can infer validity only when we reject the plurality of causes and the plurality of effects. We cannot also admit that the same cause produces the same effect. In the syllogism proper, our basis can be only the law of the effect.

11. Yet the syllogism does not stand the test of self-consistency. Take the argument:

All instances of the presence of smoke imply the existence of fire;

This specific hill offers an instance of the presence of smoke;

∴ This specific hill has in it the existing fire.

Such a deduction particularizes the predicate. But the predicate itself is not a particular. It has to express only the character of the subject. Even in the major premise, the predicate cannot afford to be a class-concept.

12. Every inference is a unique activity of the understanding. It is a single conception.⁴⁰

As linguistically expressed, it is said to have five members, called thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion. There have been various arguments directed even against the order of these members. There can be a valid syllogism where the reason is first expressed, followed by the necessary relation to the predicate. One can also state the necessary relation first, and then give the logical reason as grounded in the minor term.⁴¹

The usual five-membered syllogism opens with a thesis. It is a statement which is to be established or rejected. The basis of the syllogism is provided by the reason, or the middle term, which is advanced in support of this thesis. The relation of this middle term to similar and dissimilar major terms and their grounds constitutes the third member. These three members may be respectively derived from verbal testimony, inference, and analogy. The application of the third member to the present observed middle term is the fourth member. The conclusion sums up the result of the relation of the preceding three members.⁴²

But, if the inferential cognition is supposed to give rise to a valid knowledge which no other means of cognition can give, this account is faulty. If the syllogism is only a collection of the varied means of cognition, it is not a distinct means of cognition.⁴³

14. The first member tentatively assumes the conclusion.⁴⁴ By initiating the syllogistic argument, it functions as a means and therefore as an integral part of the second member.⁴⁵ It cannot have a separate status,⁴⁶ because it merely designates or specifies a problem for an enquiry.⁴⁷ Strictly speaking, the fact to be proved is that which interests us, that in which we are interested;⁴⁸ and this is outside the syllogism proper. Moreover, there can be a valid syllo-

³⁸ See B., 91.15-16.

³⁹ cf. NV., 46.15 ff.

⁴⁰ VVN., 125.

⁴¹ See HB., 56.4-5; HBT., 72.25-28.

⁴² NBV., 5.11-13, 63.14-19; NV., 16.

⁴³ PVA., 489.7.

⁴⁴ NBV., I.1.39; NV., 109.11,12.

⁴⁵ PV., IV.24.

⁴⁶ PVA., 510.22-26.

⁴⁷ PVA., 492.26-27.

⁴⁸ PVA., 495.16.

gism even without the statement of the thesis.⁴⁹ That which is tentatively assumed can begin the syllogism, if all that is required is only a formal validity.⁵⁰ But a fallacious or a doubtful statement has no place in a syllogism.⁵¹ The first member, as Vasubandhu observed, is only a statement of the property of the minor term.⁵²

15. The statement of the middle term is the means of arriving at the conclusion, because of its relation to the major term and because of its similarity and dissimilarity to other middle terms.⁵³ But the statement of the middle term by itself implies the conclusion to be established in the present instance. It is a specific observed fact leading to a conclusion.⁵⁴ The similarity and dissimilarity of the middle term are only aspects of the middle term; and, as such, they form an integral aspect of the middle term. They cannot constitute the third member.⁵⁵ In reality, the example that forms a necessary corollary to the middle term refers to the subject whose character is the major term.⁵⁶ When I formulate the syllogism, I may consider the statement of the middle term to be the basis of the inference; but, for the listener, the basis is offered by the statement of the similarity with this middle term. In the five-membered syllogism, even the application of the statement of the necessary connection to the given particular case may arise from the apprehension of similarity.⁵⁷ The statement of similarity, however, cannot establish the thing to be inferred.⁵⁸ On the other hand, when the logical reason is complete only when its three aspects or marks are expressed, there cannot be a separate third member of the syllogism called the example.⁵⁹

The relation of the logical reason to the pred-

icated is established or proved by induction, by an observation of similar instances.⁶⁰ This observation only helps in expressing the three aspects of the reason. The application of such a logical reason to the present case is not a separate member of the syllogism, though this application gives the minor term only.⁶¹ The fifth member is a repetition of the first, though with a greater certainty. If the first has no place, this cannot be maintained.⁶²

16. If we cognize the logical reason as invariably related to the deduced property, we have the knowledge of the major premise; and if we next apprehend the presence of this middle term at a specific place, we have the knowledge of the minor premise. Then we already know the conclusion,⁶³ and its repetition in the syllogism is futile.

When that which is perceptible is not perceived, there is the absence of that;

Here I do not perceive the perceptible jar.

These two propositions by themselves imply the absence of the jar here, because in the minor premise we have the application of the logical reason 'not perceived' to the subject of the conclusion 'here'.

That which is present is the perceptible which is perceived;

Here such a perceptible jar is not perceived. The absence of the jar is necessarily implied by these propositions. When the conclusion is thus implicit in the premises, it cannot be an additional member of the syllogism.⁶⁴

17. The syllogism requires a proper and complete statement of the logical reason. This entails a clear statement of the positive and negative examples, which alone can prevent the emergence of an incomplete induction.⁶⁵ The middle term, 'smoke', by itself is capable of giving us the knowledge of the major term; and whatever aids this cognition is only an element

⁴⁹ PV., IV.20; PVA., 488.28 ff.

⁵⁰ NBV., I.1.33; NV., 113.

⁵¹ PV., IV.23; NB., III.51; NBT., 59.19-20.

⁵² See NV., 117, 106.

⁵³ NV., 119.7.

⁵⁴ PV., IV.22; PVA., 491.3-5.

⁵⁵ cf. NVTT., 277.11 ff.

⁵⁶ PVA., 489.14 ff.

⁵⁷ NVTT., 278.2-9.

⁵⁸ HBT., 62.11-13.

⁵⁹ NB., III.156-68.

⁶⁰ NBT., 49.1 ff.

⁶¹ cf. PVA., 489.2-3.

⁶² PVA., 489.1-2. cf. TP., 244.7-246.17; TS., 421.

⁶³ See Mill, *Logic*, II.3.2. cf. Lotze, *Logic*, I.122.

⁶⁴ NB., III.40-48; NBT., 58.4-59.3. cf. Sigwart, I.334-36.

⁶⁵ PS., IV.2.

in the middle term, not a separate entity. The essence of a logical reason in general has been defined to consist in its presence only in similar cases, *and* in its absence from every dissimilar case. In this light, the non-analytical or causal reason represents the effect from which we infer its necessary cause; and the analytical reason represents a character which necessarily coexists and which enables us to deduce its antecedent or consequence. This knowledge implies the knowledge that the logical reason is present in similar cases and absent in dissimilar cases. When we say that 'Wherever smoke exists, fire also exists', we have a necessary causal relationship determined by facts. This determinate knowledge requires the explicit reference to the kitchen, where we have seen that relationship; and to make it definite, we have also to say that there is no smoke when there is no fire, as noticed in the dissimilar cases like the lake. Likewise, when we argue from an analytical reason, we say that 'Where there is production, there is impermanence or change, as found in the case of a jar. If something does not admit change, it is not a product, like space'. The similar instance offers the positive fact that strengthens the necessary relation; and the dissimilar instance proves that, where the major term is absent, the middle term does not exist. These two forms are necessary in determining the general essence of a logical connection, because they show that the causal deduction necessarily follows from the presence of the effect, and that the analytical deduction of a character is implied in the very being of the analytical reason. This represents the essence of an example.⁶⁶

The example that is deficient in the predicate is one where we infer the eternity of sound from its formlessness, which we posit in activity. This activity does not have eternity as its character. When we posit this formlessness in the ultimate molecule as an example, this example is deficient in the reason, because the molecule has a form. If we take a jar

as the example in this inference, this example is deficient both in the predicate and in the reason; for the jar has a form and is not eternal. These are three fallacies of the positive example.⁶⁷

When the example refers to an uncertain predicate, to an uncertain reason, or to both, we get another set of three fallacies. Suppose we infer that X has passions and desires, because he speaks like the man in the street. Here the presence of passions and desires in the example is doubtful. When we infer that X is mortal, because he has passions like the man in the street, the presence of the reason in the example is uncertain. When we infer that X is not all-knowing, because he has passions like the man in the street, the presence of the reason and the consequence in the example is uncertain.⁶⁸

There are three more fallacies arising from the relation of the example to the necessary connection between the middle and major terms. To begin with, there is an example which is deficient in regard of the necessary concomitance, when it exhibits only an accidental coexistence and not a logical subordination of the reason to the consequence. Such an example appears when we say that he who speaks has passions like Mr. So-and-so. A second fallacious example is that which does not correctly express the necessary concomitance; and it is present when we infer the impermanence of sound from its being a product like a jar. Though the jar and sound are products, they do not have a similar impermanence. Finally, when an example reveals the contrary of the necessary concomitance, we have another fallacy. Thus we may say that that which is impermanent is a product. But it is being a product which implies impermanence.⁶⁹

There are, likewise, nine fallacious negative examples. When we infer the eternity of sound from its formlessness and offer the mole-

⁶⁶ NB., III.156-68; NBT., 88.12-91.3. cf. NV., 48.12 ff.; P., 708-35.

⁶⁷ NB., III.169-71; NBT., 91.11-22.

⁶⁸ NB., III.171-74; NBT., 92.1-10.

⁶⁹ NB., III.174-77; NBT., 92.11-94.3; *Hetutattvo-padeśa*, 14,17. cf. NK., 27.11-28.5.

cule as a negative example, this molecule being real, it does not differ from the predicate. If action is the negative example, it does not differ from the reason; and if space is the example, it agrees with both the reason and the predicate, and is as such not negative. These are three fallacies. When the absence of the predicate, exclusion of the reason, and of both in the example is uncertain, we have another set of three fallacies.⁷⁰ When the example does not prove the contraposed general proposition, when such an example does not express rightly the contraposed, and when the negative example contains an inverted contraposition, we get the last set of three fallacious examples.⁷¹ In reality, the function of an example is only to state the presence and absence of the logical mark by affirmation and negation.⁷² It expresses, as Vasubandhu held, the relation between the reason and the predicate,⁷³ and the logical reason, according to the *Vādaividhi*, consists in the enumeration of that predicate which is non-existent where there is no property or quality analogous to the predicate.

18. Śāṅkara did not examine the necessity or otherwise of the five members.⁷⁴ It was only at a later date that the Advaita logicians began examining these five members. The syllogism does not require all the five members.⁷⁵ The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, Āryadeva, the pre-Diñnāga Tarka Śāstra, and *Tattva-saṅgraha* accepted the five-membered syllogism. Nāgārjuna, in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, adopts only the first three members, though the *Upāyahṛdaya* attributed to him has a five-membered syllogism. Vasubandhu,⁷⁶ Asaṅga,⁷⁷ and some Vedāntic thinkers argue that either the first three members or the last three are enough.⁷⁸ Cit-sukha, like Diñnāga, seems to argue that the second and the third constitute only one mem-

ber, and that this, along with the fourth, constitutes a syllogism.⁷⁹ The *Nyāya-praveśa* pleads for the relation of the reason to the minor term, and for the example only. Jitāri, however, requires the minor premise along with the positive and negative concomitance only.⁸⁰ Diñnāga observes that a syllogism requires only two inseparably related propositions. Of these, one is a general rule expressing the necessary relation; and the other is an application of this rule to the particular case. This application brings about a qualification of the minor term by the necessary relation.⁸¹ That is, the middle term as residing in the subject of the inference is not enough to establish the predicate, since the example alone in relation to the minor term can give rise to the inferential cognition. The affirmative and the negative examples constitute the reason, because they elucidate its meaning. Consequently, a syllogism requires only two members. The conclusion is actually an analytical deduction from the relation of the two premises, and it is therefore an immediate judgement.⁸²

19. Syllogistic fallacies arise from a violation of the basic rules of the syllogism. These rules are those governing the logical reason, and the fallacies accordingly refer to an incorrect statement of the reason.⁸³ Each fallacy is determined by the unreality or doubt inherent in the expressed reason.⁸⁴ Dharmakīrti thus arrives at three fallacies,⁸⁵ while the Nyāya system recognizes five.⁸⁶ Śivāditya represents six.⁸⁷ Vācaspati accepts *asiddha*, *vyabhicāra*,⁸⁸ *asādhāraṇa*,⁸⁹ *avyāpaka*,⁹⁰ and a few more.

20. The first rule expresses the minor premise, the relation of the logical reason to the

⁷⁹ See TP., 247.5-6.

⁸⁰ See *Hetutattvopadeśa*, 18.

⁸¹ See *Nyāyamukha*, 12; TS., 418; TM., 14. cf. NL., 774.

⁸² cf. Bradley, *Logic*, 235.

⁸³ See NBT., 66.6-11.

⁸⁴ NB., III.76-78, 136-38; NBT., 83.17-22.

⁸⁵ NB., III.78 ff. cf. *Hetucakraḍamaru*, 2.2-11; *Hetutattvopadeśa*, 6.

⁸⁶ NS., I.2.4-9.

⁸⁷ SSP., Section 34.

⁸⁸ B., 311.6, 444.

⁸⁹ B., 444.

⁹⁰ B., 492.

⁷⁰ NB., III.178 ff; NBT., 94.4 ff.

⁷¹ NB., III.195 ff; NBT., 96.13 ff.

⁷² NBT., 97.14-15.

⁷³ See NV., 137.

⁷⁴ See B., 97.4-98-1.

⁷⁵ HBT., 72.21-22.

⁷⁶ PDT., 37.

⁷⁷ See NV., 136; *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, 28, 105.

⁷⁸ See VP., 211-12.

subject. The subject provides the reference to reality; and a violation of this rule amounts to a rejection of such a valid reference. It is the fallacy of unreal (*asiddha*) reason, unreal because it is unproved or uncertain.⁹¹ According to Diñnāga, this unreal reason may arise from the accepted unreality of the presence of the reason, from its unreality to one of the disputants, from the uncertainty, or from the unreality of the subject.⁹² Dharmakīrti elaborates this list into six.

(i) When we argue that sound is impermanent, because it is grasped by the eye, the logical reason is unreal, because everyone admits that it does not refer to the predicate. (ii) A reason which is accepted as valid only in one school of thought is also unreal, because the others who believe in its contrary have every right to choose their own reason to establish a contradictory conclusion. (iii) If the reason is highly controversial or debatable, then, too, it is unreal. (iv) A reason can be unreal, even if it is uncertain. This uncertainty may refer to the very fact adduced as a reason, or to its localization. Thus, if I infer the existence of fire from the presence of tears, the reason is in itself uncertain, since even vapour alone can bring about the tears. (v) When we hear the voice of a peacock and locate it in this bower, the uncertainty refers to its localization, since there can be a mistake as regards the direction from which the sound has come. (vi) Finally, a reason can be unreal when the subject is a non-entity.⁹³

21. The second fallacy refers to the major premise. If the reason does not necessarily refer to the major term, we have the fallacy of a dubious (*anaikāntika*) reason. It is dubious, because it is inconsistent. This inconsistency may arise when it includes some dissimilar instances, when it is present in both the similar and dissimilar cases, or when it is not present in any similar or dissimilar instance.⁹⁴ Some-

times, it is dubious, because it does not refer to the predicate, being too narrow (*asiddha vyatirekī*). At other times, it may not give rise to any conclusion, because it is too wide (*sādhāraṇa anaikāntika*). The dubious reason is that which is amphibious. It can establish contradictory conclusions, because it is essentially of doubtful validity.⁹⁵

(i) When we infer the impermanence of sound from its being an object, the character of an object is common to the permanent and impermanent instances as well. One can as well argue the permanence of sound from its being an object like a jar. (ii) When we say that sound is not invariably dependent on volition, because it is impermanent like a jar or like space, the reason is not present in all similar cases, but in a few only. The impermanence of space follows not from its positive or negative reference to volition, but from its divisibility. (iii) The inference that sound is invariably dependent on volition, because it is impermanent like a jar or space, employs a reason which includes some contrary cases. (iv) The inference of the eternity of sound from its formlessness employs a reason which includes some positive and some negative instances as well; for space and action are equally formless.⁹⁶

When the absence of the logical reason in dissimilar cases is doubtful, then also the reason is dubious. Thus, when we argue that the not-all-knowing X is impulsive, because he speaks, the reason is amphibious. An all-knowing Y, too, can have the character of speaking, and yet not be impulsive. The exclusion of the predicate to a dissimilar subject is not established by this reason; and, then, we cannot say whether the speaker is an all-knowing one or not. This doubt arises from the fact that we are not able to come across an all-knowing speaker. A reason that refers to a dissimilar instance which is non-perceptible cannot afford a necessary conclusion, since it is doubtful whether the character of speaking excludes the

⁹¹ NB., III.78-79.

⁹² *Nyāyamukha*, 14.

⁹³ NB., III.79-90; NBT., 66.11-69.17.

⁹⁴ NB., III.90-91.

⁹⁵ NBT., 69.18-22.

⁹⁶ NB., III.91-93; NBT., 70.4-18.

all-knowing subject. There is no contradiction when there is a real all-knowing subject, who is also a speaker.⁹⁷ Even if we do not apprehend that an all-knowing Y is not a speaker, we cannot arrive at the contrary conclusion, because the argument tends only to a problematic conclusion.⁹⁸ The presence of the logical reason implies the existence of the predicate, and the absence of the latter necessarily implies the absence of the former. Here the reason is doubtful, because from the absence of the reason we are to argue to the absence of the predicate all-knowing. But even if the dependent part is not present, that on which it depends can be present.⁹⁹ The all-knowing Y being the non-perceptible, its absence cannot be ascertained, and, as such, we cannot have the conception of a contradiction arising from this Y. We cannot also arrive at Y merely from non-speaking. Since non-speaking is a bare negation, it can be the character of a log of wood also; nor can we arrive at the character of speaking from the bare negation of all-knowing, since this bare negation can as well imply the same log of wood.¹⁰⁰

When, of the two aspects of the logical reason, one is unreal and the other is doubtful, then we get another fallacy of an uncertain reason. To take an example, let the fact to be inferred be that 'X is devoid of passion or is all-knowing'; and let the reason be that he is a speaker. The person who infers this knows that he, too, is a speaker; and yet, he is aware that he is not free from passions and that he is not all-knowing. Thus the same reason leads to the contrary of the major term. And since a person who is free from passions or who is all-knowing is not a cognizable entity, we cannot maintain that the logical reason here is dependent necessarily on this major term. The necessary relation is doubtful, and it is present in the dissimilar.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ NB., III.93-100; NBT., 70.18-71.15. cf. VVN., 111 ff.

⁹⁸ NB., III.100-101.

⁹⁹ NBT., 71.16-22.

¹⁰⁰ NBT., 75.17-22.

¹⁰¹ NB., III.119-23; NBT., 79.6-14. cf. VVN., 112-13.

The logical reason is uncertain when both its aspects are of doubtful validity. Thus, when we argue that the living body contains a soul, because there is breathing, the reason is too wide. When we have a group of entities having souls, and another not having a soul, we do not have any other object that breathes. Nor are we able to apprehend the presence of the soul in any one of these classes with certainty. Then the relation of breathing to the soul is not definite or certain; and consequently, we cannot have the presence of the reason in any similar instance; nor do we find it in the non-living objects. That is, the logical reason is not known to have a positive relation with the embodied soul, nor can it be apart from the living body. Nor can we establish its absence by the method of agreement and difference, since necessary presence and necessary absence are mutually exclusive. To establish the necessary absence of breathing in the non-living, we must first establish the necessary presence in the soul of the living, and this is an impossibility. Because of the absence of certainty, the logical reason is doubtful, and, as such, we cannot be certain of the predicate which is said to imply this reason.¹⁰²

22. Diñnāga has also introduced a fallacy of the counter-balanced reason (*viruddha avyabhicāri*), almost in the line of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.¹⁰³ It is a fallacy when two contradictory reasons establish the same predicate. Dharmakīrti rejects such a self-contradictory reason, because it is impossible in the sphere of inference. The three varieties of the logical dependence are established by positive facts, and only such an established logical reason is the basis of inference. When the inferential argument is based on the properly observed real condition of real things, there is no room for a self-contradictory reason in the cases of necessary succession, of necessary coexistence, and of negation.¹⁰⁴

23. The contrary reason is that which has

¹⁰² NB., III.123-36; NBT., 79.15-83.16. cf. VSK., III.2.4; NK., 208.

¹⁰³ NS., I.2.7; PB., 239.2 ff; NK., 241.13 ff.

¹⁰⁴ NB., III.138-42; NBT., 84.1-20.

an invariable relation with the dissimilar major term. It establishes an inverted conclusion, since its presence in the dissimilar, and its absence in the similar, instances are found. The logical reason is that which is present in the similar instances and absent in the dissimilar. But, when it is absent in similars and present in dissimilars, we get the contrary reason. In these two cases, the reason is the contrary of that dependent on the predicate.¹⁰⁵ In inferring the eternality of something, the logical reason cannot be the character of a product. Such a reason is a contrary one, because being a product entails impermanence. It is a character present in a dissimilar predicate only.¹⁰⁶

A reason is a contrary one, if it contradicts an admitted principle.¹⁰⁷ Though this fallacy

was enlisted separately by Diñnāga, we find Dharmakīrti treating it as coming under the previous two types of the contrary reason.¹⁰⁸ Since the contrary reason arises when two aspects of the logical reason are contradictory, the contradiction of a tacitly admitted principle is only a case of establishing the existence or presence of a dissimilar predicate.

¹⁰⁸ NB., III.117-19; NBT., 78.13-15.

Abbreviations used in the footnotes: B.—*Bhāmātī*; HB.—*Hetu Bindu*; HBT.—*Hetu Bindu Tikā*; Kir.—*Kiraṇāvalī*; KKK.—*Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khāḍya*; NB.—*Nyāya Bindu*; NBT.—*Nyāya Bindu Tikā*; NBV.—*Nyāya Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana; NK.—*Nyāya Kandali*; NS.—*Nyāya-sūtra*; NV.—*Nyāya Vārttika*; NVTT.—*Tātparya Tikā*; P.—*Parīśuddhi*; PDT.—pre-Diñnāga Texts; PS.—*Pramāṇa Samuccaya*; PV.—*Pramāṇa Vārttika*; PVA.—*Pramāṇa Vārttikālaṅkāra*; SSP.—*Sapta Padārthī*; TP.—*Tattva Pradīpikā* of Citsukha; TS.—*Tattva Saṅgraha*; TSP.—*Tattva Saṅgraha Pañjikā*; VP.—*Vedānta Paribhāṣā*; VSK.—*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*; VU.—*Upaskāra*; VVN.—*Nyāya Kaṇikā*.

¹⁰⁵ NB., III.109-14.

¹⁰⁶ NBT., 77.2-12.

¹⁰⁷ NB., III.114-15.

SLOGANS FOR UNITY

By SWAMI SHRADDHANANDA

It is well known how, at times, a particular pithy expression—a slogan—can stimulate a large group of people towards some specific ideal and course of action. The slogan enables men to forget their differences, even though temporarily, and the individuals in the group are united in a strong bond of fellowship. The power of a slogan is tremendous. Probably, this is the reason why those who seek some sort of leadership in society have to devise, first of all, an attractive slogan.

But a slogan is not always based on comprehensive truth. What is seen on its face may be just a mask, a will-o'-the-wisp that beckons and leads the unwary far away, till suddenly the illusion is discovered and the wayfarer finds himself stranded in a wilderness.

In the field of religion, a good many slogans have left their impress on history. They have

been responsible for grandiose religious organization, unbelievable diligence and sacrifice for the cause, enormous social well-being, as also terrible hatred and destruction. It was surely the power of slogans that, to a great extent, sustained the crusades and jihads. In the name of a certain dogma, throngs of people have combined together, disregarding distinctions of lineage, nationality, and social position. They have exhibited wonderful self-abnegation for their co-religionists. At the same time, they have fought against the people of other faiths and caused streams of blood to flow on the surface of Mother Earth. Slogans for unity did bring unity, but only a limited unity, where love and hate have commingled strangely, and weal for some has produced woe for others. Let us not brush this aside as the inevitable way of the world, as a characteristic of *māyā*,

which is a mixture of light and darkness. On the other hand, a deeper scrutiny clearly shows that these examples of contradictory human behaviour originated in some initial misjudgement—in some immature, ill-conceived slogan founded on a partial truth.

Both Christianity and Islam proclaim universal brotherhood. Their divines take great pains to prove what wonderful power their religions possess for establishing unity among men. That is true; but when we carefully observe the words and activities of many of these preachers, we find that their call to unity contains a big loop-hole. The 'universe' in 'universal brotherhood' is for them a Christian universe or an Islamic universe. Those who do not accept Jesus as the sole saviour of man, or who do not subscribe to the creed of the Prophet, are necessarily deprived of the warmth and light of universal brotherhood.

Lord Buddha manifested in his life an amazing love for humanity. His heart literally bled for all suffering men and women. The teachings of the Master—the four Aryan truths and the eightfold discipline—captivated the imagination of peoples far and wide, for these teachings were free from the intricacies of rituals and the tyranny of priests. The triple vows of submission (I take refuge in Buddha; I take refuge in the Law; I take refuge in the Order) served to build up an unprecedented religious unity. And yet, there must have been some unseen elements of disintegration in this dynamic slogan. The unity implied in it could not go beyond the Buddhist world.

Śrī Caitanya (1485-1533) accomplished in his time a surprising cohesion among large sections of Hindus in Bengal and Orissa through a novel religious discipline. His creed was kindness to living beings, singing Lord Hari's name, and service to the Vaiṣṇavas. When thousands of men from all castes and strata of society sang and danced together in religious ecstasy, they were bound to experience a deep unity among themselves. There is, however, recorded evidence that the followers of Śrī Caitanya did not hesitate to affirm to the Buddhists and

Śaivites that there was no salvation for them without taking the name of Kṛṣṇa! So the unity of men effected by this Vaiṣṇavism was limited to a particular sect. It was not a unity for *all* men.

It could be a total unity, one might argue, by converting the entire population to the faith of the Vaiṣṇavas. But is it not a fantastic dream? We see that the world lives and works under a plan of variety. That seer in the Upaniṣad was right when he said, 'Infinite are the names' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III.2.12). Yes, the inclinations and the aptitudes of the human race can never be marshalled along a single route. That is not the way of unity.

If religious slogans can unite people, they create dissensions also. They cannot bind without their adherents' accepting certain canons, saluting a particular flag. For this reason, some thinkers on world-fellowship do not hesitate to say that religion is not competent to bring about a comprehensive solidarity among mankind. Some other force, closer to our practical life, is necessary for this purpose. A new slogan, intimately related to man's everyday hopes and fears, struggles and strivings, and shorn of all supernatural mist, is all that is called for. Any man could then grasp and follow it with a lively enthusiasm. Harmony and peace for all would then be ensured. 'Workers of the world, unite!' is one such powerful slogan of recent times. We are witnessing every day its tremendous influence in the modern world. Wage-earners are being more and more organized. Facing similar economic problems of life, peoples of distant regions are joining together in mutual sympathy and co-operation. The barriers of race, nationality, and religion cannot stand in the way of this seething process of international amalgamation.

But there is one stumbling block—self-interest. Antipathies, much keener than those evoked between the faithful and the infidels, do raise their head. Conflicts mount. When the material interest of a particular group of 'workers' is jeopardized, that group makes no scruple to dominate and crush another group of 'workers'.

It seems, then, that, far from cementing universal kinship among men all over the world, this slogan falls far short of establishing a stable friendship and understanding even among the working class itself.

Where, then, should we look for an adequate slogan for an all-embracing and stable human unity? Man is to be recognized and respected for some intrinsic value of his own—how can this lofty vision be realized? No caste or colour, no wealth or position, no badge of nationality or social rank, no affiliation to a creed or even to a religion—the whole emphasis is on man, the uninvolved, uncommitted, unprejudiced man, in his pure unsullied dignity. Can this be the foundation of human fellowship?

There was a time in human history when man relied on supernatural cures for his physical ailments, namely, drugs revealed by spirits, incantations, magical charms, and so on. This kind of therapy required unquestioning belief and a particular mental disposition on the part of both the sick and the healer. So it could not be called a universal system of treatment. Its application was limited and uncertain. On the other hand, modern remedies for diseases are not based on any such subjective factor. Penicillin, for example, works equally on men of all countries, India and Indonesia, Poland and Peru, America and Tanganyika. Its field of operation is the scientifically studied human system, which is one for the whole species of *Homo sapiens* throughout the world. Penicillin is therefore a universal medicine.

In the same manner, when we speak of universal brotherhood, it is proper that the means to it should be founded on something which is scientifically valid for all men. The most appropriate slogan for human unity would be one which, instead of allying itself with some of man's exterior insignia, would express the innermost truth of the human personality.

Such a slogan was discovered in ancient India.

When the Upaniṣad called, 'Hear ye all, children of immortality', it did not address persons of one particular following. Its call was directed to all humanity. Every man carries within himself his immortal nature, his real Self, the essence of consciousness and bliss. This is the ground of his personality—birthless, deathless, eternally pure, eternally free. The Upaniṣad wants all humanity to awake to this great fact about man. And what would be the immediate effect of this awakening? Says the *Īśā Upaniṣad*: 'He who sees all beings in his own self and himself in all beings has conquered all hatred by this insight. How can there be delusion and grief for one who sees the supreme unity in creation and knows that one immortal Self has manifested in all beings?'

For the Upaniṣads, the immortal Self of man—the real man—is neither a matter of theological dogma nor a subjective abstraction. It is a tangible truth, verifiable here and now. In the context of this serene truth about man, opinions and ideologies, racial prejudices and political divisions, conflicts and rivalries pale into insignificance. Man the Divine shines in his pristine glory everywhere, in every person. Love, respect, and forbearance for man become a living philosophy of life.

Through centuries of human history, man has exhibited various phases of his worth and dignity. Attempts have been made to establish human relations on these evaluations. None of these attempts, however, has been able to achieve for man a natural and unbreakable unity with all his fellowmen. Isms and superstitions, passions and prejudices have intervened. The foundations of unity were not deep enough. The slogans for unity were based on partial truths of man. Let us try an experiment of unity in accordance with an ancient finding of man's profoundest truth. Let our new slogan be: 'Hear ye all, children of immortality!'

THE CONCEPT OF MOKSA

BY DR. P. NAGARAJA RAO

The Indian philosophical systems are the intellectual and systematized expressions of the spiritual experiences of the sages of the Vedas and prophets like Buddha and Mahāvīra. Reason and logic explain and work out the implications of the spiritual experience. The Vedāntic systems, with the help of reason, put the experience on the plane of thought. In this activity, the Vedāntins of the theistic and the absolutistic persuasions have not forgotten to observe that spiritual experience is beyond the pale of thought, that thought is external to it, or that thought cannot adequately comprehend it. The function of reason is not all in all. It complements the scripture and makes it intelligible and understandable. The criticism is sought to be justified on the ground that reason, the instrument of human knowledge, cannot give us immediate awareness of a thing. It can only give us a mediate knowledge of an object, through the instrument of relations. The inconclusiveness of the findings of reason and the indefinite possibility of its being refuted by better reason are also described as constituting the limitations of reason. Further, reason, which works in terms of relations, is caught in the fallacy of self-contradiction, as shown by Bradley. Apart from all these, the Hindu view of the function of philosophy makes it impossible to accept reason as the highest thing.

The function of philosophy, for the Hindu, is not the satisfaction of our instinct of curiosity; nor is it the analysis of the meaning of propositions and verifying them to find whether they are true, after the manner of the logical positivists. The Indian philosophical systems no doubt analyse experience. But by experience, they do not understand the mere sense data. Experience is more than sense knowledge; it is not confined merely to the waking experience, but also includes the dream and sleep experiences. Experience includes values, feelings, and

emotions. It is integral, and it is not merely what is open to the gaze of cognition. Their conception of experience is more like Whitehead's account of the same. In the words of Radhakrishnan, 'Thought expires in experience'.

The purpose of philosophy is to attain the supreme value. The supreme value is designated *mokṣa*. It is an intrinsic value; it is an end in itself and not a further means to any other end. It is eternal and absolute. It is a state of existence in which there are no doubts or disbeliefs, no tension or stress. It is a state where one has no pains, and is free from the threefold sufferings (*tāpatraya*). The person who has attained *mokṣa* is called a *mukta*. He is not touched by bodily or mental diseases (*ādhyātmika*); not by beasts, birds, and natural agents (*ādhibhautika*); and not even by ghosts, spirits, or supernatural agents (*ādhidaivika*). He does not return to the world of *samsāra*. All the systems of Indian philosophy strive to attain *mokṣa*, though they differ in their general description of the idea and the means to attain it. They all affirm that *mokṣa* is the ideal. In the words of Sri Aurobindo, '*Mokṣa* is the master-word in Indian philosophy'. The purpose of philosophy is not speculative, nor the clarification of propositions, nor the examination of the presuppositions of thought. It is the desire to get rid of the limitations of easy life and the consequent sorrow in it. 'The released soul passes beyond sorrow', says the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. The concept of *mokṣa* is the unique and distinguishing mark of Indian philosophy. The ideal no doubt is a religious one, and it is also pragmatic. We must differentiate this pragmatism from that of the American philosopher William James. The Indian philosopher says: 'It is not modern pragmatism. It is not the view that truth is measured in terms of the practical. It states that truth is the only sound guide for

practice, that truth alone has efficacy as guide for salvation.'

The ultimate nature of *mokṣa* is of the nature of integral experience. The experience is not merely cognitive. Logic studies experience purely from the cognitive standpoint. Experience is a value-complex ; it includes significance and values in it. So the cognitive and the rational mode is not the only way to realize it. There are modes other than the cognitive that give us the integral experience. The experiential realization of reality is *mokṣa*. It is hardly justified to call this a dogmatic attitude. It is also not a pure pragmatic attitude of the American type. It is the quest of the supreme value.

Some critics have laid the charge of other-worldliness at the doors of Hindu thought as arising from the ideal of *mokṣa*. Concentration on the quest for *mokṣa* breeds contempt for all the things on earth, and, consequently, ethical life loses all its significance. This criticism arises from prejudice, and is far from the truth.

Indian ideals have recognized the value of *mokṣa*, not to the neglect of the other three aspirations of human life, namely, *artha*, *kāma*, and *dharma*. They never had a negative view of life. They regarded the world as the place where we learn the art of soul-making. Our Upaniṣads have described two important characteristics of spiritual experience, namely, its uniqueness and the pervasiveness of the reality experienced. The consciousness of the pervasive nature of reality and its manifestation through all life makes one necessarily and spontaneously cultivate what is called 'reverence for life'. It is the consciousness of the fundamental oneness of reality that makes for the fellowship of faiths. We come to know from our spiritual experience that all that exists in this world of facts and values are informed and actuated by the One. The liberated soul knows that all is infinite. Poetry, music, beauty in all its form, self-forgetful identification with any noble cause, and soaring on the wings of the inspired intellect into speculations and discoveries of vast scientific and artistic truths—

all these are the trumpet calls from the divine. From the life and activities of the souls who had spiritual realization, we know that they never encouraged a world-negating attitude.

Desire and wealth are not banned, but we are asked to strive for them in a righteous manner. Nobody can enjoy the pleasures of life without money or *artha*, but we are asked to make money in approved ways. We are asked to avoid anti-social activities. We are no doubt to indulge in desires. Desires are the raw materials that make our personality. If we have no desires, we cannot achieve anything. The word '*kāma*' does not mean merely sex-desires. What is forbidden is the impulsive life that has no discipline. It is very pleasant to indulge in the ways our impulses propel us. It gives us pain to overcome our impulses. It is these unbridled impulses that lead us to humiliating acts, mean motives, and anti-social desires. The impulses are so strong that, even when reason tells us that indulgence in them will land us in social obloquy and material disorder, we are unable to restrain them. It is such an impulsive life that is condemned by Hindu thought. In short, Hindu thought does not cut at the root of desires, but pleads for a careful cultivation of the ends of life. It must not be opposed to *dharma*. Hindu thought does not forbid us from developing all the aspects of human life in an integrated manner. No aspect of human life should grow in a disproportionate manner. The instrumental values of *artha*, *kāma*, and *dharma* are not to become ends in themselves. They should subserve the cause of *mokṣa*. The fourfold values imply an integrated view of life.

The concept of *mokṣa* has a special merit. It has recognized the divine and the distinct element in the composition of man. It does justice to the essential spiritual nature of man. To neglect the spiritual dimension in man, and to merely treat him as a psycho-somatic animal, is not correct. It is an incomplete approach to the nature of man. The concept of *mokṣa* does justice to this spiritual aspect of man.

The concept itself takes on three distinct

forms. But all of them agree that bondage is due to ignorance, and liberation is the result of *jñāna*. *Jñāna* is not the mediate rational knowledge we have. It is immediate integral experience, which enables us to be the object itself and not merely to know it. To attain *mokṣa*, we have to get rid of illusion and become illumined.

Mokṣa, as described by Śaṅkara, is not a thing that has to be attained hereafter. He takes the unique stand that *mokṣa* is native to the soul of man. It is the realization of the intrinsic nature of the soul. That is the state of non-dual existence, which is perfect bliss. Every soul is of this nature. Souls are never finite and particularized entities. The Ātman is one, empirical selves are many. It is *māyā* that is responsible for the separatist fallacy. With the onset of spiritual realization, *māyā* disappears, and the soul realizes its true nature. *Mokṣa* is real, but not yet realized. It is not something that is produced. For that which is born is bound to die, and it cannot be eternal. *Mokṣa* is the uncreated light in us all. Nor is *mokṣa* an attainment. It is not a kind of becoming. We are Brahman, and we do not become Brahman. The scripture says, 'That thou art', and not, 'Thou wilt become That'. Nor is *mokṣa* a transformation. It is not a journey to another place. It is what we are in reality. 'It is making known what is already there, and not a bringing into being.' We are, in the words of Śaṅkara, like the musk-deer that is running hither and thither in search of fragrance, which is all the time exuding from its own body. In the words of Saint Kabīr, we are like the fish in water feeling thirsty. Śaṅkara's conception of *mokṣa* makes liberation possible here and now, i.e. *jīvanmukti*, and *mokṣa* is the birthright of all.

As a contrast to this conception is the theistic view, which holds that *mokṣa* is derivative and not native to the soul of man. It is the result of the grace of God. 'God is not obtainable either by our acuteness of reasoning or profundity of learning, but is accessible only to the loving heart of the individual soul

to whom He grants grace.' No effort of man, nor his intellect, nor his ethical life, can command grace. The grace of God is His gift, and it is not the achievement of man. The scripture says, 'Whomever He chooses to reveal to gets the revelation'. Human longing for God is not the cause of this grace, but is its condition. 'Hunger is not the cause for food, but the condition for the enjoyment of food.' Grace is not limited or conditioned by any external factor. It is the nature of the Lord to bestow grace.

On the side of the human being, he has to make himself ready for the reception of the grace. In the language of the *Bhāgavata*, the problem is, How does one become a perfect flute in Kṛṣṇa's hands? To be a flute means to become hollow. But we are stuffed full with passions and desires. The music of the Lord cannot come through the flute. The sound is gruff and gross. We must empty the flute of self-love, of all *ahaṅkāra*, self-sense, and egoity. That is the celebrated doctrine of the unconditional self-surrender to the Lord, which the *Gītā* advocates.

Critics might say that, if *mokṣa* is the exclusive gift of God, 'if the spirit bloweth where it listeth', there is no certainty of our attaining *mokṣa*. It becomes arbitrary. Vedānta Deśika suggests that, if *mokṣa* is left to be achieved by man's intellectual and moral achievements, he would get it. It is good that the gift of *mokṣa* is in God's hands. God's love of man is infinitely greater than man's love of his spiritual welfare.

It is wrong to believe that grace would negate morality. Morality and ethical excellence are the necessary, but not the sufficient, causes for attaining *mokṣa*.

The Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya, and the Mīmāṃsaka systems also envisage *mokṣa* as the supreme spiritual ideal. They hold the view that in *mokṣa* the soul is without any pain. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system describes *mokṣa* as a state where the soul is divested of all knowledge, feelings, and actions. It is just like a stone; even consciousness is not its intrinsic nature.

The argument of the Nyāya school is that pleasure and pain are inextricably connected with each other, that avoiding pain necessitates avoiding pleasure as well. *Mokṣa* is an escape from both. It is the state of the soul devoid of all adventitious characteristics, e.g. volition, desire, pleasure, pain, knowledge, feeling, etc. This realization is to be had by the removal of the *mithyā-jñāna*, namely, that all qualities are the real attributes of the soul. The removal of the *mithyā-jñāna* is the purpose of the study of the Nyāya logic.

The Sāṅkhya *mokṣa* is called *kaivalya*. It is attained by the immediate realization of the distinctness and independent nature of the two categories, Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Owing to *aviveka* (non-discrimination), the Puruṣa identifies himself with the *vṛttis* of the *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, and *manas*. The realization of their distinctness is *mokṣa*. The Yoga system of Patañjali has outlined a psycho-somatic discipline to achieve it. In the state of *mokṣa*, the soul rests in itself. It is immutable. It is of the nature of consciousness, but conscious of nothing.

The Mīmāṃsā system regards *mokṣa* as a state of existence for the soul, free from its threefold empirical encumbrances. They are: (1) the physical body, which enjoys pain and pleasure; (2) the organs of sense and action, which relate us to objects; (3) the external world, which is the object of experience. When the soul is freed from all these, the things do not cease to exist. They are real, and not illusory. The soul attains its pure state by the performance of the scripture-ordained duties and refraining from the scripture-prohibited duties.

The soul also is not to undertake any selfish activities. The soul in *mokṣa* is consciousness, but, unlike in the Nyāya system, it retains the capacity for manifesting such features as knowledge, feeling, etc.

In the atheistic systems of Indian philosophy, Buddhism and Jainism, *mokṣa* is attained through self-culture based on virtues, concentration of mind, and wisdom. This results from a severe form of self-discipline. Gautama the Buddha exhorts us:

Seek nought from helpless gods by gift
and hymn,
Nor bribe with blood, nor feed with
fruits and cakes,
Within yourself deliverance must be sought.
Each man his poison makes.

But the latter-day Buddhism raised Buddha to the status of God and believed that his grace was necessary for *nirvāṇa*.

From this brief survey, it is clear that *mokṣa* is the master-passion and goal of Indian philosophic thought. *Mokṣa* must be distinguished from *svarga*. *Svarga* is paradise or heaven, which men reach to enjoy the fruits of their *karma*. One of our Purāṇas distinguishes between *mokṣa* and heaven. In heaven, the soul is always obsessed by the fact that he will have to return to the world, when the fruits of good deeds are expended. There is also a feeling of discomfort for the soul in heaven, arising from the differences resulting from different types of joys enjoyed by other souls. The sense of gradation is there. All these are absent in *mokṣa*.



Even after the Truth has been realised, there remains that strong, beginningless, obstinate impression that one is the agent and experiencer, which is the cause of one's transmigration. It has to be carefully removed by living in a state of constant identification with the Supreme Self. Sages call that liberation which is the attenuation of *vāsanās* here and now.

— *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*

A PLEA FOR EVOLVING AN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

BY DR. KIRTI DEVI SETH

Education, no doubt, is the product of and reflects the social order in which it functions, but its function cannot be restricted to this subordinate role only. It has obligations to the social order, no doubt, but it cannot become a tool to simply satisfy the demands which society makes articulate at any time or period. It should condition the course of development of society. With the dawn of independence in India, the latter function of education gains supreme importance.

The prevalent system of education in our country, which has behind it a materialistic philosophy of life, quite alien to our spiritual culture, will lead us into a morass. To prevent this catastrophe, we need to reconstruct the philosophy underlying the present educational structure, so that the nation may stand on firm, solid, and rocky foundations, and that our country may fulfil her destiny in the world's scheme of things. India has to play the role of a guide to suffering mankind, for her spiritual culture alone has a message of peace to the war-torn world.

As befitting a free country, it is absolutely necessary that the national system of education in India should be so planned as to give full scope for the conservation, propagation, and development of our spiritual culture. Aims of life are correlative with the aims of education. We must now realize the need of the truly Indian aims of life, and hence aims of education.

In order to determine the truly Indian aims of education, we need to evolve a philosophy of education from the Indian point of view. We have, in the first instance, to excavate the foundations of our spiritual culture, in order to discover the abiding elements in it. In the second place, having secured the abiding elements, we have to build on them a firm and imposing educational structure, which will preserve the living elements of our culture, recon-

ditioning them to suit the demands of the modern age.

In the West, there are clearly demarcated idealistic, naturalistic, and pragmatic philosophies of education. In India, the situation is different. We do not have a philosophy of education as a separate intellectual discipline in our country, because with us life, philosophy, and education have always been intimately intertwined. Hence, in order to determine the truly Indian aims of education, we will have to isolate the philosophic foundations of our ancient system of education, and reconstruct what we now term a philosophy of education. There is another reason why we need an Indian philosophy of education. As Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says: 'Since philosophy is a human effort to comprehend the problem of the universe, it is subject to the influences of race and culture. Each nation has its own characteristic mentality, its particular intellectual bent.'¹ There are certain marked characteristics of Indian philosophy, which distinguish it from that of the West, and, naturally, there would be difference between the Indian and Western philosophies of education. In India, philosophy is termed as the 'vision of truth' (*darśana*), because it aims at the knowledge of truth. Each school of Indian philosophy—orthodox or non-orthodox, with the solitary exception of Cārvāka—holds, in its own way, that there can be a direct realization of truth (*tattva darśana*). The Indian conception of a *darśana* is different from the Western idea of a system of philosophy. 'In its original meaning, philosophy, as a love of wisdom, comes nearest to the Sanskrit *jijñāsā*, a desire to know, if not a desire to be wise.'² If we take philosophy in the sense of an examination of our means of

¹ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 23.

² Max Müller, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 213.

knowledge (epistemology), and with Kant as an inquiry into the limits of human knowledge,³ Indian philosophy takes a step further, and adds to it the experiences of persons of clear minds and purer hearts (treating them as simple human witnesses to the truth).

Philosophy, or reflection on the nature of reality, is a luxury in many other parts of the world; or, rather, an arm-chair speculation. But, for Indians, it is a necessity; it is a way of life.

The special characteristic of Indian philosophy, as distinguished from the Western, is that, though its different schools express a diversity of views, all of them possess a marked unity within them. This unity is due to the unity of their moral and spiritual outlook. The point of agreement among the different schools becomes evident by the fact that all systems regard philosophy as a practical necessity, and cultivate it in order to understand how life can be lived at its best. The object of philosophy in India (unlike that in the West, where it is confined merely to the satisfaction of one's intellectual curiosity) is to have the life fully enlightened and to help live it with 'far-sight, foresight, and insight'. The reason for the predominance of this practical motive in Indian philosophy, common to all the systems, whether pro-Vedic or anti-Vedic, lies in the fact that Indian philosophy aims at discovering the cause of evils, casting gloom over one's life, and at removing them. Incidentally, it also attempts to understand the nature of the universe and the meaning of human life, in order to find the way of overcoming life's miseries completely.

The different systems have still some more common views. (a) All the systems of Indian philosophy accept the law of *karma*, the doctrine that men reap the fruits of their own actions, as the guiding factor in moulding one's behaviour. In fact, this belief has penetrated the minds of even the ordinary persons, and we can say that philosophy is actually lived in India.

(b) Every system believes that ignorance of reality is the cause of our bondage and suffering, and that liberation from these cannot be achieved without a knowledge of reality, that is, without the real knowledge of the world and the self. There is a universal desire for happiness. Real happiness can be achieved only through liberation from bondage and suffering. Bondage implies the process of birth and re-birth, and liberation (*mukti* or *mokṣa*) is the stoppage of this process. Liberation is the state of perfection and of real happiness. This state of perfection can be realized, according to Indian thinkers, even in this life.

(c) Every system holds that merely possessing intellectual knowledge cannot bring perfection. So, in order to make that knowledge effective and permanent in life, all Indian thinkers have suggested two additional disciplines: firstly, continued meditation on the accepted truth, in order to remove the deep-rooted false beliefs; and, secondly, practical life of self-control, which means the bringing of the lower self under the control of the higher self, in order to remove passions that obstruct concentration and good conduct. Self-control does not imply the killing of one's impulses, but simply training them to obey the higher dictates of conscience and reason. To reach the state of liberation, morality is absolutely necessary.

The highest triumph of philosophy, viz. the vision of truth (*darśana*) which is beyond the sphere of intellect, is possible only to those who have achieved the purity of soul. 'Philosophically, "*darśana*" is putting the intuition to proof and propagating it logically. ... A "*darśana*" is a spiritual perception, a whole view revealed to the soul sense. This soul sight, which is possible only when and where philosophy is lived, is the distinguishing mark of a true philosopher.'⁴ 'In any case, whether philosophy depends on ordinary experience or on the experience of the wise few, reason is the instrument of philosophical speculation.' Such a

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p.44.

definition denounces the charge made against Indian philosophy that its theories are not based on independent reasoning, but on authority, and that therefore they are dogmatic rather than critical.

Indian philosophy is comprised of the philosophical speculations of all Indian thinkers, ancient or modern, Hindus or non-Hindus, theists or atheists. 'Indian philosophy should not be taken to be synonymous with the Hindu philosophy', unless we take 'Hindu' in the geographical sense of the term 'Indian'. In the *Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya, belonging to quite an early date, we find that atheistic and materialistic systems, like the Cārvāka, and the views of the unorthodox thinkers, like the Bauddhas and the Jainas, are given an important place along with those of the orthodox Hindu thinkers. This striking breadth of outlook in Indian philosophy goes to prove its earnestness in the search for truth. Though there were different schools of Indian philosophy, yet each took care to learn the views of others, and did not propound its theories unless it knew what others had to say and how their points could be met. This spirit gave birth to a special method of philosophical discussion. A philosopher had first to give the views of his opponents, and this statement of the opponent's case was known as the prior view (*pūrvapakṣa*). Then he criticized the opponent's view (*khaṇḍana*). Lastly, the philosopher gave his own statement and his proof for it; this portion was known as the subsequent view (*uttarapakṣa*), or the conclusion (*siddhānta*).

These schools or systems of Indian philosophy are divided, according to the orthodox Hindu thinkers, into two broad classes, viz. the orthodox (*āstika*) and the heterodox (*nāstika*). To the former group belong the six chief philosophical systems (generally known as '*ṣaḍdarśana*'), viz. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, and Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. These are called orthodox, not because they believe in God, but because they accept the authority of the Vedas. The Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṃsā do not believe in God as the creator of this

world, yet they are supposed to be orthodox, because they believe in the testimony of the Vedas. To the second group belong three schools: the materialistic Cārvāka, the Bauddha, and the Jaina. They are called heterodox (*nāstika*), because they do not believe in the authority of the Vedas. The Vedas occupy an important place in the evolution of the Indian thought.

A striking difference between Western philosophy and Indian philosophy is that, whereas in the former we generally find different schools coming into existence, each school becoming successively prominent, only to be succeeded by another one, in the latter, the different schools, though they did not spring up simultaneously, flourished together during many centuries, and pursued parallel courses of growth. The primary reason for such a state of affairs lay in the fact that, in India, philosophy was part and parcel of life. As soon as a system came into existence, it was practically adopted as a way of life by a band of followers, who formed a school of that philosophy. They actually lived the philosophy, and transmitted it to succeeding generations of followers, who were attracted towards them through their ideal lives and thoughts. Thus the different systems continued for centuries.

Here we find a clue to the relation of philosophy to education in India. The philosophy of education has not taken its shape in our country as a separate intellectual discipline, for, with us, life, religion, philosophy, and education have always been intertwined. Besides, as is evident, philosophy here has always been the contemplative aspect of education, and education always the dynamic aspect of philosophy. With our ancients, to think out on the creative level a view of life, to translate it automatically into practice in daily life, and to transmit it to deserving pupils was a common usage. Though the different schools of thought were opposed to one another in their teachings, they were all agreed on one point, viz. that all were not fit for all things. In matters of religion and philosophy, each one was to choose that system of

thought and method of practice which suited him best. *Adhikārabheda*, or the recognition of differences in the capacities and temperaments of individual students, was of essential importance to the sages of India in the matter of education, since they regarded philosophy as a means of shaping one's practical life. In India, philosophy was never taken to be merely speculative, hair-splitting, intellectual gymnastic, but was considered to be a practical way of moulding life with an end in view. That is why a *guru* was very particular in examining the fitness of a disciple, before initiating him into his creed or philosophical system. As a matter of fact, each system of Indian philosophy represents a particular way of life, to be pursued by the different groups of people according to their mental and spiritual level. In other words, the ancient Indian was not satisfied merely with the knowledge of the goal of life, i.e. realization of *mokṣa*, but he actually tried to realize it in life.

This ideal of *mokṣa*, being an eschatological one, may lead some to think that it is merely a speculative ideal, and cannot be regarded as a satisfactory goal of philosophy. This is no doubt true, but one must not forget that the ideal of *mokṣa*, though eschatological in concept, is capable of attainment in this life itself, and is known as *jīvanmukti*. *Mokṣa* is not to be attained only after death; one may attain this spiritual perfection in this very life. The idea is that of a continuous progress towards a goal in life, and that goal is the attainment of perfection by destroying the effects of *avidyā*, through the right knowledge of one's own nature. The conception of *mokṣa*, or the attainment of freedom from the limitations and sufferings of physical life, is the supreme aspiration of Indian philosophy. Even in the case of the doctrines like those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Viśiṣṭādvaita, which do not formally accept the *jīvanmukti* ideal, there is clearly recognized the possibility of man's attaining enlightenment here (in this world), which transforms his outlook in this world and imparts new significance to the life led thereafter.

Speaking of the supreme goal of human life, Śaṅkara observes: 'A man is born not to desire life in the world of the senses, but to realize the bliss of *jīvanmukti*.' And the Upaniṣads emphasize, again and again: 'Blessed is he who attains illumination in this very life; otherwise, it is his greatest calamity.' But it is also pointed out that, if a man fails to attain the supreme goal in this life, he will attain it in some other life, for he will be given many opportunities, by rebirths, to reach the goal of perfection.

With a view to helping man to reach the goal, each school lays down a suitable course of practical discipline for its attainment. The discipline varies in the two traditions; but an ascetic spirit (or spirit of renunciation) underlies both, and its inculcation is another common characteristic of all the Indian doctrines. The pessimistic heretical systems as well as the orthodox systems, some of which are optimistic, commend absolute detachment from the selfish enjoyments of this or future life, though, of course, there is a very important difference in the conceptions of asceticism as taught in the two sets of systems. The heterodox system, which believes in the variety and nothingness of life, holds that man, in whatever circumstances he may be, should, once for all, turn away from the world. The orthodox system, on the other hand, regards that the ideal of renunciation must be progressively realized by a gradual purification of the seeker's heart and soul. 'Progressive' means the gradual attainment of the goal, passing through the four *āśramas* of life, viz., the Brahmacharya, the Gārhaṣṭhya, the Vānaprastha, and the Sannyāsa. Detachment, according to the orthodox, can only be acquired with suitable preliminary practices, undergone in the midst of the society; while, according to the heterodox, it could be achieved at any time, by realizing the illusory nature of the world and retiring from it. In other words, the orthodox system regards social training as indispensable for the perfection of character, and the other system looks down upon it more as a hindrance than a help. 'But the social factor, it should be added, is disregarded

by heterodox only as a means of self-culture, and their attitude towards it is neither one of revulsion nor one of neglect. For we know, as a matter of fact, that they attached the greatest value to society in itself, and laid particular stress upon the need for sympathy and kindness for fellowmen. There are other differences as well, such as the pursuit of ascetic morality by the heterodox as the sole mode of practical discipline, and by the orthodox as only a preparation for a fresh course of training, which may itself be different in different schools. But, whatever the differences in matters of detail, asceticism as such serves as a bond of union between the two traditions.⁵ The principle of self-denial was involved, at least for this world, in ritualism, which ultimately culminated in the teaching of disinterested pursuit of action of the *Gītā*, thus finally discrediting the charm of the reward of hereafter too.

At this juncture comes in the problem of ethics in Indian philosophy. Though ethics is not actually identified with philosophy here, yet it is its very foundation, and is the means of realizing the ideals of life. Moreover, ethics in Indian philosophy concerns itself not only with outer human activity, but extends to inner life as well. Every injunction in teaching is conditioned by the phrase 'in thought, word, and deed'. Ways and methods of conduct, prescribed by the Indian doctrines, may be characterized as aiming at transcending morality, but the supernatural attitude bears a somewhat different significance in different schools, owing to their different conceptions about the self. While some schools accept the reality of the self, others deny it in one sense or the other. Buddhism does not think of the individual self as a permanent entity. Absolutism recognizes the individuality as provisional, because it has finally got to be merged in the universal Self. The theism of Rāmānuja and the pluralistic systems, like Jainism or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, recognize the individual self as ultimate. The systems which deny the individual form do away with

the conception of obligation altogether, because the contrast between the individual and the society, upon which the notion of obligation is based, is no longer there. On the other hand, the consciousness of obligation continues in the systems which advocate the ultimateness of the individual self, though they preach the necessity for absolute self-suppression. But here, too, though the distinction between the individual and the society persists, that between rights and duties disappears, as the disciple devotes himself to the fulfilment of his duties without any thoughts of his rights. Thus, the essential duality of the moral world is transcended according to both the views. Even the practical training, imparted during the preliminary stages, aims at this transcending of morality. 'The obligations of the individual are not confined to human society, according to this Indian view, but extend virtually to the whole of the sentient creation.' If the beings who possess no moral consciousness have no duties to fulfil, it does not mean that there is none to be fulfilled towards them. The Indian ideal of life is not merely 'Love thy neighbour as thyself, but, in the words of Romain Rolland, it further adds to the phrase 'and every living being is thy neighbour'. Such a conception of moral action is quite in accord with the spirit of Indian ethics, which considers devotion to duties far above the assertion of rights.

The pursuit of *mokṣa* as the final ideal and the ascetic spirit of the discipline recommended for its attainment are the two common elements in all Indian thought. As mentioned already, in India, philosophy was neither taken as a handmaid of ethics and morality, nor as a mere intellectual gymnastic. It, of course, embraces both under its orbit, but at the same time transcends them. Neither ethics nor logic can achieve this, though both of them help one in the realization of the end. They are the means to an end, and not ends in themselves. Logic and ethics, to borrow the simile from Hiriyanna, 'are the two wings that help the soul in its spiritual flight. The goal that is reached through their aid is characterized, on the one

⁵ M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp.21-22.

hand, by *jñāna* or illumination, which is intellectual conviction that has ripened into an immediate experience and, on the other, by *vairāgya* or self-renunciation'.⁶

We have observed earlier that the different schools of thought existed simultaneously. Their mutual influence, however much desirable as a means of broadening the basis of thought, has led to a considerable overlapping of the two sets of doctrines, and it is difficult to discover what elements each has incorporated from the other. At one stage, Buddhism gained the upper hand, but, in the long run, Vedānta triumphed, which has retained its true Upaniṣadic character, in spite of the modifications and natural transformations it has undergone. Vedānta represents the highest type of ideal prescribed by the Indian philosophers, and is evidently the consummation of all philosophic thinking. The other systems are the different phases of the same tradition, and represent the various steps towards the final goal.

On its theoretical side, Vedānta stands for the triumph of absolutism and theism, because the different Vedāntic schools are classifiable under these two heads. The former is monistic, while the latter, though avowedly pluralistic, is monistic in spirit, as it believes in the entire dependence of everything on God. On its practical side, Vedānta supplies a positive ideal of life. The Vedāntic conception of the highest good implies the recognition of a cosmic purpose, whether that purpose 'be taken as ordained by God, or as inherent in the nature of reality itself, towards whose fulfilment everything moves consciously or unconsciously'. The heretical schools do not see any purpose in the world as a whole, though they admit the possibility of the individual freeing himself from the evil.

The philosopher of education in the West, while discussing the scope of education, has to decide beforehand 'whether one's education is complete without religious education or not'. This question is of paramount importance in India in the present state of affairs, when edu-

cation is not based on any sound philosophical principles. But, while deriving the idealistic philosophy of education from the idealistic philosophy of India—the main theme of Indian philosophy is essentially idealistic—this question has to be examined in the light of India's past tradition, for religion is one with philosophy in India. And this is applicable to all the doctrines or schools of thought. What is religion? Professor Hiriyanna's answer is worth noting. He says: 'Whatever else a religion may or may not be, it is essentially a reaching forward to an ideal, without resting in mere belief or outward observances. Its distinctive mark is that it serves to further right living; and it is only in this sense that we can speak of religion as one with philosophy in India.'⁷

We know that the word '*darśana*' means seeing or experiencing. From this, we may conclude: 'Indian philosophy of religion is not merely metaphysical speculation, but has its foundation in the immediate data of experience. The verities of life, like God and soul, are regarded by the Indian mind, not as concepts speculative and problematical, as is the case in Western philosophy, but as definitely experienced truths. These ultimate truths can be experienced not merely by a chosen few, but, under right conditions, by all humanity.'⁸ As already referred to, this insistence on direct experience distinguishes the Indian philosophy of education from the philosophy of the Western nations. This direct experience constitutes the source from which all Indian thought flows. It is the accepted basis of philosophy in India.

This direct experience cannot be acquired either by the senses or by the intellect. It is transcendental. In the scale of consciousness, it is the fourth, or the last, state, known as *turiya* in Indian philosophy and totally unknown to the West. It may be described as the innate nature of consciousness. 'Though it is present in all, man does not recognize it in his ignorant state.' All philosophers point to this state as

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.18.

⁸ Swami Prabhavananda, *Vedic Religion and Philosophy*, p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.24.

the goal to be achieved. This clearly points out the relation between philosophy and religion in India. In other words, religion here is not divorced from philosophy, but the latter puts rationally the ultimate truths realized in experience. 'Religion to a Hindu is not, however, the common Western conception of faith, nor does it merely comprise dogmas and creeds. It is rather *anubhūti*—realization and experience.'⁹

The above discussion has shown the relation between philosophy and education and the relation between philosophy and religion in India. Philosophy, religion, and education are all ultimately intertwined here, the former two point-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.2.

ing to the goal of life, and the latter to the means for its realization. Education has always been regarded in India 'as a source of illumination and power, which transforms and ennobles our nature by the progressive and harmonious development of our physical, mental, intellectual, and spiritual powers and faculties'.¹⁰ Such a definition is quite in keeping with our idealistic philosophy, which regards every soul as potentially divine in nature. 'The illumination given to us by education shatters illusions, removes difficulties, and enables us to realize the true value of life. A person who does not possess the light of education may really be described as blind.'¹¹

¹⁰ Altekar, *Education in India*, p.8.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

THE CRISIS OF FAITH

BY PROFESSOR BATUKNATH BHATTACHARYA

A sense of crisis in men's affairs is getting deeper as days pass. It is voiced by reflective spirits the world over, however few they may be. A feeling of insecurity about the future of the human race is mingling with the joy of heightened living, in spite of the marvels of the technique of physical well-being which modern science is multiplying on all sides. Thinking is loose, and the best minds are rarely in accord on the basic issues that face mankind. Reason is handicapped by the ties that attach men to sect, party, nation, parochial interests, or dogmas of expediency.

There are philosophers of science who opine that all disagreements in the realm of thought would fade away when a unitary system of knowledge is built up with the principles common to, and valid for, objective as well as abstract, discursive as well as normative, practical as well as speculative spheres—the phenomena of matter, mind, and society—when all knowledge will be homogeneous, and the di-

visions of science will be worries of the past. There are heroes of faith who deny that human nature is static, despite the testimony of history and prehistory, and expect the creature to outgrow the bonds of the flesh and the urges of instinct.

Common to all, however, is the view of the inadequacy of the present and the unsatisfactoriness of the immediate actual. A few months back, M. Pierre Amado, Director, French Cultural Centre, Calcutta, pointed to the problem of man in relation to the world as the metaphysical problem of the age: 'The West, tired of steel, coal, atomic plants, and satellites to the point of surfeit, full of the idea of seizing the forces of Nature to conquer happiness, yet feels that to *be* is greater than to *have*. Sick of the passion to possess, to possess more, to create more needs, many scan the horizon for some place where wisdom is more honoured than folly, than even reason, and is still the aim of life, which still holds to the one truth

which brings peace. They ask if India will be the mother to deliver them and give rest from the contentious West, and would be disappointed if they find their wish turn into a mere myth of India in the conditions actually prevalent.

The strident claim of the Occident is that in technique and values of life she leads, and the rest of the world follows. And appearances on all sides bear this out. A time there was, however, when Manu, the great lawgiver, asserted: 'From the highest-born of this land, all the races on earth are to learn their codes of behaviour.' Do the problems of humanity today admit of a cleavage, a parting of the ways, between the East and the West? Or, irrespective of latitude and longitude, do we not feel that the same perplexities stare all men equally in the face, and that all sections of humanity are in the same boat, fated to swim or sink together?

Among the elements of mental *tapas* or askesis, the *Gītā* makes lucidity of mind (*manah-prasāda*) and purity of heart (*bhāva-saṁśuddhi*) the first and the last of inner discipline. Amidst the sick hurry and divided aims, the spate of press output, the shoal of best-sellers, the babel of eager voices, the primacy of push and publicity, are not serenity and clarity of vision virtues of a forgotten past?

The distilled wisdom of the ages, as enshrined in antique texts, is therefore eagerly sought after for recipes to soothe the headaches of a bustling latter-day world. Says the *Maitri Upaniṣad*: 'The world is verily the mind, therefore the mind should be purified with all effort. One is absorbed in whatever the mind is bent on. This is the eternal secret. As the creature's mind is engrossed in the sense-objects, so were it on the highest truth, who would not be released from bondage?'

Nero, the Roman tyrant, held bread and the circus to be the unfailing tranquillizers of the populace. The present-day rulers of men have not laid aside this secret of statecraft. Work for gain and an unceasing round of pleasures are to occupy all the energies of men. Desire to look within and assay the aims and springs

of action, then, would be an irrelevance, and leisure to do so should have no place in life's routine. The human condition is thus described in a *Bhāgavata* stanza: 'One who is wholly deluded and one who has attained the limit of wisdom—these two are happy in this world, the man in the middle state is worried.' Men of the first kind, perhaps, make up the majority; and creation, to be sustained, needs it. To swell the numbers of this care-free, satisfied lot is the objective of state and society. The origin and end of creatures are not within our view, as a well-known verse of the *Gītā* says; the middle alone is open to our sight. The appearance of creatures, the genesis of life, is wrapped in mystery. So also is the ultimate end, the soul's destination. The intermediate state alone is within the range of the senses. The creature takes that alone to be real, the only truth, the solid substance, and acts on that view. This is the narrow strip between two oceans of time—the infinite past and the limitless future. Here is the play of light, the throb of hope and aspiration, the rich diversity of sound and touch, form and colour, taste and smell, the drama of union and separation. And the supreme value of life is generally assumed to be this—to lie as long as possible on the downy bed of pleasant hope wrapped in this fabric of shot silk. To make this experience, this enjoyment, intense and incessant is held to be the highest good of life. And that being gained, all anxiety about the hereafter, all quest of the highest truth and supreme reality, will melt away from man's consciousness like a speck of cloud in the autumn sky. To win mankind over to this sense of values as solely valid seems to be the aim and ideal of social regimentation in this age. Instinctive nature favours it, and science is a ready helpmate.

But will this fancied heaven on earth—a life of joy unbroken, of unfailing health, mind ever at ease, and plenty of havings, which fascinates the world today—ever be in the grip of men? The minority in the middle are stricken with doubt and perplexity on this score. It is this predicament which Vidura poses to the immac-

ulate Śukadeva in the *Bhāgavata*: 'Creatures work for pleasure, but do not thereby gain it, nor doth misery cease in consequence. Even from such activity, they come to suffer. O great soul, teach us therefore what is meet to be done.' Is this query of Vidura prompted by a partial, pessimistic outlook, or the final conclusion of all-round experience? The famous Bankim Chandra of Bengali letters likened woman's intelligence to half a cocoanut-shell. But this is verily the measure of man's reason, male or female, wise or ignorant. The whole upshot of his action—the fruit complete—is beyond the range of his vision, and outstrips the ingenuity and foresight of his contrivings.

Examples taken from the present-day happenings amply prove it. Socialism was devised to protect the individual from social iniquity and oppression, but the utmost dependence results from this very polity. Man has become a creature, a slave, of statism. Mechanized industry minimizes manual labour. But man loses himself in the care and tendance of machinery, which, by its variety and complexity, threatens to obsess and overcast his mental horizon. Machine becomes the master, and man its slave. The scope of employment is reduced. The more perfect the machinery, the fewer the hands needed to run it. A new problem arises: How to fill the emptiness of the idle hour, of spacious leisure. The cry is raised: Produce or perish. The duty of man in society is to increase the stock of food. With more food to eat, the population shoots up, and to restrict unwanted children becomes the concern of civilization. Medical science makes big strides. Epidemics and the ravages of disease wiping out populous centres are brought under control. The rate of mortality sharply declines. The problem now is to feed and clothe and house the teeming millions.

Astronomers say that only one half of the lunar orb is visible to men on the earth at any time. We see also one side only of our doings and their results. But will man therefore be in a position to lay aside the quest of the supersensuous, what is beyond the range of his per-

ceptive powers? Will he ever be merged and lost in instinctive animal existence, be equal to other creatures, and numb and still the promptings of conscience and self-consciousness? The philosopher says that metaphysics or knowledge of the ultimate truth is man's innate craving, insatiable curiosity, never to be erased. So also are his questionings about the truths of God and soul and religion inextricably woven into his psychic being. The voyage of our life is truly like a ship's over a shoreless, unfathomed sea. Wherever the mariner drops the plumb-line, he finds fathomless depth. Man is, indeed, hedged round by a network of infinities. To loosen the grip of dense matter is to discover a miniature solar system of atoms, of electrical wavicles. Inside the bud, within the seed, the blood corpuscle, or the life-germ, wherever the seeker of truth has rushed, he has come upon the boundless deep of mysteries. Bound fast in the meshes of a magic web, chained to inescapable barriers of fate, he yet deems himself the knower of the last word about reality, as the omniscient being. It has been aptly said that the acme of ignorance is the ignorance of ignorance. The ancients realized the limits of human knowledge and said: 'Even though all the men of knowledge were to set out to explore, ignorance will still lurk ahead like darkness in some chambers of the mansion of the universe.' But on this firm ground of the unknowable rests the promise and assurance of full knowledge. Truly said a Greek philosopher: 'We are able to know the unknowable, because we are ourselves such in our inmost depths.' There are thinkers who hold that knowledge is not what we discover outside of us in the objective world, but the light of our own soul shed on things around. From days of yore, sages of diverse lands have hence adjured man to know himself—*Ātmānam viddhi*.

By his knowledge of a few mysteries of matter, man flatters himself to be omnipotent and fancies that, before long, he would dislodge the supreme One enthroned in the empyrean. Today, he seems to be resolved to demonstrate scientifically the godless creed, and to reject ab-

solutely, and for all time, the infinite Power, in the warp and woof of whose cosmic design he is less than a midget to be whisked off the stage of his brief fretting and fuming, even as he was thrust into it—unwitting and unconsulted. The *yogin* in the *Gītā* is to ponder that he does nothing—seeing or hearing, touching or smelling, moving or eating, breathing or sleeping, talking or ejecting or absorbing, opening or shutting his eyes—knowing that, in all this, the senses merely draw to their objects. What the *yogin* has to intimately realize is, for one and all, this basic and undeniable fact. And yet, deluded by the ego, one hugs the conceit ‘I am the doer of all’.

At no time did man more need to curb his ego-sense than now, when the earth, fast shrinking under the pressure of explosive population, demands new norms of peaceful coexistence for race survival. And yet, at no other time did life become so torn and lacerated by eruptions of pride, conceit, and self-interest as now. Ours is an atomic age, not only for the devastating nuclear weapons, but also for the atomization of society—the dwindling of groups into individuals, each for self, loose and discrete like grains of sand on the sea-shore. Hence the paradox of social aggregation—more fusion making for more fission. Dreaming of one world, each unit is becoming a more sharply defined and divided world in and for itself.

Dashing into outer space with tiny mimicries of the shining orbs overhead, man is strangely forgetful of the priority due to the ordering of his earthly home and the discipline of his own soul. With his daring incursions into the mysteries of matter and space, he has still to realize that the root and master-key of all his devices and discoveries, his inscrutable and infinite soul, is yet to him unknown and beyond his powers of control. Its nature, its impulses, and its aspirations do not admit his direction and governance.

A more glaring fatuity is the assumption of power to guide the course of history and the destiny of mankind. It is like the claim of psychiatrists, themselves creatures of their own

blind impulses, to master the minds of derelicts under their professional charge. Howsoever the physical world might have come into being, none the less, history, it is contended, is wholly man’s handiwork. The scramble of the social classes for food has shaped it; the ideas of men have been mere bye-products of this major phenomenon. And politicians, trusting to greed and fear as the sole lever of human conduct, and the balance of power and the tussles of parties as the safeguards of peace and liberties, incontinently proceed to make contemporary history—that is the mess of affairs, of which recent annals furnish such tragic and notorious examples. It has been rather severely, but not untruly, remarked: ‘The world is full of sick men and the sickest are at the top.’ But those who survey with a far enough perspective and study the transformations of matter through aeons, the evolution of life through diverse forms, the provision of habitat and sustenance before the advent of the creature, the working of the mind even where there is no earthly good or animal urge, the sacrifices that men make gladly for ideals, their austerities and self-sought sufferings for communion with the Ineffable, those are overwhelmed with the mystery and immensity of it all, and vision with clear eyes the moving finger of the supreme Power in the sequence of cosmic events. They hear the echoes of the tread of Divinity in the drama of history, and are awed and roused by the rumblings of the wheels of the almighty Charioteer, the Ruler of human destiny. They discover no cause, no purpose behind the raree-show of the cosmic panorama, other than His irresistible will and inscrutable creative sport. To attune the will of man and to enlighten his reason so as to accord with the supreme Designer’s purposes has been the serious concern of religion through the ages.

Never was a catharsis—a purification of the inner being—a more imperative must than now, when the fate of the family of man is at stake. To reorientate faith is today the problem of problems. For faith directs activity and stirs impulses. And so the divine Kṛṣṇa says in the

Gītā: 'Men's faith is correlated to the constituent of their psyche. Man is a creature of faith; as is his faith, so he becomes.' Life without ideals is an impossibility. The alternative is not between ideals and no ideals, but between this ideal and that. The question is, What will his choice be? Solely bent on mechanical civilization, on a life of comforts and pleasures, man is far from faith today. Will this be the *ne plus ultra*, the consummation of the race's endeavour? Will this be the final phase, the conclusion of the tale, the last chapter of history?

All nations are at present caught in this stream, rapt and aswim on the swelling tide. And India cannot claim to be exempt; she makes it rather her glory to be in the run. But the upshot of it is unease, worry, and apprehension even to those who started the whirl and who are at its centre. To cite only two of the forecasts of Western thinkers: 'When man would be so far machine-like as to be identified with it, there will then be no more men on earth', says one. J. S. Mill, the utilitarian, wrote: 'Imagine all the changes you expect from ideology and organization have been ere long effected. Would you thereby gain all joy and happiness?' The clear answer of strong self-knowledge will be, no. The message of wisdom, East or West, past or present, is ever the same. But to perpetuate the whirligig of life and the unflagging tempo of human activity, the play of the Master-illusionist never stops. In the words of the *Gītā*, seated in the heart of all beings is God. He makes all creatures revolve as if mounted on a machine, by His wizardry.

He is the source of all and the cause of causes; everything evolves from Him. The purpose of creation fulfils itself by bringing this lesson home to man through his varied experience of joy and sorrow, through his manifold sensibilities and the novel devices of his ingenuity.

The span of life for the race on earth is indeterminate, but the individual's is strictly limited and admits no doubt. Today, or a century hence, as says Vyāsa, the life of creatures is fated to end. In the brief light of this little lamp, man has to, if he can, pick his way to the Light of all lights that dwells across the surrounding zone of darkness. Sages speculate on the recovery of faith in this age. This can only mean the reinstatement of the verities of the human condition and the cleaning of the moral temper and fabric, the ethos, and the climate on which all rational activity hinges. Culture is the extensive study in the dry light of truth of all that is and happens—the disinterested endeavour to find out the best that is thought and known all over the world. But perhaps being disinterested, it is also indifferent to the practical bearing of the truths it seeks. Hence is the need of some study or discipline which would relate knowledge to conviction and science to the undeniable human values. This has been the function of religion. Given the lucid mind born of the pure heart, it may yet lead mankind out of the wilderness of its wanderings to the promised land and restore the lost sense of harmony and purpose, which is today the world's sorest need.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

TO OUR READERS

Prabuddha Bharata enters its sixty-sixth year this month. Its illustrious founder, Swami Vivekananda, set before it two ideals: to work for ushering in an 'Awakened India' in tune with her past culture and heritage, and to propagate her spiritual message of Vedānta to the

world outside. *Prabuddha Bharata* has been fulfilling this twofold task in its own humble way during these past sixty years and more. On this occasion of entering into the new year, we rededicate ourselves to the lofty ideals set before this journal by this great son of Mother India, and wish all our contributors and readers

a happy new year. We also take this opportunity to express our grateful thanks to all of them for extending their kind help and cooperation in our work. . . .

Last year, we presented to our readers a series of articles under the caption 'Spiritual Talks of Swami Shivananda', which were translated from the Bengali book *Śrī Śrī Mahāpuruṣajīr Kathā*. That book having been completed, we propose to take up another this year, viz. *Śivānanda-vāṇī*, Part Two, and present serially, under the same old caption, translations of select portions from it. Swami Shivananda, a direct disciple of Sri Ramakrishna, and the second president of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission, is endearingly and reverentially referred to as 'Mahapurush Maharaj'. . . .

Dr. P. S. Sastri, M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., Reader and Head of the Department of English, Nagpur University, who is our regular contributor, has this time taken up for his study the subject 'Syllogism and Fallacies', which he discusses with his characteristic thoroughness and precision. . . .

The article on 'Slogans for Unity' by Swami Shraddhananda, of the Vedanta Society of Northern California, San Francisco, emphasizes that real unity among men, which can be universal and everlasting, can be achieved only by recognizing and respecting the basic truth of man's spiritual being, which cuts across all

barriers of race, religion, or nationality. . . .

Indian philosophy makes a distinction between *mokṣa* and heaven. *Mokṣa* is spiritual emancipation, which is the master-passion and highest goal of all Indian philosophical thought. The article by Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao, M.A., D.Litt., of Karnatak College, Dharwar, is a brief survey of 'The Concept of Mokṣa' according to the Indian philosophical systems. . . .

In India, religion, philosophy, and education have always been intimately connected with each other. Religion points out to us the reality of the highest spiritual experience; philosophy gives us a rational explanation of the same; and education makes us fit for that experience, by training our body, mind, intellect, and emotions. Dr. Kirti Devi Seth, M.A., M.Ed., D.Phil., of Allahabad University, in her article makes 'A Plea for Evolving an Indian Philosophy of Education', which will be in keeping with our ancient culture and tradition. . . .

The world's sorest need today is a recovery of faith in the higher values of the spirit, which alone can restore to mankind its lost sense of harmony and purpose. That the problem facing humanity at present is 'The Crisis of Faith' is the theme of the article by Professor Batuknath Bhattacharya, M.A., B.L., formerly of Surendranath College, Calcutta.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

REFLECTIONS ON THE TALKS WITH SRI RAMANA MAHARSHI. BY S. S. COHEN. Published by Sri Ramanasramam, Tiruvannamalai, Madras State. 1959. Pages 180. Price Rs. 4.

Mr. S. S. Cohen, in the book under review, has given us a compact and comprehensive account of the philosophy of Sri Ramana Maharshi. He gives us, in fourteen chapters, 672 small extracts from the words of the Maharshi, and he also gives brief and clear notes under each of them. The note under each extract is lively, and brings out the pith and excellence

of the ideas contained in the Maharshi's words. One's understanding of the original is improved by the notes, which do the work of the commentary. The chapter headings cover almost all the subjects related to a sound, spiritual philosophy of religion.

Sri Ramana Maharshi taught that all our sorrow is due to our lack of Self-knowledge. He asks us to find the true nature of the Self, which is Brahman. Self-inquiry, i.e. *ātma-vicāra*, is his main *sādhana*. The Self is not to be identified with the body, with the sense-organs, with the *manas*, nor even with the states of consciousness. It is, in reality, Sat-cit-

ānanda. We must get rid of *dehātma-bhāva*. He stresses the importance of *jñāna* and *vairāgya* as the chief methods. The Maharshi had a wonderful influence on the minds of men who met him. The method advocated by the Maharshi is the hallowed *mārga* of Śaṅkara. Mr. Cohen has done his work of selection with great care and devotion. The volume is an excellent introduction to the study of Sri Ramana Maharshi's philosophy.

DR. P. NAGARAJA RAO

CIVILISATION OR CHAOS? BY IRENE CONYBEARE. Published by Chetana Limited, 34 Rampart Row, Bombay-1. Second Edition. 1959. Pages 247. Price Rs. 10.50.

Neither the title of the book nor the blurb on the cover gives its exact scope. The purport of the book is set out in a footnote on page 185: 'I have merely endeavoured to interpret the philosophy of the Master, and my work is primarily for those who believe in him and his Mission. Since many of my statements demand in themselves books of explanations, I feel that readers can, if they choose, study the sources referred to, since these are the basis of much of the matter which they may be disposed to question.' The Master is Meher Baba, and he is reported to have publicly announced that he is the coming *avatāra*. Miss Conybeare believes that he is the *avatāra*.

From the end of the nineteenth century, the announcement of *avatāras* in India, generally by the person who considered himself to be the *avatāra*, has not been an infrequent phenomenon. What causes some curiosity, however, is that, when all these claims are made in a world so knit together by communications into one unit, there should be so few disciples for each *avatāra*. In all such cases, when the realization comes that there are no proofs of the *avatāra*-hood in the person hitherto accepted by the disciples, there is utter disillusionment and despair. We recall two recent instances of similar Messiahs, one of whom later on publicly recanted from the role thrust on him; but in either case, the devoted disciples were let down with a thud, from which they have never recovered. Miss Conybeare can therefore preach only to the converted. To others, among whom the reviewer counts himself as one, the book is a curious medley of religious gossip gathered mainly from the lumber rooms of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, never from the original sources of the sacred writings in any case.

'ANON.'

BHOODAN-YAJNA (LAND-GIFTS MISSION). BY VINOBA BHAVE. Published by Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. Pages 134. Price As. 14.

Mahatma Gandhi's work was twofold: to secure

the political independence of India and to bring about a non-violent revolution in the economic and social life of the country. The latter is the Sarvodaya movement. After Gandhiji's demise, no one has taken up the second task with more earnestness than Acharya Vinoba Bhave. Sri Bhave has evolved novel methods of achieving his objectives, foremost among them being the 'Bhoodan-yajna', with which the country is now well acquainted.

This booklet, first published in 1953 and reprinted twice during the next four years, is a collection of articles on the subject from the pen of Vinobaji himself. These were originally published in the *Harijan*, from time to time. The origin of the Bhoodan movement, its aims and objectives, its method of working, and the charges levelled against it and their answers are some of the main topics discussed in the book. Vinobaji considers all land as belonging to God, just like air and water. It should be distributed among His children equitably. Vinobaji's target is to collect 50 million acres of cultivable land, being one-fifth of the holdings in India. His aim is to bring about a threefold revolution. As he puts it: 'First, I want a change in people's hearts; secondly, I want to create a change in their lives; and thirdly, I want to change the social structure' (p.24). As the name implies, the Bhoodan movement is a *yajña*, a sacrifice. Vinobaji emphasizes throughout the book the spiritual aspect of his movement.

Standing at a distance of ten years since the start of the movement, we may very well feel diffident about its success; for the target is still a long way off. But whatever be the result, the value of such a movement cannot be minimized. The process may be slow, but Vinobaji puts his faith in 'thought-force', which 'has no limitation'. 'The light of a new idea often brings about a radical change in man's life' (p.9). In the welter of conflicting ideologies today, any new method that brings about harmony and a change of heart in man is welcome and praiseworthy. The value of this booklet lies precisely in preaching such a method.

S. S.

SANSKRIT-TAMIL-ENGLISH

1. ŚRĪ VEDAPĀDASTAVAH. Pages vi+91. Price Re. 1.25.

2. ŚRĪ SKANDA VEDAPĀDASTAVAH. Pages xxix+46 Price Re. 1.

BOTH EDITED, WITH A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION IN TAMIL, AND TRANSLATED INTO TAMIL AND ENGLISH BY P. N. SIVARAMAKRISHNAYYA. Both published by Sri Sringeri Mutt, Sringeri, Mysore State.

The first composition is a work of Jaimini, the propounder of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*; the authorship

of the second is unknown. They contain, respectively, 126 and 110 *ślokas*, mostly in *anuṣṭubh* metre. The last *pāda* of each verse is a quotation from the Vedas; hence the name *vedapādastava*.

The first hymn is in praise of the dancing Natarāja at Chidambaram, and the second is in praise of Subrahmaṇya, the son of Śiva. The introduction in

each book in Tamil is scholarly, and the translation elegant. These booklets will be of great use to all lovers of devotional hymns. The English translation of the hymns makes them accessible to non-Tamilians. Typographical errors are rather too many for such small books.

S. S.

NEWS AND REPORTS

ADVAITA ASHRAMA, CALCUTTA

INAUGURATION OF NEW BUILDING

The new four-storied building of the Advaita Ashrama at 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta 14, was inaugurated on the 8th December 1960, at 7 a.m., by Swami Madhavananda, the general secretary of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission, in the presence of a distinguished gathering. The Ashrama will function in the new premises from January 1961. Besides the regular publication of religious and cultural literature, and the *Prabuddha Bharata*, the Ashrama will organize weekly religious discourses, a reading room and library, and some philanthropic works.

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION NEW DELHI

REPORT FOR 1959

The Mission's activities in Delhi are as follows:

Religious and Cultural: Regular discourses and occasional lectures conducted in the Ashrama premises as well as outside, *bhajan*s, worship, and meditation conducted in the temple, and observance of the birthdays of Sri Ramakrishna, Sri Sarada Devi, Swami Vivekananda, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Jesus Christ, Bhagavān Buddha, Guru Nānak, and Śrī Śaṅkara. The weekly religious classes at the Vivekananda Hall of the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, on Sunday mornings, were continued during the year. The classes are conducted under the auspices of the Vedanta Samiti of the University, which was formed in 1952 by some members of its staff and students with a view to studying Vedānta in all its phases. In 1959, the study of Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra*, which was commenced in 1957, was completed, and Swami Vive-

kananda's *Lectures from Colombo to Almora* was taken up for study and continued during the whole year. An average of 150 students and staff members attended these classes, which consisted of reading and exposition of the text, discussion, and a few minutes' silent meditation. Thirty-three discourses on *Tulasī Rāmāyaṇa* were arranged during the year at the Mission premises, and the total attendance was 28,250. The regular Sunday discourses on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, started in 1951, continued to attract a representative gathering of about 1,300 citizens, a fair percentage of whom were students. The Secretary delivered lectures at different colleges in the city, and undertook extensive lecture tours in various parts of the country.

Library: Total number of books: 11,591; newspapers: 14; periodicals: 132. Number of books issued: 11,391. Average daily attendance at the reading room: 381.

Medical: (i) *The Outdoor General Dispensary:* The treatment is mainly based on the homoeopathic system. Number of patients treated: 52,011 (new cases: 13,527).

(ii) *The Tuberculosis Clinic:* Number of patients treated in the clinic: 1,14,650 (new cases: 2,006). Indoor cases treated in the observation wards: 459 (women: 223).

The Sarada Mahila Samiti: This is an informal group of women inspired by the ideals of the Mission and devoted to silent service. Apart from rendering valuable help to the Mission in its various activities, the Samiti continued its programme of social work in the Lady Hardinge Medical College Hospital for women and children. The Samiti conducts a moral and spiritual education class in the Mission premises for children between the ages 6 and 12.

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA'S BIRTHDAY

The 99th birthday of Swami Vivekananda falls on Monday, the 9th January 1961.