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PRABUDDHA BHARATA

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SELF-RELIANCE AND SELF-CONFIDENCE

ARE THE BACKBONE OF DEFENCE

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PRABUDDHA BHARATA

Vol. LXXI

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उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

—:o:—

LETTERS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

(100)

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Bull Temple Road
Bangalore City
9 July 1921

Dear Sriman—,

I have learnt all from your letter. Do not be afraid to the least. It has been well that you are undergoing 'Kaviraji' treatment and according to the Kaviraj the treatment has begun at the right time. He has further made it known that the ailment is quite curable.

Anything that was persisting as a cause from the previous birth, has, by the grace of the Master, been obliterated. Have no fear from anything; you will be cured. You are in the Math which is the place of the Master; there are also competent physicians at Calcutta and the treatment too has been begun. So by the grace of the Master, you will gradually recover yourself. I told all to Maharaj (Swami Brahmananda) also. He assured that by the Master's grace and through proper treatment you would come round. There is nothing to be bothered at. Know for certain that everybody would take care of you—none would despise or neglect you. And all the necessary things would, by His grace, be procured. Sarat Maharaj (Swami Saradananda) is arranging everything that is necessary for you and he will be doing so. Do not be worried in any way. Go on with your meditation and *japa* in a care free mind and try to be meticulous about what the Kaviraj prescribes for you in respect of diet and medicines. Inform Sarat Maharaj whenever there is any difficulty. Know that every one in the Math loves you. You will certainly be cured and none of your virtues as devotion to God, knowledge, discrimination, renunciation and efficiency will go in vain or become vitiated. Do not indulge in any anxiety for the future. Remember our words.

Be certain that the grace of the Holy Mother and our love—all these can never go in vain. Everybody is a victim of diseases, be he a *sādhu* (monk) or a lay person. At times the *sādhus* are subjected to virulent incurable diseases but there is nothing to be disturbed at this. Forge ahead with sustained meditation, *japa* and the spiritual practices joyfully and hopefully and you will surely attain supreme knowledge and devotion in this very life. What to write you more? You are being looked after by the Master and the Holy Mother and we all too look to you. So you have nothing to fear from. Not the least of your faith and devotion will be vitiated—rather those will increase hundred and thousandfold and at the same time the ailment will also be cured.

Your well-wisher,
Shivananda

PS. The way the Master does good to his devotee is incomprehensible to the human mind. Good will surely come unto you. Convey our heartfelt blessings and affection to all in the Math. By the grace of the Master, we are all well.

(101)

Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama
Bull Temple Road
Bangalore City
12 July 1921

Dear Sriman—,

I have received your letter duly. Maharaj (Swami Brahmananda) and myself left the Math along with a number of attendant monks of Maharaj on the 1 April last and arrived at this Ashrama visiting on the way the centres at Bhuvanewara and Madras. If the Master wishes we may have to go over to Travancore from here after a few days to consecrate the new Math there.

I am much delighted to learn about the centre of the Master there. You are blessed that you have dedicated yourself to the cause of the Master. Our Lord is a living God and you are engaged in His direct service. So what to write you more? Know everything that you do for the service of Master to be a veritable spiritual practice. That is no less significant than meditation and *japa*. About meditation and *japa* do that extent as the Master makes you do. You are engaged in His service and so you may be sure that He will guide you in the right path and condone all your imperfections. Carry on with undivided attention and consider every work to be the meditation and *japa*. You are His servant, so good will surely come unto you. Know for certain that those who serve are loved by the Master much.

My heartfelt blessings to you and the other devotees. By His grace we are keeping well. I am glad to know that homoeopathic medicines will be expended in the service of *darīdranārāyaṇas* (poor). Know this even to be a form of service to the Master.

Well-wisher,
Shivananda

THE CALL ETERNAL

[EDITORIAL]

It was about the last phase of nineteenth century when Sri Ramakrishna after the completion of his protracted austere spiritual practices, felt a strong yearning to meet those immaculate souls who were destined to become real instruments for the propagation of his universal message of harmony and goodwill throughout the length and breadth of the world. In the writhing agony of his heart he cried out at the top of his voice day in and day out, from the roof of the '*kuthi*' in the temple-garden of Dakshineswar for the advent of his would-be torch-bearers,— 'Oh, where are you? I cannot bear to live without you.' The call did not go in vain. It reached the ears of those colossal souls lying vast abroad on their times, those pure in heart who would bear the cross and rewrite the Bible of the mankind anew and they began to cluster round their Great Master to fulfil the divine mission.

Truth Eternal has a Call Eternal: But this call of Sri Ramakrishna was not a solitary and fortuitous event that had happened in that lone temple-garden. Nor was it a call sounded exclusively to a selected band of chosen few. It is an eternal one and has been the ever-recurring phenomenon in the history of mankind from the very dawn of human civilization—it is a call which has been voiced with all its compelling force by the saints and saints of all races and climes as a pointer to the self-forgetful erring travellers to follow the right track to reach the ultimate end of human existence.

Rummage the pages of world history and you will find that in the Vedas and

the Bible, the Avesta and the Koran, the *Bhagavad-Gītā* and the Tantras, the Purāṇas and *Dhammapada*, the very same call to rise to the radiance of spirit has been articulated from age to age to follow the path of righteousness and to attain to the knowledge of the glorious Self. It is the same one Truth that has been sung and echoed by the sages and saints, by the poets and philosophers of all the lands:

Truth is one
And in all lands beneath the sun
Who so has eyes to see may see
The tokens of its unity.

(John Greenleaf Whittier)

This unity of Truth and the universality of its realization are the two firm banks that hold and guide the course of world's destiny winding its way through the centuries. Facts like crucifixion of Christ, Socrates dying in derision and persecution at times impede the course no doubt, but they also make it deeper and stronger. They are the cardinal ingredients which make our annals turn into an integral history. History is not merely the conglomeration of events or juxtaposition of facts or what the sophisticated Romans would think of its details as '*res gestae*' i.e. things done. Though not always visible, it has a true face that lends support, and gives direction to the processes of human civilization.

Through the brutness and toughness of facts a subtle spirit bends all things to its own will. 'Man', says Emerson, 'is explicable by nothing else than all his history' for 'of the works of this mind history is the record.' 'This human mind wrote history, and this must read it. The sphinx must

solve her own riddle. If the whole of history is in one man, it is all to be explained from individual experience.' There is thus an inherent link between the hours of our life and the centuries of time. Studied with a subjective vision the muse of history would utter oracles and this subjectivity is what is known to make all history living. Otherwise, these are no more than the rattling bones of dry events and heaps of dead, disgruntled and mute facts. Looked at from this perspective the call of Sri Ramakrishna is the call of that living history—the call that has been renewed again and again through the vistas of ages. Man may pretend at times not to hear the call but how can he ignore the moving history pushing him forward from behind? The call that has emanated from Sri Ramakrishna is still ringing in our ears. It cannot be lost in oblivion. His message is an emphatic reaffirmation of that same eternal and universal truth and man needs to hear it.

Man and his two Dimensions: Human nature, as it has often been told, has two dimensions. One is old, habitual, conservative, inward looking and introspective and the other is new, alert, proud and eager to display itself before the world. The one is a hard headed humorist and philosopher sitting in wise silence and the other is running after the hurried pageant of this worldly life—its jumble of baroque architecture and its posters and advertisements. Reposed in a subjective contentment one always looks forward to the far distant horizon of human existence to welcome the bronze gleam of a new dawn but the other, drunk in the pleasures of this sensate life, again and again looks backward and restlessly retraces the steps of its past evolutions. Actuated by this second nature most men turn a deaf ear to the higher voices of the other. In quest of

sordid evanescent pleasure they compile philosophies, formulate creeds but, alas, in this ever changing world they find their soul restless, fortune uncertain, fame doubtful, time fleeting unnoticed and senses decaying and becoming obscure. Instead of being pilgrims to the land of blessedness, they find their lives turning into dreadful fields of unmitigated warfare. And, so to speak, this is the *nature* of the world. Yesterday you were happy over the circumstances, today you are anxious and tomorrow you become fearful. One cloud is dissipated and another gathers. The green morning of your childhood, the summer of your luxuriant youth all turn into a pale decay of your wintry old age. You are left ultimately to plough a lonely furrow. One day you find to your utter astonishment that the sun of your life so long sitting at the meridian, has gone down to the other side of the horizon, the edge of the sharp sword of your so-called wisdom has become dulled by the grating roughness of the hard reality. You feel deceived by the false beauties of your enjoyments and the wrong dictates of your senses and you hastily start drawing the balance sheet of the gains and losses of your life. But hardly have you been able to make a retrospective glance when you find death knocking at your door. You shudder to think about. One day you came to this world not knowing how and why and that did not mean anything ominous and now you get frightened to see the end staring you in the face. You came in by the entrance but you do not like to go out by the exit. Nothing can be more strange and ridiculous than this. But then these are the *ways* of the world.

For man death continues to be the same old question as it has hitherto been. By wanting to have a prolongation of life man dies in every moment. In a frantic

bid to avert death he builds pyramids and discovers science but all his ingenuities and endeavours fail. Mummies of ancient Egypt become cheap merchandise. 'Pharaoh' is sold for dollars and the gravitation of the senses proves to be too strong to be avoided in any way. But when we look upon the tombs of dead, when we read the epitaphs written therein, when we see there kings lying by the side of those deposed by them—the beloved and despised, the affrighted and the warlike all mingling their ashes together in the same dust we cannot but muse within ourselves—'the boast of heraldry' and 'the pomp of power' all lead but to the grave. The inborn philosopher within us wakes up and speaks out. But the flash is a momentary one and we are plunged into the delusion again and taken over by the hounds of senses. So if impermanence of the physical enjoyment is the nature of the world and false charms are its ways, then delusion is to be regarded as its fundamental characteristic.

Here one may well say that these are all truisms and there is no need of preaching them to a convert. What one needs is a way out. To this the Upaniṣad says :

*Tameva viditvā'ti mrtyumeti
nānyah panthā vidyate ayanāya—*

'By knowing Him alone we can avert death; there is but no other way out'.
(*Śvetāśvatara*, III. 8)

God alone is true and to realize Him is the aim of human life. He is the soul of our souls, the wisdom of the wise and the acumen of the intelligent. Away from Him we find our existence immensely complex, and we pass on from one dream to another whereas resting on Him we become immortal, the world becomes amazingly simple and we grasp the full meaning of our inner dimension—a life where we do no longer peep or steal or skulk up

and down with the air of charity boys in this world which exists for us. 'God expanded', says Victor Hugo, 'is the world and the world concentrated is God.' Life is the infinite struggle to manifest that God within and the world is a remorseless school where we learn the necessary discipline to break our false dreams.

While enunciating a definition of God and man Swami Vivekananda states, 'Man is an infinite circle whose circumference is nowhere, but the centre is located in one spot; and God is an infinite circle whose circumference is nowhere, but whose centre is everywhere.' (*The Complete Works*, Vol. II., p. 33) So devoid of God, we are petty, poor, small mortal beings oscillating like pendulums between tears and smiles, between our desires and hankerings and plodding our miserable weary way. The milestones on this path, traversed by us, are marked more by sufferings and agonies, by doubts and dusts than by the flashes of bliss and sparks of joy. The circumference of human life without its centre would make it a very poor show—a meaningless juxtaposition of pleasure and pain but standing at the centre man can explode the abominable myth of his existence, tear off the veil and realize what the sages say—

*Om Iśā vāsyamidam sarvaṁ
yat kinca jagatyām jagat—*

'All this whatever moves on the earth—should be covered by the Lord', (*Iśā*, I. 1)

Cross-roads of Human Life: In the platform of human life we unquestionably meet a cross-road. The Upaniṣads say that two paths are open before us: One is 'preya' i.e. pleasant and the other one is 'śreya' i.e. bliss. The one is freedom of our senses—the path of sense enjoyments and the other is the freedom from the senses—the path of renunciation. The one is a downy path of dalliance leading

to spiritual blindness while the other proceeds on to the unfolding of the coil of our divine being within. The one is inward and the other is outward.

*Śreyaśca preyaśca manuṣyametaṣtau
sampaṛītya vivinakti dhīrah—*

‘The preferable and the pleasurable approach mankind. The man of intelligence, having considered them, separates the two.’ (*Kaṭha*, I. ii. 2)

One can choose the path of the phantoms of enjoyments and walk in the dark or one can turn his face towards the ancient light which seeks to direct man’s inquisitive nature to the realization of his inner being, ‘the kingdom of God’ within. Man has to make the inevitable choice. He cannot have both—he cannot serve God and Mammon at the same time.

The sense bound man with a time bound life, always travels in the path circumscribed by the senses but he finds no end to it. The thirst for enjoyments is never satiable. ‘Want’, says Emerson, ‘is a growing giant whom the coat of “Have” was never large enough to cover.’ It has been said that ‘earthly happiness is a goddess in pursuit but a cloud in possession, deified by those who cannot get her and despised by those who get. Anticipation is her herald but disappointment is her companion.’ She is deceitful as the calm that precedes the tempest; smooth as the water on the verge of a cataract and beautiful as the rainbow that smiling messenger of storm; but like the mirage in the desert she tantalizes us with a delusion that distance creates and that contiguity destroys. Caesar pursued her in domination, Brutus in glory, Socrates in wisdom and the king Yajāti in pleasure; the first found ingratitude, the second disgrace, the third disgust, the last deceit and each disappointment. We hear king Yajāti in the *Bhāgavata* telling at the outset:

Na tṛpto viṣayeṣu aham—

‘I have not reached the satiety in my enjoyments as yet.’ (9. xviii. 37) But after having spent a fresh lease of life again for one thousand years in sense pleasures he repents:

*Ātmānam nābhijānāmi mohitastava
māyayā—*

‘Enticed by you, the senses, I have become forgetful of my own Self! There is no end to the lust and enjoyment of man!’ (ibid., 9. xix. 12) Moreover the scriptures say that, although our senses decay, the phantoms of sense enjoyments are too powerful and subtle to die out easily. As our age lessens the pleasures of life, increases our desire for enjoyments. Those dangers which in the vigour of youth we learn to despise, assume new terrors as we grow old. Fear becomes the last prevailing passion of the mind and the small remainder of life is taken up in useless effort to keep off our end or provide for a continued lease of existence. But the phantoms of fear would not give us respite. Laid and buried as though we might think about them they would travel with us all the while in a ghastly company mocking and jeering at our self-delusion. Hitherto invisible they would be visible now to render our mind restless, life a burden and to make our poverty bitter and biting. They will continue to dog us from the day we give ourselves to the enjoyments till our end comes off. No fence of physical care or moral philosophy proves to be of any avail against their fury. We are left to reap our own harvest. The poet Bhartrhari quite appropriately observes when he says:

‘In enjoyment there is the fear of disease, in social position there is the fear of a fall, in wealth the fear of kings; in honour the fear of humiliation, in power the fear of foemen; in beauty the fear of old age; in scriptural erudition the fear of oppo-

nents, in virtue the fear of traducers, in body the fear of death. All things of this world pertaining to man are with fear; renunciation alone stands for fearlessness.' (*Vairāgya Śatakam*)

But man is not so helpless as it appears to be. It is his discriminating intellect that can pilot him correctly to the right track. 'Amusement is the happiness of those that cannot think'. Error in this intellect is the food of the corruption in the will. When ignorance succeeds in the place of wisdom, confusion quickly comes in the room of discrimination and we become victims of delusion. Experiences in vain persuade; hope, more powerful than anything, dresses out the distant prospects in fancied beauty and like a losing gamester every new disappointment increases a person's ardour to continue the game. Although it has no new story to make us smile, no new fact or improvement with which to surprise, yet still we love it, destitute of every joy we run after it; husband the wasting treasure with increased frugality and feel the poignancy of anguish in its separation. Hence is the emphasis of the discriminating intellect in the Upaniṣad :

*Ātmānam rathinam viddhi śarīram
rathameva tu;*

*Buddhim tu sārathim viddhi manah
pragrahameva ca—*

'Know the Self as the master of the chariot and the body as the chariot. Know the intellect as the charioteer, and the mind as verily the bridle.' (*Kaṭha*, I. iii. 3) At the cross-road of 'śreya' (preferable) and 'preya' (pleasurable) the charioteer has to direct the chariot in the right path. It must recoil back from the call of senses i.e. 'preya' and be awakened to the call of Spirit i.e. 'śreya'—to the high emprise and manly endeavour that our inherent nature summons us and bids us welcome. It has the task that is supreme and deciding. Con-

fronted with the conflicts and confusions of this cross-road it has got to be steadfast in its discernment about what is right and what is wrong and to drive straight along the path that leads to the domain of blessedness.

Call Eternal is but Call Within: This call to the path of blessedness is not anything of the slogans of Philosophy or Religion. It is but the voice of inner being, the eternal urge within our own self, the ever persisting agony of our heart to realize our own nature. By not responding to this call we do become poorer in ourselves. Man is bound physically and mentally only because he can transcend the world spiritually. (The Upaniṣads state that God was not happy alone. He felt static and thus desired: *So'kāmayata—bahu syām praṅyeyeti*—He (the Self) wished "Let me be many, let me be born.") (*Taittirīya*, II. 6) He wanted to manifest Himself as many, to go as the fire goes and to leap up and to move and to expand and we, His children, came into being. So to realize Him is to have share into our divine heritage and to fulfil our natural destiny. Man is anxious to be more and more God-like and God too is anxious to enjoy the blessedness of devotional consciousness. Man ascends and God descends. There is an eternal reciprocity between the calm and the dynamism of the spirit. In the spiritual dimension of man all his sufferings and experiences collate for eternal bliss and unagitated peace. In this plane of spirit the life proves to be a series of sacrifices and self-givings—a sort of radiation. Yet the radiation does never reduce our being and exhaust the possibilities. When virtue enlarges itself into piety and kindness into love, we gain a quiet dignity of our soul—the magnanimity of not a receiver but a giver that can pass through this turbid, this fickle fleeting

life without bewailings or envyings, or murmurings or complaints. The soul then becomes the very temple of adoration, of faith, of purity and bliss. At such a level it shoots up into the angels; there appears nothing on earth too defiled for its compassion—nothing in hell too appalling for its heroism—nothing in heaven too glorious for its sympathy. Strengthened, sustained and vivified by a most mysterious power it feels itself set well forth on the way of victory over evils pervading the world. A scientist may experience uncontrollable agitation in verifying his principle of balancing systems of worlds, feeling, perhaps as if he actually saw the creative hand in the act of sending the planets forth on their everlasting way but he experiences at such a level of elevation no emotions so divine as those of the spirit becoming conscious and concrete in the form of love. The scriptures beautifully describe that state of benign equipoise of the Soul:

*Sannimītye varam tyāgo
vināśe niyate sati—*

‘When death is so certain it is better to sacrifice oneself for a good cause.’ And what else can there be so good a cause in this mortal world than God? ‘*Kam vā dayāhūm śaraṇam vrajema—*Who else is there more gracious than He in whom we can take refuge?’ (*Bhāgavata*, 3. II. 23) This is the highest of the dreams that man has ever dreamt of. The call to dream such dreams will ever be irresistible. Man may misunderstand Pythagoras, treat Jesus and Judas alike and execute Socrates but they will ever receive our heartfelt homage for they are the great dreamers whom the world has ever been able to produce. Our history may doubt and philosophy may deny but the towering figures like bare-footed Buddha, and God-intoxicated Ramakrishna will ever move as the blazing

beacons through the ages in uncommon majesty to speak unto the sense bound man the same old message:

‘How art thou fallen Lucifer, son of the morning!’

No matter that their advent alternates at different phases of human history, still they think and feel alike. Their gospels are the lenses through which we read our inner mind and stretch beyond the realm of human speculation. From the burning flames of their lives do we kindle our lamps of knowledge and inspiration and we build ‘towers of fables immortal, fashioned from mortal dreams’. They will ever ask the humanity to look inward, to listen to the unattended whispers of inner conscience and to be homeward.

Man, therefore, needs to wake up and face the brute in life. If you cannot dream must you then despair? Do not think of the past, nor of the future even. Act on the living present. It is the present that shapes our future and enables us to rise to the height of our greatness. ‘The gods of fables’, says Emerson, ‘are the shining moments of great men.’ Our divine destiny is not an indeterminable myth. We need to attain to that ‘calm of the mind with all passion spent’, that faith in the broader dimensions of human life, that serenity that arises from contemplation and discrimination and learn to retire to the shelter and quiet of what Landor called, ‘the audience chamber of God’ within us from the wilderness of our senses. This turning towards God is what we know to be the end of philosophy or the beginning of religion around which there have been the accretions of commentaries and glosses, explanations and elucidations. This inwardness of vision alone can reconcile one to the role one has to play in this great drama of life.

The scriptures uphold—Do not defer

any thing till tomorrow, for 'Tomorrow is uncertain, and how knowest thou that thou shalt live till tomorrow?' (*The Imitation of Christ*, p. 65) We need not mind our failures. Man notices our failings but God, our strivings. The moment we turn inward and march ahead we would see our heads touching the stars, we would

hear the 'knocks' of the Lord at our door within—'Behold I stand at the door' and we would hear Sri Ramakrishna still calling us anxiously from the housetop within. We need to respond to the call and be blessed. Our journey may be long and arduous but the sages say—'Arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached.'

THE MĪMĀMSĀ VIEWS ON CAUSATION: AN ADVAITIC APPROACH

DR. DEVAPRASAD BHATTACHARYA

The Mīmāṃsaka is a realist and believes in the existence of permanent substance. The modes of substance may change but it endures though not exclusive of changes. *Bhedābheda* or the difference-cum-identity is the relation between the material cause and the effect. The Ātman too may have modal changes. Mīmāṃsakas are Sat-kāryavādins and Pariṇāmavādins. Mīmāṃsakas advocate a beginningless and endless character of the world. Creation and destruction of the world go on ceaselessly and there is nothing in favour to establish that the world is created at a certain point of time or that the world is destroyed at another definite period of time (cf. *Tasmād adyavadevātra sarga-pralayakalpanā. Samastakṣayajanmābhyāṃ na siddhyatyapramāṇikā—Vārtika, Sambandhākṣepa parihārah*, V. 13). On the Mīmāṃsā view God is an hypothetical entity and not of much importance for understanding the world. It appears that Kumārila may admit the creatorship of God if from the Godly creation the Vedas are excepted. If the Vedas are also created by God, then everything in the Vedas to establish God or Godly creation will remain unproved.

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā asks how injunctions like 'Desiring Heaven one should perform

sacrifice' can be meaningful if the sacrifice which is perishable itself does not bring about some force or potency continuing up to the accomplishment of the final result. This is *apūrva*—a connective link between the act and the fruit and seeks to afford a causal explanation of the two. Presumption based on scriptures establishes *apūrva* which is a positive imperceptible force generated by the action. It is an intervening potency or the connecting link between the sacrifice and the ultimate result which may happen at a later period. 'Apurva', as Dr. Radhakrishnan explains, 'is the metaphysical link between work and its fruit.' (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 421-2) It is an imperceptible antecedent of the fruit, or the after state of the act. According to Kumārila the performance of sacrifice removes incapacities in the sacrifice and in the agent in the way of the attainment of Heaven and produces some capacity (*apūrva*) through which the final result is achieved. This capacity or potency resides in the agent throughout his life and at the end of it the agent attains his desired end. For Kumārila *apūrva* is a kind of *kriyāśakti*. According to Prabhākara *apūrva* is different from the voluntary transient act and it is *apūrva* that produces the effect. It rests

in the principal action. Śālikānātha thinks that it is *niyoga* aided by fate that produces the result. *Niyoga* produces disposition in the self and this produces the result at a later period. There is, however, some distinction between *adr̥ṣṭa* and *apūrvā* though the two bear similarity to each other. The *adr̥ṣṭa* includes the transcendental effect produced upon some material thing by a ritual treatment of it which produces no visible effect upon it. The *apūrvā* is also *adr̥ṣṭa*, but it exists of itself, and is not a function of any material or other object. (Edgerton : *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya Prakāśa*, p. 279)

Simple sacrifice has a single *apūrvā* but highly complex sacrifices like *Darśapūrṇamāsa* have four kinds of *apūrvā* : (i) *phalāpūrvā* is the immediate cause of the result (ii) *samudāyāpūrvā*—on the moonless day three sacrifices are performed and have for them *apūrvā* and on the full-moon day three other sacrifices are performed and they have also *apūrvā*. (Dr. Jha : *Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources*, pp. 256-62) These *apūrvās* are *samudāyāpūrvās*. (iii) *Utpattyapūrvā*—each one of three sacrifices performed on the full-moon day has its respective *apūrvā* ; again, each one of the sacrifices performed on the moonless day has its respective *apūrvā*. This is *utpattyapūrvā*, (iv) Even the minor act in the sacrifice has its own *apūrvā*. Prabhākara maintains that *apūrvā* has to be admitted because it is the deliverance of common experience that sacrifice itself is not continuant. How again sacrifice can be done for the Deity which is only a hypothetical entity and moreover there is no evidence to prove this. Prabhākara does not find any perceptual or inferential proof to establish that the potency is in the agent. According to Prabhākara potency is in the act.

Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā refers to the view

that the principal rite along with prior and posterior subsidiary rites acts as the instrument to the *apūrvā* which consists of merits and demerits and is a medium between the perishable sacrifice and the heaven. It is the initial unique result that helps the principal rite combine with the subsidiaries—*pradhānakarmanah svarupeṅgāsāhityābhāve api utpattyapūrvadvārā sāhityasambhavāt*. (Swami Madhavananda : *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā*, pp. 10-11) The principal rite is united with the final unique result through the medium of the *apūrvā* which is produced by the principal rite alone. The subsidiaries combine with the principal rite through their respective initial unique results.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas fire as fire is not the cause of burning but fire as having the capacity to burn is the cause of burning. The Mīmāṃsaka believes in the *śakti* which is a particular capacity on the presence of which there is an effect and its absence means that there is no effect. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools also recognize the necessity of *śakti* in some way with the absence of obstacles and identify *śakti* with the cause. *Prakaraṇapañcikā* speaks of positive *śakti* (to be inferred and not to be perceived) possessed by everything. It is eternal if things concerned are eternal and in transient things the *śakti* makes its appearance along with the appearance of things. For the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas 'Karman or action is also one of the imperceptible categories. When a thing moves, what we actually see is not the moving of things, but only the various conjunctions and disjunction of the things with certain points in spaces ; the expression the thing moves also refers to these conjunctions and disjunctions which latter cannot be regarded as the "Action" of moving, because the action of moving subsists in the moving thing, while conjunctions and disjunctions subsist in

outside space, and only these latter that we actually perceive. Action cannot be held to be perceptible as maintained by Kaṇāda; it is always to be inferred says 'Prakaranaṇapañcikā'. (Dr. Jha: *The Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, 1912, pp. 91-92) The Mīmāṃsā views on causation cannot bear the test of reason. According to Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā the common super-sensible power to be inferred and not to be perceived pertaining to different antecedent phenomena may produce similar consequents. But 'the vital question is raised if this causal power is an effect or not. If it is held to be a product either of the things in which it inheres or of the respective causes of the loci, this would involve a plurality of causes. If it is held to be uncaused it must be either co-eternal with, or antecedent to, the loci; but the result in either case will be equally unsatisfactory. On the first alternative, the causal power will be an uncaused event having a definite origin in time, which is a contradiction in terms. And power existing antecedently to, and therefore independently of, its locus, which is implied by the second alternative, presents an obvious absurdity.' (Dr. S. Bhaduri: *Studies in Nyaya-Vaisesika Metaphysics*)

Śrīdhara opposes the Mīmāṃsaka view according to which cause produces the effect through some imperceptible causal power. Śrīdhara urges that the causal power is unfounded because we do not know it. If it had been existent we knew it. Inference to causal power is impossible since there is no perception of it beforehand. The causal power of the Mīmāṃsakas is counter-acted, overpowered and destroyed. This assumption, as the Naiyāyika points out, is idle when the cause is found to be a group of conditions positive and negative. Positive conditions contribute by being present and negative

conditions by being absent. The Mīmāṃsaka may hold that the positive effect is produced by positive cause and the negative effect can only be produced by the negative cause. The Naiyāyika rejects this view. The positive effect sin is found to be produced by the non-performance of the daily duties and this constitutes the negative cause. Some type of effects may be produced by the different collocations of conditions. So the assumption of the imperceptible power of the cause is gratuitous when the perceptible nature of the cause is enough to explain everything. Nature of a thing or of a cause can by no means be altered. Burning may be produced by a variety of objects. If all causal objects have the same power of burning, we cannot explain the difference in the acts of burning produced by the different objects.

The principle of *apūrva* comes under heavy criticism. *Apūrva* is an unintelligent principle and cannot move of itself. *Apūrva* or the unseen principle is one (because there can be manyness only in something visible and tangible). *Apūrva* being one, smiles and tears of all individuals should be one and the same. But this is not the case. *Apūrva* accruing from deeds good and bad rests in the individual because it must have a locus of its own. But the individual dies. When the individual dies where does the *apūrva* rest? Anyhow the *apūrva* cannot be eternal since it is held to be generated by the Mīmāṃsakas. The assumption of *apūrva* is pointless. *Apūrva* is assumed because sacrifice is something that is generated (and therefore perishable) and cannot attain to the desired end. But similar is the case with *apūrva*. *Apūrva* is also produced on the completion of sacrifice and must therefore be perishable. So how *apūrva* can act as the medium between the sacrifice and the attainment of heaven?

For the easiness of the understanding it may be assumed that sacrifice itself is linked up with its result. But *Mīmāṃsā* sakas cannot apply one way of understanding to the sacrifice and another to *apūrva* when both are equally generated.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CO-OPERATION

DR. R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

'What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculties! in form and moving, how express and admirable! in action, how like an angel! in apprehension, how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! ...'—Hamlet.

In the course of a message sent to the Italian scientists in 1950, Einstein pointed out that the nuclear weapon had changed everything but our way of thinking. 'We need', said Einstein, 'an essentially new way of thinking if mankind is to survive.' Other eminent scientists, too, were of the same view. Max Born, for example, observed: 'Today we do not have much time left; it is upto our generation to succeed in thinking differently. If we fail, the days of civilised humanity are numbered.' Though fortunately we have so far escaped a third global war, we have succeeded in maintaining only an uneasy and precariously founded peace, with small-scale and localized wars taking place here and there, threatening world peace.

There are two dangers which we confront today. There is the nuclear weapon on the one hand; and there is the totalitarian rule on the other. The nuclear energy can be utilized for peaceful, constructive and humanitarian purposes. It can also be used in the form of a weapon, capable of extirpating mankind. Referring to the menace of the atom bomb, Einstein remarked: 'I don't know what weapons

will be used in the next war, but the one after that will be fought with bows and arrows.' Believing that peace can be maintained only by being powerful, the leading nation states which have attained the status of 'world powers' have armed themselves to their teeth with nuclear weapons. What was expected has not yet been achieved. Far from contributing to world peace and international co-operation, it has undermined the foundations of peace and co-operation by making one nation suspicious of the other. No nation seems to be satisfied with the arms under its possession. The nuclear arms-race is, therefore, a threat to peace. The totalitarian rule deprives the individual of his liberty, of his individuality, of his personality. The individual is treated as a means to serve the cause of the state or the party which is in power. In short, the totalitarian rule is as bad and pernicious as the nuclear weapon. By the one we lose life; and by the other a life that is worth living. If we are to overcome the twin dangers which we confront today, we must be prepared to adopt 'a new way of thinking' as suggested by Einstein, Max Born and other eminent thinkers.

It is necessary on the part of man to co-operate with others. His nature is such that he cannot remain aloof and pursue his ends in isolation. Plato has laid emphasis on this aspect of human nature in the course of his brilliant sociological

analysis of the nature of man. Society comes into existence when individuals come together, live together for the sake of the mutual satisfaction of the needs of one another. No man is self-sufficient. The same thing is true of nations, big and small, mighty and weak. Every individual has to depend upon others in order to fulfil some of his needs. He seeks the company of others in order to satisfy the organic needs and impulses. In fact, he becomes human by virtue of his association with others in society. Society exerts its influence on man in a number of ways from the moment he is born, whether he is conscious of it or not. If human nature is such that co-operation is a necessity, why is it that it appears to be something difficult to achieve in the present context of international relations?

Human beings are certainly interested in avoiding conflict which is the opposite of co-operation. Conflict both at the individual and international levels is bad and not desirable. No one desires to maintain the Hobbesian 'war of all against all' at the individual level. The conflict among nations, more particularly in the present context of nuclear warfare, is worse than the conflict between two individuals. Just as it is necessary for individuals to co-operate with one another, so also is it necessary for nations to co-operate with one another. It must be remembered that the alternative to conflict is co-operation. There is no satisfactory middle ground between conflict and co-operation. Either we fight armed with nuclear weapons and wipe out mankind with all its achievements, or agree to co-operate and ensure the safety and security of mankind and its achievements. To think of a middle-ground between the two is really to prepare the way for conflict rather than for co-operation.

It is necessary in this connexion to refer

to the concept of peaceful coexistence which has been eloquently advocated by many a statesman in the recent past. We must, so we have been told, believe in coexistence, if we are to live peacefully with our neighbour-nations. Just as two individuals who are neighbours coexist in spite of the differences they may have on many issues, so also two nations who are neighbours must agree to coexist, notwithstanding the differences they may have on many issues. Think of two nation states which adhere to two different political ideologies which, in their honest opinion, are irreconcilable. One nation, let us say, is committed to the path of democracy, while the other nation has unswerving faith in total rule. It is suggested by the votaries of coexistence that the two nations must believe in, and abide by, the principle of coexistence: that is to say, in spite of ideological and other differences, one nation must permit its neighbour to live peacefully, to coexist along with it. Peaceful coexistence is, therefore, considered to be the alternative to conflict.

There are difficulties in accepting coexistence as the alternative to conflict. It is co-operation and not co-existence which is the guarantor of peace. Coexistence does not and cannot contribute to peace and amity among nations. What does it mean to say that a democratic state and a totalitarian one must agree to coexist? It may be said by way of explanation that each must permit the other to conduct its affairs in its own way without outside interference and influence. Though this is what is very much desired, it seldom takes place. The difficulty here is that normal, peaceful relations do not obtain between them because the one suspects the *bona-fides* of the other. And such a suspicion is inescapable so long as their mutual relations are not based on, and directed by, the principle of co-operation. There is a

world of difference between the concept of coexistence and that of co-operation. The former is negative in character, since it does not imply anything more than *absence of conflict*. Two nations may co-exist without co-operating with each other. If they carry on without any open conflict for the time being, it must not be construed as a condition of peace. The 'uneasy peace' or the 'absence of conflict' that prevails for the time being is only a prelude to the attack on the one by the other, on the weaker by the powerful at the opportune moment. It is generally the case that the totalitarian state advocates coexistence in order to gain a breathing spell and postpone war for the time being. Its policy is in keeping with the celebrated advice of Fichte: 'Preserve peace so that you may begin war with an advantage in your favour.' The German philosopher Jaspers went to the extent of characterizing the concept of coexistence as a *fraud*. To quote Jaspers: 'He who lacks power, or an opportune moment to use it, may for the time being resort to the fraud called "peaceful coexistence".' By "peacefully" weakening his antagonist wherever possible he will prepare for the final act of violence.' The position is the same whether we consider individuals or nations. There is no peace worth the name when two individuals *merely* coexist, harping all the time on their differences, petty very often and profound on occasions. Differences are bound to be there, and they are most welcome. But to stop with coexistence is to maintain a state of tension which is for all practical purposes denial of peace. What is needed is not a negative attitude of coexistence, but a positive outlook of co-operation. The two individuals must be rationally convinced of the imperative need to co-operate with each other with due respect to the admitted differences. The same is the case with the nations. Un-

less there is a definite commitment on the part of the nations to co-operate with each other, peace can never be secured merely in terms of coexistence. It is only by an open commitment to the principle of co-operation at all levels, individual as well as national, can we hope to secure and maintain world peace.

Let us now analyse the implications of co-operation. What does it mean to say that people must co-operate with one another? The answer is that people must have *faith in reason*. It means that they must consider the issues, whatever they may be, only from the *rational* point of view. It is not enough if man claims that he is a rational being. The claim to rationality must be the guiding principle in all that he does. In short, people must agree to meet on the same platform of reason and follow reason to the end. Once people are agreed on the *significance* of co-operation, they can work out the *areas* of co-operation.

To have faith in reason is first of all to recognize the importance of communication. There must be a free flow of information from person to person, and from country to country. While people of one nation freely communicate with one another, there is restriction when information has to pass on from one nation to another. The difficulty is all the more greater for people of the 'free countries' with an 'open society' to communicate with those who are subject to total rule and shielded by 'iron curtain,' and *vice versa*. People must willingly share the knowledge they have acquired, whether they be in science or technology, mathematics or medicine, art or administration, and the governments should not restrict the free flow of information.

Secondly, the information must be reliable. It is no use in permitting information to go out, when it is not reliable.

For the sake of propaganda, it is not uncommon for some nations to make tall claims about the unrestricted freedom enjoyed by the people, while they are denied even the basic liberties. Some may stoutly deny that nuclear weapons are being tested secretly, while in truth they may be busily engaged in testing them. As a calculated measure to instil fear and awe in the minds of the neighbouring nations, one nation may speak about the possession of the latest variety of deadliest ballistic missiles, though it may not have any. In short, many nations deliberately adopt the unscrupulous policy of suppressing the truth and suggesting the false. Such a policy will not be conducive to international co-operation. The followers of reason cannot be unfaithful. If we profess to follow reason, we must not only freely share our thoughts and desires, beliefs and achievements with others at home and abroad, but our information must also be dependable. In the words of Jaspers: 'The political community of all can find the way of reason only where men who can trust each other in communication inspire trust in others.'

'Holding final positions' is another factor which jeopardizes co-operation at the individual as well as national levels. Knowing the limitations of the human intellect, no body should claim that his insight into what he considers to be the truth is final and that his utterance in respect of what he has known is unalterable. It does not mean that one should not believe what is true, as one understands it or as one has reasons to believe it to be true. Every one has a right to hold certain beliefs in the light of one's reason. When this right is conceded, it follows that every one has to respect the beliefs which others hold, beliefs which they claim to have arrived at as a result of reason. It is not suggested that reason, instead of bringing people

together, will take them apart. It should not be thought that if people commit themselves to the path of reason, there will be as many opinions as there are people in the world. Reason is the greatest unifier. The more we think, the closer we come together. Man, according to the well-known dictum of Protagoras, is the measure of all things. *Each* man, it is claimed, is the measure of all things. Each one is at perfect liberty to hold any opinion or belief as one thinks it fit or appropriate to hold. But there is obviously a limit to this. Because each one is admitted to be the measure of all things, it does not follow that two individuals cannot give the same answer when they are called upon to find out the total of a column of figures, or that they cannot agree with regard to the rightness of an act or the goodness of a thing or the beauty of a work of art. Nor does it follow that every one is infallible. As Russell has pointed out, 'the Protagorean position, rightly interpreted, does not involve the view that I never make mistakes, but only that the evidence of my mistakes must appear to me.' While the mistakes that a person commits may not be quite often apparent to him, he will undoubtedly get a chance to realize his mistakes and rectify them, if he admits in humility that truth is not his prerogative and that others who also claim to follow reason might have had the good luck to know the truth. In short, there is no such thing as a final position, so long as we are committed to reason. To think in terms of final position which is an expression of fanaticism and obstinacy is all the more dangerous in social, economic and political spheres. No one should think that certain social reform which he brings in to suit the conditions of a particular region or a country is needed everywhere. A certain policy in economic matters admirably suited to a particular

country at a particular time will not be the right one in some other country or in the same country at a different time. The same is the case in political matters. No one should think that a certain political ideology represents the final position known to human reason. And so no attempt should be made to thrust a political dogma or ideology on others. To follow reason is to cultivate the habit of seeing an alternative which will enable us to admit that there is as much truth, if not more, in other points of view as there is in our own.

Another way in which we can demonstrate our faith in reason is by permitting and encouraging 'public clash of minds'. If there is no such thing as final position from the point of view of reason, then every opportunity should be provided for all people to discuss and exchange, criticize and clarify the different view-points in the interest of truth. Truth emerges, said Nietzsche, when there are two. If we are interested in a 'brotherhood of reasonable men', then we must permit and encourage public clash of minds. It is only when people argue and discuss that they get chances to expose the follies of prevalent views and entertain new ideas which are true. If we admit that we are fallible, we must also admit the need for discussion, argument and criticism which will be possible only if there is unlimited freedom of expression. Protagonists of liberty like Milton and Mill have stressed the importance of freedom of expression in the interests of truth and progress of society. We cannot establish a community or brotherhood of reasonable men by law or by force; it can come into existence only through the practice of unlimited freedom of expression. Just as every one has a right to live, so also every one has a right to give expression to any opinion, whether true or false, or partly true and partly

false. Eloquenty pleading for the right of the minority to express its opinion, Mill declared: 'If all mankind minus one were of one opinion and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would no more be justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.' Since we are not super-human philosophers and since we cannot find such super-human philosophers to administer the country by setting up an 'ideal state', it would be folly of the worst type to follow the path of Plato and censor poetry, music and art in terms of fixed ideas apprehended by the wisdom of the philosopher. Human that we are, we must follow a different path; and that is the path of unlimited freedom of expression. Man thrives only in freedom. Under pressure of compulsion, he can repeat but not create. Without the right to free creation, life loses its significance and is not worth living. To sum up: co-operation will be a fact only if people are reasonable; and the most convincing proof of the people being reasonable is their willingness to exchange and their eagerness to discuss views and opinions for the purpose of mutual criticism and benefit.

Finally, there is the factor of responsibility. We are all familiar with the truism that the world problem is the individual problem. What we call 'the world problem', or the 'international problem' or the 'social problem' is ultimately the individual problem. Every individual must bear the *responsibility* for what he says and does. Man claims freedom for the sake of living a life of reason; and a life of reason implies a life of responsibility. If man is free to do what he likes, he must be responsible for what he does in society. There is no freedom without responsibility. The Existentialists in contemporary times have rightly emphasized

the problem of individual responsibility. The change that we hope to achieve at the level of society or at the level of interstate relations can be realized only if there is a change in the individual, in every man's manner of living. Every little act and word, every attitude and adjustment in millions and billions of people will count. In the words of Sartre: '...Man being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being.' Jaspers observes that '...every one shares the responsibility for the effects of creative endeavour. Every approach or acceptance, every act of criticism, praise or blame, indeed, every mere mention has results in fact. Every judgment confirms, intensifies, prepares, shapes, or spoils in the area of minds,

where the ceaseless battle for reason is waged.' Man has his relations not only with his immediate neighbourhood but also with the nation of which he is a member as well as with the international society. While his relations with the international society are not immediate in the way in which his relations are with his immediate neighbourhood, nevertheless they are vital. His sphere of influence extends to every nook and corner of the world. That is why Sartre maintains that man 'carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders'. International co-operation cannot be achieved overnight by passing a resolution at a roundtable conference. It can be realized only if every individual resolutely endeavours by accepting the responsibility for what he says and does in society.

SĀMKHYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE

DR. ANIMA SEN GUPTA

According to Sāmkhya, *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* represent two stages of knowledge. This distinction is made here on the basis of the functional differences of the external and internal sense-organs.

The external sense-organs first operate in producing perceptual cognition. The awareness that results from their operation is of an indeterminate type. The external sense-organs produce only a non-relational apprehension of the object (i.e. simply and purely as an indefinite one). This simple awareness begins to change into the form of a determinate and qualified object when the mind comes into operation. This is because the mind possesses the power of determining the nature of

the object by making such discrimination as '*ayam guṇaḥ*', '*īyam kriyā*', '*īyamatra jātiḥ*' etc. Both discrimination and assimilation which are involved in determinate perception are referred to here by the word *samkalpa*. This is the special function of the mind. Hence, determinate perception begins to emerge as soon as mind comes to function. Further, the functions of the three internal organs and one external organ may be both *yugapat* and *kramaśaḥ* in perception. Here, it seems to us that the words '*yugapat*' and '*kramaśaḥ*' do not refer to actual operations of the sense-organs; they, rather, stand for two different kinds of subjective feeling of the perceiving mind in respect of the awaken-

ing of knowledge due to the operation of the internal and the external organs. Sāṃkhya really believes in the successive operations of the different sense-organs, since in *Kārikās* (28, 35 and 36), it has been clearly mentioned that the external sense-organ first perceives an object indeterminately, it then brings such indeterminate impression to the mind which presents it to the ego-sense and which, in its turn, presents it to the intellect through which consciousness of the self is manifested. All the organs cannot therefore, be supposed to operate actually at one and the same moment of time in any situation whatsoever. Moreover, had all the organs of knowledge operated simultaneously, there could not have been any discrimination between indeterminate and determinate forms. If two things occur at the same moment, they will not be regarded as different. The use of the word 'yugapat' really suggests that in some situations, the internal and the external organs operate in such quick succession that the knower has the feeling that he is having that knowledge of the object immediately after his external organ has come into operation. As for example, the recognition of a snake revealed by a flash of lightning and the immediate flight as a result thereof. Here, the gradual arousal of knowledge is not felt as gradual due to very quick succession of the operational processes. There are, however, other situations when the knower feels that his knowledge is gradually passing through indeterminate stage to the determinate one. As evidence, we can cite the example of indistinct perception in twilight of a tall vertical object, the doubt followed by a recognition of that as a human being, the reference of that to the self and determination to meet and to talk to the man or to turn and walk away from him. Truly speaking, the different organs can operate in differ-

ent moments only in regard to one and the same object. If all the organs operate at one and the same moment, there will be conflict and confusion and no clear perception of the object as a consequence thereof. *Kramasāh* feeling, generally, arises in the case of doubtful cognition.

The process of perception when analysed fully, will be as under :

First moment of perception : Indeterminate impression of the object received by the external sense-organ, 'idamkiñcidasti'.

Second moment of perception (First moment of determinate perception) : Discrimination and assimilation by the mind. This is the first moment of determinate perception when there is awareness of the form 'Ayam ghaṭaḥ'.

Third moment of perception (Second moment of determinate perception) : Functioning of the ego-sense and emergence of perceptual knowledge in the form 'ghaṭam grahitum śaknomi'.

Fourth moment of perception (Third moment of determinate perception) : Functioning of *buddhi* in the form of *adhyavasāya* 'Mayaitat kartavyam'.

Thus, in the opinion of the Sāṃkhya, determinate perception begins from the second moment and assumes the form of *adhyavasāya* at the fourth moment.

The Nyāya system, too, recognizes indeterminate stage as the initial stage of the perceptual process. In the opinion of this school, we cannot have determinate knowledge or *viśiṣṭa jñāna* without a prior perception of the simpler elements of *jāti*, *guṇa*, *ākāra*, *sambandha* etc. in a state of separation (*dvandva*). A prior perception of *viśeṣaṇa* is absolutely necessary for determinate knowledge of an object.

The Nyāya process of perception, when analysed, stands as follows ;

First moment of perception : *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* or non-relational apprehension of *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa* etc.

Second moment of perception (First moment of determinate perception): Determinate perception or relational apprehension.

Third moment of perception (Second moment of determinate perception when *aham* will operate): This is the stage of *anuvyavasāya*.

Fourth moment of perception (and third moment of determinate perception): At this moment, '*hānopādānopekṣā buddhi*' arises. This stage represents the full perceptual knowledge of the object, because, here, the sense of the object being desirable or undesirable dawns upon the mind of the perceiver.

Here, we should remember that according to Nyāya, determinate knowledge arises after the second moment and in the third and the fourth moment (*anuvyavasāya* stage and *hānopādānopekṣā buddhi* stage) this determinate knowledge, already aroused becomes simply more clear, more rich and full. According to Sāṃkhya, however, determinate knowledge, in the true sense of the term, does not arise until *buddhi* comes into operation at the fourth moment. *Adhyavasāya* which is the proper form of determinate knowledge is a disposition of *buddhi* and as such without the operation of the intellect, *savikalpaka jñāna* cannot arise.

Although in respect of the number of moments needed for the arousal of full determinate knowledge, there seems to be no difference between the Sāṃkhya school and the Nyāya school, still in respect of the number of internal organs operating in producing perceptual knowledge there is difference. There is consequent difference in the *prakṛyā* (process) also.

DIFFERENCE IN RESPECT OF THE NUMBER OF INTERNAL ORGANS

Buddhi and *ahamkāra* as separate internal organs have not been recognized in the

Nyāya. According to this system, the co-ordinating function of the *buddhi* has been ascribed to the soul through the instrumentality of the mind. According to Naiyāyikas, I-consciousness is generated in the soul when it gets associated with the mind-body system. So, ego-hood as a separate *tattva*, has not been accepted. Since, mind alone is capable of transforming non-relational awareness to full relational knowledge, no other internal organ is necessary to transform indeterminate impression of an object into determinate knowledge. Now, Vācaspati Miśra has stated in his commentary on *Kārikā* 27, that indeterminate perception occurs through the functioning of the external sense-organs whereas mind has the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate.

Here, therefore, following Vācaspati, one may say that according to Sāṃkhya determinate perception arises fully due to functioning of the mind. There is no need for postulating three stages of determinate perception in accordance with the successive operations of mind, ego-sense and intellect at three different moments. This view cannot be accepted. According to Sāṃkhya, definite knowledge of an object or *adhyavasāya* is a *dharma* of *buddhi* and *buddhi* is different from the mind. It is only when *buddhi* is stimulated by the functioning of the mind and the ego-sense that the *tamoguna* of the intellect is completely overpowered by the over-flowing *sattvaguna* and the object is definitely revealed through *buddhivṛtti*. It is only at this point that Puruṣa appears to have 'the perceptual knowledge of the object because of reflection acting in co-operation with ignorance. Hence, in the Philosophy of the Sāṃkhya, (as has been already pointed out) the contributions of *ahamkāra* and *buddhi* towards the formation of determinate perception

cannot be ignored. Vācaspati has stated in his commentary on *Kārikā* 27, that determinate perception is due to mind, perhaps, because of the fact that he is considering (in the said *Kārikā*) the functions of the eleven gross organs only. *Buddhi* and *ahamkāra*, being subtle in nature and being of different kinds (*tattvāntara*) have not been mentioned here.

DIFFERENCE IN THE PRATYAKSA PRAKRIYA OF THE TWO SCHOOLS

Both the schools believe that in perception, there is relation of the sense-organ with the object. Both also believe that sense-organs are *prāpyakārī*. The word *prāpyakārī* is, however, used in different senses by the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya-school. According to Sāṅkhya, all external sense-organs are *prāpya-prakāśakārī*, because they first get at their objects through *vṛttis* and then reveal them. The real *indriya* is the inner faculty which has *ahamkāra* as its *upādāna kāraṇa*. It is because sense-organs are *ahamkārika* in nature that they can go out to the object. The stimulation of the external sense-organs produces further stimulation of the mind, ego, and intellect. The external sense-organs (as we have already seen) produce indeterminate impressions which are, then, successively operated upon by the mind, ego-sense and *buddhi*. The final result is the determinate knowledge of the object.

The Nyāya school, on the other hand, uses the word *prāpyakārī* in a different sense. According to this school, it is only the visual organ which is of the nature of light that goes out and reaches the object. The other organs do not move out to meet the objects. They come in contact with the objects remaining in their own places in the body of a living being. They are called *prāpyakārī* because they are receiving impressions by coming in direct contact

with their respective objects.

Now, when there is a contact between a sense-organ and the object which is called *sannikarṣa*, then the sense-organ establishes a particular relation with its appropriate object, according to both the schools. The nature of *sannikarṣa*, however, is differently conceived by these two schools. This difference is due to the fact that the Sāṅkhya school believes in *tādātmya* between substance and quality, quality and its universal etc. whereas according to Nyāya, substance, quality, universal etc. are entirely different. The relation that unites substance with its quality or the quality with its universal etc. is termed *samavāya* in the philosophy of the Nyāya school.

As soon as there is intercourse between the object and the sense-organ, there is the emergence of the indeterminate perceptual knowledge involving the operation of the sense-organs only. Now, according to Nyāya, determinate perception proper arises as soon as the mind comes into operation. The mind is connected with the soul and as such through mind the soul, too, becomes directly connected with the object. There is no such thing as *vṛtti* in the Nyāya theory of perception. The embodied soul is the *pramātā* who knows the object directly.

According to Sāṅkhya, however, the sense-organs receive indeterminate *vṛtti* from the object and this, they present to the mind, for discrimination and assimilation. The mind then presents its own cooked up stuff to the ego-sense for further elaboration and the ego-sense to *buddhi*. It is only when *buddhi* comes to make its own contributions to knowledge and assumes the form of the object of knowledge that determinate knowledge proper arises (according to Sāṅkhya). *Buddhi* is the principle that defines, ascertains and recognizes the object as belonging to a

particular type and also determines the desirability and undesirability of its attainment on the basis of which a definite conative attitude is adopted by the *pramātā* who is no other than the *cetanāviṣṭa buddhi*. Spatial and temporal localization

of the object is also a function of *buddhi*. (Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha : *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, commentary of *Kārikā* 23) Hence, determinate perception proper arises when the intellect works upon the material supplied to it by the other sense-organs.

THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF MORAL THEORY

DR. P. S. SASTRI

We require and expect from moral philosophy some definite criterion of right and wrong which can be construed into particular duties.

The practical value of any *theory* of morals presupposes a particular interest in the moral ideal; and the practical value, in any case, must be negative rather than positive.

One is tempted to say that moral philosophy is necessary chiefly to remedy the evils it has itself brought into being. Under the influence of an operative ideal, institutions and practices grow up, reflection upon them commences, and with our real need for, and sometimes rash construction of generalizations, we try to construct 'universal rules' of behaviour. These rules are the sources of our trouble; and theorizing attempts to cure such ills. The function of resolving antinomies, rather than discovering ideals and deducing a universe of positive duties from them—this is the negative value of moral philosophy.

Consider some examples to show the service rendered by moral philosophy in cases of perplexity as to the right line of conduct. Practical perplexities for the moral consciousness seem always to arise through one or other of the following causes: (1) through conflict of abstract formulae of different aspects of the ideal—

e.g. 'Thou shalt not be accessory to murder' and 'Thou shalt not be a party to deceit'; (2) through conflicting commands delivered by two different institutions which claim, or are acknowledged to possess, a 'divine' sanction for the authority they exercise—e.g. commands of state and religion; (3) from conflict between a formula and a command of such an institution—e.g. 'Thou shalt not kill' and the demand on a soldier on active service; or (4) from conflict of formula or institution with some particular impulse or individual conception of human good.

From these cases of perplexity we have to distinguish questions as to matters of *fact* (whether, e.g., such and such a course of conduct is at all *likely*, to cause death or injury to anyone), and questions of the *sophistical* kind which aim at finding 'justification' for conduct our conscience cannot really sanction.

Consider (4) and the rule of veracity. Jeanie Deans speaks a single untruth to save her sister from condemnation for a crime of which she really believed her innocent.

Is one *never* entitled to lie in order to save an innocent person from death? We have to take this down to the particular case, setting out the whole context of circumstances, in order to see whether the

departure from the principle of veracity is inspired by the highest motive.

It is impossible to analyse the situation in an unbiased way under the actual necessity of acting. In the hour of action it is the ideal into which one has lived and thought oneself that takes command. But in preparing the soul for such test, sheer dispassionate theorizing about morality—the analysis of the meaning of right and duty—can do a great deal, by making one sensitive to the leading issues involved, and enabling one to see them despite personal considerations; and also by counteracting the bad effects of sceptical or wrongly inspired theories about the basis of moral ideas.

Our rational nature, at some stage or other, compels us to ask—whether this really is an ‘imponent’ of duty—whether, e.g., the ‘Law of Moses’ is binding on us *because* it has been commanded and sanctioned by penalties, or whether it originated in any source other than the moral consciousness.

Here reflection tells us that the conception of an external divine legislator is an imaginative explanation.

The reality of the divine nature is not comprehensible by us, though that nature is reproduced and is operative *in* us, through our ideas of perfection, and in the idea of a being in whom this perfection is eternally real. These operations of the divine nature in us, and the negative idea we have of it as the Best, acting upon an imagination, yield the language of ordinary religion.

Philosophical criticism has to disentangle the real, operative ideals from their imaginative expression. Moral ideals are commands only in the metaphorical sense that our possession of those ideals implies in us the expression or reproduction of an infinite spirit, and a sense of personal responsibility for realizing them. But philos-

ophy has to explain the real nature of the moral consciousness and the source of its power, showing that moral ideals are not without rational justification. So we have the picturesque language which clothes these ideals.

Next it reviews the claims, made by or on behalf of institutions and individuals. Apprehension of the truth (i) that morality is not fundamentally obedience to ‘divine commands’ or to commands issued ‘under Divine Commission’; (ii) that ‘divine commands’ are promptings of the divine Spirit as reproduced in each individual; (iii) that no generalization as to particular duties, based upon past obedience to those promptings, can be *absolute* in the sense in which the ideal itself is absolute—apprehension of these things should help to show the method of dealing with perplexities of conscience.

Philosophy explains the origin of the conflict, and without presuming to decide for either side, directs the mind to the true end to which each deliverance is somehow relative.

The counsel offered by philosophy can affect individuals themselves by preparation in meditation beforehand. The ideal of a true and common good backed by knowledge gained from past experience of the race and of the individual must decide what one’s actual duty is. This is called the final dictate of one’s conscience.

Moral duty has a significance apart from any external authority. But in showing the ‘derived power’ of external authorities, philosophy should emphasize the fact that moral duty does have a significance. External authorities cannot be ultimate for the individual, but they are necessary factors in social life. Thus the state has a moral right to make martyrs, and individuals have a moral right to be martyrs. Public authorities at least further objects in which we are interested. We trust the

authority as having a better judgement and a more complete view of circumstances and means than we have ourselves.

Recognition of the authority of the society is essential. We have to accept tradition, a great fund of inherited moral wisdom, not through fear of any coercive power. It has a limited and derived title to exact obedience; but we should not lose the moral perspective.

Under certain social conditions, and in face of certain intellectual movements, philosophy then can render practical service. To pretend to supply a moral dynamic would be impertinent. The moral dynamic is in the spiritual nature of man. It is the duty of the philosopher to understand it, not to bring it into existence, or even to strengthen it.

His proper work, his best practical service to the community, is to analyse, to

remove mis-apprehensions, and thus to remove obstacles to the effort after true well-being. He is like an intellectual scavenger.

To derive any help from moral philosophy in this way, one must already be actuated by the moral ideal. It implies a previous discipline of character which comes only from conducting oneself under the guidance of those institutions which philosophy teaches us to understand and value on their real merits. Sometimes our convictions are undermined too. But philosophy is of practical moral value only to those having the disposition to morality. It does not make good men bad; perhaps it does not make bad men good. But it helps all men to see more clearly the implications of the practical ideals actuating them, and therefore it helps to make good men better.

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA: THE MYSTIC

BRAHMACHARI SUDHANSHU

INTRODUCTION

Mysticism is as old as Religion. The investigations of science in the field of nature might have succeeded in eradicating some of its prejudices and superstitions which were somehow associated with it since its formative days but the experience of Truth at its source remains in the same way inexplicable and mysterious. The limitations of the so-called human knowledge fail to view the Truth fully and properly. For it is not reason or intelligence exactly that obstructs this kind of Truth view, but the very nature of the experience which is available only through a kind of subjective experience. Till the knowledge of Truth comes under one's direct experi-

ence in its entirety, its veracity will be questioned again and again.

Otherwise there is very little of contradiction between Religion and Reason. The ultimate experience of Religion being transcendental and all comprehensive it includes both Reason and Science. In true realization there is perfect harmony.

Unfortunately the word 'mysticism' is much misunderstood and confused by many in the domain of philosophy. To Bertrand Russell mysticism 'is in essence, a little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe. He calls it an emotion that inspires whatever is best in man and draws a line of distinction in the

history of philosophical development between the scientific knowledge and metaphysical knowledge. According to him the source of the mystic metaphysical tradition lies far beyond in the interesting strain of mysticism of Parmenides. From Plato to Hegel, the long line of philosophical development shows that philosophy at its highest stage has not been able to avoid mystic ideas in some way or other.

In the East, particularly in India, the problem of Reality has been approached in a different way altogether. It is always a mixed approach of Religion and Philosophy. Religion follows Philosophy and goes further ahead in the pursuit, because Philosophy only extols the Reality but Religion realizes it. Religion is for the subjective experience of the objective philosophy of Truth.

The common sense view of mysticism takes it to mean miracle or magic, making the impossible possible. But a gradual penetration into this magic of *Māyā* or the changing appearance is sure to bring about a conviction of unity contradicting all these laws of change and appearance. This kind of mystic experience is not altogether isolated from other thoughts and sensations. It comes in the same way but, as has been said, it is peculiarly isolated only to the mystic in the sense that another non-mystic cannot experience it or interpret it. But in spite of this, there are certain common features of mystic experiences throughout the world. Russell enumerates these characteristics of mystical philosophy as :

- (a) belief in insight as against analytic knowledge ;
- (b) its belief in unity ;
- (c) denial of time ;
- (d) denial of appearance ;
- (e) its peculiar ethical aspects.

THOUGHTS OF SWAMI VIVEKANANDA ON MYSTICISM

Applying these tests supplied by Bertrand Russell with certain reservations, one can say that Swami Vivekananda, too, was a mystic. Particularly it is well known that his teachings marked all these characteristics, mentioned in the foregoing section and he had the experience of the timeless unity of the Reality beyond the veil of appearance—beyond the plane of so-called good and evil. But he was not a mystic of the common type for he pleaded for a scientific and universal religion based on purity of character and it is fundamentally the same everywhere. He cut through all the barriers of materialism and prejudices and superstitions of primitive and conventional religion. Driving home his conception of real religion he said, 'Stick to your reason until you reach something higher, and you will know it to be higher because it will not jar against reason. The stage beyond consciousness is inspiration (*samādhi*), but never mistake hysterical trances for the real thing. It is a terrible thing to claim this inspiration falsely, to mistake instinct for inspiration. There is no external test for inspiration ; we know it ourselves. Our guard against mistake is negative ; the voice of reason ...' He said further, 'All religion means going beyond reason, but reason is the only guide to get there. Instinct is like ice, reason is the water and inspiration is like the subtlest form or vapour, one following the other.' (*The complete works*, Vol. VII, p. 60)

The religion is never irrational. The 'Belief' of religion is not a fancy or imagination contradicting our analytic knowledge. Religion is faith based on experience. Swamiji clears the point when he says 'Faith is not belief, it is the grasp on the ultimate, an illumination.' This does not mean that he gave reason a licence to

drive about aimlessly. To him reason was a means or instrument only and not the end of religion. Reason pays only when it conforms to spirituality and Swamiji wanted to plant the thorn of reason in the garden of religion as a good fencing and as a protection against all superstitions and prejudices.

Now about the second and the third criteria—the ‘unity’ and the ‘Timeless’ view of mystic philosophy put forward by Russell, the following observation of Swami Vivekananda can be regarded as very significant. Quoting Patañjali’s aphorism on *yoga*, he said: ‘Time stands controlled, all knowledge is there in one second. Everything is known like a flash.’ He says further in his lecture ‘The Absolute and Manifestation’—‘In the first place time, space and causation cannot be said to be of independent existences. Time is entirely a dependent existence; it changes with every change of our mind. Sometimes in dream one imagines that one has lived several years; at other times several months passed as one second. So time is entirely dependent on our state of mind. Secondly the idea of time vanishes altogether sometimes, so with space. We cannot know what space is. Yet it is there indefinable and cannot exist separate from anything else. So with causation.’ (ibid., Vol. II, p. 135) The one peculiar attribute we find in time, space and causation is that they cannot exist separate from other things. They are one and in the ultimate there is no time, no space, no causation. This claim is not at all superstitious.

Thus about unity, Swamiji has further said in the *Raja-Yoga*, ‘Thus even in the universe of thought we find unity and at last when we get to the self, we know that that self can only be One. Beyond the vibrations of matter in its gross and subtle aspects, beyond motion there is but

One. Even in manifested motion there is only unity. These facts can no more be denied. Modern physics also has demonstrated that the sum total of energies in the universe is the same throughout.’ (ibid., Vol. I, p. 152) The uniformities of Nature and other scientific laws also point out to a sustaining unity behind all these changes and it is therefore no longer a mere notion of the mystic thought. Similarly, the last criterion of Russell, that is the ethical aspect of mystical philosophy needs reconsideration. Particularly in the case of Swami Vivekananda moral values should be understood a little differently. To him morality itself is not religion though purity is a *sine qua non* there. Religious perfection must transcend finally the dual sense of good and evil and include morality only as a necessary step towards perfection. It is not perfect in itself. ‘The goal is far beyond. The goal is unity.’

PERSONAL ASPECTS OF THE MYSTIC EXPERIENCE

Mysticism, according to Evelyn Underhill, is a direct intuition or experience of God; and the mystic is a person who has such a direct experience; one whose religion and life are centred not merely on an accepted belief or practice but on that which he regards as a first hand personal knowledge. The life of Swami Vivekananda is a clear evidence of this direct intuition or experience of God and that life was never centred on merely accepted belief or practice. His life was a challenge to blind belief and practice. At the very threshold of youth there was tremendous spiritual unrest in him. He had his first direct mystic experience at the very touch of his Master when he experienced a thrilling sensation in him. But prior to this he had some mystic vision of which he him-

self was not very clear. His meeting with Sri Ramakrishna and his initiation into the spiritual life through a peculiar and affectionate way brought a real transformation in his personality. And actually mysticism means initiation into a spiritual life for the realization of the Ultimate.

It is indeed astonishing that the mystical aspect of Swami Vivekananda is not so much revealed. People know him as a dynamic character with a cyclonic power of speech which attracted the people throughout the world. But behind the veil of his inspiring character, his immediate being was mystical and spiritual. It is his rigorous active open life that has made him simple and easy and this he wanted to be for the sake of his great mission. His nature apparently contradicts the settled notions about the mystics that they must be, for individual realization, doing *tapas* far away in the deep forest, never haunted by men.

The life of Swami Vivekananda is an answer to this misleading view about the mystics. He also wanted individual realization. But Sri Ramakrishna explained to him the real goal of his life. He expected him to be a huge banyan tree under whose shelter tired souls would refresh themselves. Besides, in God realization there is no self or individuality. The moment one realizes he loses himself in the sense, he becomes universal. The subjective identification is transformed into an objectivity, finite breaks into infinity. Swami Vivekananda had all these pervasive mystic realizations of the Absolute Spirit. In fact the mystics are not lazy contemplatives. To follow Underhill, the mystic, instead of being useless, selfish and other-worldly is useful, unselfish and this worldly. He is a creative personality consecrated to the great business of actualizing the eternal ever within the temporal.

He does it or tries to do it not because he seeks joy, but solely for love—love of God and love of his fellowmen.

Swamiji had this inspiration of love for all, as manifestation of divinity and dedicated his whole life to the cause of this great love. His untold sufferings and miseries in India and America bear ample testimony to this fact of dedication and inspiration. But at the same time he was not an isolated mystic. He was the historical embodiment representing the best of our past heritage in the form of present. What Underhill has said in the introduction of the *Mystics of the Church* can be referred here. It is said, 'On the historical side every mystic is profoundly influenced by his environment and cannot be understood in isolation from it. He is rooted in the religious past of his race, its religious present surrounds and penetrates him whether he will or not; and through this present and this past, some, indeed much of his knowledge of God must come.' Every word of it is true in the case of Swami Vivekananda. He combined in himself both the purposes of individual and corporate life together for a greater spiritual achievement. His was not a flight alone as Plotinus remarked about mysticism in general.

In a mystic this experience is a two way traffic. Sometimes the perceptions of the things without arouse the memory of the infinite within, and in this way a relation is established with the universal. In the same way the memories of the spirit within suggest the perception of the without and it is spread out in an enwrapped vision of all-pervasive unity. It is this latter experience that inspired Swami Vivekananda to worship the God in every being. Thus he emphasized the eternal and transcendental aspect of the being and never deified that with an immanent conception like many others.

CERTAIN TESTS AND EXAMPLES OF MYSTIC EXPERIENCE

Mysticism is not a cult or constitution. It is not to be confused with mere catholic piety. But as has been said already, it is realization. About the personal aspect of the mystic realization, views are generally divided. All opinions are not unanimous and they do not follow universally in all the cases. But an approximate estimate can be had out of the common views expressed by thinkers like William James, Dr. Richard Maurice Buck and Suzuki, the exponent of Zen Buddhism. These are characterized as : (a) visions and photism, (b) supernatural power, (c) exaltation, (d) charming personality, (e) a sense of beyondness, (f) authority and affirmity and (g) death and immortality.

Let us illustrate a few of these mystical tests from the life of Swami Vivekananda and conclude.

Visions and Photism

Swami Vivekananda's opinion about visions and miracles are well known. According to him visions are side issues. 'They are not the true *yoga*. They may have a certain usefulness in establishing indirectly the truth of our statements. Even a little glimpse gives faith that there is something behind the gross matter. Yet those who spend time on such things run into grave danger. These (psychic developments) are frontier questions!' There can never be any certainty or stability of knowledge reached by these means. It is because of this rational attitude Swami Vivekananda could himself bypass so many mystic experiences and visions in his life. In his early life he had seen good many visions of an effulgent photic light covering his body every night at bed-time, and of a monk appearing before him. After coming in contact with Sri Ramakrishna only, he could confirm some of these experiences.

It is too well known that the effect of a vision at Kashmere in the temple of Mother Kṣīra Bhavānī brought important change in his life towards the end. The situation has been described in his biography. Swamiji was 'brooding with pain on the dilapidated condition of the temple, wished in his heart that he were able to build a new one there in its place'. But as these thoughts crossed his mind he heard the voice of the Mother, 'My child ! If I so wish I can have innumerable temples and magnificent monastic centres. I can even this moment raise a seven-storied golden temple on this very spot.' This mystic experience brought in him such a major transformation in his spiritual personality that he remained a child of the Divine Mother for ever depending on Her mighty cosmic universal will. (*Life of Swami Vivekananda, By His Eastern and Western Disciples, Advaita Ashrama, 1955, pp. 599-600*)

At Cossipur garden house once he had a peculiar experience of losing his body altogether and Sri Ramakrishna had to intervene personally to bring his consciousness back to normality. But afterwards Sri Ramakrishna told him : 'Now then, the Mother has shown you everything. Just as a treasure is locked up in a box, so will this realization you have just had be locked up and the key shall remain with me. You have work to do. When you will have finished my work, the treasure-box will be unlocked again ; and you will know everything then, just as you do now.'

Supernatural Power

His power of clairvoyance can be cited in the following : This happened sometime during his pre-monastic days, when he was visiting Dakshineswar intermittently, but stopped going there for sometime. Noticing this unusual absence one day Sri

Ramakrishna was coming towards his house on a horse carriage. Swamiji saw him coming from a long distance through different roads and he confessed this to the Master as soon as he arrived.

His experience of clairaudience can be cited in the fact of his own statement wherein he said that in America he used to hear some voice giving him the necessary matter for his speech on different occasions, particularly whenever he felt any dearth of it or was not prepared at all.

A few other strange experiences also can be mentioned here. Sister Nivedita writes referring to one such case: 'Again in the last winter of his life, he told his disciple Swarupananda that for some months continually he had been conscious of two hands, holding his own in their grasp. Going on a pilgrimage, one would catch him telling his beads. Seated with one's back to him in a carriage one would hear him repeating an invocation over and over.' (*The Master As I Saw Him*, 1910, p. 469)

Strange was the power with which he could see sometimes a person's past, present, and future. The only example that will be sufficient here is that of Madame Calvé, the famous artiste of that time. She herself wrote about it later. 'An appointment was arranged for me; and when I arrived at his house, I was immediately ushered into his study. . . . After a brief pause he spoke without looking up, "My child, what a troubled atmosphere you have about you. Be calm. It is essential." Then in quiet voice, untroubled and aloof, this man, who did not even know my name talked to me of my secret problems and anxieties. He spoke of things that I thought were unknown to my nearest friends. It seemed miraculous and supernatural.' (*Reminiscences of Swami Vivekananda*, second Edition, p. 264)

Exaltation

Often he would be in an exalted mood and when he would be serious it was even difficult for any one to stand before his grave appearance. It is reported that once in America he was talking about meditation and whilst in the class itself he became so absorbed that it was difficult for him to come to normal plane for some-time. Giving such description of exaltation in Thousand Island Park, Sister Christine wrote in her reminiscences: 'There was nothing set or formed about these night classes on the upper verandah. He sat in his large chair at the end near the door. Sometimes he went into deep meditation. At such time we too meditated or sat in profound silence. Often it lasted for hours and one after the other we slipped away.' (*ibid.*, p. 166)

Question of Personal and Impersonal and His Charming Personality

In the words of Sister Nivedita, 'But there was a third element in the Swamiji's teachings whose unexpectedness occasioned me some surprise. It was easy to see that he was no mere lecturer, like some other propounders of advanced ideas whom I had heard even from the pulpit. . . . He was, to his own thinking at least, as clearly an apostle making an appeal to man. . . . calling on the world to enter into the kingdom of God.' (*The Master As I Saw Him*, 1910, p. 18)

About the impersonal aspect of his character, she describes: 'The Swami himself was, on personal subjects, intensely reserved. . . . His talk was always impersonal.'

A Sense of Beyondness and Other Deep Moods

There was always a sense of 'beyondness' in his talk. It is recorded in the *Reminiscences* that on being asked to explain

the nature of Māyā : 'He was speaking fast and I followed his words and logic. By and by, my mind lost the contact of the sense organs. I experienced a subtle world around me which was much finer than the gross world.'

Sister Nivedita wrote about this in the *Notes of Some Wanderings*, 'Whatever might be the subject of conversation it ended always on the note of the infinite. Indeed I do not know that our Master's realization of the Advaita Philosophy has been in anything more convincing than in this matter of his interpretation of the world. He might appear to take up any subject, literary, ethnological or scientific but he always made us feel it as an illustration of the ultimate vision.' (1922 Edition, p. 4)

Authority and Affirmity

His contact with Reality was very intimate and close and this gave him an authority of affirmative character to assert himself in carrying the message of Reality in its directness and universality.

Death and Immortality

About death and immortality there are quite a few incidents, mentioned in his biography to prove his fearless and free attitude towards life. A heroic adventure for the Absolute always possessed him and he did not care for the consequence. During the days of itinerary many

times he threw himself before the jaws of death. In the palaces of the Princes he boldly condemned their affairs greatly exposing himself to the risk of death. Such occasions can only prove that death was slave to him. He tasted immortality and why should he fear? More than once, he said, 'I shall never live to see forty.' He knew about his death long before.

Surprisingly enough he entered into *mahāsamādhi* on the 4th of July, 1902. That very day Swami Ramakrishnananda, one of his brother disciples, heard his voice in meditation at Madras : 'Sashi, I have spat out the body!'

A few years later Sri Aurobindo, too, had some mystic experience in the jail. He said : 'It is a fact that I was hearing constantly the voice of Vivekananda speaking to me for a fortnight in the jail, in my solitary meditation and felt his presence.' Thus the deathless immortal spirit of Swami Vivekananda remains there to inspire the message of eternal, the message of India's spiritual heritage to be handed over down the ages.

Swami Vivekananda is thus a mystic, for his vision mediates to him an actuality beyond the reach of the sense. He is a mystic, for his philosophy passes beyond the realm of thought to the apprehension of pure truth, and he combines within him all the aspects of a true mystic personality.

AHIMSĀ : SOME REFLECTIONS

SRI P. S. S. RAMA RAO

The doctrine of Ahimsā is the linchpin of Hindu ethics. It is considered to be the *parama dharma*, the supreme duty of man in his progress to moral and spiritual perfection. It has moulded the lives of

generations of people through a chequered period of history. My purpose in this paper is not to give any historical elucidation as to how people have applied this principle in their lives, but to examine *in*

general, what is implied by Ahimsā, and whether the principle ought to be followed as the moralists have exhorted us to do.

The term 'ahimsā' is generally translated in English as meaning 'non-violence', and this suggests a negative significance to the term, i.e. that we should resist any temptation to do violence to another in thought, word and deed. Thus, the three forms of evil activity—*kṛta*, *kārita* and *anumata* (directly doing the act, indirectly causing it to be done through another agent, and permitting evil conduct in others) should be avoided if the principle is to be observed. But the Indian thinkers have emphasized the fact that this will be giving a narrow interpretation of the term 'ahimsā', and it has a positive aspect as well, namely, that we should *love* and be kindly to others. And this fact gives a new twist to the significance to the term, and is a big leap forward in our ethical conceptions of good and evil. To resist from doing violence to one who has not done us any harm is easy; to pay our opponent in his own coin as a sort of 'retributive justice' is natural; but not to retort when someone has done us wrong, and at the same time love him, is a state of mind to be cultivated.

Buddha declared two thousand five hundred years ago: 'Not by hate is hate destroyed, but by love is hate destroyed. This is the eternal law.' (*Dhammapada*, 1.5) In our times, Gandhi gave India the same message when he said quoting from Shelley:

Stand ye calm and resolute
Like a forest close and mute
With folded arms and looks which are
Weapons of unvanquished war.

And if then the tyrants dare
Let them ride among you there,
Slash, and stab, and maim and hew,
What they like, that let them do.

With folded arms and steady eyes,
And little fear, and less surprise,
Look upon them as they slay,
Till their rage has died away.

(Louis Fischer: *Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World*, p. 49)

This emphasis on non-violence and love is not peculiar to Hinduism alone. The other religions too, emphasize this fact. There is no doubt that this involves personal suffering, but there can be no love without suffering. Dante looked at the lovers through all the ages as the supreme crown of sorrow.

Now, I will take the terms 'violence' and 'non-violence' as undefined, but (i) will use the term 'violence' for any act of injury or harm done to another in thought, word or deed, either to satisfy my sadistic tendencies, or as a retribution to the wrong done to me. The clause 'thought, word or deed' raises many complex questions, in that I may not be able to *do* any violence to another in *thought*; nor is the feeling, degree and intensity of the harm done by any of these methods the same. Likewise, (ii) I will use the term 'non-violence' as the resistance of any temptation to do harm or injury to another either (a) to satisfy my sadistic tendencies, (b) or as a retribution to the wrong done to me, and (c) also to positively love another who has injured me.

To be more clear, I am supposed to be following the principle of Ahimsā:

- (i) if even the thought that I should do harm to another never comes to me;
- (ii) if X does wrong to me, I will be indifferent, which will be a case of silent suffering; and
- (iii) if X does wrong to me, I will be kind and sympathetic towards him, and will love him.

Cases (ii) and (iii) are also complex, in that they admit of different *kinds* of harm

done to me, as for example the case of violence done to me by a morally culpable person who is unknown to me is different in kind from the case of a person whom I loved and for whom I sacrificed my lot. Anyway, it is not possible to discuss here the different kinds of violence that can be done.

Leaving (i) alone which may not require any analysis, I will confine my examination to (ii) and (iii).

To take (ii) first: Two questions are involved here:

(a) Should I, following the principle of non-violence, remain indifferent when someone has done me wrong? Should I not pay him in his own coin and thus make him realize his folly? If I remain indifferent, does not my enemy think me to be a coward and will he not further persecute me?

To this question, Gandhiji who was a champion of Ahimsā in our generation says that the spirit of Ahimsā is found in the courageous, but not in the cowards. 'My creed of non-violence is an extremely active force. It has no room for cowardice or weakness.' (Bose: *Selections from Gandhi*, p. 154) He said once in connexion with the Indian Independence movement that non-violence would require much more courage than violence. '...No coward would sit still in the ground as galloping police horses advance upon him or lie in the path of an automobile. ... This was active resistance of the brave.' (Louis Fischer: *Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World*, p. 90)

(b) If I should punish the wrong-doer, what would be the principle or principles according to which I am justified in punishing?

Much can be said in answer to (b), but broadly we may say that it involves at least two main conceptions:

(a) That I should punish the wrong-

doer because it is in itself something of value quite apart from any other considerations. In other words, the man who has done me harm *deserves* that punishment, and there is such a thing as 'atoning' for the wrong done to me by his suffering; and

(b) That I should punish the wrong-doer only as a means, my end being the reformation of my enemy, and the possible good that he may attain thereby.

Regarding (a): The theory that I should punish the wrong-doer had the support of some of the influential philosophers in the West, especially Kant, Hegel and Bradley.

Kant says that punishing the guilty is a Categorical Imperative, and being a Categorical Imperative, the principle should not be used to further another good, be it the reformation of the individual or whatever it may be. Punishment should be inflicted upon my enemy, simply for the reason he has done me harm, and for no other reason. Another reason why I should punish him is that he has used me as a *means* for furthering his advantages, and according to Kant's famous formula, mankind should never be used as means, as we do with inanimate objects. But Kant was cautious enough to add that the punishment I should so inflict on my enemy should correspond qualitatively and quantitatively to the harm he had done to me.

Hegel supports this theory basing it on his metaphysics. The harm that someone has done to me is not something positive, but negative, so that the revenge I may take on my enemy will be only a negation of negation. He says that the punishment I so inflict on my enemy is ultimately *unreal*, but its unreality ought to be made manifest by punishment, and therefore *annul* it. As my Self is identical with the Self of my enemy according to his metaphysics, the man who has done me harm

is ultimately striking at his own will, and therefore, all that happens when I punish him is, his own will returns against himself. Hegel conceives an immanent dialectic in this.

It is easy to dispose of Hegel's theory as untenable, if we do not accept his fundamental metaphysical principles. It is difficult to see how there is any immanent dialectic involved in the above case, for my intervention is necessary in order to punish my enemy, and left to himself nothing happens to him. To 'annul' the harm that has been done to me should not be taken too seriously, for what has been done cannot be undone. Moreover, it is difficult to justify the contention that my punishing my enemy is only a negation of negation. Even if it is so, we do not know how adding another negative to an already existing thing should make things better. The approach of applying the principle of Double Negation is wrong in this case, for my punishing the enemy is not a denial of the wrong done to me, but at best an affirmation of the seriousness and gravity of the affair.

Likewise, when we take Kant's view, what we have to consider is whether the punishment that is *deserved* by my enemy in virtue of doing some harm to me, should be an *end* in itself. A formidable difficulty comes up here, when we ask how do we know that a certain thing is an end-in-itself? What is the criterion by which we know that certain things have intrinsic value—positive or negative?

This apart, the difficulties involved in judging what 'just' punishment could be given to my enemy qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent to the harm done to me, are obvious. Suppose in a case where my dealings with my enemy in other ways, e.g. showing him love or giving him a milder punishment than what he deserved, etc. have good consequences, will it not be

better that I follow them than my giving him a 'retributively just' punishment? Is it not better to save soul if possible by other means, than by demanding the 'pound of flesh'?

A host of other objections may also be raised against punishing my enemy as an end; for (i) firstly it presupposes that man is the master of his fate and maker of his future, without taking into consideration the circumstances in which he had done the harm, his previous social and environmental background, and other factors, which, we may perhaps presume, forced him to act as he did; or whether it is due to his ignoble temperament inherent in his very nature. (ii) So also, it is difficult to decide how there can be such a thing as a right proportion of pain I may inflict on my enemy, qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent to the guilt involved in a particular case. If the pain I may inflict on the guilty is either *more* or *less*, I will be transgressing my duty, but I do not know how to decide about the right proportion of the pain I should inflict.

Regarding (b): We have so far seen the inherent difficulties involved in treating punishment as an end-in-itself. When we have no way out of the difficulty, shall we give up punishing the guilty altogether and satisfy ourselves that after all by punishing the guilty, the pain so involved will be bringing into this world another evil. But this can be waived, if we accept Moore's conception of 'Organic Unities', where pain, although an evil, if taken by itself, may nevertheless make such a complex state of which it is a member, better and not worse by its presence. Prof. G. E. Moore says: '...On the contrary, if a feeling of pain be combined with any of the evil states of mind which we have been considering, the difference which its presence makes to the value of the whole As

A WHOLE, seems to be rather better than for the worse.' (G. E. Moore : *Principia Ethica*, p. 213)

And this leads us to the fact that my punishing the enemy is not an end-in-itself, but only a means. Means to what? one may ask. And the reply suggests itself—the good effects that it may have, as for example, the reformation of the individual concerned, the possible deterring of other individuals with evil intentions from doing wrong actions, etc. If I am not misinterpreting, this consequential view of the problem had been advocated by Gandhi also, when he said once :

'...Nothing but organised non-violence can check the organised violence of the British Government ... This non-violence will be expressed through Civil Disobedience. ... My ambition is no less than to convert the British people through non-violence, and thus make them see the wrong they have done to India.' (Louis Fischer : *Gandhi : His Life and Message for the World*, p. 97)

Now, we can give an interesting twist to our arguments. Supposing the same end, viz. the reformation of the individual by punishing (not *qua* punishing, but *while* punishing) is achieved by means other than punishing and which will do lasting good, then will it be better to explore those means? And this is exactly where the principle of Ahimsā strikes at. I should not only not take revenge on the man who has done me harm, but should love him as if he is my friend, if this is going to make him a better man. I should love him, perhaps because I realize that rewards are better than punishment, or

because that pain being a non-moral principle cannot contribute, except negatively, to the moral improvement of the individual, or still because I want people to realize that fear of punishment is not the only reason to abstain from doing harm to others. All these complex motives may be in my mind when I advocate Ahimsā as a positive principle. But bringing about a change of heart in the guilty through Ahimsā implies, and this is the most important point, that man is not merely an animal, but is capable of moral improvement, that though he is *now* immoral, is not amoral. And this leads us to the further implication that Ahimsā has no meaning if even after I show love to the guilty, *per impossible*, he has not changed. I do not know what Gandhiji would have said in a case like this, but it appears that he never doubted its efficacy, and he seems to have based Ahimsā on the psychological principle that my beaten opponent may beat me again at the next opportunity and may thus become a sworn enemy, whereas my reconciled foe becomes my good friend. Violence may suppress wrong, but increases bitterness and hatred.

Three conclusions seem to follow from the above discussion :

(i) Ahimsā is not a principle which is an end-in-itself, but is a means for the moral improvement of man ;

(ii) Ahimsā presupposes that man, though now may be immoral, is not amoral ; and

(iii) Ahimsā has no meaning if the guilty individual does not realize the wrongness of his conduct.

MEANING AND SYMBOL IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

SRI LAXMI KANT AVASTHI

A concern with the problem of meaning is a characteristic of modern philosophy. Paul Henle has remarked, 'it is hardly an exaggeration that the problem of meaning is the problem of this century.'

The principal philosophical problem of meaning is about the concept of meaning itself. The question has been formulated in several ways: 'What sort of things are meanings?' (Quine), 'What is it for our expression to have meaning? or what is the nature and status of that which an expression and its translation or paraphrase are both vehicles?' (Ryle). The purpose of this paper is to discuss the treatment of the problem at the hands of modern logicians and philosophers.

In addition to merely operating upon meanings as the persons engaged in all the branches of study do, the logicians and philosophers have to say something *about* meaning if asked to state clearly the nature of their job. For example, a logician would say that in studying the rules of inference he is concerned with features of arguments, viz., premise and conclusion; and more correctly, he is concerned not with the specific propositions or concepts (or meanings, whatever) expressed by the sentences used as premises and conclusions in the logician's work. These he has used only by the way of illustrations. He is concerned rather with premise types and conclusion types—more general and abstract things. There are some who contend that some *types* of meaning and the said premise types and conclusion types which are the proper concern of logicians are identical. But even if we do not admit a relation of identity between the subject matter of logic and meanings, we may agree that the logician is concerned with meanings in a

more intimate and special way than say, a physicist or a sociologist. The physicist or sociologist, while in the course of his studies, does not reflect over the relation of the meanings of such words as 'copper' or 'society' with the objects they refer to—whether the relation is of identity or of any other sort. He simply assumes that he is concerned with the material object—copper or society and not with the meanings of words—their nature and status—whether or not they are identical with the things the words stand for. Of course, in philosophy one may hold that the meaning of 'copper' or 'society' is identical with copper and society respectively but it is a position in *philosophy* and not in physics or in sociology.

To understand this connexion we have to go back to the attempts made by Husserl and Meinong to distinguish philosophy from mental and physical sciences on the basis of subject matter. The subject matter of philosophy is different from the things that belong to mental phenomena or behaviour such as abstraction, conception, memory, judgement, supposal or inference, on the one hand and from the facts of external experience on the other. They determine a third realm—the realm of concepts, proposition, classes, types, truth, implication, number etc.—for philosophy assimilated all these things under the comprehensive title of 'Meaning'—'Bedeutungen'. 'At the same time and in some degree affected by these influences, Moore consistently and Russell spasmodically were prosecuting their obviously philosophical and logical inquiries with a special *modus operandi*. They ... were deliberately and explicitly trying to give analysis of concepts and propositions asking what does it

really mean to say, for example, that this is good or that is true? . . . Moore's regular practice and Russell's frequent practice seemed to exemplify what for example Husserl and Meinong had declared in general terms to be the peculiar business of philosophy and logic namely to explore . . . meanings'. (G. Ryle: *The Theory of Meaning*. In Mace, *Br. Philosophy in Mid Century*, p. 261.)

It was, however, Wittgenstein who called philosophy 'the critique of language' and diverted the attention of western philosophers to a *special* study of language, though attempts had also been made earlier by logicians like Pierce to study the symbolism of language. The study of language—a system of specific sort of signs, the bearers of meaning—was to be considered a task assigned to the philosophers. Whether meanings are ideas or other extra linguistic entities, as earlier philosophers thought, or only ways of operating with signs (the media) the relevance of the study of signs to the philosophy is unquestionable. (Ayer holds that the problem of meaning is a part of general sign problem—'What is Communication', p. 25)

A sign—the relatum in the meaning relation which is also called by such names as 'expression' 'word' or 'sound—letter-complex'—may strictly be described as something which represents or signifies something other than itself to some interpretant. While studying signs we should find out types among them and make classifications, such classifications may be made in numerous different ways. Pierce, for example has made an important classification into icons, index signs and symbols; icon resembles its significant, index sign points out to a significant and symbols are purely arbitrary signs which come to be associated with certain significant. Another distinction made by him is that between token and type. A token is a

specific instance of sign usage, a type is an abstract class of such tokens. But these classifications are not very important to us because they do not tell us the different *ways* of the functioning of signs. A classification for this purpose was developed by Morris in his semiotics—the science of signs, comprising of syntactics—the study of the relation of signs to one another, semantics—the study of the relation of signs and the object which they signify and pragmatics—the study of relation between signs and the users of these signs. We shall primarily be concerned with classifications based on different ways of using signs because they give us different types of significance or meaning.

Though we can use the term 'meaning' only in reference to some mark or sign, the latter is not all that we require to study. Whether we can or cannot talk of meanings as being independent of signs, is debatable, but we can and do talk of them as different from signs.

'Meaning' is both ambiguous and vague term. Its usage covers a range, so wide that it is difficult to enumerate all the ways in which the word is used. For example, take two expressions: 'dark clouds mean rain' and 'Father' means 'male parent'. The term 'mean' in the two sentences is used so differently that the meaning illustrated by the former sentence is something which is different in type from the thing which may be thought to be the meaning illustrated by the latter one. Consider again the latter sentence; if we remove inverted commas from 'male parent' the sentence will show that meaning here, is identical with some non-linguistic object, some person, otherwise the sentence shows that meaning there is identical with synonyms. Often in common parlance the term 'meaning' is used as substitute for 'intention', 'implication' 'suggestion' and the like. In a large number, different types

of things may be listed if one sets to investigate different usages of the term 'meaning'. But to equate any one or all of it with meaning will not provide the answer we seek. We have to find out different important uses of the term and to investigate whether these uses are radically different or whether there is something essentially common among them to justify the application of the same word to all (or most) of them.

There seems to be something common and essential in all the uses of the term 'meaning'. We may hold that different uses of the term 'meaning' are instances of different types of meaning and that there must be a general notion of meaning consisting of some most essential feature or features which are common to all the instances and of which all different types of meanings are the types.

An attempt to get a comprehensive notion of meaning would require a careful consideration of the different answers which have actually been given to the question 'what is meaning?' For most of the well known theories of meaning (enumerated by Ogden and Richard for example), it may be said that no one is so general as to satisfy our requirement. Such an attempt would include the formulation of a wide and general definition on the basis of narrower ones.

There are some other considerations too. Can we answer the question, 'what sort of things are meanings?' directly or in a straightforward way? Is it the case that we can talk of meaning only by way of analogies i.e., by comparing and contrasting them with other things and that by this method we can make their nature intelligible? Christenson compares them with offices, Wittgenstein also makes important use of analogies to illustrate the nature of meaningful signs, expressions or symbols. But Quine believes that there are no

meanings, there are only languages. Is there any difference between him and those like Wittgenstein and Oxford philosophers who say that meaning is the use of expressions in language?

In explaining the concept of synonymy Quine rules out the usefulness of an appeal to meanings as entities, 'Meanings themselves as obscure intermediary entities may well be abandoned'. (*Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, p. 23) He further states that we may talk of words and sentences having meaning and also some times having same meaning as other words and sentences have, but we do not thereby commit ourselves to the view that meanings are some sort of existent entities. (*From a Logical point of View*, p. 12) 'Even if we are allergic to meanings as such we can speak directly of utterances as synonymous or heteronymous one with another. The problem of explaining these adjectives "significant" and "synonymous" with some degree of rigour ... in terms of behaviour is as difficult as it is important. But the explanatory value of special and irreducible intermediary entities called meanings is surely illusory'. Though a denial of synonymy might not logically follow from rejection of meanings it appears to be a natural consequence that Quine is prepared to accept it. (*Methods of Logic*, p. 200)

There may be two interpretations of Quine's view concerning meaning. (1) By refusing meanings as entities he might have meant that meanings are not such things as physical objects, mental images or Platonic ideas. The word 'meaning' forms an altogether different type of word; we may take meaning as some thing that characterizes another thing for instances a particular sound—and letter-complex. (2) In no sense it can be said that there *are* meanings. It cannot be said against such a view that meanings are properties and characteristics of expressions if not in-

dependent entities. From the fact that a word means something it is not to be concluded that there is something which it means, not even from the fact that two words might have the same meaning does it follow that there is a meaning.

Another view apparently similar to that of Quine's is reflected in the phrase 'meaning in the use of signs'. This phrase and other expressions like it may be taken to imply at least three things: first, it may mean that it is possible to play the game without being able to formulate its rules. If we want to know that a person understands a word we should not ask him but pay attention to his use of it. Second, it may mean that words do not have meaning in isolation but only in suitable context—a subject to which attention is often called and which is known also from the type of definition called 'contextual'. Finally it may suggest that the meaning of an expression is not an object proper but an instrumental—functional entity. Ryle has compared meanings with jobs or roles which the expressions are employed to perform. (*Meaning and Necessity*, p. 74 and *The Theory of Meaning*, p. 235) Thus he has made it clear that it is a category mistake to take meaning as a substantial thing and has further reminded us that our conceptual analysis of meaning must seek to determine their category. Holding that meanings are not entities like sticks he argues that though 'he took a stick' does imply a relation between him and the stick, 'he took a walk', 'he took a job' do not imply a relation between him and a funny entity. (*Meaning and Necessity*, p. 70) Regarding the relation between an expression and its meaning Ryle denies that there can be any and remarks that the rational theories of Frege and Carnap are either erroneous or worse. (*Meaning and Necessity*, pp. 69-76)

Frege talks of two kinds of relations ref-

erence or denotation and meaning or sense ('Bedeutung' and 'Sinn' respectively). The former obtains between expression and the object referred to by the expression and the latter, between expression and the non-physical non-mental entity called 'meaning' or 'thought'. Carnap has emphasized that the different concepts of various authors concerning meaning have some times been regarded as different theories of which one is true and the other false. Against this he holds that the differences are rather practical about the choice of a suitable method or language system. Among the many possible systems which we ought to build in order to investigate their properties we might prefer one but what guides us in this choice is never truth but simplicity and expedience. (*ibid.*, p. 204)

But if we take up the simplest linguistic expression in which no conventional or postulated entity is recognized as meaning and where the meaning of a term is not conceived to be something in addition to its use—not its use considered to be something in addition to its meaning, the two are thought to be one and the same, some serious problems confront us. (Lazerovvitz: *The Structure of Metaphysics*, p. 255)

It becomes extremely difficult to explain how two expressions might have the same meaning if we reject meanings, for we thereby reject that particular sound and the letter-complexes which have something abstract connected with them when they are appropriately produced—something abstract that we grasp or understand. Having rejected such a notion of meaning we must look for a way of recognizing that two expressions are synonymous other than by simply trying to grasp whether they bear identical meaning. This brings in the much debated criterion of synonymy.

The concept of synonymy plays an important role in most of the philosophical discussions. The reason why its importance does not become so obvious is that in actual treatment of philosophical problems or in philosophical discussions people assert the relation of synonymy between expressions in so many different and round about ways that it seems difficult to enumerate them; only some important philosophical notions like those of analytics, real definitions or of analysis may be mentioned in which the notion of synonymy is essentially involved.

The purpose of adequately defining synonymy could not be served, according to some philosophers, unless scientific inquiries have been made to find out factors that determine the actual relation of synonymy between expressions. Thus Benson Mates says, 'I am sorry to confess not only that I have no definition to propose but also that it seems to me doubtful that any adequate definition of "synonymity"—at least for a language sufficiently complex to make the problem interesting—will ever be found by means of the usual armchair methods of philosophizing. We need empirical research regarding the ordinary language in order to determine which expressions are in fact synonymous and with the help of these data it may be possible to find out an acceptable definition of "synonymity" for some language which has a determinate structure and which closely resembles with the ordinary language.' (*Synonymity*. Linsky: *Semantics and Philosophy of Language*, p. 118)

Some philosophers, including Quine, have attempted to explain the notion of synonymy in terms of actual behaviour. In general those who try to give the behaviouristic interpretation of language consider how much of language can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus conditions and what scope does this leave for em-

pirically unconditioned variation in one's conceptual scheme.

Quine takes up problems such as the problem of radical translation which may be considered in the context of concrete factual situations, for example he considers linguists' method of determining the ways of using expressions by putting expressions to the subjects by way of interrogation in particular stimulatory situations which prompt the subjects to assent to or dissent from the questions put to them. Since almost all the expressions in our language, according to Quine, are associated directly or indirectly with experience, some of them are reports of primitive experience, the 'surface irritation', and others emerge from further, structured and complex associations of such reports. Quine further develops the notion of stimulus synonymy of sentences. In a stimulatory situation, the stimuli or surface irritations themselves are not to be identified with the stimulus meaning of the expressions. The stimulus meaning is something that sums up the disposition of a person to assent to or dissent from the sentence in response to present stimulation; whereas the stimulation is what activates the disposition as opposed to what instills it. (*Word and Object*, p. 31) Thus it seems difficult to determine the sameness of meaning between expressions even in terms of overt behaviour.

In rejecting the concept that meanings are some sort of entities, it is natural to prefer that the criterion be formulated in concrete behaviour terms. But it is to be expected that such attempts may break down since behaviour towards an expression is something that seems to be preceded by an understanding of it and thus it does not seem to be a reliable guide to its meaning. Obviously, however, we will have to enquire further into the matter before passing a final judgement.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IN THIS NUMBER

Dr. Devaprasad Bhattacharya, M.A., D.Phil. (Cal.), Senior lecturer, Sripat Sing College, Jiaganj, Murshidabad, West Bengal, is well known for his deep insight into the treatment of philosophical subjects. A promising scholar of mature thoughts he is intimate with the Sri Ramakrishna-Vivekananda movement and its impact on Indian philosophies. In his present short article on 'Mīmāṃsā Views on Causation: An Advaitic Approach', Dr. Bhattacharya makes a thought-provoking analytical probe into the topic and draws an emphatic conclusion.

Dr. R. Balasubramanian, M.A., Ph.D., Reader in Philosophy, Annamalai University, reviews in his article the subject 'The Philosophy of Co-operation' which is so necessary in the present day world of conflicting interests. The article is based on a lecture delivered by Dr. Balasubramanian in a symposium on International Co-operation organized by the Planning Forum of the Annamalai University.

Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., Reader in Philosophy, Patna University, Bihar, gives in her article a learned ex-

position of the 'Sāṃkhya Theory of Knowledge' in its both determinate and indeterminate aspects.

In the article 'The Practical Value of Moral Theory', Dr. P. S. Sastri, M.A., M.Litt., Ph.D., Head of the Department of English, Nagpur University, beautifully examines the role of moral philosophy in all its practical aspects.

'Swami Vivekananda: The Mystic' is an attempt made by Brahmachari Sudhanshu of the Ramakrishna Order to assess the real meaning of mysticism with reference to the life of Swami Vivekananda.

The article 'Ahimsā: Some Reflections' is a short study made by Sri P. S. S. Rama Rao, M.A., Senior Research Assistant, Division of Humanities, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, on the various implications of the ideal of Non-Violence.

Sri Laxmi Kant Avasthi, M.A., Research Scholar in the Department of Psychology-Philosophy, Lucknow University, attempts to study the 'Meaning and Symbol in Contemporary Philosophy' in his article on the subject.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

FUNCTIONALISM: AN OUTLINE OF A PHILOSOPHY FOR TODAY. BY JOHN HENRY MELZER. Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40th Street, New York 16, N.Y. 1965. Pages 145. Price \$4.

Most teachers of philosophy in the present century have been busy teaching the philosophical systems of others. They are in a way teachers of

the history of philosophy. Dr. Melzer, however, felt that every teacher of philosophy must work out his own system of philosophy. Such systems could ultimately help the nation and mankind. The result of this attempt is the present work.

In six chapters, Dr. Melzer surveys metaphysics, logic, ethics, religion, aesthetics, education, and poli-

tics. Then follows an illuminating chapter on a functional philosophy of life.

The self must be accepted as necessary for the existence and reality of the universe. As we proceed from this basic standpoint, we discover that metaphysics and epistemology are mutually dependent upon each other. Likewise, an acceptable religion without an ethic is not at all possible. Functionalism will then be pragmatism in action. It is a pragmatism that differs widely from that of Dewey and others. The functionally successful person knows 'how to tap, project, and control the physical, intellectual, and biological and spiritual energies of overall force'. 'He owns his part of the world, because the world always has belonged to and always will belong to the energetic.' This approach has in it the seeds of a new totalitarianism.

DR. P. S. SASTRI

MALAYALAM

PRABUDDHAKERALAM, GOLDEN JUBILEE NUMBER, OCTOBER 1965. Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, P.O. Puranattukara, Trichur, Kerala. Pages 120. Price Rs. 2.

Prabuddhakeralam is the Malayalam organ of the Ramakrishna order, started in 1915. It has an unbroken record of publication. The issue under review, containing thought-provoking articles and illuminating poems by the leading literary men of Kerala and brought out elegantly, does credit to the publishers as well as the organization it represents. Some of the articles, especially the one by Sri S. Guptan Nair on the 'Search after Illusory Values', deserve publication in other Indian languages so that they would reach the millions of our misguided and staggering youth of the present day.

SWAMI GABHIRANANDA

NEWS AND REPORTS

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION PATNA

REPORT FOR THE YEAR APRIL 1964 TO MARCH 1965

The activities of this branch of the Ramakrishna Mission during the period under review were the following:

Religious: Scriptural classes were organized regularly during the year both in and outside the Ashrama. Besides discourses on Sri Ramakrishna-Vivekananda literature, classes on the *Viṣṇu Purāna*, *Bhāgavata* and *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* were regularly held. The number of classes held during the year was 240.

Pūjā at the temple and the *Rāmanāmasaṅkīrtana* were performed regularly. Birthdays of Sri Ramakrishna, the Holy Mother, Swami Vivekananda, Śrī Rāma, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Buddha, Christ, Śrī Caitanya and Tulasidasa were duly celebrated. *Durgā-pūjā*, *Kāṭi-pūjā*, *Sarasvatī-pūjā* and other festivals were also observed.

Educational: The Adbhutananda U.P. School was started more than three decades ago in memory of Swami Adbhutanandaji Maharaj, a direct disciple of Sri Ramakrishna, who was of humble parentage belonging to Bihar. There were 218 students in the school at the end of June 1964, when it was taken over by the Patna Municipal Corporation.

Students' Home: The Students' Home is exclu-

sively meant for college going students. At the end of the year there were 24 students of whom 12 were free and 3 partly free. Of the 21 students appearing in various University examinations during the year 19 passed with one obtaining first class in B.Sc. (Eng.).

Swami Turiyananda Library and Free Reading Room: The library has a collection of books numbering 7,338 of which 183 were added during the year. The Reading Room received 8 dailies and 54 periodicals. The number of books issued was 8,539 and the recorded attendance in the Reading Room was 14,753. Moreover, lectures on various religious subjects were arranged in the lecture hall.

An illustrated souvenir was published in July 1964 as a part of the Swami Vivekananda Birth Centenary Celebrations at a cost of Rs. 3,500, and it was acclaimed as a neat and informative publication.

Medical: In the Bhubaneswar Charitable Homoeopathic Dispensary of the Homoeopathic Department 55,153 patients were treated of whom there were 5,946 new cases. The number of patients treated in the Allopathic Department was 40,000, including 5,824 new cases.

Relief: A sum of Rs. 2,129 was collected for the relief of the East Pakistan immigrants in response to the appeal made by the General Secretary Ramakrishna Mission.