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Prabuddha Bharata

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By Karma, Jnana, Bhakti, and Yoga, by one or more or
all of these the vision of the Paramatman is obtained.

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PRABUDDHA BHARATA

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Vol. LXXIII

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No. 2



उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत

Arise ! Awake ! And stop not till the Goal is reached.

—:0:—

LETTERS OF SWAMI SHIVANANDA

(137)

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Belur, Howrah
26 June 1925

Dear Sriman —,

The letter which you had despatched on Saturday reached me here on Monday and I came to learn all from it.

The *mantra* which you are now repeating in your *japa* is the right one. You must repeat your *japa* every day. Just as you take your food etc. daily and regularly, so it is very much necessary that you take to the remembrance of the Lord daily and regularly. Through *japa* you will attain to His grace and only when you get the grace that you will have your mind concentrated and you will feel the joy. Prayer is very much necessary. He shows His grace to one who prays to Him. He will give, only if you seek. He is very kind-hearted. He is seated within your heart and He wants the love of your heart. If you pray to Him with love, he will give you love and devotion, everything. Take His name with love and you will feel His presence within you. I pray from my heart so that the Master may give you much faith, devotion and love. May your mind be calm, you become pure and slowly make progress into His realm.

I have written all in my previous letter ; so there is nothing much to write now. My heart-felt love and blessings to you. May the Master give you much devotion, faith and love. It is drizzling here with great storm for

the last few days. Is it very hot there? Has there been no rain in the meanwhile?

Your well-wisher,
Shivananda

PS. Convey my love and blessings to the boys of the club, and my *namaskar* and love to Swami Vijnanananda.

(138)

Sri Ramakrishna Math
Belur, Howrah
12 August 1925

Dear Sriman —,

Received your letter and learnt all. One who thinks 'I am quite happy while living amidst thousands of enjoyments, is but totally deluded. But he who as a result of the accumulated virtues of his past and through the grace of the Lord has received the grace of his *guru*, can never take this world to be the abode of happiness and peace, whatever might be the circumstances. For this reason he always tries to take refuge in God who is beyond the reach of that delusion. Whenever I receive your letters and go through them I feel delighted, because your mind never finds happiness with this world. This is but the sign by which a seeker after liberation is to be known. There is no fear, for the Master is leading you to the right path. He is always looking after you, so you need not fear about slips.

Do your *japa* somehow on that rosary now; there will be no harm in it. Henceforward, keep the rosary carefully. It will do if you take the new rosary later on. If you happen to come here during the *pūjā*, you will take the new rosary then for you. Probably the Divine Mother will be worshipped in image, although no provision could be made so far in that regard. Through His grace things come to pass this very way every year.

May you all be well in every respect by taking the Lord's name and having remembrance of him. This I pray for you. I am not so unwell in my health. By His grace, general health in the Math has not deteriorated till now. But time for that is drawing near.

Ever well-wisher,
Shivananda

SAINTS AND THEIR TEACHINGS

[EDITORIAL]

Need of Critical Approach : Life-stories of saints and God-men occupy an important place in the field of spiritual understanding. They are but examples through which the abstract maxims of spiritual truth turn into concrete forms and, by being clothed as it were with bodies, are presented to our understanding with the irresistible appeal of history. Seen through the stories of these lives the precepts of renunciation and discrimination, devotion and compassion no longer remain barren and dry as in theoretical discourses. In spiritual life, example is always better than precept. It is, of all others, a method which is best adopted to all circumstances and dispositions, because through example we are led to the ideal quite quickly as well as unconsciously. St. Bonaventure, while commenting upon the life-story of St. Francis, writes : 'By the remembrance of the saints, as by the touch of glowing stones of fire, he was himself enkindled, and converted into a divine flame.' Even the instances of mistakes and failures in the lives of the saints have their profound and positive spiritual import. These are lessons that speak not only of the conflicts, but also of the victories of the martyrs of truth and ask the struggling souls to suffer afflictions with patience and hope. Thus, a saint, while he lives the life, becomes a living spiritual institution and, as he passes away, his life-story proves to be the fountain-head of unending inspiration and encouragement to the posterity.

What makes things so often different from the actual in this field of study is the absence of a critical outlook in the evaluation of the saints and their teachings and the absence becomes all the more pronounced, because, in most cases, the saints

do not leave their teachings competently recorded or dispassionately described. These give rise to diverse speculations and misinterpretations in the field of hagiography and biography and the saints and God-men are made to appear different from what they really were and to behave in a fashion which they never had adopted in their lives. Soon they are made to turn into mythical personalities preaching some isolated gospels regardless of the perspectives of the time and circumstances and, as a result, they become forgotten and their spiritual missions in this world lose all meaning and significance. While they are worshipped in temples and churches, their teachings are scarcely emulated in practical life. Aldous Huxley's observations in this context are worth mentioning. In his *Foreword* to the book *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna* · Huxley writes : 'Of the day-to-day life of the great theocentric saints and contemplatives we know, in the great majority of cases, nothing whatever. Many, it is true, have recorded their doctrines in writing, and a few such as St. Augustine, Suso and St. Teresa have left us autobiographies of the greatest value. But all doctrinal writing is in some measure formal and impersonal, while the autobiographer tends to omit what he regards as trifling matters and suffers from the further disadvantage of being unable to say how he strikes other people and in what way he affects their lives. Moreover, most saints have left neither writings nor self-portraits, and for a knowledge of their lives, their characters and their teachings, we are forced to rely upon the records made by their disciples who in most cases, have proved themselves singularly incompetent as reporters and

biographers. Hence the special interest attaching to this enormously detailed account of the daily life and conversations of Sri Ramakrishna.'

Therefore, to make the teachings of the saints perpetuate as living gospels of spiritual truth necessitates a critical and correct evaluation. The other factor which makes this critical evaluation all the more necessary is the extraordinary developments manifested in a saint's life. Unlike a statesman or a soldier who leaves behind him trails of some definite events and concrete occurrences here and there, the life of a saint moves with imaginative leaps and not with facts. His struggles and stresses, perplexities and ambiguities, tumults and excitements are all uncommon, because he lives on the frontiers between the subjective and the objective world. As a mystic he goes beyond his mind and time but as a humanist he is one with the men of his time and age. He thus holds together both nature and supernature, both time and timelessness. In short, his life is a phenomenon which beggars linguistic description. Christopher Isherwood describes the life of Sri Ramakrishna as 'the story of a phenomenon'. His book *Ramakrishna and His Disciples* (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London) begins with the following lines: 'This is the story of a phenomenon. I will begin by calling him simply that, rather than "holymen", "mystic", "saint", or "avatār"; all emotive words with mixed associations which may attract some readers, repel others.'

'A phenomenon is often something extraordinary and mysterious. Ramakrishna was extraordinary and mysterious; most of all to those who were best fitted to understand him. A phenomenon is always a fact, an object of experience. That is how I shall try to approach Ramakrishna.' Life of each and every saint, therefore,

represents more or less a phenomenon, which requires rare dispassionateness to describe it. And this dispassionateness is the aim of all critical study.

Perspective of Critical Study: In a sense, both the biographers and the readers of the biographical literature have to take the role of critics. But what are their perspectives by which they are guided and moved? The question involves several vital considerations with regard to the critical study of the lives of the saints and God-men.

Critics often make critical estimates which are either too insipid or too pragmatical. There are some who would see nothing but spiritual qualities in the lives of the saints and there are others who would see only human developments in them. The latter attitude takes only the objective view of things and this is the criterion of modern critical evaluation, which, according to Matthew Arnold, demands 'intellectual deliverance'. This new outlook in the field of biographical researches is at once an advantage as well as a problem. By its relentless emphasis on objective details it has, no doubt, made the portraits of the saints and the God-men more living and natural, for it seeks to highlight the objective canvas behind them. The social, national and humanistic roles, which were associated with the lives of many of the saints of the past and which had hitherto been ignored, have now been salvaged from the limbo of the past and presented before our eyes in distinct and bold vignettes. By describing the historical and social backgrounds behind the teachings of the saints wherever necessary, the new outlook attempts to depict the saints and God-men not as persons indifferent to the human problems but as men right around us, familiar and responsive to our feelings and distresses. It makes the portraits of Buddha and Śaṅkara real,

because it affirms the dignity of the humanistic roles which these great teachers had taken up while they lived. But this so-called modern outlook leads us to make our study a study of *knowledge* and not a study of *power*. It ends with the refractory elements of the earthly life and does not prove to be 'a step upwards, a step' as Thomas Quincey says, 'ascending as upon a Jacob's ladder, from earth to mysterious altitudes above the earth'. Characterizing the fundamental traits of literature in general, Quincey says: 'There is first, the literature of *knowledge*; and, secondly, the literature of *power*. The function of the first is—to *teach*; the function of the second is—to *move*: the first is a rudder; the second, an oar or a sail. The first speaks to the *mere* discursive understanding; the second speaks ultimately, it may happen, to the higher understanding or reason, but always through affections of pleasure and sympathy.' (*Literary Theory and Criticism*) What Quincey says about literature in general makes much meaning for the biographical studies in particular. Critics, guided by mere objective considerations, so often miss the very real in the saints and the prophets. They paint the portraits of the saints as portraits of knowledge that can *teach* and not as portraits of *power* that can *move*. Worst perversions of this outlook will be evident from the views of some of these critics who, for example, still describe Buddha as an atheist, or are prone to study Swami Vivekananda more as patriot or social reformer than as spiritual teacher or will smell something unwholesome in the life-stories of all the spiritual teachers of all lands and all ages. Actuated by the outlook of science, they will try to find out scientific interpretations for each and every mystical phenomenon.

There are experiences and occurrences

which are transcendental and mystical in their meaning and significance and they defy any empirical explanation or material interpretation. Swami Vivekananda, we may recall, at first did not take the spiritual visions of his Master Sri Ramakrishna to be acceptable and real. Imbued with the spirit of science and reason, he was bent on finding rational and scientific explanation for everything. To Sri Ramakrishna he would very often say, 'Who can say that Mother showed you these things or that they are not the fictions of your own brain? ... Science and philosophy have proved beyond doubt that our eyes, ears and other organs of sense, very often deceive us, especially when there is a desire in our mind to see a particular object.' On another occasion, when Sri Ramakrishna told him about the non-dual philosophy indicating the oneness of *jīva* and Brahman, he could not subscribe to the logicity of the idea. While smoking with Hazra [a devotee who lived at Dakshineswar temple garden and was of a perverse disposition] he remarked: 'Can it ever be possible that the water pot is God, the cup is God, whatever we see and all of us are God?' Hazra also joined him in ridiculing the idea and both burst into laughter. But the great exponent of reason could not deny the truth when, lifted up by the divine touch of Sri Ramakrishna, he realized it himself. To quote his own words, 'There was a complete revolution in the state of my mind in a moment at the wonderful touch of the Master. I was aghast to see actually that there was nothing in the whole universe except God.'

There are, on the contrary, persons who would like to portray the saints and God-men as ever-perfect and describe them in absolute fulsome terms. Their excessive devotion would make them hesitant to attribute any human imperfection to the

characters of the saints and God-men, who to them are born perfect. They will invariably overrate the extent and value of every posthumous fame. Even in the mistakes and failures of a saint's life they will discover divine dispensations and praise them in snivelling and cringing phrases. One therefore finds little detailed study of the lives of many of the saints and prophets of the past as spiritual aspirants. Nothing could be known as to how they struggled for truth and in what way they actually realized it. Doubtless, this outlook, too, is another kind of perversion that makes the saints and God-men seated in a far away transcendental realm at all times of the day and night beyond the reach of the ordinary minds. As a result, such personalities offer us neither encouragement in our virtue nor rebuke in our folly. They are so thoroughly forgotten that it is almost as if they never lived.

On the question of a true perspective for critical study we may refer here to the views expressed in the introductory chapters of the book *Sri Ramakrishna, the Great Master*, the first comprehensive critical study on the life and teachings of Sri Ramakrishna as made by Swami Saradananda, one of Sri Ramakrishna's direct disciples. Dealing with the question of critical study of the lives of the incarnations of God, the author writes: 'In the past Purānic age the human nature of the incarnations of God was kept hidden and the divine one alone discussed. In this sceptical modern age, the divine nature of those characters is being completely disregarded while the human one is being studied. In the present instance, we shall make an effort to explain to the reader, by a discussion of those characters, that both the natures co-exist in them.'

Again he elaborates the idea and writes: 'In as much as our Master, the God-man

has actually accepted human imperfections, much good will accrue to us from the study of those human feelings of his. And this is why we counsel our readers to study his divine nature keeping before their eyes his human feelings. If we do not take him as one of us, we would not be able to discover any purpose behind his superhuman efforts, perseverance etc., at the time of his *sādhana*.' By these observations the saint-biographer sets forth a note of rare synthesis, proportion and dispassionateness in the field of biographical studies on the lives of the saints. It speaks of both the subjective and the objective value-judgements. It asks for both 'intellectual deliverance' and 'moral deliverance'. The author's monumental treatise has served as a source book giving both information and inspiration to all the later biographical and critical studies which are considered to be the competent evaluations of the life and the gospel of Sri Ramakrishna. In the field of biographical literature in India, the book with its dispassionate outlook offers a bold lead which can be emulated by others. Thus to make a correct estimate of a saint and his teachings is a difficult task and the role of the critic in this field is extremely important. 'Real character', says Hazlitt, 'is not one thing, but a thousand things; actual qualities do not conform to any factitious standard in the mind, but rest upon their own truth and nature.' So on the question of criticism he writes, 'To *elevate and surprise* is the great rule for producing a dramatic or a critical effect.' The critic has to *elevate* the entire character of a saint, all its details important and unimportant, human and divine. He has, therefore, to be a spectator of life like the man in Browning's poem, 'How it Strikes a Contemporary', who took note of everything. On the exact role of a critic of life, Benson writes: 'He does not see life as

the historian, or as the philosopher, or as the poet, or as the novelist, and yet he has a touch of all these.' According to Geoffrey Tillotson critics are of three kinds: (i) Appreciative critic—who 'makes people more aware of what they are missing by not reading more'; (ii) Analytical critic—who 'makes our appreciation more intense by pointing out the things which most readers take in without noticing them, without giving them subsidiary attention'; (iii) Historical critic—who 'can show the masterpiece more clearly, he can show us how it belongs to its time, how it does best what many are striving to do well'. On the question of ideal critic Tillotson says, 'Indeed all the critics should ideally be concentrated in the same person.' To put the life and teaching of any saint under critical study will, therefore, require the ability, courage and understanding of such ideal critic who can examine, analyse, appreciate and interpret all the characteristic features of the life with charm and quality of things and make others love the life a little better. While he will be ready to take note of all the human imperfections and weaknesses and be not disturbed by them, he must at the same time take due cognizance of the passionate visions and the flashes of idealism in which the life as a whole glows in glory and fullness. The critic here is not merely a critic of life but the critic of some extraordinary life and the art of criticisms is therefore an extraordinary one. Associated with Oliver Cromwell's life there is an important anecdote which perhaps expresses the true spirit of critical study. Once when Cromwell was to be painted, he wanted his exact likeness 'warts and all'. He did not shrink from the reality of the things and he wanted to be represented as he was. Critical study concerning the life of a saint must embrace this exactness depicting 'warts and all'.

Critical evaluation of the role of the saints in Indian life: India has an unbroken line of saints, seers, spiritual teachers and God-men, who, by their wonderful spiritual attainments, have contributed to the fund of Indian thoughts in hundred different ways. In fact, saints are the natural leaders in this country and one can easily trace their influence in every branch of life and activity. But, as ill luck would have it, few saints have so far been critically studied or their roles correctly estimated. A pervasive touchiness seems to have taken deep roots here. With regard to the saints and their teachings there has developed a sense of blind traditionalism, which refuses to be re-examined or re-assessed. If the teaching of any saint is put to critical study, it will be interpreted as blasphemy or casting a slur on a particular sect, community or religion. Narrow regional outlook, which characterizes Indian political life today, often comes to influence our thoughts on biographical studies. People make much fuss over the question whether Jayadeva, the saint-poet, was born in West Bengal or in Orissa. Many historical personalities cannot be studied critically except with awe and reverence, because a section of people has already deified them. Blind sentiments often make people blind about the different historical perspectives behind the teachings preached by the different saints and God-men at different periods of history. Śaṅkara's emphasis on pure knowledge and Swami Vivekananda's exhortations to activity bear no definite meanings to them. As a result of all these, their ideas about God and religion become rigid and dogmatic, where there is scarcely any room for reinterpretation or revaluation according to the need of the time. There is a danger in allowing unreasoned admiration or blind sentiment to stifle re-examination of attitudes and ideas that

have become long outmoded. It only promotes hypocrisy and postpones corrective actions. It seeks to make an image flawless in every respect, even though that making warrants a little exaggeration, a little suppression and a judicious use of epithets and adjectives. Fisherwood makes a pointed observation on these ramifications of modern publicity and value-judgements as he introduces his book *Ramakrishna and His Disciples* to the readers. He writes, 'Modern advertizing has inflated our value-judgements until they are nearly worthless. Every product and person is said by its publicist to be the best. I want to avoid the competitive note here so I will say only this: Ramakrishna's life, being comparatively recent history, is well documented.' This overrating of the personality of a great-man or a saint has become a marked feature of value-judgements here. People can hardly distinguish between a great saint and a great politician. Competitive notes make all appear alike. Little difference is made between an incarnation of God and a saint. Swami Vivekananda's visit to East Bengal is marked by an incident which may serve as an appropriate illustration in this regard. We reproduce below the exact lines from *Life of Swami Vivekananda*: 'Speaking of fanaticism he [Swami Vivekananda] related the story of

a sentimental youth of Dacca, who showed the Swami a photograph asking him if the original was an *avatāra*. "My boy, how can I know?" answered the Swami. But the boy repeated his question three or four times. "At last," narrated the Swami, "seeing that he desired an affirmative answer, I said, 'My boy, take my advice; develop your muscles and your brain by eating good food and by healthy exercise, and then you will be able to think for yourself. Without nourishing food your brain seems to be a little weak.' Perhaps the boy did not like to be told the plain truth. But what else could I do? Unless I warn such people, they may become unbalanced." "You may think of your *guru* as an *avatāra*," continued the Swami "or whatever you like. But Incarnations of God are few and far between. There have arisen in Dacca itself three or four *avatāras*, I heard! Indeed, there is a craze for them nowadays, it seems!"' (*Life of Swami Vivekananda*: By His Eastern and Western Disciples, 1965, pp. 709-710)

Lives and the teachings of the saints and God-men are the rare documents of spiritual history in this country but they often become lost behind many pious exaggerations, inflated legends and dubious suppressions. Hence arises the necessity of a critical study in this field.

'I studied his (Swami Vivekananda's) teaching sufficiently to become convinced of its coherence, but never, till I had had experiences that authenticated them, did I inwardly cast in my lot with the final justification of the things he came to say. ... Referring to this scepticism of mine, ... a more fortunate disciple was teasing me in the Swami's presence. ... The Swami paid little or no attention to the conversation at the time, but afterwards he took a quiet moment to say, "Let none regret that they were difficult to convince! I fought my Master for six long years with the result that I know every inch of the way! Every inch of the way!"'

Sister Nivedita: *The Master as I saw Him*, p. II-12

SISTER NIVEDITA

SWAMI VIRESWARANANDA

[Sister Nivedita Birth Centenary was formally inaugurated by Srimat Swami Vireswaranandaji Maharaj, President, Ramakrishna Math and Mission, at a public meeting held at the Mahajati Sadan, Calcutta on Saturday, the 28th October 1967. The following is the full text of the inaugural address which was delivered on the occasion.—Ed.]

We are here today to celebrate the birth centenary of a great soul who though an alien had made India her motherland and had dedicated herself to her service. The memorial raised to her in the laps of the Himalayas, where she breathed her last, 'Here reposes Sister Nivedita who gave her all to India' is literally true.

Born in Ireland, brought up in England, her field of activity was in India; but through her life and work she belongs to the whole world. Her idealism and spirit of dedication have lifted her to the ranks of the eternal. Her parents were pious Christians and her mother had consecrated her at birth to the service of God. She too was endowed with the qualities of self-sacrifice and passion for Truth. It only needed the living touch of a great soul to set ablaze the latent fire of dedication in her. And this was what happened when she met Swami Vivekananda in London in 1895. In spite of her being on the guard not to be influenced by the magnetic personality of the 'Hindu Yogi' and her intensely independent nature, she was captivated by his nobility and loftiness of his life and teachings. The result was as she said later, 'I had recognized the heroic fibre of the man and desired to make myself the servant of his love for his own people.'

Sister Nivedita was a unique gift of Swami Vivekananda to India. A talented lady deeply rooted in Western culture and civilization was as it were uprooted from that soil by Swami Vivekananda and made

to strike root in Indian culture and civilization. The metamorphosis was a painful one even to a brave heart like the Sister's but she did succeed in the end. Discipleship to this 'Master' and playing the role of a servant to India according to his vision was also no easy task. But he knew what he could expect from her and was not disappointed. The intense spiritual training she received under her *Guru's* supervision, the infinite trust he had in her, as also the blessings of the Holy Mother who accepted and treated her as her own child, all these made the seemingly impossible possible. Thence-forward she dedicated herself to the cause of India in various ways. She inspired patriotism in the youth of India, and called them to dedicate their lives for the emancipation of India. She worked for the education and uplift of Indian women and interpreted to the West Indian culture and ideals in various fields—in arts, education, social life, religion, religious symbology etc. through speeches and books like *Religion and Dharma*, *Web of Indian Life*, *Footfalls of Indian History*, *Śiva and Buddha*, *Kālī the Mother*. She also influenced many great personalities of her time in India.

Nivedita was a born educator, endowed with the vision and qualities needed. She started a school for girls which has now blossomed into the Nivedita Girls' School. Besides she became instrumental to a great extent in laying the foundation for the development of 'national education' in India.

Her great qualities of head and heart and her versatile genius drew to her quite a good number of leading personalities of the time in the fields of art, literature, science, education, journalism and politics. Many she inspired and helped in their own fields. Her strength of character, her originality, and her kind heart and self-effacement evoked loving tributes from many. The most significant tribute was 'this radiant child of God'. It was her own innate purity coupled with the blessings of her *Guru* and the Holy Mother that transformed Margaret E. Noble into 'this radiant child of God'.

In serving India to the best of her abilities she became convinced that political freedom was indispensable for the building of the nation. But she did not want to compromise the position of the Ramakrishna Order which had eschewed politics completely at the behest of its founder Swami Vivekananda. So in order to be fair both to herself and the Order she resigned from it thereby feeling free to work in the political field. She, however, maintained the spiritual bond. The brother disciples of Swamiji also maintained the same love and affection which they had for her before her resignation. She continued to be one of them as before. The break was only from the organizational point for the safety of the Order and not in any other respect. This act of hers was misunderstood in some quarters by people who did not know the true story behind this decision of hers. It was no doubt very painful to her but she could realize that it was the only way to be faithful to her-

self and to the Order, which she loved so much.

Her politics was of an aggressive type and she had no patience with moderate politics of the petitionary type. Therefore the Swadeshi movement had her full support. In spite of this view in politics she was a friend of the leaders of the different schools of politics, for she had realized that India had to be united if she was to achieve her freedom. It was her dream to see in India 'the great re-establishment of *Dharma*, when the whole of this nation shall be united together not in a common weakness, not in a common misfortune or grievance, but in a great...ever living consciousness of the common nationality, common heritage...'

Nivedita had her full share of trials and tribulations and had to live an austere life. But she was, and had been, prepared for it. Swamiji had held before her the ideal of sacrifice in these words, 'Sacrifice in the past has been the law, it will be, alas, for ages to come.' Nivedita had accepted this ideal placed before her by her *Guru*, for we read in her book *Kālī the Mother*, 'Look for no mercy for thyself, and I shall make thee bearer of great vessels of mercy to others. Accept bravely thine own darkness and thy lamp shall cheer many. Fulfil gladly the meanest service and leave high places unsought.'

May the life of this great dedicated soul inspire our youth in the service of our Motherland is my earnest prayer to Swami Vivekananda who gave in her his unique gift to our Motherland.

SOME LITERARY QUESTIONS EXAMINED

DR. S. K. NANDI

Indian tradition, if any, consists in offering a rationale of our various types and patterns of experience and results in postulating the highest type of idealism and the lowest type of realism as well. This supra-ideal and at times the infra-real figured prominently in Indian minds and left a legacy both for the idealist and for the realist. 'Indian tradition' or 'Indian view-point' has often been loosely used and it has been rightly pointed out that even the term 'Indian Philosophy' as such does not carry much sense apart from a reference to a geographical unit, called 'India'. Axiologically speaking, Indian tradition in literary criticism does not mean more than a 'method of analysis' and again this is no differentia for 'Indian approach'. Because 'analysis' had been everybody's prerogative in the past and it will be anybody's privilege in the future. It has been used or claimed to be used by all fellow-travellers and it is no peculiar weapon in the Indian arsenal. It has been shared by all and it is as much Indian as it is foreign. It has been as much modern as it has been claimed to be traditional. So in methodology, I am neither modern, nor ancient; neither do I claim Indianness nor any foreign influence thereon.

In the context under discourse, we mean by literature, all forms of conceivable literature ranging from lyric poetry to drama and novel. [Dr. Brojendranath Seal in his unpublished 'Autobiography' tells us that literature comprized poetry, imaginative prose, poetic prose, literary prose, prose literature, drama (drama of plot, drama of character, drama of ideas), artificial, imperfect and mixed types in prose or verse and lastly prose. So he takes the term 'literature' as a blanket term

and for the purpose of this essay we accept this meaning.] In so far as all these forms share a common generic character, they come under the purview of the observations to follow. Literature throws up some very intriguing problems, which have been taken up at different periods of history by men of different types of training and temperament. Their discipline being different, they have reacted differently to those fundamental problems and they are relevant for a student of the history of aesthetics and art. For a student of semantics and analytic philosophy, they are not of much consequence. That is why we have abjured the historical method and taken recourse to analysis.

Herein, we propose to examine some of the problems connected with literary works. They will be examined under the following two heads:

(a) What impact do the ideas of a work of literature make on its readers? The question arises in the context of some aspects of intellectual criticism involving the question of the external efficacy of art presupposing the division of aesthetic and intellectual judgements.

(b) Are form and content in art organically related? And hence the nature of organic unity in art has got to be examined carefully.

As for the problems involved in (a), we take the words 'reader' and 'critic' as interchangeable (as has been done by some modern critics like James P. Dougherty) and in the discussion to follow they may be so treated. Is the reader influenced by the substance of the poem and is he overwhelmed by its technique? If he is overwhelmed by the technique, the mission of poetry is thereby fulfilled. Are the con-

tent or the ideas as bodied forth by the lines of the poem not taken seriously? This problem very recently reared its head up during the second world war and it centred round the *Pisan Cantos* of Ezra Pound being adjudged as the best work to be awarded the Bollingen Prize. At that time the poet was under indictment of treason for his pro-fascist or anti-semitic broadcasts from Italy. No reader or critic even doubted the aesthetic excellence of the *Pisan Cantos* but what they were worried about was the efficacy of the ideas as conveyed in those excellent aesthetic forms. Of course, here we are not concerned with the question of aesthetic insincerity (as there was none on the part of Ezra Pound) but herein the problem involved is not the poem which Pound wrote but the poem which the reader had experienced. This reference to the experience of the reader leads to a new and different problem—the problem of viewing the artist's world from the reader's individual point of view. We know that an individual personality stands out as a definite *gestaltqualität*. It is something, which emerges as a result of the combination of the various characteristics that are too well known to need any repetition. It is equally true that personality is something which affects the functioning of all the phenomena—the nervous system, emotions, intelligence, memory, learning, motivation, etc. Personality is often described as the sum total of all these, as they function in an individual. Yet as a result of a synthesis of all these, certain new qualities emerge, which described one's personality more adequately. Further, personality can also be considered as the inner tempo, a dynamic and integrating nucleus which determines and directs the functioning of all the phenomena such as emotions, intelligence, memory, learning etc. This personality, in a way, determines the aesthetic experi-

ence of the reader. His experience in the matter may naturally anticipate a separation of *Canto's* rhythm and diction, their effective use of a living colloquial language from their vicious and ugly emotions. It was Pound's considered opinion as would be evident from his own writing.

'In each age one or two men of genius find something and express it. It may be in only a line or in two lines or in some quality or a cadence; and thereafter two dozen or two hundred or two or more thousand flowers repeat and dilute and modify ... Needless to say (their critical) presentation would be entirely independent of consideration as to whether the given passages tended to make the student a better republican, monarchist, monist, dualist, rotarian or other sectarian.' Really speaking, this is not a non-assertion theory. Pound and his tribe think that the business of the reader is to assess not the ideas but verbal technique. Absolute formalism in art, if accepted, could make such statements acceptable. We have noted that the tendency in recent criticism has been to overlook a work's statements or presuppositions in the spheres of philosophy, ethics, religion, politics, etc. If art is considered to be completely divorced from all contexts, intellectual and volitional, such a tendency could be justified by logic-chopping and casuistry of the extreme type. In our view such a divorce is untenable and a critic in his truest function—that of explicator and evaluator is the servant of the literary work. What he does must be governed by the 'entirety of the work.' [In the Aristotelian sense. It was made clear by him when he differentiated between poetry and history. What a drama gives us, Aristotle asserts, is a single action, which is a complete whole in itself, with all the organic unity of a living creature: whereas the historian has to deal not with one action but with one period and all that happened

therein to one or more persons, however disconnected the several events may have been.] An analysis of the work of art would reveal this unified character of the work of art. A work of art in the proper sense of that phrase is not an artifact but a creature of the artist's imagination, of his total imaginative experience. We know of different levels of experience—two of them being the psychical level and the conscious level. Each such level presupposes the one below it, not in the sense that the lower is left behind when the higher is reached but in the sense that the lower is related to the higher somewhat as a new material is related to something made out of it by imposing upon it a new form. The higher thus contains the lower within itself as its own matter, the special principles of the higher being, as it were, a form according to which the matter is now organized. By this reorganization the lower is modified in certain ways. For example, the transition from the psychical level to the conscious entails the conversion of impressions, which are the elements of which psychical experience consists, into ideas or (which is the same thing) of sensuous experience into imaginative experience. What converts impressions into ideas or sensation into imagination is the activity of awareness of consciousness. If this is so, there can be no ideas without impressions, for every idea is an impression which the work of consciousness converts into an idea. The impression from which a given idea is, as Hume puts it, 'derived' is not a past impression degraded by mere passage of time into an idea; it is a present impression elevated into an idea by the work of consciousness. Wherever there is an idea or imaginative experience, there are also the following elements. (i) An impression or sensuous experience corresponding with it, (ii) an act of consciousness converting that impression into

an idea. So we may say that every imaginative experience is a sensuous experience raised to the imaginative level by an act of consciousness. Or every imaginative experience is a sensuous experience together with consciousness of the same. The aesthetic experience is wholly and entirely imaginative; it contains no elements that are not imaginative and the only power which can generate it is the power of the experient's consciousness. But it is not generated out of nothing. Being an imaginative experience, it presupposes a corresponding sensuous experience; where to say that it presupposes this does not mean that it arises subsequently to this, but that it is generated by the act which converts this into it. The sensuous experience need not exist by itself first. It may come into being under the very eyes, so to speak, of consciousness, so that no sooner it comes into being than it is transmuted into imagination. Nevertheless there is always a distinction between what transmutes (consciousness), what is transmuted (sensation) and what is transmuted into (imagination). So the critic is not free to overlook the ideas as conveyed by the work. But the question remains as to how best we could deal with these ideas? A theory of non-assertion has been frequently advanced in this context meaning thereby that ideas in the literature are not presented in such a way as to raise the question of their validity. But we must bear in mind that the raw material of literature is language and the essence of language is grammatical predication, the explicit and implicit linking of one thing with another. The relationship of grammatical predication to logical predication, to what aestheticians call 'statement' or 'assertion'—is a delicate one and the criticism of literature becomes involved with problems for which the criticism of more directly sensory art mediums offers no exact and convinc-

ing analogies. Of courses, no one would like to make us believe that literature puts forward 'report sentences'. They convey 'reflective sentences' as well and if the work wants to argue, then the reader must be willing to argue. And while arguing, the reader feels that he has lost his case, the poet or the writer triumphs. If the reader has a feeling of triumph over the writer, that feeling must be justified. The reader must thoroughly probe into the technique of the work, the materials presented therein, the relevant historical and biographical material, the literary theories and all other allied contexts relevant for a proper appraisal of the aesthetic form. (Following Yvor Winters) We could here formulate five clear steps in the critical process (Monroe Beardsley: *Aesthetics*, New York, 1958, p. 22):

(1) to state the relevant historical and biographical material;

(2) to analyse the writer's relevant literary theories as embodied in the literary work;

(3) to make a rational criticism of the paraphrasable content;

(4) to make a rational criticism of feeling, style, language and technique;

(5) to make a final act of judgement 'a judgement of the poet's judgement of his materials. An appraisal and evaluation of the poet's understanding of the situation he deals with are called for.'

It is plain that the first two steps are ancillary, though in a given poem they may be indispensable. Three and four are concerned with (what Arnold Isenberg calls) 'understanding'—grasping the form and structure of a work imparted by the internal coherence of its ideas and language. Within this structure, paraphrasable content (ideas) and feeling, style, language and technique (language) are not so clearly distinguishable as Winter seems to suggest. Rather they have a relation of

formal coherence of elements as is found in a musical composition. Winter's fifth step refers to external validity as distinguished from the internal validity of ideas as a principle of form.

Dougherty prefers to call 'aesthetic' the kind of criticism which stops with this 'understanding'. (*Vide* James P. Dougherty in his paper entitled 'Aesthetic and intellectual analyses of literature' in the spring 1964 issue of the *Journal of aesthetics and art criticism*, U.S.A.) He does not deny that ideas are present in the work but holds that they are present only as a larger unit of form and that only within the context of the work within the art-world—may they be judged. We may, in this context, take the view as intellectual which seeks to pit the artist's vision against the reader's own and pass a judgement on the artist and his view as expressed in the art-work. This judgement may be philosophical, moral or just informative. We really agree with Dougherty when he holds that the aesthetic judgement must come first and it is clearly 'distinguishable'. An art-work failing aesthetically can hardly claim any excellence on the strength of its 'ideas'. Benedetto Croce was very much emphatic on this point when he wrote: 'It is nonsense, a nonsense common enough in aesthetic writers, to classify works of art by the external criterion of their subject. This would be to ignore the question at issue, which is an aesthetic one; indeed the subject-matter is mere matter just so far as it still lacks form and distinctness; it only emerges from vagueness when it is given form which is a quality conferred on it by one of the activities of the spirit.' (*My Philosophy*, p. 143) But we do not share his over-all emphasis on form and prefer to observe that the subject-matter (a content) is given a significant form by the activity of the human understanding. So if ideas are crippled and lame, the art

work suffers on that score. If ideas look stale and ancient, the art work fails to elicit the approbation it deserves. An instance in point is the great Bengalee novelist Sarat Chandra Chatterjee. In a wonderful art-form he presented his ideas and they were very much appreciated in India, because the ideas and ideals as bodied forth in the characters of his novels were considered revolutionary and epoch-making. Chatterjee's 'Characters' revolted against the out-moded Hindu social customs, such as prohibition of widow marriage and other forms of social injustices. But his ideas were not much appreciated intellectually in the west and those ideas looked stale and uninspiring to the western readers as those reforms and revolts were matters of seventeenth century revolution in the western hemisphere. So a good art-form failed to impress the western readers aesthetically as the ideas were nothing new, novel or revolutionary with them. The reader did not judge the art work in the context of the artist and the art work itself. 'Understanding' of the artist and his work of ideas were subjected to a fateful subservience to the ideas of the reader and thus a biased aesthetic judgement was the outcome. Apparently the disapprobation was due to the disharmony intellectual in nature. The emotive meaning of Chatterjee's works to an Indian reader was completely different from that cognized by a western reader, because they had completely different intellectual background, born of different training and temperament. This is how and why a whole generation of Indians took fancy for this novelist for creating delicate emotional situations in which they could easily participate. The Westerners had no such participation, the emotional context of Chatterjee's art-works looked to be ancient and a sort of an anachronism in the modern context (for the Westerners). But

one may argue that the aesthetic judgement was primary in importance. As a literary critic our first task was to look for internal harmonies and to point out inconsistencies in the world of the work. But to stop there and to leave the intellectual aspect of my reaction in the vague state of a warm human feeling or a slight sense of dissatisfaction is simple mental laziness. To stop half way and to cry a halt to the whole process without reaching the end of the natural mental process is arbitrary and can be described as 'motivated'. The art experience, it should be remembered, persists and the fact is that it is largely the attitudes and the paraphrasable content. And these attitudes and paraphrasable content become a part of my total human experience. So we should note that while the aesthetic and the intellectual judgements may be distinguished, in practice they cannot be separated always. The absorption of the reader in the art-world is contingent upon harmonies both within the work and in relation to his own personal beliefs and experience. On the one hand, the critic determined to make only the aesthetic judgement, limiting his attention to the elements of verbal and thematic form, may find that the prominence afforded to form in a given work renders his approach unjust, inadequate and perhaps even ludicrous. Moreover, this may be taken into account in this regard that a false emotional response to or the emotive content of the art-work is largely dependent upon a proper intellectual appraisal of the art-work. It is common knowledge that an object whether it evokes admiration or sympathy should be known intellectually and its nature (in its cognitive aspect) would greatly determine and limit our emotional response and this in turn determine the emotive content of the art-work. The ideas involved in and suggested by an art-work should be

'read or understood in their proper perspective and such a comprehensive appraisal will lead to an adequate aesthetic response'. Moreover, we may take into account the observation that emotive content does hardly signify the ontic entity. If the value-world concerning beauty has got to be saved from utter subjectivity (without having any reference whatsoever to the object, we call beautiful), we cannot go by the emotive meaning only. It is therefore no doubt emotion-oriented but it must have necessary reference to our intellectual understanding of the art-situation. On the other hand the critic who confronts a work merely to extract its ideas is not a literary critic at all but he may be a philosopher or a sociologist or an economist or a historian. The aesthetic critic in extending his analysis to the totality of the work may find that to assess its statement, characterization, plot or point of view, he must pass from an aesthetic judgement to an intellectual judgement and weigh the writer's experience against his own, the writer's attitude against his own. Thus intellectual criticism of art seems inevitable and some aspects of this intellectual criticism involve the question of the external efficacy of art. In determining the impact that an art work makes on its readers, if we take note of aesthetic criticism alone, the result will be nil. The external efficacy will be placed at naught as the reader will not be permitted to tilt any way as that is not simply permissible under the terms of reference. The half-way house that aesthetic criticism seeks to build up is unrealistic and does not conform to the actual psychological processes involved in such aesthetic appreciation. The intellectual element must be seen in its proper perspective for the aesthetic reaction is the reaction of the whole man as psycho-physical complex. While read-

ing a piece of good literature, say Bankimchandra's '*Ānandamath*', (Yvor Winter's) all those five principles discussed above would require a thorough intellectual assessment of the work; without intellectual criticism the real worth of the novel and the tremendous external effect it had on its readers will not be appreciated. Of course, it would be equally wrong to read literature simply on an intellectual level alone—for its 'ideas' only or worse, for its maxims and truisms. The aesthetic understanding of a work must always be primary (in a very limited sense). But the reader consciously or unconsciously has some sort of a harmony or disharmony between the poet's world view and its own. He is to decide whether the poet or the reader is in error. In cases of agreement, the reader has got to ascertain how far the intellectual agreement influenced his aesthetic appreciation. Many works of literature do not demand any intellectual analysis, because their subject or their treatment, for one reason or another, creates no intellectual disharmony in the mind of the reader. Again, we have seen there are some which for their intellectual disharmony did not get the approbation which they otherwise deserved. Thus it may be said in the face of these contrary evidences that most literary works depend explicitly or implicitly upon some value system which we may or may not share. This, in a way, only explains the apparent anomalies in our art-appreciation. That is how Catholics are more apt than Marxists to grasp the aesthetic coherence of Dante, and that is why liberal nationalists more readily accepted '*Ānandamath*' as a piece of good literature than any of the communalists. But in both cases, in the case of the liberal nationalists or in that of the rank communalists, the external efficacy of art is undeniable as the whole function of the

reader as critic includes both an aesthetic and an intellectual appraisal of the literary work. We do admit that the amount of attention required by each of these will vary with the work under discussion. We may note here the warm appreciation of W. B. Yeats of Tagore's *Gitanjali* and his subsequent denunciation of Tagore's later translations. There has been discovered apparent contradiction in the attitude of Yeats and certain historical and psychological factors were made responsible for this metamorphosis on the part of Yeats. Our reading of the situation suggests that the intellectual understanding of the thematic content of *Gitanjali* by Yeats was more complete and closer to that of Tagore and it was actually very poor in Tagore's subsequent works (in translation). That is why Yeats reacted so violently and made certain uncharitable remarks so very commonly resented by the Indian critics, who better understood the thematic content of these works than Yeats. We should not suspect Yeats of partiality or indifference. He was suffering from a lack of proper understanding and that is why his response to the subsequent works of Tagore was poorer. He was quite sincere in his own way and aesthetic sincerity does not conform to the moral consistency.

The problems involved in (b) as posed earlier are taken up in the following lines. The very fact that in practice the aesthetic and intellectual judgements are not separated though they are often distinguished leads us to the tendency to formulate the ideas of organic unity in a work of art. In a recent review of the position, a modern critic quotes Harold Osborne observing as follows :

'When the theory of organic unity claims that any subtraction or addition would diminish the value of the work (of art) as a whole, changing also the character of all the contained parts, it does not involve the

consequence that every part is equally important when by importance we mean prominence or impact.' (Catherine Lord : *Organic unity Reconsidered*, Journal of aesthetics and art-criticism, Vol. XXII No. 3)

This statement involves three distinct principles which may be stated as follows : (1) Subtraction or addition would diminish the value of the work of art as a whole. (2) Subtraction or addition changes the character of all the contained parts of the work of art. (3) Every part of the work of art is not equally important when importance means prominence or impact.

We start with (2) for in our opinion, it involves the central theme of the entire problem. This view that subtraction or addition changes the character of all the contained parts of the work of art has its origin in the 'Poetics', in the statement that the unity of plot consists of 'incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole'. Here although Aristotle has been referring only to a plot, but this plot was considered by him to be the soul of tragedy. (Samuel H. Butcher : *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts with a critical text and translation of the Poetics*, Fourth edition) The insistence that any addition or subtraction dislocates the whole brings us to principle (1). The first two principles as stated above are inter-related and they point to the fact that the work of art fulfils the maximum unity, the unity consisting of internal relations. The question of external relations cannot be considered in this context, because it will involve regression *ad infinitum*. The specific nature of this internal relation, we may try to define, in terms of *samavāya*, so commonly used in ancient Indian philosophical texts. It will aptly apply to the type of relation that obtains in between the different aspects of an art-work vis-a-

vis the totality or the synthetic work. We would refer to Praśastapāda and Kaṇāda, two celebrated names in ancient Indian Philosophy. Following Praśastapāda, the ancient Indian commentator, we could explain this relation of part and whole, as obtaining between a part or aspect of a work of art and the work of art as a whole. Praśastapāda, while explaining this concept of '*samavāya*', brings non-causal relations under it and hence instead of following Kaṇāda, we take to the Praśastapāda line of thinking and consider the relation obtaining between a part or aspect of a work of art to the whole as that of '*samavāya*' or inherence. Members related by '*samavāya*' are inseparably connected. Two things in the relation of '*samavāya*' cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed, as '*samavāya*' is real coherence. This relation of '*samavāya*' is not perceptible but only inferrable from the inseparable connexion of things. We may bear in mind that the notion of inherence is the result of intellectual discrimination though an objective existence is granted to it. It has its origin in abstraction and has no existence apart from substances. If maximum unity in the work has been attained through this relation of '*samavāya*', then any change will either dislocate the unity and thereby diminish the value of the work or it will bring about a complete change in the identity of the work by changing all of the contained parts and thereby form a new unity possessing a different character with different value. Thus subtraction or addition changes the character of the artistic whole as it changes the relation *inter se* of the contained parts or aspects and consequently a different art-object emerges, with a totally different significance and meaning. Again, when we say that subtraction or addition changes the character of all the contained parts of the work of art, we

mean thereby that any such change would mean a change in the larger context, which constitutes the terms of reference for the aesthetic evaluation. In this changed context the parts assume new dimensions of meaning and significance. This idea of '*samavāya*' or relation of inherence gives some undefined significance to 'form' and 'content'; they derive their mutual meaning with reference to the other and as such they could be hardly distinguished in their ill-defined boundaries. Here we would be faced with semantic difficulties, if we try to dogmatically ascertain therein individual meaning as the meaning-and-significance in each case is determined with reference to the other. In a given context the "content" is largely dependent on the form for the total effect it creates and *vice versa*. This idea of '*samavāya*' may connote and include the idea of organic unity so forcefully advocated by Plato, in his noted work *Phaedrus*. To quote from *Phaedrus* :

'Every discourse ought to be a living creature, having a body of its own and a head and feet; there should be a middle, beginning and end, adopted to one another and to the whole.' Aristotle's most stringent criterion of unity followed in the wake of Platonic observation in point. While we characterize this unity in art as 'organic' we do not distinguish, unlike Aristotle, between essential and non-essential features. This distinction is a legacy of the utility-bias' of the Greek thinkers and it has nothing to do with aesthetic appreciation. The reader as a student of grammar or rhetoric might analyse a literary piece into its essential and non-essential aspects or factors but so far as aesthetic appreciation of a particular work of art is concerned, every factor or aspect was equally important as the others. They combine in a particular way and in a given context. Thus they provide with 'Unique

individuality', which is likely to be lost at the slightest change even in some minor detail. This aesthetic unity in a work of art is peculiarly its own and it could be safely defined as the 'perfect unity' under the given conditions, technically known as 'context'. We do not share the view of Catherine Lord quoted earlier, when she refuses to accept this unity as 'perfect unity'. (Her article '*Organic Unity Reconsidered*', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art criticism*, Vol. XXII, No. 3) We profitably recall an episode wherein Avanindranath [Avanindranath Tagore, the father of Modern Indian Art Movement] the master-artist, asked his disciple Nandalal [Reference is to Acharya Nandalal Bose, the doyen of Modern Indian School of Painting] to give a few bright touches to his famous work '*Umār Tapasyā*' (penance of Umā) while Nandalal was working on this famous piece. Avanindranath left Nandalal for the night while Nandalal sat for the whole night in front of his finished work to suitably accommodate his master's suggestions. Next morning Avanindranath hurried back to ask Nandalal not to disturb the unity of the picture even by the slightest touch of bright colours, which would tilt the unity of the picture and harm its aesthetic excellence. So we consider this unity (as in painting so in literature) as absolutely inviolable and any change in any of the constituents of the work of art would disturb this unity and change the total character of the work of art.

This perfect unity (in that particular context) is there not only in a short and compact sonnet but also in a long winding drama or novel. Again we revert to analogy to make our point clear. As a single stone slab removed from the sphinx-structure tilts the balance and leads to the ultimate demolition of the great *art-gestalt*, so a line or even a word removed from a

novel removes the early pattern of unity. That is why perhaps the artists resent changes in their art-works even though they might seem very minor to the critic or to the layman. The total image of this 'perfect unity' is responsive to the little possible change that may be effected in the total structure. Moreover, we think that this unity in art comprizes all these generic (or specific qualities) of a species of art, such as poetry or drama and this unity concept is applicable to all forms of literature irrespective of their generic and specific characteristics. So far we held that the unity in drama is not different from the unity in poetry or from that of a novel. The sensitivity of an artist reacts sharply to any suggested change in his work and he resists it. For, to him, the unity in his work of art is not the unity of a confederation but that obtained in a well-knit system where any change in any one of the constituents would disturb the total unity of the whole. This unity is unalterable and if altered, the old unity gives place to a new type of unity. Thus subsequent changes by a creative litterateur in his work create different values, they being marked by such symbols as x, x1, x2 etc. To some, they might look as improvements but to others they might look as retrograde steps. At any rate, all such changes change the character of the old aesthetic unity and seek to substitute it by a new type. Of course, unity could be effected by many ways when the constituents are different. By effecting a little change in the language or technique or in some other aspect, we change the constituents and as such a new unity emerges. Ernst Cassirer stressed this point while discussing 'teleological structure' of a work of art. If any alteration or change is effected in the structure, this 'teleological structure' changes and suffers. We may profitably quote Cassirer in point :

'In every act of speech and in every artistic creation we find a definite teleological structure. An actor in a drama really "acts" his part. Each individual utterance is a part of a coherent structural whole. The accent and rhythm of his words, the modulation of his voice, the expressions of his face and the postures of his body all tend to the same end to the embodiment of human character. All this is not simple "expression"; it is also representation and interpretation. Not even a lyric poem is wholly devoid of this general tendency of art. The lyric poet is not just a man who indulges in displays of feeling. To be swayed by emotion alone is sentimentality, not art. An artist who is absorbed not in the contemplation and creation of forms but rather in his own pleasure or in his enjoyment of the "joy of grief" becomes a sentimentalist. Hence we can hardly ascribe to lyric-art a more subjective character than to all the other forms of art. For it contains the same sort of embodiment and the same process of objectification.' (*An Essay on Man*, p. 142) Then Cassirer quotes Mallarme who wrote: 'Poetry is not written with

ideas, it is written with words'. Thereon Cassirer comments: 'It is written with images, sounds or rhythms which, just as in the case of dramatic poetry and dramatic representation, coalesce into an indivisible whole. In every great lyrical poem we find this concrete and indivisible unity.' (ibid., pp. 142-43)

Following this trend we may observe that a good piece of literature can never be translated in a different language or transliterated in a different medium. That is why it has been contended that even a word in a Tagorite or Shakespearean composition cannot be changed without affecting the total effect of the work as a whole. That is why Klaus Holzkamp raised the important 'functional problem' in art-appreciation viz, 'How can one's own experience appear to belong to somebody else?' The obvious answer from our view point would be that no reader could possibly imitate and graft in his imagination what the author wrote or said. He creates his own world as suggested by the author. There is no identity between the two but only a close proximity.

SANKARA AND THE CAUSAL CONCEPT (PART-II)

MR. MAX NOLAN

Having now briefly dealt with the groundwork of Śaṅkara's Advaita philosophy, and the orientation within it towards causation, we may now deal with his logical arguments in defence of the causal thesis he is prepared to accept, i.e. Satkāryavāda, the pre-existence of effects in their causes. Further ramifications of the Advaita philosophy which have not yet

been outlined, and which are pertinent to the general discussion, will emerge in the course of this essay. As will become clear in the section on Sāṅkhya, the Satkāryavāda theory is capable of being conducted purely on a realistic basis, as opposed to an Advaitic one. This possibility of the theory insinuated itself in the problem presented to Advaita, previously mention-

ed, where the question was raised as to how the manifold world could have come from the non-dual Brahman. Śaṅkara's support of Satkāryavāda is meant to show the essential non-difference between cause and effect, and his arguments to this end are intended to undermine the realist assumptions behind the rival interpretation.

We do not set about making a jug out of milk. The notion is ridiculous and offends common sense, but why? Because invariably in the past for the production of specific effects it has been found that specific causes are necessary. For the manufacture of curds we use milk, for jars we use clay (or some other special substance), for gold ornaments we use gold. In all these cases then there is found to be an existential dependence of the effect upon the cause. Every cause is the 'without which not' of its effect. He argues that the emergence of specific effects from specific causes derives from the pre-existence of the former in the latter. If this were not so, surely anything could be produced from anything. He writes, 'If everything be equally non-existent everywhere before creation, why should curds be produced from milk alone and not from clay; and why should a pot come out of clay and not out of milk?' (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. i. 18., Translation by Swami Gambhirananda, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta-14) Behind much of Śaṅkara's argument against Asatkāryavāda is his emphasis on the impossibility of producing something out of nothing. He charges that arguments for Asatkāryavāda really rest on this absurdity, or lead to it.

Those who argue for Asatkāryavāda may maintain with some force that if the effect already existed in the cause, and was non-different from it, there would have been no need for causal agency. However, it is seen that people do engage in causal activi-

ties in order to achieve their ends. Such action pre-supposes that the effects to be striven for do not yet exist. Śaṅkara's reply to this is that causal agency is not inconsistent with Satkāryavāda. What he disallows is that causal agency can be considered *creative* of its object in the absolute sense (i.e. out of nothing). What causal agency does is to organize the causal material into the form of the effect. (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. i. 18) This emergence of the effect as distinct from the cause is a case of modification rather than creation. The appearance of the effect as something different from its cause furthermore need not be taken as signifying a difference of a *real* order. We need not assume that a thing becomes something else merely through appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may be seen at one time curled up, and at another time with all his limbs outstretched, and yet he is still the same Devadatta. Relatives appear to us in varying states and yet we do not miss their identity. The reply to this may be that these instances pertain to the period *between* the birth and death of the individuals concerned, and identity is therefore establishable in such cases. But in the case of material cause and effect, the former has to undergo destruction in order for the effect to occur. So the analogy of Devadatta and the relatives is inappropriate. However Śaṅkara will not allow this premise, so, for him, the point of the analogy remains valid. The premise is not allowed, because there are instances to the contrary, as in the case of milk which is changed into curds. The causal matter of milk is recognizable when the latter has been transformed into curds.

The terms 'birth', 'death', 'creation' and 'destruction' are all relative and not absolute. When a seed bursts forth into a sprout, which may ultimately become a great banyan tree, common usage speaks

of this event as the birth of the latter. With the dissolution of the tree through decay, its death is spoken of. If from this we arbitrarily speak of the sprout as an absolutely new creation, a rising into existence of what was formerly non-existent, then we are placed in a quandary, for this implies that the unborn child concealed in the mother's womb and the newly-born baby lying in its cot are two different beings. (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. i. 18)

This brings us to a distinction which Śaṅkara explicitly raises in his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (I. 2. i.), which reminds one of Aristotle's notions of 'potentiality' and 'actuality'. Here he discusses whether a jar exists prior to its production from clay. The essence of his position is that the jar does not exist in a state of actuality (i.e. ready-made), as does the potter who sets to work on the clay. This in his view is not inconsistent with Satkāryavāda, since the provision in his argument is that 'existence' in this case refers to what is made manifest or actual, in contradistinction to that which is in a state of potency. What is involved in the transition from potency to actuality however is a mere change of form and not of essence. To say that a jar does not exist prior to its production from a lump of clay is to restrict the term 'existence' to the form perceived, but the term as understood in Śaṅkara's interpretation of Satkāryavāda has in view the *essence* of a thing and not simply the *forms* it may assume.

Śaṅkara elsewhere (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, I. iv. 15) refers to the claim that Śruti in various places (e.g. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III, xix 1) supports the view that being arose from non-being, or the void. Śaṅkara here applies the same distinction, and in doing so, contrasts figurative non-existence with absolute non-existence. What is figuratively non-exist-

ent exists merely in a different form, and is thus in a state of potency, to become actual when its latent form is realized.

At the back of all this is the familiar point that something cannot be derived from nothing. Novelty of form is a potentiality which exists in appropriate causal bases. Its appearance does not justify a *creatio ex nihilo* assumption as is actually implied by Asatkāryavāda. Identity of essence and not of appearance is Śaṅkara's view of the causal relation.

There is a similar logic behind the following argument put forward by Śaṅkara. (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* II. i. 18.) Asatkāryavāda involves the notion of the origination of the effect without a referent which is the subject of such action. Where there is action there is *something* which is active, e.g. the action of walking refers to that which walks, the walker. All activity necessarily involves some referent or other. The notion of action without such agency is an impossibility. And yet, according to Śaṅkara, such an impossible situation is implied by Asatkāryavāda. If Satkāryavāda is denied, then whenever the origination of a jar is spoken of, the problem arises that since the jar itself does not exist at the moment prior to origination, something else must serve as the locus of the originative act. This locus cannot be the potter or his materials, since these are already existent (i.e. originated) prior to the origination of the jar. When we speak of the origination of the jar we do not mean by this expression the origination of the potter or his materials, so if the Asatkāryavādin recognizes the necessity of a referent, which is the subject of the originative act, he has to concede the pre-existence of the jar in the form of its material cause, e.g. clay. By origination is meant (in this case) the modification of clay into the form of a jar.

The Asatkāryavādin may proffer an

alternative explanation of origination. He may say that it is the resultant of the connexion of the effect with the cause. But since according to his own theory the effect does not exist prior to such connexion, how can the latter possibly be established? A connexion can only take place between existent entities, not between the existent and the non-existent.

Śaṅkara questions the Asatkāryavādin use of the concept of non-existence. The Asatkāryavādin states that the effect is non-existent *before* its origination. But how can limitation be used with reference to non-existence? Limitation has meaning only with reference to such real, existing things as fields and houses. Non-existence is destitute of features, which would serve to distinguish it from other things. Being literally no-thing, it is an unreality. To ascribe to non-existence the property of temporal relations is an unwarranted extravagance!

Śaṅkara brings in a paradigm to drive home his point, i.e. 'The son of a barren woman became a king before the enthronement of Pūrṇavarman.' (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. i. 18, Translation by Swami Gambhirananda, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta-14.) We have here an example of a fictitious (i.e. non-existent) person being assigned to a certain period in time. Such chronological finesse, as this might suggest, is wholly pointless, since the subject of the dating is a non-entity.

The implication behind Śaṅkara's argument in this connexion is based on a point which has earlier been discussed and is also raised in his commentary on the preceding *Sūtra*. The implication is that if the Asatkāryavādin is to avoid the present impasse, his use of the term 'non-existence' must be qualified to refer simply to the antecedent form of the effect and not to its absolute non-existence.

The Asatkāryavādin may seek to explain the specialization of causes, in a manner consistent with *his* theory, by saying that although effects do not exist at all in their causes prior to their production, each such cause is possessed of a potency or power to produce its specific effect. Although effects as such on the Asatkāryavāda view are *equally* non-existent everywhere before such production (e.g. the jar before manufacture no more existing in a lump of clay than in, say, a piece of fruit), because such causes possess this potency to produce effects peculiar to themselves, we get certain effects from certain causes and not otherwise, e.g. curds from milk and not from clay, etc.

Śaṅkara subjects this notion of potency to some sharp criticism. If by it is actually meant an antecedent form of that which becomes the effect, then the Asatkāryavādin's theory is by virtue of this admission discarded.

Potency (or *atīśaya*) is assumed by the Asatkāryavādin in the present instance in order to avoid the charge that his doctrine leads to a conclusion which is at odds with what is observed in causal processes. But if this potency is other than *both* cause and effect the same problem recurs which it was intended to meet, since if the potentiality which is presumably resident within the cause is other than that which becomes the effect, the charge can still be made that there is no reason why a certain potency and not another should produce a particular effect. Obviously, unless one resorts to some theory of *magical* potency on the part of causes, the situation can only be made intelligible by a straightforward admission that such potentialities are in fact nothing other than the effects themselves before emergence.

The Sāṅkhya, as is well-known, also supported Satkāryavāda, but differed in their interpretation of it from the Advaita.

While the former maintained that effects pre-exist in their causes and are but transformations thereof, it believed that such modifications were as real as their causes. Ontologically effects were not regarded as less real because they *were* effects. Consequently, the process of modification of causes was viewed as a real development, or *pariṇāma*.

Within the scope of *vyavahārika*, or relative experience, the *pariṇāma* view of cause received acceptance in Śaṅkara's philosophy, but it is subordinated from the standpoint of *pāramārthika* to the Vivartavāda doctrine of causation. The *pariṇāma* relation obtains between one object and another on the empirical level, while the *vivarta* relation holds between Brahman and the world. The Sāṅkhya maintains that *Pariṇāmavāda* is an ultimate principle, whereas the Advaita puts limited approval on it, but does *not* treat it as ultimate. The Advaitic acceptance of Vivartavāda, or *apparent* change, as the ultimate principle behind all phenomena, marks it out as being really radically different from the Sāṅkhya, in how it handles a basic causal notion common to them both, i.e. *Satkāryavāda*.

There are passages in Śaṅkara where the relation between Brahman and the world is developed along *pariṇāma* lines, but this is a tentative measure, where his intention seems to be to establish firstly on the empirical level the tenability of belief in a supreme spiritual reality. Mention has already been made of causal arguments concerning the origin of the world, which locate the latter's cause in some principle other than Brahman. Given the dual conception of *vyavahārika* and *pāramārthika*, and the probability that Śaṅkara was addressing his arguments in a field of common discussion, where rival theories of reality competed for acceptance by appeal to common sense, it seems

to have been a natural enough procedure on his part to have used *pariṇāma-type* arguments in the service of his Advaita philosophy. Philosophical discussion, after all, seems to take its rise from the level of common thought and experience, rising from there to more abstract levels of cogitation. In this perhaps psychological sense even Śaṅkara's critics might view his dual use of *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* modes of cause (concerning the relation between Brahman and the world) as at least understandable. But the *philosophical* explication of this procedure might still remain with them a major stumbling block. This is because the question is reducible in their terms to an either/or proposition. To put the issue very bluntly, if the relation between Brahman and world is a case of Vivartavāda (therefore analogous to the *vivarta* phenomenon experienced in the perception of 'silver' in a mother-of-pearl shell), why trot out examples of *pariṇāma-type* instances in order to justify some originative connexion between them both? Why not concentrate on the Vivartavāda alone? The point of this approach is the view that *vivarta* and *pariṇāma*, as causal notions, cannot consistently be applied together to the same causal situation. They are incompatible. To reiterate some familiar ground, there is equivalence of reality between the cause and the effect, in the case of *pariṇāma*. With *vivarta*, on the other hand, the effect is nothing other than an *illusory* imposition upon the cause.

Let us, in following this argument, refer back to a typical example of each, to see how exclusive they are of each other, in this connexion. For an instance of *Pariṇāmavāda* there is the case of the milk which is transformed into curds. Here one can legitimately speak of the process of change as a real one. Contrast this with an instance of Vivartavāda, already just

previously referred to, viz., the perception of mother-of-pearl as 'silver'. In this second case there is no question of the causal ground, or *adhiṣṭhāna*, becoming actually involved in the nature of the effect. Any 'involvement' would simply entail belief in the illusion. There is no transformation of the mother-of-pearl into 'silver' for the benefit of the observer. There is only the mother-of-pearl shell, the 'silver' as such is illusory and non-existent, and so we cannot speak of a real connexion between the one and the other.

Now, the argument against the Advaitin goes, it would be inappropriate and indeed false to explain the *vivarta* instance in terms of *Parīṇāmavāda*. The distinction between real and illusory imposition of effects as derived from common experience is what gives point to the respective theories of *Parīṇāmavāda* and *Vivartavāda*. It is the contention of the Advaita that the causal relation between Brahman and the world is *fundamentally* a case of *Vivartavāda*, but the dual application of both *vivarta* and *parīṇāma* modes of cause in explicating this causal relationship, which can be shown in various passages from Śaṅkara, is a violation of the distinction which gives to each (*parīṇāma* and *vivarta*) its proper meaning.

This is a serious logical charge against Śaṅkara, but it seems arguable that its success is dependent on obliging the Advaitin, to admit that the irreconcilability thus shown between the two specific instances given, is of the same order as the irreconcilability between *parīṇāma* and *vivarta* explanations of Brahman's causality. If the two cases are of the same order then the accusation hits home. But I do not think Śaṅkara does say this. The irreconcilability is indeed there in each case, but each affects our argument differently. And they affect our argument differently, because the difference is be-

tween the mundane and the transcendental.

The examples of the 'silver'/mother-of-pearl and the milk/curds are drawn from plain, ordinary experience. They represent two types of experience in the possession of everybody. The distinction is perfectly well realized by Śaṅkara, and it is a realization which gives much force, when he argues analogically from it, to his writings on *Māyā*, *avidyā*, and so forth. But the distinction which is so drawn from common experience presents an opposition which is customary. (I would not wish the use of the word 'opposition' in the present context to be taken in the aggressive sense, but rather as a strong way of describing what is a keenly felt contrast.) The illusions which often occur in the normal course of events are quickly sublated as a rule, hence they are recognized as illusions. Now, there is no such customary opposition between *vyavahārika* and *pāramārthika*. Though the birthright, so to speak, of one and all, the achievement of *Brahma-jñāna* is a rare and precious thing which will not *necessarily* occur in the present life of the individual. The world about us has a reality about it which is vastly superior to the character of the illusory experiences which sometimes occur within it. It has a public character which is not characteristic of, say, the mistaking of a mother-of-pearl shell for a piece of 'silver'. The 'silver' as such is purely a figment of the observer's mind, whereas the world is acknowledged by Śaṅkara to have extramental status. His criticisms of subjectivism are well-known. The world has therefore being or existence in a way which is *anirvacanīya*, or indefinable, in terms of reality or unreality.

The 'silver' appearing in the mother-of-pearl shell also has for Śaṅkara the character of being indefinable in terms of the real or the unreal, since it is his view that anything which is presented in experience

must have some *kind* of existence. (*Vide Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*, II, vi. 1) There is no such thing as vacuous experience. However, in relation to each other, there is an ontological superiority on the part of *vyavahārika*.

There is therefore a distinction of importance between the conventional contrast between *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* examples of causal explanation on the empirical level, and the problem of reconciling *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* explanations of the causality of Brahman. Because the world has a continuous and objective character which is not sublated in the way *prātibhāsika* phenomena are, it would seem quite natural to look for an ultimate causal explanation of the world along *pariṇāma* lines. In occasionally adopting this conceptual approach Śaṅkara makes it clear that the propriety of such a method of inquiry is contingent on the influence of *avidyā*, or nescience. This is the justification for his occasional use of it. He consistently maintains that it is a contingency which is valid on its own terms until the realization of *Brahma-jñāna*.

It was stated at the beginning of this section that Śaṅkara's advocacy of Satkāryavāda was meant to reveal the essential non-difference between cause and effect, and that his arguments to this end are intended to undermine the realist assumptions behind the rival interpretation of Sāṅkhya. In the closing section of this article I shall return to this point in drawing the various threads of Śaṅkara's arguments together.

Let us meanwhile turn to another line of argument which Śaṅkara pursues in his support of the doctrine of the non-difference of cause and effect. In his commentary on *Brahma-Sūtra*, (II. i. 15) he points out that cause and effect *conjointly* affect the mind. This observation follows an argument at the beginning of which he

states that one of the reasons for the non-difference of cause and effect is the dependence of the latter for its existence upon the former. This dependence is illustrated by the jar, which cannot exist without its material substratum (i.e. clay), and the cloth, which similarly cannot exist without its material substratum (i.e. threads).

Cause and effect moreover are implicated in each other in a way which is not characteristic of the independent relationship which exists among entities whose distinctness from each other is not in doubt. Śaṅkara writes: 'It is not an invariable fact that something is seen when something other than it is present, for it is not the case that a cow, which is different from a horse, is seen only where a horse is present. Nor is it a fact that a pot is perceived only when the potter is there, even though there is the relation of agentship and effect.' (Translation by Swami Gambhirananda)

Therefore the inseparability of cause and effect presents a case for their non-difference. A possible objection Śaṅkara considers here is that inseparability need not imply non-difference, since an example can be given of non-identical entities which are nevertheless inseparable. The case given is that of fire and smoke, which are invariably seen together. Śaṅkara's reply to this is that it is not necessarily the case that the observation of smoke is dependent on the existence of fire. Perception can be had of smoke trapped in a jar after the fire has been extinguished. Although fire and smoke are frequently perceived together, smoke can be perceived to exist separately, whereas there is no possibility of the effect being perceived to exist independently of its material cause.

Śaṅkara suggests that the objection may be maintained by qualifying the present instance to smoke of a particular kind, e.g. a continuous emanation rising from its

source. However, Śaṅkara argues that even this does not affect his case, for the argument for non-difference rests not only on the effect having existence *only* when the cause exists, but *also* on the fact that the awareness of the cause is invariably implicated in the awareness of the effect. In the present instance perceptual involvement of this kind does not exist between the fire and the column of smoke. The perception of smoke does not entail the perception of fire. On the other hand, the perception of effects does entail perception of their material causes.

This brings us back to the point initially mentioned, Śaṅkara's assertion that cause and effect conjointly affect the mind. Ānandagiri summarizes the matter as follows: (a) the causal relation arises on the ground of the existence of one thing depending on another, (b) it arises also from the mental fact that the consciousness of the one is not possible without the consciousness of the other. (*Vide* Thibaut's note in his translation of *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, II. i. 15)

Śaṅkara considers the possibility that the nexus between cause and effect may be explained in terms of *samavāya*, e.g. the sort of relation which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains exists between a substance and its qualities, or a whole and its parts. In this way the inseparability of cause and effect which he has been consistently pointing to can be explained in terms other than that of non-difference. However Śaṅkara does not accept the assumption which underlies this viewpoint, that there is a real difference in point of fact between a substance and its qualities, a whole and its parts.

If, in order to avoid the conclusion of identity, the relation of inherence is introduced to explain why both terms of the relation cannot be meaningfully separated, what is then the nature of the relation it-

self? It cannot be identical with the terms it relates, since it is introduced on the principle that the two terms really are different. If A and B are different but are bound together by an inseparable relation of inherence, which let us here designate as C, then we cannot logically predicate of C identity with *both* A and B. If C is identical with A, it follows that it is non-identical with B, since B is non-identical with A. If C is identical with B, it follows that it is non-identical with A, since A is non-identical with B. Therefore the possibility of inherence being identical with the terms it relates is ruled out as logically impossible.

This leaves us with the problem of determining the connexion between the relation of inherence itself and the things which it relates. In the absence of identity it is necessary to further assume between inherence and the things related another relation of inherence, thus leading to an infinite regress. If it is argued that the relation of inherence does not lead to such a regress, by the provision that inherence itself has *no* relation with the two terms of the inherence, we are worse off, since the latter become disconnected and talk of a relationship becomes meaningless. (*Vide* Śaṅkara on *Brahma-Sūtra* II. i. 18, for more of his discussion on this point)

Śaṅkara artfully brings out an inconsistency which can be found among the dicta of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: on the one hand the maxim that inherence is the relation which subsists between inseparables (e.g. Praśastapāda's well-known definition in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*), and on the other, the temporal precedence of the cause over the effect. The doctrine of Asatkāryavāda, which is pressed so strongly by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in other contexts, makes much of the latter principle. But this latter principle implies that cause and effect are *not* inseparable, and so the

causal relation cannot be a case of inherence.

This difficulty might be circumvented by refining the definition of the cause/effect relation by showing that inherence refers to *one side* of the causal relation, i.e. the dependency of the effect throughout its existence upon the cause. In this sense it is inseparable from the cause. But then how does the connexion between cause and effect arise in the first place? In order for the connexion to initially take place the effect must already exist, since a connexion cannot occur between two entities one of which is non-existent. If the effect is existent prior to its connexion with the cause, then it is not non-separable from the latter, so again the case for inherence is dealt a blow. (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. ii. 17)

Śaṅkara's detailed criticisms of inherence suggest that it is a basically artificial construction of the intellect. He is naturally disposed to criticize it, since it has pluralist and realist implications. Inherence as an ultimate category of thought, such as it is in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, ensures the principle of differentiation, thus splintering the Advaitic vision of reality for which Śaṅkara's impressive system stands. With great energy he is determined to show by the application of logic itself that inherence is a feeble cover-up of what is essentially a matter of identity.

We come now to Śaṅkara's treatment of Buddhist causal theory. He alleges that a satisfactory Buddhist explanation of causation cannot be put forward owing to the commitment of Buddhist thought to the doctrine of momentariness. According to this view, all that exists does so merely for an instant. Nothing endures beyond a moment, all is in dynamic flux. Permanence is a delusion. All things on analysis prove to exist but momentarily, with no anterior or posterior existence. Śaṅkara

attacks this scheme as making an impossibility of causal relations. How can there be a causal relation between A and B if A is non-existent at the moment that B rises into existence? If at the very instant that the effect comes into being there is no cause, since the latter has already been extinguished, is this not a case of claiming something from nothing? That effects do arise not from anything but from their proper causes is implied in Buddhist teaching itself, e.g. the doctrine that the mind and its modifications arise through four causes (*ālambana*, *samanantara*, *adhipati* and *sahakāri*).

Śaṅkara here places his philosophical adversary in a difficult position, since it has to be shown how there can be a real connexion between cause and effect (which needs to be assumed if the causal concept is to be intelligible), without introducing into the account grounds for assuming a *succession* of moments in the life of the cause. The connexion breaks down if the cause is extinct at the very moment the effect rises into being. If the assumption is to be avoided that effects spring from nothing, the cause has to persist to a point at least simultaneous with the emergence of the effect. This in turn will entail the admission of a succession of moments during the life of the cause, since by general acknowledgment the latter has existence precedent to the rise of the effect.

Śaṅkara surmizes a suggestion by his opponent (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* II. ii. 20) that the entity which precedes the effect is the *cause* of the latter when the former is in the fullness of its momentary existence, thereby avoiding but not solving the dilemma of conceding the rise of effects from causes which are non-existent. If a cause is productive of an effect, such productivity obviously extends beyond the presumably momentary existence of the

cause itself to the moment of the actual emergence of the effect.

If it is maintained that the mere presence or existence of the cause constitutes its causality, without actually imparting anything of itself to the effect, this is alien to the character of material causes. As has been pointed out in this regard, such a conclusion robs us of the perfectly legitimate distinction which there is between material and efficient causes.

Śaṅkara suggests (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. ii. 26) that the Buddhist (in order to preserve his momentariness doctrine) may argue that although on their view the cause, as a momentary phenomenon, is non-existent upon the emergence of the effect, different *types* of non-existence may be postulated to account for specific causal sequences. The difficulty here however is that such differentiation of types of non-existence, having each characteristics of their own, would cease by such distinctive-

ness to be non-entities. Śaṅkara adds that supposing existence could arise out of non-existence, then effects would partake of the latter, which is against the positive character of effects as they are known.

Also, if something could come from nothing, Śaṅkara writes, 'then on the same ground even the indifferent people who are inactive should attain their desired results, for non-existence is clearly evident even there; and so a husbandman who does not engage in cultivation should get his crop, a potter who makes no effort for preparing the clay should get his vessels ready....etc.' (*Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya*, II. ii. 27, Translation by Swami Gambhirananda, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta-14)

Śaṅkara is of course here thinking in terms of efficient causes, for the elementary principle he is backing (i.e. something cannot be derived from nothing) applies in the areas of both material and efficient causes.

EDUCATION AND LIBERTY

PROFESSOR WILLIAM E. HOOKENS

I had seen that book *Education and Liberty* on my shelf but somehow I had no time to go through it; and may be because it was one of the special Student Edition, bound in paper-cover back. But having been in the midst of election and seeing how so many, many people were ignorant on how to use their franchise—I felt it was a colossal waste of votes, time and energy. And yet those who have witnessed the elections or read of them in the papers will see great hopes for the people as much as the country where things went peacefully and which augurs well for our democracy.

Now James Bryant Conant's book *Education and Liberty*, I feel, should be made available to all literate people in the country as much as in the world, for it shows that education not only matters but makes for liberty without which people are lost. Only an American can understand what liberty means, and one has only to read the history of America to know that only the Americans could have made their country represent Liberty, after having gone through travails and cleared the country of all that was undesirable. America three hundred years ago and America today are two different

countries, and there is much that India can learn from this new and progressive country.

Conant's book is not only worth reading, it is worth buying and its cheapness should not put readers off. For there is much by way of statistics that can help this country, which is also large and has large number of people. The book is rightly divided into three parts—'The Anglo-Saxon Tradition', 'The American College' and 'Looking Ahead'. Any book that wants to help India and her people will need to begin with 'India's Tradition', 'The Invaders' and (these can be classified as good or bad, depending on what they did for the country and people), 'Understanding through Education' (where a Conference of the best brains of the country and the world can meet to bring about unity through Education), with the last chapter on 'Tomorrow with Confidence' as far as education and democracy are concerned.

As I pass my eyes through the books on education, I feel what a waste it has been to recommend these books to teachers and students of education who somehow see a great difference between Democratic Britain, America and India. Somehow the Indian student of education would love to see some Great Indian Teacher or some Great Asiatic Teacher in his text book on education, since India and Asia have produced some of the finest teachers without whom the world would have been the poorer. I have hopes that in the near future there will be revised editions of the books I am now mentioning and others as well, with the incorporation of such matter as will make East as much as West understand one another, for there is much in the West that the East wants and very much in the East that the West rightly wants. And I am therefore against those die-hards who

are all for the West without understanding the East and *vice versa*.

Needless to say, we have in the country people who are slavishly imitative of the West and look down on everything Indian or Asiatic; as there are others who look down on everything that is Western and show their approval with everything Indian or Asiatic. India or, for that matter, Asia cannot help wanting things Indian or Asiatic to be incorporated in the Indian or Asiatic scheme of education; but, then, neither India nor Asia can grow in isolation. Somehow East and West have come close to one another and this means that something good must come of this contact, and the sooner the better. For, both the East and the West have problems and it is not so much a question of backward and forward countries as of environmental differences. There is much that the East cannot understand of the West, as there is much of the East that the West cannot understand, and this is not because of prejudice (though it exists in some form or another) but because of the wrong approach to people and countries other than the one seen and which can be remedied by education, as Bacon would have it, namely through reading of books and by travelling...

Here are some of the books I mention on education and without which I would feel myself the poorer:

1. James S. Ross: *Groundwork of Educational Psychology* (Harrap, 1951)
2. Robert R. Rusk: *The Doctrines of The Great Educators* (Macmillan, 1941)
3. Sir Percy Nunn: *Education—Its Data and First Principles* (Arnold 1949)
4. Mary Sturt and E. C. Oakden: *Modern Psychology and Education* (Paul 1944)
5. T. Raymount: *Modern Education—Its Aims and Methods* (Longmans, 1946)
6. Herbert Butterfield: *The Universi-*

ties and Education Today (Paul 1962).

7. William F. Cunningham: *The Pivotal Problems of Education* (Macmillan 1940, NY)

Sir Arthur Mayhew who was for some time the D.P.I. of the Madhya Pradesh thought that education during the British rule was 'soulless', and those interested in the education and the progress of the country will pay attention to this fact of soullessness which has not only crept in to the education of today but which is working havoc in all walks of life.

Mechanistic education has never done any good to any people and merely to industrialize the people without the essential background of culture or respect for human values will mean the creation of robots rather than men and women. Mere knowledge of the three R's is of no avail and mere literacy is not education. And India is certainly not wanting to compete with people of other countries that pretend to be advanced and even cultured. The prestige of a country is to be judged not by the number of people who can read a newspaper or can vote successfully during an election, but by the character of the people as a whole. The impulsiveness of the people of this country will need to be taken into account when formulating a scheme of education; and this would mean that the impulses of the people are canalized in the right directions or in good causes rather than allowed to go waste on the slightest provocation. There are better and more durable things than politics.

What can be said in favour of Britain and her people, for example, is character and sturdy commonsense, and these are a matter of long training or tradition, born of confidence in the people themselves. They do not pretend to be superhuman nor do they pose to have virtues they do not possess, but they are certainly normal to the extent of living for the day and not

burdening themselves with other people's worries or their own. To say that they accept humans as humans is to say the obvious. The colour problem in Britain or America is symptomatic of the misunderstanding that exists between the whites and the coloured people and which, I believe, is beginning to grow—and only education, affection, understanding can solve it.

Education cannot work wonders (though in the hands of right teachers the work can be nothing short of miraculous), and it will take some time before prejudices die down and good habits become the rule. This can also be said of America which is beginning to understand the Negro and sees in him great potentiality for good. Education makes for elevation, for the proper understanding of man as man and the fact that we have Poetry, Religion, Art, History makes it hopeful for all to seek the understanding of man through his soul. This is, I believe, a spiritualizing process which education should undergo, if man is to show himself as man and to bring out his best and like this best in other people of other countries. Character is not only the backbone of a people or nation, but it is life itself.

There is, thus, a great need for the right personnel in all walks of life to help in the progress of the people and the country; and no man is so great or so small that he cannot contribute his mite of good towards the sum total of good for the world. This does not mean that the people of the villages in India need to be told of international understanding or any other thing for that purpose. What the villagers need is a sense of pride in being human beings. This will make education a glorious achievement and human beings will be proud of their country and their culture, wanting to do their best for their country's good rather than emigrating. Rulers with vision help

their people by giving them the best they can by way of good government and opportunities for all on merit-basis. Education and liberty go hand in hand : both entail hard work, but then they are worth it. Civil and global wars can come to an end only through the process of education and fair treatment to all, on the understanding that all must work and none must be idle. Democracy means the

absence of blue blood in any form and, where all are equal (or considered equal), all must work and feel the pride of work. This means dignity in human labour for which the British, Americans and Europeans are so well-known and which the nations of the East need to learn. Prestige must be synonymous with individual effort, or Education and Liberty mean nothing.

EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SET-UP

DR. PARESH NATH MUKHERJEE

The object of this article is to study the problems posed in the field of mass education in India in an objective and detached manner, and see what solutions we can offer.

It is a matter of common experience nowadays that while the student unrest and indisciplines are growing in a rapid manner, educational standards and achievements are going down. There is growing frustration among the educated and, above all, there is no character in most cases among the educated young men and women. All these are very bad and dangerous signs. They indicate that there is something fundamentally wrong in our educational system and in ourselves. Unless we succeed in arresting this deterioration, the future of the country is not bright.

It will also be accepted on all hands that these defects were not to be found in our educational system and students in the past, not very remote. The system of education (whatever might have been its defects) has remained more or less the same. Why is there then this decline? Where should we locate the cause for it?

The cause for it is mass education, which

has led to a considerable degree of vulgarization in education. Formerly students only from aristocratic or higher middle classes used to come to schools, colleges and universities for higher education. They had certain educational background. They were keen for knowledge and education. Also higher education opened greater possibilities for employment then. So, when students were serious, class-room atmosphere was very different. The teachers could impart the best education to their students and feel great pleasure in doing it. Few came for higher education and with great eagerness for it. That was a different age.

With mass literacy and mass education in independent India cropped up new problems. Large numbers of students with hardly any educational background filled the class rooms. With the adoption of the vernaculars as media of instruction it was now possible for students to come for higher education from classes where the capacity or competence to learn or master a foreign language was totally absent. All this incompetence was sought to be justified under the convenient cloak

of patriotism and nationalism. But, then, educational standards gradually went down. It became a serious problem with the old and experienced teachers to teach their students who were both incapable and unwilling to learn. Such things were unimaginable in the past. All this decline has come in the wake of mass education.

All these facts at once pose a very difficult question. If we believe in democracy and want it to succeed and if mass education means a lowering of standards and output then what are we to do? Should we abandon the very idea of mass education? In other words, should we bid good-bye to democracy? For, without mass education democracy is not possible. But we cannot go back to the past. We must have both mass education and democracy and find out a solution that will prevent indiscipline and low standards that seem to be the order of the day. After all there is mass education in England, Russia and other countries that have recorded considerable progress. Why should we then fail to achieve that result?

But we must achieve that result in our own way. This is all the more reasonable if we remember that there was a time when eager students from many countries used to come to India for higher education. Nālandā and Vikramśilā attest to the fact. Why should we then fail to re-establish our leadership in the field of education once again and show that mass education may well be combined with discipline and higher standards? The task is not only not impossible; it is not even so very difficult.

Moreover, we must never forget that in a democratic set-up we have to educate our masters, the masses. Or else, there is the great risk that democracy shall yield ground to some other form of government, which may prove to be dictatorial and tyrannical. Such things happened in

recent history in many countries both in Asia and in Europe. If we allow it to happen in India and in wider areas, that will be the end of all human hopes for a scientific and rational society or what we call nowadays the 'welfare state'. All of us must realize the basic fact that human welfare and progress will be retarded, if democracy fails and whether democracy shall succeed or not will depend on the success or failure of our educational system.

A fundamental mistake in the present system of education is to assume that the same type of education is equally suited to all persons in the society, men and women, artisans and intellectual workers, soldiers and the tillers of the soil. So, while agreeing to the fact that every citizen needs some sort of general education upto a certain standard we strongly insist that there should be different types of education for different classes of citizens. That will not only solve the problem of bread and butter more completely, but also give more meaning to education. Our government has already done something towards this end, but much more remains to be done.

The next thing is that education should not be merely diploma education. If it is merely diploma education, as it is at present mostly, it can never command respect and will be regarded as useless. It is a fact that in many cases the present-day students cannot express their meaning (even where they have a meaning) either by writing or by speech. They are not methodical in their habits nor are they efficient in performance of any duty allotted to them. Punctuality or the value of time is conspicuous by its absence. What then is the value of the diploma of such a student? All this must be changed. Nowadays in a diploma it is written that a student has prosecuted a prescribed course of study

and that on examination he is found worthy of the prescribed standard and is placed in a particular division. In the diploma itself there is nothing to indicate whether he was punctual in classes, whether he was interested in extra-curricular activities, whether his moral character is such as to make him a worthy citizen free from blemish, whether his teachers feel they can recommend him for any office of trust or responsibility and so on. The diploma is thus not a complete picture of the character and capabilities of a candidate.

Then the system of evaluation of the student is wrong. At the end of a long period of study a student's attainments are judged on the basis of a written examination. This is not the surest and most flawless way to find out the real worth of a student. At the time of this crucial written test a student may fall ill just at that time and completely spoil his papers. Or a student who is capable of cramming up a good deal will do surely far better than one who may not have that capacity but may be otherwise far more intelligent and competent. The standards of the different universities differ widely. A talented student may fail to pass an examination in one university, whereas another student who is far inferior in calibre may pass the same examination in a good class from another university where the standard is actually low. The courses prescribed for study in the same standard differ widely from one university to another. For all these reasons our university diplomas are not the true indicators of the real attainments of the students. They, therefore, do not create that atmosphere of confidence as they should.

All these are the defects that we find in the present system of education. But they have been intensified because of the fact that in a democratic society mass education is the aim. Therefore, we hear of

low standards and low achievement.

What then should we do? In a free country where democracy is the accepted doctrine with the vast majority of the people and in the modern age it will not do to think of shutting the doors of higher education to the masses. The masses must be educated and not simply made literate, for in a democratic society it is the masses who rule. No matter how difficult it is to educate the masses we have to do it and there is no escape from it. Moreover, it is highly desirable to educate the masses, for we can never solve all our social problems nor remove the social ills simply by legislation even assuming that our legislators are very efficient. It is an imperative to make a democratic society stable and progressive.

In order to make higher education compatible with democracy, it is therefore necessary to build a comprehensive and co-ordinated system of education right from the nursery to the highest standard. It is also necessary to ensure in it literacy for all and higher education for those whose natural aptitudes and inherent possibilities make them worthy of it. The doors of higher education in a democratic society must not be closed to all such persons on grounds of poverty, birth, caste, creed or race.

But above all in a democratic society it is most necessary to inculcate moral values in every stage of education—from the lowest to the highest standard. Moral values are implicit and indispensable in every system of education, but they are most necessary in the education system of a democratic society. Democracy means government by the masses. The masses must, therefore, be properly educated. Proper education means not simply possessing diplomas. It means the ensurance of those virtues and qualities that increase the moral stature of a man and society.

Without these virtues a democratic society tends to be vulgar and demoralized. It tends to be a mobocracy where irrational violence becomes the order.

The malaise of the present is mainly due to the defects in our educational system, the greatest of them being the lack of emphasis on ethical values in it. In the days of yore when famous persons from different parts of the world used to come to this country for higher studies, the chief excellence of educational system was the development of the personality. Truth, purity, honesty, dutifulness, charity, and all other qualities and values that go to constitute the best character were inculcated in every educational institution or university in all the stages of education. There was discipline and character, because everywhere the teachers insisted on the moral values. Manu's insistence on the famous 'Ten Marks or Essentials of *Dharma*' is a magnificent achievement. These consist of 'fortitude', 'forgiveness', 'self-control', 'abstaining from theft', 'purity of mind and body', 'mastery of the senses', 'a pure intellect, wisdom, truthfulness, and absence of wrath'. (*Manu Samhitā*, VI. 91-92) Manu's greatest social wisdom was uttered when he said, 'Of all the senses (*indriyas*) if one goes wrong that in itself is enough to mislead a person, just as one single hole in a leather

vessel is enough to drain out all its water.' (ibid., II. 99)

Once again we must insist on these virtues and keep them confined not to the few intellectuals, but spread them among the masses, for in a democratic society it is the masses who rule and unless they are disciplined and are of a high moral calibre there is no scope for improvement.

Here it is necessary to remember that a democratic society is intellectual and critical in its outlook, and that it will be too much to expect blind obedience or blind faith in it. So, the ethical values must be co-related with reason and not blind faith. We must realize that religions shorn of their outward ceremonies and formalities (built mostly by the priestly classes for their own ends) have no basic contradiction with reason and reasonability. In fact that is their chief merit and recommendation. So, in a democratic society education must defend itself on grounds of ethics and reasonability. It is not a luxury as it was in other forms of government and polity, but a necessity—nay, a dire necessity. It must produce not just excellent technicians or artisans but competent men of excellent character. This type of the education is the need, if a democratic society is to survive. If we fail to do so, it will give encouragement to violence. And violence means death to all democracies.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IN THIS NUMBER

S. K. Nandi M.A., L.L.B., D.Phil., (Cal), Griffith Scholar (Calcutta University), *Sāhityabhāratī* (Visva-Bharati University) is at present a Senior Research Fellow of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study,

Simla. He was previously the Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Presidency College, Calcutta. Dr. Nandi's present article entitled 'Some Literary Questions Examined' deals with the problems of 'Aesthetic appreciation', a subject on

which he is carrying on his comprehensive research study.

Mr. Max Nolan of Perth, Western Australia, presents here his second article entitled 'Śaṅkara and the Causal Concept (Part-II)'. Our readers may remember that the first section of this series appeared in our November 1967 issue.

Professor William E. Hookens is the Head of the Department of English, Sri

Nilkanteswar Government Post-Graduate College at Khandwa, Madhya Pradesh. In his short article on 'Education and Liberty' Professor Hookens explains that political liberty and education are intimately linked up with each other.

In 'Education in a Democratic Set-up' Paresh Nath Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., Head of the Department of History, D.A.V. College, Dehra Dun gives an objective review of the recent problems of mass education in India.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

YUGANĀYAK VIVEKANANDA (VOL. III).

BY SWAMI GAMBHIRANANDA. Udbodhan Karyalaya, Calcutta. 1967 (Bengali Era 1373). Pages 484. Price Rs. 7.

The volume under review is the third and last in the series. It surveys the last five years of the life and activities of Swami Vivekananda. To write the biography of a God-man like the Swami is extremely difficult. For, he was more than an age or institution. The elusive flame-like human spirit always defies analysis. Swami Vivekananda, who embodied the spirit of the Renaissance of India, has so long eluded the grasp of biographers. Swami Gambhirananda has made a thorough study of all the available materials about Swami Vivekananda and in the three volumes of *Yuganāyak Vivekananda* has done almost an impossible task. Pramatha Nath Basu's *Swami Vivekananda* in Bengali and the *Life of Swami Vivekananda* By His Eastern and Western Disciples in English are admirable indeed. And yet they are incomplete. Readers have long been looking forward to a work like *Yuganāyak Vivekananda*, which does not offer to the public a gilded statue of the patriot-prophet of India, nor does it commemorate him in the sickening Victorian style. It is the most authentic record of the life of Swami Vivekananda, because it is so well-documented. The author is a persistent seeker of truth, and therefore, the divine aura of Swami Vivekananda has not made him blind to his human aspect. The

cardinal mistake of most of existing biographies is that they sought to depict Swami Vivekananda minus his human appeal. Swami Gambhirananda has set down his monumental record from a vast long-gathered archive, documentary and reminiscential. For the first time the reminiscences of Mahendra Nath Dutta, Benishankar Sharma, Sarat Chakraborty, Sister Nivedita and a host of disciples and admirers have been laid under contribution. Browning once asked in one of his poems, 'Have you seen Shelly plain?' Swami Gambhirananda has ably recounted the reminiscences of many persons who have seen Swami Vivekananda plain. Moreover, he has allowed his subject wherever possible to speak in his own voice. Swami Vivekananda, therefore, has not been always apotheosized. He laughed like a child and wept when emotionally wrought. And he always loved even the riff-raff of the society, and therefore, he was divine. Yet these traits are not in conflict with each other. They tend to offer a full-length picture of the Swami and heighten his greatness, for he symbolized all that is good, noble and beautiful, and yet retained all the essential human qualities.

The third volume of *Yuganāyak Vivekananda* dwells at length on Swami Vivekananda's attempt to flood India with religious ideas. 'My whole ambition in life', said the Swami, 'is to set in motion a machinery which will bring noble ideas to the door of everybody.' The present volume seeks to narrate how this ambition was being materi-

alized. He was becoming a voice without a body—a voice that gave a clarion call to India, the sleeping Leviathan to arise and awake and stop not till the goal was reached. The ablest exponent and practitioner of Neo-Vedāntic Positivism, Swami Vivekananda has left an undying legacy, which posterity will not willingly let die.

Swami Gambhirananda deserves congratulation on his achievement. *Yuganāyaka Vivekananda* is an inspiring and ennobling study, and will, I believe, continue to be the standard and authorized biography of Swami Vivekananda for many years to come. It will be a source of edification and spiritual stimulation, for it affirms the dignity of man and the greatness of God.

DR. S. P. SEN GUPTA

THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SISTER NIVEDITA (VOL. I). The Secretary, Sister Nivedita Girls' School, Calcutta, 1967, Pages, 512. Price Rs. 12.

On the tombstone of Sister Nivedita there is an inscription: 'Here reposes one who gave her all to India.' Rabindranath described her as 'Loka Mātā', i.e., the Mother of the people. Sri Aurobindo characterized her as 'Śikhāmoyī',—the living flame. Nivedita, however, chose to call herself the Nivedita of Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda. On the 29th July, 1897 Swami Vivekananda wrote to her:

'Let me tell you frankly that I am now convinced that you have a great future in the work for India. What was wanted was not a man, but a woman; a real lioness to work for the Indians, women specially.

India cannot yet produce great women; she must borrow them from other nations. Your education, sincerity, purity, immense love, determination and above all, the Celtic blood make you just the woman wanted.'

Nivedita heard the call of the Master and gladly responded. In one life she had her rebirth. She became an Indian to the very marrow of her bones. She loved every particle of dust of the land of her choice. Her life was completely dedicated to the cause of India. Unlike the foreign tourists, she did not look merely at the surface; she had the wonderful ability to see the soul of things. Rightly has Rabindranath said, 'She was in fact a Mother of people ... When she uttered the word "our people", the tone of absolute kinship, which struck the ear, was not heard from any

other among us. Whoever has seen what reality there was in her love of the people, has surely understood that we—while giving perhaps our time, our money, even our life—have not been able to give them our heart.' It was this unbounded love for India that was the perennial source of her speeches and writings.

Nearly sixty years have passed since her death. And yet her complete works could not be published so long. Advaita Ashrama and the Udbodhan Office published sixteen books of Nivedita, but most of them are out of print. The letters and speeches had so long escaped the notice of the publishers. Pravrajika Atmaprana has done an admirable job by bringing out the first two volumes of the writings of Nivedita. Two more volumes will soon be published. In the volume under review we have *Our Master and His Message*, *The Master as I saw Him*, *Notes of Some Wanderings with Swami Vivekananda*, *A pilgrim's Diary* and *Kali the Mother*. All her works are lyrical. With the vision of a seer and the language of a poet she has made accessible to the West, the story of the life and message of Swami Vivekananda. She has also recorded her impressions about India and her religion with the zeal of an Indologist. Nivedita has loved and adored India, and yet she is not fanatical. Nivedita's thoughts and ideas are our national heritage. India is spiritually starved today. Our civilization has advanced, but our culture has considerably declined. In this age of our spiritual crisis, Nivedita's writings will have an added significance and serve as a beacon torch to the nation that has like a philistine forsaken God and has chosen to worship Mammon.

DR. S. P. SEN GUPTA

A PANORAMA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. BY R. C. PANDEYA. Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi. 1966. Pages 223. Price Rs. 10.

Indian philosophical systems, as we all know, may be described as *mokṣa-śāstra* or the *science of liberation*. The state of liberation as expounded in Indian philosophical thought, is a state of complete freedom and peace. This state of freedom can be attained through different means and these different means followed by persons of different temperaments have paved the way for different religio-philosophies of India. Since all philosophical systems aim at the same goal, they can very well exist together in peaceful co-existence without coming into conflict with one another.

The author of the book under review Dr.

Pandeya has made a sincere attempt in a lucid style to show that the central idea of Indian philosophy, on the whole, is an investigation into the nature and possibility of freedom and peace. The author asserts that the religio-philosophical systems of India contain thoughts and ideas, which can be collected in a systematic manner to support secularism and democracy.

Foreigners interested in the culture and civilization of ancient India will find the book useful.

DR. ANIMA SEN GUPTA

THE QUEST FOR EDEN. BY ELENA MARIA MARSELLA. Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40 Street, New York 16, N.Y. Pages 275. Price \$ 5.

The book is not one that can be read in a hurry nor is it one that contains smug truths. There will be much that Hindus as much as Muslims, Jews and Christians will want to read and yet all these, including people of other denominations will find that it is exciting as it is provocative. Miss Marsella has not planned to please anybody, least of all herself and hers is therefore the *Quest for Eden* as she would want intelligent persons to seek. Dogmatism is therefore ruled out from her book. No summary of the book is possible and no one would dare to give a gist of the book, for there is much to differentiate between knowledge and understanding. There is so much that people the world over know and yet they do not understand. As Miss Marsella quotes: 'Rarely will two Americans agree on who is immoral or what is the moral thing to do. We are adrift without answers!' (p. 3) Or again as she quotes from a Reverend: 'It seems like a semantic joke to state that today very few theologians teach theology, or even believe in it, save in an extremely theoretical or official way.' (p. 4) Or again as she writes quoting a Red Indian (in chapter three 'The Childhood of Religion'): 'Brother, we do not wish to destroy your religion or take it from you. We only want to enjoy our own.' This is precisely what Miss Marsella sets out to do in her twenty-two chapters to show the continuity of religion dating far back into the dim ages, when man was not without some form of religion or mystic language. The author is no exponent of any one religion nor has she any desire to excite fanaticism, seeing as she does in fanaticism the root of all evil and the destruction of man. No man is on the wrong track nor is anyone, for that matter, on the right track. That we believe we are in the right makes us feel right but mere thinking ourselves right does not solve the problem. The things we learn at school or

in our mother's arms and the things we learn when we grow up are two different experiences. Or as St. Paul said to the Corinthians, 13:11 (and which Miss Marsella quotes): 'When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things.' (p. 11) This the author brings out in the chapter 'The Childhood of Religion'; and we note the opening lines of her chapter: '... there are no false religions—unless a child can be called a false man.' (p. 11) It is this outlook that prompts the author to deal so interestingly on 'Man—the Mongrel' (ch. 2); 'The Chosen People' (ch. 4); 'Dilmun: A Sumerian Eden' (ch. 4); 'Adam, the Tree and the Serpent' (ch. 6); 'The Vindication of Adam' (ch. 7); 'Who was Jesus of Nazareth?' (ch. 8); 'The Magic and Mystery of Numbers' (ch. 9); 'The New Name' (ch. 13); 'The Mystery of Bread and Wine' (ch. 14); 'The Resurrection' (ch. 15) and the Epilogue 'The Gates are Open Wide', followed by Notes which amply indicate the voluminous amount of reading that the author has done to make the *Quest for Eden* no idle one, but a promising one for all. Though one may not agree with all that the author says but there is much that will keep readers thinking—and only the open-minded can read this book with profit. For others who see in their own religion the quest for Eden there is nothing to be dismayed about. For to all is given the kingdom of Heaven. What the Pharisees and Sadducees could not understand in Christ was His mystic allusion to food which the literal-minded Jews failed to understand. And they certainly could not place Christ as God and therefore Christ became a victim to the misunderstanding of the Jews. But today all is changed and even the present Pope sees in the Jews no longer enemies of Christ, or Christians. Resentment, hatred, envy do not do any one good and the wholesale murder of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis was probably motivated by the hereditary hatred for the crucifier of Christ who was God and Man. No one is good and the saying of Christ is: 'Call no man good but only He Who is God.' (sic) Christians will see in the chapters pertaining to Christ much that is unorthodox, and so will the exponents of other religions whose customs or rites the author refers to in her book; but then there is no denying sense to what the author says or quotes:

'Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.' (St. John, 3:3) p. 163. For, as Jesus told Nicodemus: 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.'

This is a book that has its gates wide open for all—but they must be born anew to taste the life eternal. For those who are on the mundane level there will be much that will be unintelligible. What is the Resurrection? And are we again (after death) as we were, or do we undergo a change or transformation? The author not only takes the best of all religions but what is more, sees in all the quest for Eden in some form or another. What is symbolism, and is it something that only the moderns know about, or is it something as old as man, as old as the prayers and psalms that are 'intoned today in thousands of temples, mosques and churches all over the globe' and which had 'their genesis in Mesopotamia more than five thousand years ago?' The author's thesis that the Sumerian civilization (and not Moses) taught the Hebrews all that they knew and practised is exciting. The author as well as the publisher needs to be congratulated on this intellectual treasure.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM E. HOOKENS

A HUMANIST'S VIEW OF RELIGION. By SONYA BIERSTED. Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40 Street, New York. 1966. Pages 151. Price \$4.50.

Starting with an Introduction running over thirty pages the book has ten chapters dealing with the Ten Commandments in a critical and novel way. Organized Church, religion, and their dogmas have come in for sharp attack. 'The entire Christian structure is raised on the doctrines of men sans Truth'. (page 3) The writer does not believe in 'an orthodox God'. (page 4) She is against the 'historical Jesus Christ' (page 9) and the 'Catholic-Christian mind' which 'is bound in dogma from which it

is forbidden to deviate'. (page 11) 'Organized religion is on every side of evil, but far removed from God'. (page 13)

She then shows how the Ten Commands are flouted, most of all by the orthodox Christians. Christian nations have 'lived for centuries on Eastern nations' uncultivated resources' contrary to the Commandment, 'Thou shall not covet'. (page 148) Contrary to the Commandment 'Thou shall not kill', the Christian nations have sanctioned massacre of women, children and men.

Even though it is certain that all readers shall not agree with all the points or statements in this book, no reasonable man or woman can possibly differ from the concluding paragraph, 'Jesus-Christ-God-Truth, the one whole, is crucified daily around the clock in the very same manner as religion is practised in all other pagan cultures world-wide'.

The book is a sharp reminder to the many savageries and brutalities committed in history by organized Church not only in Christendom but in other Churches as well. Under the saintly emperor Marcus Aurelius, Saints Blandine and Pothin were outrageously tortured before being put to death in Lyon; ironically enough in 1022 A.D. Robert the Pious decided that heretics should be burnt and the Inquisition disgraced the Christian Church far more completely than its worst enemy could possibly do. So, Augustus Comte wanted to replace the old religions by *Religion de l'Humanité* and Louis Blanc saw in the true Christ *le sublime maitre des socialistes*.

With bibliography and proper indexing this critical and thought-provoking book based on a very thorough study of the scriptures must be considered as a valuable addition and a contribution in the field of knowledge.

DR. P. N. MUKHERJEE

NEWS AND REPORTS

**RAMAKRISHNA MISSION SARADAPITHA
BELUR, HOWRAH
REPORT FROM 1961 TO 1966**

This branch of the Ramakrishna Mission, situated quite adjacent to the Headquarters at Belur, is engaged mainly in the field of education. The centre was started in 1941 to give practical shape to the educational ideas of Swami Vivekananda. All the different institutions of the centre con-

tinued to function efficiently during the period under review. Their activities were as follows:

Vidyamandira: Originally an Intermediate College, the Vidyamandira was upgraded into a three-year degree course with effect from July 1960. The Silver Jubilee of this College was celebrated in 1966. Under the supervision of the monastic inmates the students got ample opportunities to develop their all round personality through regular course of study, work, prayer, literary activities,

games and sports and other co-curricular activities. Poor brilliant students enjoyed financial help to prosecute their studies in this College. The last batch of the I.A. and I.Sc. students numbering 101 appeared in the University Examination in 1961. Out of 100 boys who came out successful, 89 were in 1st division securing 1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th, 9th, and 10th places and seven 1st grade senior scholarships. Details relating to the roll strength, result etc. of the College during the last few years were the following:

	1962-63	1963-64	1964-65	1965-66
Students on the rolls	258	265	245	281
Number of students appeared in the Final Part II University Examination	35	86	71	56
Number of successful candidates	31	70	65	48
Number of First class Honours secured	4	3	2	2

Shilpamandira: This Polytechnic offers three-year course in Civil, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering and it has got hostel accommodation for a limited number of students. There were 527, 545, 622 and 616 students during the years 1961-62, 1963-64, 1964-65, and 1965-66 respectively. All along, the institution maintained high percentage of success in the Licentiate Examinations and secured a good number of first classes almost every year. In 1961-62 one boy stood first class first in L.E.E.

Shilpayatan: This free Junior Technical School started functioning from January 1963 with 68 boys on its rolls. In 1965-66 all the 14 candidates came out successful 13 out of them securing 1st division.

Shilpavidyalaya: Free trade courses such as Electrical Wiring, Electroplating, Auto-Mechanics, Welding, Turning, Fitting, Carpentry, Weaving, Tailoring etc. ranging from one to three years of durations were imparted to deserving students. There were 76, 84, and 89 students on the rolls during the years 1963-64, 1964-65, and 1965-66 respectively.

Research and Production Section: Different types of gas-plants, small machines, electric-clocks, Roota-type positive blowers came to be devised

and manufactured by this section. A number of gas-plants were installed in West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The products of the section as well as those of Shilpavidyalaya and the publications of Ramakrishna Math and Mission in different languages were sold through its sales department.

Janasikshamandira: This section conducted regular programmes of service and mass education in the rural and urban areas. 234 adults of industrial and rural areas received their education in its six night schools. Poor boys were given coaching facilities and the text book library served their needs. In its free Library there were 16,006 books and the issues through its four mobile units were 20,591. 116 films and a number of slide shows were exhibited through its Audio-Visual unit and the shows were attended by 64,670 people. Nearly 200 children were served daily with free nutritious tiffin. Through its 39 rural centres UNICEF milk was served to 6,400 beneficiaries comprising destitute children and under-nourished mothers. The youths of the areas were attracted through its various educational, cultural and recreational activities.

Social Education Organizers' Training Centre: Social Education workers of different states were trained in various aspects of social service and community development by this institution. *Vikās Melās* were organized every year in Bargachia (Howrah), a rural area, to encourage the agriculturists and industrialists. These were visited by thousands of people from various surrounding villages, and prizes were awarded for the best exhibits in the *Melās*.

Sikshanamandira: This residential B.T. College started in the year 1958 with the help of the West Bengal Government remained engaged in training teachers. There were 109, 120, 128, 127, 124, and 125 trainees during the years 1960-61, 1961-62, 1962-63, 1963-64, 1964-65 and 1965-66 respectively. The results in the University Examinations were all along brilliant. The construction of a three-storied hostel building was taken up during 1966.

Some important publications were brought out by this centre during this period. The Photography and Film department and the Dairy and the Agricultural wings functioned efficiently.

During the year 1963-64 all the sections of this centre celebrated the Birth Centenary of Swami Vivekananda in a fitting manner.